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ABSTRACT
This work is an exercise in practical comparative 
law. It examines how justice is administered in a unitary 
State with two extraneous legal systems, the common law and 
the civil law. The whole work is divided into six main parts. 
Part One explores the phenomenon of law in pre-colonial 
societies and explains how Cameroon came to have two extraneous 
legal systems. The German, French and British systems of 
colonial justice in Cameroon are critically discussed in Part 
Two. Part Three takes the machinery of justice as its focus 
of inquiry. It begins with a survey of the constitutional 
setting and them proceeds to deal with the courts system and the 
outward manifestation of the legal order - the magistracy and 
the legal profession. Part Five treats the administration of 
criminal and military justice while Part. Four concentrates on 
those branches of the civil law on which there is now a common 
substantive law and procedure, namely, labour law, le contentieux 
administratif, and customary law. Part Six rounds off this 
study with an examination of a number of topical issues - human 
rights, law reform, legal education, and the cost of justice.
The entire thesis runs to twenty chapters. Style and treatment 
have not been the same in all of them. Nor has an attempt been 
made to give equal space and attention to each part or chapter - 
as if one were dividing an academic cake into symmetrical slices. 
There are topics which call for and have received more detailed 
analysis than others.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Republic of Cameroon is not only a 
language but also a law laboratory. Here is a unitary 
republic consisting of an amalgamation of an English-and 
a French-speaking territory. It has two official lan- 
guates, English and French (the government has no policy 
with regards to indigenous languages). It has a single 
legislative body (a 120-member National Assembly) in which 
English- and French-speaking parliamentarians sit. It 
is in essence a bi-jural state and also a country where 
one encounters conflicts of legal ideas. Official policy 
towards customary law is nonchalant, if not negative.
So, although millions of Cameroonians are, in matters of 
marriage and inheritance, governed by traditional law, 
the common law and the civil law remain the manifest bases 
of Cameroon's national legal systems. Each of these two 
legal systems operates in a well-defined geographical area; 
the common law in the English-speaking part and the civil 
law in the French-speaking part. But there is a constant 
interplay of the two systems. Thus, Cameroon has a single 
bar, judiciary, courts system, supreme Court, a number of 
bi-jural and bilingual codes (Labour Code, Penal Code, 
Criminal Procedure Code) in force in both parts of the 
country, and an active law reform programme geared towards 
a synthetic legal system. Nor does Cameroon's distinctive­
ness ends there. Most judges, advocates and state prose­
cutors in Cameroon have had their legal education and
forensic training either exclusively under the common law 
system or exclusively under the civil law system. Fur­
thermore, at the Supreme Court civil-law trained judges 
and their common-law trained brothers sit together.
Also, advocates- schooled in one legal system hold briefs 
for clients in courts operating under the other legal 
system. The situation is something like English barristers 
appearing in French courts and French advocats-defenseur 
appearing in English courts. All this is the more intri­
guing when one bears in mind that the vast majority of 
advocates and judicial and legal officers in Cameroon are 
both mono-lingual and mono-jural.
For the legal researcher therefore, especially 
if he is interested in comparative studies, Cameroon pro­
vides a very fertile, fascinating and compelling field 
for research and a fruitful arena for a great deal of 
comparative legal activity.
*
Cameroon is however not the only bi-jural country 
in the world. Other bi-jural jurisdictions certainly 
exist. But they fall in a different category of theirs. 
Take the United States of America. Louisiana is a civil- 
law jurisdiction. However, Louisiana is a lonely exception 
among the American States as all others are common-law 
jurisdictions. Besides, in Louisiana one finds a situation
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where a foreign law (French law) is being administered in 
English.
In Canada, French-derived laws apply in the 
minority French-speaking province of Quebec. The rest of 
Canada is English-speaking and a common law jurisdiction.
No attempt has ever been made to unify the laws in both 
parts of the country. Hence in Canada neither the common 
law nor the civil law has had any influence whatsoever on the 
other.
Turning to Britain one finds that the law in 
Scotland (akin to French law), is different from that in 
the rest of the country. But Scotland and the rest of 
Britain share a common language (legal terminology is how­
ever not the same in both parts of the country), a common 
Court of Appeal, and a common legislative assembly (West­
minster Parliament). Moreover, Scotland has never had a 
code and it is doubtful how much that is Scottish law 
shall be retained by the Scottish law reform commission.
Only in the Republic of South Africa does one 
encounter a situation close to that in Cameroon, although 
not exactly on all fours with it. South Africa has one body 
of law, a synthesis of the common law and Roman-Dutch law, 
administered in two different languages, English and 
Afrikaans. However, there are no two distinct law districts 
in South Africa as there are in Cameroon.
The situation which obtains in Cameroon is there­
fore a unique one and that is why Cameroon remains a com­
pelling field for study.
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Cameroon is a triangle-shaped medium-size 
African state of 71 million inhabitants (average annual 
birth rate is 40£ and death rate is 22%0) wedged between 
West and Central Africa and covering an area of 475,442 sq. 
km. (183,569 sq. miles). It is bordered by the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Southwest, Nigeria to the Northwest, Chad 
to the Northeast, the Central African Empire to the East, 
Congo to the Southeast, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea to 
the South. Ethno-linguistically, Cameroon is a racial
crossroads and a tower of Babel. It is composed of more 
than 200.different ethnic groups, each speaking its own 
tongue. It is the confluence of the three principal 
African races, namely, the Nigritic peoples from the Guinea 
coast, the Western Sudanic peoples from North Africa, and 
the Bantu from Southern Africa. The oldest inhabitants 
of the territory are however the pygmies who are found in 
the Southeastern forests. They have been hunters and food 
gatherers for hundreds of years and live in small hunting 
bands.
Of Cameroon’s 75 million inhabitants, about half 
the population adheres to traditional beliefs while the 
other half is made up of Roman Catholics, Protestants and 
Muslims - about a million adherants in each group. Douala 
(roughly 500,000 inhabitants), Yaounde (approximately 
300,000 inhabitants), Nkongsamba, Kumba, Bamenda, Poumban, 
Bafoussam, Garoua, Maroua and Victoria are the principal 
towns of the country. The national economy is basically
agricultural and is dominated, by French financial insti­
tutions and banking houses. Cameroon falls within the 
communaute financiere africaine (C.F.A.) franc zone.
The cfa franc is tied to the French franc at the fixed 
exchange rate of 50 francs cfa to 1 French franc.
Cameroon underwent a triple colonial experience - 
German, English and French. During the German colonial 
period (1884 - 1916), German was the official language 
and German laws applied as the general law of the colony.
In 1916 the territory was wrested from the Germans by the 
British and the French who proceeded to partition it, the 
French making away with the lion’s share. German and 
German laws were replaced, in the British sphere of the 
territory, by English and English-derived laws and, in the 
French sphere, by French and French-derived laws.
In i960 the French Cameroun, by far bigger in 
size and population than the British Cameroons, became 
independent and in 1961 united with the southern half of 
the British Cameroons (the northern half was incorporated 
into Nigeria) to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon.
The young Republic inherited two extraneous legal systems 
(the common law and the civil law) and two official lan­
guages (French and English). In 1972 Cameroon adopted 
a new constitution under which it became a highly centralised 
unitary republic. Politically, Cameroon is a conservative 
de facto one-party State. French influence is very strong 
in the country. No field of activity has escaped this 
influence. This has led to a swallow-up phobia among the
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minority English-speaking Cameroonians and to great anxieties 
about the ever increasing ’French connection’ in the country. 
Officially however, French and English are on an equal 
footing. So too the common law and the civil law.
*
This treatise is an essay in practical compara­
tive law.. The author has been concerned (i) to identify 
the common-law and the civil-law systems as they operate 
in Cameroon, (ii) to ascertain how far they differ (if 
at all) from their parent systems, (iii)'to assess the 
extent of the interaction between the two systems, and 
(iv) to detect the direction towards which things are 
moving. All the available material bearing on the subject 
has been assembled, weighed and assessed as objectively 
as possible. As there is a dearth of literature on the 
subject the bulk of the information has come from statutes, 
interviews, personal observations and experiences. Twelve 
months were spent in Cameroon doing field work. Through­
out this work the emphasis is on the courts and the reality 
of the law in action. The thesis is descriptive, ana­
lytical and critical. It is divided into six main parts, 
each part into chapters and each chapter into sections 
and sub-sections.
Part I, entitled ’Origin of the dual legal system’, 
opens with a discussion on the phenomenon of law in pre­
colonial African (and Cameroonian) societies and then goes
on to explain how Cameroon came to have two extraneous 
legal systems. Part II focuses on ’Colonial justice in 
Cameroon'. It deals with a period when the foundations 
of Cameroon’s judicial and legal systems were laid. 
Although innovatory legislation has since independence 
been introduced here and there by the national government 
most laws in Cameroon bear the marks of their colonial 
origins.
Part III concentrates on 'The machinery of 
justice’. It is a crucial part of the work because 
the administration of justice can only be done through 
courts set up for that purpose. Here one begins to see 
the interplay of the common law and the civil law systems 
in Cameroon. The courts system inherited at independence 
has been altered, unified and simplified. Customary 
courts have been removed from the courts system. The 
writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and the order 
of prohibition hitherto applicable only in Anglophone 
Cameroon have been extended to the Francophone part of 
the country. At the Supreme Court cassation and renvoi 
apply also to cases originating from Anglophone courts. 
Whereas the Cameroonian magistracy is faithfully patterned 
on the French model, the Bar reflects influences from both 
the English and the French Bar. Generally, Cameroonian 
judges and advocates take a rather cavalier attitude to­
wards the problem of law in a developing country. Apart 
from a few, most of them show little creativity, broad­
mindedness and boldness. They shy away from any form of
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academic exercise. There is need for a strong, able 
and fearless Bar and an independent, incorruptible and 
fearless magistracy. It is the contention of this writer 
that in a one-party state membership of the Party (as 
opposed to engaging in open party activity) is not neces­
sarily incompatible with judicial fearlessness and inde­
pendence .
The comparative method is a powerful tool for 
the analysis and understanding of legal systems. So in 
dealing with the criminal and the civil law the comparative 
approach is often resorted to whenever it is thought that 
this will illuminate the issues or point a parallel or 
divergence in the familiar fields of English or French laws. 
Part IV deals with three disciplines - customary law, labour 
law and administrative litigation. Official policy 
suggests a relentless move in the direction of abolition 
(at least on paper) of customary law. It is however sub­
mitted that such an abolition is neither feasible nor 
desirable.
Labour law is governed by the Labour Code which 
drew heavily from the old French Code du Travail d ’Outre- 
Mer of 1952. Only in the area of trade union law has 
the Code drawn from the law in Anglophone Cameroon. Due 
to lack of an adequate machinery for enforcement and lack 
of workers' education on the subject, much of the law 
relating to contracts of employment, payment of wages and 
working conditions are in practice disregarded. Further­
more, the Code itself does not deal with the issues of
9.
industrial accidents and occupational diseases. These 
matters are, oddly enough, dealt with only in a separate 
law - Law No. 68/LF/18 of 18 November 1968. Finally, 
Cameroon labour law has not been placed entirely within 
the matrix of contract law but wedged between the criminal 
law and the law of contract. The Labour Code attaches 
penal consequences to breaches of certain of its provisions. 
Thus any employer who pays his employee less than the 
minimum guaranteed wage may be sentenced to pay a fine of 
up to 100,000 francs. In fact in the case of breach of 
certain other provisions the sentence may be up to two 
years' imprisonment.
The law on administrative litigation in Cameroon 
is practically nothing more than a re-statement of French 
law on the subject. French literature and case-law on 
the subject still carry much weight in Cameroon. This is 
partly due to the paucity of Cameroonian literature and 
case-law on the subject. The extension of administrative 
law on the French pattern to the common-law part of Cameroon 
is another fascinating aspect of Cameroon’s legal system.
In the criminal law area synthesization of the 
common law and the civil law has been achieved. The Penal 
Code and the Criminal Procedure Code are both bi-jural and 
bilingual and the criminal procedure may be described as 
a mixed system. It may however be noted that the civil 
law system has come out on top in parts dealing with pre­
trial procedures (police powers, state prosecutor's
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powers) while in the parts on trial procedures the common 
law system has come out on top.
The Cameroonian penal system is progressive on 
paper but leaves much to be desired in practice. The 
purpose of the prisons system need not be wholly punitive. 
Humanitarian considerations should be paramount. In 
other words, the emphasis should be on reforming the offen­
der and helping him through consistent work and education 
to regain his self-respect. It is proper that prisoners
should be obliged to work. But while serving their sen­
tences prisoners ought to be given compulsory education 
and vocational training that will fit them to take their 
place in society and normal work. Schooling is in fact 
an important means of reforming law-breakers, particularly 
those anxious to atone for their past. Tuition in prison 
sets prisoners on the road of honest work and often gives 
them a taste for further education which they pursue on 
their release. Home visits should be experimentally 
introduced for prisoners with a record of good conduct.
Only hardened criminals deserve the strictest discipline. 
The law should explicitly guarantee and stipulate the 
rights of convicted persons. These rights should be made 
known to every prisoner at the time of his admission into 
prison. It should be the duty of the local State Prose­
cutor to supervise the observance of these rights.
Military law in Cameroon is another discipline 
where the law is almost entirely French. The military
tradition in Cameroon is French and the Cameroonian army 
is a French-monolingual institution. One thing which 
strikes anyone groomed in the common law system is that 
military courts in Cameroon exercise jurisdiction not only 
over soldiers but over civilians as well. However, mili­
tary law in Cameroon has not completely escaped some amount 
of common law influence. Thus, cross-examination is 
allowed in military courts.
The last part of this twenty-chapter thesis is 
headed TEnvoi’ and deals with human rights, legal education, 
the cost of justice, and law reform in Cameroon. Law 
reform in Cameroon' is carried out through ad hoc law 
reform commissions (consisting of part-time members) set 
up from time to time to codify a given area of the law,
This is the typical method of law reform in civil law 
jurisdictions. It is cheaper and particularly suitable 
for a country like Cameroon that suffers from a shortage 
of qualified law personnel. In common law jurisdictions 
however law reform is approached through a permanent law 
reform commission (consisting of full-time members) set up 
to deal with the whole of the law.
The absence of law reporting and the unavailability 
of laws and legal literature remains a perennial problem in 
Cameroon. So too is the poor quality of legal draftsman­
ship and translation. It is strongly suggested that all 
laws should be drafted and .passed in French and English,
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both versions being of the same validity. Laws should 
not be drafted in French and then merely translated into 
English. There is also a pressing need for bi-jural/ 
bilingual law reports. A law reporting council should 
be set up to report decisions of the Supreme Court and 
Courts of Appeal. Such a council should be attached to 
the Ministry of Justice and funded by it. There is also 
a need for a closer relationship (at the moment nonexistent) 
between law teachers, members of the magistracy and the Bar. 
This could take the form of occasional seminars or confer­
ences at which all three participate. This will foster 
an esprit de corps among Cameroonian jurists of various 
fields of activity and provide an avenue for the exchange 
of ideas and experiences.
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PART ONE
ORIGIN OF THE DUAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN CAMEROON
This Part seeks to show how Cameroon came to 
acquire two extraneous legal systems. As the answer 
evidently lies in her colonial history, Chapter two gives 
a historical account of how Cameroon came to be annexed by 
the Germans and later occupied by the French and the 
British, and demonstrates that the international tutelage 
Agreements for Cameroon gave Britain and France legal 
licence to introduce their laws into Cameroon. The 
general question whether pre-colonial societies in Africa 
south of the Sahara had laws and a legal machinery is 
disposed of, with particular reference to Cameroon, in 
Chapter one.
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CHAPTER ONE
JUSTICE IN PRE-COLONIAL CAMEROONIAN SOCIETIES
Before focusing attention on the position as 
it was in those societies which subsequently constituted 
the entity known today as Cameroon, the position as it 
was in Black Africa as a whole will be discussed in the 
broadest outline.
I . The Phenomenon of Law in Pre-colonial African Societies
The ascertainment of law in' pre-colonial societies 
in Africa South of the Sahara presents some difficulties. 
Writing was either unknown or still very rudimentary and 
this is why the people of that time left no records.
Partly because of this hiatus the phenomenon of law in 
pre-colonial African societies was often given a cavalier 
treatment by some researchers who claimed that these 
societies had no law but simply customs rooted in taboos 
and magico-religious practices.
1. The controversy
The question has often been raised whether pre­
colonial African societies had laws which regulated their 
affairs. This is the familiar quarrel among lawyers and 
anthropologists as to whether so-called primitive societies
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had law. A great deal of heat has gone into it. On
the one hand, there are those who strongly argue that law
did exist in those societies.1 . On the other hand there
2
are those who strenuously deny its existence there.
Their denial is based on the questionable claim that those 
societies had no legislature, courts, or police force.
It is argued that those societies had neither structures 
for formal legislation nor for judicial decisions nor law 
enforcement officers of any kind. Only grudgingly is it 
conceded that these societies had at least some *lawstuff*. 
Even then, it is further claimed that modern jurists have 
tended to exaggerate the significance of this 1lawstuff* 
and "have added to this exaggeration by excessive use of 
the concepts of modern legal analysis whether as descriptive
3
aids or for jural evaluation".
There are basically two main reasons for the 
cavalier treatment of law in pre-colonial African societies. 
First, there was li.-.ited amount of material available on 
the subject. Besides, such literature on African law as 
there was had been written predominantly by non-jurists,
1. Cf. T.O. Elias, The nature of African customary law, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1956; iYL 
Gluckman, Judicial Procedure among the Barotse of Northern 
Rhodesia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1955.
2. E.A. Hoebel, The law of primitive man. Harvard University 
Press, 1964; Middleton & Tait, Tribes without rulers,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 195 6; G~. Sawer, Law
in Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965, 
chapter 3.
3. Sawer, op.cit., p. 43.
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particularly anthropologists and ethnographers, using the 
tools of their discipline to investigate the phenomenon 
of law in Africa. Such explorations often led to a pro­
pagation of mutilated and confused exposition which for­
tunately has now been rectified and clarified with the
4tools of informed African jurisprudence. Secondly, law 
in pre-colonial African societies apparently did not fit 
into the Austinian theory of law as a command imposed 
upon society by the sovereign ruler of a state, "an omni­
potent authority standing high above society, and issuing 
downwards its behest". Classical Austinian theory links 
the existence of law to the emergence of a state; no 
state, no law. As societies in Africa were seen only in 
terms of ethnic groups and tribes they were characterised 
as ’stateless' and being’stateless’ they were said to have
g
no law. This doctrine is now exploded. States and even 
empires did exist in Black Africa even before European
7
colonisation. Besides, it is a mistake to link the
phenomenon of law with the notion of sovereign state.
What else is a state but a form of political society? It
4. A.K. Mensah-Brown, Introduction to law in contemporary 
Africa, Conch, New York, 1976, p . 22.
5. C.K. Allen, Law in the making, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
7th ed., 1964, p. 1.
6. Cf. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1940.
7. P.P. Gonidec, Les droits africains - evolution et sources, 
2e ed. , L. G . D . J . , Paris , 1976, p. T~.
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is certainly the best integrated form of society but all 
the same a political society fundamentally like others, 
simply une esp£ce dans le genre. In approaching the 
phenomenon of law as a social fact, one must eschew dog­
matism and any philosophical prise de position.
However, the controversy over the existence or 
not of law. in pre-colonial African societies is today 
largely ddpass£ because the theory denying the existence 
of law in those societies has been debunked by in depth 
analyses of scholars steeped in African jurisprudence.
An eminent authority on African law has asserted that 
"Before the arrival of the British or other European colo­
nisers, indigenous legal institutions were everywhere found. 
These institutions were for the most part customary in 
origin and type, though there was a certain amount of 
legislated law in the centralised monarchies, and Islamic 
personal and public law was applied in varying degrees in 
those areas where a large part of the population was Muslim,
Q
or the rulers belonged to the Islamic faith." Besides, 
the fact is often overlooked that the controversy arises
Q
because there are various theories of law. Law may be 
defined in general terms simply as any rule of human con­
duct which is regarded as obligatory in any society. So 
defined, law exists in any given society for, all societies
8. A.N. Allott, New essays in African law, Butterworths, 
London, 1970, p. 10.
9. Cf. R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence, 3rd ed., Butterworths, 
London, 1970, chapters 14-20; Elias, op.cit., chapter
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have compulsory rules of conduct. These rules of conduct 
may be labelled by some as mere customs. But customs 
that are fixed and generally obeyed are indistinguishable 
from laws. If'law, as Savigny points out, is the mani­
festation of the common consciousness of the people (the 
volksgeist), then what else is custom but the volksgeist.
Law may also be defined in narrow legalistic terms to 
embrace the idea of a court, legislation and police force: 
law is the social control through the systematic appli­
cation of the force of politically organised society. A
denial of the existence of law in pre-colonial African 
societies even on the basis of this narrow definition will 
be "an overstatement, because it does not only ignore the 
village councils which hold regularly to adjudicate on 
matters affecting the inhabitants and to enforce such 
decisions through the instrumentality of secret societies 
like the nqumba society, but places too much reliance on 
the fact that law is only obeyed because of the fear of 
force - a fact which most psychologists dealing with the 
problem of obedience to law will take issue with".^
Since research on the phenomenon of law in pre­
colonial African societies has been carried out during or 
after the colonial period, it may be suspected that the 
results obtained reflect the image of an African law already 
distorted by European influence. It is submitted that this 
is not necessarily the case. In many parts of Africa
10. J.N. Monie, 'The place of customary law in modern
Africa’, Ann. Fac. de Droit du Cameroun, No. 3, 1972,
p. 66.
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there were and there are still communities in which the 
mode of life of the people and system of social organisation 
remains unsullied by European influence. Furthermore, 
serious research by well-informed investigators during 
the early hours of European colonisation ought to give a 
fairly accurate picture of the phenomenon of law in areas 
covered immediately before colonisation.
2. The nature of indigenous African law
Law in pre-colonial African societies was 
derived from custom, that is, ancient usages and obser­
vances (sometimes rooted in divine beliefs) so generally 
accepted and practised by the people that they have formed 
a body of standardised patterns of behaviour and acquired 
the force of law. This custom was however not static.
It was dynamic and evolutionary. "Human society is a 
dynamic-evolutionary entity, the dynamism of which is con­
stantly being actuated by the historical and contemporary 
inputs of change. From this dynamic-evolutionary concept 
of society, it follows that change is a significant feature 
of every society. Also, since law is an integral part of 
a people’s cultural fabric making up the society, it goes 
without saying that legal change cannot be divorced from 
societal c h a n g e A l t h o u g h  inadequately organised, custom 
was backed up by some coercive sanction. The nature of the
11. Mensah-Brown, op.cit., p. 22.
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sanction itself reflected the type of political organi­
sation attained by the traditional polity - centralised or 
acephalous.
Given its predominantly illiterate environment,
indigenous law was generally an unwritten law; it was an
oral law. French writers on African law speak of 1'oralite
juridique and stress that it is the fundamental character-
12istic of African law. Early investigators had tended to
regard the unwritten nature of African law as a negative 
rather than a positive trait. It was argued, to some 
extent correctly, that because it was unwritten indigenous 
law was vague and difficult to ascertain as people were 
wont to differ in their interpretation or recollection of 
events or traditions. But this does not entirely corres­
pond with lived realities. The argument tends to substi­
tute appearance for reality.
Another characteristic of indigenous law is 
that it contained legislative enactments. This was true 
of both centralised and acephalous polities. The chief or 
council of elders made decrees for better conduct of tribal
affairs or to abolish old usages which the tribe had out- 
13grown. These enactments, for the most part straight­
12. E. Le Roy, 'Justice africaine et oralite juridique',
I.F.A.N., No. 3, juillet 197^, p. 566: "L'oralite 
juridique est le caractere fondamental qui permet de 
degager la logique propre des syst^mesjuridiques et 
judiciaires autochtones". See also Michel Bechelet, 
Systemes fonciers et reformes agraires en afrique 
noire, L . G . D . J . , Paris , 196b, p. 93; H"! Des champs ,
L 1Afrique noire pre-coloniale, P.U.F., 1962; P.F. 
Gonidec, op.cit.
13* E.N. Kwayeb, Les institutions de droit public du pays 
Bamileke - evolution et regime actuel, L.G.D.J., Paris, 
i960, pp. 27-28; H  Schaoera, A handbook of Tswana law 
and custom, 2nd ed., O.U.P., 1959 5 p7
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forward prohibitions or injunctions, usually presented no
complication in wording and content and were consequently
not easily forgotten. They were indeed ’masterpieces of
14simple and general drafting’.
In Africa, there were (and there still are) geo­
graphical varieties and wide differences and variations of 
habit, economic activities, social and political organi­
sation, ideas, language, and peoples. Since law is 
influenced by a people’s culture and socio-politico-economic 
organisation, diversity in these aspects meant some diver­
sity also in the indigenous law that obtained in Africa.
But there was a certain unity in this diversity. Besides, 
one should not over-emphasize the differences that existed 
in the law because a certain measure of basic uniformity of 
content did and does exist over a considerable range of 
matters. It is possible to classify traditional law into 
categories (law of property, succession, wrongs, marriage, 
and so on) and to identify similarities of principles in 
the different systems of law. ’’For comparative and related 
studies, therefore, it is possible to group together dif­
ferent phenomena of law which are found in these societies 
under a collection of rubrics. In this way, one can re­
duce the degree of diversity that exists between the various 
socio-legal systems, without necessarily minimizing the lack
14. Gluckman, op.cit., p. 249. Schapera, op.cit., at 
page 4l, asserts that this type of legislation was 
very marginal and inconspicuous, the chief being more 
concerned to maintain the existing law than to alter 
it.
ISof uniformity which is still very great."
Indigenous law distinguished between substantive 
and procedural law and also between norms which had the 
quality of ’lawness1 and those which had not. In other 
words, a distinction existed between those norms compliance 
with which was obligatory on members of the community 
and those which were just matters of social observance 
not touching upon any important aspect of life of the com­
munity and as to which the individual could afford to be 
indifferent.
II. The Structure and Content of Cameroonian Native Law
There are variations in the structure and content 
of legal and judicial systems between societies with dif­
fering political, social, cultural and economic struc­
tures. Cameroon is made up of differing traditional 
societies each with its own laws. That being the case one 
should perhaps speak of Cameroonian native (or traditional 
or indigenous) laws and not law. However, such differences 
as exist between the various Cameroonian societies are not 
as big or important as may at first sight seem. Cameroon 
is a country with a heterogenous mixture of several petty 
tribes or societies, none of which is either wholly centra­
lised (that is, one having a strong monarchical government),
15. Mensah-Brown, op.cit., p. 27; see also, Allott, 
op . cit., p . 10.
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acephalous (one having a gerontocratlc government), or
segmentary (that Is, one In which there is a kind of
'anarchy’, each' family head exercising full authority over
his family and recognising no superior authority over him).
The pygmies, the coastal tribes and the tribes in the
hinterland in Cameroon are sometimes labelled as having
respectively a segmentary, acephalous and centralised
system of political organisation. But one finds neither
a real gerontocracy among the coastal gribes nor ’anarchy’
among the pygmies. In the hinterland, Hausa-Fulani
pastoralists cohabit with native agriculturalists and in
some chiefdoms real power lies not with the nominal chief
but with either the council of elders or the secret societies.
There is no single tribe in Cameroon which has been so
powerful as to completely subjugate its neighbour and compel
16it to accept its own laws. Instead, there has always
been a great deal of borrowing and inter-dependence between 
the various tribes. The cumulative result is that, minor 
differences apart, one finds almost identical jural pheno­
mena in the various Cameroonian societies.
16. The Muslim invaders who have now settled in the northern
portion of Cameroon may be considered an exception.
But even there, Islamic law which the invaders brought
along with them has not been accepted in toto by the
native tribes. Nor has Islamic law itself escaped 
being diluted by the local law. Skirmishes did occa­
sionally take place between various tribes in other 
parts of Cameroon. But these were on a minor scale 
and undertaken with the limited objective of getting 
slaves or booty.
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1 . Structure
The customs of the people constituted the lav;.
These customs were not identical in each and every tribe.
17But similarities were abundant. These customs were not
written because writing was unknown in those societies at 
that time. There was a mechanism for the settlement
of disputes. Cases, whenever they arose, were decided,
depending on the gravity of each case, either by the 
family head, quarter head, or the chief and his council.
The boundary between what we know today as civil and cri­
minal cases was sometimes blurred. But a distinction 
between the two did exist although the labels ’civil’ and 
’criminal' were probably not known. Civil cases were 
generally settled by arbitrament, the defaulting party 
being required to apologise and to make restitution. A 
real trial took place in criminal cases and the party found 
guilty was penalised.
Marriages, divorce, the right to children or 
affiliation, inheritance, disputes concerning farms and 
the soil, the pawning or pledging of property, co-operative 
labour agreements - these were all civil cases. There 
even existed a public as well as- an inter-tribal law.
The public law centred around the chief - his enstoolment
17- See supra, p. 19
18. A notable exception relates to the invention by Sultan 
Njoya of Foumban of his own writing shortly before 
European colonisation.
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and de-stoolment; his powers, spiritual and temporal; 
his relations with his people, the elders of his council, 
and the various secret societies; payment of tribute; 
communal labour; and the status of strangers. Inter­
tribal law regulated such matters as the waging of war, 
parleys, the taking of prisoners as slaves, war booty,
boundary disputes, trade agreements, the right of passage
19through one tribe by another tribe.
Criminal offences were relatively few, and those
that there were may be classified into four groups:
(i) There were offences against sexual morality - incest,
rape, and adultery. (ii) As regards offences against
property, theft was the common crime. (iii) There were
also offences against the person - wounding or killing.
whether by physical violence, poisoning or by esoteric
means. (iv) There were offences against the chief, the
prototype of which was adultery with any of the chief’s
wives, and offences against the community as a whole such
20as witchcraft per se, desecration of revered objects and 
places, and treason (that is, deserting the village).
19. P.N. Nkwi, Traditional government and social change.
A study of the political institutions among the Korn of 
the Cameroon grassfields, Studia Ethnographica Fribur- 
gensia 6, The University Press, Fribourg, 1976, p. 45.
20. Witchcraft (or sorcery) and not divination was punished. 
Witchcraft is used for malevolent ends while divination 
is used for benevolent purposes.
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2. Content
Perhaps no other document can give us a better 
and probably accurate picture of the content of Cameroonian 
indigenous law as it was before effective European coloni­
sation than an ethno-legal document on certain Cameroonian 
tribes produced by the Germans almost eighty years ago.
The document was produced as a contribution to the over-all 
policy of the then German government to ascertain and codify 
the native laws and customs in all of Germany's colonial 
possessions. In 1896 an ethno-legal questionnaire was 
produced in Berlin by a committee set up for that purpose 
and under the direction of a certain Professor J. Kohler. 
Copies of this questionnaire were subsequently sent to the 
Governor of each colony for distribution to officials who 
were to undertake the research. Each questionnaire was 
divided into five parts - law of family and persons, the 
regime of property, criminal law, civil and criminal pro­
cedure, and public and intertribal law - and consisted of 
one hundred main questions and several subsidiary ones.
In Cameroon, the questionnaires were distributed to various 
German officials in the territory and the research began in 
earnest in 1909• The project was however frustrated by 
the First World War. By the time that war broke out only 
six coastal tribes had been studied. These tribes are 
the Bassa, Boulou, Bakossi, Banok, Mabea, and Batanga; 
and the questionnaires dealing with them are still available
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21at the National Archives in Yaounde. The answers from
these tribes reflect, with only minor variations, the indi­
genous law as it was in Cameroon before European coloni­
sation. That this is so may be seen from the answers 
given to questions on land law, criminal law, and the law 
of evidence.
With regards to land, the law in all six tribes 
was the same. The law was recorded to be as follows.
"The tribe has its own specific land (originally acquired 
by immigration). The clan.possesses land within the tribe 
and the family possesses land within the clan. Each 
member of the tribe may, without any particular authori­
sation, cultivate any piece of uncultivated tribal land.
But he must request certain rights over palms, trees, etc., 
even with regards to trees growing in virgin forests.
Virgin forests are not ownerless. They are divided judi­
ciously and their non-utilization does not entail a loss 
of rights over them. Land cannot be sold. No compen­
sation is paid for the temporary cultivation of land.
22Mineral rights do not exist." It was further recorded
that among the Batanga "the chief or the community cannot 
alienate land; from the point of view of land rights the 
chief is in the same position as any other Batanga".
21. Situation juridique des peuples dits primitifs, File 
No. TA-lb, Cameroon National Archives', Yaounde.
22. My translation.
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The criminal law was recorded to be as follows. 
’’Vendetta exists for cases of murder whether voluntary or 
involuntary. Talion [that is, the eye-for-an-eve tooth- 
for-a-tooth rule] also exists and was carried out by the 
nearest relative (son, brother) or the chief. Elders 
judge and punish offenders. The various punishments are: 
fine, banishment, death, mutilation such as cutting of 
fingers or ears, confiscation of property. Imprisonment 
does not exist. Sentence is pronounced by the secret 
society. The chief may grant mercy depending on the situ­
ation and behaviour of the offender. If a thief is caught 
in flagrante delicto he is smeared with cow, pig and human 
excrement. Some of it is also put in his mouth. The 
thief is also beaten up on the orders of the chief. The 
secret societies act as a police force. If a person fails 
to appear for his trial after having been ordered to do so 
he must pay a fine of one cow. At the beginning of the 
trial one of the elders sings a song having a connection 
with the case and then dances. At the end of the singing 
and dancing he is greeted by all present and the case will 
begin. Witnesses may be called to testify. There are no 
case-files. There are various oath forms. For example, 
'if I lie may my father come back from the dead1.”
On the law of evidence this is what the question­
naire recorded. "Testimony exists. Each party calls 
his witnesses. The witness is not bound to appear and 
is not punished if he does not. Greater weight is 
attached to the testimony of witnesses of substance or
29.
credibility. The feathers of chickens killed during a 
particular transaction may be produced as evidence in 
court. There are various means of proof. An accused 
person who cannot otherwise vindicate his innocence will 
go along with a guarantor to a fetish priest. There he 
will undergo one of several forms of ordeals: (i) A magic
grain of corn is forced into the eye of the accused. If 
he is innocent the grain of corn will come out, but if he 
is guilty it will remain in his eye. (ii) The accused 
may be given a certain poisonous substance to drink. If 
he can throw it out, he is innocent; but if he cannot, 
he is guilty. (iii) The accused may also be given the 
bark of poisonous tree to eat. If he is innocent he will 
vomit out the bark. If he is guilty he will be unable to 
do so and will fall ill or die. If a murderer is unknown 
the assistance of a diviner is sought in order to discover 
the murderer.”
It is of interest to note that although this was 
the statement of the traditional law as it was almost a 
century ago, the law has not changed much even today.
The Muslim Foulbe or Peuhl in northern Cameroon need special 
mention because they have a different system of law from 
the one just discussed for the other Cameroonian societies. 
These people were invaders from North Africa who entered 
Cameroon via Bornu and Sokoto about the early nineteenth 
century. They conquered the Fali aboriginese whom they 
called infidels. The Foulbe had an archaic feudal society 
founded on conquest and organised into castes, victor and
30.
23vanquished, slaves and non-slaves. J The sedentary 
Foulbe were grouped into patriarchal families under the 
authority of a village head known as djaouro. Those 
Foulbe who were nomads were scattered all over the Adamawa 
region, each group under the leadership of an ardo. The 
djaouro and the ardo came under the authority of a chief, 
the 1amido. It was the French colonial administration 
which gave the wandering Foulbe a territorial base by re­
organising them into villages so as to facilitate the
24collection of taxes and the counting of heads. It was
the Foulbe then who introduced Islamic law into Cameroon. 
Today however, given the interaction over the years with 
the local natives and their customs, the Islamic law which 
obtains in the northern part of Cameroon has become diluted 
and its sources heterogenous and nebulous.
Ill. Juridical Techniques and the Judicial Process
There were various sets of adjudicating 
authorites in the traditional judicial system and diviners 
and secret societies played a crucial role in the adminis­
tration of traditional justice.
23. J.C. Froelich, 'Ngaoundere - la vie economique d'une 
cite peulr, Etudes Camerounaises, N o . 43-44, 1954, p. 7; 
P. Malzy, ’Les Fali du Tingelin’, Etudes Camerounaises, 
No. 51, 1956, p. 3.
24. J.C. Froelich, ’Le commandement et 1 ’organisation 
sociale chez les Foulbe de l ’Adamaoua1, Etudes Camer­
ounaises, No. 45-46, 1954, p. 52.
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1. The role of diviners and secret societies
The administration of traditional justice was
supported by the belief in the supernatural or the spirit 
25
world. That belief was a great deterrent to the commis­
sion of crimes. A person who had decided to commit an 
offence was often deterred from doing so for fear that
some evil consequence would befall either him or his 
2 6family. A person who wanted to murder someone would
fear revenge from the spirit or ghost of the murdered 
person. It was for this reason that whenever a man was 
afflicted by some disease he would, enlist the assistance 
of his ancestral spirits, saying that he had lived a clean 
life and that he had wronged no one to deserve the calamity 
that has befallen him. It was also for this reason that 
an accused person swore by inviting a conditional curse 
either upon himself or his family: ’If I killed him (or
if I stole his property) may my ancestors curse me for the 
rest of my life’.
This deep religious belief resulted in a prepon­
derant role being accorded to the diviner (or fetish priest) 
in the community. He was both priest and judge in some 
communities. In other communities he was a kind of expert
25. Nkwi, op.cit., p. 57; B.T. Sakah, fNso magico-religious 
practices’, ABBIA No. 2, May 1963, p. 67.
26. Cf. P. Mukoko-Mokeba, ’Philosophical basis of Bakweri 
mysticism’, ABBIA No. 3, 1963, p. 39.
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witness whose evidence was often conclusive on the matter 
in dispute. The diviner exercised religious and lay 
functions. He decided cases between individual liti­
gants. He acted as umpire in inter-village disputes.
He served as the medium between man and the mystical world 
of the unknown. He took charge of supernatural matters 
which defied the competence of the uninitiated such as 
invoking rain, ensuring success in war, and foretelling 
the future. He was the spiritual protector of the village 
against evil intruders. He accompanied the chief on his
various missions to foriegn lands, acting as his seer and 
27protector.
Secret societies existed; for example, the Korn 
kwifon, the Bali nqumba, the Bassa urn and m'unqi, the 
Bamileke kamve and kuentan. They were an arm of the 
traditional government. They worked hand in hand with the 
elders and the chief. But they enjoyed a large measure 
of ’constitutional' autonomy. Their functions were mul­
tiple and diverse. They exercised judicial, executive 
and legislative functions. Sometimes they acted as a 
police force, a tribunal, gaolers, or bailiffs. The role
they played "was neither a feudo-vassalage nor of political 
2 8clientship". These societies "apprehended wrongdoers,
27. Cf. P. Gebauer, Spider divination in the Cameroons, 
Milwaukee Public Museums Publications in Anthropology 
10, 1964; J.C. Froelich, 'Le commandement et 1 ’organi­
sation sociale chez les Fali du Nord Cameroun',
Etudes Camerounaises No. 53-54, p. 20; Malzy, op.cit.
28. Nkwi, op.cit., p. 89.
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policed the market, inflicted punishment imposed by the 
king and his council, tried cases of witchcraft, murder 
and adultery with the king’s wife referred to it by the 
king, disciplined its own members, and dealt with infringe­
ment of its injunctions. These took various forms which 
involved prohibitions of movement, use of disputed land,
raffia and kola plantations and immobilisation of persons
29for breaches of law". They constituted the feared arm
of the law, the secret weapon of the chiefs who carried
30out fearful punishment on witches, adulterers and murderers. ;
2. Adjudicating authorities
Justice was administered in traditional society 
by a set of ad hoc bodies for there were no standing courts 
staffed with professional judges as we know them today. 
Depending on its nature and gravity a controversy was adju­
dicated upon either by the family head, the quarter head,
31or the chief and his council of elders. Various
29. P.M. Kaberry, ’Retainers and royal households in the 
Cameroons’, Cahiers d ’Etudes Africaines, Vol. 3S No. 2, 
1962, p. 289.
30. R. Brian, Bangwa kinship and marriage, Cambridge Univer­
sity Press’^ 1972, p. 6; R~! Delaroziere, ’Les institutions 
politiques et sociales des populations dites Bamileke’, 
Etudes Camerounaises, No. 25-26, 19^9* p. 136.
31. Kwayeb, op.cit., p. 78; A. Seidel, Deutsch-Kamerun, 
Berlin, 1906, p. 214; Delaroziere, op.cit., p . 36;
Nkwi, op.cit., p. 97. V. Kanga, Le droit coutumier 
Bamileke au contract des droits europeens, Imprimerie 
du Gouvernement, Yaounde, 1959* p. 72.
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societies and associations dealt with controversies invol­
ving their members or any of their members and an outsider; 
they also dealt with offences committed by non-members 
against the society's interest. A fascinating example 
was the women’s society in Korn known as anlu. It dealt 
with offences considered to be against womanhood such as 
having sexual intercourse with a woman under her menses,
beating a pregnant woman, using vulgar abuse about a
32woman’s genitals and so on. Cases of juvenile delin­
quency were generally dealt with by the age-group associa­
tion to which the miscreant belonged. This often took the 
form of jeering by the delinquent’s age mates, beating and 
a threat that if he did not desist from his delinquent 
behaviour a fearful masker or spirit would be invited to 
come and take him away.
The jurisdiction of the family head was limited 
to internal family matters - petty thievery within the 
family, an obligation owed by one family member towards 
the other, family property, succession, sorcery within the 
family, marriage, divorce, filiation and paternity. The 
family head also chastised juveniles guilty of petty 
stealing and of disrespect to their seniors and parents. 
Cases of unnatural sexual conduct and incest were regarded 
as a curse on the family. The offender was regarded as a
32. P. Ritzenthaler, ’Anlu - a women’s uprising in the 
British Cameroons’, African Studies, Vol. 19 > No. 3, 
I960, p. 151; Nkwi, op.cit., pp. 102, 131 and 178.
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patient and attempts were made to treat him by a cleansing 
ritual. Libations were poured to the gods and sacrifices 
made to expiate the curse. The family head was both 
master of the family community, father and conciliator.
He dealt mainly with what today may be classified as civil 
matters. He also exercised a disciplinary power against 
the party at fault. The defaulting party was ridiculed, 
shamed, and subjected to expressions of reprobation. But 
he was neither fined, jailed, nor sentenced to death no 
matter the gravity of the offence. J
A village was territorially divided into quarters, 
each quarter being made up of compounds. Disputes within 
a quarter were settled by arbitrament. Such disputes 
were reported to the quarter head for his intercession.
The quarter head could fine the party at fault or require 
him to make restitution. The fine was usually a goat or 
pig plus a calabash of palm wine. However, the quarter 
head had no power to ostracise or condemn to death.
At the village level, the chief together with 
the elders of the village (men steeped in the customs of 
the people) constituted the highest adjudicating body.
The village court exercised unlimited jurisdiction over 
the infringement of any village law, from matrimonial 
offences to treason, and could pass the death sentence.
33- F. Hutter, Wanderungen und Forschungen im Nord-Hinter- 
land von Kamerun, Berlin, 1902, pp. 377 et seq.; 
Delaroziere, op.cit. , p. 36; Froelich, ’... chez les 
Fall1, op.cit., p. 24.
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It was essentially a criminal court. Few cases of con­
troversies which one would today regard as civil came 
before this court because they would already have been 
dealt with either by the family or quarter head. It was 
the village court that most researchers saw in action and 
since it dealt mainly with criminal cases, some of these 
researchers hastily and erroneously concluded that tradi­
tional law consisted mainly of repressive justice.
3. Judicial proceedings
The village court sat in the palace. There was 
no special form for commencing an action in the court.
In much earlier times when the communities were not yet 
stable and close-knit, self-help either by way of vendetta 
or blood revenge was not unknown. But when the societies 
became more politically organised, cases were started by 
the aggrieved party complaining to the chief. In cases 
of witchcraft, treason, or sacrilege however it was not 
necessary for anyone to complain in order that an offender 
may be prosecuted. This was so because those offences
were considered to be offences against the community as a 
whole. If a complaint was made against someone, that 
person was summoned to court by the chief sending him a 
token, such as a palm leaf, through a retainer. If the
34. Hutter, op.cit., p. 378; Seidel, op.cit., p. 214 
et seq.
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person so summoned failed to appear he could be brought 
to court manus militaris by members of the secret society. 
Often however, the offender was apprehended following a 
hue and cry levied by someone, caught in flagrante delicto, 
or taken unawares by night in bed by members of the secret 
society. He was then brought before the chief who would 
convene his council and proceed to try the case.
Proceedings were entirely oral. The prosecutor 
(the complainant in most cases, or a member of the secret
society, or the quarter head of the area where the offence
was committed) first presented his case in full to the 
court, produced his witnesses who did likewise, was then 
cross-examined and perhaps challenged by the other side. 
After which the accused was called upon to give his own 
version of the story. He could call his own witnesses too. 
Each person terminated his narrative with an oath. There 
were several of such oaths: If I do not speak the truth
may the chief’s feet cause my stomach to swell until I die;
If I am lying may the clouds blind me; If I lie may I 
drop dead; If I lie may thunder strike me dead; If I 
lie may the gods of my father and mother curse me; I 
swear on my mother’s tomb ... The parties swore touching 
either a human bone or a revered object such as a fetish.
No lawyers existed. But sometimes a defendant 
’briefed’ an eloquent family member to speak for him.
35. Cf. A.F. Calvert, The German African empire, Werner 
Laurie Ltd, London-^ 1916, p. 256.
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The modern relevancy rule was also unknown In the tradi­
tional judicial process. Each party spoke at length, 
time and again embellishing and punctuating his account 
with irrelevant histories, hearsays, and asides. Besides, 
if the accused happened to be a notorious rogue in the 
village many witnesses.gave evidence against him simply 
because they believed in his guilt. However, much weight 
was attached to the evidence of eye witnesses and senior 
and respected members of the community. There was always 
room for what modern lawyers call cross-examination. This 
often resulted in an altercation between accused and 
accuser until the chief called for silence. The place of 
documentary evidence was taken by the use of real or tan­
gible evidence of a transaction. Tokens, gifts, symbols, 
stolen objects, and objects used for the commission of a 
crime could all be produced as real evidence. The chief 
and the. elders themselves questioned the accused closely.
But no matter what was produced or said in court as evi­
dence, at the end of the day, it was the chief and his 
elders who assessed what weight to give to which evidence.
The system strangely resembled what contemporary jurists 
have identified as the inquisitorial process.
The pre-trial stage was one of the most interesting 
stages in the traditional judicial process. As in some 
modern states various means of torture were used to extort 
confessions from the accused. Beating was liberally adminis­
tered. Divination was resorted to in order to detect an 
unknown criminal.
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In complicated cases such as sorcery where it was 
difficult to ascertain his guilt or innocence, the accused 
was subjected to various forms of ordeals as a means of 
demonstrating his guilt or vindicating his innocence.
There were various forms of ordeals. The commonest
ones consisted of drinking a. poisonous concoction, putting 
of hands in boiling palm oil or water, holding red-hot 
iron or coal, inserting a grain of corn or a snake’s tooth 
in the eye. The accused was innocent if the ordeal pro­
duced no ill effect on him. But if he died as a result of 
drinking the poison, or If his hands got roasted as a 
result of putting them in boiling oil or handling red-hot 
coal, then he was guilty.
A suspected accuser was also subjected to the 
same ordeals. This was to ensure that an innocent man 
was not wrongly accused. Hence, when the modern police 
came, the secret societies found it strange that
"When you arrest a man doing wrong 
When you catch a man stealing,
And you bring him to the police,
The police will ask you questions;
When you cannot answer the questions,
They will instead accuse you and the thief Is
set free;
This is not our custom
It is not the way of our people
To accuse the innocent
It was never the manner of our people
To take pride with the guilty." 37
When an offence was committed and a complaint
made but the offender was not apprehended, two favourite
36. Kwayeb, op.cit., 81-82.
37. Nkwi, op.cit., p. 155.
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methods were used to detect him. A diviner was called 
to reveal the identity of the offender. The second method 
of detecting and punishing an offender was by requiring 
all those suspected of the crime to swear over a venerated 
object such as a fetish, the ancestral stone, or the drum
o o
or gong of a dreaded secret society. The guilty person
was the person who was visited by some evil consequence.
For example, he lost a family member, or was afflicted 
with a dreaded disease such as yaws or leprosy, or was 
struck dead by thunder.
At the end of the trial, the chief briefly consul­
ted with his notables and pronounced the accused guilty or 
innocent. If the verdict was guilty, the chief indi­
cated the penalty to be inflicted and the notables nodded 
their heads in agreement. There were various forms of
punishment: payment of a fine, beating, being sold into
qa
slavery, ostracization, imprisonment in stocks, muti­
lation, death. In traditional society, "judgements were
given with a view to righting wrongs, adjusting claims and
40defending norms” . The fine (payment was made either in
goats, pigs, poultry, bangles, cowries or palm/raffia wine;
38. Didactic stories about the severe mystical consequences 
of telling lies on oath abound in Cameroon.
39. P. Hitzenthaler, The Fon of Bafut, Cassell & Co. Ltd, 
London, 1967* p. 85.
40. J.N. Monie, The development of the laws & Constitution 
of Cameroon, Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1970,
p. 400.
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the exact combination of these being indicated by the
elders) and flogging were the usual penalties for such
offences as cases of minor thefts (stealing of a chicken,
foodstuff, etc.) and adultery committed with a woman other
than one of the chief’s wives. The beating of a notorious
thief was sometimes accompanied by his hut being ran- 
Z|1
sacked and his property confiscated. The property thus
confiscated was handed over to the elders who decided on
Zj2what to do with it.
Adultery with one of the chief’s wives, wounding
intentionally, treason and repeated serious thefts (for
example, of livestock or cattle) attracted severe penalties.
The offender was either declared an outlaw and sold into
slavery, or mutilated by cutting of his ears or fingers to
4 3
publicize the fact that he was a dangerous criminal, or
44publicly executed, being despatched in like manner and
45
by the same means as that employed by the criminal.
As the ’grand judge’ of the village, the chief 
was vested with the right and power to grant mercy. Upon 
hearing his sentence, the prisoner fell at the chief’s feet,
41. Froelich: ... Chez les Falls, op.cit., p. 26.
42. Elements de Droit Coutumier Bassa, ABBIA No. 4, 1963,
p. 150.
43. Ibid.; Seidel, op.cit., p. 216.
44. Ritzenhaler, The Fon of Bafut, op.cit., p. 83.
45. Calvert, op.cit., p. 257.
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fawned on him and craved his mercy. The chief acceded 
to his solicitation if he found his appeal for mercy to 
be meritorious. The prisoner was then granted a reprieve 
or his sentence commuted to say a fine which was paid to 
the elders and members of the secret society.
Moral persecution and ostracization were the 
common penalties for sexual crimes and offences against 
traditional morality (for example, disrespect for one’s 
seniors, the use of vulgar language, consuming forbidden 
substances or food - e.g. women and children were for­
bidden to eat certain classified animals, eggs, and the 
gizzards of chickens). A well-known persecution tech­
nique was that employed by the Anlu women's association 
of Korn against anyone who committed a misdemeanour deemed 
to be against womanhood.
"The women of the quarter and sometimes of the 
neighbouring quarters ... were enlisted. On a set day 
they dressed in leafy vines, articles of woman’s clothing, 
and paraded to the culprit’s compound around five o'clock 
in the morning. There they danced, sang mocking and 
usually obscene songs composed for the occasion, and de­
filed the compound by defecation or by urinating in the 
water storage vessels. If the culprit was seen, he could 
be pelted with stones or a type of wild fruit called 
'garden eggs’ ... They would prohibit the offender from 
visiting other compounds and instruct the people that no 
one should visit him. Sometimes the culprit fled to 
another compound or even another village, but Anlu was
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continued. At the next weekly market the women volun­
tarily attended, dressed in their vines, and publicly ridi­
culed the culprit by dancing and singing mocking songs.
When his endurance was at an end, he put the Anlu vines 
around his neck as a sign of capitulation and went to the 
women to plead for pardon. If his pleas and indemnity 
goods were accepted, they took him naked to the stream 
and bathed him . .., a ritualistic act which removed the 
guilt.,T^
46. Risenthaler, ’Anlu - A Women’s Uprising in the British 
Cameroons', Zaire, Vol. 19, No. 5-6, I960, p. 482.
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CHAPTER TWO
ALIEN DOMINION AND THE IMPORTATION 
OF ALIEN LEGAL SYSTEMS
After a period of Anglo-German rivalry for spheres 
of influence along the Cameroonian coast, Germany outwitted 
Britain and annexed Cameroon. But thirty-two years later, 
by one of those ironies of history, the British were back 
in Cameroon; this time, with the French (I). Although 
Britain and France held Cameroon under international tute­
lage Agreements, each power pursued its own separate colonial 
policy in the sector it occupied(II) and introduced its own 
laws therein (III).
I . From the German Annexation to the Anglo-French 
Partition of Cameroon
By the middle of the nineteenth century there 
were already intensive missionary and commercial activities 
at the mouth of the Rio Camerones. British and German 
traders constituted the two main mercantile communities in 
the area. In order to gain a monopoly over the trade in 
the area, each trading community urged its home government 
to annex the coastal enclave and its hinterland. While 
Britain hesitated, Germany acted quickly and proclaimed the 
area the German protectorate of Kamerun. During the First 
World War Anglo-French forces wrested Kamerun from Germany
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and the territory was partitioned between Britain and 
France.
1. The acquisition of the Schutzgebiet von Kamerun
Hanno the Carthaginian was probably the first 
foreigner to visit the Cameroonian coast; and that was 
as early as the fifth century B.C. He espied the Camer­
oon Mountain and named it ’the chariot of the gods’.1 
For several centuries thereafter no other foreigner visited 
the area. It was not until the emergence of the lucra­
tive transatlantic slave trade in the fifteenth century A.D. 
that European interest in West Africa was kindled. From 
that time onwards Europeans began to visit the Cameroonian . 
coast to trade in slaves. First came the Portuguese who
called at the Ambas Bay about 1480 and, close on their 
heels, the Spaniards who reached the mouth of the River 
Wouri which was rich in shrimps and named it Rio Camerones 
(River of Shrimps), from which the name Cameroon is derived.
1. V. Le Vine, The Cameroons from mandate to independence, 
University of California Press, Berkely & Los Angeles, 
1964, p. 16; J.N. Monie, The development of the law and 
constitution of Cameroon, Ph.D. Thesis, London Univer­
sity, 1970, p. 21. Contra, R.P.J. Bouchand, ’Notes 
d ’histoire du Cameroun - le char des dieux’, Etudes 
Camerounaises, No. 10, 1945, p. 85. Bouchand strenu­
ously argues that it is very unlikely that Hanno ever 
got as far as the Cameroonian coast and that reference 
to ’chariot of gods’ in Hanno's account of his voyage 
cannot possibly be a reference to Mount Cameroon.
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In the early nineteenth century there was an uprush of 
humanitarian feeling in England.. Britain, hitherto a 
great slave-trading nation, became penitent and not only 
outlawed slavery (the Slavery Act 1833) and the slave trade 
(the Slave Trade Act 1876) but actually embarked upon a 
crusade in the High Seas for the abolition of the trans­
atlantic slave trade. Slaves liberated by British men- 
of-war were re-settled in such places as Sierra Leone 
and Jamaica. In 1843, Alfred Saker an English Baptist 
missionary who had been evangelising the liberated slaves 
in Jamaica, arrived on the Spanish island colony of 
Fernando Po off the Cameroonian coast to christianise the 
liberated slaves there. He established a missionary post
there. In 1858 however Spain proclaimed Roman Catholicism
2
as the sole and only permitted religion on the island. 
Alfred Saker and his Baptist congregation therefore had 
to leave the island. After protracted negotiations by 
the British diplomatic services with the Spanish govern­
ment, the latter paid a compensation of £1,500 to the Bap­
tist Mission for the missionary post Saker was forced to 
abandon in Fernando Po.
2. See Proclamation by Carlos Chacon, Governor-General of 
the Spanish Islands in West Africa, dated 27 May 1858, 
to the effect that ,TThe religion of this colony is 
that of the Roman Catholic Church as the only one in 
the Kingdom of Spain, to the exclusion of any other". 
See Victoria Centenary Committee, Victoria - Southern 
Cameroons 1858-1958, Spottiswoode, Ballantyen & Co., 
London, 1958, p. 102.
3* J.R. Brutsch, ’Fernando Po et le Cameroun’, Etudes 
Camerounaises, Nos. 43-44, 1954, p. 77.
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Saker was desirous of founding a new settlement 
where he and his converts would practise their religion 
without molestation. He made two trips to the Cameroon 
coast and found the bay around Bimbia suitable. He 
brought his converts over and bought a piece of King Billie 
(William) of BimbiaTs territory for £2,000.^ He named 
this new settlement ,Victoriat after Queen Victoria of 
England. He hoisted the British flag over the tiny 
settlement and requested the British government to take it 
over as a British colony. The Foreign Office politely 
refused to do so but assured Saker of the government's 
protection. The settlement was consequently placed under 
British protection while it was governed by the Baptist 
Mission. As founder and missionary-in-charge of the 
settlement Saker acted as the 'governor' of the small 
colony.
He drew up rules and regulations for the good 
governance of Victoria. "A Court of Justice^ was set up, 
composed of a dozen negro leaders of the township. The 
Chairman (of the Court), Sammuel Brew, was a fine charac­
ter, a man greatly respected by all. He acted as agent 
of a German Trading Company, and was in charge of the 
local factory. Every Saturday he was in his place at
the tribunal. All evil-doers respected him, for they knew
4. Victoria Centenary Committee, op.cit., p. 102.
5. This court is sometimes grandiloquently referred to as 
the Victoria Court of Equity. It was not an equity 
court and there was nothing equitable about it.
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that 'Daddy Brew’ had a summary way of dispensing justice.
For ordinary breaches of the law fines were imposed, as 
money was needed for the treasury, but for flagrant 
offences he depended on the corrective powers of a heavy 
strap, which he always displayed on the table as a warning 
to those who were brought before him. As the cases were 
disposed of, I had to make detailed notes - so many fines 
and so many strokes. The execution of the sentence took 
place in the yard at the back of the court after the court 
had finished its ordinary business. Daddy Brew and most 
members of the Tribunal sat in sate to see the thing done."
The Court’s jurisdiction did not extend beyond 
the tiny settlement which was 120 sq. miles big. The 
court dealt with theft, failure to attend Sunday services, 
sexual immorality and so on. It did not open its doors 
to "pagans”, who continued to be under the jurisdiction 
of the various traditional courts.
At this time the rivalry and mutual jealousies 
between the major European Powers in Europe had shifted to 
Africa. Colonial enterprises in Africa were being earnestly 
pursued to meet the various needs of the emerging indus­
trial nations of Europe. But no nation openly advocated 
the exploitation of natives as the reason for acquiring 
colonies. Humanitarianism, trade, religion and science were 
often invoked. It was said that the white man was 
anxious to stop the inhuman practice of slave trade, that
6. T. Lewis, These Seventy Years, London, 1930, p. 60.
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he wanted to bring the light of God to shine upon the 
heathen people of the Dark Continent, and that he wanted 
to carry out research for the benefit of science and man­
kind. And so European Missionaries, adventure-seeking 
explorers and traders came to Africa all in the name of
bringing civilisation to primitive peoples. Traders,
7
whether as individuals or chartered companies, priests, 
and explorers were always the avant-garde of European 
colonialism.
By .1830 there were already several European 
traders vying for territorial possessions, under the pro­
tection of their various countries, along the West African 
Coast. The fifty years from 1830 to the Congress of 
Berlin in 1884-5 was to witness an intense political 
activity by the major European powers along the West 
African coast. Each nation tried to out-manoeuvre the 
other. The era of the aggressive acquisition of terri­
tories had dawned. The role of protector was assumed 
over ill-defined areas (the geographical limits of which 
were usually nebulous) by means of the now familiar technique 
of declaring ’spheres of influence’. "Emissaries of
7. The first British experiment of colonial rule was that 
of Chartered Companies. The Hudson’s Bay Company 
brought Canada into the British Empire. The East 
India Company secured India, the Royal Niger Company 
secured Nigeria, the East Africa Company secured British 
East Africa, and the British South African Company 
secured Southern Africa.
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Governments moved about in mysterious ways and by divers 
routes3 visiting African chiefs and negotiating treaties 
with them, with a view to securing a foothold for their 
respective Governments on the shores of the Dark continent, 
that they might claim the hinterland for their own. One 
got tired of hearing about ’hinterlands’ and ’spheres of 
influence’ in this race for the territory of the black 
man. Engineers on board the coastal vessels were kept 
busy cutting tin sheets and making them into gaudy crowns 
for the heads of the deluded chiefs who were ready to sign 
away their territory for a few bottles of gin and the 
title ’King’ .
This rivalry was particularly heightened after 
Germany delivered a crushing defeat over the French in the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870. After her crippling defeat 
of 1870, France more than ever before became convinced 
that she must look to ’la France Outre-Mer’ especially 
in Africa for honour and rehabilitation. And although 
she suffered another humiliation at the hands of the British 
at Fashoda in 1898, she dug in her heels in Africa. The 
nascent united and powerful Germany sought to demonstrate 
her greatness by also acquiring a colonial empire parti­
cularly in Africa. She was a late-comer to the race, 
but this did not matter as there was always room in the 
sun for everyone. The acquisition of a colonial empire
8. Thomas Lewis, op. cit., p. 69. See also Lugard, The 
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 3rd ed., 
William Blackwood & Sons Ltd, London, 1926, p. 16.
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was then a mark of greatness.
Now, it was against this background that events 
along the Cameroon coast were taking place. By 1850 
there was already, a large European mercantile community 
carrying on trade in Douala. They were often at logger­
heads with each other; mainly German versus British 
traders. But Douala was a British ’sphere of influence’ 
because of the numerical superiority of British traders 
in the town. In 1856 a 'Court of Equity’ was set up 
under the aegis of.the local British Consul, to settle 
disputes between the traders inter se.
As British 'spheres of influences', Douala and 
Victoria fell under the general supervision of the British 
Consul in charge of the Bight of Benin and Biafra with 
residence at Fernando Po. The steady increase of German 
traders in Douala made British traders suspicious of Germany’s 
motives. To protect their trading advantages, they 
requested the local British Consul formally to annex the 
territory for Britain. Much as he was sympathetic to 
their desire, he courteously refused to accede to their 
request, pointing out that he had no authority to annex 
the territory. The traders then decided to achieve their 
aim by working through the local chiefs. The stratagem 
was to influence the Foreign Office in favour of their 
request by inspiring and instigating the local chiefs to 
write letters to the Crown inviting the 'British to annex 
the territory. It would then be said that the chiefs 
voluntarily handed or ceded their country to Britain.
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The plan was put into action. On the 7th 
of August 1879, King Acqua, Prince Dido Acqua, Prince
Q
Black, Prince Joe Garner and Prince Lawton of Douala
jointly wrote this oft-quoted letter to Queen Victoria:
"Dearest Madam, - We your servants have join 
together and thoughts it better to write you 
a nice loving letter which will tell you 
about our wishes. We wish to have your 
laws in our towns. We want to have every 
fashion altered, also we will do according to 
your consul's word. Plenty wars here in our 
country. Plenty murders and idol worshippers. 
Perhaps these lines of our writing will look 
to you. as an idle tale.
We have spoken to the English Consul 
plenty times about having an English Govern­
ment here. We never have answer from you, 
so we wish to write you ourselves.
When we heard about Calabar River, how 
they have all English laws in their towns, 
and how they have put away all their super­
stitions oh, we shall be very glad to be 
like Calabar now." 10
Her Majesty the Queen did not even favour the TKingT and
’Princes’ with the courtesy of a reply. It looked as
though the chiefs had been ill-advised by the traders to
write directly to the Queen instead of to the Prime Minister.
This apparent error was repaired two years later when, by
the advice of the traders, Kings Bell and Acqua appealed
to the Prime Minister saying that "as we heard here that
you are a chief man in the House of Commons, ... do for
mercy sake please to lay our request before the Queen and
9. Note the liberal distribution of the title ’King’ 
and ’Prince’ as well as the alien names.
10. E. Lewin, The Germans and Africa, Cassell & Co. Ltd, 
1915, p. 138; S .G . Ardener, Eye-Witnesses to the 
Annexation of Cameroon, Gvt. Press, Buea, 1968,
pp. 19-20.
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to the rulers of the British Government".'*''*' Her Bri­
tannic Majesty's Government sent an official reply on 
the 1st of March 1882 to the effect that "although Her 
Majesty’s Government are not prepared as at present advised
to undertake the Protectorate of your country they will
12further examine the matter and write to you again".
But they never wrote again.
While Britain procrastinated, the German trading 
community in Douala decided to beat the English at their 
own game. They began to negotiate so-called treaties 
with the chiefs. In May 1884, Adolf Woermann specifi­
cally instructed his company in Douala to obtain the "ces-
13sion of sovereignty" from the local chiefs. Meanwhile,
Bismarck, who had all along shown an indifference to the 
acquisition of colonies, was won over by the pro-colonial 
caucus and the traders' lobby in the Reichstag. He des­
patched Dr Nachtigal, a one-time explorer in the Sudan 
and diplomat in Tunisia, to Douala with a secret brief to 
annex it for Germany and to declare its 'hinterland' a 
German 'sphere of influence'.
When news came that Dr Nachtigal was already on 
his way to the Cameroon coast, Britain became suspicious 
of Germany's designs and hastily despatched Consul Hewitt
11. Lewin, op.cit., p. 139.
12. Ibid.
13. See letter dated 6th May 1884 and reproduced in 'Eye- 
Witnesses op.cit., pp. 84-86.
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to the same area also with a secret brief to declare it
formally as a British ’sphere of influence’. He got
there only to find the German flag already fluttering
over the territory. Nachtigal had arrived there on July
12th 1884 and had concluded a treaty with the Douala chiefs
dealing with trading rights and the surrender of sovereignty 
14to Germany.
The acquisition of colonial empires whether by 
Germany, Britain or Prance in fact followed a well-known 
process. "First travellers, missionaries, and traders; 
then treaties of commerce and friendship; then a kind of 
protectorate half concealed under the form of an unequal 
alliance; afterwards the delimitation of spheres of in­
fluence and a declaration of a kind of right of priority; 
then a protectorate properly so called, the establishment 
of tutelage, the appointment of Residents and all that 
follows in their train; and finally annexation pure and 
simple."^
With the declaration of Cameroon as a German 
protectorate (Schutzgebiet von Kamerun), a rudimentary 
system of administration was set up under Dr Buchner (he
14 . This was the famous Douala Treaty of 12th July 1884.
It is more than probable that this treaty was not con­
cluded by Nachtigal himself. German traders may well 
have concluded the treaty with the local chiefs behind 
the back of the English traders and all Nachtigal did 
was to ratify it on behalf of the Imperial German 
Government.
15. Lugard, op. cit., p. 16.
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was Nachtigal's aide) with Douala as capital of the pro­
tectorate. But the English-supervised Douala court of 
equity was not abolished, because the English argued 
(without foundation, it is submitted) that an abolition of 
the court would constitute a unilateral abrogation of an 
international agreement. In any case, that argument 
became untenable six months later when, following the 
Douala insurrection of December 1884 (it was essentially 
a quarrel between pro-German and pro-British natives), the 
Germans abolished the court. Britain and France, desirous 
not to offend the Iron Chancellor, especially in view of 
the impending Berlin Conference, recognised Germany's 
annexation of Cameroon. Germany then proceeded to demar­
cate the western boundary between German Cameroon and
British Nigeria, as well as the eastern boundary with
1
French Equatorial Africa. But Victoria continued to
remain under British protection until May 7th 1886 when 
Britain agreed to relinquish her to Germany in exchange 
for German Forkados at the mouth of the Niger and Saint 
Lucia in Southern Africa.
While these events were taking place along the 
coast, Muslim invaders were advancing from the Lake Chad 
region. As they pushed their conquest southwards and the 
Germans extended theirs northwards, there was bound to be 
a clash in the middle somewhere.
16. See appendix to Confidential Handbook on Cameroon, pre­
pared by the British Foreign Office in Feb. 1919, for 
the delimitation agreements.
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In the seventeenth century the Muslim Fulani 
who had declared a ’jihad’, began to push southwards, 
spreading the Islamic faith. It was their avowed inten­
tion to sweep down south, metaphorically dipping the Quran
in the ocean. From his Sokoto headquarters, Usuman Dan 
17Fodio in 1806 commissioned one of his lieutenants, by
name Adama, from Bornu, to carry the jihad down to the
Cameroon coast. Adama, on whom Usuman Dan Fodio gave
the title ’Lamido Fumbina’ (Lord of the South), made Yola
his base. He raised a large army into which he recruited
many Hausa mercenaries. He carried the Crescent south
into present-day Fumban, sweeping across Mora, Garua, Marua,
Mandara, and Ngaundere. After heroic resistance on the
plains, the Kirdi, aborigenes of this part of Cameroon,
were forced to reatreat to the mountain regions where the
cavalry of the invading Hausa-Fulani could not reach.
Adama’s sons Lawal and Zubeiru consolidated the
territorial gains made by him. But by the time Zubeiru
came to the throne in Yola in 1890, Cameroon was already
five years old under the Kaiser’s rule and Germans were
already actively engaged in the exploration of the hinter-
18land of the territory, making treaties■with local chiefs, 
deposing some, and establishing military stations as they 
went along. As a result of these expeditions, the entire
17. He is that same great Nigerian Fulani warrior whose 
southward thrust in Nigeria was only arrested by the 
British advance from the south.
18. E.M. Chilver, Zintgraff’s Explorations in Bamenda, 
Adamawa, and Benue Lands, 1889-1692, Government Printer, 
Buea, 1966.
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Adamawa region, named after Adama, passed to Germany as 
part of her Cameroon Protectorate. However, the Fulani 
(locally known as Peul or Fulbe) continued to be restive 
and hostile towards the Germans. So in 1899, Captain von 
Kamp, commander of the military garrison at Wute-Adamawa, 
led a punitive military expedition to Tibati where he 
deposed and captured the incumbent Sultan, Mohama. On 
the 11th of September 1899, the Peul sued for peace and 
signed a peace treaty with the Germans. The amenable 
Jerima Chiroma was installed as the new Sultan of Tibati. 
He undertook to pay war damages assessed at 100 elephant 
tusks and 250 heads of cattle. He also undertook to 
obey and follow faithfully, unflinchingly and uncondition­
ally the orders of the German Governor. In exchange the 
new Lamido Chiroma was to be under the protection of the 
Kaiser and to be honoured with an award of the German 
flag.19
With this defeat the last vestige of Hausa- 
Fulani resistance to German suzerainty was broken. By 
1900, Germany’s authority was acknowledged all over the 
country although in remote areas the Germans were yet to 
make their presence felt. German control was more effec­
tive in the coastal areas. As the territory was vast and 
the means of communication virtually non-existent, the
19. For the Germano-Peul Peace Treaty of 1899, see Etudes 
Camerounaises, No. 51, Mars 1956, pp. 42—43 - The 
treaty is not in the original German but has been 
translated into French.
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Germans wisely decided to rule peoples in the remote 
hinterland through their own traditional institutions which 
were left undisturbed. Hence, with the exception of the 
coastal urban centres and the few. military stations in 
the interior, traditional institutions and way of life 
elsewhere in the territory were but little affected by 
the German presence.
Germany had no colonial policy in Cameroon as 
such. Her overriding interest in the territory was the 
intensive exploitation of its natural resources to feed 
the expanding industries of Germany. To achieve this 
goal, her rule was direct in some areas of the territory 
and indirect in others. In the coastal areas where 
German authority was firmly entrenched, the Germans ruled 
directly. A number of traditional institutions were dis­
banded and the chiefs were only chiefs in name. They 
could be de-stooled. They could be flogged. Some of 
them were absorbed as paid auxiliaries of the German 
administration. They received their orders from the local 
district officer. They owed their chiefly stool not to 
their people or by inheritance but to the German Adminis­
tration. In the interior, the story was different.
The Germans adopted a system of indirect rule mainly for 
practical reasons. The protectorate was vast, communi­
cation poor, and German personnel scarce. The Germans 
therefore signed treaties with local inland chiefs and 
relied upon them to support the Administration; German 
control and influence being only very remote. So long as
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the chiefs recognised German hegemony over them, so long 
as they collected the required taxes, supplied their own 
quota of able-bodied men for the colonial armed forces 
(Schutztruppe) and for compulsorty labour, and so long 
as they maintained the peace, they were not molested by 
the Germans. Although their wings had been clipped a 
little, they still retained their authority over their 
people and their traditional institutions were respected.
The payment of tax was not new. Before the 
Germans came, Cameroonians were wont to paying to their 
chiefs a form of tax known as 'tribute*. It was how­
ever the Germans who in 1902 introduced direct taxation 
in the coastal areas and in the interior in 1909. ’’When 
the head-tax was introduced in 1909, every able-bodied 
male had to pay six marks commutable to 30 days of tax- 
labour (Steuerarbeit). What was known as a head-tax 
was really a quota or district tax. The station officials 
sent the foyn [i.e. chief] only a determined number of tax- 
tickets and expected in return the required lump-sum.
When the tax-tickets or metal tags reached the foyn, he 
despatched his retainers to village heads and sub-chiefs 
telling them how much they had to send in to him. When 
they paid in the money the foyn sent to the Administration 
... the lump-sum amount and the rest went into the royal 
coffers .
20. P.N. Nkwi, Traditional Government & Social Change, 
Fribourg, 1976, p] 149.
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It is a trite observation that German rule was 
repressive. However, theirs was a pioneering effort 
and it is to their everlasting credit that they laid the 
basic foundations for modern Cameroon. They neither 
disdained traditional institutions and customs nor tried 
to assimilate Cameroonians. Indeed shortly before the 
First World War they were seriously considering the use 
of native Secret Societies as an arm of the colonial 
police force.
2. The German defeat' and the consequent Anglo-French 
partition
When the First World War broke out Germany found 
herself fighting a. two-front war in Cameroon. The 
British attacked on the west from neighbouring Nigeria 
and the French on the east from French Equatorial Africa. 
The German forces were crushed in the middle like a nut in 
a nutcracker. The last German stronghold, Mora, which 
was gallantly defended by Captain von Raben, fell on 
February 20th 1916. Cameroon was lost.
France and Britain would there and then have 
partitioned the territory along their respective combat 
zones as war booty. But who was to take Douala, Britain 
or France? That town had been jointly wrested from the 
Germans in 1914 and provisionally placed under an uneasy
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21Anglo-French Condominium, headed by Britain’s Brigadier-
General Dobell. Moreover, in 1915 it had been agreed
to maintain the Condominium until the collapse of German
22resistance in- the territory. The question as to which
Power was to acquire Douala, which had been jointly con­
quered, delayed the partition of Cameroon for about two 
weeks after the collapse of German resistance. Surpri­
singly, Britain readily surrendered Douala to France. The 
latter scored a diplomatic victory over Britain who there­
by threw away another opportunity of acquiring Douala.
The question as to who was to get Douala having been resol­
ved, the way became clear to carve out the territory along 
the respective combat zones of the two Powers. Accor­
dingly, hardly had the smoke of the last battle with the 
Germans dispersed than Britain’s Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Viscount Milner, and France’s Minister for the
21. The Condominium was placed directly under the Foreign 
Office and the Quai d ’Orsay which issued directives 
for execution by the military Governors. But up to 
the partition of Cameroon in March 1916 the social, 
administrative and judicial situation in the territory 
was very chaotic.
22. On the 24th of September 1915, the French Foreign 
Minister, M. Delcasse sent a letter to the British 
Ambassador in Paris saying that "Until the Allied 
offensive has broken the German resistance, the 
administration of the occupied zones of the country by 
the forces under the command of General Dobell shall 
fall on the military authorities assisted by civil ser­
vants delegated for this purpose and chosen from the 
neighbouring English and French colonies." Quoted
by Adamou Ndam Njoya, Le Cameroun dans les Relations 
Internationales, L .G.D.J ., Paris, 1976, p . 86.
(My translation).
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Colonies, Monsieur Simon, met in Paris on the 4th of 
March 1916 and formally partitioned Cameroon along what 
came to be known as the Simon-Milner Line. On March 29th 
1916 the partition agreement was initialed in Douala and 
the Condominium was- liquidated.
Prance made away with the lion's share of the
spoils. Britain was afraid of incurring great financial
responsibilities over another colonial territory. Her
primary concern was to secure what she regarded as better
boundaries for her vast territory of Nigeria. This
explains why Britain was content with only a tiny strip
of Cameroon. "We shall not, indeed," said Viscount
Milner in his memorandum of May 29th 1919, "have added much
to our possessions in West Africa, either in the Cameroons
or in Togo. But the additional territory we have gained,
though not large in extent, has a certain value in giving
2 2us better boundaries." J
The Supreme Council made up of Lloyd George for 
Britain, Clemenceau for Prance, Wilson for the United 
States of America, and Orlando for Italy, acting as a de 
facto international government, met in Paris on May 7th 
1919- and agreed to allow Britain and France to make a 
joint declaration to the League of Nations with regards to 
the future of Togo and Cameroon. On the 2 8th of June 1919 
the Treaty of Versailles (that ominous document stigmatised
23. Quoted by P.Y. Ntamark, Constitutional development of 
the Cameroons since 1914, Ph.D. Thesis, London Univer­
sity, 1969, at p. 35.
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by the Germans.as a ’diktat') was concluded and Germany 
signed. Article 119 of that treaty said Germany renounced 
her rights to her overseas possessions in favour of the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Two weeks later, 
on July 10th 1919, Britain and France made their joint 
declaration confirming the partition of Cameroon which 
had already been carried out in March 1916. They however 
undertook to administer their respective spheres in accor­
dance with article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. 
That article expressed Europe's latest conscience when it 
pontifically declared that "the well-being and development 
of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves form a 
sacred Trust of Civilisation".
Contrary to general belief, the League of Nations 
never gave Britain and France mandates each to administer 
portions of Cameroon. Before the birth of the League of 
Nations, Britain and France had already partitioned the 
territory and had since 1916 been administering their res­
pective parts as appendanges of their respective conti­
guous colonial possessions. The future of Cameroon was 
decided by Britain and France and not by the League which 
was simply presented with a fait accompli. True they 
placed their respective spheres of the territory under 
the League’s mandates system. But this was on the terms 
presented to the flimsy and pusillanimous League by the 
two Powers and not on the League’s own terms.
The terms of the mandate formulated for Cameroon 
by Britain and France were approved in toto by the League’s
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Council (in which sat Britain and Prance with preponderant
voices) on the 20th of July 1922. But the mandate did
not come into force until September 29th 1923. It is
significant that France saw her own portion of Cameroon
as "a sort of colonial Alsace-Lorraine" which would return
24to the "full sovereignty of Prance". Cameroon in her
eyes was nothing short of plunder taken in war from an 
arch-enemy.
It is generally allowed that the idea to place
ex-German colonies under a mandates f system came from
General Smut, the South African. But surely there was
25nothing.new about this idea. The mandates system was
novel in 1919 only in the sense that it was systematised 
at the international level. By the end of the nineteenth 
century ’annexation’ had become anathema as a means of 
acquiring colonial territories. The methods of ’protec­
torate’ and ’mandate’ were however not objectionable. So
24. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. II, 1928,
p. 276.
25. At the Paris Conference of 1815, Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria gave Britain mandate to assume protection over 
the Ionian Islands. Again at the Paris Conference of 
i860, Prance was mandated to intervene in Lebanon and 
Syria to protect the Christian minorities against Muslims. 
Within the British Empire itself Britain had given man­
dates to certain dominions under the Union Jack to 
administer backward territories, e.g. in 1886 a mandate 
was given to Australia to administer Papua New Guinea,
in 1909 the Union of South Africa was given mandate to 
administer the contiguous British possessions. See 
Njoya, op.cit., pp. 98-99.
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the European Powers began to talk not In terms of annexing
2 6territories but acquiring mandates or protectorates.
In 1919 the mandates system found favour with President 
Wilson of the United States of America because he advo­
cated an ’open door' policy in the mandated territories, 
opposed annexation, and preached self-determination espe­
cially for the Balkan peoples who were under the Ottoman 
Empire. He was in fact out-witted because the mandates 
system was nothing but annexation in disguise.
II. Conflicting Value Systems in Cameroon
1. French colonial policy
The partition of Cameroon in March 1916 left 
Britain and France with a free hand to deal with their 
respective portions of the territory as they deemed fit.
As France was still at war with Germany in Europe, she saw 
her presence in Cameroon as the military occupation of the 
territory of an enemy country. Accordingly she decided
26. The Berlin Conference put an end to the era of aggres­
sive acquisitiveness. By the Berlin Act of 1885, the 
signatory Powers set up an international free state in 
the Congo Basin, under the mandate of the Powers for 
free trade and navigation. The Brussels Act which 
came into operation in 1892 dealt more explicitly with 
the moral obligations of the Powers towards natives.
The Treaties of Versailles, the Covenant of Sept. 1919 
and the Mandates System were merely wider and more prac­
tical versions of the Berlin and Brussels Acts; the 
great innovation being the declared principle of self- 
determination. See Lugard, op.cit., Chap. 3, passim.
to govern her part of Cameroon (which became known as
’French Cameroun') in accordance with the Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907, Section III, Articles 42 to 56 dealing
with military authority over the territory of an enemy 
27
State. But in taking this view which was in fact
correct, she ran into difficulties. In the first place 
the enemy territory in question was a colonial one.
Secondly, the military occupation of a territory does not 
entail the transfer of sovereignty. There is only a pro­
visional and limited substitution of power by the occupying 
State (in this case France) vis-a-vis the occupied state 
(in this case Cameroun). The legal sovereign, Germany, 
having disappeared, the problem arose as to how to exercise 
the judicial, legislative and administrative powers which in 
principle normally fall on the legal sovereign.
But France was not to be tied down by these legal
hair-splittings. In 1911 she had voluntarily ceded to
Germany a strip of territory from French Equatorial Africa
to form an integral part of German Kamerun. In 1916,
France amputated this strip of territory from French
Cameroun and re-absorbed it into French Equatorial Africa
(made up of Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Tchad and Oubangui- 
2 8Chari). At local level'the territory was carved out
27. Njoya, op.cit., p. 90; Le Vine, op.cit., p. 34.
28. Fifty years later, in 1961, Britain also cut a portion of 
her own share of Cameroon and annexed it to Nigeria by 
way of a most.controversial plebiscite ever organised in 
the history of de-colonisation. This thinly disguised 
annexation moved the Cameroun Government to take Britain 
to the International Court of Justice. The Court how­
ever did not repair the injustice committed. It ruled 
that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Cf. 
Incorporation of Northern Cameroons into Nigeria, Cmnd 
Paper No. 1567; Johnson, D.H.N.,’The Case Concerning
the Northern Cameroons’, I.C.L.Q., vol. 13, p. 1143, 1964.
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into the same districts as the Germans had done. German 
laws and regulations in force at the end of the war con­
tinued to be enforced until the mandates system became
29 ,
operative in 1923. By a decree of September 5th 1916
Paris appointed a civil Governor, Fourneau, to replace 
General Aymerich who had hitherto been administering the 
French Section of the occupied territory.
The Governor, styled ’Commissaire de la Republiquef 
was up to 1921 a subordinate Governor, for he was responsible 
to the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa based 
in Brazzaville. France, like Britain, used art. 9 of 
the Mandate to administer French Cameroun along with her 
neighbouring colonial possessions as a French colony. How­
ever, by a decree of 23rd March 19 21, French Cameroun was 
granted administrative and financial autonomy within French 
Equatorial Africa. The French Commissaire in Cameroun was 
granted the rank of full Governor and made the depository 
of the powers of the French Republic in Cameroun. He 
’’received his instructions from the Minister [for the
Colonies] and was responsible for his actions before the
30French Government”. No legislation passed by the French
Government could enter in force until it had been promul­
gated by the Commissaire in the local official Gazette
29. Le Vine, op.cit., p. 34.
30. P.F. Gonidec, Droit d ’Outre-Mer, Tome I - De 1 ’empire 
colonial de la France h la Communaute, ed. Montchrestien, 
Paris, 1959, p. 200 (My translation).
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by means of Orders (arretes). The Commissaire had special powers 
(pouvoirs reglementaires) which allowed him to attach 
criminal sanctions to the breach of a rule. He made all 
but' the most senior appointments in the territory. All 
correspondence passed through him. The administrative 
functions of his office were assumed by a Secretary-General.
At local level the day-to-day running of the territory was 
carried out by various categories of district officers 
(prefets, sous-pr€fets , chefs de circonscriptions et 
arrondissements, maires,- etc.). But it was the Commis- 
saire’s duty to ensure that French colonial policies were 
successfully pursued in the territory.
To accomplish what she regarded as her ’civili­
sing mission’ in the colonies, France pursued two basic 
colonial policies. Civilisation in politico-cultural 
terms meant assimilation and therefore direct rule. In 
socio-economic terms it meant resorting to forced labour
as a justifiable means to an end - the much vaunted advance-
31ment of natives.
Assimilation was the cornerstone and substratum
32
of France’s colonial policy. It meant fostering
31. In its 1912 Report, the traditionally conservative Roman 
Catholic clergy had no qualms in saying that ”it is 
necessary to impose labour on the blacks in order to
secure the modification of their mentality, and to 
bring them to realise their duty as civilised people 
do.” Quoted by Lugard, op.cit. at p. 413. France 
is predominantly a Roman Catholic country.
32. For French policy of assimilation in French Cameroun 
see also D.E. Gardinier, Cameroon - United Nations 
challenge to French policy, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963, pp. 10-24.
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the concept of the ’evolue’. A distinction was made 
between citizens (citoyens) and.subjects (sujets), a kind 
of separating the sheep from the goats. A ’citoyen’ was 
a Frenchman or a native who had evolved and attained such 
standard of French culture as qualified him to be assimi­
lated to a Frenchman. A ’sujet’ was a native who had 
not yet been assimilated.
Assimilation in fact meant self-denial. The 
native had to deny himself and claim, irrespective of his 
black skin, that he was a Frenchman. J It was a very 
seductive invitation to commit racial and cultural suicide. 
The French educational system taught the native to deny 
his language and culture and instead to learn the French 
language and adopt French culture. It taught him to 
look down on his tribal customs and Institutions and 
encouraged him to break with his tribal world. It taught 
him not to ask for the Twhysr and 'hows’ of issues or 
things. It taught him that only the civilised French 
laws really mattered.
However to become a Frenchman the native had to 
meet a number of requirements. He must be an adult (about 
18 years of age), be able to speak French like a Frenchman, 
practise a ’civilised’ profession such as law, medicine 
and engineering, earn a sufficient income, be prepared to 
shed blood for France by serving in the French colonial
33- Cf. Frank Fanon’s explosive book, Black skin, white 
masks, Paladin, London, 1972, originally published in 
France as Peau noire, masques blancs, ed. de Seuil 
Paris, 1952.
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army, be of good character and posse'ss the qualities of a 
Frenchman, consume only goods (including water ) imported 
from France, et cetera. Having thus acquired a Tcivilised’ 
way of life, the ’sujet' could then carry the tag 
’citoyen’ and be guaranteed the same judicial rights as 
those enjoyed by a born Frenchman, for example the right 
to take a French spouse.
In theory therefore, assimilation was only a 
transition through an evolutionary process by which the 
entire native population was to acquire French citizenship. 
In reality however, only few Camerounians ever became 
citoyens. There was really no desire and in fact no wisdom 
in assimilating every Camerounian, making them ’citoyens’. 
France still needed sujets to do the dirty work, to dig the 
mines and cultivate the plantations for her. And since 
citoyens were by law exempted from such labours, there was 
no sense making every ’suj et’ a citoyen. The Mandates 
Agreement forbade the Mandatory Power to confer her 
nationality on the natives of the mandated territory. But 
France construed this prohibition as referring to the 
conferment of French nationality on-the natives en bloc. 
According to her there was no prohibition on French citizen­
ship being granted to individuals ’’par un acte individuel
34de naturalisation".
34. Gonidec, op.cit., pp. 195, 301. Those natives who 
did not renounce their ’sujet’ status to become French 
citizens were deemed to be of no nationality. France 
saw them as merely 'administres francais' to whom she 
was kind enough to give diplomatic protection.
71.
The policy of assimilation served France very 
well, because it fostered in the colonised people a sub­
servient attitude and enabled France to adopt a paterna­
listic attitude towards them. The French President 
(especially Charles de Gaulle) was regarded as a ’bon 
p£re de famille’ • and France itself was ’la patrie’. The 
policy of assimilation was a political trojan horse by 
which natives were made to depend upon the metropole for 
virtually everything. It engendered in them the belief 
that they were incapable of ruling themselves and managing 
their own affairs, and that their destinies and fate were 
by some divine Providence bound to that of France. Con­
sequently the French monopolised political and economic 
power to the exclusion of natives. ’’Everything began and 
ended in the Ministry for the Colonies ... Up to 19^6,
35. "It must, besides, be well observed that a Cameroun
made up of four different population groups and diffi­
cult to weld together is not viable in the present 
circumstances; think of the 1,250,000 Bantus more or 
less Christianised, of the 370,000 Foulbe Muslims, of 
the 9^0,000 primitive pagans and of the 5^0,000 Bamileke 
and Bamoum with an original civilisation. Cameroun 
runs the risk, the day autonomy shall be granted to her, 
of splitting up into two or three little states, each 
too small to be able to live an economically independent 
existence.” - J.C. Froelich, Cameroun-Togo, territoires 
sous tutelle, ed. Berger-Levrault, Parish 1956, p. Ix 
(my translation). The author, a French colonial civil 
servant who had seen service in Cameroun, then called 
on France to make the people of Cameroun realise that 
their future, welfare and development lay not in seeking 
for autonomy, least still for independence, but in the 
continued association with and loyalty to France.
What a dramatic irony.
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there was no representative assembly. The Council, 
placed under the French Representative [i.e. Commissaire] 
was made up mainly of high French civil servants and was 
purely consultative.” The Administration was autocratic
77
and very centralised.
The dispensation of two types of justice, la 
justice indigene and la justice europee'ne was merely the 
policy of assimilation in practice in the judicial sphere. 
,TBefore 19^6, judicial organisation in Cameroun rested on 
the distinction between la justice indigene and la justice 
europeene. This distinction was the expression in the 
judicial field of the indigenat system which, on the poli­
tical, economic, and social level perpetrated its prin­
ciples of violence, exactions and dehumanisation prac­
tically known under the expression of the exploitation of
qo
man by man.” Unassimilated natives were subject to
droit indigene regarded as being made up of primitive and 
uncivilised customs. Once the suj et had evolved from a 
primitive Camerounian to a modern Frenchman he was branded 
citoyen and subject to droit europeen.
Sujets became ashamed of their own traditional
36. Gonidec, op.cit., p. 200 (my translation).
37. Ibid.; See also the same author in his La Re'publique 
Fede^rale du Cameroun, Encyclopedie Politique et Con- 
stitutionnelle, ed. Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1969,
p. 19.
38. Victor Kanga, Le droit coutumier Bamileke au contact 
des droits europeens, Imprimerie du Government, Yaounde, 
1959, p. 71 (my translation).
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laws. The policy of assimilation militated against and
undermined traditional laws and institutions. The rough-
handedness with which the French handled customary law
was eloquently evidenced by the fact that it was given a
39very low place in the scale of justice and was mutilated 
almost beyond recognition under the apparently attractive 
proposition of codification. Like customary justice, 
traditional institutions were only tolerated. De-stooling 
traditional authority and enstooling stooge chiefs became 
the order of the day. These new breed of ’arrete’ chiefs 
became mere subordinate agents of the colonial adminis­
tration in their various ’chefferies’. They were employed 
in matters of sanitation, the levying of taxes, road con­
struction, engagement of labour and so on. Moreover, 
the French instituted a hierarchy of chiefs (chef du 
quartier, chef du village, chef superieur, etc.). But 
denuded of any real power or authority oven their people 
these chiefs were chiefs only in name. (And even the 
name or title ’ chief’ depended on the will, whims and 
caprices of Monsieur le Commissaire de la Reoublique.)
39- Recognised native courts were presided over by French 
civil servants who were assisted, as assessors, by 
'chefs’ and ’notables’. The activities of these native 
courts were closely supervised by the French district 
officer. It was said that these courts should not 
be staffed by the natives themselves because the chiefs 
and notables would be tempted to settle personal scores 
with a litigant by imposing on him a very harsh penalty. 
This was the familiar German excuse for presiding over 
the coastal native courts. The truth however, was 
that the natives whom the French regarded as little 
more than immature and incompetent children could not 
be trusted to run these courts which brought in much 
revenue by way of court fees and fines to the adminis­
tration .
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The French wanted through the duplication of 
their educational system in the colonies to inculcate 
loyalty to France and French culture. But at the same 
time they entertained great misgivings about giving the 
natives a good and sound education. For a long time 
they limited the education of natives to primary school 
level. (The primary school was divided into two grades: 
a lower elementary and a higher elementary which was 
grandiloquently styles 4co1e superieure.) The French 
were in a dilemma. By educating the young natives they 
hoped to make them Frenchmen. But they knew that they 
were also giving them tools to become aware of their 
African character. Low education and therefore access to 
only inferior jobs in the colonial administration served 
France well because it put the natives under French 
influence and led to political passivity and acquiescence; 
but job, economic and political monopoly by the French 
led to frustration and thence to conscious opposition.
This was the more so as ’’public liberties did not exist.
The great French laws on public liberties were not declared
40
applicable in Togo and in Cameroun.”
The other face of French colonial policy in
41French Cameroun was forced labour. The French often
40. P.F. Gonidec, Droit d ’Qutre-Mer, op.cit., p. 200.
41. Assimilation as a colonial policy was not the prero­
gative of the French. It was a colonial disease 
found in all latin countries in Europe: France,
Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal. This is how 
Portugal’s Caetana defended the Portuguese concept of 
the 'assimilados’ in 1954: "The blacks ... have to be
directed and indoctrinated by Europeans ... The 
Africans have not learnt how to develop alone the 
territories they have inhabited for thousands of years, 
they have produced no one useful invention, made no 
valuable technical discovery, no conquest that has
/Continued over
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talk in rather glowing terms about their so-called mise
en valeur du Cameroun or 1'oeuvre de la France au Cameroun,
conveniently forgetting that they inherited an already good
framework from the Germans. True they added improvements
here and there. But their methods were hardly different
from the much criticised German methods. Fettered to each
4 3other, requisitioned persons (chiefs were required under 
pain of de-stoolment and harsh penalties to supply quotas 
of men to the French administration, planters, and con­
cessionaires) were marched to go and work on private plan­
tations (the notorious one was at Dizangue) and mines 
(especially at Betare-Oya) as well as on projects of a 
public nature such as the completion of the half-finished 
German railway to Yaounde. They worked under slave
Footnote 4l continued from previous page.
counted in the evolution of humanity, and have done 
nothing that can compare to the accomplishments in 
the fields of culture and technology by the European 
or even the Asian." Quoted at p. 50 by Bruno da 
Ponte, Portuguese colonialism in, Africa, International 
Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1974. This view has
been debunked by scholarly research. See Chancellor
Williams, The destruction of Black civilisation,
Third World Press, Chicago, 1976.
42. Cf. P. Chaleur, L'Oeuvre de la France au Cameroun, 
Yaounde, 1936.
43. Requisitioning of persons for public works is some­
thing known in French law. It rests on the general 
concept of French Public Law. Although Its origin 
may be traced back to ancient Rome, the system existed 
in France during the Ancien Regime and is linked with 
military history. See generally, J.P. Dorly, Les 
requisitions personnelles, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1965.
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conditions and were to say the least quasi-slaves. They
were flogged at will, paid starvation wages, poorly fed
and lived under extremely poor sanitary conditions.
Hundreds died. The tribulations of the natives shocked
the world. France however continued to issue categorical
denials claiming that the situation had been grossly exag-
44gerated by people envious of her. But critics of this
inhuman policy tenaciously pursued by France in Cameroun
have been vindicated by a Camerounian who himself lived
through these gruesome events and who has poignantly com-
45pared them to the woes of the Nazi concentration camps.
The legal framework of the policy of forced 
labour was the ignominous system known as the indig^nat.
The term forced labour (travail force) was itself a blanket 
term. It "covered several different legal categories of 
compulsory work: travail publique obligatoire; prestation
or tax in labour for public works, generally levied through 
the chiefs and redeemable in cash; and military conscrip­
ted labour, or the deuxieme contingent of the colonial army,
46used to carry on public works." There were in fact two
44. Le Vine, Cameroon from Mandate to Independence, 
op.cit., p. 10b et seq.
45. Henri Manga Mado, Complaintes d Tun forpat, ed. CLE, 
Yaounde, 1970.
46. R.S. Morgenthau, Political parties in French-speaking 
West Africa, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964 , pp". 1-2.
The ’travail publique obligatoire’ is also known as 
’corvee’. The Tiers Etat had experienced this kind of 
forced labour in pre-Revolutionary France. It figured 
prominently in the ’cahiers de doleances’ as one of their 
major grievances. The French justified the intro­
duction of this system of forced labour in Cameroun
on the dubious claim that under African custom, it was 
part of the normal obligations of community life. The 
French were once more harping on the familiar German 
argument. Group work under traditional society cannot 
properly be compared to the colonial system of forced 
labour.
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systems of forced labour* one to achieve certain economic
47objectives* the other as a means of political coercion.
4.8Both were combined in the Tindig£natT which was by a
decree of 8th August 1924* introduced in Cameroun and
49allowed for imprisonment for up to ten years. The
reason for importing the indigenat from Togo into Cameroun 
appeared in a covering letter (appended to the decree) 
from M. Daladier French Minister for the Colonies to the 
President of France, M. Doumergue:
Paris, the 8th 8.1924
Mr President*
The Order of the Chancellor of the [German] 
Empire, dated. April 1896, regulated (in the 
Cameroons under German domination) the 
application of disciplinary punishment to 
the natives : the stipulated penalties wefe 
imprisonment in irons for a period of 14 
days and the cudgel or whip up to the limit 
of 20 or 25 blows, respectively.
Since l4th May 1916, the Commissioner of the 
Government in the occupied territories of the 
Cameroun has substituted for the penalties 
imposed by the German laws penalties more in 
conformity with our principles of civilisation: 
simple penalties or a fine.
Despite certain similarities, the indigenous
47. Dorly, op.cit., p. 330.
48. Originally, the indiggnat was the special provision 
in the criminal law applicable to French West Africa 
and which permitted French Governors and local 
administrators to take speedy punitive action against 
African sujets. See Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 5.
49. Lamine Gueye, Etapes et perspectives de Ionian 
Francaise, ed. de l ’Union Francaise, Paris, 1955,
pp . 37-38; Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 6; Le Vine op.' 
cit., pp. 99-111 and Appendix C.
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races which populate the Cameroun present 
certain apparent differences from those of 
French Equatorial Africa: their social and
moral level seems, on the whole, to be 
higher.
It appears under these conditions, that it is 
of interest to regulate (by special decree) 
this important question and suggest [for 
adoption] the text already proposed for the 
territory of Togo ...” 50
Camerounians of citoyen status (and they were 
very few) were outside the purview of the indigenat. The
system applied only to Camerounians of suj et status; 
that is, virtually the entire native population. By way 
of recompense for serving France, certain categories of 
sujets were however exempted from the indigenat. These, 
were those who had spilled their blood for France by ser­
ving in the colonial army together with their wives and 
children, those chiefs who had been anointed and enstooled 
by the French, those serving in the colonial administration
and receiving a stipend, and those who have been decorated
51with a medaille militaire. But like the other suj ets
they could still be subject to extraordinary penalties, for 
example, internment for ten years or more, sequestration 
of property, and collective fines imposed by the Commissioner 
where he thought there was menace of insurrection of 'grave 
political troubles'. The Commissioner alone decided 
whether there was such a menace.
50. Quoted by Le Vine, op.cit., in English at page 99.
51. This fact is satirically portrayed in The Old Man and 
the Medal by the Cameroon novelist Ferdinand Oyono.
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Under the indigdnat French officials imposed
disciplinary penalties on the suj et for the violation of
an alarmingly wide and ill-defined range of trivial acts;
such as for example, ’acts of disorder', 'acts showing
disrespect to a duly authorised officer', 'failure to
provide articles requisitioned for essential public works',
'giving aid to malefactors', 'giving aid to natives who
52have fled their villages’, etc. These breaches were
not triable by any court of law. They were summary extra­
judicial penalties exacted by French administrative officers 
arbitrarily and on the spot without resort to the courts.
On paper, the penalties were not excessive, being only a
FFmaximum, of 15 days imprisonment plus a 100 fine. But
in practice (and practice is what matters) people could
be interned for up to ten years.
"The indigenat deprived the masses of freedom 
of speech, association, and movement and 
also rendered them liable to severe punishment 
for quite minor offences. It was a symbol 
of French policy designed and superbly calcu­
lated to repress the masses in the hope that 
they would feel the strain and.burden of 
this intrusive 'code of law' and accept 
French culture and institution for all their 
worth. The expected result was that the 
general acceptance of French culture and 
institutions would deter the masses from 
seeking self-government.... The indigenat only 
hardened the attitude of the colonial peoples 
against French policy ..." 53
52. See 'Arrete' determining the special infractions of 
the indigenat in accordance with the 'Decret' of 8th 
August 1924, in Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate 
to Independence, appendix C.
53. P.Y. Ntamark, Constitutional Development of the Cameroons 
since 191^, Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1969,
pp. 7B-79.
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The Brazzaville Conference which was held from
30.01.1944 to 08.02.1944 has often been quoted as the
54watershed in French colonial policy. But the Confer­
ence wrought no fundamental change in French colonial 
mentality. France continued to see the future of her 
clonies as tied to her. The Conference made deceptive 
use of the seductive notions of independence and political 
advancement. In reality, it rejected even the idea of
self-government or autonomy in the Anglo-saxon sense of 
55the word.
A decree of 21st August 1930 authorised the use 
of forced labour for works of a Tpublic nature’. This 
was an additional legal basis for requisitioning porters 
and using them as beasts of burden, and for requiring every 
able-bodied suj et to work as and where French officials 
determined, as well as employing tax defaulters. The com­
pulsory labour tax known as prestation was additional to
54. The meeting, convened by the exiled Charles de Gaulle, 
was attended by the French colonial Governors in Africa 
and their assistants, and representatives of the Pro­
visional Assembly in Paris. The aim of the meeting 
was to put French colonial policy in Africa on a new 
footing. Would France liquidate her colonial empire?
To do so would be suicidal for a France which had 
itself just experienced colonial domination under the 
swastika.
55. ’’French policy offered African territories only the 
possibility of self-administration, under which the 
Africans would participate in the central government 
of a French Republic dominated by the French and would 
acquire a local administration like that of metropolitan 
France." D.E. Gardinier, op.cit., p. 1.
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the capitation tax which the French imposed on both men 
c 7
and women. The indigenat, corvee, and prestation were
greatly resented by many natives who, despites attempts
58by the administration to hem the exodus, continued to 
fly to neighbouring British Cameroons where they consti­
tuted a large emigre* community. The indigenat was abolished 
in December 1945 and following the International Labour 
Convention of 1946, forced labour was also abolished by 
Act No. 46-645 of 11th April 1946. But it was not until 
the passing of the Labour Code for Overseas Territories in
1952 by the Law of 15th December 1952 that forced labour
59ceased in French Cameroun.
The Brazzaville Conference had resolved that 
"The objectives of the task of civilisation accomplished 
by France in her colonies rule out any idea of autonomy, 
any possibility of an evolution outside the French bloc of 
the Empire; the eventual creation, even in the distant
60future of autonomy for the colonies should be ruled out."
56. France still lords it over her ex-colonies by means of the 
equally hazy slogan, independance et cooperation*.
57. Under the Germans, women paid no tax. The French had 
calumnised the German 30 days per annum labour tax.
But the prestation was that same labour tax, this time 
in French accoutrement.
58. Decree of 9.7.1925, art. 2 & 3; Njoya, op.cit., p. 136;
Le Vine, op.cit., p. 105.
59* Le Vine, op.cit., p. 110; J.P. Dorly, op.cit., p. 328.
60. La Conference Africaine-Francaise, Brazzaville, 30
janvier au 8 fevrier 1944, Paris, 1945, pp. 32-35, 
quoted by Ntamark, op.cit., p. 92.
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The 19^6 Constitution therefore brought all French colonies 
(including Cameroun) under a sort of confederacy known as 
Union Franqaise presided by France. Camerounians were 
granted the status of ’Citoyen' in this French Union, 
and allowed to enjoy the rights and freedoms envisaged in 
the preamble of the 19^6 Constitution.
For the first time they were given the vote and 
allowed to participate in politics. Cameroun was represen­
ted in the French Parliament by two senators and in the 
Union Assembly by five counsellors. But there were two 
electoral colleges, one for Europeans and the other for 
Camerounians. Moreover, the vote was very limited; 38,507 
voters in 19^6 and 600,000 in 1953- Executive power con­
tinued to be exercised by Monsieur le Commissaire de la 
Republique and his team of administrators.^1
By this time a new international order had set 
in following the Allied victory over German forces. The 
sick League of Nations was dead and so too its child, the 
Mandates System. The United Nations Organisation was 
created and under its aegis was placed a new international 
system of tutelage, the Trusteeship System. But the 
change from ’mandate’ to ’trusteeship’ was only a change 
of nomenclature; a case of old wine in new bottles. It 
brought no fundamental change to the life of the people
6l. See P.F. Gonidec, La Republique F^derale du Cameroun, 
op . cit., p . 20.
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and the powers of the administering authority were in no 
way curbed. Such political changes as were taking, 
place in the territory were slow and, in any case, the 
result of the wind of change which was at that time 
beginning to blow across Africa and which the colonial 
powers could hardly contain, although they tried their 
utmost to do so.
Following several nationalist petitions to the
U.N. and the U.P.C.-led popular uprising in 1955 against 
6 2the French, France in 1956 passed the Loi-Cadre for 
Togo and Cameroun. But the Cameroun version of the 
Law was less explicit than the Togolese version. In
Cameroun it was a question of bringing about ’institutional 
reforms’ and the creation of provinces with their own 
organs (assemblies and councils). Political autonomy came 
under what was known as le Statut du Cameroun spelled out 
by a Decree of the 16th of April 1957 and later modified 
by Ordinance of the 30th December 1958. Cameroun was 
granted its own Legislative Assembly and a Government 
headed by a Premier. But France retained power over
62. These were all agitations for independence. When the 
French ruthlessly crushed the 1955 popular demonstrations 
and began tracking down the ’U.P.Cists’, the movement 
took to the forest and waged a guerilla campaign against
"the French, a war ferociously and tenaciously fought by 
both sides and which was to plague the country for 
nearly two decades.
63. The Togo version provided that both Togo and France would 
share power in a Togolese Assembly and Executive.
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certain listed matters (and these were the more important 
matters): law and order, defence, the administration of
justice, foreign affairs and so on. On 1st January I960, 
France at last politically relinquished her own sector of 
Cameroon.
2. British colonial policy
Following the partition of Cameroon on March 4th 
1916, Britain proceeded to administer her own part of the 
territory as part of the adjacent British Colony and Pro­
tectorate of Nigeria. Accordingly, laws in force in
64Nigeria were extended to British Cameroons. Proclamation
6 R
No. 1 of 1916 which came into force retrospectively on
January 24th 1916 provided that:
"All British military officers in command of 
detachments of troops and all British civil 
officers appointed to temporarily administer 
any territory in the Cameroons are hereby 
authorised as from the date of their appoint­
ments to hold courts with full jurisdiction in 
civil and criminal matters in which natives 
are concerned in so far as it is known, and, 
if not known, the laws of that part of Nigeria
64. In British colonial lexicon, the laws of a Protectorate 
or Mandate were styled ’Proclamations’ while the laws 
of a Colony were known as ’Ordinances’. The officer 
administering the government of a Mandate or Protec­
torate was called a ’High Commissioner’, while his 
counterpart in a Colony went under the appellation 
’Governor’. Before long however, these "fine dis­
tinctions fell into desuetude.
65. The Proclamation was made after March 4th 1916.
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in which they hold appointments immediately 
prior to their present appointments." 66
Having defined the international status of Cameroon as a
61
Mandated Territory of the League of Nations Britain pro­
ceeded to make permanent administrative arrangements for
the territory. Relying on Art. 9 of the Mandate and on
6 8the Foreign Jurisdictions Act of 1890 Britain enacted 
the Cameroons Under British-Administration Order-in-
£ Q
Council No. 1621 of June 1923 according to which Cameroon
was to be administered as though she formed part of the
70Protectorate of Nigeria.
66. Nigerian Gazette No. 15 of March 9th 1918.
67. Britain assimilated a Mandated Territory to a Protec­
torate. So like the inhabitants of a British Protec­
torate, the inhabitants of a British Mandated Territory 
were styled ’British Protected Persons’ and did not 
like the inhabitants of a Colony, enjoy the status of 
British subjects.
68. The ancestry of this Act can be traced back to the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1843. This Act was 
amended in 1866, 1875, and 1878, and then consolidated 
and replaced by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890.
The Act provides that "it shall be lawful for Her 
Majesty to hold, exercise and enjoy any power or juris­
diction which Her Majesty now hath or may at any time 
hereafter have within any country or place out of Her 
Majesty’s dominions in the same and as ample a manner 
as if Her Majesty had acquired such power or juris­
diction by cession or conquest of territory." See 
Read & Morris, Indirect rule and the search for justice,
O.U.P. 1972, p . l C
69. See the 1923 Report on the British Cameroons, pp. 77-78.
70. Art. 3 of the Order-in-Council provided that the northern 
part of British Cameroons and the southern portion were 
to be administered as if they formed part of Northern 
and Southern Nigeria respectively.
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The Governor-General of Nigeria with the advice 
and consent of the Legislative Council of Nigeria and in 
accordance with art. 4 of the Nigeria Protectorate Order- 
in-Council, 1922 and art. 5 of the Nigeria Legislative 
Council Order-in-Council, was empowered to provide for 
the administration of justice, the raising-of revenue, and 
generally for the peace, order and good government for 
the Cameroons. The-British Cameroons Administration Ordi­
nance No. 3 of 1924 was enacted with effect from February 
28, 1924. By this Ordinance, German law, in so far as it 
was previously in force, was automatically superceded.
These provisions formed the basis of all legislation in the 
Cameroons until the introduction of the Richardson Con­
stitution of 1946.
There were two corner-stones of British colonial 
policy; indirect rule and trade. Britain, perhaps more 
than any other colonial power, saw her colonial possessions 
mainly as a source of raw materials to feed her booming 
industries as well as an outlet for her surplus industrial 
products. Hence the success of any colonial possession 
which Britain had was measured by the stimulus it gave to 
British commerce. So long as British mercantile interest 
was preserved, it was believed that liberty and self­
development could best be secured to the natives by leaving 
them free to manage their own affairs through their own 
rulers, proportionately to their degree of advancement 
under the guidance, of the British staff, and subject to 
the laws and policy of the Administration.
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The British policy of indirect rule is often 
associated with that veteran British colonial master, Lord 
Lugard, who served the British Empire so well in East 
and West Africa. Indirect rule was however not uniformly 
applied to all British colonial territories. Since it 
was a system by which the British colonial administration 
governed the colonised peoples through their own tradi­
tional institutions, indirect rule was applied in varying 
degrees depending on the circumstances and degree of 
advancement of each territory.
The British maintained tribal institutions and 
acted merely as supervisors of native affairs. One effect 
of this system of administration was that it encouraged 
tribal allegiances: for, within a given territory the
various tribes behaved as though they were states within 
a state. Theoretically, whereas direct rule has the advan­
tage of fostering a national spirit in the natives, indirect 
rule militated against national consciousness. • However, 
history has shown that the former Belgian and French 
possessions in Africa (territories in which direct rule 
was pursued) are no less torn by tribal strife than the 
former British territories.
Although she pursued a policy of decentrali­
sation and continuity, Britain also maintained a strong 
central coordinating authority in order to avoid centri­
fugal tendencies and the multiplication of units without 
a sufficiently cohesive bond. This apparently contra­
dictory policy smacked of a deliberate policy of divide
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and rule.
The system of indirect rule was however flexible
and inculcated a sense of responsibility in the natives.
Their traditional institutions were adapted for the pur-
71poses of local government or native administration.
These traditional institutions were left almost intact 
"so that they may develop in a constitutional manner 
from their own past, guided and restrained by the tradi­
tions and sanctions which they have inherited, moulded 
or modified as they may be on the advice of the British 
officers, and by the general advice and control of those 
officers".
Traditional chiefs were integrated into the 
colonial administrative hierarchy. The Governor-General, 
appointed by a Royal Commission was the highest authority
71. The system of Native Administration was "the procedure 
of which a colonial government whose European estab­
lishment is necessarily restricted in numbers has pro­
vided itself with the administrative machinery re­
quired for certain definite purposes of whose most impor­
tant are the supervision of the tribal or other insti­
tutions which regulate the domestic affairs of most 
African communities, the maintenance of law and order, 
the assessment and collection of native tax ...":
Hailey, Native administration in the British African 
territories, Part 3, W. Africa, H.M.S.O., London,
1951, p. 1.
72. Latham, G.C., ’Indirect Rule and Education in E. Africa’, 
AFRICA, vol. 7, No. 4, p. 423, quoted by Nkwi, op.cit., 
p. 137.
73. Chiefs were stratified: sub-chiefs, village chiefs,
clan chiefs, and paramount chiefs. This was a colo­
nial innovation.
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responsible to and representative of His Majesty in the 
colony. He appointed and dismissed officers of the 
colonial service. He assented to or refused to assent 
to Bills passed by the local legislative council. He 
had the power to grant pardons and remit penalties. He 
was in fact an autocrat. He was only controlled by His 
Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies. He was 
in charge of the whole territory; occupied Government 
House and was styled ’His Excellency’. Under the Governor- 
General was the Lieutenant-Governor who assumed the adminis­
trative charge of group of provinces for which he was 
responsible. Next below was the Resident. He assumed 
the administrative charge of a Province. He was respon­
sible for the efficiency of the public service in his pro­
vince, the native administration and the conduct of provin­
cial and native courts. He was Judge of the Provincial 
Court; supervisor and guide of native rulers. He acted 
”as sympathetic adviser and counsellor to the native chief,
being careful not to interfere so as to lower his prestige,
74or cause him to lose interest in his work” . Below the
Resident were Divisional Officers. Every Province was 
divided into Divisions, each under a Divisional Officer.
Upon the D.O.s largely depended the maintenance of law and 
order in the Divisions. They came of the class which made 
and maintained the British Empire. So far as the masses
74. Lugard, Dual Mandate, op.cit., p. 201.
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of the colonised people were concerned, the administration 
was mainly carried on by the D.O.s for they wielded 
considerable power in their Divisions. Power was dele­
gated down from the Governor-General to the District or 
Divisional Officer who was in-direct contact with tradi­
tional chiefs.
The policy of indirect rule was a reflection of 
Britain’s proverbial conservatism as well as her artisto- 
cratic tradition. "Indirect Rule is characteristically 
a British reaction to the political problems of Africa.
It derives partly from our conservatism with its sense of 
historical continuity and its aristocratic tradition.
Our experience has not taught us to believe in fresh con­
stitutional starts, or. in the existence of political prin­
ciples of universal applicability ... But indirect rule 
derives equally from our liberalism with its respect for
the freedom of others and its conscious reaction from the
75old selfish type of imperialism."
It was however not until 1922 that indirect rule 
was introduced in British Cameroons. Between the parti­
tion in March 1916 and the League of Nations Mandate in 
July 1922 British administration in the Cameroons was poor 
and confused. The territory was administered from faraway 
Lagos. Not only was the territory geographically segre­
gated from Lagos, seat of the British colonial administration
75. M. Perham, 'The System of Native Administration in Tan­
ganyika', AFRICA, July 1931, p. 302, quoted by Nkwi, 
o p .cit. , p . 137 .
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for the Cameroons and Nigeria, but it was also under­
staffed particularly in the Bamenda grassfields, where as 
late as 19^5 there were only five British officers to 
supervise the native administration. Britain’s know­
ledge of the territory was very sketchy. And from distant 
Lagos came, contradictory orders for the local district 
officer. It was a period of virtual laissez-faire, 
confusion and maladministration.
When the British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies directed that indirect rule be extended to Cameroon, 
the Lieutenant-Governor in Lagos did so, stressing "the 
consolidation of tribal units, the resuscitation of indi­
genous forms of government ... , the selection of the 
rightful chief, his installation with appropriate ceremonial, 
the re-establishment of the clan council together with the 
definition of the jurisdiction and power of the clan 
council or chief” .
The Clan Council or the Chief constituted the 
Native Authority. As instruments of Government having 
responsibility for the management of their own affairs 
and promotion of development at the local level (building 
schools, dispensaries, undertaking communal projects such 
as the building of bridges and the digging of roads, col­
lecting taxes and maintaining a native treasure, etc.),
76. Chilver, E.M., ’Native administration in the West 
Central Cameroons 1902-195^’ in Essays in Imperial 
Government, ed. K. Robinson and F. Madden, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, p. 108.
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Native Authorities were endowed with executive, judicial, 
fiscal and partly legislative powers, as well as being 
granted statutory authority. A number of selected chiefs 
received a stipend. The Native Authority had its own 
’police’ (known as N.A. Messengers) who maintained the 
peace in their various localities. They had power to 
arrest, detain, and bring before the native courts anyone 
who infringed public order. Native law and custom 
remained in force to the extent that it was not repugnant 
to English■ideas of justice nor incompatible with any 
written law in force in the territory.
Court fees-and fines as well as native taxes were
paid into the Native Treasury. "Tax quotas were fixed at
a percentage of an estimate of the gross income of villages
based on yields per acre, the annual value of livestock,
wage income, and the disposal of crop surpluses and manu-
77factures at local market prices."
The maintenance of traditional institutions as 
instruments of the colonial administration was very much 
detested by the Christian missions who saw them as pagan 
institutions. For a long time during the colonial period 
there was constant cleavage between the missionaries and 
their new converts on the one hand and the vast majority 
of. natives on the other hand whom they regarded as heathen. 
Native converts, aided and abetted by missionaries, refused 
to obey traditional authority. They would refuse to pay
77. Chilver, op.cit., p. 110.
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tax into the native treasury, to take part in communal 
labour, and to obey the chief. With zeal and alacrity
they declared Christ to be their one and only ruler and 
would receive orders from none but the priest whom they 
saw as the messenger of Christ.' Many young men and 
women, newly converted, fled from their homes and 
marriages and took refuge with the Missions who refused 
to hand them over on request. In certain places, this 
antagonism almost brought the native administration to a 
standstill. The colonial administration had to step in 
and called for moderation on the part of the Missions.
The converts were told to give until Caesar what is Caesar's 
and to God what is God's. But it took a long time for the 
Missions to accept native institutions and practices.
But apart from this participation in local govern­
ment the natives in British Cameroons were politically, 
socially and economically in no way better than their 
brothers in French Cameroun. Up to the end of the Second 
Wo]rld War the territory was politically dormant. The 
new post-World War II status of 'Trusteeship Territory' 
brought no real change in the territory. Although the 
political agitation of Cameroonians in the Eastern Nigerian 
Assembly spilled over into Cameroon, the territory remained 
economically as destitute as before. There was always a 
chronic penury of administrative and judicial personnel. 
Educational opportunities for the natives were lacking. 
Responsibility for education was placed in the hands of 
native authorities. Emphasis was laid on character building
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and adaptation to the needs of natives. The' use of verna­
cular or a local lingua franca was encouraged. But there 
was no wish to create a corps d felite. The whole edu­
cational system was geared towards the learning of the 3Rs 
(Reading, Writing, Arithmetic), handicraft, hygiene, and 
manual labour. Opportunities for further education 
existed only in Nigeria; and very few were the Cameroonians 
who had the means to get there. No Cameroonian occupied 
any position of consequence.
However, unlike the French who believed that 
natives were not yet fitted for the full measure of indivi­
dual liberty which it has taken European countries cen­
turies to evolve for themselves, the English respected 
fundamental human rights and freedom of expression (although 
throughout their 44 years rule in Cameroon the British 
established neither a written nor the spoken Press in the 
Territory). Before re-unification in 1961, natives of 
British Cameroons knew'nothing about having to carry 
passes, identity cards, or their homes being raided by 
the forces of law and order, or even seeing policemen on 
duty with a pistol hanging at their hips.
But then the territory was very poorly developed. 
Infrastructure and means of communication were a disgrace. 
Only a few miles of narrow motorable roads existed.
Most of them were impassable during the rainy season. 
Electricity was a rare commodity. And there was hardly 
a modern town anywhere in the territory. The capital,
Buea, perching on the slopes of Mount Cameroon, was a very
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small town and such good buildings that existed there were 
built by the Germans. Even Her Majesty’s Commissioner 
for the Cameroons lived in the German built ’Schloss’.
No industry existed in the territory. The 
Cameroon Development Corporation (successors of the various 
German plantations in the territory) in Victoria was the 
major employer. Its task was to exploit the agricultural 
wealth of the territory allegedly for the benefit of all 
Cameroonians. But no Cameroonian occupied any high post 
in the enterprise. Most Cameroonians were poorly paid 
and poorly housed plantation labourers. Compulsory 
labour also existed in British Cameroons; although not 
in its dehumanising form as in French Cameroun. ■ The 
British view was that the object of compulsory labour was 
purely educative. It was an unavoidable and disagreeable 
necessity in order to carry on the work of administration 
and development and resorted to only where labour cannot 
otherwise be procured for public works of an essential 
and urgent nature.
After the Richardson Constitution in Nigeria in 
19^6, political events in the southern part of British 
Cameroons began to move fast. Maintaining benevolent 
neutrality in Nigerian politics, Cameroon politicians in 
Nigeria continued to agitate for an autonomous Southern 
Cameroons. By 195^, that autonomy came and Southern 
Cameroons was granted its own House of Assembly. On 1st 
October 1961, Southern Cameroons gained her independence 
and also re-unified with the former French Cameroun to
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form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. (Since 1972 It 
has been transformed into the United Republic of Cameroon.)
Colonialism whether by the Germans, British or 
French was basically the same in Cameroon; the economic 
exploitation of the territory, the imposition of alien cul­
ture, rule and law, and the rough treatment of natives.
There were always contradictions and differences in the 
value systems implanted by these colonial powers in 
Cameroon.
Germany's legacy to Cameroon is undeniably her 
initial .contribution to the economic development of the 
country and especially the creation of the concept of a
7p n q
Kamerun Nation although Johnson and Ardener take the 
view that this is a myth which has been exaggerated by 
Cameroon Nationalists. Cameroon has inherited from Britain 
and France their cultures and legal systems.
Ill. International Tutelage: Carte Blance to Import
Allen Laws
The two regimes of international administration,
80the Mandates and the Trusteeship Systems, were like ad hoc
78. W.R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation - political inte­
gration in a fragmentary society, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, chapter 3*
79. E. Ardener: 'The Kamerun Idea', West Africa, June 7th 
1958, p. 533 and June 14th 1958, p. 559.
80. See generally, A. Ndam Njoya, op.cit., ch. II, pp. 95-153; 
D.E. Gardinier, op.cit., ch. 1; H.G. Nicholas, The U.N. 
as a political institution, 5th ed., O.U.P., London, 1975, 
ch. 2 and 6; A .G . Mezerik (ed.), Colonialism and the 
United Nations, International Review Service, New York,
19b4, passim.
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bodies charged with the definite responsibility of protec­
ting and guiding weak and uncivilised peoples; of seeing 
that they progressed and gained self-government or inde­
pendence. Once this ’sacred1 mission of seeing to the 
’’well-being and development of people not yet able to 
stand by themselves” was accomplished, the system would 
liquidate itself, for, in the circumstances, there would 
be no raison d ’§tre to maintain it.
1. The mandates agreements
The Mandates Agreement drawn up for Cameroon by
Britain and France was approved by the League of Nations
in 1922. Article 2 of the Agreement provided:
’’Art. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible
for the peace, order and good government of 
the territory and for the promotion of the 
utmost material and moral well-being and
social progress of its inhabitants."
This provision conferred upon the Mandary responsibility 
for every aspect of life of the inhabitants of the terri­
tory. Article 9 of the Agreement gave her the means by
which to discharge those responsibilities.
"Art. 9. The Mandatory shall have full
powers of administration and legislation 
in the area subject to the Mandate. The 
area shall be administered in accordance 
with the laws of the Mandatory as an inte­
gral part of his territory ... The Man­
datory shall therefore be at liberty to 
apply his laws to the territory under the 
Mandate subject to the modifications 
required by local conditions ..."
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This article gave Britain and France licence to 
introduce their respective laws and legal systems into 
Cameroon. However, the fact must not escape notice that 
well before the formulation of the Mandates Agreement, the 
two Powers had each extended to their respective parts of 
Cameroon some of their laws in force in their respective 
contiguous colonial territories. Articles 2 and 9 merely 
gave a legal basis to a de facto situation. Article 2 
confirmed responsibilities which Britain and France had 
already arrogated to themselves; while article 9 gave 
both full rein to legislate in and administer the territory.
Britain and France had the right to administer 
Cameroon each in accordance with its laws and as an inte­
gral part of its territory. On this basis, English and 
French laws were imported into Cameroon. Under this pro­
vision, international agreements were also made enforceable 
in the territory. The Mandatory was moreover at liberty 
to apply its laws to the territory under Mandate. This 
did not mean that the Mandatory was positively required to 
introduce its laws into the mandated territory. It 
was Tat liberty1 to do so or not to. If it chose to 
introduce its laws into the territory, it did so "subject 
to the modifications required by local conditions".
The Mandates Agreement was conspicuously mute 
on the question of customary law in general. Only in 
regards to the holding or transfer of real property did 
the Agreement make reference to customary law.
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"Art. 5- In the framing of laws relating 
to the holding or transfer of land the 
Mandatory shall take into consideration 
Native Laws and Customs and shall respect the 
right and safeguard the interests of the 
native population."
This provision required Tnative law and custom’ to be 
taken into ’consideration' in land matters. It placed 
a positive obligation on the Mandatory to "respect the 
right and safeguard the interests of the native popu­
lation" when framing laws relating to land tenure.
However, nowhere in the Agreement is the Man­
datory even required to ’take into consideration’, let 
alone observe and enforce the observance, of customary law 
in general. The Mandatory could therefore have elected 
to be blind to the existence of customary law. But this 
she could not honestly and practically do. The vast 
majority of the natives were illiterate and governed by 
customary law. Besides, the villages were remote and 
not easily accessible, and the Mandatory had neither the 
economic means and desire to open up every corner of the 
territory nor an abundance of the requisite trained legal 
personnel to squander in the territory. Hence even if 
the Mandatory had chosen to ignore customary law and to 
enforce only her own imported laws she would have found it 
an uphill task to make a complete tabula rasa. Practical 
reasons more than anything else obliged the Mandatory to 
observe and enforce the observance of customary law; 
although she did so with a very powerful reservation - that 
it passed the 'repugnancy' (Britain) or 'civilisation' 
(France) test.
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2. The trusteeship agreements
81At the end of the Second World War, the nascent
United Nations Organisation established an ’international
trusteeship system’ to replace the mandates system which
8 2had been set up by the defunct League of Nations. By
art. 75 of the U.N. Charter, the Trusteeship System was
established ’’for the administration and supervision of
such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent
individual agreements” .
The 'individual agreements’ did not, as may be
thought, consist of agreement between the Administering
Power and the United Nations.
"Art. 79- The terms of the trusteeship for 
each territory to be placed under the trustee­
ship system, including any alteration, or 
amendment, shall be agreed upon by the States 
directly concerned, including the Mandatory 
Power ...”
The clause "shall be agreed upon by the States directly
81. Between Versailles and San Francisco, most countries had 
come to look on colonialism and imperialism as a thing 
of shame. There came to be a polarisation of Nations 
into pro- and anti-colonialists. This ambivalence was 
reflected in the U.N. whose Charter was signed at San 
Francisco on June 26th 1945.
82. See Chap. 12, art. 75 to 85 of the Charter. The U.N. 
was both sympathetic to the aspirations of colonised 
peoples for independence and concerned about the 
interests of the Great Powers. The USA and the USSR 
were however in an anti-imperialistic mood; the for­
mer still reminiscing- over the Spirit of 1776, and the 
latter prompted by the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
as interpreted by Stalin and the October 1914 Revo­
lution .
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concerned" was vague and nebulous and so gave rise to 
divergent interpretations. It was however taken to mean 
agreement between the administering authority and neigh­
bouring States. In the case of Cameroon therefore, it 
meant agreement between Britain and France.
The Agreement had however to be approved by the 
U.N. General Assembly, the organ on which ultimate respon­
sibility for the Trust Territories rested; except for 
strategic ones where ultimate responsibility rested with 
the Security Council. In practice, the degree of the 
U.N.'s jurisdiction over these territories was limited 
because the Charter used tentative language. There was 
no obligation to place a mandated territory under the new
O o
system. Article 77 merely said that the system "may be
applied to territories now held under mandate". The 
Trusteeship Council was required to consider reports from 
the Administering Authority and examine petitions from 
the trust territory "in consultation with the Administering 
Authority". If the Council wanted to make periodic visits 
to the trust territory, it could only do so "at times 
agreed upon with the Administering Authority". Hence as 
under the League, oversight could only be exercised by 
agreement with the controlling trusteeship power. Moral
83. E.g. South Africa refused to place Namibia under the 
system, a stand upheld by the I.C.J. in its judgment 
of 11.12.1950. It was only after international moral 
pressure on her that France reluctantly placed French 
Cameroun under the system.
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pressure was the Trusteeship Council’s only weapon, if 
the 'basic objectives’ of the system were being deviated 
from.
"Art. 76. The basic objectives of the trus­
teeship system ... shall be -
(a) to further international peace and 
security;
(b) to promote the political, economic, social 
and educational advancement of the inha­
bitants of the trust territories, and their 
progressive development towards self- 
government or independence as may be appro­
priate to the particular circumstances of 
each territory and its peoples and the 
freely expressed wishes of the peoples con­
cerned and as may be provided by the terms 
of each trusteeship agreement;
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion, and to encourage recognition of 
the interdependence of the peoples of the 
world; and
(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, eco­
nomic and commercial matters for all Members 
of the U.N. and their nationals, and also 
equal treatment for the latter in the 
administration of justice ...”
As under Art. 22 of the League, this provision was merely
an unenforceable expression of good intent.
It is against this background that the Trusteeship
Agreements must be considered. As under the Mandates
system, Britain and France gave themselves full powers of
administration and legislation in their respective spheres
of Cameroon. The British Trusteeship Agreement for the
Cameroons provided:
"Art. 5. For the above-mentioned purposes 
and for all purposes of this Agreement, as 
may be necessary the Administering Authority:
(a) Shall have full powers of legislation, 
administration and jurisdiction in the 
Territory and shall administer it in
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accordance with the Authority’s own laws as 
an integral part of its territory with such 
modification as may be required by local 
conditions ...” 84
This was merely Art. 9 of the Mandates Agreement suitably
reframed.
As under the Mandates Agreement nothing is said
about customary law in general. There is reference to
’native law and custom’ only with regards to land tenure.
"Art. 8. In framing laws relating to the 
holding or transfer of land and natural 
resources, the Administering Authority 
shall take into consideration native laws 
and customs, and shall respect the rights 
and safeguard the interests, both present 
and future, of the native population. No
native land or natural resources may be trans­
ferred except between natives, save with 
the previous consent of the competent public
authority. No real rights over native lands
or natural resources in favour of non-nativesgi- 
may be created except with the same consent."
Again this provision merely recapitulated and amplified 
Art. 5 of the Mandates Agreement. It did not say that
customary law governed matters relating to land and natural
resources. The Administering Authority was only required 
to take that law ’into consideration’ when framing laws 
relating to land and natural resources. The Administering 
Authority was however bound to respect the rights and safe­
guard the interests, both present and future , of the native
population.
84. See Art. 4 of the French Trusteeship Agreement for 
Cameroun.
85. See Art. 7 of the French Agreement. The French pro­
vision talks of ’local law’ and not ’native law and 
customs’. More significantly, it is silent on the 
question of ’natural resources’.
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Native land and natural resources could only be 
transferred between natives with the consent of the compe­
tent public authority. The provision was apparently 
designed to prevent native lands and natural resources 
falling into the hands of non-natives be they intending 
settlers, concessionnaires or planters. This did not 
mean that non-natives were totally debarred from acquiring 
real rights over native lands and natural resources.
They could acquire such rights upon obtaining the requisite 
consent. For example, Art. 13 of the Agreement provided 
that missionaries could ’acquire and possess' property 
in the territory subject to ’local law’. However, the 
terms 'competent public authority', ’native’ and ’non- 
native’ were vague. Nor was it clear what ’native land' 
meant. Could there have been any land in the territory 
which did not belong to the natives?
The Mandates Agreement had not made it very 
clear whether any international treaty could be applied 
to the territory. The Trusteeship Agreement put the 
matter far beyond the region of any doubt.
"Art. 7. The Administering Authority under­
takes to apply in the territory the pro­
visions of any international convention and 
recommendations already existing or hereafter 
drawn up by the U.N. or by the specialised 
agencies ..., which may be appropriate to 
the particular circumstances of the Terri­
tory ..." 86
86. See Art. 6 of the French Trusteeship Agreement for 
Cameroun under French Administration.
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The regime of international tutelage therefore 
gave Britain and France a blank cheque to import their 
laws as well as international treaties into Cameroon.
With the exception of the provision requiring the Adminis­
tering Authority to take native law and custom into con­
sideration when framing laws relating to the holding and 
transfer of land, the Trusteeship Agreements say nothing 
about customary law in general. There was no requirement 
that customary law be ascertained and enforced. The 
Administering Authority was at liberty to ascertain and 
enforce it or not to.
In keeping with the paternalistic attitude 
which the United Nations adopted towards colonial terri­
tories, the system of international tutelage assumed that 
the ’basic objectives’ of the System could only be 
achieved by the introduction in the trusteeship terri­
tories of the value systems of the Administering Authorities: 
their culture, policies, laws and legal systems. In the 
final analysis, this so-called system of international 
administration by Britain and France did not constitute 
a panacea. Cameroon was in no way privileged. The 
situation in the territory was not different from that in 
other African countries under colonial rule: the same
economic exploitation, poor social and educational faci­
lities, and the wholesale importation of alien cultures 
and legal norms.
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PART II
COLONIAL JUSTICE IN CAMEROON
Law and the judicial process occupied no small place 
in colonisation. They commanded and controlled a growing 
civilisation. They contributed to stability, peace and 
order. The acquisition of a colonial territory, whether 
by settlement, purchase, conquest, cession, or agreement, 
at once necessitated the introduction of an extraneous 
law and the creation of new courts to administer it, and 
the evaluation and qualified application of the local cus­
tomary laws. At the end of the day there was always in 
a colonial territory a dual system of courts, one adminis­
tering exclusively the domestic law and the other adminis­
tering basically the imported law. This was generally 
true whether such a colonial territory was labelled a 
'colony', ’protectorate', or 'trusteeship territory’.
It is true that Cameroon was styled a German protec­
torate and not a colony.^ It is also an historical fact 
that following the defeat of Germany in Cameroon, German 
Kamerun was in March 1916 partitioned by Britain and France. 
British Cameroons and French Cameroun became, in 1922,
1. Schutzgebiet and not Kolonie. H.N.A. Enonchong, 
Cameroon Constitutional Law, Centre d ’Edition et de 
Production de Manuels, Yaounde, 1967, argues at p. 4q 
that Cameroon was never a German colony. It is however 
submitted that the tag ’protectorate’ was merely a 
labelling swindle for the territory was to all intents 
and purposes a German colony.
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mandated (trusteeship, after World War II) territories
under Britain and France.
But, by and large, the way Cameroon was administered
by the various colonial powers (.Germany, Britain and France),
and the policies they each pursued in the territory were,
2
with minor differences basically the same as what obtained 
in their various colonies or protectorates. Take Germany.
By 1907 she had clearly come to see and to treat Kamerun 
as a colony. British Cameroons, a trusteeship territory, 
was not administered any differently from other British
2. The following differences were said to exist between a 
colony on the one hand and a protectorate or trust terri­
tory on the other hand: (a) A colony was headed by a
Governor or Governor-General while a protectorate or 
trust territory fell under the administrative head of
a Commissioner or High Commissioner. But Governor and 
Commissioner had the same powers and were subject to 
the same legal constitutional limitations. (b) The 
legislative enactments of a colony were called Ordinances 
while those of a protectorate or trust territory were 
styled Proclamations. In practice, legislative enact­
ments for protectorates and trust territories were also 
called Ordinances. (c) The inhabitants of a colony were 
called ’subjects’ while those of a protectorate or trust 
territory were known as ’protected’ or 'administered' 
persons. But this distinction had little practical 
consequences. (d) There was in theory another difference 
in terms of British jurisdiction in each type. Juris­
diction in a colony was said to be unlimited and in a 
protectorate, limited. Again this was only in theory 
since jurisdiction in a protectorate could be extended 
indefinitely. "In Kenya Colony the jurisdiction of 
the British Crown is unlimited; but in the Kenya Protec­
torate, it is limited. It Is limited to such jurisdic­
tion as the Crown has acquired. ... The limits may in 
fact be extended indefinitely ..." per Denning, L-J.
(as he then was) in Nyali v. Att. Gen. (1955), 2 W.L.R. 
649. Cf. Martin Wight, British colonial constitutions 
1949, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952, pp. 5-14.
3. Cf. Area handbook for United Republic of Cameroon, 
Washington, 1974, p7 12; E7 Mveng, Hlstolre du Cameroun, 
Presence Africaine, 1963, p. 293.
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possessions such as, for example, protectorates. France 
too, like Germany, eventually came to refer to, to regard 
and to treat French Cameroun as a colony.
This state of affairs was not altered by the fact
that after World War IT, the French Government thought the
use of the word ’colony* so anathema that the Qua! d ’Orsay
had to request the Minister for France Overseas to instruct
French colonial administrators to desist from using the
term ’colony' or ’colonial’ in their official texts and 
4
despatches. ” ... This terminology," wrote the French 
Foreign Minister, "does not tie in with the statute of the 
French Union such as it had been spelt out by the Consti­
tution of 1946. It evokes a notion which from the formal 
legal point of view, Is now outmoded ... Abroad, this lack 
of change is in danger of taking a vexatious turn, parti­
cularly in circles where our policy towards those Terri­
tories under our charge is, out of good faith or not-, being 
systematically misrepresented ..."
By letter number 7651 of the 2nd September 1949 
the Minister for Overseas France replied to his political 
colleague at the Quai d ’Orsay that laws and decrees which 
were passed before the 1946 Constitution, for France’s 
overseas territories made frequent use of the terms ’colony’
4. Letter No. 2533 SC dated Paris, 17th August 1949,
National Archives, Yaounde, File No. 12053/C: Circulaire
7653 Emploi des mots ’colonial’ et ’colonie’.
5. Ibid. My translation.
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and rcolonial', and therefore that it was impossible,
when referring to or quoting from such laws, not to use
those same words. He however assured the Foreign Minister
that steps were already being taken to get rid of the
adjective ’colonial’ hitherto appended to certain names.
Thus for example, ’le Service Administratif Colonial’
became ’le Service Administratif Outre-Mer’; 'Office de
la Recherche Scientifique Coloniale’ became ’Office de la
Recherche scientifique Outre-Mer’.
In Cameroun the Haut Commissaire, Monsieur
Soucadaux, instructed his subordinates to refrain from
using the words ’colony’, ’colonial’, and ’indigene’.
For the last word he substituted the word ’africain’.
It would seem that this operation was merely a
cosmetic exercise, a window dressing prompted by the feeling
that French policy in her overseas territories was being
7
systematically misrepresented abroad.
Be that as it may, the term ’colonial’ is used 
here in a wide and not a restrictive sense. It does not 
refer exclusively to a colony as opposed to a protectorate 
or trust territory. The word is used here in an elastic
6. Circular No. 99/5P dated Yaounde, 16th August 1950, 
National Archives, Yaounde, File No. 12053/C.
7. At this time many colonial territories were already agi­
tating for independence from their colonial masters. 
Ihthis the U.N. proved an appropriate platform from which 
to castigate colonialism. French colonial policy was 
one of those policies which frequently came under fire.
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sense to describe the dependent or subordinate politico- 
economic relationship which existed between a subjugating 
State (the colonial power) and a subjugated territory 
irrespective of whether such a territory was styled ’colony’, 
’protectorate’ or ’trust territyr’ in colonial terminology.
The expression 'colonial justice’ is therefore 
used here as referring to the system of legal justice which 
obtained in such a subjugated territory during the period 
in which it was under the tutelage of the colonial 
power. Indeed, the expression ’colonial justice’ con­
jures up the picture of a system, a system of justice which 
was peculiar to and obtained in colonial territories.
This was in fact the case. For, the manner in which jus­
tice was administered by Germany, Britain and France in 
Cameroon reveals similar basic characteristics. There is 
no reason to suppose that this was a mere coincidence.
On the contrary, it does seem to me that it was a deliber­
ate judicial policy pursued by colonial powers in their 
colonial territories.
The following common characteristics are dis- 
cernable in the systems of justice which obtained in 
Cameroon during German, British and French colonial rule: 
a qualified recognition and enforcement of 
customary law;
the introduction by the colonial power of his 
own law;
the existence of two parallel systems of courts, 
one primarily for whites and the other
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exclusively for ’natives’; 
the use of the administrator-cum-judge; 
the separation of powers hardly existed since 
the colonial administrator was also a ’judge'; 
the colonial judicial service was merely an arm 
of the colonial civil service; judges were 
recruited like all other colonial civil servants; 
the Germans and the French, had an arbitrary and a 
rough system of justice for ’natives’; the 
Germans called it diszlplinarstraf and the 
French, 1 ’indigenat. Due to the absence of legal 
representation, the British also administered 
a rough system of justice as regards the indi­
genous population.
At least, if only for these common traits, one is 
justified in speaking of a system of colonial justice in 
Cameroon. It would however be naive to conclude from 
this that the systems of justice which obtained in German 
Kamerun, British Cameroons and French Cameroun were wholly 
identical. Indeed each system had features peculiar to
it and which marked it out from the other systems.
Colonial justice in Cameroon will therefore be studied 
under the following three headings:
Chapter 3. The German system
Chapter 4. The British system
Chapter 5. The French system.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE GERMAN SYSTEM
Cameroon was annexed by imperial Germany in 1884.'1'
Thirty-two years later, in 1916, Germans were defeated
and forced out of the territory by English-led and French-
led forces. During those thirty-two years of German rule,
civil administration in German Kamerun was closely allied
2
to jurisdiction in courts. The court was always the 
first means through which various areas of the territory 
were administered. The use of local chiefs as judges in 
the village courts meant that complaints came in via the 
courts to the Administration.
Although Germany had annexed Cameroon in 1884, 
the English-supervised Douala Court of Equity, which had 
been set up in 1856 by the European mercantile community 
to resolve trade disputes between them and the autochonous 
traders, continued to operate as before. Such a surviving 
vestige of British influence in the territory was irksome 
to the Germans. Accordingly, the Douala Court of Equity 
was abolished in 1885.
1. Douala Treaty of 12 July 1884. See supra, Chapter 2.
The acquisition of Cameroon by Germany received the 
benediction of the Berlin Conference.
2. Cf. The Victoria Centenary Committee, Victoria - Southern 
Cameroons 1858-1958, published by the Basel Mission Book 
Depot, Victoria, and printed by Spottiswoode, Ballantyne
& Co., London, 1958, pp. 79-80.
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Following his abolition of that Court, Governor 
Soden set up a temporary court (something like the early 
consular courts in British territories) in Douala with 
himself as president. He appointed two lay members of 
his staff to assist him in his judicial duties. They 
held office for one year. This temporary court exercised 
jurisdiction in matters between Europeans inter se. An 
issue involving a European and a Caermoonian was first of' 
all tried by a panel of ad hoc ’judges’ appointed by the 
Governor. An appeal from here lay to the temporary court 
over which the Governor personally presided. Matters 
between Cameroonians inter se continued to be dealt with 
by the various traditional courts which had been in exis­
tence before the arrival of Europeans. This arrangement 
went on until 1892 when a .system of courts was set up for 
Cameroonians in Douala. As the German flag was laboriously 
but surely carried deeper and deeper into the territory
so too the system of courts established in Douala was
•2
extended to the hinterland. As for Europeans it was not 
until around 1900 that a durable system of courts was also 
organised for them.
Thus there existed in German Kamerun two dif­
ferent systems of courts, one for Europeans and the other
3. The territory was structured differently from area to 
area. In areas where German rule was not yet firmly 
established, areas on a military footing such as Garoua, 
Bamenda, and Yaounde, the district administrator had a 
free hand in the dispensation of justice.
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for Cameroonians. The former courts applied essentially 
German law as obtains in metropolitan Germany while the 
latter courts applied basically customary law. Hence, 
there was judicial segregation between Europeans and 
Cameroonians.
I . The System of Justice for Europeans
Europeans in the territory were subject to German 
law which was administered by a separate courts system.
1. Content of the applicable law
In 1886 debates began in the German Reichstag
on measures aimed at laying the constitutional foundations
4
for a government in Kamerun. But it. was not until 1900 
that the administration of justice, as regards the white
c;
community in the territory, was regulated.
Two basic Acts were passed declaring German law 
applicable to Europeans in the German colonies generally. 
The first was the Law regarding Consular Jurisdiction
4. H.N.A. Enonchong, Cameroon Constitutional Law, Centre 
d ’Edition et de Production de Manuels et Auxiliaire, 
Yaounde, 1967, p. 50.
5- Victor Lehmann, 'The German appellate practice’, in
Barnett Hollander, Colonial justice - the unique achieve­
ment of the Privy Council’s Committee of Judges, Bowes &
Bowes, London, 1961, p. 109.
(Gezetz ueber die Konsulargerichtsbarkeit) dated 7th 
April 1900. The second was the Colonial Law (Schutz- 
gebietsgesetz) dated 10th September 1900. In terms of 
these instruments the administration of justice with 
regards to Europeans in the territory was to be governed 
by the laws of the German Empire.
Accordingly, the German Civil and Criminal Codes 
became applicable in Kamerun. The Civil Code, dated 
1896, consisted of five books. Book I dealt with general 
principles, Book II with the Law of Obligations, Book III 
with the Law of Things, Book IV with Family Law, and Book 
V with the Law of Inheritance.
The Imperial German Criminal Code had come into
force in Germany itself only in 1871 as the Criminal Code
7
of the German Empire. The Code adopted the traditional 
division of offences into felonies (Verbrechen), mis­
demeanours (Vergehen), and simple offences (Uebertretung).
A ’Verbrechen' was any offence punishable either with 
death, or penal internment or military detention of more 
than five .years. A ’Vergehen' was any offence punishable 
with military detention not exceeding five years, with con­
finement, or with a fine not exceeding 150 Marks. Part I
6. Chung Hui Wang, The German Civil Code 1896, Stevens & 
Sons, London, 1907.
7. Gage & Waters, The Imperial German Criminal Code, Hortor
& Co. Ltd, Johannesburg, 1917; G. Drage, The Criminal
Code of the German Empire, 1885.
of the Code dealt with the punishment of crimes in general. 
Decapitation was prescribed as the mode of carrying out 
the death penalty.. Another mode of punishment was soli­
tary confinement. Part II of the Code was devoted to
particular crimes. The famous offences of treason and 
high treason were respectively contained in sections 80 
and 93.
2. The courts system
The courts system was very simple. There were 
just two types of courts, courts of first instance and a
o
unique appellate court.
The court of first instance was the district 
court - so called because there was one of such courts in 
each of the administrative districts into which the terri­
tory was divided. Called Bezirkgerichte, the district 
court was presided over by a solo judge known as the 
Bezirksrichter. The Bezirksrichter’s jursidiction in 
civil matters, was analogous to the civil jurisdiction exer­
cised by a court of first instance in metropolitan Germany. 
His powers in criminal matters were also similar to those 
exercised by juries in criminal matters in Germany. Where
8. A separate system of courts for Europeans was in fact not 
really necessary. The white community was small. For 
example, the Governor’s staff In 1890 consisted of only
12 officials, in 1900 it was made up of 200 officials, 
and in 1916, 240 officials. See Area handbook for the 
United Republic of Cameroon, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 1974, p . 13.
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a district judge sat with two lay assessors, the court’s 
civil jurisdiction was the same as. that of a court of 
first instance back in Germany. In criminal matters, a 
district judge sitting with four lay assessors had the 
same jurisdiction as that exercised both by the police 
court and the assizes court in Germany.
An appellate court, the Obergericht-, was estab­
lished and served as a court of appeal for Germans in 
Cameroon as well as those in Togoland. It sat in Douala 
but was moved to Buea in 1905 when that town became the 
new capital of German Kamerun. The President of the court, 
Qber— ^richter, sat with four lay assessors, Bel'sl't'zer.
It was a court of last resort.
There were demands in the German Reichstag for 
the creation of a colonial supreme court, a Ko Tonlalgeri cht shof, 
either in Berlin or Hamburg to entertain appeals from Germans 
in the colonies. Complaints had been reaching Berlin from 
the colonies about the quality of justice dispensed there.
The idea was to have a German counterpart of the English 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The proposed 
Kolonialger!chtshof was however to serve as an appellate
court for civil appeals arising from Germans in the colonies.
9The proposals did not materialise into anything concrete.
9- H.R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroon 1884-1914: a case
study in modern imperialism, Jonathan Cape, London, 1938, 
p. 200; B. Hollander, op.cit., passim; contra M.E.
Townsend, The rise and fall of Germany’s colonial empire 
1884-1918, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930, p. 2 80, 
where it is suggested that the Kolonialgerichtshof was 
in fact established in Germany in 1914.
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Up to 1900 Germans appeared to have been immune 
from prosecution. Even when they began to appear in 
court after 1900, charged with offences, they were often 
readily acquitted. This was especially the case where 
the German stood to go to jail if convicted of an offence.
In such a case it was thought better to acquit rather 
than send him to jail. However, if he must be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment, then he was to be deported to 
the mother country to serve his term there and not in 
Cameroon.
This judicial attitude was based on two theories. 
The first was that if a German were ever sent to prison 
the white man’s ego would be hurt. No German would again 
ever command the respect and esteem of Cameroonians.^
So a.German who was jailed could appeal even to the Reich­
stag on the ’proper’ ground that sending him to prison 
would dangerously compromise German prestige and authority 
among Cameroonians. The second theory was that it was 
revulsive and repugnant to deport German criminals to serve 
their terms in Germany. This was the more intolerable as 
at that time all the other colonial powers were dumping 
their convicts in far away colonial possessions.'*''*'
10. For, Cameroonians would then realise that Europeans were 
also capable of committing crimes.
11. Britain’s dumping ground was Australia, and France's 
was French Guyana. Portugal, Spain, and Holland had 
similar dustbins for dumping human refuse.
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And so it came to pass that the fine became the
commonest penalty for European offenders. In the judicial
year 1909-1910, one hundred and fourteen Europeans, appeared
in court charged with various offences. But nearly all
of them were discharged and acquitted.
Most of them were charged with assault.occasioning
bodily injury to Cameroonians. The fact that they were so
readily discharged and acquitted gives rise to at least
two observations. First, the ill-treatment of Cameroonians
went on unabated and was in fact condoned by the local
authorities. Secondly, the courts were not inclined to
12punish European offenders.
Having seen how justice, as regards Europeans, was 
administered in German Kamerun, let us now look over on the 
other side of the fence and see also how justice, as 
regards Cameroonians, was administered.
II. The System of Justice for the Indigenous Population
In the early years of the exercise of sovereignty 
over Cameroon by Germany, disputes between Cameroonians were
12. H. Schnee, German colonization, past & future, George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1926, at p . 124 argues that 
,TThis phenomenon repeats itself in all colonies with a 
mixed population. Since the judges work independently, 
it is a matter on which the government is practically 
powerless to interfere.” One must strongly disagree 
with this assumption. To talk of the separation of 
powers, least of all of the independence of the judges 
in the colonies, is nothing but a palpable falsehood 
bordering on farce.
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settled by Individual German officials with the help of
interpreters. Account was taken of local customs. In
serious cases, such as for example a feud between two
rival tribes or villages which had previously resulted in
bloodshed, the Governor of the colony was petitioned to
mediate in the matter. Missionaries also occasionally
assumed a similar office.
The administration of justice was,, with regards
13to Cameroonians, governed by ordinances. Section 4 of
the Colonial Law of 1900 vested in the Kaiser the right
to legislate for the colonies by virtue of his royal pre- 
14rogative. The Kaiser could however delegate this
authority to such persons or corporate bodies, as he deemed 
appropriate. Generally, the exercise of his powers was 
delegated mainly to the Imperial Chancellor. For Cameroon 
he did so by a Decree of 3rd June 1908. The Imperial 
Chancellor could in turn sub-delegate these powers to the 
Governors in the colony by the authority or consent of the 
Kaiser. In fact this sub-delegation of powers to the 
Governors became the rule rather than the exception.
1. Content of. the applicable law
By direction of the Imperial Chancellor, the dis­
pensation of justice, as far as concerned the Cameroon
13- L ’Abbe T. Ketchoua, Contribution a l'histoire du
Cameroun de 450 avant Jesus-Christ a nos jours, Yaounde,
1962, p. 80.
14. V. Lehmann, op.cit., p. 110.
121.
population, fell under the administrative authority of the 
Governor and his subordinates. They were enjoined to 
give due consideration to local customs in settling dis­
putes. Here, there was no bifurcation of the adminis­
trative and judicial functions. The German colonial civil 
servant was both judge and administrator.
There was no codification of the procedure and 
the substantive laws which applied in issues between 
Cameroonians.
In civil matters the set of courts for Cameroonians 
in theory applied exclusively the known customary law and 
procedure of the area of the court. In practice, the 
German Civil Code, tempered by such customary law as 
could be ascertained, applied. If a court for Europeans 
was seised of a matter between Cameroonians, the court took 
native law and custom into account in settling the issue.
In an issue between a Cameroonian and a European the 
question as to which court could properly claim juris­
diction depended on the race of the defendant. If he was 
a European the courts for Europeans had jurisdiction; if 
he was a Cameroonian, the courts for Cameroonians were 
competent.
In the early days of the colony there was no 
attempt to define criminal offences. It was largely left 
in the hands of each German District Officer (Be-zirksamtmann) , 
leader of an expedition or military commander of a station 
in the interior, to determine what acts or omissions by
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Cameroonians constituted an offence as well as the punish-
15ment appropriate for such an offence.
After 1900 the Criminal Code of Germany was made 
applicable to Cameroonians as well, with the important 
qualification that offences punishable under the Code by 
10 years’ imprisonment could, if committed by a Cameroo­
nian, be punished with death. These offences included 
rape and allied offences committed by Cameroonians against 
Europeans, attempts to endanger railway trains, and forcible
resistance to a German official in the discharge of his
 ^ ^  16 duties.
In addition to offences contained in the Criminal 
Code, offences against employers by any ’native' servant 
or employee (e.g. carelessness, laziness, disobedience, 
desertion) could be summarily punished by a Disziplinarstraf 
involving flogging or confinement in chains. Moreover, 
the administrative official could use 'administrative 
coercion’, Verwaltungsstrafverfahren, for non-compliance
with any executive order which the official concerned had
4. • 17the power to issue.
The Kaiser, by an Imperial Decree dated 15th June
1896, vested in the German Crown the ownership of all lands
15. Sir Hugh Clifford, German Colonies, a plea for the 
native races, John Murray, London, 1918, p. 69.
16. Report on the British Sphere of the Cameroons, 1921, 
Cmnd. 1647, p. 54.
17. Ibid.
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in the Cameroon hinterland on the highly questionable
18ground that such lands were ’vacant and ownerless’.
The Decree sanctioned the claim by white planters to
19private titles to land. Dealings in land were conducted
in accordance with the received principles of German Law
of real property. A system of registration of titles
to land in a land register (Grundbuch). was introduced in 
20the territory. In theory, titles which were so regis-
21tered in the Grundbuch are valid today.in Cameroon.
2. The courts system
A system of courts with a triple hierarchy was. 
set up in 1892 for Cameroonians: Village Courts, Native
Arbitration Tribunals, and the Governor’s Court.
The lowest court was the Village Court. It was
presided over by the Chief of the village. But it was
22subject to the control of the local German administrator.
18. This decree of 15th June 1896 must be read together with 
that of 17th October 1896. See Ruppel, Die Landes- 
gesetzgebung fur das Schutzgebiet Kamerun, Ernst 
Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1912, pp. 687, 689.
19. Cf. C. Anyangwe, ’German colonial land policy in Kamerun’, 
Cameroon Tribune, May 17 & 24, 1978, p. 9«
20. Ibid.
21. Cf. J.N. Monie, ’The Influence of German Law In Cameroon’,
Ann. de la Faculte de Droit du Cameroun, 1973* No. 5,
pp. 3-12.
22. H. Rudin, op.cit. at p. 202 informs us that there were 
abuses where ’native’ chiefs settled cases. So much Is
the 'native’s ’ love for litigation, he says, that the ’native’ 
courts became flooded with cases as a result of which the 
Administration had to require the advance payment of a fee 
for the hearing of any case. It seems the amount payable 
was originally fixed by the chiefs for, in 1900 action had 
to be taken to protect ’natives’ from the excessive fees 
 charged by the chiefs. __________________________________________
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This court was competent only in matters in which small 
amounts were involved - issues with a monetary value of 
up to 100 marks in civil matters and criminal offences 
carrying a penalty of up to 300 marks fine or six months 
imprisonment.
Native Arbitration Tribunals had original juris­
diction in civil and criminal matters beyond the compe­
tence of the Village courts. They also exercised appel­
late jurisdiction In matters coming from the Village courts. 
A Native Arbitration Tribunal however had no jurisdiction 
to try murder, manslaughter, or crimes punishable with 
death. For all other offences It was competent and could 
pass sentences of up to two years. The Tribunal was 
required to keep a record of its proceedings. The Governor 
could attend its sessions in person or appoint someone to 
represent him. A multi-member court, the Native Arbit­
ration Tribunals were set up only in districts of some 
importance well-defined ethnographically and economically. 
Members of the court were appointed by the District Officer.
The court of last resort for Cameroonians was 
the Governor., sitting as a court. The Governor could 
however transfer his judicial functions to the European 
Chief Justice who then sat as a court of last resort for 
Cameroonians in the place of the Governor. In fact the 
Governor almost always delegated his judicial functions to 
the Chief Justice. But this practice did not contradict 
the principle according to which the administration of
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justice vis-a-vis Cameroonians was subject to the super­
vision and control of the administration.
Whenever the Governor delegated his judicial 
duties to the Chief Justice, the latter did not act qua 
Chief Justice but decided the case as the Governor in the 
circumstances would have done.
Moreover, in matters outside the scope of the 
Village Court and the Native Arbitration Tribunal, the 
District Officer (Bezirksamtmann) or the chief of a mili­
tary station (St a ti o ns1e i t e r ) exercised first instance 
jurisdiction while the Governor, or by his delegation the 
Chief Justice (Oberrichter), exercised appellate juris­
diction. No further appeal lay from here.
3. Punishment of Cameroonian offenders
23 24Police cruelty was not unknown. Various
means were used to extort confessions, denunciations, and 
similar evidence. Even before his conviction the Camer­
oonian accused could be knocked about in court by the 
police. "If the accused or his witnesses did not stand 
at attention strictly; if he moved his hand when making
23. The German police force in the territory was in reality 
not a purely civil force; it was semi-military, the 
Polizeisoldat. In addition Germans had soldiers 
(Schtuztruope") stationed in various barracks in the 
territory. See Report on the British Sphere of the Ca- 
meroons, Cmnd 1647’, 1921, p. 54"
24. P. Weston, The black slaves of Prussia, U.M.C.A., 
London, 1917, p. 9.
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his statement; if he called the German ’master* instead
of ’great master’; if he should hesitate in answering . ..,
the police boxed his ears or hit him with their fists. It
was the custom. It exalted the Germans' dignity. That
2 5it did not serve justice was no matter.”
Methods of punishing Cameroonians included the 
death penalty, imprisonment, corporal chastisement, and 
fines. There were acquittals in certain cases, and sen­
tences of imprisonment were seldom long. But this must be
understood against the background that Germans showed no
2 6particular readiness to send the Cameroonian to prison.
A number of beliefs deeply held by Germans in
the territory explains this general disinclination to pass
prison sentences. It was believed that, unlike the
European, the African attached no value to freedom. It
was also a commonly held belief among Europeans that
Africans regarded the prison house as a sort of mansion
where one led a life of ease with the problem of social
security solved. Again the Germans believed Africans
took imprisonment as a reward rather than as punishment for
crime. The imposition of fines to be paid in ivory became 
27frequent.
25. Ibid. This account is probably an exaggeration. But
it does not distort the truth.
26. Rudin, op.cit., p. 200; Schnee, op.cit. at p. 119;
Enonchong, op.cit. at p. 52.
27. In this way the administration came to have a large 
stock of ivory much to the envy of individual German 
traders.
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As for the death penalty, the carrying out of
any execution was subject to confirmation by the Governor.
But provision was made for summary trials and the immediate
carrying out of the death penalty during an 'emergency'
riot, or war'. The use of summary procedures became the
rule rather than the exception. The public was excluded
2 8from law courts. Cases were often heard in camera.
Indeed the leader ..of an expedition or the commander of a
military garrison in the far interior had the power to
exact the death penalty should he feel convinced of the 
29need to do so.  ^ He would no doubt make a report to the 
Governor. But then the execution would already have taken 
place.
However, it is notorious that flogging, torture,
and vicarious punishment remained the favourite and most
cherished ways of 'civilising' Cameroonians. It mattered
not that whipping was criticised by liberals in the Reichstag
and that regulations placed limitations on it. What
counted, it seemed, was that it was highly recommended by
protagonists of colonialism as the best cure for African
delinquency and the proper way of civilising primitive 
80races. And so the whip ruled in Cameroon.
28. Clifford, op.cit., p. 75.
29. Rudin, op.cit., p. 206.
30. According to Schnee, op.cit. at p. 119, ’’The whip or 
cane is used in all colonies where there are primitive 
races to deal with, the native territories under British 
and French rule not excepted. It is really Impossible 
to do without it altogether, for the native in many 
respects resembles a child."
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In a move advertised as representing a liberal
policy, the Imperial Chancellor promulgated a number of
decrees aimed at curbing and regulating the punishment of
31natives in the colonies. The first decree dated 17th
February 1896 provided that "In proceedings at law where
natives are concerned,, any measures for the purpose of
obtaining confessions or declarations other than those
allowed by the German Rules of Court are forbidden. The
infliction of unusual punishments particularly in the
cases of suspected guilt, is likewise prohibited."
But another decree was passed on the 22nd April
1896 providing that "The admissible punishments are:
corporal chastisement (whipping, flogging), fines, imprison-
32ment with hard labour, imprisonment in chains, death ...
A sentence of flogging is to be carried out with an instru­
ment approved by the Governor, that of a sentence of 
whipping with a light cane or switch. A sentence of 
flogging or whipping may specify a single or double flog­
ging or whipping. The second flogging must not take place 
until after the expiry of two weeks."
The decree proscribed the whipping of women and 
children. It further provided that flogging or whipping 
was to be administered in the presence of an official and 
a doctor or sanitary officer.
The decree indeed took care to describe the whip
31. See Clifford, op.cit., pp. 71-72; Rudin op.cit., p. 203-
32. It was only as from 1900 that Germans began to keep 
statistics of sentences passed on convicted persons in Ca­
meroon. Statistics for 1900 to 1913 show that an 
average of 30 Cameroonians were being executed yearly, 
i.e. at least 390 death penalties carried out between 
1900 and 1913. See Rudin, op.cit., p. 203.
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Itself with detail. The German whip was ropes’ ends
softened by being beaten with a hammer or piece of wood
and issued by the Governor as a necessary item of equipment
for the good administration of the colony. It was 60 cm
long and 2 to 2^ cm thick. A record of all floggings
was required to be kept. Finally, it was provided that
flogging should be administered as a punitive measure only,
never as a disciplinary one, and never legally by a private 
33person.
Perhaps no instance illustrated the cleavage 
between paper legality and social reality in German Kamerun 
than this one. What transpired in practice belied the 
theory on paper.' The decrees made no provision for means 
of control of possible and easily foreseeable excesses by 
individual Germans. They were glaringly silent as to any 
form of trial being a necessary preliminary to punishment. 
They ignored the desirability of evidence being taken and 
committed into writing.
The decrees themselves represented an official 
admission of malpractices that had become commonplace In 
the German colonies. They confirmed that indeed improper
33. Townsend, op.cit., p. 286.
34. ’’The German method in the colonies was of a patriar­
chal character. The officials in charge were expected
to use their knowledge of human nature and familiarity 
with native customs and usages rather than lose them­
selves and bewilder the litigants in the technicalities 
of a Europeanized procedure." See Schnee, op.cit., 
pp. 123-124.
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methods were being used to obtain 'confessions and dec­
larations’; that ’unusual punishments were being inflicted 
even to mere suspects; that 'corporal chastisement’ was 
the ordinarily ’admissible’ form of punishment; and that 
a sentence of flogging was being carried out all at one 
flogging session.
That the 1896 decrees were honoured more in 
breach than in their observance is amply evidenced by the 
fact that in 1907 another decree was passed in another 
attempt to regulate the manner in which ’natives’ were
being punished. Jesko von Puttkamer who held the gover- 
35norship in Cameroon during this period was more
interested in the mercantile prosperity of Germans than
in the bien-etre of Cameroonians. So the 1907 decrees
were largely ignored. No one bothered about legal
niceties, and the status quo ante went on unperturbed.
The notorious ’law of floggings’ was carried out in a
37manner which was nothing short of brutality.
35. Six Germans held the Governorship in Cameroon through­
out the whole period of German rule: Soden (1885-1891), 
Zimmerer (1891-1895), Puttkamer (1895-1907), Seitz 
(1907-1910), Gleim (1910-1912), and Ebermaier (1912-1915).
36. Out of the 2,700 Cameroonians punished in 1906-1907,
906 were subjected to flogging; in 1907-1908, the num­
ber was 924 out of 3,150. In 1912-1913, of the 11,229 
Cameroonians who appeared in court 4,800 were sentenced 
to flogging. See Rudin, op.cit., p. 203, fin. 3.
37. Weston, op.cit., at p . 7 has noted that ’’The condemned 
man is not tied up, as he ought to be. He lies on the 
earth, his face in the dust or on a hard floor, as the 
case may be. After the first two or three stokes he 
usually has to be seized and forced to keep still. If 
he continues to wriggle and scream, he is liable to
/Continued over
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With a system in which the administering authority 
either participated actively or acquiesced in forms of 
torture the police usually supplied a criminal to meet 
every case. Common forms of torture were: beating day
by day for several days, putting the victim in the iron-hat, 
finger-bending, and the chain-gang.
Germans never hesitated to inflict vicarious 
punishment on Cameroonians. Parents were made to suffer 
for the faults of sons. A wife was also made to suffer 
for the faults of her husband. And this not only for local 
offences where connivance or complicity could be suspected 
but for offences committed in distant places as well.
Footnote 37 continued from previous page.
receive the same number of strokes again, there and then. 
Again when the punishment is over, if in his pain and 
excitement he forgets to come to attention and salute 
the German, he is liable there and then, to receive the 
whole punishment again. Thus while the law orders 
fifty lashes to be received in two instalments, a man 
gets fifty at one time: 25 for his offence and 25 for
his breach of etiquette."
38. The iron-hat was a special device consisting of a band 
of iron. It was passed round the victim’s head and 
then tightened by means of a vice-like screw. The screw 
was tightened progressively to produce pain especially 
around the temples until the victim confesses to an 
alleged crime. Finger-bending was a form of torture by 
which a string was tied to the middle finger of the 
victim, passed back under and around the fore-arm and 
tightened until the man confessed. The chain-gang 
operated like this. A number of ’natives’ were chained 
by the neck to one very heavy chain. They remained so 
chained until they had purged their prison sentences.
Day and night, at all times and in all circumstances, 
the men lived more as one, while they were entirely at 
the mercy of the gaolers who used on them freely heavy 
nail boots, or the butt-ends of their rifles. The 
chain-gang was the method used by slave traders to fetter 
Africans before transporting them to America. The 
Germans must have fallen in love with this method. Cf. 
Weston, op.cit., pp. 7-11; Cmnd No. 1647, 1921, op.cit., 
p. 54.
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Women were particularly vulnerable because it was believed 
’natives’ treasured their wives as the most important item 
of property they possess.
The excuse for the application of the principle 
of group responsibility here was that the jungle provided 
an excellent asylum for delinquent Cameroonians, thereby 
making arrest of offenders almost impossible. It was 
also contended that Cameroonians tended to shield their 
brothers.
For these reasons, whenever an accused person 
evaded arrest his spouse, parent, nearest of kin, or 
fellow tribesman was seized and held hostage until the cul­
prit returned. A man’s property could also be seized 
and impounded for the payment of a debt owed by his 
relative.
The ex post facto justification for abandoning
the principle of individual responsibility in respect of
Cameroonians was that such practices were current among
’natives’ themselves. Hence, the Germans never hesitated
to arrest the chief of a village or to flog him as propi-
39tiation for offences committed by escaped subjects. A
worse fate befell a chief seen to be taking sides with or 
leading his people in making just claims from the adminis­
tration.
A case in point was the sad Affaire Rudolf Duala
39. See Rudin, op.cit., p. 206; Enonchong, op.cit., p. 52.
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40Manga. We shall close this chapter on it just as the
case itself closed the period of German rule in Cameroon.
When his father, chief Manga Ndumbe of Douala,
died on September 2nd 1908, Rudolf Duala inherited the
Douala chiefdom of Bell. He was officially enthroned on
May 2nd 1910. As chief, he was absorbed into the German
4ladministrative system and was on a salary of 3S000 marks 
a year.
In 1910 the Germans decided to expropriate the
people of Douala of land in the area today known as
’Quartier JossT so as to make it a white residential area
42with Government services. The Douala rightly resisted
the plan and made representations to the Reichstag. When 
the official decree dealing with the expropriation was 
published in January 1913 protests increased. That same 
year the German Secretary for the Colonies, Dr Solf, visited 
Cameroon. The Douala seized the opportunity to make their 
animosity to the expropriation plan known to him.
40. Rudin, op.cit., pp. 4o8-4ll; J.R. Brutsch, "Autour du 
Proces de Rudolf Duala Manga1, Etudes Camerounaises,
No. 51, Mars 1956, pp. 44-51; Townsend, op.cit.,
pp. 282-283.
41. The value of one German mark in Cameroon in 1917 was 85 
French centimes or 8 British pence. See Arrete of 3rd 
April 1917 'fixant le taux du mark dans les Territoires 
Occupe*s de l TAncien Cameroun,’ Journal Officiel des 
Territoires Occupes de l'Ancien Cameroun, 1 Mai 1917» 
p. 65, Douala.
42. A similar segregationist policy pursued in German South 
West Africa jumps to mind. According to Rudin, op.cit., 
pp. 408-4)9, health reasons prompted the expropriation. 
Cf. Carlson Anyangwe, "German Colonial Land Policy in 
Cameroon", op.cit.
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Naturally, as leader of his people, Rudolf Duala 
spearheaded these protests. The Germans pointed out 
(right, it must be conceded) that his role in the matter 
was completely incompatible with his duties as a functionary 
of the Administration with sworn allegiance to the Kaiser. 
Consequently, on August 4th 1913, he was ’dethroned’.
But the Douala were not deterred in their oppo­
sition to the expropriation. They collected money and 
sent an emissary, Ngoso Din, to Berlin. They also instruc­
ted two German counsels, Dr Fleming of Hamburg and Dr 
Halpert of Berlin, to hold briefs for them before the 
German Parliament. The local administration in Cameroon 
got alarmed at the new dimension the matter was taking.
It had Ngoso Din arrested and brought back to Cameroon 
where he was charged together with Rudolf Duala with high 
treason.
The particulars of the charge were: (i) that
Rudolf Duala Manga had tried, in a letter supposed to have
been sent through a messenger, Ndane, to incite Chief Njoya
of Foumban to rebel against the Kaiser, and (ii) that he
had made contacts with a foreign power, namely, Great
Britain. Whether Rudolf Duala Manga did in fact make
contact with the British and whether he actually attempted
to incite Chief Njoya to rise against the Germans still
43remains a highly controversial issue. The truth would
43. The Douala have consistently maintained that the so-
called Ndane mission to Sultan Njoya was a German fabri­
cated tale. But J.R. Brutsch (op.cit.) maintains that 
Rudolf Manga did send Ndane with a written message to
/Continued over
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probably never be known. However, It Is on record 
(1) that neither chief Njoya nor Ndane was ever called 
upon to give evidence at the trial, and (ii) that no
Footnote 43 continued from previous page.
Njoya calling on him to take up arms against the Germans. 
The message, he claims, was translated for Njoya by a 
Christoph Geprag, a German Basel Mission missionary at 
Foumban. After reading the message, Njoya is said to 
have had Ndane arrested and handed over to the German 
authorities. Brutsch then refers to Histoire et 
Coutumes des Bamum, a book written under the direction 
of Sultan Njoya and published in 1952 by the Institut 
Francais d ’Afrique Noire. At page 214 of that book 
the following account is found.
’’The Germans were masters of Bamum country. It 
happened that Duala, son of Manga, sent Ndane to King 
Njoya. Sold a long time ago to the people of the forest, 
Ndane had come to inform Njoya of the conflict which 
existed between the Germans on the one hand, the French 
and the English on the other hand. It is through him 
that Duala, son of Manga, advised Njoya to start the 
fight against the Germans in his country. King Njoya 
sent messengers to tell Duala, son of Manga: ’The
Germans are my fathers, and he is as my brother, how 
then can I go to war against them?’ Then he arrested 
Ndane and handed him over to the German authorities who 
were not displeased by this kind of action. Ndane was 
put in prison, and, shortly afterwards, Duala, son of 
Manga, was arrested and executed.” (The translation is 
mine.)
The controversy goes unabated even to this day.
One author has recently pointed out that while Njoya 
was in exile in Yaounde, he denied he ever received an 
emissary or letter from Duala Manga Bell. See, lye 
Kala Lobe, Douala Manga Bell hero de la resistance Douala, 
ed. A.B.C., Paris, 1975, pp. 60-75. Oddly enough, in 
his biography of Sultan Njoya, Adamou Ndam Njoya throws 
no light on this matter. See, A.N. Njoya, Njoya: le
reformateur du royaume Bamoun, ed. A.B.C., Paris, 1976.
44. According to Brutsch, the Germano-Duala Treaty of 12th 
July 1884 and Ndane’s mission to Njoya are crucial to a 
better understanding of the case.
”It is in fact on the 1884 Treaty, concerning the 
complete surrender to the Germans by the Douala of 
their rights relating to sovereignty, legislation, and
/Continued over
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evidence was adduced to show that Rudolf Duala did make 
contacts with the British.
There were two sets of trials; one in Douala 
on the 7th August 1914 for Rudolf Douala and Ngoso Din, 
and the other in Soppo-Buea on August l4th 1914 for a 
group of elders who had been arrested in Douala on July 
21st 1914 and charged with complicity in the matter.
These elders were either relatives, friends, or advisers 
of the principal accused.
Rudolf Duala and Ngoso Din appeared before Justice 
Niedermeir assisted by one assessor, a Mr Dix. A defence 
counsel, Dr Etscheit, was assigned to the defendants.
Footnote 44 continued from previous page.
administration of the Territory, that was legally 
based the expropriation of the Joss plateau. From 
the point of view of European law, German as well as 
French, such a surrender of the rights of sovereignty 
would not exclude the principle of legal expropriation 
for public purposes. That is why the French Adminis­
tration went ahead with the German urbanisation plan on 
the Joss plateau." (The translation is mine.)
But there is authority that the expropriation was, 
contrary to Brutsch’s claim, contrary to the Treaty in 
question. See Adamou Ndam Njoya, Le Cameroun dans les 
relations internatlonales, Librairie Generale de Droit 
et de la Jurisprudence, Paris, 1976, p. 78.
45. It is probable that the charge was based on mere sus­
picion. A. Ndam Njoya's assertion that ’Des 1914 les 
Douala, mecontents se rallieront aux Anglais', (ibid., 
loc. cit.), is an over-statement. The Douala cer­
tainly had pro-English sympathies. But that was 
nothing new. Their pro-English stance dated as far 
back as the 1850s when the Douala chiefs unsuccessfully 
pleaded with Britain to take over their country.
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The trial was summary and in camera. To no one's
surprise the two accused were convicted and, sentenced to
death. At 5 p.m. on August 8th 1914 after a Rev. Philipp
Hechlinger, the incumbent head of the. Basel Mission in
Douala, had in vain pleaded with Governor Ebermaier to
commute the death sentence to one of deportation, Rudolf
Duala Manga and Ngoso Din were sent to the gallows. After
the execution, Ebermaier immediately issued the following 
4 7
statement:
"People of Duala,
"I am addressing you to inform you that 
Manga (Rudolf) Bell was today sentenced, to 
death by hanging because he showed himself
a traitor to the Kaiser and the Empire.
"He confessed at the last moment that he had 
been activated by fear of vengeance from his 
fellow countrymen, from those whom you all 
know, those who, for fear, remain secretly 
behind the scenes, those who brew poison and 
seduce the people.
"The blood of Manga shall be on those who 
pushed him unto the path of crime I
"Anyone who does not himself want to be a 
traitor like Duala Manga should detach him­
self from these seducers who stay secretly 
in the dark and prepare poison!
"Anyone with loyal intentions shall be wel­
comed. The Kaiser's Government shall always
46. Brutsch justifies this on the ground that for about a 
week Cameroun had been placed on a war footing which 
meant that the normal trial procedures had to be waived 
and an expeditious one adopted.
47. Cf. Brutsch, op.cit. The translation is mine. One 
takes with a pinch of salt the Governor’s claim that 
Rudolf Manga confessed at the last minute to being a 
traitor and that he entreated the Douala people to be 
faithful to the Kaiser.
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be fair and grateful to its loyal assistants 
and faithful subjects.
"What you deplore Is the consequence of the 
activities of these men of darkness who - 
the Government knows it - have always been 
at work inciting the people, keeping them 
in a state of terror by their poison and 
holding them under their sway for their own 
gain.
"Desert them and you shall be happy.
"Manga himself in his last hour entreated his 
people that with his death, faithfulness to 
the Kaiser and obedience to the Government 
should return to the hearts of the Douala 
people.
Duala, this 8th day of August 1914.
The Imperial Governor, Ebermaier." 
Predictably fear ran through Douala. Many 
Douala, justifiably fearing a witch-hunt, fled into the 
bush.
A week after the Imperial Governor’s statement 
the second trial opened in Soppo, Buea. The 14 accused 
appeared before a von Krosigk, presiding judge. Ndumb’a Kum, 
Mwane Etoa and Din a Manga were discharged and acquitted. 
Tokoto Esome got a life sentence. Misipo Mulobi, Maso 
Eyango, Ekande Epana, Ekwela Dumbe, Kofi and Njala were 
each jailed for ten years. Lob a Manga Priso got eight 
years while Njembele Ekwe and Pastor Mod’a Din were each 
sentenced to five years imprisonment. Luck was however 
on their side. Barely a couple of weeks after these sen- 
.tences had been passed the whole coastal area stretching 
from Douala through Victoria to Buea fell into the hands 
of allied troops led by Britain’s Brigadier-General Dobell.
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By the end of February 1916 the Germans had been 
completely driven out of Cameroon by British and French led 
soldiers.
The German system of justice In Cameroon was at
an end. Since then, German law has .had no bearing on the-
development of law or any legal instutution in Cameroon.
It has however been suggested that certain land titles
48today in Cameroon can be traced to the German times.
The harshness of German justice - this is one
of the things Cameroonians always talk about whenever they
discuss German colonisation in Cameroon. Indeed, German
49
justice was rough and its colonial system a military
despotism founded on the characteristic German glorifi-
50cation of militarism. The system of justice did lead
to confusion, dissatisfaction and injustice. The com­
bined judicial and administrative powers of the District 
Officer and the leeway given to leaders of military expe­
ditions in the interior proved an excellent opportunity 
for abuse. The dual system of courts and applicable laws
48. Cf. Monie, op.cit.; Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6th July 
1974 establishing rules governing land tenure;
Ordinance NO. 74;2 of 6th July 1974 establishing rules 
governing state lands.
49. German justice is sometimes described as 'strict, 
harsh, rough but just'. See Rudin, op.cit., p. 210;
Le Vine and Nye, Historical Dictionary of Cameroon.
50. "The German colonial system, so young in years, ever 
remains the oldest system, because the most tyrannic, 
the most oppressive and illiberal Signor Giordani,
The German Colonial Empire, cited by Clifford, op.cit.,
pp. 67-68.
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was based on colour segregation.
However, the Germans did recognise and took
account of the various customary laws in Cameroon. It
is to their credit that they did embark on a project to
51ascertain and compile the laws of the people. It is a
matter of pity that time and events were not in their 
favour. Germany’s legacy to Cameroon lies not in the 
juridical but rather in the politico-socio-economic 
spheres.^
51. Cf. I. Kohler: Questionnaire pour l fetude de la
situation juridique-des peuples dits primitifs, Berlin 
1896; Reponse au questionnaire pour 1 Tetude de la 
situation juridique des peuple dits primitifs - Bassa,' 
Bakossi, etc. Both the questionnaire and the answers 
from six tribes in Cameroon are to be found in the 
National Archives, Yaounde, File No. TA-18.
52. Undoubtedly, the greatest and lasting legacy which 
Germany bequeathed to Cameroon is what one ’Cameroonolo- 
gist’ has aptly called ’The Kamerun Idea’. See Edwin 
Ardener, ’’The Kamerun Idea”, West Africa, June 7th 1958, 
p.533 and June l4th 1958, p. 559. The Kamerun Idea 
became the symbol of nationalism in Cameroon politics.
It created the myth of a ’Cameroon Nation’. It 
prompted the Reunification Movement. It gave meaning 
to the irredentist effort by Cameroon to recover via
the International Court of Justice the Northern Cameroons 
annexed to Nigeria by Britain. In the socio-economic 
field, "The German Administration laid the foundation 
for modern Cameroon’s social overhead capital (i.e. basic 
transportation, communication and power facilities): 
wharves and docks at Douala, Kribi, Campo, Tiko, and 
Victoria; rail lines north from Douala to Nkongsamba 
and east almost to Yaounde; many bridges, roads and 
paths; and well-constructed public buildings many of 
which are still in use. The plantations and develop­
ment projects begun by the Germans gave the subsequent 
French and British Administrations an established basis 
for further economic development.", Le Vine and Nye, 
op.cit., loc. cit. Today’s Trans-Cameroon Railway is 
the realisation of the German Mittellandbahn railway 
planned to link Douala with Garoua.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE BRITISH SYSTEM
The administration of justice in Cameroon 
suffered a serious dislocation in the interregnum between 
the outbreak of World War I and the coming into force of 
the mandatory system in 1922. It was not until after 
1922 that the judicial and legal services in the British 
Cameroons were put on a systematic footing.
In the interval between the outbreak of World 
War I and 1922, the dispensation of justice in the terri­
tory was haphazard and uncertain. When Britain got her 
own share of Cameroon in March 1916, she decided to admini­
ster it along with her contiguous territory of Nigeria.
The Governor General of Nigeria issued Proclamation No. 1 
of 1916 authorising
"All British military officers in command 
of detachments of troops and all British 
civil officers appointed to temporarily 
administer any territory in the Cameroons 
... as from the date of their appointments 
to hold courts with full jurisdiction in 
civil and criminal matters in which natives 
are concerned in so far as it is known, 
and, if not known, the laws of that part 
of Nigeria in which they hold appointments 
immediately prior to their present 
appointments."
Justice in the British Cameroons was, until 
further notice, to be administered by British adminis­
trative and military officers. They held courts in which 
they exercised full jurisdiction in civil and criminal
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matters. However, they could only try cases in which all 
parties were natives. Each court applied the law which 
obtained in the place of its location. If there was 
doubt as to which law to apply, the law of the place in 
Nigeria where the presiding officer previously held appoint­
ment applied. It was however unclear whether this 
referred to the imported English law or customary law.
This was clearly a chaotic way of dispensing justice. It 
was also unsafe because everything was virtually left to 
the individual whims and caprices of the officers concerned. 
However, this was only a stop-gap as the British had not 
by then established a durable administrative structure in 
the territory.
Subsequent Proclamations provided, inter alia, 
for the application in the British Cameroons of various 
ordinances already in force in Nigeria. Thus it was 
that the legal system in the British Cameroons came to be 
similar to that in Nigeria. Britain made provisions for 
the administration of the British Cameroons along with 
Nigeria.1
This chapter is divided into two sections.
Section I examines the various courts which existed at 
different periods in the history of British rule in the
1. British Cameroons Administration Ordinance, 1924, 
amended by Ordinances No. 1 of 1925, No. 13 of 1925, 
No. 1 of 1927, No. 13 of 1928, and No. 24 of 1929. 
The 1924 Ordinance bisected the British Cameroons. 
The Northern Cameroons was administered along with 
Northern Nigeria while the Southern Cameroons was 
administered along with Southern Nigeria. This 
chapter deals only with the Southern Cameroons.
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territory as well as the laws they applied. Section II 
is devoted to an appraisal of British colonial justice in 
Cameroon.
I . The Courts System and the Applicable Law
Between 1924 and 1961, the year when the Southern 
Cameroons became independent, the courts system was over­
hauled on four occasions; in 1924, 1933, 1943, and 1954.
1. The Courts System: 1924-1933
Between 1924 and 1933 justice was administered 
in the territory by three types of courts which already 
existed in Nigeria. These were the Supreme Court, the 
Provincial Courts, and the Native Courts.
A . The Supreme Court
Under the Supreme Court Ordinance No. 6 of 1914, 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria had original jurisdiction 
throughout the colony of Lagos as well as in a number of 
small localities, styled ’Supreme Court areas’ in the 
other parts of Nigeria. Outside these Supreme Court areas, 
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over non-natives only. 
This jurisdiction was concurrent with that of the Provin­
cial Courts. The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
was additional to its usual appellate jurisdiction.
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The Idea to create a Supreme Court area in the 
Southern Cameroons had been mooted in 1925 in Lagos but 
left in abeyance. As a result no such area was ever 
created in the territory. Only once did the Supreme 
Court sit in the Southern Cameroons: that was in 1928,
when a European was charged with manslaughter. The 
Supreme Court had to hold an assize in Buea to try him.
Civil appeals from the Provincial Courts in the 
Southern Cameroons were heard by the Supreme Court sitting 
in one of the Supreme Court areas in Nigeria. On the 
application of the accused or of the Chief Justice, a 
criminal case could be transferred from the Provincial 
Court to the Supreme Court. In 1932, a man who was 
charged with manslaughter in the Southern Cameroons elected 
to be tried in Calabar, which was the nearest Supreme 
Court area to the Southern Cameroons.
When sitting as a court of appeal, the Supreme 
Court was, by s . 7 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, fully 
constituted by two judges. For other purposes it was 
composed of three judges. Under s. 4 of the Ordinance 
Judges held office during His Majesty’s pleasure. Section 
14 of the Ordinance directed the Supreme Court to apply the 
common law, the doctrines of equity and statutes of 
general application which were in force in England on 1st 
January 1900. However, by s . 78, the court was required 
not to enforce against a debtor native any such obligation 
if it appeared to the court that it was not reasonably 
probable that the native was fully aware of the nature of
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the obligation and the consequence of failure to perform 
the same.
B . Provincial Courts
By ss. 11 and 12 of the Provincial Courts Ordi­
nance No. 7 of 1914, Provincial Courts (before which no 
legal practitioner was allowed to appear) exercised com­
plete jurisdiction over all persons, natives and non­
natives, and were presided over by the Residents of the 
Provinces concerned.
The Resident had civil jurisdiction in such 
matters as the issuing of habeas corpus, appointment of 
guardians, granting of injunctions and in \ny case where 
the amount involved did not exceed £50. In criminal 
cases they could pass sentences of up to two years impri­
sonment or a £50 fine.
By s . 22 of the Ordinance, all sentences of 
imprisonment in excess of six months, sentences of cor­
poral punishment exceeding twelve strokes, and fines 
exceeding £50-required the confirmation of the Governor 
of Nigeria. In respect of the Southern Cameroons, how­
ever, power to confirm such sentences was practically 
delegated to the Chief Justice. All capital sentences 
were reviewed by the Chief Justice and, where confirmed by 
him, were considered by the Governor who, after consul­
tation with the Executive Council, decided whether or not 
the prerogative of mercy should be exercised.
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The applicable criminal law was that which 
obtained in Nigeria, which was basically English criminal 
law suitably adapted to suit local conditions and the 
juridical sentiments of the natives.
The civil law, in so far as it was not con­
tained in local ordinances, was the English common law, 
doctrines of equity, and statutes of general application 
which were in force in England on 1st January 1900, modi­
fied by the proviso that in civil cases affecting natives, 
especially in matters relating to marriage, land, and 
inheritance, the courts should recognise native laws and 
customs when they were not repugnant to natural justice 
and humanity.
In the Provincial Courts the Resident in charge 
of the Province could sit with native assessors if he so 
wished. The choice was entirely his.
Every male person between the ages of twenty 
and sixty being of sound mind and not afflicted with 
deafness, blindness or any other infirmity, who is resi­
dent within the jurisdiction of the court could serve 
as an as *essor.
In addition to trying cases in court, adminis­
trative officers dealt with a large number of petty cases 
which usually arose in the form of complaints. Most of
these cases were settled by executive action. A few
were sent to Native Courts for adjudication.
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C . Native Courts
Established under the Native Courts Ordinance 
No. 5 of 1918, there were In 1933 sixty-four Native 
Courts in the Southern Cameroons classified as either 
grade B, C, or D courts. These courts exercised limited 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over natives, applying 
native laws and customs. Grade B courts were native 
appeal courts. Decisions of native courts were subject 
to review by the local administrative officers. A 
review fee used to be payable but it was abolished in 1932. 
Although no lawyer was allowed to appear before a native 
court, the relative of a litigant could represent him in 
certain cases.
2. The Courts System: 1934-1943
In November 1933 four bills were passed by the 
Nigerian Legislative Council reorganising the judicial 
system in the Protectorate of Nigeria and in the Southern 
Cameroons. These laws came into force on 1st April 1934.
This reform innovated in two respects. It 
separated the judicial from the executive function of 
government. It also afforded a right of appeal from the
2. The Supreme Court (Amendment) Ordinance No. 46 of 1933, 
the Protectorate Courts Ordinance No. 45 of 1933, the 
West African Court of Appeal Ordinance No. 47 of 1933, 
and the Native Courts Ordinance No. 44 of 1933.
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Native Courts in certain prescribed cases and the newly 
created Magistrates and High Courts to the newly estab­
lished West African Court of Appeal.
The Protectorate Courts Ordinance No. 45 of 
19 33 established High Courts and Magistrates Courts as 
superior and inferi'r courts respectively. It abolished 
the Provincial Courts. Magistrates and High Courts were 
collectively styled ’Protectorate Courts’.
The High Court was constituted as far as possible 
in the same way as the Supreme Court; but with a simpler 
form of procedure. It tried indictable offences, espe­
cially murder, with a jury of twelve. It had no original 
jursidiction in land matters under customary law. It 
could take such matters only on appeal from a Native Court. 
Probate, matrimonial causes, admiralty, divorce suits, 
and cases under certain ordinances-^ were reserved for the 
Supreme Court which was largely confined to Lagos. Legal 
practitioners were now allowed to appear before the High 
Court and the Magistrate’s Court.
Protectorate Courts were not subordinate to 
the Supreme Court. Appeals from the Magistrate’s Court 
lay to the High Court. But appeals from the High Court 
lay, as in the case of appeals from the Supreme Court, to 
the West African Court of Appeal. Moreover the High
3. For example, the Companies Ordinance, the British and 
Colonial Probates Ordinance, the Intestate Estates 
Ordinance, the Wrecks and Salvage Ordinance, the Legal 
Practitioners Ordinance.
149.
Court possessed, concurrently with the Supreme Court, 
unlimited criminal jurisdiction over non-natives through­
out the Protectorate and over natives in the townships. 
Furthermore, the Chief Justice and puisne Judges of the 
Supreme Court were also judges of the High Court.
No High Court was however located in the Southern 
Cameroons. The territory was included in the Calabar-Aba 
judicial division.of the High Court. Judges of this 
court seldom visited the Southern Cameroons owing to the 
paucity of cases from there as well as difficulties of 
communication. The jurisdiction of the High Court was, 
under s. 3 of the Protectorate Courts Ordinance, exercised 
in the Southern Cameroons by the Resident of the territory. 
He was invested with the powers of an Assistant Judge of 
the High Court.
Magistrates1 Courts were courts of summary 
jurisdiction. The powers of magistrates were limited in 
civil cases to matters of not more than £100 in value and 
in criminal cases to imprisonment of up to one year or a 
fine of £100.
There was no substantive magistrate in the 
Southern Cameroons. The District Officer of each 
Division exercised the powers of a magistrate, except 
the District Officer of Bamenda Division who had and 
exercised the powers of an Assistant Judge of the High 
Court. Monthly list of cases heard by ’magistrates’ in 
the Southern Cameroons were forwarded to the High Court 
in Calabar and operated as appeals on behalf of the persons 
convicted.
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The Native Courts Ordinance 1933 took away the 
executive functions hitherto exercised by Native Courts. 
Cases heard by these courts were, however, still subject 
to review by administrative officers. Moreover, in the 
Southern Cameroons appeals from Native Courts lay to the 
District Officer, then to the Resident in Buea and 
finally to the Governor in Lagos.
The Criminal powers of grade B native courts 
comprised imprisonment of up to one year, a fine of up to 
£50, and whipping of up to twelve strokes. They had 
jurisdiction in civil cases regarding any issue under 
customary law involving up to £100. The civil jurisdic­
tion of grade C courts was limited to suits of up to £50. 
In criminal matters a grade C court could sentence to six 
months'imprisonment (or twelve months in the case of theft 
of foodstuff or livestock), to a £10 fine and a whipping 
of up to twelve strokes. A grade D native court could 
sentence to a maximum of three months' imprisonment (six 
months in the case of theft of foodstuff or livestock), a 
£5 fine, and twelve strokes of the cane. Its civil power 
did not go beyond an issue involving an amount of £25.
Each Native Court kept a Judgment Book, a Cash Book and 
a Cause Book.
3. The Courts System: 19^3-1954
In 19^3 the judicial system was again reformed. 
The 1933 reorganisation had been unsatisfactory in that it
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had created a High Court which was distinct from but 
co-ordinate with the Supreme Court. The 1943 reform 
therefore abolished the High Court.
The Magistrates' Courts Ordinance No. 24 of 1943 
set up a chain of Magistrates' Courts in Nigeria and in 
the Southern Cameroons. Magisterial districts, each 
with its own magistrates, were established. These 
magistrates' courts had increased powers and were gradu­
ated according to the grade of the magistrate concerned.
Magistrates were ex officio justices of the peace and were
4
classified into 1st, 2nd and 3rd grade magistrates.
The Supreme Court Ordinance No. 23 of 1943^ 
established a new supreme court, the Supreme Court of 
Justice for the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria with 
unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction throughout 
Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons; subject only to the 
jurisdiction of the Native Courts in land tenure, family 
status, guardianship of children, and testamentary disposition
4. A Grade I magistrate could pass a sentence of up to 
two years imprisonment or £200 fine. In civil matters 
he could determine a suit where the pecuniary value 
involved was up to £200. Grade II and Grade III magis­
trates tried cases involving a maximum of £100 and £25 
in value, respectively. A Grade II magistrate could 
sentence to a maximum of one year imprisonment, while
a Grade III magistrate could not sentence to more than 
six months imprisonment. A grade of Chief Magistrate 
was later on added. He had a wider jurisdiction and 
the other magistrates were administratively subordi- 
• nate to him.
5. This Ordinance came into force on 1st June 1945.
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of property, under customary law. The Supreme Court 
exercised both appellate and supervisory jurisdiction 
over Magistrates' Courts.
The West African Court of Appeal was retained 
as an appellate court for appeals from the Supreme Court 
in respect of matters in which provision was expressly 
made in any ordinance for.such appeal. From the West 
African Court of Appeal appeals lay, as of right, to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as before, in 
all cases where the pecuniary value was over £500. Where 
the pecuniary value was less than £500, an appeal to the 
Judician Committee of the Privy Council was available 
only with leave of the West African Court of Appeal.
The Children and Young Persons Ordinance No. 41 
of 1943 set up two Juvenile Courts in Nigeria but none in 
the Southern Cameroons.
4. The Courts System: 1954-1961
The 1954 constitutional changes in Nigeria and 
the Cameroons^ necessitated the re-organisation yet again 
of the judicial system. The Nigerian (Constitution) Order-
6. The Nigerian Littleton Constitution of 1954 granted Southern 
Cameroons the status of 'quasi-federal territory'.
The Nigerian Richardson Constitution of 1947 had divi­
ded the territory into the Cameroons and Bamenda Pro­
vinces. Now, however, it was simply known as 'the 
Southern Cameroons'. The territory had a 13-member 
House of Assembly and an Executive Council. Six 
Southern Cameroonians sat in the Nigerian House of 
Representatives in Lagos.
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in-Council, 1954 regionallsed the courts system.
The High Court which was abolished in 1943 was
resurrected and established in each Region. A High
Court was also set up in the Southern Cameroons.
In Lagos was established a Federal Supreme Court
to which appeals from the High Court went.
The West African Court of Appeal ceased being
a court of appeal for Nigeria and the Cameroons. Appeals
from the Federal Supreme Court lay direct to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in London.
The Southern Cameroons, like the Regions of
Nigeria, had her own Magistrates’ Courts, subordinate to
the High Courts. These new High Courts and Magistrates’
Courts were set up in the Southern Cameroons on December
31st 1955 by the Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955
and the Magistrates’ Courts (Southern Cameroons) Law, 1955.
As of 1st October 1961 when the Southern
Cameroons became independent, the courts system in the
territory consisted of courts primarily administering
7
customary law, namely, Native Courts, and courts primarily
administering the received English law, namely, the High
8 9Court and the Magistrates’ Courts. The Privy Council in
7. Native Courts Ordinance, Cap. 142 of the 1948 Revised 
Laws .
8. Southern Cameroons Order-in-Council I960, s. 50(1);
S.C.H.C.L., 1955.
9. Magistrates’ Courts (Southern Cameroon) Law, 1955.
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London and Federal Supreme Court in Lagos exercised 
appellate jurisdiction over cases from the Southern
Cameroons High Court.^  These courts will now be examined
. , 11 in turn.
A. Customary courts
The appellation 'customary courts' became current 
only after 1964. Hitherto, these courts were known as 
'native courts' and were governed by the Native Courts 
Ordinance, chapter 142 of the 1948 revised Laws of Nigeria.
That Ordinance conferred on the Commissioner of 
the Southern Cameroons the power to grade Native Courts 
and to prescribe the jurisdiction to be exercised by each.
As of 1964, only grades C and D Native Courts existed in the 
Southern Cameroons. In civil matters the suit value limit 
of both grades of court was £25. Both courts had full 
jurisdiction in cases relating to land, inheritance, tes­
tamentary dispositions, the administration of estates and 
matrimonial cases other than those arising from or con­
nected with a Christian marriage as was defined in the 
Criminal Code of Nigeria. Grade C Native Courts had 
jurisdiction over offences which could be adequately punished 
by imprisonment for six months or a fine of £10. Grade D 
courts could sentence to three months’ imprisonment, twelve
10. Southern Cameroons (Constitution) Order-in-Council, I960.
11. Cf. A.N. Allott (ed.), Judicial and Legal Systems in 
Africa, Butterworths, London, I960, pp. 76-81.
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strokes of the cane or a fine of £5.
In 1956 the Southern Cameroons Customary Courts 
Law 1956 was assented to. Section 1 of that law how­
ever provided that the law "shall come into operation on 
such date or dates to be appointed by notice in the 
Southern Cameroons Gazette". No such notice was ever 
given. And so the Native Courts Ordinance, chapter 142 
of the 1948 Laws continued to apply. This was confirmed
in the case of Jesco Manga Williams v. The President,
12Native Court Victoria.
The Adaptation of Existing Laws Order 1963 sub­
stituted the name ’customary court1 for 'native court’ 
and ’Customary Courts Ordinance’ for 'Native Courts Ordi­
nance’. This Order was brought into operation by West 
Cameroon Legal Notice No. 23 of 1964. The old Native 
Courts Ordinance was largely retained by the Adaptation 
of Existing Laws (Customary Courts Ordinance) Order 1965 
which was brought into operation by Legal Notice N. 119 
of 1965. The Customary Courts Ordinance as amended, is 
found in the Customary Courts Manual Volume I. But this 
Manual is merely a guide and claims no force of law.
Section 14(1) of the Customary Courts Ordinance 
provided that "Every customary court shall have full
12. (1962-64), W.C.L.R. 34.
13. On October 1st 1961, the Southern Cameroons became 
independent by unifying with the Republic of Cameroun 
(former French Cameroun) to form a federation, ’the 
Federal Republic of Cameroon’. In that Federation, 
the Southern Cameroons became the federated state of 
West Cameroon.
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jurisdiction and power, to the extent set forth in the 
warrant establishing it, and, subject to the provision of 
this law, in all civil and criminal matters in which all 
the parties belong to a class of persons who have ordi­
narily been subject to the jurisdiction of customary tri­
bunals .,f
The Ordinance set up three grades of customary 
courts, A, B, C. All three grades had civil jurisdiction 
in causes and matters concerning marriage, land, and 
succession under customary law. The suit value limit 
for grade A courts was £200, for grade B £100, and for 
grade C £50. In criminal matters, grade A courts had 
jurisdiction in causes which could be adequately punished 
by imprisonment for one year, six strokes, or a fine of £50 
or the equivalent by native law and custom. The maximum 
a grade B court could pass was six months’ imprisonment, 
six strokes, or a fine of £30; and a grade C court, three 
months’ imprisonment, six strokes or a fine of £15.
Customary courts however had no power to try a 
certain number of criminal offences. These were: homi­
cide, treason, sedition, counterfeiting, trial by ordeal, 
slave dealing, child stealing, judicial corruption, 
fraudulent false accounting, obtaining goods by false 
pretences, offences against the public revenue, offences 
relating to the Posts and Telegraphs or to the railway, 
official corruption, official secrets, defilement of girls, 
procuration, rape, defamation (libel), forgery, corrupt 
practices, conspiracy, perjury, witchcraft.
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The old system of review of customary court 
cases was abolished. But District Officers still had 
access to customary courts which they inspected and super­
vised. In cases where there was an apparent miscarriage 
of justice or where an obvious error needed to be cor­
rected, the District Officer ordered the matter to be 
transferred to the appropriate appeal court, which court 
was empowered to deal with the matter as an appeal.
The District Officer could also transfer cases from one 
customary court to another customary court, to a Magis­
trate’s Court or to the High Court.
The High Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons 
was empowered to appoint such persons as he thought fit to 
be appeal officers having appellate jurisdiction to hear 
and determine appeals from the decisions of a customary 
court in any matter other than a land cause. Appeals in 
land cases lay to the District Officer. Appeals from the 
decisions of Appeal Officers lay to the Magistrates’
Courts. Appeals from the decisions of District Officers 
in land cases lay to the High Court.
The Deputy Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons 
could, subject to confirmation by the High Commissioner, 
establish such customary courts as he considered necessary 
and appoint thereto such persons as he thought fit. Su.ch 
appointments were held at the pleasure of the Commissioner 
who dismissed or suspended any member who appeared to 
have abused his power, to be unworthy, or to be incapable 
of exercising it justly, or for 'sufficient reason’.
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Presidents and vice-presidents of customary 
courts could, from time to time, be designated by the 
Commissioner. But he seldom did so. Normally, members 
of a customary court bench elected their own president for 
each session. Benches were kept as small as local senti­
ment and tribal feeling allowed. Five members, of whom 
three formed a quorum, were considered the most suitable 
number.
Customary courts exercised jurisdiction over 
all persons who "have ordinarily been subject to the 
jurisdiction of native tribunals". The Commissioner 
could, however, direct, that some or all of the powers of 
customary courts should not be exercised over any natives 
or class of natives, or, that persons or class of persons 
not normally subject to the jurisdiction of customary 
courts should be subject to a particular customary court 
or class of customary courts. Direction of this kind 
was put into effect only when the consent of the Southern 
Cameroons House of Assembly, signified by resolution, had 
been obtained. One such direction was made extending 
the jurisdiction of customary courts to all natives of 
Nigeria and all ’native foreigners’ who, though not nor­
mally subject to the authority of customary courts, never­
theless agree to accept their jurisdiction.
Customary courts administered both the general law 
of the territory as well as customary law. The general 
law comprised the provisions of any written law which the 
court was authorised to enforce by an order made under
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section 21, and the provisions of all rules and orders 
made under the Native Authority Ordinance, bye-laws and 
so on. By section l8(l)(a) of the Customary Courts Law, 
customary law is ,Tthe native law and custom prevailing in 
the area of the jurisdiction of the court so far as it 
is not repugnant to natural justice equity and good con­
science, nor incompatible either directly or by natural 
implication with any written law for the time being in 
forceTr. Islamic law was administered as part of customary 
law. The interpretation section of the Southern Cameroons 
High Court Law 1955 provided that the phrase 'native law and 
custom’ includes moslem law.
Customary law has never been recorded or codified. 
But a Native Authority could, and if the Commissioner 
required, must record what in its opinion native law and. 
custom is on any point within its jurisdiction, and if 
the Commissioner was satisfied that such a declaration was 
correct, it became effective within the jurisdiction of 
the Native Authority which made it. Similarly a Native 
Authority could recommend to the Commissioner that native 
law and custom be amended within its jurisdiction. The 
Commissioner approved the amendment if he was satisfied 
that it was expedient, not repugnant to natural justice, 
equity, or good conscience, and not in conflict with any 
law.
Legal practitioners were not allowed to appear 
before customary courts. But a husband, wife, guardian, 
servant, master, or any inmate of the plaintiff’s household
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or the defendant’s household, could appear for a party 
provided satisfactory evidence was given of their authority 
so to appear. ’’The essential reasons for forbidding 
legally trained representatives of the parties in a cus­
tomary court are that it is felt desirable to keep the 
proceedings as simple and inexpensive as possible. The 
atmosphere and approach are a good deal less formal in a 
customary court than in the Magistrates’ and High Courts
14
and the court itself participates to a much greater extent.” 
After independence in October 19_6l the most impor­
tant change affecting customary justice was the reduction 
of the criminal jurisdiction of customary courts. They 
became entitled to try only minor criminal offences. The 
question has been raised whether the Cameroon Penal Code,
Book II which came into operation in 1967, repealed the
criminal jurisdiction hitherto exercised by customary
15courts. One view is that the Penal Code took away the 
criminal jurisdiction of customary courts. Another view 
is that this is not the case.^ It Is argued that the 
Penal Code contains no specific provision repealing the 
criminal jurisdiction of customary courts. In practice
14. J.A. Howard, Law of marriage and succession among the 
Korn of Cameroon, Ph.D. Thesis, London University,
1972, p. 67.
15. J.N. Monie, The development of the Constitution and 
Laws of Cameroon, Ph.D. Thesis, London University,
1970, p. 238.
16. J.A. Howard, op.cit., at p. 63. For a full discussion 
of this issue, see infra, chapter 12.
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however, it was only In 1977 that customary courts ceased 
exercising any criminal jurisdiction.
B . Magistrates’ Courts
The High Commissioner appointed magistrates who 
were either styled chief magistrates or 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
grade magistrates. Every magistrate so appointed had 
civil and criminal jurisdiction throughout the Southern 
Cameroons. But a magistrate could be assigned to any 
specified district or transferred from one district to 
another by the Chief Justice.
It was usual for Chief Magistrates and Grade I 
Magistrates, which were full time appointments In the Judi­
cial Department, to be qualified to practice as advocates. 
Posts of second and third class magistrates were often 
occupied by District Officers. There was a Chief Magis­
trate stationed at Buea. He was In administrative charge 
of all the Magistrates’ Courts in the Southern Cameroons 
and was responsible for seeing that they functioned expe­
ditiously. Only Bamenda and Victoria had Grade I magis­
trates .
The extent of the jurisdiction of a magistrate 
varied according to his grade. A Chief Magistrate had 
the following civil jurisdiction: (a) personal suits to
the value of £500; (b) landlord and tenant cases to the 
suit value of £500; (c) actions for the recovery of any 
penalty, rates, expenses, contribution or other like
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demands, to the value of £500; (d) proceedings in res­
pect of which jurisdiction has been conferred upon a 
magistrate’s court by the Land and Native Rights Ordi­
nances. A Chief Magistrate did not exercise jurisdiction 
in causes and matters subject to the jurisdiction of cus­
tomary courts. His criminal jurisdiction was however 
complete. He tried and determined summary offences.
He sentenced to a maximum of £500 fine, and/or five years 
jail.
The jurisdiction of other magistrates was 
similar except that the money value was scaled down.
Magistrates’ Courts had appellate jurisdiction 
over appeals from a party aggrieved by the decision or 
order of an appeal officer given on appeal from a customary 
court. Appeals from the decisions of Magistrates’
Courts in both civil and criminal matters lay to the High 
Court.
The Chief Justice could require specified magis­
trates to forward a monthly list to the Chief Justice or 
to another Judge for review. The Southern Cameroons High 
Court had powers of revision in respect of all proceedings 
in the Magistrates’ Court.
A Magistrate could himself transfer a cause or 
matter before him to another magistrate in the same dis­
trict. A magistrate could of his own motion report certain 
causes to a judge for transfer either to any other magis­
trate’s court or to the High Court. A magistrate could 
also transfer any case pending before him to a customary
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court having jurisdiction in that matter, except, for 
example, matrimonial causes arising out of or in connec­
tion with a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance; or a 
cause or matter which had been transferred to his court 
by the High Court.
Magistrates’ Courts administered the same law 
as administered in the High Court.
C . The High Court
The High Court was composed of a Chief Justice 
17(President) and Judges. They were appointed by the
Governor-General of Nigeria by Instrument under the Public 
Seal in accordance with such instructions as he may have 
received from Her Majesty. They held office ’during Her 
Majesty's pleasure'. No person could be appointed a 
judge of the Court unless he was or had been a judge of 
a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
matters in some part of Her Majesty’s dominions, or he was 
qualified to practise as an advocate in such a court, and 
he had been qualified for not less than ten years to prac­
tise as an advocate or a solicitor in such a court.
Sections 50(2) and 51(1) of the Southern Cameroons 
Order-in-Council I960 however provided that the Southern
17. The Nigerian (Constitution) Order-in-Council provided 
that for the time being the Chief Justice and Judges 
of the High Court of Lagos were to be the Chief Justice 
and Judges of the South Cameroon High Court.
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Southern Cameroons High Court shall consists of a single 
judge appointed by the Commissioner of the Southern 
Cameroons by Instrument.
18The High Court was a superior court of record 
and, subject to the limits imposed by the Constitution Order- 
in-Council I960 and the High Court Law 1955, exercised all 
the jurisdiction, powers and authorities, other than admi­
ralty jurisdiction, vested in or capable of being exer­
cised by Her Majesty's High Court of Justice in England.
This included all Her Majesty’s civil and criminal'juris­
diction which immediately before the coming into operation 
of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law was, or at any
time afterwards may be exercisable in the Southern 
19Cameroons.
The High Court did not, unless otherwise directed, 
exercise original jurisdiction in any suit or matter which
(a) concerned title to land subject to the jurisdiction of 
a customary court; (b) related to marriage, family status, 
guardianship of children, inheritance or the disposition 
of property on death, and was subject to the jurisdiction 
of a customary court. However, the High Court had juris­
diction in respect of the above-mentioned suits on transfer
to it under the provisions of the Customary Courts Ordi-
20nance, or any law replacing the same. The High Court
18. A court of record was one which maintained a record of 
its proceedings.
19. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, ss. 7-8.
20. Ibid., s . 9.
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21administered law and equity concurrently.
The jurisdiction of the High Court in probate, 
divorce and matrimonial causes and proceedings could, 
subject to the provisions of the High Court Law, be exer­
cised by the court in conformity with the law and practice
22for the time being in force in England.
The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court 
was governed by the High Court Law and s. 5^ of the 
Southern Cameroons Constitution in Council. The Court 
had appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine all 
appeals from the decisions of Magistrates’ Courts. Fur­
ther , it had power to hear and determine appeals from the 
decisions of Magistrates' Courts and District Officers on 
appeal from Customary Courts.
Appeals from the High Court lay to the Federal
Nigerian Supreme Court in Lagos. The Chief Justice
could also, at any time or at any stage before judgment, 
transfer any cause or matter before a judge to any other 
judge. A judge could transfer any cause or matter before 
him to a Magistrates’ Court which had jurisdiction in such 
cause or matter. A judge could furthermore transfer any
matter before him to a customary court.
The general law applied by the High Court consisted
of:
21. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, s. 12.
22. Ibid., s. 15.
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(a) the common law;
(b) the doctrines of equity; and
(c) the statutes of general application which were in 
force in England on January 1, 1900, so far as these 
relate to any matter with respect to which the Legis­
lature of the Southern Cameroons is for the time being
23competent to make laws.
The High Court also had a duty to observe and
enforce the observance of every existing customary law
which was not repugnant. Section 27 of the Southern
Cameroons High Court Law, 1955 provided:
"(1) The High Court shall observe, and enforce 
the observance of, every native law and custom 
which is not repugnant.to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience, nor incompatible 
either directly or by implication, with any 
law for the time being in force, and nothing 
in this law shall deprive any person of the 
benefit of any such native law or custom.
(2) Such laws and customs shall be deemed 
applicable in causes and matters where the 
parties thereto are natives and also in causes 
and matters between natives and non-natives 
where it may appear to the court that sub­
stantial injustice would be done to either 
party by a strict adherence to the rules of 
English law.
(3) No party shall be entitled to claim the 
benefit of any native law or custom, if it
23. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, s. 11. This 
’reception provision’ is found in most former British 
colonial territories. The dominant opinion at the 
moment is that the received common law is the narrow 
unenacted judge-made law of England and not the Anglo- 
American system of jurisprudence known as Common Law 
(as opposed to the Civil Law system). This issue is 
exhaustively treated by A.N. Allott in Allott’s New 
Essays in African Law, Butterworths, London, 1970, 
chap. 1.
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shall appear either from express contract, 
or from the nature of the transactions out 
of which any suit or question may have 
arisen, that such party agreed that his 
obligations in connection with such tran­
sactions should be regulated exclusively 
by English law or that such transactions 
are transactions unknown to native law 
and custom.
(4) In cases where no express rule is 
applicable to a matter in controversy, the 
court shall be governed by the principles 
of justice, equity and good conscience."
Section 27 was therefore available for the resolution of
any problem of internal conflict of laws.
The seat of the Southern Cameroons High Court
was Buea. But it held assizes in Kumba, Mamfe, and
Bamenda. Appeals from Buea went to Lagos.
D . The Federal Supreme Court
This Court, situated in Lagos, heard appeals 
from all final judgments and decisions of the Southern 
Cameroons High Court as well as of the High Courts in 
Nigeria.
In criminal matters a person convicted in the 
High Court could appeal to the Federal Supreme Court 
against his conviction:
(a) on any ground of appeal which involved a question 
of law alone;
(b) with leave of the court, or on the certificate 
of the judge who tried him, on any ground of 
appeal which involved a question of fact alone, 
or a question of mixed law and fact. With 
leave of the Court he could also appeal against
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the sentence passed on his conviction unless 
the sentence was one fixed by law.
Appeals from this Court lay to Her Majesty in
Council.
E . The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Appeals lay from the Federal Supreme Court, when
hearing appeals from the Southern Cameroons High Court
also, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council In 
24London.
The Privy Council developed from the early
advisory council or cabinet set up by the English King to
advise him. This became the King’s Privy Council. It 
evolved to become the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, a superior court which acted as the final Court 
of Appeal from all Courts in the British Empire save those 
of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The British King in the twelfth century did not 
only reign. He also governed, taxed, judged, and adminis­
tered. He was assisted by a feudal Council variously 
known as the concilium regis, curia regis, magnum concilium, 
or commune concilium. The King came to be regarded as
the fountain of all justice throughout his Dominions - a
doctrine which was already an axiom of the British consti­
tution. Any subject of the King could therefore make a
24. Southern Cameroons (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 
I960, s. 57.
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petitory appeal to the Sovereign, as the fountain of 
justice, for protection against an unjust administration 
of the law. The right extended to judgments in criminal 
as well as in civil cases.
The Privy Council was re-organized and regulated 
in a series of statutes. For example, the Judicial Com­
mittee Act, 1835 recited that 'Tfrom the decisions of various 
courts of jurisdiction in the East Indies and in Plan­
tations, Colonies and other Dominions of His Majesty abroad, 
an appeal lies to His Majesty in Council”. The Judicial 
Committee Act of 1844 enacted that it shall be competent to 
Her Majesty by general or special order in Council to 
Ttprovide for the admission of any appeal or appeals to 
Her Majesty in Council from any judgments, sentences, 
decrees or orders of any Court of justice within any British 
Colony or Possession abroad". The theory is that all 
jurisdiction exercised in countries owing obedience or 
allegiance to the King is derived from the Crown. It is 
a cardinal principle in English law about jurisdiction that 
judges stand in the place of the Sovereign in whose name 
they administer justice. The administration of justice is 
regarded as a prerogative of the Crown.
Thus it came about that the appellate jurisdic­
tion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
Commonwealth and colonial countries originated from the 
prerogative of the King, as the fountain of all justice, 
to receive petitions from his subjects who had failed to
25get justice from the ordinary courts of law.
Appeals from the Southern Cameroons High Court 
in Buea to the Nigerian Federal Supreme Court were rare. 
There is no known case from the Southern Cameroons which 
ever got to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
The High Court in Buea was practically the final court of 
appeal in the Southern Cameroons. Cost, time, and dis­
tance militated against any further appeal from the High 
Court.
Barring minor cosmetic amendments, this was by 
and large the judicial structure in the Southern Cameroons 
up to the time of independence and unification on 1st 
October 1961.
II. Appraisal of British Colonial Justice in Cameroon
It is a trite observation that unlike the French 
the British never encouraged the concept of the evolud or 
the assimile in her colonial administration. But Britain 
like France, operated two parallel systems of courts in 
Cameroon. Native Courts were for the traditional sector 
of the population. Non-Native Courts were for the modern 
sector of the population. No doubt the dual system of
25. For a detailed account of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council, see, Barnett Hollander, Colonial 
justice, the unique achievement of the Privy Councilfs 
Committee of Judges, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961; 
George Rankin, TThe Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council’, Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 7, 1939 5 pp.2-21
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courts which the French introduced in Cameroun jumps to 
the eye. But this is because it was based on a division 
between whites plus assimilated natives on the one hand, 
and unassimilated natives on the other hand. The dif­
ference between the dual system of courts introduced by 
the French in French Cameroun and by the English in British 
Cameroons is simply this: the former was based on a verti­
cal segregation, and the latter on a horizontal segre­
gation .
The first part of this section describes the 
personnel of the law in the Southern Cameroons and the 
content of the colonial law therein applied. This shall 
be followed by a critical analysis of the penal system 
which obtained in the territory.
1. Personnel of the law
One of the most untoward effects of the adminis­
tration of the Cameroons by Britain merely as an adjunct 
of Nigeria was that the territory almost came to losing 
its identity. It was regarded and treated merely as an 
appendage of Nigeria. Up to i960 the Southern Cameroons 
had neither its own proper services nor laws. Generally, 
Nigerian services and laws were merely extended to the 
territory. The laws were the ’laws of Nigeria’ quoted 
from the ’revised editions of the laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria’. Cases cited in court were invariably Nigerian 
cases from the Nigerian Law Reports. The legal system was
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the ’Nigerian legal system’, the judiciary was the 
’Nigerian judiciary’, the legal department was the ’Nigerian 
legal department’, the bar was the ’Nigerian bar', and 
so on and so forth.
It may be argued that this was only a question 
of labels. Perhaps. But it was a paternalistic attitude 
which helped to cloud the identity of the territory. It
hurt the feelings and pride of the inhabitants of the 
territory because it made it look as though they were 
being colonised by a neighbouring African country. Witness 
the large Nigerian population in the territory. The 
Bar, the Legal and Judicial Services in the Southern 
Cameroons were virtually the monopoly of Nigerians.
A. The Judiciary
The Judiciary consisted of the Chief Justice, 
Judges and Magistrates. Up to 1956 there was no resident 
Chief Justice in the Southern Cameroons. The Chief Jus­
tice of Nigeria was also the Chief Justice for the Southern 
Cameroons. The Chief Justice was head of the colonial 
judiciary. He headed the Judicial Department. Puisne
Judges (that is, superior court judges who are below the 
rank of Chief Justice) and magistrates came under the 
Judicial Department. In theory the Governor appointed 
the Chief Justice and other members of the judiciary. In 
practice however, the Chief Justice owed his appointment 
not to the Governor but to the Secretary for the Colonies. 
He, as well as the other members of the judiciary, held
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office ’during Her Majesty’s pleasure’. The Chief 
Justice came after the Governor in protocol. But he 
was independent of him and was neither a member of the 
Executive nor of the Legislature.
The Chief Justice had the power to appoint Com- 
2 c
missioners of Oaths. A Commissioner of Oaths received
production of documents, took affidavits and declarations 
and the examination of witnesses on interrogation or 
otherwise, which was necessary to be taken in respect of 
any proceedings in court. The Chief Justice also appointed 
Notaries Public on payment of an admission fee of £10. The
Notary Public attested the execution of deeds or writings 
and made certified copies of them for use in court or 
abroad.
To qualify for appointment to a judgeship the 
candidate must have practised as an advocate for at least 
five years in a court in the United Kingdom or some other 
part of Her Majesty’s dominions having unlimited juris­
diction either in civil or criminal matters, or been a 
member of the colonial legal services for not less than 
five years.
The Secretary, of State for the Colonies had the 
last word in the appointment of Judges and magistrates. 
Often,appointment was made after consultation with or on
26. Supreme Court Ordinance, Cap. 211 of the 19^8 Laws of 
Nigeria, s. 72.
27. Notaries Public Ordinance, Cap. l6l of the 19^8 Laws 
of Nigeria.
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the recommendation of the Chief Justice. Magistrates 
were usually appointed from among practising barristers 
of at least three years experience. Judges were nor­
mally appointed from magistrates. In other words Judges 
were magistrates promoted to hold that post.
The foregoing was not always put into practice 
in the Southern Cameroons. Here, it was common practice 
to appoint administrative officers to posts of magistrates 
and assistant judges. Indeed, the magistrates in the 
Southern Cameroons were ex officio Justices of the Peace 
(that is to say, lay magistrates). The administrator- 
cum-magistrate was the rule rather than the exception in 
the Southern Cameroons. The main reason for this prac­
tice was probably financial. The use of the administrator- 
cum-magistrate partly explains why there was such a con­
spicuous absence of career magistrates and judges in the 
territory.
District officers did not directly preside over 
Native Courts. But they closely supervised them as well 
as exercised appellate jurisdiction over cases from there. 
Thus with regards to the Southern Cameroons, the theory 
of the separation of powers remained largely a pious 
verbal assertion. The separation of the judicial from 
the executive functions was stoutly disrecommended for 
the African context by Lord Lugard (he was the architect 
of the policy of indirect rule) on the dubious ground that 
it "would seem unnatural to the primitive African since
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they are combined in his own rulers” .
The District Officer was both an administrative 
officer and a judicial officer. There was no safeguard 
against the possibility of his decisions being politi­
cally tainted. It was naive of the colonial adminis­
tration to have assumed that the District Officer was 
necessarily a good man. A system such as this was con­
genial for abuse of the judicial process in the hands of 
the wrong District Officer.
It is therefore not surprising that as of 1948 
there was only one career magistrate serving in the 
Southern Cameroons under the employ of the Nigerian Judi­
cial Department. He was British and on a yearly salary 
of between £450 to £1000. He was assisted by one regis­
trar, one clerk, one assistant clerk, and one office
29messenger.
Ten years later, in 1958, there was a signifi­
cant improvement in the number of judicial personnel 
serving in the Southern Cameroons. In that year 27 
persons employed in the Nigerian Judicial Department were 
posted to the Southern Cameroons to serve in various capa­
cities. Of this number, one was British, 11 were natives
28. Lugard, The dual mandate in British Tropical Africa, 
3rd edition, London, 1926, p. 539 •
29. 1948 Report on the British Cameroons, p. 298. The 
messenger was on a salary of between £42 - £240 per 
annum. There were a total of 70 court clerks and 
294 court messengers employed by the Native Authority 
in the various Native Courts in the territory. A 
Native Court messenger earned betw en £24 - £80 per 
annum. 194 8 Report, p. 303.
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of Nigeria and 15 were natives of the Southern Cameroons.
But Cameroonians held only inferior posts: court clerks,
office boys, messengers.
The Nigerian Legal Department had only four
persons serving in the Southern Cameroons. Of the four,
two were natives of the Southern Cameroons, one was a
30native of Nigeria, and the other was a white.
Of the 153 persons employed by the Nigerian 
Prisons Department in the Southern Cameroons, 147 were 
natives of the Southern Cameroons, 4 were Nigerians, and 2 
were British. The number of persons who served in the 
Southern Cameroons under the employ of the Nigerian Legal., 
Judicial, and Prisons. Departments between 1954 and 1958
were as follows:
Table 1
Year Judicial 
Dept.
Legal 
Dept.
Prisons
Staff
N.A; Judiciary
1954 9 81
1955 22 4 91 325
1956 26 4 121 308
1957 32 3 136 273
1958 27 4 153 333
Source: Compiled 
the 1958
from data at pages 307, 
Report.
313, 314 of
30. 1958 Report on the British Cameroons, p. 305*
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The large number of Native Authority judicial staff results 
from the fact that there were far more Native Courts than 
non-Native Courts, the traditional sector of the popu­
lation was by far larger than the modern sector, and the 
bulk of litigation consequently took place in the Native 
Courts.
Although the Prison staff situation rose from 
a handful in the 1920s to 158 in 1958, the number was 
still very small in view of the fact that there were 
approximately two thousand prisoners in the Southern 
Cameroons as of 1958.
One further issue needs to be mentioned here.
It concerns court fees. Litigants appearing before any 
court in the Southern Cameroons paid court fees. There 
were no special arrangements for legal aid .to needy per­
sons. But court fees could be waived or remitted by a 
judge on grounds of poverty.
Court fees, the bulk of which came from Native 
Courts, accounted for about 1% of the territory’s Govern­
ment income while 1.1% of Government expenditure in the
11territory went to the Judicial and Legal Departments.
What this meant was that money derived from the courts in 
the Southern Cameroons was sufficient to run the courts.
The courts were therefore self-financing.
B . The Bar
a) The official bar: the legal department
In keeping with British tradition there was no
31. 1958 Report on the British Cameroons, pp. 332-33*+.
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Ministry of Justice in Nigeria or the Southern Cameroons.
There was instead a Legal Department and the Judicial 
Department. The Legal Department was headed by a Law 
Officer known as the Attorney-General.
In England, the Attorney-General is the chief 
Law Officer of the Crown. He is assisted by the Solicitor- 
General and a number of Crown Counsels known as Junior 
Counsels to the Treasury. He is head of the English Bar.
The Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General are legal 
advisers to the Crown. Both are political appointees 
made from eminent members of the Bar who are sympathetic 
to the political party in power. Apart from his political 
duties, which include advising Government Departments and 
answering questions in the House of Commons, the Attorney- 
General represents the Crown in certain civil proceedings 
and, as a matter of practice, in trials for treason and 
other important offences with a political or constitutional 
element. He also exercises the prerogative power of 
staying prosecutions on indictment by the entry of a nolle 
prosequi and, by statute, leave of the Attorney-General is 
required for the commencement of certain criminal proceedings.
Under the Colonial Legal Service, however, the 
Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General were civil 
servants appointed by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. The Attorney-General was also the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. He advised the Executive on the 
institution of prosecutions for political offences such 
as sedition or treason. Like the English Lord Chancellor,
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the Attorney-General sat in the Council of Ministers.
He was responsible for the preparation of Bills for reform 
of the law. He drafted Bills for Government Departments 
(as does the English Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury) 
and conducted Crown litigations in the courts. He was 
a member of the Legislature and was often appointed 
chairman of almost all its Select Committees. Finally, he 
was head of the local Bar.
The Attorney-General was, and still is in England, 
the living denial of Montesquieu's theory of the separ­
ation of powers.
Up to 1956 there was no resident Attorney- 
General in the Southern Cameroons.. The Nigerian Attorney- 
General was also the Attorney-General for the Southern 
Cameroons. Criminal litigation was conducted by the 
Police in the name of the Crown or the Commissioner of 
Police. As of 1958 the Legal Department in the Southern 
Cameroons counted only four officers (two Cameroonians, 
one Nigerian, and one English).
b ) The private bar
There were no Inns of Court in the Southern 
Cameroons and Nigeria. All legal education was under­
taken in England. Up to 1959 there was not a single 
Southern Cameroonian practising law. Barristers who 
appeared before the courts in the Southern Cameroons were 
all Nigerians.
Admission to the Bar was governed by the Supreme
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Court Ordinance NO. 4 of 1876. Under this Ordinance,
the Chief Justice could admit and enrol to practise as
barristers and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
persons already admitted as barristers or advocates in
the United Kingdom. But the Chief Justice could refuse
on other sufficient grounds to admit an applicant. No
one whose name was not duly enrolled in the Roll of Court
kept by the- Chief Registrar was entitled to practise.
There was a penalty of up to six monthsT imprisonment
and a fine of £100 for anyone practising law without a
32Certificate of Enrolment.
The Chief Justice could also admit anyone who
had been for five continuous years in the service of a
practising barrister or solicitor and who had passed an
examination in Principles and Practice of Law. Before
admission such a person had to subscribe the oath or
affirmation of allegiance and fidelity in his office in the
form prescribed by law.
The law provided that the Chief Justice could
in his discretion approve, admit and enrol to practise
as a barrister and solicitor in the Supreme Court, the
High Courts, and the Magistrates' Courts:
"(a) any person who is entitled to practise 
as a barrister in England or Ireland or as 
an advocate in Scotland; and who
!)■ produces testimonials sufficient to
32. The Legal Practitioners Ordinance, Cap. 110 of the 
1948 Laws of Nigeria consolidated earlier ordinances 
on the subject, notably the L.P.O., No. 44 of 1917 
(drawing of land instruments), the L.P.O. No. 57 of 
1933 (discipline of members of the legal profession).
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satisfy the Chief Justice that he is 
man of good character; and 
ii) has read in the Chambers of practising 
barrister or advocate of more than five 
years standing for at least one year, or 
has practised in the courts of the country 
in which he has been called or admitted 
for at least two years subsequent to his 
call or admission; or 
iii) has subsequent to his call to the Bar or 
admission as an advocate read in Nigeria 
in the Chambers of a practising barrister 
of more than ten years standing for at 
least two years; or 
iv) has practised as a barrister or solicitor 
in the courts of a territory under 
British administration for at least two 
years;
(b) any person who has been admitted as a 
solicitor in any of the Courts of London,
Dublin or Belfast, and produces testimonials 
sufficient to satisfy the Chief Justice that 
he is a man of good character;
(c) any Law agent admitted to practise in 
Scotland who produces testimonials sufficient 
to satisfy the Chief Justice that he is a 
man of good character.tT
Native Courts are excluded from the list of 
courts before which barristers may appear. No legal
practitioner could appear or act for or assist any party 
before a customary court.
Persons qualified to practise law were enrolled 
as 'barristers and solicitors’. This meant that every 
barrister was entitled to practise also as a solicitor 
and proctor, and every solicitor was entitled to practise 
also as an advocate, and subject to the Rules of Court, to 
sue for and recover his fees. The fusion of these two 
professions was significant in at least two respects.
First the classic dichotomy between barristers and soli­
citors with differing functions and status was abolished. 
Each could henceforth perform the functions of the other.
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For example, the barrister could.also draw deeds and the 
solicitor could also plead in court. Secondly, barristers 
who by English law could not sue for their fees were 
enabled to do so on account of the fact that they prac­
tised also as solicitors who by English law could sue 
for their fees.
The Full Bench of the Supreme Court could, 'for 
good reasons', suspend for a stated period or strike off 
the Roll of Court the name of any barrister or solicitor.
C . The content of the law administered
The law which was administered in the Southern 
Cameroons emanated from three sources, namely, customary 
law, laws specifically enacted for or extended to the 
territory, and English received laws.
Laws specifically enacted for or extended to 
the territory included various Proclamations and Orders- 
in-Council made for the territory, Nigerian Ordinances 
expressly extended' to the territory, and British Imperial 
Acts of Parliament specifically made applicable to the 
territory either directly or through Nigeria. There was 
no comprehensive list of all the laws which were in force 
in the Southern Cameroons. But a large section of these
laws existed in various colonial statute books known as 
'the revised editions of the laws of the federation of 
Nigeria’.
Section 27(1) of the Southern Cameroons High
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Court Law 1955 enjoined the High Court in the territory 
to observe and enforce the observance of rules of cus­
tomary law which passed the frepugnancy-incompatibilityT 
test. J Customary law was deemed applicable in causes 
and matters where the parties thereto were natives and 
also in causes and matters between natives and non-natives 
where it appeared to the court that substantial injustice 
would .be done to either party by a strict adherence to 
the rules of English law. No party was entitled to 
claim the benefit of customary law if it appeared either 
from express contract or from the nature of the transaction 
that English law governed the matter or again, if the tran­
saction was one unknown to customary law. Where no 
express rule was applicable to a matter in controversy, 
the court was governed by the principles of justice, equity 
and good conscience.
However, the fact that the parties to a dispute
33. The 'repugnancy clause’ was used to abolish barbarous 
customs (e.g. slavery, witchcraft, trial by ordeal) 
and also as a Trojan Horse by which English juristic 
ideas (e.g. prescription - laches and acquiescence, 
the right to be heard before being condemned, child 
custody to be governed by the welfare principle) were 
infused into customary law. But this omnibus pro­
vision was not always easy to apply. Excess of 
judicial zeal sometimes led to customary law rules 
being struck down as being repugnant simply because 
they offended against the law of England or English 
ideas of justice. For an in depth treatment of this 
issue, see, Allott’s New Essays in African Law, op. 
cit.; T.O. Elias, British colonial law - a compara­
tive study of the interaction between English and 
local laws in British Dependencies, Stevens & Sons 
Ltd, London, 19^2; Morris and Read, Indirect rule 
and the search for justice, O.U.P., London, 1972.
were natives did not call for the automatic application of 
customary law because not all natives were subject to the 
operation of customary law. Furthermore, the mere lack 
of repugnancy in an alleged custom did not bind the 
court to apply customary law. For customary law to apply, 
the court had to be satisfied not only that the alleged 
custom has passed the repugnancy test but, further, that 
the matter before it was purely customary or that all the 
circumstances taken into account were connected with native 
life, habit or custom.
Customary law governed the following matters: 
title to land subject to the jurisdiction of a customary 
court; marriage, family status, guardianship of children, 
inheritance or the disposition of property on death, sub­
ject to the jurisdiction of a customary court.
The general law applicable in the Southern
Cameroons was the English common law, the doctrines of
?L\
equity and statutes of general application which were in 
force in England as of the 1st January 1900. Hence the 
general principles of the English law of tort, contract, 
crime, evidence, civil and criminal procedure, mercantile 
law, commercial law, land law (applicable only as regards 
leasehold and freehold estates), constitutional law, pri­
vate international law, etc. were applicable in the terri­
tory. In every case however, these principles of English
34. In the Nigerian case of Att.-Gen. v. John Holt (1910),2N.L.R.l. 
Osborne, C.J. put forward the following test as decisive 
of what a statute of general application is: by what
courts and to what classes of the community in England 
was the Act enforced in England? Allott, op.cit., 
proposed the following test: was it a public general
Act? was it suitable for general application outside 
England?
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law applied only in so far as they had not been expressly 
modified by legislation, judicial decision, or local laws.
Because the limitation date was 1st January 1900, 
post-1899 English statutes did not apply in the Southern
q C
Cameroons. By the same token post-1899 English decisions 
based on post-1899 English statutes did not apply as well. 
But post-1899 English decisions applied if they were based 
on pre-1900 English statutes or if they did not involve 
a change of any particular common law doctrine or prin­
ciple. One effect of all this was that although a
pre-1900 English statute may have been repealed in England,
37it continued to be in force in the Southern Cameroons.
The situation was otherwise with regards to family law 
matters. In probate, divorce and matrimonial causes 
and proceedings jurisdiction was exercised by the courts 
in conformity with the law and practice 'for the time
q O
being in force in England’.
2. The Penal System
The criminal law applicable in the Southern 
Cameroons was the Criminal Code of Nigeria. The Code
35. E.g. the Nigerian Criminal Code (cap. 42), the Evidence 
Ordinance (cap. 62), Criminal Procedure Ordinance 
(cap. 43).
36. E.g. the Contributory Negligence Act 1945, the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947, the Law Reform (Frustration 
Contracts) Act 1943.
37. E.g. the Fatal Accidents Acts, of 1846 and 1864.
38. In the Southern Cameroons that phrase has always been 
construed as being ambulatory; i.e. 'from time to 
time in force’ in England.
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together with 'other Ordinances such as the Immigration 
Ordinance defined offences and set out the penalties for 
each. Convicted persons generally served their sentences 
in prisons inside the territory. Sentences of imprison­
ment were however seldom high as the incidence of crime 
was low and offences were, for the most part, never 
serious and complicated.
A . Penalties
The following penalties existed: hanging, jail,
fine, imprisonment in stocks, corporal chastisement, and 
deportation.
Hanging was the prescribed penalty for capital 
murder. Execution took place inside a prison on enclosed
gallows. All death sentences in the Southern Cameroons
were carried out in the Buea Prisons which was the only 
prison in the territory which had a gallows and a hangman. 
A ligature or a running noose was put round the condemned 
person's neck, his head having been covered with a black 
hood. The ligature is pulled and he is suspended, the 
constricting force being the weight of his body.
Terms of imprisonment were generally never high. 
There were seldom sentences of more than five years. But 
it was common practice to sentence prisoners to a term of 
imprisonment 'with hard labour'. Fines too were not 
excessive. If an act or omission offended both against 
customary law, the criminal code and some other enactment, 
a Native Court could not impose punishment in excess of
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the maximum punishment permitted by the criminal code or 
such other enactment.
Up to I960 an offender in the Southern Cameroons 
was still liable to corporal punishment. It differed 
from the German method only in that it was administered 
with some respectability. Thus, the flogging was carried 
out ’with a light cane’ in enclosed premises after medical 
examination. Twelve strokes on the bare buttocks was the 
maximum permissible. From 1958 onwards however corporal 
punishment could be inflicted only on juvenile offenders.
Up to the 1930s offenders in the Southern 
Cameroons could still be sentenced to imprisonment in 
stocks. This method of punishment was also similar to 
the German method; the only difference being that the 
English replaced iron chains with wood. Moreover, 
prisoners who were thought might try to escape from prison 
were fettered to their cell walls with chains.
One striking similarity with what obtained in 
the French Cameroun was that a court in the Southern 
Cameroons could recommend to the Governor-General of 
Nigeria that a person be deported from one part of the 
territory to another. The recommendation was made if 
that person had been convicted of an offence punishable by 
imprisonment without the option of a fine and it seemed 
that deportation would be in the interest of peace, order 
and good government. Similar considerations applied 
where a person was likely to commit or provoke a breach 
of the peace and failed to give security for good behaviour.
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The same applied to people who sought to incite enmity 
against the Queen and to anyone who intrigued against 
constituted power and authority. That was not all.
If the Governor considered that a former chief, village 
headman, member of a Native Authority, or member of a 
Native Court, ought in the interest of the maintenance 
or re-establishment of public order to leave the neighbour­
hood where he used to exercise authority, the Governor 
could cause him to be removed to such other part of the 
territory as was directed.
This was a powerful weapon in the hands of the 
Governor to deal with troublemakers, nonconformists and 
political activists. This provision was however apparently 
never used in the Southern Cameroons. Likewise, the 
Governor’s power to reprieve condemned persons in appro­
priate cases does not seem to have been used in the terri­
tory.
B . The incidence of crime
The African population in the Southern Cameroons 
passed from 299,000 in 1921, 410,482 in 1936 to 752,700 in 
1953. The 1953 figures consisted of 383,900 males and 
368,800 females.^ Of this number only 666,900 were 
natives of the Southern Cameroons while 85,800 came from
39. 1958 Report on the British Cameroons, pp. 294, 297.
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various tribes in Nigeria.^ By i960 the population of 
the territory had risen to 800,000.
The white population^ rose from a mere 374 
in 1936, 797 in 1954 to 1,142 in 1958.42 As of 1954 
therefore there were at least 86,597 foreigners in the 
Southern Cameroons as against 666,900 indigenes; that 
is a ratio of roughly 1:8. In 1958 the ratio of aliens 
to Southern Cameroonians was something like 1:6.
Unfortunately available statistics do not dis­
close the proportion of offences committed by foreigners 
and those committed by the indigenes; nor do they indi­
cate what offences were committed by foreigners.
Because of the insufficiency of statistical information, 
it is difficult to determine the real incidence of crime 
with regards to Southern Cameroonians.
However, offences in the territory were seldom 
of a complicated nature. Offences against property 
(mainly petty thefts of foodstuff or livestock or some 
common household utensil) were the most common. The 
number of persons tried in the Provincial Courts between 
1925 and 1927 were as follows:
40. 1958 Report on the British Cameroons, p. 301. Of 
the 85,800 Nigerians, 26,000 were Ibos. In 1951, 
the C.D.C. alone had 4,000 Nigerians in its employ.
41. In 1958 this white population consisted of 19 
nationalities.
42. 1958 Report, p. 303. There were 598 British in 
1954 and 786 in 1958.
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Table 2
Division
Civ.
1925
Crim. Total Civ.
1926
Crim. Total Civ.
1927
Crim. Total
Victoria 108 384 492 88 499 587 94 596 690
Kumba 11
mCO 94 18 122 140 16 230 245
Mamfe 11 105 116 28 162 190 8 104 112
Bamenda 5 100 105 2 130 132 2 104 106
Total 135 6 72 807 136 913 1049 120 1034 1154
Source: compiled from data at p . 19 of the 1928 Report on
the British Cameroons by His Majesty’s Government 
to the League of Nations.
Most criminal cases came from Victoria and Mamfe Divisions. 
Data showing the number of criminal cases tried in the Pro­
vincial Courts in 1927 reveal that 55 persons were convicted 
of fighting in public places (affray), 5 of murder (of whom 
2 had the death sentence and were executed), 63 of assault, 
147 of stealing, 309 of various offences under the Nigerian 
Customs Ordinance, 4l of a number of offences under the 
Forestry Ordinance, 22 of offences under the Public Health 
Ordinance and 10 of witchcraft. There were a total of 
846 convictions and 188 acquittals. Of those convicted,
2 were sentenced to death and were hanged, 459 were sentenced 
to various terms of imprisonment, and 385 were fined or 
otherwise disposed of. Imprisonment was the favourite 
penalty imposed by Provincial Courts. Only in respect of 
petty offences under various Ordinances were fines often 
imposed.
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While Provincial Courts used imprisonment more 
frequently than any other penalty, Native Courts consis­
tently sentenced offenders to pay fines. In 1927 for 
example, Native Courts sentenced 673 offenders to various 
terms of imprisonment, 2,148 to pay fines, 22 to be 
flogged, 23 to be locked in stocks and admonished 21.
Native Courts dealt with far more cases than did 
Provincial Courts. In 1927 Native Courts disposed of 
8,379 civil matters and 3,739 criminal cases. Most civil 
cases concerned debts (3,810 cases), the greatest number 
coming from Kumba and Mamfe, and matrimonial matters 
(3,554 cases), the bulk of them from Bamenda Division.
There were 78 cases of adultery, 76 of which came from 
Victoria. Thirty-six adultery cases in Mamfe were 
punished as criminal offences.
Up to the eve of independence, this pattern 
remained unaltered. In 1957 for example, more and more 
people were appearing before Native Courts charged with 
contravening various Native Authority Rules and Orders 
as well as Nigerian Ordinances such as the Customs and 
Excise Ordinance (cases of contraband). Assault cases 
still remained high. But the number of theft cases coming 
before the courts had fallen. There were more adultery 
cases reported in Bamenda than the southern part of the 
territory which hitherto led in this type of cases. Most 
convicted offenders were fined (at most £5). A fairly 
large number received prison terms not exceeding six months 
each.
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Between 1954 and 1958 the Southern Cameroons 
High Court dealt with 165 cases of which 77 resulted in 
acquittals and 88 in convictions. Of the 88 convicted,
25 were cases of theft and 18 were cases of manslaughter. 
Twelve were sentenced to death, 62 to imprisonment, 12 to
i 4^pay fines and 4 to be whipped. J
Over the same period (.1954 - 1958) about 300
juveniles were charged before the Magistrates’ Courts.
Most of these juvenile delinquents were boys charged 
mainly either with offences against property or the person 
(simple assault). Approximately half the number of those 
charged were discharged and the others convicted. None 
of those convicted was sent to prison or borstal. Most 
of them were whipped, 8 were fined and 17 were bound over. 
Over the same period and in the same courts, roughly 20,000 
adults (including 300 female adults) appeared in court 
charged mainly with theft, assault and failing to pay tax. 
Imprisonment remained the most used form of penalty. It 
was perhaps thought that imprisonment served as a deterrence. 
Offenders who were minors were either bound over or flogged.
What emerges is that simple and unsubtle forms
of stealing were the most frequent offences. Next in 
order of frequency were offences against the person 
(assault, wounding). By 1957 cases of smuggling and tax 
evasion were becoming significant. The High Court had
43. 1958 Report on the British Cameroons, p. 322.
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comparatively an insignificant number of cases to deal 
with. The entire sentencing range was used. However, 
whipping and binding over were infrequently used. But 
whereas Native Courts usually sentenced offenders to pay 
fines, non-Native Courts consistently resorted to 
imprisonment. After 1956 more and more cases of adultery 
were coming before Native Courts, especially in Victoria. 
This was probably due to urbanisation and the plantation 
economy in that part of the territory. Up to 195°
there was no recorded prosecution for prostitution, rape, 
criminal abortion, and soliciting.
C . Prison administration
Prison administration in the Southern Cameroons 
was governed by the Prisons Ordinance. As there were 
only a few cases of juvenile delinquency in the territory 
there was no special legislation, courts, or prisons for 
them. The few juvenile delinquents who appeared before 
the courts were sent either to the Approved School at 
Enugu or the Borstal Section of the prisons at Port Har- 
court, both of them located in Nigeria. There they got 
a general education and some knowledge of a trade. Upon 
the discharge of a former juvenile delinquent from the 
Approved School or the Borstal Institute, it was the duty
44. Cf. Edwin and Shirley Ardener and W.A. Warmington, 
Plantation and Village in the Cameroons, O.U.P., 
I960.
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of the District Officer of the Division to keep an eye 
on him and give him what assistance he needed; for, there 
were no Probation Officers in the territory.
There were four prisons in the Southern Cameroons, 
at Buea, Bamenda, Mamfe, Kumba. The last three were 
prisons for short term prisoners; that is, those serving 
terms of less than two years. Buea prison received long 
term prisoners. In some cases prisoners with suitably 
long sentences were sent to convict prisons outside the 
territory in Nigeria where they learnt a trade.
Ultimate responsibility for the administration 
of all prisons in the territory rested with the Director 
of Prisons in Nigeria. But the immediate responsibility 
for the Buea, Kumba and Bamenda prisons rested with the 
Superintendent (to whom the power of assistant Director 
was delegated) and the Assistant Superintendent of Prisons, 
the former resident in Buea and the latter in Bamenda.
Mamfe Prison was controlled by the District Officer of 
the Division assisted by a chief warder who supervised 
the routine work and maintained discipline. These 
officers inspected the prisons regularly to ensure that 
prisons regulations were duly observed and that there were 
no abuses. As of 1958 there was only one Southern 
Cameroonian as ’senior officer’ in the Prisons Department.
Prison warders were recruited from both men and 
women with at least a standard six Primary School Leaving 
Certificate. Pay was equivalent to that of the Police 
Force. Engaged in the first instance on an agreement for
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six years, a warder who was re-engaged (he was re-engaged 
If his services or conduct were satisfactory) served con­
tinuously up to the age of 45. Warders worked for eight 
hours and their duties were mainly that of supervision of 
prisoners out at work. They were supplied free quarters 
or paid an allowance in lieu.
Prisoners lived mainly in association cells of 
about 360 cubic feet of space each. On addmission a 
prisoner was issued with a prisons uniform and three 
blankets. From 1957 prisoners began sleeping on vono 
double-deck beds. Male and female prisoners were separated 
from each other, and first offenders from recidivists. 
Unconvicted prisoners or those awaiting trial were kept 
away from convicted ones. Prisoners of unsound mind 
were either detained at Kumba Prison or transferred to 
asylums in Eastern Nigeria.
Prisoners worked mainly outside the prison - 
cutting grass, carrying firewood and water, farming, 
building and so on. Indoors, prisoners learnt how to 
make mats, ropes, baskets, stools. They also learnt 
carpentry and how to sew. With the establishment of the 
Buea Dairy Farms in 1957, selected prisoners were housed 
and employed there under ’open prisons conditions’ where 
they got a constructive agricultural training in cattle 
grazing, milking of cows, pig farming, the growing of vege­
tables. Prisoners put in 6^ - hours of work per day. 
Supervised by wardresses, female prisoners were chiefly 
employed in the preparation of meals. Those serving long
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sentences were taught sewing and handicrafts. Educated 
prisoners were encouraged to teach illiterate ones.
Adult education classes were held inside the prisons.
A prisoner who conducted himself well and worked 
hard usually earned remission to the extent of 1/3 his 
sentence. After two years in jail, a long-term prisoner 
earned two shillings a month; one shilling to spend on 
luxuries, in the shape of food or tobacco, the other 
shilling to save in a till until he was discharged.
Prison discipline was maintained by the depri­
vation of privileges and the loss of remission, which 
was considered to be a great deterrent against bad 
behaviour. Other sanctions included the reduction of 
food rations, and solitary confinement. If a prisoner 
was thought to be violent or likely to escape, he was 
put in leg irons. Flogging was the common punishment 
for mutiny, incitement to mutiny and assault on prison 
officers.
Medical officers regularly visited prisoners 
and those who were seriously ill were removed to the
nearest General Hospital. The health conditions of
prisoners was apparently good.. Some indeed did put on
weight. In 1927, there were 14 deaths reported in the
four prisons in the territory. The total number of 
inmates in all four prisons was 1,100. The deaths were 
attributed to an outbreak of pneumonia. Prisons medical 
statistics for 1958 reveal that prisoners who died did :so 
mainly as a result of dysentary, pneumonia, heart failure
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and pulmonary tuberculosis. There were a few cases of 
suicide. The contraction of an infectious disease such 
as chicken-pox was fairly common although those so 
afflicted were always removed to infectious diseases 
hospital.
Upon their discharge from prison destitute ex­
convicts were repatriated to their homes or place of con­
viction at the Government's expense. They were also 
given a few shillings to tide them over until they reached 
their destination. A long term prisoner could however, 
be given substantial pecuniary aid on discharge or the 
tools of the trade he learnt in prison.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FRENCH SYSTEM
French colonial legislation in Cameroun was all 
a matter of trial and error. No sooner was a law enacted 
than it was quickly amended, repealed., re-enacted, or 
replaced. ,fAu Cameroun ... il existe un amas de textes 
juridiques, veritable labyrinthe dans lequel se perd le 
profane. En effet, la diversite'*, 1 T instabilite, la com- 
plexite’ sont les caracteres principaux et reconnus de 
notre legislation d ’Outre-Mer. ... Bon nombre de textes 
sont bien vite depasses par les evenements, ce qui conduit 
a les remanier , a les modifier, a les abroger, tr§s 
souvent, trop souvent
There were three characteristics of French legis­
lative policy in Cameroun. First, a law passed in France 
had to be specifically promulgated in Cameroun to be valid 
in the territory. As Cameroun was married to French Equa­
torial Africa for legislative purposes, France usually 
legislated for the whole of that federation by means of 
decrets and it was left to the French Commissalre in 
Cameroun to promulgate the law in question in the territory 
by means of arrete. However, before the approval of the
1. H^ Chene, Repertoire general des textes legislatifs et 
reglementaires applicables au Cameroun, Compagnie 
Africaine de Diffusion, Douala, 1954, p. Ill, X.
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the terms of the Mandates Agreements In 1922, the Commissaire
had, in the exercise of his regulatory and legislative
powers, introduced certain aspects of French laws into the
territory by means of arretes. But in 1924, Paris made
it clear that laws, decrees and regulations in force in
France could be rendered executory in Cameroun only by a
2
decree of the French Head of State. The only exception 
related to the French Constitution and Tles principes 
generaux de droit’ which were executory in the territory 
without having to be specifically promulgated therein.
Secondly, under the tutelage Agreements France 
assumed full powers of legislation and administration as 
well as the right to introduce her laws in Cameroun. She 
vested legislative authority for Cameroun in the central 
government in Paris. Article 72 of the French Constitution 
of October 27th, 1946 specifically provided that only the 
French Parliament could legislate for the overseas terri­
tories with regards to criminal law, civil liberties and 
political and administrative organisation. The French 
Parliament in fact had full powers to enact laws for 
Cameroun on any subject. The French Head of State could
2. Art. 1 & 2 of Decree of 16 April 1924. Hence in
Procureur General, Yaounde c. Fende et Malika, Penant,
1959, p^ 434, the Chambres Reunies of the Cour de 
Cassation held that "in the absence of a special clause 
of applicability and failing local promulgation, a penal 
law cannot be held applicable in Cameroun".
3. Chene, op.cit., p. VI; Syndicat General des Ingenieurs
Conseils, C.E., 26th June 1959, Penant, 1959, p. 572.
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also legislate by decree on those matters not governed by 
existing laws or not reserved to Parliament. This legis­
lative competence of the Head of State was not based on
4 o  ithe Senatus-Co-nsulte of 1854 but upon article 8 of the 
Constitution of the 16th July 1875 which gave the Head of
c:
State power to execute treaties.
Thirdly, the French organised two parallel systems
of courts in Cameroun; one for Frenchmen and assimilated
Camerounians, and the other for the unassimilated Camer-
6ounians styled indigenes or natives. This dual system
of courts reflected in the judicial sphere, the French 
policy of assimilation which distinguished between Camer-
7
ounians of citoyen status and those of sujet status.
4. The Constitution of the 14th January 1852 of the Second 
French Empire directed the French Senate to draw up a 
Constitution for French colonies by means of an instru­
ment known as Senatus-Consulte. This colonial constitution 
or senatus-consulte was duly drawn up and promulgated
on May 3rd, 1854. It gave the French Emperor, into 
whose shoes the French President has stepped, the exclu­
sive power to rule the African colonies by decrees.
5. See generally, J.W. salacuse, An introduction to law in 
French-speaking Africa, the Michie Co., Charlottesville, 
Virginia, 196 97 Ch* T7
6 . MEst indigene ... (a) individu originaire des territoires 
sous mandat du Cameroun, Togo, des possessions de l'A.O.F. 
et de l ’A.E.F. ne possedant pas la qualitd de citoyen 
francals; (b) individus originaires des pays Grangers 
entre ou limitrophes des possessions francaises enumerees 
ci-dessus et ne possedant pas dans leurs pays d Torigine
le statut des nationaux europeens." Justice Indigene - 
Principe, File No. 10942/A, Cameroon National Archives, 
Yaounde.
7. See supra, Chapter Two.
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To facilitate exposition, the dichotomy between 
what the French called ’justice de droit francais’ and 
’justice de droit indigene’ will be followed.
I . Justice de Droit Francais
o
People of French nationality and citoyen status 
had their own system of courts. These courts applied 
French laws in force in metropolitan France. The colonial 
Bench and Bar were however different from the metropolitan 
magistracy and Bar.
Q
1. The system of courts for Frenchmen-7
Shortly after the Anglo-French partition of Cameroon 
in March 1916, France set up a tribunal in Douala to 
assist the French army in maintaining law and order.^ This 
court, which was later re-constituted, ^  was however super­
seded in 1918 by a court of first instance presided over by
8 . In 1954 there were 10,200 Frenchmen in Cameroun.
9. These courts were variously styled tribunaux francais, 
tribunaux europeens, tribunaux modernes, etc. Other 
whites as well as Cameroonians of citoyen status were 
also justiciable before these courts.
10. Arrete du 8.8.1916 promulgant le ddcret du 6.5.1916 
reorganisant le service de la justice dans les Territoires 
Occupes de 1 ’Ancient Cameroun. This court was akin to 
the justices de paix a competences etendues set up in
A.E.F. by Decree of l6th April 1913.
11. Decree of 12th January 1917 brought into force by Arretes 
of 12.4.1917.
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12a career magistrate. Appeals from this court lay to
the Court of Appeal for French Equatorial Africa situated 
in Brazzaville.
13A later decree set up a hierarchy of courts to
administer French law in all matters involving Frenchmen,
aliens belonging to nations recognised diplomatically by
France, and Cameroonians of 'citoyen* status. These
courts were: tribunaux de premier instance, justices de
paix, consell d'appel, and an ambulatory cour crlmlnelle.
This last court sat in Douala but on the request of the
Procureur de la Republique and with the approval of the
Commissalre de la Republique, it could sit in any other
town. With the creation of the Conseil d'Appel appeals no
longer went to Brazzaville.
193^ was a notable year with regards to French
judicial policy in her overseas possessions. She cut down
her colonial judicial personnel as well as the number of
14courts in her possessions. Once more the Brazzaville
Court of Appeal became the appeal court for Cameroon as
well as being the court of appeal for French Equatorial 
15Africa. The Cameroun Conseil d'Appel was therefore
abolished. The composition of the cour crlmlnelle was 
altered and a justice de paix a competence etendue was set
12. Decree of 8th August 1920.
13. Decree of 29.12.1922 promulgated by Arrete of 17.3.1923.
14 . Decree of 11.5.1934.
15- Decree of 31.12.1934.
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up in Garoua.xo These reforms were later consolidated.
This situation remained unchanged until after
World War II. In 19^7 the following set of courts were
18established for Frenchmen: a tribunal superieur d fapoel
19 20with a chambre d ’accustion, cours criminelles, tribunaux
de premiere instance, justice de paix a competences etendues,
justices de paix investies d ’attributions correctionelle
limitees, and justices de paix a competences ordinaire.
Appeals no longer went to Brazzaville.
In 1951 the Tribunal Superieur d ’Appel with its
seat in Douala was upgraded to a Cour d ’Appel and moved to
Yaounde. There were in all six courts for Frenchmen in
Cameroun distributed as of 1959 as follows: 1 Cour d ’Appel,
1 Cour Criminelle, 7 Tribunaux de Premiere Instance, 13
v "* * iJustices de Paix a Competences Etendues, 4 Justices de Paix 
a Attributions Correctionnelles, and 25 Justices de Paix a 
Competences Ordinaires. These courts shall now be examined.
A . Cour d ’Appel
Composed of career magistrates, the Cour d ’Appel
16. Ibid.
17. Decree of 30.6.1936 extended to Cameroun by Arrete of 
15.2.1936.
18. Decree of 27.11.19^7.
19. The Tribunal Superieur d ’Appel was the equivalent of 
the Cour d ’Appel in French West Africa and French 
Equatorial Africa.
20. This court was the Cameroun equivalent of the Cour 
d ’Assises.
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was presided over by a . judge-president, assisted by at
least two assessors chosen yearly by the Haut Commissaire
on the proposition of the court. These assessors were
usually French civil servants. The court also had a
registrar and one or two assistant registrars. The Pro-
cureur-General at the Cour d'Appel was also the head of
the judicial and.legal services in Cameroun T,avec la charge
d fadministrer la justice dans le territoire sous 1 ’autorite
21du Haut Commissaire".
The court heard appeals from inferior courts 
except appeals from the Justices de Paix a attributions 
correctionnelles which went first to the Tribunal de 
Premiere Instance. Like the metropolitan Cour de cassation, 
the Cour d'Appel saw to the correct interpretation and 
application of the law. It had two benches; a chambre 
d'accusation and a chambre d 'annulation. The former had 
the same role and powers as the chambre de mlse en accusation 
in France; the latter could annul or quash decisions given 
by inferior courts.
However, appellate jurisdiction over the most 
important cases was exercised by the Cour de Cassation in 
Paris. Appeals for cassation were available against the 
infringement of a law by a French authority. Sometimes the 
Cour d'Appel was called upon to apply customary law. In 
such a case, an appeal for cassation to the Cour de Cassation 
was unavailable.
21. B. Lembezat, Le Cameroun, 3rd ed., Editions Maritimes 
et Coloniales Paris, 195^, p. 99.
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B . Cour Criminelle
The Criminal Court had its seat in Douala but 
could hold sessions in other towns by authority of the Haut 
Commissaire after consultation with the Procureur. Its 
jurisdication was exclusively criminal. It differed from 
the Cour d Tassises in France in that it had no jury system. 
But it had assessors who sat with the court's judges.
(these were judges from the court of appeal)' and all of 
them decided on the question of guilt and punishment. 
Questions of jurisdiction, procedure and applications for 
the award of damages were however decided by the judges 
alone. Half the number of assessors were chosen from 
French civil servants and the other half from among Camer­
ounian civil servants.
C . Tribunal de Premiere Instance
This court exercised.original jurisdiction in 
civil, commercial, and minor criminal matters which were 
outside the purview of the Justice de Paix a attribution 
correctionnelle limitee. Appeals from this latter court 
lay to the Tribunal de Premiere Instance.
In principle this court was presided over by a 
career magistrate. But it was common practice for the 
High Commissioner to appoint French civil servants, after 
consultation with the Procureur General, to preside over it. 
Appeals from here lay to the Cour d ’Appel.
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D. Justices de Paix
There were three types of Justices de Paix, each
different from the other in the extent of its jurisdiction.
The Justices de Paix a competence ordinaire dealt with petty
civil and commercial cases while the Justices de Paix a 
> ,
competence etendue dealt with civil and commercial matters 
involving a high financial value. The Justices de Paix a 
attributions correctionnelle's limitees exercised limited 
jurisdiction in petty criminal matters (offences against 
the administrative authorities of the locality, summary 
offences). These courts were presided over by district 
officers appointed by arr§te of the Haut Commlssaire after 
consultation with the Procureur-General. These ’justices 
of the peace’ were assisted by clerks chosen by the ’justices’ 
themselves.
2. The law applied by the courts for Frenchmen
Courts for those of French nationality and citoyen 
status applied French laws which were in force in metropolitan 
France although in some cases they could, with the help of 
native assessors, apply customary law in matters where only 
indigenes were litigants. French law as a general prin­
ciple constituted the ordinary or general law, while cus­
tomary law was regarded merely as a residual law. As a 
result, in any case involving a Frenchman and a Camerounian, 
the jurisdiction of native courts was ousted in favour of
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French courts. The only exception was.where the Frenchman
had affirmed in a written contract that he would submit
22to the jurisdiction of customary courts.
By Decree No. 46-877 of the 30th April 1946,
such jurisdiction as the courts for natives exercised was
taken away.and vested in the French courts. This was
the sequel of the grant of citoyennete de T fUnion franchise
to Camerounians by the 1946 Constitution. The so-called
native penal code which had been instituted by Decree of
17th July 1944 was abolished. The French Penal Code was
amended to suit local conditions and made applicable to
Camerounians as well.
Criminal procedure was governed by a Decree of
26th February 1931. However, another Decree of 21st
November 1933 made the French Code d TInstruction Criminelle
2 3generally applicable in Cameroun. In particular, articles
590 to 597 relating to the keeping of criminal records
were made specifically applicable by Decree No. 54-868 of
i 24the 2nd September 1954. Appeal procedures were however
determined by the Haut Commissaire after consultation with
>■ > 25the Procureur-General.
In civil and commercial causes the jurisdiction
22. Decree of 31st July 1927, art. 43.
23. Cf. Nlate Nlate et Autres, Cass. Crim., 7th January 
1955, Penant, 1955, p. £”2, being an appeal from the 
Cameroun Cour Criminelle.
24. Penant, 1955, p. 75.
25- Decree of 27th November 1947, art. 29 and 37.
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of French courts was general while that of native courts 
was limited. French courts were competent in all matters, 
with regards to natives,, which did not form part of personal 
status. Their jurisdiction arose either by virtue of an 
express legal provision or as a result of Tincompatibility 
de la coutume avec l ’ordre public ou les principes de notre 
civilisation* or where customary law was silent on the issue 
being litigated, or again where the native litigant opted 
for French law.
There were two variants of this option; ’option 
de legislation* and 'option de juridiction’. In the 
former case the native litigant opted for French law. He 
did so expressly and in writing. In the latter case, the 
native litigant merely elected to have his case tried in 
a French court. Here, the court seised of the matter 
applied customary law if the issue was one of status and 
French law in all other cases.
Before the second half of the 1920s, the courts 
followed a rudimentary system of civil procedure which was 
fixed by the presiding magistrate of each court. A number
2 6of enactments later instituted a system of civil procedure. 
These were nothing but the piece-meal introduction into 
Cameroun of the French Code de Procedure Civile. Even
26. Arretes of 1.2. 1926, 12.8.1927, and 11.5.1944; Waffo 
Thomas c. Societe John Holt, Trib. lere Inst, de Douala, 
15.5.1952, Penant, 1955, p. 36.
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provisions of that Code which were not specifically promul-
27gated .in Cameroun applied in the territory.
Litigants could be represented by lawyers who
combined the functions of solicitor and barrister. The
existence of the barrister-cum-solicitor was perfectly
normal in French possessions; there was nothing wrong with 
2 8it. Lawyers were few; four in 19^7 and twenty-two in
291952. All were French. No Bar Association existed.
The court registrar or clerk often acted as notary, 
bailiff, or auctioneer (commissaire-priseur). It was 
common practice for the magistrate of the Tribunal de 
Premiere Instance to act at the same time as prosecutor.^0
3. The judicial service
The separation of judicial and executive powers, 
31laid, down as a principle, remained largely theoretical,
27. In Soclete de Gestion de la Compagnle Francaise du Gabon, 
Penant, 1959, p7 ^99, the Cour de Cassation held on 5th 
January 1959 that "Provisions of the Code de Procedure 
Civile not promulgated, apply as written rules in French 
Equatorial Africa".
28. Cass. crim., 18 January 1955, Penant, 1955, p. 184.
29. Lembezat, op.cit., p. 99. There was then no Camerounian 
’avocatT .
30. Procureur de la Republique pres le Tribunal Sup^rieur 
d TAppel du Cameroun et Mboumoua, Cass, crim., 12 May 
1954, Penant, 1955, p. 59~!
31. This principle was confirmed and reinforced by the 19^6 
Constitution.
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especially with regards to courts for Camerounians.
French civil servants continued to fill the place of judges.
The excuse was lack of trained legal personnel.
Judicial courts however had no power to try cases
relating to the functioning of the Administration’s services.
Such administrative cases were tried by the Conseil du 
32Contentieux which was analogous, not to the Conseil 
d ’Etat, but rather to the Conseil de Prefecture in France. 
Appeals lay to the Court of Appeal.
The Haut Commissaire and the Parquet were
33stripped of the powers they used to exercise over the Bench. 
The discipline and independence of magistrates and the 
overall administration of courts was ensured by the Conseil 
Superieur de la Magistrature.
But the status of colonial judges was in some
3I1
respects different from that of their metropolitan brethren. 
Since Cameroun was an associate territory in the French 
Union, French colonial judges serving in Cameroun came 
under the French Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
State in charge of relations with Associate States. Their 
status was fixed by Decree of 22 August 1928 as modified 
by Decrees of 2nd April 1955, 30 August 1955, 22 October,
1929 and 18 January 1930.
32. C.E., 31 March 1954, Penant, 1955, p. 11; Emile
Mbarga, ”L'Evolution de la juridiction du Conseil d ’Etat 
francais sur le Cameroun”, Ann. de la Fac. de Droit du 
Cameroun, No. 7, pp. 3-34.
33- Art. 84 of the French Constitution of 27th October 1946.
34. Cf. art. 83 and 84, ibid.
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French colonial judges were regarded and treated 
as performing Ta public service' under the Ministry for 
the Colonies, on secondment from the Ministry of Justice. 
Their salaries were paid from the local budget. They 
were appointed by decree of the French President on the 
joint proposal of the Minister of Justice and the Minister 
for the Colonies. They were not, as their confreres in 
France, ’inamovible’. Their discipline and independence 
was ensured by the Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature.
But the Court of Appeal could, as a disciplinary measure, 
censure, reprimand, and temporarily suspend a judge. How­
ever, judges were posted to specific posts by the presiden­
tial decree appointing them and could, in theory, only be 
transferred from one colony to another, without promotion, 
upon their request or under conditions laid down by their 
decree of appointment.
In principle, only graduates from the legal section 
of the Ecole Nationale de la France Outre-Mer or the holders
of a Licence en Droit who have passed a special competitive 
examination were eligible for recruitment as judges. In 
practice, besides lawyers and other law decree holders, it 
was usual to appoint civil servants, court clerks, regis­
trars, and les offlciers ministeriels (legal officers) as 
judges in the colonial legal and judicial services.
To qualify for promotion, the colonial magistrate 
must have completed at least one year of service in his 
current grade. His name must also have figured on the
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promotion list (known as tableau d 1avancement).
A person appointed judge had to subscribe the 
following oath: nJe jure et promets de'bien et fidelement
remplir mes fonctions de garder religieusement le secret 
des deliberations et de me conduire en tout, comme un digne 
et loyal magistrate1 This judicial oath could be taken 
viva .voce or in writing. The oath for interpreters ran 
as follows: "Je jure de traduire fidelement les discours
echanges entre personnes parlant des langages differents." 
That for expert witnesses was: ,TJe jure de bien et fidele­
ment remplir la mission qui m ’est confiee, de faire mon 
rapport et de donner mon avis avec honneur et conscience."
II. Justice de Droit Indigene
The French established a separate set of courts 
to deal with cases between unassimilated Camerounians (these 
constituted the overwhelming majority of the population). 
There was therefore a dual system of courts in the territory. 
This dual system of courts survived until it was fused by 
the judicial re-organisation Ordinance of 1959. At this 
point, at the threshold of independence, one stops and makes 
an appraisal of French colonial justice in Cameroun.
35- 'Justice Indigene', File No. 10942/A, National Archives, 
Yaounde.
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1. The system of courts for the natives
By the Decree of 6th May 1916, Prance brought 
the administration.of justice in Cameroun within the frame­
work of French Equatorial Africa.
The system of courts instituted by the Germans 
was provisionally maintained but subsequently suppressed 
by Decree of 13th April 1921 which set up local courts 
(tribunaux de ler degre*) , district courts (trlbunaux 
de races), regional courts (tribunaux de 2nd degr£), and 
an organ of control, the Chambre d*Homologation. These 
courts were presided over by French administrators with 
the help of native assessors nominated by the Haut Commis- 
saire. The Chambre d THomologation was however presided 
over by a French career judge assisted by two assessors, 
one French, one Camerounian,, both designated by the Haut 
Commissaire.
These courts exercised criminal jurisdiction over 
offences known to and punishable under customary law as 
well as civil jurisdiction in matters known to customary 
law. They could sentence to a term of imprisonment. 
Corporal chastisement was replaced with a fine. Overall 
supervision of this system of courts was done by the 
Procureur de la Republique.
The Decree of 22 May 1922 "rendered executory in
36. This set of courts bore various labels in the literature: 
tribunaux indigenes, tribunaux de droit local, juridic- 
tions indigenes, juridlctlons de droit coutumler, etc. etc.
21k.
the territory of Cameroun placed under the mandate of 
France the laws and decrees promulgated in French Equa­
torial Africa prior to 1st January 1924". Such legis­
lation however applied only in so far as it was not contrary 
to decrees made specifically for Cameroun. It was in 
fact as a result of this reception statute that the sur­
viving German laws in Cameroun were replaced.
With the exception of the Tribunal de Races 
which it abolished, the Decree of 31st July 1927 maintained 
the court system instituted by the 1921 decree. It 
granted the right of appeal to native litigants and 
gave ’le pouvoir deliberatif’ to native assessors. The 
submission of an issue for conciliation either to the 
village chief or the Conciliation Court was made a compul­
sory preliminary to any civil or commercial suit.
Although some of its provisions were from time to 
37time amended, the Decree of 31st July 1927 remained, until 
the judicial reform of December 1959, the basic text 
governing the system of courts for the indigenous people.
The 1927 decree which was brought into force by Arrete of 
11th September 1928, established four courts: tribunaux de
conciliation, tribunaux de premier degre, tribunaux de 
second degre, chambre speciale d 'homologation. A fifth 
court, the tribunal coutumier, was created by Decree of 
26th July 1944.
37. Decrees of 16.5.1928, 29.11.1929, 24.1.1930, 13.12.1932, 
22.6.1934, 24.10.1940, 26.7.1944.
215.
A. Tribunal de Conciliation
Situated at village level, the Conciliation Court 
took over the existing conciliatory machinery which had 
been set up by the 1921 decree according to which chiefs 
were required to make every effort to persuade litigants to 
settle their differences through conciliation. Only after 
this attempt had failed could litigants then go to the 
Tribunal de Races, ancestor of the Tribunal de Premier 
Degre.
The Tribunal de Conciliation was presided over 
by chiefs aided by assessors. A successful conciliation 
had the same effect between the litigants as a binding con­
tract and was recorded as such. Where.the conciliation 
was not binding it was deemed to have the same force as 
that usually accorded to customary law agreements. A 
successful conciliation could however be nullified by the 
Chambre Special d 1 Homologation. In difficult cases, 
matters relating to jurisdiction and proof, and in cases 
having an administrative or political leaning, only dis­
trict officers or important chiefs were empowered to 
attempt conciliation.
B .' Tribunal de Premier Degre
This court was merely the old Tribunal de Races 
in another name. It heard cases in respect of which con­
ciliation had failed. Each Tribunal de Premier Degre was
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established by an arrete of the High Commissioner. He 
selected the location o f .the court (usually at district 
level) and determined the number of such courts in each 
locality. The location of these courts was usually 
influenced by ethnic considerations.
A district officer, or any other French civil 
servant appointed by the High Commissioner, presided over 
a Tribunal de Premier Degre. He was aided by two native 
assessors who acted in an advisory capacity only. Cases 
of personal status, family matters, marriage, divorce, 
and filiation were reserved exclusively for this court.
In localities with no Tribunal Coutumier, this court also 
dealt with civil and commercial matters. Up to 1946 it 
also exercised limited criminal jurisdiction.
A case was begun by an oral or a written com­
plaint of the plaintiff addressed either to the district 
officer or the presiding judge of the tribunal, enclosing 
8 francs in stamps for summons. He did not need to have a 
solicitor. He could be represented by any duly mandated 
person. He could swear where customary, law so provided.
He could also be assisted by an interpreter chosen by him 
and accepted by the court. The defendant who had to be 
sued in the court of the place of his residence, had rights 
similar to those of the plaintiff. A European was not 
bound to appear before any native court whether as plaintiff 
or defendant. His evidence was got by commission rogatory 
or memorandum which was read in court by the presiding judge.
217.
On appeal the plaintiff became the appelant and the defen­
dant, the intime. An appellant who lost on appeal could 
be ordered to pay costs assessed at between 1 to 100 francs.
In criminal matters the presiding judge exercised 
concurrently the functions of juge d Tinstruction and prose­
cutor. Appeals from here lay to the Tribunal de Second 
Degrd.
C. Tribunal Coutumier
Created in 1944, this court stood in a coordinate 
position with the Tribunal de Premier Degre. It had juris­
diction in civil and commercial matters (moveable property, 
debt, succession, gifts, etc.) except for cases relating 
to status and the family which were reserved for the 
Tribunal de Premier Degre. A 'tentative de conciliation' 
was obligatory in this court but not so in the Tribunal 
de Premier Degrd. Tribunaux Coutumiers were presided over 
by cantonal chiefs assisted by assessors named yearly. 
Appeals lay to the Tribunal de Second Degre.
D . Tribunal de Second Degre
It was composed in the same manner as the Tribunal 
de Premier Degre. It was set up at regional level. It 
took appeals from the Tribunal de Premier Degre and the 
Tribunal Coutumier. But it also exercised original juris­
diction in land cases and, up to 1946, serious criminal
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offences such as murder, armed robbery, rape, arson, 
slavery, refusal by a native to obey a French official, 
and.so on. The French administrative officer who presided 
over the court was assisted by two native assessors with a 
consultative voice. Appeals from here lay to the Chambre 
Spdciale d'Homologation.
E . Chambre Speciale d THomologation
This court was at the apex of the system of 
courts for Camerounians. It was not a full court by 
itself. It was a division or bench of the Court of Appeal 
exclusively in charge of appeals from the courts for 
natives.
The Chambre Speciale d 'Homologation was presided 
over by the president of the Court of Appeal aided by two 
assessors, a French civil servant and a native notable, 
with a consultative role.
This chamber ratified, reversed or annulled deci­
sions given by the Tribunal de Second Degre. When a 
decision was quashed or reversed, the case was sent back 
to the appropriate subordinate court which had tried it.
It was the over-riding duty of this chamber to ensure that 
courts for Camerounians applied only those customs which 
were compatible with "les principes de notre civilisation"; 
a provision which was often used to bend, modify, or trans­
form rules of customary law and, sometimes to strike down 
rules of customary law the presiding French judge little
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understood or was ignorant of, or again, did not tie in 
with his own concepts of civilisation.
This system of courts survived until December 1959. 
By that time, despite their ideological differences and 
tribal proclivities, the various political factions which 
had sprouted up in Cameroun were all talking of the 
inalienable right of the people to participate in the 
running of their own affairs. Indeed, by 1955 there was
o Q
already open agitation for independence and reunification.
Events began to move fast. In 1956 the French National
Assembly passed the famous Loi-Cadre. (Enabling Law No. 56-619
of June 23) giving greater power to the Cameroun Territorial
Assembly and providing that elections would be held on the
basis of universal adult suffrage, from a single electoral 
39college.
38. The re-unification issue was re-affirmed in a Resolution 
taken by the Cameroun Legislative Assembly In its plenary 
session on the 24th October 1958: ’’Conscious of expres­
sing the unanimous sentiment of the populations in all 
the regions of Cameroun ... Affirm once more its attach­
ment to the principle of re-unification of the two 
Cameroons and request that all steps be taken to enable 
the populations concerned to freely express their wish 
on such reunification before 1st January I960.” See 
M.D., "Les nouveaux statuts du Togo et du Cameroun”,
Penant, vol. 69, 1959, pp. 179-198, at p. 197. My 
translation. See also Haut Commissariat de la Repub- 
lique Francaise au Cameroun, Cameroun, 1946 - From Trustee­
ship to Independence i960 - Next independent country in 
Africa, Paris, 1959, p. 10.
39* See generally, M.D., "Le statut du Cameroun", Penant, 
vol. 68, 1958, pp. §5-110; P.M. Gaudemet, "L’Autonomie 
camerounaise", Rev. Fr; de Sc. Pol., vol. 8, 1958, p. 42; 
P.F. Gonidec, "De la dependence a 1 ’autonomie", Aunnuaire 
Francais, vol. 3, 1957, p. 597. For the first time the 
vote was given to all adults! The existing Territorial 
Assembly was dissolved on November 8th 1956. The December 
elections which were held to elect deputies to the Terri­
torial Assembly were marred by acts of violence and 
sabotage.
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Decree No. 57-501 of April 16, 1957 passed the
Statut du Cameroun creating a Legislative Assembly and a
40Government with authority over internal matters.
Article 2 of the fstatutr designated Camerounians as
possessing Camerounian nationality. This was novel. But
then the territory was still under French Trusteeship and
part of the French Union. Moreover, Camerounians were,
by virtue of art. 80 of the 1946 French Constitution,
citizens of the French Union. Hence, between April 1957
and December 1959 Camerounians were at the same time
nationals of Cameroun and citizens of the French Union.
There was however nothing anomalous in this for nationality
4land citizenship are two distinct issues. Under this
fstatut1 Cameroun retained responsibility over customary 
j ustice.
In February 1958, the first Camerounian Government,
which had been barely nine months in office, fell following
4 p
a political crisis, and was replaced by a new one which 
proceeded to negotiate independence and cooperation terms
40. See, J.P.G. Mopo, Constitutions du Cameroun, documents 
politiques et diplomatlques, Editions Stella, Yaounde, 
1977, pp. 11-24. In the May 1957 elections, Mr A. 
Mbida emerged as the Cameroun Premier.
41. See, R. Decittignies, MLa condition des personnes au 
Togo et Cameroun", Annales Africaines, 1957, pp. 7-52. 
At independence however, Camerounians ceased to be 
citizens of the French Union. See generally, M. de 
Bieville, "La naissance d ’une nouvelle nationality en 
Afrique", Rev. Jur. et Pol., vol. 15, 1961, p. 600.
42. The person who headed this new Government was Mr Ahidjo. 
He has been in power ever since.
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with France. Ordinance No. 58-1375 of 30th December 1958
(it came into force on 1st January 1959) set out a new
’statut’ for Cameroun. The Legislature and Government were
granted ’full’ autonomy over internal matters except for
43
money and security.. Independence was scheduled for 1st
January I960. But until then France retained full powers
over external affairs.
In theory France relinquished responsibility over
the administration of justice in the territory. But, as
envisaged in art. 21 of the 1958 ’statut’, a convention
signed with the Camerounian Government left France with
the continued superintendence of justice in Cameroun.
"Le service de justice est transfer^ mais, suivant une
procedure insolite prevue par l ’art. 21 du statut, c ’est
une convention qui pose les principes de J, ’ organisation
judiciaire camerounaise; en outre elle 'maintient au
President de la Republique Francaise le droit de grace et
confie au conseil d ’etat et h. la Cour de' cassation le
44controle de la justice camerounaise.”
Article 5 of the 1958 statut provided that laws 
and regulations made by Cameroun must respect treaties, 
international conventions and the principles and fundamental
43. Art. 23; cf. Mopo, op.cit., p. 27. As of 1958 there 
were 740 men in "the Camerounian Guard, 690 in the 23 
platoons of auxiliary Guards, and 635 in the police 
force. The French Army had 1,200 men stationed in 
Cameroun, divided into three garrisons. In 1956 a 
further 1,500 French soldiers were drafted in from 
French Equatorial Africa. See Cameroun from Trustee­
ship to Independence, op.cit., p. 20.
44. M.D., "Nouveaux Statuts ... ”, op.cit., p. 191.
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liberties inscribed in the Universal Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Charter of the United Nations.
Having won a large measure of political autonomy, 
the Cameroun Legislative Assembly on December 17th 1959 
passed Ordinance No. 59-86 overhauling the judicial insti­
tutions of the country. The Ordinance provided that jus­
tice would be rendered in the name of the Camerounian people. 
It abolished the distinction between ’justice francaise’ 
and ’justice indigbne’. The principal objective of this 
law was to integrate traditional justice within the main­
stream of ’modern’ justice by suppressing the two systems 
of courts which hitherto existed and creating in their
place.a single unified court system with jurisdiction over
45all persons, black and white.
Courts created by this Ordinance were: tribunal
de conciliation, tribunal de premiere instance, cour d ’appel, 
cour criminelle, and cour supreme. Article 62 of the Ordi­
nance provided that the Government could, by decree, post­
pone the date of coming into force of any part of the Ordi­
nance should they find themselves■temporarily unable to set 
up any of these courts. Accordingly, decree No. 59/247 of 
the l8th December 1959 was passed providing for transitory 
measures.
With the exception of the Supreme Court, which 
was entirely new, being the creation of the 1959 Ordinance,
45. Anne Marticou Riou, "L’Organisation judiciaire du 
Cameroun”, Penant, vol. 79, 1969, pp. 33-86.
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the other courts differe.d from those which they superceded, 
and whose names they continued to bear, in appearance only. 
The Tribunal, de Conciliation (the requirement that concilia­
tion should be first attempted was now made optional and 
no .longer compulsory) and .the Tribunal de Premiere Instance 
(now composed of ’magistrats du siege et des magistrats du 
parquet’) now exercised only civil and commercial juris­
diction. Up to 1969 these two courts existed only on paper. 
The old courts with civil jurisdiction were maintained.
The situation was the same with regard to penal justice.
The setting up of the Tribunaux Correctionnels and the 
Tribunaux de Simple Police envisaged by the Ordinance was 
left in abeyance. Indeed, Decree No. 59/247 of December 
l8th 1959 expressly retained the old Justices 'de Paix (’a 
competence ordinaire’ and ’a competence correctionnelle').
The special Criminal Court and the Military 
Tribunal were special courts established to meet specific 
challenges - the alarming incidence of embezzlement of 
public funds and the Union des Populations du Cameroun 
guerilla campaign, respectively.
At first instance level therefore, the courts 
system remained in practice substantially as before 1959- 
The distinction between ’justice de droit francais’ and 
’justice de droit indigene’ was replaced with the dichotomy 
’justice de droit moderne’ and ’justice de droit local’.
This was merely the old distinction in a thinly veiled 
form.
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At the appellate level, the situation was dif­
ferent. Decree No.59/246 of the 18th December 1959 (.as 
subsequently amended.by Decree No. 62/317 of the 6th Sep­
tember 1962) set up four Courts of Appeal, one each in 
Douala,. Dschang, Yaounde and Garoua. Each Court of Appeal 
had four divisions: chambre de mise en accusation, chambre
correctionnelle, chambre civile, and chambre sdciale.
In theory, each Court of Appeal' was composed of 
a President, three Vice-Presidents (for the Yaounde and 
Douala Courts of Appeal), one Procureur-General, one 
Advocate-General (.for the Yaounde and Douala Courts of Appeal 
only), one or two assistant Procureurs-General, and two or 
three puisne judges. In practice,, there was not enough 
personnel to fill all these posts. The Dschang and Garoua 
Courts of Appeal for example were each presided over by a 
single Judge. Moreover, the Court of Appeal and the 
Tribunal de Premiere Instance shared one Legal Department. 
Furthermore, the Yaounde Court of Appeal had jurisdiction 
over two regions, the South-Centre and the Eastern Regions.
The greatest innovation of the 1959 Ordinance was 
the setting up of the Cameroun Supreme Court with its seat 
in Yaounde. It was composed of a President, four Counsel­
lors, a Procur.eur-General, an Advocate-General, and a Chief 
Registrar.
The Supreme Court was the highest court in the 
country. It entertained ’appeals’ lodged on any of the 
following ground: lack of jurisdiction, mistake of law,
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and miscarriage of justice. Complaints about judges 
acting ultra vires were also lodged in the Supreme Court 
by the Procureur-General on the advice of the Minister of 
Justice.
The received French laws continued to be in
force. These consisted of statutes or modified versions
thereof in force in France and expressly extended to
Cameroun as well as legislation enacted by Paris specifi-
46cally for Cameroun. The law that governed family and
47related matters as well as land issues depended upon 
whether the Camerounian had opted for ’droit moderne? (a 
euphemism for French law) or ’droit local’ (customary).
The election needed not be express. It could be implied 
from conduct or manner of life. A classic example is the 
case of marriages. Two types of marriages existed and 
still exist in Cameroun: a customary law marriage and a
46. Between 1956 and 1958 two Frenchmen, Gaston-Jean Bouvenet 
and Rene' Bourdin, compiled all the laws in force in 
Cameroun under a five-volume collection styled ’Codes
et Lois du Cameroun’. Tome I dealt with public law.
Tome II: Code Civil, Code de Commerce, Code de Proce­
dure Civile, Code Penal, Code d ’Instruction Criminelle. 
Tome III: Droit Social [Enseignment, Sante et Hygi*ene,
Service Social, Droit du Travail"]. Tome IV: Economie
Generale et Finances Publiques [Regime du Sol, Monnaie 
et Credit, Intervention Administrative dans 1 ’Economie, 
Regime Financier, Droit Fiscal, Impots Directs, Douanes, 
Enregistrement]. Tome V:^ Production et Circulation 
[Agriculture, Elevage, Forets, Mines, Chemins de Fer, 
Circulation Routiere, Navigation Aerienne, Navigation 
Maritime, Postes et Telecommunications].
47. Marriage, filiation, divorce, children, succession, and 
so on.
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registry marriage (mariage a l ’etat civil). A person who 
contracted a registry marriage was deemed to have elected 
’droit moderne’ to govern all issues relating to that 
marriage. On the other hand, a person who got married 
under customary law was taken to have evinced an intention 
that his marriage would be governed by customary law. 
Camerounians, who had acquired the status of ’citoyen’ were 
now styled ’persons of modern status’ ('personnes du statut 
moderne’). These persons were taken to have abandoned 
customary law altogether. They were subject, in all 
matters, to the received French laws and local enactments.
482. Appraisal of French colonial justice
The administration of justice was apparently a 
low priority in the territory. Trade came high on the 
list of priorities. A glance at the ’Rapports annuels 
adresses par le Gouvernement francais’ to the League of 
Nations and subsequently to the United Nations, brings this 
fact out. The section devoted to ’justice europeene et
48. Statistical data used here have been culled from the 
following sources: Rapports Annuels on the French
Cameroun by the French Government; Labouret, Le 
Cameroun, Hartmann, Paris, 1937, pp. 83-90 and 131; 
Ministere de la France d ’Outre-Mer, Inventaire Social 
et Economique des Terrltoires d ’Qutre-Mer 1950-1955, 
Paris, 1957j pp. 101-105; Ministere de la France 
d ’Outre-Mer, Annuaire Statistique de 1 ’Union Francalse 
Outre-Mer 1939-1949  ^ Tome I , Paris, 1951, pp. 278-280; 
Ministere de la France d ’Outre-Mer, Annuaire Statlstiques 
de l ’Union Francaise 1949-1954 , Paris’^ 1956 , pp. 12-154; 
J. Binet, MLa delinquence au Cameroun", Rev. Jur. et 
Pol., vol. 12, 1958, p. 523.
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justice indigene’ hardly covered more than four pages.
There is very little literature, almost all the pages being 
taken up with large statistical tables. One gets the 
impression that this part of the report is being skated 
over. By contrast, more time, space and ink are devoted 
to the section on economic matters. Moreover, in 1935 
there were only eleven Frenchmen in the judicial service 
of Cameroun and three ’avocats-defenseurs et agents d ’affaires’. 
In 1950 there were only 14 judicial personnel serving in 
the European courts system in the territory. Within four 
years however, the number had increased to 69.
In 1935 there were persons from at least twenty- 
five countries residing in Cameroun. These aliens totalled 
2,324, of which 1,761 were French.^ There were 513 
persons employed in the Civil Service. They were distri­
buted as follows: 181 in the general administration, 126
in the public works, 71 in the health service, 44 in the 
Police, 19 in teaching, 18 in agriculture, and 11 in the 
judicial service. There were 840 persons engaged in the 
private sector and distributed as follows: 301 in trade,
183 in plantation development, 164 in missionary work, 43 
in forest exploitation,. 16 in mining activities, 11 in 
banking, and 3 in the private practice of the law. A 
probable explanation for the low—keyed position of the
49. There were also 103 Greeks, 63 English, 63 Lebanese, 
60 Americans, 59 Swiss, 40 Germans, 39 Italians, 21 
Norwegians, etc.
228.
colonial administration of justice in Cameroun is that 
neither service on the colonial Bench nor practice at 
the Bar in the territory provided rosy prospects and parti­
cular attraction especially for bright lawyers.
The population distribution of whites and 
Camerounians in the 20s, 30s, 40s and 50s was as follows:
Table 3
1921 1936 1946
Camerounians 2,170,000 2,340,000 2,778,000
Whites 1,600 2,300 3,900
Source: Compiled from data at pp. 12-13 of Annuaire Statistique
1949-1954, op.cit.
The growth of the population of Camerounians was slow. For 
over a period of thirty years it rose just by one million.
For the same period, by contrast, there was a sharp rise in 
the white population, particularly after the Second World 
War. The ratio of whites to Camerounians was roughly 
1:1360 in 1921, 1:1020 in 1936, 1:712 in 1946 and 1:270 in 
1954. Of the 12,300 whites in 1954 at least 10,200 were 
French; that is, a ratio of approximately 1 French to 307 
Camerounians.
Now, it may be thought that it was a large white 
population which justified the setting up of two separate
1954
3,130,000
12,300
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systems of courts in the territory, one for whites and the 
other for blacks. Not so. The dual system of courts 
was not set up as a result of a large residential white 
population in the territory. Judicial segregation was 
part and.parcel of French colonial policy. The position 
would not have altered, it is felt, even if there had been 
only a handful of Frenchmen in the territory. In theory 
this judicial segregation was not based on colour (since 
assimilated natives were also justiciable'in the courts 
for whites). But in practice it virtually was (since 
there were only a. few dozen assimilated natives). To 
evolve from an indigene or sujet to a citoyen the native 
had to attain an acceptable level of French civilisation 
and culture. The metamorphosis was not all that easy.
On the whole French colonial attitude towards the 
administration of justice in Cameroun can be described as 
one of judicial paternalism. The penal system however 
left much to be desired.
A . Judicial paternalism
That France should have adopted a paternal posture 
in Cameroun is not surprising. Paternalism was at the 
root of the international tutelage‘system: the adminis­
tering power had to look after the infant administered 
territory until it was able to walk and look after itself.
In the judicial sphere, this paternal attitude manifested 
itself in various ways.
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a) Control over -the system of courts for natives
The French President exercised the right of pardon
50over death sentences passed by Nativesf courts. It
was the French Minister for the Colonies who by decree 
organised the functioning of courts for natives. The Haut 
Commissaire saw to the prompt and rapid administration of 
justice. He appointed court judges and could banish or 
deport. He could grant bail or revoke a court decision 
granting bail after consultation with the Procureur. He 
could remove a case which was before one court and have it 
tried by a court in another region of the territory. He 
could in certain cases require the revision of a case.
The local district officer controlled and super­
vised the courts for natives in his region, and gave 
accounts to the Haut Commissaire. He authorised the 
execution of any judgment, signed all orders for expendi­
ture, received appeals from all judgments delivered by the 
courts for natives, and could take statements and depositions 
from non-natives. Furthermore, he could require the 
Procureur to refer a conciliation to the Chambre d'Homolo­
gation if he was of the opinion that, the conciliation in
51question offended against 'l'ordre public'.
Courts, for natives were single-judge courts pre­
sided over by French administrative officers. Natives
50. Decree of the 31st July 1927, art. 64.
51. Principes de Justice Indigene, File No. 10942/A, 
Cameroon National Archives, Yaounde.
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served in them merely as assessors with either a consul­
tative or deliberative voice, depending on the degree of 
confidence the French had in them as well as "leurs dis­
positions naturelles et le stade d ’assimilation auquel ils 
52sont arrives". Any rule of customary law which was
incompatible with French ’civilisation’ or public order
was struck down. French officials presided over these
courts, even though that meant that cases had to be heard
through the tedious and unreliable medium of interpretation.
Apart from their linguistic shortcoming, these officials
were also handicapped in that they were generally ignorant
5 3of native jurisprudence and ideas of justice. Judicial
errors must have been many and a large number of decisions 
inequitable.
b ) 1 Option de jurldictionT and ’option- de legislation
After the Second World War, unassimilated natives 
were allowed a special favour. They could, if they so 
wished, opt for French law and/or courts. Two native 
litigants could, if they both so agreed, elect to have their
52. Ministere de la France d ’Outre-Mer, Annuaire Statis- 
tique 1939-19^9, op.cit., p. 257.
53. One Paris-based lawyer who undertook a tour of French 
Equatorial Africa at the time was astonished to discover 
that colonial judges here had little knowledge of local 
customs and languages and that they worked with a small 
and poorly trained auxiliary staff without any elemen­
tary documentation. See Maitre Rolland in Chroniques 
d ’Outre-Mer, January 1952, cited by Thompson & Aaloff, 
The emerging states of French Equatorial Africa,
Stanford University Press, California, I960, p. 82.
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case tried in the courts meant for whites. The exercise 
of this option was known as ’option de juridiction'. But 
the sole exercise of this option did not confer upon the 
litigants the right to the benefit of French law. The 
French court seised of the issue applied customary law.
Where the litigants wanted the benefit of French law^ they 
made a declaration in writing to that effect. This was 
known in the literature as ’option de legislation’. The 
exercise of this option operated to oust customary law 
and entitled the French court seised of the matter to 
apply exclusively French law.
The exercise of either of these options was not
once and for all time. The law did not in turn permit a
litigant to elect to have the benefit of French law in a
native court. The exercise of ’option de legislation’
necessarily meant, appearance before the French courts.
In theory a native litigant could in one case opt for
French law and in another go back on his earlier election
and claim the benefit of customary law. In practice, the
election was to all intents and purposes final. This
was so for two main reasons. First, customary law was
usually depicted as a primitive law fit only for the uncivi-
54U s e d  sector of humanity. Customary law was always
54. In a speech made at the opening of the Cameroun Cour 
d ’Appel on the 23rd January 1952, the President of the 
court, Mr Baptiste had this to say: "Nous verrons par-
fois des plaideurs rejeter les normes de notre Droit 
police pour s ’en retourner vers leurs lois naturelles, 
parfois inhumaines, voire curelles. II conviendra 
alors que par un lent et patient travail de persuasion, 
et au besoin, par une repression equitable et bien com­
prise, nous fassions leur education et les orientations 
vers un ideal de justice moins primitif", cited by M. 
Ngulni, "Droit moderne et droit traditionnel", Penant, 
1973, pp. 1-10.
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contrasted with 'droit moderne', a deft innuendo that the 
former was a primitive law and the latter a modern law.
To be able to bring one's case before a French court was 
a status symbol. Secondly, as French courts were staffed 
with career magistrates who examined cases with more care 
and attention, it was definitely advantageous to have one's 
case tried there. The- quality of justice here was higher 
than that in the courts for natives presided over by French 
administrative officers with barely a nodding acquaintance 
with legal principles and, less still, customary law.
c) Compulsory preliminary attempt at conciliation
Most disputes between litigants who were natives 
were settled through conciliation.  ^ This was so because 
natives were required by law to submit their cases first 
for conciliation before taking them to the Tribunal de 
Premier Degre if the conciliation attempt failed. The 
bulk of native litigation was handled by the Tribunal 
Coutumier and the Tribunal de Premier Degre. Only about 
10% of the cases dealt with by these courts ever went on 
appeal to the Chambre Speciale d 'Homologation. The require­
ment of a compulsory preliminary attempt at conciliation and 
the preference for the administrator-cum-judge seems to 
have been dictated by at least two considerations. First,
55. 27,010 suits were settled through conciliation in 1950 
and 42,482 in 1954.
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the penury of trained legal personnel In the territory; 
and, above all3 the desire for a rapid cheap and uncompli­
cated system of justice. Moreover the insistence on 
attempt at conciliation evidently stemmed from the erroneous 
view that indigenous judicial process is marked by proce­
dural informality and emphasis on negotiation and concilia­
tion in contrast with European procedure. As a matter 
of fact however, informality in traditional judicial process 
is more apparent than real. Although reconciliation has 
an important value in the system it is not an ultimate 
value to which legal norms are sacrificed.
d) Internal conflict of laws rules
Civil cases were generally governed by the personal 
law of the litigants. In the case of Frenchmen and assi­
milated natives, this law was the French Civil Code as 
received in Cameroun. Indeed, French law was said to con­
stitute Tle droit commun', or the ordinary law, of the 
territory. Unassimilated natives (that is, virtually the 
entire Camerounian population) were governed by customary 
law (droit local) which was regarded merely as a residual 
law. In deciding a customary law matter, the courts 
applied the customs of the litigants. But as rules of 
customary law sometimes differed from one ethnic group to 
another an internal conflict situation was bound to arise 
where an issue involved two parties from tribes with con­
flicting rules of customary law. To resolve this problem
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56four rules were laid down.
Rule 1 In matters relating to marriage, divorce, custody 
of children, the lot of a wife following the 
breakdown of marriage by divorce, repudiation, 
or death of her husband, the court shall apply 
the custom under which negotiations for the 
marriage were made or, if there was no contract, 
the custom of the woman.
Rule 2 In matters relating to gifts the court shall 
apply the custom of the giver.
Rule 3 In contractual matters other than a contract of 
marriage and, generally, in all other matters, 
the court shall apply the custom habitually 
observed in the place where the contract was 
made .
Rule 4 In matters of succession and wills, the court 
shall apply the custom of the deceased.
e) A uniform criminal law and procedure
Before 19^6 courts for natives had criminal juris­
diction over offences committed by natives. They could 
impose a fine of up to 5,000 francs, banish for up to 20 
years, imprison for up to 20 years or for life and could 
even pass the death sentence. The decree of 31st July had
56. H. Labouret, op.cit., p. 75. My translation.
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provided for the fusion of sentences to run concurrently 
where several offences had been committed simultaneously.
In 1946 the baneful ’indig£natr was proscribed 
by Decree No. 46/277 of the 20th April. On 30th of that 
same month and year the criminal jurisdiction of courts 
for natives was abolished. Also abolished was the common 
native criminal code for Africans which had been recommended 
by the Brazzaville Conference and had been instituted by 
the decree of 17th July 1944. The Decree of 30th April 
1946 provided that T,as from the 1st of July 1946 . . . French 
courts shall alone have jurisdiction in criminal matters 
in accordance with the law applied in these courts and, to 
the exclusion of any native court, jurisdiction over all 
offences committed by natives".
The French Penal Code was immediately extended to 
apply to natives. This sudden vo.lte-face resulted in a 
serious slow down of the criminal process for, the Code had 
to be tinkered with to meet local conditions. Provisions
had to be made for punishing witchcraft, slavery, adultery
57by a polygamous spouse, anthropophagy or cannibalism,
and so on. By 1959s at least 63 out of the 484 articles
58in the Code had been amended to suit local conditions.
Courts with criminal jurisdiction soon found
57. Poursuites contres les anthropophages, File No. APA 
10816/4, Cameroon National Archives, Yaounde.
58. J.C. Froelich, Cameroun-Togo: territoires sous tutelle,
editions Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1956, p. 74.
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themselves with much work and. a heavy backlog of cases.
The result was bottlenecks. At first this increased
number of cases was regarded as an indication of widespread
confidence in the new system of criminal justice. But as
time went on it was realised that natives were becoming
disillusioned with the new system. The rural population
in particular was disorientated because cases were no longer
tried according to customary law and procedure. The
French Criminal Procedure Code was introduced, piecemeal,
59into the territory.  ^ Hence, after 1946, the criminal 
law and procedure in Cameroun was basically the same as 
that in France.
f ) Jurisdiction of the Cour de Cassation over colonial courts 
'Appeals’ from the Cameroun Cour d'Appel lay to 
the Cour de Cassation in Paris which reviewed the legal 
points involved in the case. That court had three divi­
sions: Chambre de Requete, Chambre Civile, and Chambre
Criminelle. The chambre de requ§te decided whether there 
was a. sufficient legal basis for the appellant’s appeal to 
be heard by either the Chambre Criminelle or the Chambre 
Civile. This was something like a pre-trial of the case
59. For example the following aspects of metropolitan 
criminal procedure: bail, legal aid for the accused, 
concurrent sentences, mitigation, conditional release, 
rehabilitation, constitution de partie civile.
60. For a summary account of the jurisdiction of the Cour 
de Cassation over French colonial courts, see Maitre 
Lapaulle in Hollandar, Colonial Justice, Bowes &
Bowes, London, 1961, pp"! 107-108.
238.
at cassation level. If the Chambre de Requete decided 
that there was no basis for the appeal, it refused leave 
to go to either chamber.
A judgment of the Cour de Cassation sitting in 
Pull Bench (Chambres Reunies) was final. But such a 
decision had to be recorded by a third Court of Appeal 
which was bound-to enforce it.
The Cour de Cassation usually sent back the case 
to another court of appeal for judgment because the Cour 
de Cassation was in principle a court of cassation and 
not one of judgment. No problem arose where there was 
more than one court of appeal in a given colonial territory. 
In Cameroun however, there was only one Court of Appeal.
So what happened was that where the Cour de Cassation 
quashed a decision given by the Court of Appeal in Yaounde, 
it sent the case back to the same court; but this time, 
sitting with a different judge. There were however not 
many appeals from Cameroun to the Cour de Cassation.
g) Court fees
During the German era court fees were assessed 
at 10% of the pecuniary value of the suit and a fixed fee 
of 20 marks in matters of status. This fee schedule was 
abolished by the French in 1933* The new fee schedule was 
as follows: 6% of the pecuniary value of the suit, 60 fr.
where the value of the suit could not be determined, and 
75 francs in any action for the recognition of title to land.
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But this fee schedule was not commensurate with the ability 
of most litigants to pay. Judges were therefore empowered 
either to waive or reduce fees where appropriate.
h ) Early attempts at codification of customary law
The history of codification in Cameroon goes back 
to German times. It was they who first attempted to codify
r -j
the traditional laws, of the people of Kamerun. Their
laudable efforts were however arrested by the 191*1-18 War.
At their Brazzaville Conference in 19^4 the French 
agreed to draw up a common criminal code for French terri­
tories in Africa. That code was drafted and promulgated 
in Cameroun by Decree of the 17th July 19^^. But this so- 
called Native Criminal Code (it was merely a variant of 
the French Penal Code) lasted for only twenty months. In 
April 19^53 French courts were vested with exclusive cri­
minal jurisdiction. There was therefore no need to import 
French criminal law into the territory through the back 
door. It was brought in through the front door and made 
to apply to natives as well. The code, like others, had 
to be tinkered with to suit local situations.
As far as the civil law went, the French followed 
the path already beaten by the Germans. In 1932, the 
French undertook to codify customary law. By a Circular
61. See, Situation jurldique des peuples dits primitifis, 
File No. TA-lb, Cameroon National Archives, Yaounde.
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of 11th October 1932, the Commissaire de la Republique 
Francalse directed all heads of administrative units in 
Cameroun to carry out research.into the traditional laws 
of the natives in their various circonscriptions to serve 
as a basis for general codification. But he added a caveat. 
’’This codification", he minuted, "shall not be completely 
immutable. Custom evolves under diverse influences just 
as our civil law has undergone those modifications brought 
about by case-law. But native customary law, without 
claiming the force of the civil law,, shall constitute a
r p
precious guide for the native tribes."
The investigators’ terms of reference were ’le 
droit civil tout entier’. They were instructed to use 
the broad classification in the French Civil Code as a 
model. Their investigation was to fall under four heads: 
Collectivity, Persons, Property, Contracts.
The project however failed mainly because it 
was undertaken by heads of administrative units who were 
already overworked. Such bits of information as were 
hastily collected through the tedious and dubious medium 
of interpretation did not come near the wide scope of the 
project. Moreover, the envisioned document was to be a 
code only in name. The Commissaire himself had said that 
it was to be a mere ’guide’ claiming no force of law.
62. Labouret, op.cit., pp. 79-80. My translation and 
emphasis.
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This attempt having failed, it was decided to 
embark on less grandiose projects. The French therefore 
fell back on the so-called codifications speciales.
These were merely compilations of rules of law on specific 
subj ects.^
B . The Penal System
It was a feature of French colonial penal system 
that offences were sometimes imprecisely defined, that 
the sentencing pattern was not uniform, and that there was 
a marked preference for sending convicted offenders to 
jail.
a) Offences
Besides the ill-defined offences contained in the
64notorious and ignominous ’indigenat’ decree, there were 
also such offences as ’rebellion’, ’outrages a fonctionnaire’,
63. Cf. Decree of 30th November 1926 proscribing ’mariage 
des impubbres’; Arrete of 26th May 19 34 regulating 
customary marriages in Cameroun as amended by the 
Arrete of 11th January 1936. See generally, Carlson 
Anyangwe, Divorce and property rights in Cameroon: a 
comparative study, Dissertation in part fulfilment of 
the requirements for the Licence en Droit, University 
of Yaounde, 197^ •
64. Decret No. 46-277^du 20.4.1946 portant suppression des 
peines^de 1'indigenat en A.O.F., au Cameroun, au Togo,
a la cote francaise des Somalis, a Madagascar et depen­
dences, et en Nouvelle Caledonie. For an exhaustive 
treatment of the 'indigenat’ system, see R.L. Buell,
The native problem in Africa, vol. II, the Macmillan 
Company, New York, 192 8, pp. 379-392.
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'refus d'obeissance', 'pillage en bande et a main armee',
illegale', 'vagabondage', etc. Most of these offences 
were not found in the French Penal Code but had been created 
specifically for the territory. They were however, often
65. Decree of 30th November 1926 proscribing slavery and 
cannibalism in Cameroun. In May and June 1917 alone 
the following persons were convicted of slave dealing 
by the 'tribunal indigene’: Barkido dit Tiamake,
Moussa Goto, Sarah Robertson, Motasse, Yeme Isaac,
Diarra Tiecourre. See, Journal Officiel des Territoires 
Occupes de l'Ancien Cameroun, June 1917.
66. Between June and July 1917 'tribunaux indigenes' con­
victed 7 persons of murder and 1 of murder and canni­
balism. Journal Officiel, August 1917-
67. In 1932, Albert Chaspoul, Procureur-General and head 
of the Judicial Service in Cameroun minuted (Circular 
No. 2607 of 20.9.1932) that 'viol et attentat a la 
pudeur’ offences came frequently before the courts.
See, Justice Indigene, File No. APA 10310, Archives, 
Yaounde.
68. These were the most common offences. See, File No.
APA 10310, ibid.
69. This was one of the most ill-defined offences. It 
was sometimes prosecuted' as ’magie' or ’fetichisme’.
As early as 1916 the Douala 'tribunal indigene' convic­
ted and sentenced from between 5 to 10 years five persons 
charged with being ’fetichistes'. See, Journal Officiel 
of 1st March 1917.
70. As recently as November 1948 a case* of cannibalism was 
reported in Bertoua. A number of Baya hunters living 
in the forest were alleged to have killed and eaten a 
person who was mentally deranged. The matter was brought 
to the attention of the Haut Commissaire in Yaounde by 
the administrative officer(M. Doudet) for the region of 
Lorn and Kadei in his despatch from Batouri dated 2nd April 
1949. Three arrests were made. See Poursuites contre 
les anthropophages, File No. APA 108l6/4~ Cameroon 
National Archives, Yaounde.
'mariage d'impubere 
'meutre',^ 'viol', 'adultere', 'coups et blessures’,
te’, ’vol et escroquerie',^
70
’anthropophagie', 'medecine
'exaction et abus d ’autori
69’sorcellerie', ’magi
vague and nebulous. 71
71. For example, art. 1 of Arrete No. 206 of the 26th January
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Offences against property and the person were
the commonest types of offences in the territory. The
prototypes of the former category were theft and fraud;
and of the latter, homicide and other crimes of violence
72
against the person.
Convictions for theft shot up from 3,034 in 1952, 
3,358 in 1953 to 4,631 in 1954. Convictions for fraud 
also rose from 300 in 1952 to 430 in 1954. Convictions 
for 'rebellion' rose from 17 in 1941 to a staggering 306 
in 1948. Convictions for murder were 34 in 1939, 44 in 
1952, 57 in 1953, and 52 in 1954. There were 423 convic­
tions for manslaughter in 1953 as against 386 in 1952. In 
1952 there were 1,424 convictions for assault causing 
wound, 1,675 in 1953 and 2,417 in 1954.
Most of these offences were perpetrated in the 
more advanced districts of the territory such as Douala,
Footnote 71 continued from previous page.
1946 provided: "Tous acts, paroles, gestes, manoeuvres
quelconques, toute dissimulation d ’identite, toutes 
abstentions volontaires susceptibles de constituer 
une opposition a 1 ’autorite legitime d'un chef de 
region administrative, d ’un chef de sub-division, ou 
d'un chef de poste administratif, et, par la, d'atteindre 
l ’ordre public ou d ’entraver la bonne marche du service 
seront punis des peines preVues."
72. A colonial officer who once served in Cameroun has
remarked that "delinquency is to a large extent linked 
with professional life. It is not by chance that 
drivers and motor-boys are often indicted for adultery, 
and sales employees for theft or fraud.” See, J.
Binet, ’La delinquance au Cameroun’, Rev. Jur. et Pol., 
vol. 12, 1958, pp. 523-530, at p. 530.
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Edea, Kribi, Yaounde, and Garoua, an indication that there
73must be a nexus between development and criminality.
On the whole, between 1955 and. 1958, 35,156
persons were convicted of various criminal offences,
7.4$ of whom had been convicted of 'reconstituting an
74illegal organisation'. The incidence of crime was by
far higher in the southern than in the northern part of
the territory. Offences by young persons below twenty
years were quite frequent. But the vast majority of
75offenders came.from the 20-35 years age bracket.
b ) Sentencing
The Germans had leaned in favour of flogging
and imposing a fine rather than imprisonment. By contrast
the French showed a marked preference for imprisonment.
Of the 10,288 natives who were convicted in 1953, 8,873
were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment while only
1,145 were fined.
There was no uniformity in the sentencing pattern.
This was particularly so under the 'indigenat' system where
16
French officials sentenced natives as they pleased.
73- According to Labouret, op.cit., at p . 86, homicide and 
other offences of violence against the person "ont leur 
siege dans les regions de Dschang et dans la cuvette 
tchadienne, sur le territoire de Maroua et de Mokolo.
C ’est egalement dans ces deux circonscriptions que les 
faits de traite et les attaques a main armee sont le 
plus souvent constates."
74. Haut Commissariat, Cameroun, from trusteeship ..., 
op.cit., p. 22.
75. Cf. Binet, op.cit.
76. In 1935 for example, in a Cameroun whose population was
only 2,338,000, the number sent to jail under the 'indigenat' 
was 38,000, i.e. one out of every 64 Camerounians was sent 
to jail.
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Moreover, a decree of May 3rd 1945 gave administrative 
authorities ' le droit ... de prendre des arretes avec 
pouvoir de les sanctionner de quinze jours de prison et 
1,200 francs d'amendes aux maximum'.
Sentences were sometimes harsh. An offender
could be jailed for up to ten years (in 1934 for example,
464 convicts were serving terms of above five years each)
and could be deprived of such rights as he had; he could
be deported from the territory; he could be banished
from his locality or exiled for up to ten years. Moreover,
murder, assassination carried the death penalty. Executions
77were however never carried out in public,
c) Prisons
Prisons administration was governed by an Arrete 
of 8th July 1933. Article 1 of that law made provisions 
for the setting up of prison centres in the various adminis­
trative areas of the territory to detain native debtors, 
natives awaiting trial, and natives punished under the 
'indigenat' system. White convicts were, subject to the 
rules governing their transfer to Europe, detained in the 
Douala and Yaounde prisons where there was a special wing 
of the prison reserved for them.
77. An arrete" of 15.5.1944 designated prisons in which exe­
cutions may be carried out. Art. 3 of that law pro­
vided that natives sentenced to death by Native courts 
would be executed by a firing squad of 12 native 
soldiers.
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Prisoners had to work; women and dangerous ones 
inside the prison, and the rest outside on 'chantiers 
administratifs'. Apart from their normal daily corvee, 
prisoners were in theory taught such productive trades as 
weaving, bricklaying, carving and so on. Prison labour 
could be hired by anyone who needed such labour and could 
pay for it. Prisoners could be transferred from one 
prison to another inside the territory 'dans l'interet d'un 
bon fonctionnement du regime penitentiaire et en vue d'une 
utilisation judicieuse de la main-dfoeuvre penale'.
There were two categories of adult prisoners, 
'detenus de droit commun' and 'detenus administratifs'.
The former were segregated from the latter and did not do 
the same type of work. There were usually more 'detenus 
administratifs' (these were mainly natives jailed by French 
officials under the 'indigenat' system) in the prisons 
than 'detenus de droit commun'. For example, there were 
39,730 convicts in the former category in 1934 as against 
2,821 in the latter group. In 1935 they were respectively 
32,858 and 3,515. The number of 'detenus administratifs' 
began to fall after 1946 following the abolition of the 
'indigenat' in that year.
By 1955 there were 2,583 prison inmates in Cameroun, 
most of them serving terms of below six years. Of this 
number, 80 were young offenders of below 18 years of age.
There were two types of young offenders. First, those who 
acted without discernment. These were supposed to be sent
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to borstals (maison d ’education surveillee). No borstal 
was in fact ever built in the territory. Second, those 
young offenders who acted with discernment. These were 
supposed to serve their sentences in special reformatory 
centres or, in default, in a special wing for young offen­
ders in the ordinary prisons. An arrete of 7th December 
19 33 set up a 'colonie penitentiaireT for delinquent juve­
niles on a small island (to prevent possible escape) at 
the mouth of the River Sanaga, at Malimba. It had 16 
inmates in 1933, 26 in 1935, and 36 in 1936. This centre 
was however closed down in 1939 (arrete of 10.7.1939) and 
its inmates moved to the Prison at Saa.
Discipline in the prisons appears to have been 
lax. Prisoners could obtain permission to attend a dance 
or cinema outside the prison. Correspondence to and from 
prisoners were censured except those from counsel or an 
administrative authority. Article 30 of the arrete of 
July 8th 1933 provided, "Les cris, chants, interpellations 
et tous actes de nature a troubler le bon ordre a l ’inter- 
ieur des locaux penitentiaires sont interdits. II en est 
de meme pour les jeux de toutes sortes." A prisoner who 
offended against prison regulations could be punished in 
one of the following manners: extra work to do, depri­
vation of meat or fish for two weeks, solitary confinement 
for 15 days, solitary confinement in chains for 15 days 
without food.
Prisoners were, on paper, entitled to prison 
uniform. This was in practice not the case. Prisoners
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wore their private items of clothing. Prisoners slept 
on mats on raised floor (bat-flanc). By contrast white 
detainees slept on beds with complete bedding and a mos­
quito net. However, the prisons doctor made monthly 
visits to each prison. Prisoners were required to have 
a- bath or shower, at least once a week Ta l ’heure chaude de 
la journee’. Where there was an outbreak of a contagious 
disease or epidemic, the doctor in accord with the local 
administrative boss, took ’toutes les mesures de protec­
tion et de prophylaxie necessaires'. Nevertheless, the 
data below would appear to suggest that prison conditions 
were probably not quite hygienic.
Table 4
Year No. of medical Days of illness Deaths
consultations
1934 81,211 32,605 147
1935 73,742 42,598 216
Even-in the 1950s the 'journees d findisponibilitesT were 
still in the thousands and deaths in the prisons had by no 
means been brought down to single figures. One is there­
fore inclined to take with a pinch of salt the claim that 
"after a month’s stay in prison, prisoners put on between 
three to eight kilogrammes of extra weight. The
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accommodation was comfortable, the food far superior
to the usual meals, and work very light. It is therefore
not surprising that well informed offenders voluntarily
7 R
have themselves incarcerated during the lean years.’
In 1935 the Mokolo Prison, designed to take har­
dened criminals serving terms of more than five years, was 
completed.
At the end of 1958, there were 2,191 persons 
awaiting trial and 3*662 already serving their sentences 
in the various penitentiaries in Cameroun.
The indigenat remained a sore in the French 
colonial system of justice. The hallmark of the judicial 
system was a segregated system of courts based on the 
distinction between whites and assimilated natives on the 
one hand, and unassimilated natives on the other hand. 
Legislative policy was marked by the piecemeal intro­
duction of French laws into the territory.
Although France herself tasted the bitter pill 
of alien domination during the Second World War, French 
colonial legislative and judicial policy did not witness 
a radical change. The only enlightened move was the abo­
lition of the indigenat in 1946. The change of the
78. P. Decheix, ’’Reflexions sur la justice penale Outre-Mer”, 
Rev. Jur. et Pol. d ’Outre-Mer, Vol. 13* 1959* pp. 120-126, 
at p. 126.
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political status of Cameroun from mandated to trusteeship 
territory had little effect on the existing legal and 
judicial systems in the territory.
Nor did independence in i960 bring immediate 
and radical changes in the administration of justice in 
Cameroun. Firstly, independence merely nationalised, as 
it were, the existing French laws in force in the country. 
Secondly, independence did not, as far as the civil law 
was concerned, destroy the duality of status which existed 
between ’citoyens’ and ’sujets’. The former category 
of persons (now euphemistically called ’personnes du 
statut de droit ecrit1) continued to be subject to the 
received French Civil Code, and the latter (now styled 
’personnes du statut de droit local’) to customary law 
except where they expressly opted out of it. Finally, 
virtually all the numerous colonial courts were maintained; 
for, most of the reforms envisioned by the 1959 Ordinance 
never saw the light of day.
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PART III 
THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE
According to Montesquieu’s theory of the separation 
of powers, there are three branches of government: the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. The 
legislature makes the laws, the executive executes them 
and the judiciary administers public justice. There are 
therefore specially trained people whose duty it is to 
administer public justice following a machinery established 
for that purpose.
There-was no doubt that political independence 
and unification of the ’two Cameroons’ even under a federal 
system of government would present the authorities with 
the crucial problem of law and the administration of justice 
in the new State. Accordingly, the constitutional approach 
to the issue was and continues to be pragmatic (Chapter 6). 
Forty-four years of separate colonial administration had 
left indelible marks on the country; two official lan­
guages, two opposing cultures and mentalities, and two 
extraneous legal systems. Under these circumstances it 
was neither wise nor feasible to make a complete tabula rasa.
Accordingly, the 1961 Federal Constitution pro­
vided for the continuance of the laws and the courts of 
the pre-independence period while leaving open the possi­
bility of the creation of new courts (Chapter 7). In 1972,
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the process of political unification was carried a step 
forward with the abrogation of the federal constitution 
and the adoption of a unitary one. The 1972 constitution 
maintains 11 in force" the "legislation resulting from the 
laws and regulations" applicable in the Federal and feder­
ated States on the date of entry into force of the consti­
tution; provided that such legislation is not contrary 
to the provision of the Constitution or amended by legis­
lative or regulatory process. The Constitution also 
created a single Supreme Court for the whole country, 
thereby abolishing the Federal Court of Justice and the 
Supreme Courts of each of the two federated states. This 
paved the way for the rationalisation and unification of 
the hitherto complex and cumbersome courts system in the 
country (Chapter 8).
However, it is not sufficient for the State merely 
to establish the judicial organs which are to administer 
justice and the rules governing the existence and organi­
sation of the various courts. The legal status of the 
persons in charge of or concerned with the administration 
of justice must be spelt out (Chapter 9) and the legal 
profession organised (Chapter 10). Moreover, personnel 
of the law and matters of judicial administration require 
control, supervision and coordination by a body created for 
that purpose, the Ministry of Justice (Chapter 11).
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Since reunification in 1961, Cameroon has had 
two Fundamental Laws; the Federal Constitution of 1st 
September 1961 and the Unitary Constitution of 2nd June 
1972. In dealing with the content of Cameroonian law 
and with the issue of the administration of justice the 
draftsman of each of those constitutions had to take 
account of the bi-jural nature of the country. How 
was this done under the 1961 constitution (section I) 
and that of 1972 (section II)?
I . The Federal Constitution of 1st September 1961
Before examining how the draftsman of the 1961 
constitution approached the question of the administration 
of justice (paragraph 3), it would be germane to indicate, 
in the broadest outline, how the 'two Cameroons' came to 
reunify (paragraph 1) and the peculiar nature of the 
defunct Cameroonian federation (paragraph 2).
1. The road to independence and reunification
The vociferous Lond- and Paris-based National 
Union of Kamerun Students and the militant Union des
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Populations du Cameroun had advocated the reunification of 
the Ttwo CameroonsT before the grant of independence. The 
reverse took place. Independence preceded reunification'*'
and besides, the reunification fervour, kindled and nurtured
2 3by the 'Kamerun Idea’ was only partly satisfied.
The reunification issue itself was pursued 
without clear-cut ideas as to what form it was going to 
take. Meetings between Mr J.N. Foncha and Mr A. Ahidjo 
resulted in only vague agreements that reunification should 
take the form of a federation. The All-Party Conference
1. France granted independence to the French Cameroun on
1st January i960. It became known as the Rpublic of 
Cameroun. Following a U.N. organised plebiscite which 
was held there on February 11, 1961 the Southern 
Cameroons gained her independence from Britain by 
uniting with the Republic of Cameroun on 1st October 1961.
2. The ’Kamerun Idea’ was based on an irredentist sentiment 
among Cameroonian nationalists that thirty-two years of 
German rule had forged a Kamerun Nation and therefore 
that Britain and France should restore the country to 
the single unit it was before the Anglo-French partition 
of 1916. The myth was that the Germans had so welded 
the various tribes together that one could properly speak 
of a ’Kamerun Nation’. For a view that this was a mere 
figment, see E. Ardener, ’’The Kamerun Idea", West Africa, 
June 7, 1958, p. 533.
3. In a highly controversial U.N. sponsored plebiscite held 
in the northern segment of the British Cameroons there 
was a 60$ vote by the inhabitants there to remain within 
the Nigerian Federation. Yaounde protested to the U.N. 
alleging that there had been malpractices and Irregularities 
during the conduct of the plebiscite. The U.N. rejected 
the protest and ruled that the trusteeship of the Northern 
Cameroons should be terminated on 1 June 1961 - a day 
observed for some years in Cameroon as a day of national 
mourning. Cameroon took the matter to the International 
Court of Justice. By a judgment of 2.12.1963, the
court refused to accept jurisdiction in the case on the 
ground that the U.N. had approved the result of the plebis­
cite and terminated the trusteeship agreement.
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of the political leaders of the Southern Cameroons held 
at Bamenda from June 26th to 28th, 1961 to define the 
position of the Southern Cameroons on the reunification 
issue ended in a failure to reach a consensus on the form 
reunification should take.. There were however a number 
of interesting proposals put forward, at the. Bamenda Con­
ferences: (i) that there should be a loose federation
with a high degree of autonomy for each of the two states 
(that is, each state would exercise the powers it already 
had while a weak central government would exercise only a 
few residual powers); (ii) that there should be two 
citizenships for Cameroonians (that is, a state citizenship 
and a federal citizenship); and (iii) that there should be 
a clause in the proposed Constitution providing for the
legal secession of the Southern Cameroons should that
4become necessary. These proposals however came 'to 
nothing.
5
The Poumban ’bilateral conference’ held from 
July 17th to 21st, 1961 brought together the representatives 
of the Republic of Cameroun and of the Southern Cameroons.
The Southern Cameroons’ delegation was in a weak position 
to negotiate meaningfully, make strategic demands and secure 
far-reaching concessions. There were many reasons for this.
4. J. Benjamin, Les camerounais occidentaux, Montreal, 
1972, p. 109.
5. Benjamin, ibid. at page 111 appears to suggest that the 
expression ’constitutional conference’ is a misnomer 
here.
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First, there was political dissension among members of 
the delegation as to the form unification should take. 
Secondly, the delegation never presented a common front. 
Thirdly, the delegation’s attitude at Foumban was rever­
ential and suppliant rather than tough and business-like. 
Fourthly, the delegates were naive and taken in by the 
idea of meeting and discussing with a ’big brother'. 
Finally, and very crucial too, was the hard reality that 
the Southern Cameroons was then still a colonial territory 
whereas the Cameroun Republic was already a sovereign 
state. Under these circumstances, defeat was inevitable. 
The whole conference lasted only four days, during which 
time there was only one plenary session. The Cameroun 
Republic's delegation saw the conference as no more than 
an opportunity given to politicians of the Southern Camer­
oons to make reasonable proposals for the modification of 
the existing constitution of the Cameroun Republic (i.e. 
the March I960 Constitution) "so as to meet the peculiar 
situation of a hitherto estranged part of the country 
returning to the motherland". Although both sides even­
tually agreed to a federal union, the Southern Cameroons’ 
hopes for strong state autonomy were not realised. The 
Southern Cameroons delegates "anticipated a loose feder­
ation with a dimunitive and weak government at the center,
6. Note the full title of the 1961 Constitution.
See also, Frank M. Stark, 'Federalism in Cameroon: the 
shadow and the reality’, Canadian Journal of African 
Studies, vol. X, No.3, 19 76, p.423.
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and robust states endowed with nearly every power they had 
formerly exercised. This vision and the values that 
inspired and nourished it could not have contrasted more 
with what the Ahidjo regime proposed and achieved at the 
Foumban conference and a few secretive discussions which 
followed.
2. Federation a la camerounalse
On 1st October 1961 the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon was formed with the Cameroun Republic as East 
Cameroon and the Southern Cameroons as West Cameroon,.
The Constitution, adopted on 1st September 1961 and 
effective on 1st October that same year, provided for a 
Federal President, Vice-President, National Assembly, and 
Federal Ministries, while basically retaining the formal 
governmental structures which existed in each of the two 
federated states before independence. Immediately after 
federation however, Cameroon was divided into six Regions 
for purposes of ’territorial administration’. West 
Cameroon constituted a region while East Cameroon was 
carved out into five regions. Each of these ’adminis­
trative regions’ was headed by a ’federal inspector of 
administration’ appointed by the President ’not only to
7. W.R. Johnson, The Cameroon federation - political inte- 
gration in a fragmentary society, Princeton, 1970, 
p. 184.
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control but also to coordinate’ federal services in the 
region. The Federal Inspector was the President’s direct
g
representative in each administrative region.
There were therefore two 'Authorities' in West 
Cameroon in charge of two levels of administration; the 
Prime Minister (Anglophone) in charge of state matters and 
the Federal Inspector (Francophone) in charge of federal 
services. In the early years of.the federation however, 
federal jurisdiction was limited. Moreover, because of 
the shortage of qualified personnel the Federal Government 
decided that civil servants of the federated states should 
also act as federal civil servants. The Federal Inspector 
had the power to issue and ensure the enforcement of regu­
lations. His powers increased as federal jurisdiction 
extended. His omnipresence, his insistence that civil 
servants came under his authority as the President’s direct 
representative, and his bold claim that he stood in a 
coordinate position with the West Cameroon Prime Minister, 
inevitably led to frequent conflicts between him and the
Q
West Cameroonian Authorities.
8. Decree No. 61/DF/15 of 20 October 1961.
9. Benjamin, op.cit., pp. 65-69. There were persistent 
quarrels, especially in matters of protocol. At public 
occasions the Inspector wanted to arrive at the same time 
as the Prime Minister and also be escorted by a police 
motorcade, to inspect the guard of honour mounted by the 
forces, to fly the national flag above his residence, etc. 
This was in effect a psychological battle as to who was 
the effective authority in West Cameroon. In 1967,
Decree No. 67/DF/542 of 20 December 1967 was passed by 
the President making It clear that in West Cameroon the 
Inspector came sixth in protocol. But this did not 
deter the Inspector in early 1968 from insisting, during 
the opening of the judicial year in Kumba, that it was he 
and not the Chief Justice as has traditionally been the
/continued over
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Federation seems to have been agreed upon merely 
as a means, .of allaying the fears of Southern Cameroonians 
of becoming second-class citizens in the new Republic.
But the 1961 constitution was more in the nature of a 
unitary constitution than a federal one. The federated 
states had virtually no proper powers of theirs. The 
Federal Government was all-pervading. The relationship 
between the states and the federal government was not defined. 
The President was preponderant. "Any federalism supposes 
a distinction between matters reserved for the Federal 
State and those which are part of the domain of the Feder­
ated States. A simple reading of article 5 et seq. of 
the Cameroonian constitution shows that the Federal State 
has got the lion’s share for itself ... Thus the autonomy 
of the Federated States is fairly weak, as much also from 
the point of view of the exercise of p o w e r s . C o m m e n ­
tators on the 1961 constitution have always been intrigued 
by the special kind of ’federation’ that was the Cameroonian 
one.
The division of power between the Federated States
Footnote 9 continued from previous page.
practice in West Cameroon, who had to inspect the guard 
of honour mounted on that occasion. Once more the 
quarrel was resolved by the President who instructed the 
Inspector to respect West Cameroonian traditions. Cf. 
Benjamin, op.cit., p. 173 5 footnote 67.
10. P.F. Gonidec, La republlque federale du Cameroun,
Berger-Levrault^ Paris, 1969, pp . 36, TT* My trans- 
lation.
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and the Federal State weighed heavily in favour of the 
latter. Federal jurisdiction was defined in articles 5 
and 6. Article 6 specified those subjects over which the 
federated states might continue to assert responsibility 
until such a time as the federal government.chose to take 
control of them. Article 5 spelt out those matters over 
which the federal government had immediate and exclusive 
control. All matters not specifically entrusted to the 
federal authorities (and these were by far the less impor­
tant matters) remained, as provided by article 38, within 
the exclusive competence of the individual states. The 
strict and immediate application of article 6 would have 
led to the erosion and disappearance of federalism and 
the realisation of a unitary state for, "lorsque les 
autorites federales se sont saisies de toutes les compe­
tences enumerees a 1 Tarticle 6, les Etats federes devien- 
dront de simples circonscriptions administratives”.^
But, as.already indicated, provision was made for the states 
provisionally to control many matters,, although only for 
as long as the Federal Government chose to ignore them.
In this way the immediate impact of articles 5 and 6 on 
West Cameroon was softened and not immediately perceived 
by West Cameroonians. The honeymoon however lasted for
only about, five years. By 1966 the Federal Government had
11. J.M. Nzouankeu, ’Remarques sur la constitution camer- 
ounaise’, Civilisations, vol. 19, no. 2, 1969, Dp. 216- 
223, at p. 219.
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effectively pre-empted the matters listed in article 6 
from state control by passing legislation concerning them.
The process was ironically referred to locally as Tfedera- 
lisation1.
Another characteristic of the 1961 constitution 
was that the division of power between the Executive and 
the Legislature was tilted heavily in favour of the former. 
The Federal National Assembly consisted of 50 deputies 
(40 from East and 10 from West Cameroon) elected for a five- 
year term. The legislative authority of the Assembly was 
limited to matters specifically mentioned in the consti­
tution. The Federal President, also elected for five years, 
was both Head of State and Government. Power was heavily 
concentrated in his hands.. He was empowered to appoint 
ministers, exercise regulatory power, and conduct foreign 
affairs. He exercised considerable direct control over
the state governments: he appointed and dismissed their
12 13Premiers, he dissolved the state assemblies, he pub­
lished their laws, if he disagreed with a Bill passed by a 
state legislature he could refuse to promulgate it and 
return it for reconsideration, although it was automatically
12. Theoretically the President could only appoint as Premier 
a person who has received the investiture of the state 
assembly. Such an investiture was however a mere for­
mality particularly after the institution of the de facto 
one party system in 1966.
13. He did so either when the Premier of a state has lost 
the confidence of the state assembly or in the event of 
persistent disagreement between the state assembly and 
the state government.
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published if it passed again; he controlled the appoint­
ment of the state Premiers' small cabinet of six secre­
taries of state, each heading a state ministry.
3. Matters relating to the administration of justice
The failure of West Cameroonian leaders to secure 
a high degree of autonomy for West Cameroon at the Foumban 
conference has already been noted. Another failure, at 
least as the West Cameroonian delegation saw it, was in 
the area of the administration of justice. During his 
plebiscite campaigns Poncha had promised his electorate 
that the English legal system would be preserved in West 
Cameroon. In his vision of a loose federation, matters 
relating to justice and the Police were, among other things, 
.going to be the exclusive responsibility of each federated 
state. This hope was shattered at Foumban. Responsi­
bility for justice was allotted to the Federal Government. 
Only one concession was made to West Cameroon in this 
respect. West Cameroon customary courts were preserved 
and regulated by the rules of that state except for appeals 
therefrom. It has however been suggested that the allot­
ment of matters relating to the administration of justice 
to the Federal Authorities was prompted by the desire to
unify the differing legal systems which obtained in East
14
and West Cameroon.
14. A.M. Riou, 'L'Organisation judiciaire du Cameroun', 
Penarrt, vol. 79, No. 723, 1969, pp. 33-86.
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Under article 5 of the 1961 constitution the 
powers of the Federal Authorities embraced, inter alia, 
the following matters: regulations concerning conflict of
laws,, regulations concerning the Federal Civil Service, 
the Judiciary, and the organisation and functioning of the 
Federal Court of Justice. Article 6 also allotted the 
following matters to federal jurisdiction: public
liberties, the law of persons and property, the law of 
obligations and contracts in civil and commercial matters, 
judicial organisation including the rules of procedure 
and jurisdiction of all courts (with the exception of the 
customary courts of West Cameroon, save as regards appeals 
from the decisions of those courts), criminal law, prisons 
administration, legislation relating to state land, labour 
legislation, and administrative organisation. Even though 
the federated states were provisionally permitted to legis­
late in respect of matters listed in article 6, they could 
only do so after consultation with the Federal Commission 
for Coordination. By article 24, only a federal and not
a state law could deal with the following matters:
fundamental guarantees and obligations of the citizen, 
the status of persons and properties, police, administrative 
and judicial organisation, the determination of felonies 
and misdemeanours, the creation of all types of offences, 
criminal and civil procedure, amnesty, the execution of 
judgments and the creation of new sets of courts.
The combined effect of articles 5, 6 and 24 was
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as follows. Matters enumerated in article 5 were within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government.
The judiciary, for example, was entirely a federal concern. 
Although article 6 provisionally permitted the component 
states of.the federation to continue to legislate in res­
pect of matters therein listed, article 24 limited that 
temporary competence of the states by listing matters on 
which only the federal authorities could legislate. In 
practice however, the federal authorities did not imme­
diately assume responsibility over the matters listed in 
article 6. This meant that each of the states of the 
federation maintained, for the time being, its own civil 
law, criminal law, civil and criminal procedure and system 
of courts.
Up to the second half of 1972 therefore, the 
judicial organisation in the federated states of East and 
West Cameroon consisted of two separate quasi-autonomous 
entities controlled by the Federal Ministry of Justice. 
Article 32 of the Constitution provided, that justice would 
be rendered throughout the country in the name of the 
people by the competent courts of each state. The effect 
of this provision was to maintain the courts system which 
already existed in each of the federated states before 
independence. However, by article 35 of the constitution, 
warrants and legal decisions issuing from whatever legal 
jurisdiction of one of the federated states were executory 
throughout the federal territory.
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Besides the courts of the federated states 
there also existed a number of federal courts; that is 
courts whose territorial jurisdiction covered the entire 
national territory. The constitution itself set up two 
of such courts, the Federal Court of Justice (art. 33) 
and the Federal High Court of Justice (art. 36). Two 
more federal courts, the Military Tribunal and the Exchequer 
Court, were subsequently created by ordinances.
Access to the Bench and to the Bar were governed 
in each state by its received laws in this regard. Article 
12 vested the prerogative of mercy in the Head of State, 
who was advised on this matter by the Federal Council of 
Magistracy. By article 32, the Head of State was also 
"garant de 1 ’independance de 1*autorite judiciaire et 
nomme les magistrats des Etats fed^res ... II est assiste' 
dans cette mission par le conseil supe'rieur de la magis- 
trature qui lui donne son avis Sur toutes les propositions 
de nommination des magistrats du siege". This somewhat 
vague and nebulous provision made the President ’guarantor' 
of the independence of the judiciary. But the' irremova­
bility of judges was established not by any constitutional
provision as for example, under article 65 of the 1958
15French Constitution, but by a simple law. Article 1(4)
of Decree N. 66/DF/205 of the 28th April 1966 provided 
that members of the Bench shall be irremovable and, in the
15. Law No. 63/LF/7 of June 1963; Decree No. 66/DF/205 
of 28 April 1966.
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carrying out of their judicial functions, only be res­
ponsible to the law and their conscience.
In the discharge of his duties as guarantor of 
judicial independence the Head of State was assisted by 
the Federal Council of Magistracy which gave him its 
opinion on all proposed appointments to the bench, pro­
motion, secondment, transfer, and bestowal of honours on 
members of the Bench. The Council also drew up a Bencher’s 
Promotion Table (as prescribed by the Judicial and Legal 
Service Rules contained in Law No. 63/LF/7 of June 1963) 
and exercised powers of a disciplinary nature over members 
of the Bench. By and large however, the Council’s role 
was merely consultative and the President was under no 
legal obligation to accept its opinion, although he invariably 
did. The composition of the Council was heterogeneous.
Its nine members were drawn from the judiciary, the legis-
16lature and the executive. They were required to take
oath before assuming their functions and, with the exception 
of the President and the Minister of Justice, held office 
for five years.
II. The Unitary Constitution of June 2nd 1972
Economy, efficiency and national unity were the 
reasons advanced by Mr Ahmadou Ahidjo, the Cameroonian Head
16. The President (chairman), the Minister of Justice (vice- 
chairman), one presidential nominee, three members of 
the Bench nominated by the F.C.J., and three members of 
the Federal National Assembly.
V
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of State, for the abolition of the federal system of govern-
17ment and the installation of a unitary one. The Presi­
dent’s decision to switch over to a unitary constitution
was made known to the Federal National Assembly on May 6th
-| o
1972 and thrown to a.referendum on May 20th of that year.
The result of the May 20th referendum was a 99.999$ vote 
(3,177*846) in favour of the adoption of the Unitary con­
stitution. The constitution was promulgated and became 
law on 2nd June 1972.
1. A highly centralised unitary state
Under the provisions of the new constitution the 
old Federal Republic of Cameroon became a unitary state 
styled the United Republic of Cameroon. The legislative 
Houses of the two former federated states were abolished 
and State authority was vested in the President of the
17. For an analysis of the 1972 Constitution and how the 
unitary state came to be instituted, see Joseph Owona,
’La nouvelle constitution camerounaise du 2 juin 1972: 
de l ’Etat federal a l ’Etat unitaire’, Ann. Fac. de 
Droit du Cameroun, 1973s no. 4, pp. 17-42. The 1972 
Cameroonian constitution was never publicly debated and 
discussed. Even its actual drafting was shrouded in 
secrecy and the people were called upon in a referendum 
to vote for a constitution whose contents they knew 
nothing about. This is typical of all French-speaking 
African countries. In English-speaking African countries 
by contrast, the device of a ’constituent assembly’ is 
always used, the draft constitution is widely publicised 
and the public is always invited to contribute to the 
discussions on the draft constitution.
18. See Decree No. 72/DF/239 of 9 May 1972.
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19United Republic and the 120-member National Assembly.
20The country was carved Into seven provinces each headed 
by a Governor appointed by the President. On June 30th 
1975 substantial changes were made in the constitution 
resulting in the revision of articles 1, 5, 7, 8, 32 and 
34. The President decided to create the post of fa 
Prime Minister’. By article 5 of the constitution the 
President ’shall define the policy of the Nation. He 
may charge a Prime Minister with the implementation of 
this policy in given spheres. The Prime Minister shall 
for this purpose receive a delegation of powers to direct, 
co-ordinate and control governmental activity in such 
spheres.’ However, no functions relating to the Presi­
dency, foreign affairs, armed forces and security may be 
assigned to the Prime Minister, who owes his appointment 
to the President and can be dismissed by him at will.
The Prime Minister is in fact not a primus inter pares.
He has no cabinet. Ministers get their instructions from
the President and not from him. The major civil service
21appointments are made by the President and not by him.
19* The distribution of members of the National Assembly is 
as follows: Centre-South 23, East, 6, Littoral 13,
North 36, West 18, North-West 14, South-West 10. See 
Decree No. 73/121 of 23rd March 1973 to fix the number 
of members of the National Assembly per Province.
20. The Provinces are: South-West, North-West, West, East, 
North, Littoral, and Centre-South.
21. Cf. A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz (eds.), Constitutions 
of the countries of the world, Inc. Dobbs Perry, New 
York, 1976. ck r€&ev\t &wi-ey\c3iYv\-e CkjYkS't/itw'r.^ot/)
"tHS- p q :^ V\cv£ vvoia> lo^ .£v\
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The President of the Republic has control not only 
over appointments to jobs in the Civil Service and para- 
statals but also over the selection of members to the 
country’s legislature.^ ’’The Constitution of 1972 - 
like its 1961 predecessor - gave the President the majority 
of governmental power in nearly all matters, except those 
of the judiciary, and he made full use of his authority.
His control over the Civil Service provided jobs for most 
of the country’s educated minority. His role as head of 
the dominant political party gave him considerable addi­
tional power, notably through his influence in, if not
control over, the selection of other government officials,
2 3including the members of the National Assembly.”
To most political analysts and constitutional 
lawyers, the abolition of the federation and the institution 
of a unitary system of government in Cameroon came as no 
surprise. The writing had been on the wall ever since the 
promulgation of the 1961 Constitution. The preponderance 
of the Federal President and the very strong centripetal 
force exerted by the centre were such that every indication 
pointed to a unitary form of government. ’’The federal 
government was controlled largely by persons accustomed to 
the concepts of a highly centralized governmental system.
22. This he does through the One Party, the CNU, of which 
he is President and which he presides at the decision­
making level.
23. Area Handbook for the United Republic of Cameroon, The 
American University, Washington, 197^, p . 13^•
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Their experiences are drawn from the French model emulated 
in their educational system, the authoritarian format of 
the colonial system, and the theocratic pyramid, which 
had been the tradition among many of the government leaders' 
ancestors. The resultant attitude coupled with the pro­
visions of the Constitution and the lack of any effective 
opposition, led over a decade to the steady growth of 
federal authority. By 1972 the powers actually exercised
by the states were little more than those apt to be vested
24in a local government unit within a centralized state."
2. Judicial organisation
The 1972 Constitution provides that the control 
of the constitutionality of laws shall be by the Supreme 
Court. In reality however, this function is not performed 
exclusively by the judiciary. When it sits to review 
legislative acts, the Supreme Court is enlarged by chosen 
members of the National Aseembly and a number of persons 
specifically appointed by the Head of State for that pur­
pose. It has been suggested that this arrangement, whereby 
the review of legislative acts is not left entirely in the 
hands of the judiciary, has been prompted by fear of the 
risk of 'gouvernement des juges'.
24. Ibid., p. 135.
25. Michel Prouzet, Le Cameroun, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1974,
p. 212.
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The first trait of the judicial system in 
Cameroon as previewed in the 1972 Constitution is inde­
pendence of the judicial authority. As under the 1961 
Constitution the Head of State is the guarantor of that 
independence. He is assisted in this task by the High 
Judicial Council, a body with the same composition, 
attributes and functions as the Council of Magistracy 
under the 1961 Constitution. The second feature is 
the considerable protection of civil liberties provided in 
the preamble to the 1972 Constitution. This protection 
has however not yet been tested. Two more characteristics 
may be mentioned; the establishment of a single system of 
courts throughout the entire country and the maintenance 
of laws of colonial heritage.
Article 31 of the 1972 Constitution and Ordinance 
No. 72/4 of the 26 August 1972 establish a unitary courts 
system in the country to replace the separate system of 
courts that up to then existed in Cameroon. Two main 
reasons appeared to have prompted this reform; economic 
considerations and judicial policy. There was need for a 
simple and uncomplicated system of courts for, in the past, 
litigants were often bewildered by the various types of 
courts and uncertain as to which of those courts to take 
their case. Moreover, there was a penury of judicial 
personnel. There were not enough judges to man all the 
existing courts. Even if expatriate judges could be hired, 
there was not always money to pay all of them.
Laws from the colonial period have not been dis­
carded en bloc in Cameroon. The principle has always been 
that laws not officially or specifically or implicitly
2 g
repealed survive and continue to be in force. The
practical effect of this has been the preservation of a 
substantial body of laws received from both France and 
England. Although there has been local legislation here 
and there, especially on certain aspects of family law, 
land law, criminal law and labour law, most of the laws in 
force are still of colonial origin. Thus the English- 
speaking part of the country apply laws which are of 
English or basically of English origin while the French- 
speaking part applies laws of French origin.
26. See art. 51 of the I960 Constitution, art. 46 of the
1961 Constitution, and art. 43 of the 1972 Constitution.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE JUDICIAL ORGANISATION BEFORE AUGUST 1972
Article 46 of the 1961 Constitution provided that 
previous legislation of the federated states would remain 
in force insofar as it did not conflict with the pro­
visions of that constitution. Hence, English and French 
received laws not repugnant to that constitution continued 
to be in force in West and in East Camerooon respectively. 
The Judicial system in the two states continued to 
function.through their respective pre-unification courts 
and administrations.
In West Cameroon a bifurcated system of courts 
(customary and non-customary) operated under the common law 
and statutes in use before 1961. Similarly,, the 1959 
system of courts which derived its inspiration and tra­
dition from French practice continued to function in East 
Cameroun. At federal level, a number of federal courts 
were created and the control of all judicial organs was 
carried out by the Federal Ministry of Justice. Each 
federated state had a subordinate system of courts of 
appeal (one in West Cameroon and four in East Cameroun) 
as well as its own supreme court. There was no common 
court of appeal except where there was an erroneous inter­
pretation of federal law in either state, in which case 
appeal lay to the Federal Court of Justice. Moreover, 
each state had its own judiciary to which the Head of
274.
State appointed members after consultation with the 
Federal Council of Magistracy.
Before August 1972, therefore, two sets of 
courts operated in Cameroon; federal courts (Section I) 
and state courts (Section II). The ratione loci juris­
diction of federal courts covered the entire country while 
that of state courts was limited to their respective states.
I . Federal Courts
The federal courts were the Federal High Court 
of Justice (Para.. 1), Military Tribunals (Para. 2), and 
the Federal Court of Justice (Para. 3)«
1. The Federal High Court of Justice
This court was in effect a court of impeachment 
created by article 36 of the 1961 Constitution. It was 
empowered to try (i) the President of the Republic for 
high treason committed in the exercise of his duties, and 
(ii) the Vice-President of the Republic, Federal Ministers, 
and the Premiers and Secretaries of State of the two feder­
ated states for conspiracy against the security of the State. 
As there was never any impeachment in the country, this 
court never sat and existed only on paper.
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2. Military tribunals
Following independence on 1st January i960 the 
Cameroun Republic set up military tribunals to provide what 
amounted to summary justice to persons convicted of involve­
ment in the Union des Populatios du Cameroun guerrilla 
campaign or of some particularly heinous crime. A stan­
ding Military Tribunal was set up in Yaounde and a tem­
porary military tribunal in Dschang and in Douala.
One month after unification of the Southern 
Cameroons with the Cameroun Republic on 1st October 1961, 
a permanent state of emergency was declared in the four 
West Cameroon Divisions bordering on the Mungo and Bamileke 
troubled areas. This was because many U.P.C. insurgents 
took refuge in West Cameroon. Consequently, a standing 
military tribunal was also set up in Buea. In normal 
times, the powers of these military tribunals was limited 
to military offences committed by soldiers or persons 
assimilated to soldiers. In exceptional times however, 
these powers were widened to include offences committed 
against the security of the state, subversion, arson and 
offences against firearms legislation.
Military tribunals applied three sets of laws: 
the relevant provisions of the Federal Penal Code, the 
various special laws promulgated by the State, and the 
French Code of Military Justice with regards purely mili­
tary offences (the Cameroonian soldier's training is
basically of French tradition and the Armed Forces remains 
a French-monolingual institution). The procedure followed 
in those courts was that provided in the Code d fInstruction 
Criminelle for the Ttribunaux correctionnelsT in East 
Cameroun or that provided in the Criminal Procedure Ordi­
nance for the Magistrate’s Courts in criminal matters in 
West Cameroon. Judgement of military tribunals were not, 
as a general rule, appealable. But in certain exceptional 
cases, a convicted person could petition either the Supreme 
Court of either of the federated states, the Minister of 
Justice or the Minister of the Armed Forces, for his case 
to be reviewed. If a person was sentenced to death he 
could petition the Head of State to exercise his prerogative 
of mercy, to reprieve him or to commute the sentence.
All military tribunals came directly under the 
Ministry of Armed Forces. A military tribunal was presided 
over by a president who was invariably a civilian judi­
cial officer. The president sat with two officers chosen 
from the Armed Forces. All three decided on the issue of 
guilt and sentence. Prosecutions in the military tribunal 
were conducted by the commissaire du gouvernement who was 
at first a civilian legal officer; later however, the 
office passed over to an officer of the Armed Forces.
3. The Federal Court of Justice
Instituted by the 1961 Constitution, the Federal 
Court of Justice was vested with five distinct sets of
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powers. Article 33 of the 1961 Constitution empowered 
it to: (i) resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between the
supreme courts of the federated states; (ii) give final 
judgments on such appeals as may be. granted by federal 
law from the judgments of the superior courts of the 
federated states whenever the application of federal law 
was in issue; (iii) decide complaints against adminis­
trative acts of the federal or federated authorities, 
local authorities and public corporations, whether claiming 
damages or on grounds of ultra vires; (iv) determine 
issues between the federated states, or between one of them 
and the federal Government. A fifth power.was conferred 
on the Federal Court of Justice by articles 14, 29 and 34 
of the Constitution: that of judicial review of legis­
lative action and the giving of advisory opinions. These 
powers were subsequently specified in a number of laws.1 
The Court had,’ broadly speaking, two types of functions, 
contentious and non-contentious.
A . Composition of and the law applicable in the Federal 
Court of Justice
a) Composition
The composition of the Federal Court of Justice
1. Ord. No. 62/OF/6 of 4 October 1961 defining the compo­
sition, jurisdiction, and procedure of the Federal Court 
of Justice; Decree No. 64/DF/218 of 19 June 1964 (Adminis­
trative Procedure in the FCJ); Law No. 65/LF/29 of 19 
November 1965 (Reform of Administrative Litigation);
Law No. 69/LF/l of 14 June 1969 (Composition, jurisdiction 
and procedure of the Federal Court of Justice).
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was first spelt out in Ordinance No. 61/OF/6 of 4th October 
1961 but modified in 1964 and again in 1969. The Court 
consisted of a Full Bench which sat in Yaounde and two 
Local Benches, one in Buea and the other in Yaounde.
1. The Full Bench
Originally, the Full Bench was constituted by 
nine Judges (five substantive and four alternate), a 
Procureur General, an Advocate General and a Chief Registrar. 
The president of the East Cameroon Supreme Court was the 
permanent president of the Federal Court of Justice while 
the West Cameroon Chief Justice was one of the five sub- 
stative Judges of the Court. Of the remaining three sub­
stantive Judges, one had to come from the Supreme Court of 
West Cameroon and two from the Supreme Court of East Camer­
oon. The Procureur General at the East Cameroun Supreme 
Court was cumulatively the Procureur General at the Federal 
Court of Justice while the Court’s Advocate General was 
the Procureur General at the West Cameroon Supreme Court.
The other members of the Court were appointed by the Head 
of State after consultation with the Federal Council of 
Magistracy. Whenever the court sat to give an advisory 
opinion or to determine the validity of a legislative 
measure, its membership was doubled. The Federal Court of 
Justice had therefore no proper personnel of its own but
2. Decree No. 64/DF/218 of 19 June 1964; Law No. 69/LF/l 
of 14 June 1969.
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rather, personnel borrowed from the other courts.
The composition of the Full Bench was later 
modified to consist of a President, four Federal Judges 
(substantive or alternate, excluding the judge who parti­
cipated in the judgment of the case at first instance), a 
Procureur General or an Advocate General, and a Registrar 
who acted as secretary during the bi-annual sessions of 
the court. This new composition was unsatisfactory as 
nothing was said about the number of Judges that had to 
come from each of the two federated states if the consti­
tution of the court, when it sat to decide any issue, was 
to be valid. The Federal Court of Justice resolved the 
issue itslef by ruling in one case that the court could 
only be properly constituted if it sat with three French- 
speaking and two English-speaking Judges. But fear still 
persisted in West Cameroon. It was argued that although 
two of the five Judges had to come from West Cameroon, 
the Judges from East Cameroon were still in the majority 
and could, if they were so minded to, always rule against 
a litigant from West Cameroon. The West Cameroon Bar 
Association proposed that the majority of judges sitting 
on any given case should always come from the same state 
as the citizen litigant involved in the case. This fear 
appears, in retrospect, to have been unjustified. Through­
out its twelve years life-span, there was not a single 
recorded instance in which the Federal Court of Justice
3. Cour Federale de Justice, arr^t no. 11 du 17 octobre 1968.
280.
acted out of sectarian interests.
The Full Bench exercised original and appellate 
jurisdiction. It had original jurisdiction in matters of 
review of legislative and administrative measures, disputes 
between the component federated states, and dispute between 
the Federal Government and a state Government. Its appel­
late jurisdiction ^encompassed conflicts of jurisdiction 
between the three judiciaries and the interpretation of 
federal law.
2. The local benches
Although s. 15 of the 1961 Ordinance had provided 
for the setting up of two local benches of the Federal 
Court of Justice, each at the capital of each of the feder­
ated states, it was only in 1965 that this provision was given 
practical effect.** In fact it was only in December 1966 
that the Buea Local Bench was installed. Local Benches of 
the Federal Court of Justice exercised only original juris­
diction. Appeals from the Local Benches lay to the Full 
Bench in Yaounde. Each Local Bench heard complaints 
against the Government of the state in which it sat, the 
Federal.Government, local authorities and public corpor­
ations. The Yaounde Local Bench replaced the Tribunal 
d 1Etat in East Cameroun. That court used to hear complaints 
against the East Cameroun Government. The Buea Bench took 
over the powers of the High Court to entertain suits against
4. Law No. 65/LF/29 of 19th November 1965.
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the West Cameroon Government. Indeed petitions of right 
were abolished and with them any need for the consent of 
the West Cameroon Government for it or any of its agents 
to be sued.
Each Local Bench was composed of a Federal Judge 
who was assisted by two assessors chosen from among judicial 
officers or high-ranking civil servants of the federated 
state in which the court sat, a representative of the 
Procureur General’s chambers, and a registrar. Of the two 
Local Benches, the more important in terms of the volume of 
matters it handled was the Yaounde Bench. However the 
work of this Bench was frequently hampered by the chronic 
absence of civil servants appointed assessors at court 
sessions. The main reason for this absenteeism was ’’the 
fear of sitting in judgment over cases in which the Adminis­
tration was sometimes implicated and severely criticised’’.^
5. It has in fact been argued that the Petition of Rights 
Ordinance (Cap. 149), which was then in force in West 
Cameroon, was inconsistent with the 1961 Constitution 
and therefore void. ”If the idea of crown immunity is 
preserved in West Cameroon, then we will have the po­
sition in Cameroon where a person injured by an officer 
of the East Cameroun Government or by a Federal Officer 
(even in West Cameroon) will have an effective legal 
remedy while a person injured by a West Cameroon Officer 
might not ... The Petition of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 149) 
... is in conflict with Article 2 of the Federal Consti­
tution, which gives the Federation corporate personality 
and for this and other reasons, ... void. On similar 
grounds the whole common law principle of immunity is 
also void.” See, H.N.A. Enonchong, 'The position of the 
Cameroon state in litigation', ABBIA, No. 11, November 
1965, pp. 59-67, p. 64.
6. M. Nguini, 'La cour federale de j ustice’, 3 R . C . D . 1973, 
p. 37.
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b ) Law administered
1. Procedure
The Full Bench followed the procedure laid down 
in the 1961 Ordinance, Decree No. 64/DF/218 of 19 June 1964 
and Law No. 61/LF/l of 14 June 1969- The Yaounde Local 
Bench applied the procedure laid down in these laws in so 
far as they related to original jurisdiction. The Buea 
Local Bench was governed by the ordinary civil procedure 
applied by the courts in West Cameroon.
2. Substantive law
Although there was no doubt that the Federal 
Court of Justice did not administer customary and religious 
laws, it remained for a long time undecided what general 
law the court was to apply. There were two alternatives: 
either the court selected any set of legal principles which 
would provide justice in a given case (applying something 
equivalent to ’natural justice, equity and good conscience’) 
or apply the law prevailing in the federated state from 
which the case arose. No enactment provided an answer to
this vexed question. The problem of specifying a single
all-embracing set of principles which could govern judicial 
decisions in a mixed legal system was left in abeyance.
Law No. 65/LF/29 of 19th November 1965 avoided this issue 
when it allowed the Court to apply, in any given case, the 
law prevailing in the federated state from which the case 
arose. This was only a partial solution, as it left unre­
solved the situation where a case arose from the Federal 
Government itself.
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B . The Role of the Federal Court of Justice
a) Its non-contentious role
The non-contentious functions of the Federal 
Court of Justice consisted in taking cognizance of the 
vacancy of the Presidency of the Federal Republic, swearing 
in the Head-of-State-elect, administering the oath to 
barristers, ascertaining and proclaiming the results of 
national elections, and nomination of Judges to the Federal 
Council of Magistracy and the Permanent Disciplinary Com­
mission. No litigation was involved in these cases and 
the Court’s role here was. merely ceremonial.
1. Vacancy of the presidency and vice-presidency
It was the function of the Federal Court of Justice
to ascertain vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic as
7
a result of death or permanent physical incapacity and 
to certify, at the request of the President of the Republic, 
the vacancy of the Vice-Presidency of the Republic for
Q
whatever reason. It was however not indicated what 
’permanent physical incapacity' meant. Moreover, why only 
’physical’ and not- mental incapacity as well?
2) Swearing-in of the President-elect
To say that the Federal Court of Justice swore 
in the President-elect is in fact an overstatement. The 
court merely participated in the swearing-in ceremony
7. Art. 10(a) of the 1961 Constitution; art. 65 of Ord.
No. 62/OF/33 of 31 March 1962; Law No. 69/LF/14 of 10 
November 1969 to amend certain provisions of the 1961 
Constitution.
8. Art. 68 of Ord. No. 62/OF/33 of 31 March 1962.
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conducted during a solemn session of the National Assembly
9
and chaired by the Speaker of that Assembly. The Presi­
dent-elect recited the oath from a card held out to him.
He did not, as happens in the United States of America for 
example, repeat the oath of office, phrase by phrase, after 
the President of the Court. Furthermore, after the new 
President of the Republic has subscribed his signature to 
the double originals of the record of the swearing-in 
ceremony, the only other person who appended his signature 
to that document was the Speaker of the Federal National 
Assembly. The President of the Federal Court of Justice 
did not. The presence of that Court at the swearing-in 
ceremony of the President-elect was therefore only for 
cosmetic purposes. This juxtaposition of the legislature 
and the judiciary at the swearing in of the President-elect 
was probably unnecessary. "The Federal Court- of Justice, 
as guardian and interpreter of the Fundamental Law was ... 
better fitted to assume this formality alone, in the same 
manner as the United States Supreme Court, which exclusively 
receives the oath of the President of the Union.
3) Administering the oath to barristers
The power to administer practitioners’ oath to 
fresh barristers was conferred on the Federal Court of
9. Art. 61 of Ord. No. 62/OF/33 of 31st March 1962.
10. Marcel Nguini, op.cit., at p. 38.
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Justice in 1972 by the Bar Law - Law No. 72/LF/5 of 23rd
May 1972. Hitherto, East Cameroon barristers took their
oath before the East Cameroun Supreme .Court‘d  while West
Cameroon barristers took theirs before the Supreme
12Court of West Cameroon.
4) Ascertainment of national election results
Articles 54 to 60 of Ordinance No. 62/Of/33 of 
31st March 1962 empowered the Federal Court of Justice to 
proceed, inter alia, to a general check of votes cast, to 
determine all complaints on questions concerning the con­
duct of elections or the count of votes, to check the elec­
toral procedure of each polling station, and, in solemn 
session, to determine and proclaim the results of Presi­
dential elections.
5) Nomination of ;judges
The Federal Court of Justice had the power to
13make certain limited judicial nominations. At the
beginning of each judicial year, the court nominated, for 
a period of one year, three members from the magistracy 
to complete the composition of the Permanent Disciplinary 
Commission in charge of pronouncing disciplinary sanctions 
on legal officers. The court also nominated, for a term of
11. Art. 2 of Ord. no. 60/8 of 2nd February I960.
12. Art. 4 of Law No. 63/LF/67 of 5th November 1963.
13. Art. 52(c) of Decree No. 70/DF/253 of 2nd June 1970 
(Law governing the Magistracy).
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five years, three Judges, one of them chosen from among
the Judges in West Cameroon, to complete the composition
14of the Federal Council of Magistracy..
b ) Its contentious role
This was the principal role of the Federal 
Court of Justice. The court had jurisdiction to decide 
on the constitutionality of a law or bill referred to it, 
to interpret any federal law referred to it for interpre­
tation, and to resolve administrative disputes.
1) Determination of the constitutionality of laws
Article 14 of the 1961 Constitution gave the 
President of the Republic the right to refer to the Federal 
Court of Justice, any federal law which he considered to 
be unconstitutional, or any law passed by a federated state 
which he regarded as violating the Constitution or a 
federal law. Although the Constitution did not say so, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the President could 
also refer to the Federal Court of Justice any federal law 
which encroached on state jurisdiction for such a law would 
be unconstitutional. Article 29(3) of the 1961 Consti­
tution also empowered the President of the Republic or the 
Speaker of the Federal National Assembly to refer to the
14. Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 61/OF/7 of 6th October 1961.
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Federal Court of Justice, ’for decision’, any doubt or 
dispute on the admissibility of a bill or amendment.
Under article 14 the Court was called upon to 
make a judicial pronouncement, on the alleged unconstitu­
tionality of the law referred to it. But under article 
29(3) the court had to be resorted to merely for an advi­
sory opinion. This was so notwithstanding the fact that 
article 29(3) used the word ’decision’. These two 
instances were cases in which the Court exercised original 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, when the Court sat to hear 
any of these matters, its membership had, in conformity 
with article 34 of the Constitution, to be double its 
normal size by personalities appointed as ad hoc judges for a 
period of one year, by reason of their expertise on the 
matters in issue. This was so even though under article 14 
the court made a judicial determination and handed down a 
j udgment.
Ne-ither article 14 nor article 29(3) was ever 
c.alled into play. One isolated case in which the consti­
tutionality of a law was challenged did however come before
the Federal Court of Justice in 1970. It was the case of
15Societe des Grands Travaux de l ’Est. In that case the
appellant was, under article 2696 of the 1965-66 Fiscal 
Roll, assessed to pay the sum of 10,577,985 francs cfa as
15. Cour federale de justice, arret No. 4 du 28 oct. 1970, 
unreported.
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income tax for the fiscal year ending June 20th 1966.
The appellant, a business firm, alleged that it had been 
over-assessed and appealed for partial annulment of 
article 2696. The firm further contended (i) that the 
tax had been assessed in violation of the law and in par­
ticular of the terms of the old art. 43c of the General 
Tax Code, (ii) that in so far as it gave retroactive vali­
dity to the new art. 43c of the Tax Code, the Law of 30th 
June 1966 offended against the fundamental principle of 
the non-retrospection of laws - a principle found in the 
preamble to the i960 Constitution, and (iii) that the 
tax assessment was illegal and should therefore be annulled 
because it was made under provisions which were themselves 
contrary to the Constitution. These arguments carried 
little weight with the Court which ruled that under the 
law of Cameroon there was no control of the constitutionality 
of laws by way of an objection in law. Such a control 
could only be made by way of direct action and then only by 
the President of the Republic.
2) Interpretation of federal law and resolution of
jurisdictional conflicts
The Federal Court of Justice was empowered to
resolve conflicts of jurisdiction and to interpret 
17federal laws. Its powers to resolve conflicts of
16. Law No. 69/LF/l of 14 June 1969.
17. Ibid.
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jurisdiction was a recognition of the legal realities of
the country; the fact that there was (and there still is)
an interplay of the common law and the civil law systems
within a unitary administrative judicial system. This
power of the Federal Court of Justice obviated the extra
cost and inconvenience involved in hearing the same case
in two different courts under separate legal systems in
which the rules governing the doctrine of res judicata were
not necessarily the same. However, no conflicts ever
arose between a West and an East Cameroonian court.
Both the West Cameroon Court of Appeal and the
East Cameroon Supreme Court had jurisdiction to interpret
18the Constitution and federal laws. But the Procureur
General and the Advocate General at the Federal Court of
Justice could appeal ’on a point of law and in the interest
19of law’ to that Court. Thus in one case on the proper
construction of ’embezzlement of public funds' the Federal 
Court of Justice held that fraudulent intention was dis­
tinct from motive and that it existed from the moment the 
accused appropriated for his personal ends monies from the 
state funds for which he was responsible, regard being had 
to. public accountability under which a public servant must 
be able, at any time, to satisfy the Government Auditor 
that the funds allocated for his official purposes were
18. Art. 11 of Ordinance No. 61/OF/6 of 4 October 1961.
19. Ibid.
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20intact. In another case, ’murder with premeditation’
was construed as requiring more than the intent to cause
grievous bodily harm or the intention to kill formed in
the heat of the moment but that it required over and above
the intention to kill one or more persons, identified or
not, at least a plan, made prior to the act, in a period
of time, sufficient for reflection, which should have
21induced the accused to abandon his scheme.
3) Resolution of administrative cases
The Federal Court of Justice decided disputes 
involving the Government, Government agencies, public uti­
lities, corporations and local government bodies. It
also had power to resolve disputes involving certain pro-
22fessional organisations such as the Bar Association and
23the Medical Association. J It was however in the area of 
contentieux administratif (the law governing the judicial 
review of administrative decisions and actions) that the 
Federal Court of Justice was most active.
20. Cour federale de justice, Arret No. 23 du 17 mars 1967, 
unreported.
21. Cour federale de justice, Arret No. 4 du 18 oct. 1969; 
Procureur-General of the Federal Court of Justice v.
Aliyo Ndimisa, unreported.
22. Law No. 72/LF/5 of 23rd May 1972.
23. Law No. 66/LF/7 of 10 June 1966 regulating the practice
and organisation of the medical, dental and midwifery 
professions; Dr Bernard Auteroche v. Cameroon National
Medical Association, C .F .J ., Arret N o . 2 du 2b oct. 1970.
The plaintiff however failed to proceed with this case.
Droit administratif (of which contentieux adminis-
tratif is only a part) in Cameroon has been tremendously
influenced by the corresponding law in France. In fact,
one ventures to say that it has been borrowed almost in toto
from French droit administratif. There are two main
explanations for this. The concept of ’droit administratif’
had been introduced in the French-speaking part of Cameroon
by the French and since colonial days courts, inspired by
the case-law of the French Conseil d ’Etat, have had to deal
with disputes involving the individual and the State or any
of its agencies. In deciding such cases sets of rules
different from those applicable in civil litigation between
private individuals were applied. Secondly, during the
twelve years of existence of the Federal Court of Justice
the overwhelming majority of cases decided by the Court
came from East Cameroun and came before the Yaounde Local
Bench. The concept of ’droit administratif’ was novel in 
24West Cameroon. The Government of that federated state
was amenable to justice in the same way as natural and
24. Thus in Robert Abunaw v. Francis Tommy Wilson & Director 
of Lands and Surveys, a case in which the Buea Local 
Bench purported to exercise jurisdiction, the Full Bench 
in Yaounde had no difficulty in ruling that the case 
was not an administrative dispute and that the ordinary 
courts and not the administrative court had jurisdiction 
over the matter. See, FCJ, Order No. 3/A of 28 October 
1971. Again when the Buea Local Bench purported to 
exercise jurisdiction in the case of C .D .C . v. SOCOPAO, 
a case in which a private firm (SOCOPAO) was being sued 
for damages by a mixed economy corporation (the C.D.C.), 
the Full Bench ruled that the administrative court was 
incompetent to entertain the matter and that the case was 
one for the ordinary courts. See, FCJ, Order No. 6/A 
of 10 March 1972.
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artificial persons at private law and was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. As in England, con­
trol of the executive and of Government agencies and public 
corporations was by the common law and the doctrine of 
ultra vires.
The scope of administrative litigation was de­
fined in article 14 of the Law of 19th November 1969.
It provided:
"The Federal Court of Justice takes cognizance 
of all the administrative litigation brought 
against the Federal Republic, the federated 
states, public bodies and corporations.
Administrative litigation includes:
a) appeals for annulment of ultra vires acts, 
and, in non-penal matters, appeals arising 
on points of law. In the sense of the 
present artilce ’ultra vires’ is to be defined 
as: defective procedure; lack of jurisdiction; 
violation of the law; violation of any appli­
cable legislation; abuse of authority
b) actions for indemnity for wrongs caused by an 
administrative decision
c) disputes relating to Government contracts 
(except those implicitly agreed to be under 
the aegis of the ordinary law) or concessions 
for public undertakings
d) cases concerning state property
e) matters which are expressly assigned to it 
by law.
"The ordinary law courts take cognizance, in 
accordance with the general law, of all other 
actions or disputes, even if the artificial 
persons described in the first paragraph are 
involved. The liability of such an artificial 
[legal] person, with regard to third parties, 
fully replaces the responsibility at law of its 
agent who cause any loss or injury, even in the 
course of his employment. The ordinary courts 
furthermore have jurisdiction in all issues of 
administrative acts of violence, requiring all 
measures to be taken to terminate such acts, 
and similarly for cases of expropriation.
"No court or tribunal may have jurisdiction 
over ’acts of state’."
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Despite this provision, the actual frontiers of adminis­
trative litigation remained unclear. Moreover, the last 
but one paragraph of the above provision was in error when 
it said "The liability of such an artificial [legal] 
person, with regard to third parties, fully replaces the 
responsibility at law of its agent who cause any loss or 
injury, even in the course of his employment". Logically, 
the sentence just quoted means that the liability of the 
artificial person is ordinarily substituted for that of 
its agent when such an agent is not in the course of his 
employment (that is, when he is on a frolic of his own). 
This is absurd because in law, a master or a principal can 
only be held liable for the acts of his servant or agent 
when that servant or agent acted in the course of his 
employment.
II. State Courts
Each of the two component states of the Cameroon 
Federation had its own system of courts.
1. The Courts in West Cameroon
These were: the West Cameroon Supreme Court,
the West Cameroon Court of Appeal, the High Court, the 
Magistrate’s Courts, the Labour Courts, and the Customary 
Courts. These may be conveniently classified into courts 
with appellate and courts with original jurisdiction.
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A . Courts with appellate jurisdiction
These were the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal 
and the High Court (which also exercised original juris­
diction) .
a) The West Cameroon Supreme Court
Set up on 16th October 1961 by Ordinance No. 61/OF/9, 
the Supreme Court of West Cameroon never sat as such. On 
the English model, it consisted of two courts, the old High 
court of the pre-independence period and the Court of Appeal. 
This meant that the Court was divided into a High Court 
and an Appeal Court Division. Judges appointed to the 
Court sat in both Divisions. The West Cameroon Supreme 
Court was composed of a Chief Justice and four Judges, all 
barristers of the English Bar and of many years’ standing.
Its jurisdiction was exclusively appellate. The procedure 
followed by the Court was that contained in the Nigerian 
Federal Supreme Court Ordinance i960 and the Nigerian 
Federal Supreme Court Rules 1961. Appeal on a point of 
interpretation of federal law lay to the Federal Court of 
Justice in Yaounde. The Court applied locally enacted 
Cameroonian laws, the common law, the doctrines of equity 
and the statutes of general application in force in England 
as of 1st January 1900. It also applied customary and 
religious law in matters governed by those laws. However, 
no such appeal ever came before the Supreme Court.
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b ) The West Cameroon Court of Appeal
Established by the same law which set up the 
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal heard appeals from the 
High Court and other inferior courts. The Court was com­
posed of three Judges and was a division of the Supreme 
Court. Its jurisdiction and powers were contained in 
Ordinance No. 61/OF/9 of 16 October 1961, the Nigerian 
Federal Supreme Court Ordinance i960, the Nigerian Federal 
Supreme Court Rules 1961 and the Southern Cameroons (Con­
stitution) Order-in-Council I960.
c ) The High Court
The old Southern Cameroons High Court was absorbed 
in the West Cameroon Supreme Court which the Ordinance of 
16th October 1961 created. But the Southern Cameroons 
High Court Law No. 7 of 1955 continued to be in force by 
virtue of section 11 of the Ordinance of 16th October 1961. 
The same Judges who constituted the Supreme Court also sat 
in the High Court. But the High Court was constituted by 
a Judge sitting alone. In practice the High Court had no 
permanent seat but went on assizes in Buea, Kumba, Mamfe 
and Bamenda.
The court exercised original jurisdiction in the 
more serious criminal matters (indictable offences) and 
in civil cases of a pecuniary value of over 350,000 francs 
cfa, save for matters coming within the province of the 
Federal Court of Justice, the Labour Court, the Military 
Tribunal and the Customary Court. By section 27 of the
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the Southern Cameroons High Court Law 1955 the High Court 
had no jurisdiction over matters in which jurisdiction was 
vested in the Customary Courts. However, under s . 9 of 
that same law any case over which Customary Courts have 
jurisdiction may be transferred to the High Court. Further­
more s. 61 of that law empowered the High Court to transfer 
other cases to the appropriate Customary Court. Likewise, 
under s. 56(1) of the same law the High Court could transfer 
a case to the appropriate Magistrate's Court.
Criminal and civil appeals from the Magistrates' 
Courts whether under the general law or under customary 
law lay to the High Court which also heard appeals in 
certain matters from the Labour Court. The jurisdiction 
and powers of the High Court were contained in the Southern 
Cameroons High Court Law 1955, the Nigerian Supreme Court 
Rules (Cap. 211 of the 19^8 Laws), the Southern Cameroons 
(Constitution) Order-in-Council I960, and Ordinance No. 61/ 
OF/9 of the 16th October 1961.
B . Courts with original jurisdiction
a) The Magistrate's Courts
Established by the Southern Cameroons Magistrate's 
Courts Law No. 6 of 1955, these courts dealt with the day- 
to-day criminal and civil cases. A Magistrate's Court was 
composed of a single Magistrate. He was always a legally 
qualified person, usually a barrister of the English or the 
Nigerian Bar. From 1969 however, most Magistrates were
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barristers or University graduates in law or both, who 
had been trained and qualified for that purpose in the 
Judicial Division of the National School of Administration 
and Magistracy at Yaounde. Since he sat alone, a Magis­
trate decided the issues of both fact and law in his court. 
Appeals lay from the Magistrates’ Courts to the High Court 
within thirty days.
In theory a Magistrate had territorial juris­
diction throughout West Cameroon for, the fiction was that 
the Magistrate’s Court was a single court for the whole of 
West Cameroon with merely branches in the main towns.
In reality, each Magistrate's Court was a separate entity 
set up by the Chief Justice under s. 7 of the Southern 
Cameroons Magistrate's Court Law 1955. Consequently, each 
Magistrate heard only cases arising within the area of 
the court to which the Chief Justice had allotted him. 
However, the Magistrate sat regularly in different courts 
on different days, and he could be sent by the Chief Jus­
tice to sit in another court for a particular case. The 
Chief Justice derived this power from s. 40 of the Southern 
Cameroons Magistrate's Court Law 1955.
The jurisdiction of Magistrates other than Chief 
Magistrates did not exceed two years' imprisonment or a 
fine of approximately 138,000 francs cfa or both in cri­
minal cases. In civil matters their jurisdiction was 
limited to claims not exceeding 138,000 francs cfa. The 
jurisdiction of Chief Magistrates was increased by the
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Minister of Justice on the advice of the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of West Cameroon. In criminal matters 
they could sentence to a maximum of five years imprison­
ment or a fine of roughly 3^9,000 francs cfa or both.; 
in civil cases other than those relating to customary 
matters, litigation concerning amounts not exceeding 
3^9,000 francs cfa.
The Magistrate's Court was a court of summary 
jurisdiction and dealt with minor issues expeditiously. 
Magistrates held preliminary inquiries (P.I.) where they 
had no jurisdiction to try a criminal case or where the 
accused could and did elect trial in the High Court.
This was normally the procedure in the case of indictable 
offences for, such offences were triable only in the High 
Court with a jury. If the evidence warranted it, the 
Magistrate's Court committed the accused for trial before 
the High Court. Provisions existed for the summoning of 
juries. But it was up to the Judge trying any particular 
case to decide whether to call a jury or not. Judges 
chose not to and in fact no jury was ever empannelled in 
the courts of West Cameroon. The Magistrate's Court 
applied the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Ordinance in cri­
minal matters: The civil procedure it followed was out­
lined in the Southern Cameroons Magistrate's Court Law 1955. 
The court exercised appellate jurisdiction in certain 
matters from Customary Courts.
299.
b ) The Labour Court
The Labour Court in Buea was set up under Law No. 
67/LF/6 of 12th June 1967. It was presided over by a 
Magistrate sitting with two assessors appointed by the 
Minister of Justice on the proposition of the Minister of 
Labour and Social Legislation. The Minister of Labour 
proposed the names from a list of names supplied by the 
leading Trade Unions and Employers' Federation in West 
Cameroon. The court had jurisdiction to hear and determine 
all labour disputes Irrespective of the amount of money 
involved. It applied the procedure laid down in the Labour 
Code and, In default, common law procedure; in either 
case it was not required to pay due regard to technicalities.
Appeals from the Labour Court lay to the High 
Court and from there to the Court of Appeal. It was how­
ever held in SOCOPAO (Employers) v. SOCOPAO (Employees)^  
that an appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal 
In a labour matter could be made only where the pecuniary 
value of the suit exceeded 45,000 francs cfa. The Court 
of Appeal was the final court in labour cases. But where 
a case involved the interpretation of federal law the 
Procureur General of the Supreme Court of West Cameroon 
could bring the matter to the Full Bench of the Federal 
Court of Justice for a decision. In Procureur General at
25. WCCA/9/1969, unreported; see also WCCA/13/8/1969, 
unreported.
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the Supreme Court of West Cameroon v. Decision of the Court
2 6of Appeal for West Cameroon, the President of the Court 
of Appeal appointed an expert to make an expert report on 
a civil matter pending before the Court. After the expert 
report had been made the Court authorised its President to 
sit alone and decide the case. The Procureur General 
appealed to the Full Bench of the Federal Court of Justice 
on the ground that the Court of Appeal had been improperly 
constituted, violating federal Ordinance No. 61/OF/9 of 
l6th October 1916. Held, that the appeal succeeded.
c) The Customary Courts
Customary Courts were governed by the Customary
Courts Ordinance, Cap. 1*12. They were originally known
as ’Native Courts’. But in 1964 the adjective ’native’
27was removed and 'customary’ substituted therefore.
A peculiarity about Customary Courts was that barristers 
could not appear before them. Furthermore, art. 6(1)(d) 
of the 1961 Constitution excepted them from federal juris­
diction, save in respect of appeals from them to the ordinary 
courts. The Customary Courts in West Cameroon did not
26. FCJ, Judgment No. 21 of 20 March 1968, ’Recueil 
Mboyoum 1962-1970, p. 133.
27. Adaptation of Existing Laws Order, 1964, West Cameroon 
Legal Notice No. 23 of 1964. The Southern Cameroons 
Customary Courts Law 1956 was never brought into 
force. Its content was however substantially the same 
as the provisions of the Customary Courts Ordinance. 
Cap. 142 ’Customary Courts’ included the Alkali Courts 
that exist for the peripatetic Fulani of the Bamenda 
area and all those who practised the Muslim religion.
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therefore come under the Ministry of Justice in Yaounde 
but under the West Cameroon Ministry of Local Government. 
Customary Courts dealt with matters under traditional law: 
land disputes, marriage, divorce, claims for the refund 
of dowry, custody of children and inheritance. Neither 
the Magistrate’s Courts nor the High Court had original 
jurisdiction in these matters. They could however exer­
cise such jurisdiction where a matter was transferred, to 
them by a District Officer in accordance with the Cus­
tomary Courts Ordinance. Such a procedure was hardly 
ever resorted to. Customary Courts exercised limited 
criminal jurisdiction in petty offences.
There were two grades of Customary Courts, ’A ’ 
and TB ’. The jurisdiction of the grade ’A ’ courts was 
limited to suits whose monetary value did not exceed
138,000 francs cfa. The jurisdiction of grade ’B' courts 
did not go beyond suits with a pecuniary value of 69,200 
francs cfa. Each court was set up by warrant issued by 
the West Cameroon Secretary of State for Local Government. 
The warrant defined the powers and jurisdiction of the court 
thus established. The courts had jurisdiction over causes 
and matters in which all the parties belong to a class of 
persons who have ordinarily been subject to the jurisdiction 
of Customary Courts and resided or were within the area of 
jurisdiction of the court. The Customary Courts Commission 
which was appointed annually by the Prime Minister of West 
Cameroon advised and assisted the Secretary of State for
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the Interior on the establishment of warrants and the 
selection of judges, and court members. This Commission 
was normally presided over by the Legal Adviser to the 
Prime Minister and consisted of chiefs and elders with 
experience in matters relating to customary law.
A Customary Court was composed of five judges, 
three of whom made a quorum. It administered the tradi­
tional law (Muslim law inclusive) prevailing in. the area 
in which the court was located or binding between the 
parties, so far as it was ’not repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience’. Procedure in these courts 
was informal. In fact the West Cameroon Ministry of 
Local Government produced a monograph in English and in 
Pidgin-English known as ’Manual of Practice and Procedure 
for Court Clerks’ to serve as an aid to customary court 
clerks.
A separate system of appeals existed for Cus­
tomary Courts. Appeals lay from customary courts of 
first instance to customary courts of appeal. These latter 
courts were established by warrant under the Southern 
Cameroons Native Courts Amendment Ordinance No. 8 of 1961. 
Further appeals went to the District Officer and then to 
the Senior Divisional Officer of the Division in which the 
particular customary court sat. The number of appeals were 
often so many that Special Appeals Judges (they were not 
legally qualified persons but had had much experience of 
customary practices, having themselves been Senior Divisional
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Officers) were appointed to hear and determine appeals that 
would normally have been heard by the Senior Divisional 
Officers. A further appeal from the Senior Divisional 
Officer's court lay to the Prime Minister. Cases hardly 
ever went beyond the Prime Minister's court and so it was 
generally assumed that the Prime Minister was the final 
appellate jurisdiction in customary law matters. In 
reality, this was not the legal position. Under s. 54 
of the Southern Cameroons Constitution Order in Council i960 
all courts other than the Supreme Court, the High Court 
and a Court-Martial were subordinate courts. The Prime 
Minister’s court was therefore a subordinate court- and an 
appeal from it lay to a superior court.'-. Having regard to 
s. 54 therefore, a party who was not satisfied with the 
decision of the Prime Minister sitting as a customary court 
of appeal, had a right of appeal to the High Court. The 
District Officer, it is to be noted, had the power to 
transfer any case pending before a customary court, either 
to a Magistrate’s Court or to a High Court with or without 
application or consent by either party. This was made 
easy by the fact that he supervised and inspected these 
courts and had at all times access to them, their records 
and proceedings.
2. The Courts in East Cameroon
The colonial courts system which existed in the 
French Cameroun was, on the eve of independence, reorganised
K Peter Ako v. Henry Ngafor, suit No. 3CA/28M/74, Bamenda 
Court of Appeal.
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by the Judicial Organisation Ordinance No. 59/86 of 17th 
December 1959. Before then, there was a multiplicity of 
courts in the territory and these courts were constituted 
into two parallel systems based on a daulity of personal 
status. However, independence did not change this situ­
ation. In East Cameroun, there were still many courts 
and the dual system persisted although this time it did 
not extend to the appellate level. The various courts 
which existed in East Cameroun consisted of courts with 
original jurisdiction, courts of first and last resort, 
and courts with appellate jurisdiction.
A. Courts with original jurisdiction
There were five types of courts of original juris­
diction: First Instance Tribunals, Labour Tribunals,
’Justices de Paix’ Tribunals, Grade I Tribunals, and Cus-
2 Q
tomary Tribunals. The first three types of courts were
known in the literature as ’modern or written law courts'
(juridictlons de droit moderne ou ecrit) and were exclusively
for litigants of ’modern or written law status’. The
last two types were known as ’traditional or local law
courts’ (juridictions de droit traditionnel ou local) and
their jurisdiction was limited to 'persons of traditional 
29law status'.
28. The French use ’tribunal’ for inferior courts and 'cour' 
for appellate courts.
29. For details on this subject, see chapter 5, supra.
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a.) ’Written law courts’
Labour Tribunals dealt with labour matters only 
while criminal matters could be brought only before the 
First Instance Tribunals or the Justices de Paix Tribunals. 
These latter types of courts exercised, concurrently with 
’traditional law tribunals’, jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters: a litigant of modern law status was
justiciable before the ’written law tribunals' while 
those of traditional law status were justiciable before 
the 'traditional law tribunals’. Article 2 of Decree 
No. 69/DF/544 of 19th December 1969 limited the powers of 
traditional law tribunals by providing that they could 
only deal with those civil and commercial matters which the 
laws then in force did not reserve for the modern law tri­
bunals . Henceforth, traditional law tribunals could only 
deal with residual matters, that is, matters not reserved 
for the modern law tribunals. What this amounted to was 
that the court to which a person of traditional law status 
took a civil or commercial suit no longer depended on his 
personal status as such. If the civil or commercial action 
concerned a matter over which 'written law tribunals' have 
been given jurisdiction, then the litigant went to those 
courts and it made no difference that he was a person of 
traditional law status. On the other hand however, persons 
of modern law status were always justiciable before the 
written law tribunals.
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1) First Instance Tribunals
These courts which numbered 27 as of June 1972 
were established by the 1959 judicial organisation ordi­
nance although as a matter of fact their ancestry may be 
traced back to a decree of 27th November 1947 by which they 
were still partly governed. With the exception of the 
Batouri, Douala, and Yaounde First Instance Tribunals 
which covered two Divisions each, there was a First 
Instance Tribunal for each Division. Each Tribunal was 
composed of a single judge save for the Douala and Yaounde 
Tribunals which sat as a bench of three magistrates in 
civil and commercial matters. The court had original 
jurisdiction in criminal and civil and commercial matters 
arising within its area. Its civil jurisdiction was 
limited to matters whose monetary value did not exceed
45,000 francs cfa. In criminal matters the court tried 
only misdemeanours and simple offences. Where a felony was 
committed, the court had to conduct a preliminary inquiry 
and then commit the accused for trial at the Court of 
Appeal. With the exception of the Yaounde and Douala ones 
which had a public prosecutor each, the other First Instance 
Tribunals had no public prosecutors; the presiding magis­
trate of each court was both judge and prosecutor. Appeal 
from the First Instance Tribunal lay to the Court of Appeal 
within whose area the tribunal sat.
2) Labour Tribunals
The 1959 ordinance established Labour Tribunals
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(five of them in all: Douala, Edea, Garoua, Nkongsamba,
Yaounde) with exclusive jurisdiction in labour matters 
where the claim involved did not exceed 45,000 francs cfa.
A Labour Tribunal was presided over by a magistrate appointed 
by decree. The magistrate sat with two assessors (one 
employer and one employee) appointed by the Minister of 
Justice on the proposition of the Minister of Labour from a 
list .of names submitted by trade union and employers organi­
sations .
3) TJustices de PaixT Tribunals
There were two types of Justices de Paix Tribunals;
the justice de paix with ordinary competence, and the jus-
tice de paix with 'correctional1 powers. A justice de paix
a competence ordinaire was located at district level and
was constituted by a district officer (sous-prefet) sitting
alone and acting both as prosecturo and judge in criminal 
30cases. Its criminal jurisdiction was limited to petty
offences not punishable with imprisonment committed within
the district where the court sat and referred to it by the
magistrate-cum-prosecutor of the First Instance Tribunal of 
31the area. Appeals in such minor criminal matters lay to
32the local First Instance Tribunal. The civil jurisdiction
of a justice de paix with ordinary competence embraced
30. Arrete of 27th April 1948.
31. Decree No. 66/DF/512 of 15th October 1966.
32. Decree of 27th November 1947-
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personal actions, commercial actions, and actions con­
cerning movable property of a pecuniary value of up to
500 francs cfa (or of up to 3,000 francs cfa with the pos-
3 3sibility of appeal) in each case. J
A justice de paix a competence ordinaire invested 
with powers to try offences punishable with a 'peine cor- 
rectionnelle' such as misdemeanours, was known as a 'justice 
de paix a attributions correctionnelles. There were four 
of such justices de paix located at Banyo, Tibati, Yoko, 
and Moloundou.
b ) 'Traditional law courts'
The ratione materiae jurisdiction of these courts 
shrank over the years. They ceased to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction in 1946 and in 1969 their civil jurisdiction 
was limited to those matters not specifically reserved for 
the 'written law courts'. Abolished by omission from the 
list of courts in s . 5 of 1959 ordinance, they were re­
established the following day by Decree No. 59/247 of the 
18th December 1959* section 2 of which however specified 
that their existence was only temporary. The functioning 
of these courts was subsequently specified in Decree No. 
69/DF/544 of 19th December 1969, itself amended by Decree 
No. 71/DF/607 of 3rd December 1971. There were two classes 
of courts administering customary law at first instance, 
each subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal: Customary
33. Arrete of 29th July 1948.
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Tribunals and Grade I (or First Degree) Tribunals.
1) Customary Tribunals
The jurisdiction and seat of these courts were 
spelt out in their text of establishment. They were set 
up at the level of traditional units, often the tribe, clan, 
or village. But it was not everywhere that they were 
established. For example, although, they were 230 in 
number, five Divisions of the Western Region had no Cus­
tomary Tribunals. Each of these courts was presided over 
by a notable (appointed by the Minister of Justice) sitting 
with two assessors of the same tribe as the litigants.
Civil jurisdiction was limited territorially by the court’s 
area, and personally by the need for the defendant to be 
subject to the court. Ratione materiae jurisdiction 
embraced the great majority of all civil litigation at 
customary law: land matters, claims for the recovery of
civil and commercial debts, claims in respect of material 
and bodily damage, and contracts.
2) Grade I Tribunals
They were situated at sub-district and at district 
level and numbered about 100 in all. Their jurisdiction 
was spelt out in the warrant of their establishment. If 
the court was located at sub-district level, it was pre­
sided over by an Assistant District Officer; if located 
at district level it was presided over by a District 
Officer. In either case, the presiding judge was assisted 
by two assessors of the same tribe as the litigant. These 
assessors were chosen from a list of six elders by the
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Minister of Justice on the joint proposition of the local 
District Officer and the presiding magistrate of the Local 
First Instance Tribunal. Grade I Tribunals dealt with 
matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, 
affiliation, succession) and land disputes, under customary 
law. Appeal from either the Customary Tribunal or the 
Grade I Tribunal lay to the Court of Appeal. Both courts 
were subject to inspection by the Procureur General at the 
Court of Appeal and by the Ministry of Justice. The 
Procureur General had access to all records of any court 
administering customary law, and could himself appeal 
against any decision.
B. Courts of first and last resort
These courts were special in that they dealt 
exclusively with criminal cases and their decisions were 
not subject to appeal. There were two of such courts: 
the Divisional Criminal Court and the Special Criminal 
Tribunal.
a) Divisional Criminal Courts
Article 29 of Ordinance No. 59/86 of 17th December 
1959 established a Divisional Criminal Court at the head­
quarters of each Division to replace the Criminal Court 
of the colonial period. Each of these courts was composed 
of president, four jurors, a representative from the legal 
department and a registrar. The president was either an
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Appeal Court Judge or a Magistrate of the First Instance 
Tribunal appointed by the president of the Court of Appeal. 
Jurors were chosen by lot, at the beginning of each 
session, from a list drawn up each year by a commission 
chaired by the presiding magistrate of the First Instance 
Tribunal and including the Prefect or his representative 
and three members from each of the municipal councils 
designated by these councils. The Divisional Criminal 
Court tried persons accused of felonies and misdemeanours 
on committal to it by the chambre de mise en accusation 
of the Court of Appeal. The chambre de mise en accusation 
in fact conducted a second preliminary inquiry for a first 
preliminary inquiry would already have been conducted by 
the juge d 1 instruction. If it was found that the accused 
had a prima facie case to answer, the chambre de mise en 
accusation committed him for trial at the Divisional 
Criminal Court.
b ) The Special Criminal Tribunal
The Special Criminal Tribunal, established In 
Yaounde by Law No. 6l/6 of the 4th April 1961 (later 
repealed and replaced with Law No. 62/LF/10 of 9th November 
1962) with jurisdiction over the entire federated state of 
East Cameroun, dealt with cases of embezzlement of public 
funds. The creation of a special court to try offences 
of this nature was necessitated by the recrudescence, in 
alarming proportions, of cases of embezzlement of public 
funds in the federated state soon after independence on
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1st January I960. Law No. 67/Lf/l of 12 June 1967 pro­
vided that offences of embezzlement committed in East 
Cameroun to the prejudice of the Federal State, a federated 
state, a collectivity or a public body, as well as related 
offences, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Special Criminal Tribunal. Presided over by the President 
of the East Cameroun Supreme Court who sat with two Judges 
from that court, the Special Criminal Tribunal held sessions 
in the Regional headquarters of the federated state. The 
Procureur General and Registrar of the Yaounde Court of 
Appeal were also Procureur General and Registrar at the 
Special Criminal Tribunal.
C . Courts with appellate Jurisdiction
These were: the Courts of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of East Cameroun.
a) The Courts of Appeal
Ordinance No. 59/86 of 17th December 1959 created 
a number of Courts of Appeal to replace the solo Appeal 
Court of the colonial period. A Court of Appeal was 
established at the headquarters of each Region (Douala, 
Bafoussam, Garousa, and Yaounde), except that the Yaounde 
Court of Appeal served the Eastern Region. Each Court of 
Appeal was composed of a President and Puisne Judges (in 
Douala and Yaounde three Judges constituted a bench, but 
elsewhere, due to lack of judicial personnel, the president 
sat alone), a Procureur General, and Advocate General (who
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existed on at the Douala and Yaounde courts) and a regis­
trar. The Court of Appeal had appellate jurisdiction 
in respect of criminal and civil cases from the First 
Instance Tribunal and traditional law courts within the 
area of the Court of Appeal. The applicable criminal pro­
cedure was that contained in the old French Code d TInstruction 
Criminelle. Civil procedure was governed by the High 
Commissioner's Order of 16 December 195^ which was basi­
cally the French Civil Procedure Code as of that date.
Error (there was no appeal in the English sense) lay in 
the East Cameroun. Supreme Court.
b ) The East Cameroun Supreme Court
Created for the first time by the 1959 Ordinance, 
the East Cameroun Supreme Court sat in Yaounde and was 
composed of a first President (Chief Justice of East 
Cameroun), two bench presidents (presidents de chambre), 
four Councillors, one Procureur General, one Advocate 
General, and a Registrar. Three Judges constituted a 
quorum. It entertained appeals only on points of law.
An 'appeal' (pourvoi en cassation) lay to the Supreme 
Court on any of the following grounds: incompetence, lack
of motive, incorrect form, and violation of law. The 
court could, of its own volition, take cognisance of any of 
these grounds of appeal or any other ground not raised by 
the appellant. Furthermore, when a lower court gave a 
judgment per in curiam and the interested party failed to 
appeal within time , the Procureur General was bound to 
seise the court of the matter. The success of the Procureur
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General's appeal did not however benefit the parties who 
continued to be bound by the previous erroneous judgment.
An appellant to the Supreme Court who lost his 
appeal could be required to pay damages over to the res­
pondent. He could in addition be required to pay a civil 
fine of between 5,000 and 20,000 francs cfa. If an
appeal succeeded, the decision of the court below was 
quashed or annulled and the case sent back to a court of 
the same level as the one from which the appeal originated. 
This was known as renvoi. The court of renvoi was bound 
to adhere to the point of law decided by the Supreme Court. 
Parties appearing before the Supreme Court had to be 
represented by barristers. However, the Federal Govern­
ment or the federated state of East Gameroun could be 
represented by a senior civil servant holding the Tfc'erice
35en droit degree and designated by the competent authority.
The Minister of Justice could require the Procureur 
General to refer to the Supreme Court any act by a judge 
done in excess of his powers. This was known as an 'appeal 
by order of the Keeper of the Seals'. The Procureur 
General of a Court of Appeal could appeal against any decision 
by the Court of Appeal on matters of customary law, even 
if the legal department was not a party to the proceedings. 
This was an extremely important instrument of control, by 
the Supreme Court, over the application of customary law.
34. Law No. 65/LF/23 of 12 April 1965.
35. Law No. 67/LF/26 of 3 November 1967.
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Indeed, in respect of cases originating from customary
courts, the Supreme Court took the posture of a formative
and a unifying influence. The" nature of custom being
to evolve, particular attention was paid, to the desuetude
of custom and to incompatibility with any written law,
and the Constitution which, by reference, included the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Procedure before
the East Cameroun Supreme Court was governed by rules
enacted immediately before and after independence.
Decisions of the Supreme Court were appellable to the
Federal Court of Justice when the interpretation of federal
37law was in issue.
36. Article 40-48, Ordinance No. 59/86 of 17 December 1959; 
Decree No. 60/33 of 22nd February i960 as subsequently 
amended.
37. Art. 11 and 12 of Law No. 69/LF/l of l4th June 1969.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
JUDICIAL ORGANISATION SINCE AUGUST 1972
The first attempt at unifying the judicial systems, 
of both East and West Cameroon was made in 1969. In that 
year the Federal Ministry of Justice placed before the 
Federal Government a reform project known as * 1'avant- 
avant-projet Comte-Quinn'.^ The proposal was for a three- 
tier court system: District Courts, an Appeal Court for
each of the two federated states, and a Federal Supreme 
Court. Two suggestions were made to resolve the perennial 
problem of shortage of qualified judicial personnel. It 
was proposed that the proposed. District Courts should move 
from place to place on circuit. It was furthermore sug­
gested that a judge should sometimes sit in the lower court 
and on appeal. "It is by this means that the Court of 
Appeal of West Cameroon is at present staffed by a small 
group of Judges of a high calibre, that is, the Chief 
Justice and three Puisne Judges; these Judges sit alone 
in the High Court at first instance and they sit 'in bank' 
on appeal from the cases they do not try. This rotation 
of judicial personnel between courts of first instance and
1. The draft project bore the names of the two expatriate 
legal officers who had been working on it: Mr Quinn
(English) and Mr Comte (French), both of them at that 
time Technical Advisers at the Ministry of Justice.
For the draft proposals see, Ministry of Justice (Legis­
lative Affairs Division), File No. 3 DL 1304/DL,
Circular No. 30 023 C/MJ, 30th December 1968.
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Courts of Appeal ensures the possible employment of the 
available judicial personnel. One can, without diffi­
culty, envisage a system less rigorous and could admit of 
a situation whereby a President of a District Court who 
sat as a juge d 'instruction, on a purely procedural matter, 
could not necessarily be debarred from hearing the affair 
when he is hearing it as a judge in the normal course of 
events. In such matters, the English system is far more 
flexible: when a judge has sat at an early stage of the
proceedings or on an application for bail by an accused 
person, he is not thereby debarred from sitting as a judge
on the same matter when it comes before the court as a 
2
criminal case." The proposed Federal Supreme Court was 
to replace the Supreme Courts of the federated states and 
the Federal Court of Justice. It was to sit in Yaounde 
and be made up.of six Judges, two coming from West Cameroon. 
These proposals never saw the light of day. Their adoption 
would have required amending the Constitution, especially 
the provisions relating to the Federal Court of Justice.
However, with the change over to. a unitary system 
of Government, it became necessary to set up a unified and
2. File No. 3 DL 1304/DL (Ministry of Justice), p. 9*
3. The problem was probably one of lack of political will 
rather than one of amending the Constitution. After all,
by the end of 1970 the constitution had already been 
amended twice: on 10 November 1969 (President empowered
to dismiss the state Premiers and Secretaries of state) 
and on 4 May 1970 (posts of Vice President and of Presi­
dent incompatible with any other elective or professional 
function).
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less cumbrous and confusing system of courts for the 
entire country. Article 42 of the 1972 Constitution 
empowered the Head of State for a period of one year to 
set up the new institutions of the Republic by way of 
ordinances, organic laws or legislative measures. It 
was by virtue of this provision that Ordinance No. 72/4 of 
26 August 1972 on judicial organisation was made. That 
Ordinance (together with its subsequent amendments shall 
hereinafter be referred to as the Judicial Organisation 
Ordinance) established four sets of courts, viz., Courts 
of First Instance, High Courts, Courts of Appeal and the 
Military Court. But to these courts must be added others 
provided for in the Constitution: the Supreme Court, the
Court of Impeachment and the Higher Judicial Council which, 
stricto sensu.is not a court (although it behaves like one 
in disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer) 
but an advisory body. For ease and clarity of exposition 
these courts shall be classified into courts of ordinary 
jurisdiction (Section II) and courts with special juris­
diction (Section III). This chapter however opens with a 
section on the general principles on which the adminis­
tration of justice in Cameroon in based (Section I) and 
closes with an examination of advisory bodies (Section IV).
I . General Principles
The administration of justice in Cameroon, as 
in all modern States, is governed by a number of general 
principles and concepts. These may conveniently be
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examined under six principles: the principle of public
justice (paragraph 1), of reasoned judgments (para. 2), 
of free justice (para. 3), of the enforceability of court 
decisions and orders throughout Cameroon (para. 4), of 
the unity of civil and criminal courts (para. 5)a and of 
the decentralisation of the system of administering 
justice (para. 6).
1. Justice must be administered in public
The preamble to the 1972 Constitution provides 
that the "law ensures the right of everyone to a fair 
hearing before the courts". Consonant with this consti­
tutional provision is art. 4 of the Judicial Organisation 
Ordinance, which provides that justice shall be adminis­
tered in public and that all judgments shall be pronounced 
in open court. Any breach of this principle renders the
whole proceedings null and void ab initio. In the case
4
of In re Daniel Ekpombang v. Benji Gbaruko the learned 
judge below had pronounced formal judgment in court but 
reserved his reasons for the judgment. The reasoned judg­
ment was not reduced to writing and a copy available until 
one year afterwards. The then West Cameroon Court of 
Appeal had no difficulty in holding that in such a case, 
the judgment was a complete nullity. Per Gordon, C.J.
4. WCSC/2C/1964 (1962-1964) W.C.L.R. 62.
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(President), at page 62, delivering the unanimous decision 
of the court, "We have come to the conclusion that the judg­
ment in this sense is a complete nullity, first for the 
formal reason that once judgment in the formal sense has 
been pronounced, the Judge is functus officio, and secondly 
on the wider plane because such a procedure puts a weapon 
into the hands of the successful party while denying the 
other party the countervailing shield constituted by his 
right of appeal. ... We prefer, therefore to decide as a 
general principle admitting of no exception that unless 
the reasoned judgment is ready when formal judgment is pro­
nounced it may not be prepared at all."
The principle that justice must be rendered in 
public is aimed at ensuring that a. person standing trial 
before the courts is given and seen to be given a fair 
hearing. Its purpose is also to instil confidence in the 
judicial machinery by obviating any suspicion of bias on 
the part of the judge. The principle is therefore another 
aspect of the broader principle of judicial neutrality, 
impartiality and independence. Justice must not only be 
done; it must also be seen to be done. The principle 
of multi-judge courts is a further attempt to ensure judi­
cial impartiality. The principle of collegiality is 
generally considered as a guarantee that the decision will 
be impartial and delivered only after careful deliberation. 
This is why the superior courts are composed of several 
j udges.
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The principle of public justice does not however 
mean that a court may not hear a case in camera. As an 
exception to the general rule, a court may try a case in 
camera. Any court must, where it is so expressly pro­
vided by law or procedure, remove certain matters for 
hearing in chambers. Any court may also, of its own 
motion or on the application of any of the parties, order 
that all or any part of any case or matter be heard in 
camera on the grounds that a public hearing would be dan­
gerous to the security of the State, public order or 
morality.
Notwithstanding the principle of public justice, 
press coverage (photographic , phonographic, or written) 
of judicial proceedings may, in certain circumstances, 
amount to an ’obstruction of public service’ which is a 
criminal offence. It is a criminal offence punishable 
under s. 198(1)(a) and (b) of the Cameroonian Penal Code 
for anyone to publish "any record of any proceedings of 
a court or of the legal department in respect of a felony 
or misdemeanour before it has been read out in open court; 
or any account of proceedings in camera or in any juvenile 
court". Section 198(2) punishes anyone who "publishes 
any deliberation in chambers by any court"; and s. 198(4) 
punishes "whoever, in courtrooms or during court pro­
ceedings makes any sound recording, or takes any photograph 
whatever, by means of any camera, cinematographic or tele­
vision process". The penalty in any of these cases is a
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fine of up to three million francs cfa.
The principle of public justice entitles anyone, 
if he so wishes, to walk into the court and quietly follow 
its proceedings. It does not entitle a person to pub­
lish the proceedings of the court before judgment has been 
read out in open court. In the case of proceedings held 
a huis clos, the ban on publicising the proceedings of 
the court is absolute. Indeed, any such publication would 
be subversive of the very raison d'etre for holding the 
proceedings behind closed doors.
2. Reasons must be given for judicial decisions
Article 5 of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance 
provides that all judgments must set out the reasons upon
5
which they are based in fact and in law. A judgment 
given in breach of this principle is invalid. So where 
the learned Judge in In re Daniel Ekpombang v. Benji Gbaruko 
merely pronounced formal judgment without stating his 
reasons for the decision, the judgment was, on appeal, pro­
perly held to be a total nullity. A judge must also date 
his judgments. However, whether failure to do so would 
render the judgment invalid or not would depend on whether
5. It may be noted that for the Anglophone Judge schooled in 
the common law tradition (unlike his Francophone 'brother1 
trained in the civil law tradition) ’law’ does not just 
mean statute law or droit positif but includes case-law 
and adjectival law.
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the requirement for the dating of such a judgment was 
imperative or directory only and in the latter case, 
the judgment remains valid despite the failure of the 
learned Judge to date it at the time of the pronouncement.
One reason for the principle that reasons must
be given for judicial decisions is to provide a safeguard
against judicial arbitrariness. "Herein lies the whole
difference between a judicial decision and an arbitrary
one. A judicial decision is based on reason and is known
to be so because it is supported by reasons. An arbitrary
decision for ought that appears, may be based on personal
7
feelings, or even on whims, caprice or prejudice."
Judges are not entitled.to make curt 'guilty' 
or 'not guilty', 'liable' or 'not liable' pronouncements 
and then proceed to sentence or discharge the accused or 
to find for or against the plaintiff. They must formulate 
a reasoned and written judgment. But provided it is 
reasoned and written, a judgment is not invalid simply 
because it is brief. In Joshua Nwana v. Commissioner of
g
Police the appellant was convicted on a charge of conver­
ting to his own use the sum of 50,5^2 francs cfa which came 
Into his hands as deputy sheriff on the execution of a writ 
of fieri facias (writ of fifa) in a civil suit and sentenced 
to three years imprisonment with hard labour. On appeal
7. Sir Alfred Denning, Freedom under the law, Stevens, 
London, 19^9, p. 91-
8. WC/10 CA/1965 (1965-1967), W.C.L.R.15.
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against conviction learned counsel for the appellant 
argued with force that his client had been sentenced without 
any finding of guilt or conviction and that there was no 
written judgment. Held, by the West Cameroon Court of 
Appeal, that the words ,TI believe that all prosecution 
witnesses are telling the truth, and that the defendant is 
lying. I find the case proved" constituted a written 
judgment although undoubtedly a brief one.
The principle of reasoned judgments also provides 
a means by which the superior courts are enabled to control 
decisions by inferior courts. Hence, in Sonde Ngue Marie
t Q
c. Ministere Public, the Supreme Court of Cameroon held 
that "tout arret doit contenir les motifs propres. a justi- 
fier la reformation du judgement qu'il infirme. L ’insuffi- 
sance de motifs ou la non-reponse aux conclusions reguliere- 
ment de'pose'es, equivaut a 1 ’absence de motifs et est 
sanctionnee par la cassation de l ’arret contre lequel le 
pourvoi est dirige." It is an universally acknowledged 
principle that the losing party has the right to appeal from 
the decision of the court to another court which has the 
power of quashing or amending the disputed decision."^ This
9. CSC, Pourvoi No. 130/P, Arr§t No. 6/P du 30 nov. 1972, 
unreported. See also, Ewane Eooh Samuel & Autres c. 
Eyongo Joseph & Autres, CSC, Arret No. 117 du 5 juillet 
1973, Bulletin, No. 29, 1973, p. 4128; Tankoua Jean c. 
Dame Tankoua nee Tchandjeu Helene, CSC, Arret No. 113 
du 5 juillet 1973, Bulletin, No. 29, 1973, p. 4122.
10. There are however exceptions. No appeal lies from cer­
tain decisions of the Military Tribunal. In trivial 
claims and prosecutions for simple offences, only a 
single hearing is allowed.
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way of controlling the decisions of the lower courts by 
superior courts would be impossible if judges were not 
required to give reasons for their decisions. In England, 
it may be mentioned, courts do not, as a general principle 
of law,, give reasons for decisions in criminal cases and 
Justices of the Peace do make curt ’guilty1 or ’not guilty’ 
pronouncements. This, it is submitted, is incredible 
and absurd.
The judge may not refuse to give the legal and
factual reasons for his decisions. Nor may he decline to
render judgment in a matter once he has been properly seised
of it. By art. 147 of the Penal Code, it is a denial of
justice for any person exercising judicial functions to
decline, after having been duly moved in that behalf, to
issue a decision.^ Procrastination in deciding a case
may amount to a denial of justice. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that the adjournment of a case sine die is
12tantamount to a denial of justice.
3. Justice to be rendered free of charge
It is statutorily provided that justice shall be
administered ’free of charge, subject only to the fiscal
13provisions concerning stamp duty and registration’.
11. The penalty is imprisonment for from between three 
months to two years.
12. CSC, Arret No. 109/P du 17 janvier 1974, 6 R.C.D. 1974, 
p. 144.
13. Sec. 6(1) of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance.
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It is unclear what ’free of charge' means in this context.
It probably means no more than that litigants are not 
required to pay for the services provided by judges. If 
a person involved in a case requires the services of an advo­
cate, he must pay the advocate’s fees. Judges however 
are employed and remunerated by the State to perform a 
public service (that of administering justice) and are 
therefore not entitled to demand or receive payment for the
services they render. A judge who receives such a payment
14may be guilty of corruption.
Providing justice ’free of charge’ does not how­
ever mean that litigants are exempted from paying costs, 
court fees, stamp duty and registration fees. Article 
6(2) of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance provides that 
such fees and expenses shall be paid in the first place 
by the party who incurs them as shall all costs incurred 
in commencing an action and in execution of judgment. The 
sub-section goes on to provide that such fees and expenses 
shall be borne finally by the party who fails in the action, 
subject only to the reasoned decision of the court.
This provision does no more than re-state the general prac­
tice whereby the party who fails in a case may be required 
by the court to pay costs over to the successful party in 
a civil suit. Similarly, where a party to a civil suit 
persistently refuses to appear in court after having been 
duly summoned or served, judgment may be given in default,
14. S. 134 of the C.P.C. The giver too may be prosecuted
under s. 161 for procuring influence.
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that is, in his absence, and he may be ordered to pay 
costs. The court can always, by- a reasoned judgment, 
exempt the party who has succumbed or defaulted from 
paying costs.
4. Judicial decisions and orders enforceable throughout 
Cameroon
The provision that judicial decisions and orders
15are enforceable throughout the territory of the Republic 
may appear a truism not calling for comment. But the 
provision is important because there are two law districts 
in Cameroon and In its absence it may be doubted whether a 
judicial decision or order by a court in one sector is 
enforceable in the other. Before 1972 this issue had been 
put beyond any shadow of a doubt by art. 35 of the 1961 con­
stitution which had provided that warrants and legal deci­
sions issuing from whatever legal jurisdiction of one of 
the federated states were executory throughout the federal 
territory.
The executory formula of copies of judgments and 
judicial warrants, together with engrossements and copies 
of contracts and all documents capable of enforcement, is 
introduced as follows:
"United Republic of Cameroon
In the name of the people of Cameroon"
15. S. 8(1) of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance.
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and closed with the following words:
’’Wherefore the President of the United 
Republic of Cameroon commands and enjoins all 
bailiffs and process-servers to enforce this 
judgment (or order, etc.) the Procureurs 
General and the State Counsels to lend them 
support, and all commanders and officers of 
the Armed Forces and Police Forces to lend 
them assistance when so required by law.
"In witness whereof the present judgment 
(or order, etc.) has been signed by the 
President and the Registrar or by the Judges 
in the majority and the Registrar." 16
5. The unity of criminal and civil courts
In some systems of law the courts are specialised.
This specialisation, a sort of judicial division of labour,
is made with the provision of the best possible justice in
mind, and according to the nature and importance of the
business to be dealt with. This however, desirable as it
may be, is not a practical proposition in Cameroon where
there is still a serious shortage of qualified judicial
personnel. Here, civil and criminal cases are handled by
17the same courts. Most courts devote four of the six
16. S. 9(1) of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance. 
Cameroonian Judges may write dissenting judgments but 
such judgments may not be read in court. S. 9(2) of 
the Judicial Organisation Ordinance provides that "The 
Judge or Judges in the minority may express their 
opinion in writing and enter it in the file of the 
proceedings."
17. Of course there are exceptions. Customary courts no 
longer deal with criminal matters. The Court of 
Impeachment and the Military Court do not handle civil 
matters.
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working days of the week to criminal matters and the
remaining two to civil matters. The actual dates of
court hearings are fixed by the Minister of Justice on
18the proposal of presidents of the various courts.
Consistent with this principle of the unity of 
criminal and civil courts is the practice of non-speciali­
sation. Cameroonian judges do not specialize in any par­
ticular branch or area of the law. In the Francophone 
courts one sometimes hears references to 'divisions': 
chambre sociale, chambre civile et commerciale, chambre 
criminelle, chambre coutumier, and so on. In a sense this 
is misleading. One is apt to think that groups of judges 
sit in separate divisions, each division handling only a 
given type of case; the criminal division handling cri­
minal matters, the civil division handling civil matters, 
and so forth. In reality, no such divisions exist.
An allusion to chambre criminelle, for example, means no 
more than that the court sat as a criminal court in the exer­
cise of its criminal jurisdiction. Whether sitting as a 
civil or as a criminal court, the composition of the court 
is the same. There are no separate judges for civil 
matters, criminal matters, labour matters, commercial 
matters and customary law matters.
Not even in the Supreme Court is there any such 
specialisation. Under the civil law system, droit adminlstratif
18. S. 10 of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance.
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is thought to be a special and technical branch of the 
civil law and in France judges who handle administrative 
litigation are specialists in droit administratif. But 
not so in Cameroon. Judges who sit on the Administrative 
Bench of the Supreme Court are not specialists in droit 
administratif. They are the same judges who sit in 
criminal and other civil matters.
6. Decentralisation of the system of administering justice
It may be that the judge can dispense justice 
only at the fixed seat of the court. In such a case one 
talks of permanent courts. Alternatively, he may move 
from one town to another dispensing justice. In this case 
one talks of itinerant judges. Both situations obtain in 
Cameroon.
The courts structure in Cameroon is highly decen­
tralised. This decentralisation is said to have been
prompted by the Government’s desire ”to bring justice nearer 
19to the people”. This desire itself has evidently been
motivated by the realisation that the courts, located as 
they were, in the urban areas, were physically inaccessible 
to the vast majority of the people in the rural areas.
Even today, transport and communication difficulties,
19. ’Justice goes nearer Bertoua and Mundemba populations’, 
Cameroon Tribune, No. 72, 12 November 1975, p. 3.
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poverty, illiteracy and ignorance mean inaccessibility of 
the courts to most people. This fact coupled with the 
chronic delays in the disposal of cases has led to a dis­
inclination, on the part of most people, to litigate; 
nay to forgo their rights in most cases.
The decentralisation of the courts structure was
20also intended to bring about ’cheap and quick justice1.
"For, the nearer the institutions of justice are to an
individual, the more he is secure in his person, honour,
and property. He does not have to travel long distances
to seek legal redress in the law courts. He does not have
to pay high transport fares in order to arrive at the seat 
21of a court-." The Judicial Organisation Ordinance makes
provision for the setting up of one Court of First Instance
for each sub-Division in the country, one High Court for
each Division and one Court of Appeal for each Province.
There are 7 Provinces, 39 Divisions, 133 sub-Divisions,
22and 37 Districts in Cameroon. One would therefore expect
to find 7 Courts of Appeal, 39 High Courts and 133 Courts 
of First Instance (i.e. Magistrate’s Courts) in Cameroon. 
This is not the case. Although the 7 Courts of Appeal have
20. 'Government policy is cheap and quick justice - Justice 
Wakai’, Cameroon Outlook, Vol. 10, No. 10, March 17th
1978.
21. Speech by the Minister of Justice, Mr Charles Doumba, on 
the installation ceremony of Mr Justice Nyo' Wakai as 
President of the Court of Appeal for the North-West Pro­
vince, Bamenda, 25th November 1977.
22. Minister of Territorial Administration, Order No. 63 of 
the 28th March 1973 to fix the call-signs of adminis­
trative units of the United Republic of Cameroon.
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23been established, the number of High Courts in existence 
are not up to thirty and the number of Courts of First 
Instance only 40. Hence, periodically, judges from the 
permanent courts move out to dispense justice in those 
areas without a fixed court.
II. Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction
Courts of ordinary jurisdiction are courts which 
have an all-embracing jurisdiction to hear and determine 
actions of every kind, whether civil or criminal. In 
Cameroon these courts are: Customary Courts, Justices de
Paix a Attribution Correctlonnelle, Courts of First Instance, 
High Courts, Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. In 
each case, the territorial jurisdiction of the court, save 
for the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction covers the entire 
national territory, is local. A convenient classification 
of these courts would be into courts with original juris­
diction and courts with appellate jurisdiction.
1. Courts with original jurisdiction
Customary Courts, Justices de Paix, Courts of 
First Instance, and High Courts all exercise original juris­
diction.
23. The Appeal Court for the Eastern Province was established 
only as recently as November 1975. See, ’Justice goes 
nearer Beroua and Mundemba populations’, Cameroon Tribune, 
No. 72, November 12th 1975, p. 3.
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A . Customary Courts
The Customary Courts of former West Cameroon and 
the Customary Tribunals and Grade I Tribunals of the former 
East Cameroun were not abolished by the Judicial Organisation 
Ordinance. The courts continue to operate as they have 
always been. However, they have been given only a temporary 
lease of life and do not figure in the mainstream of the 
current courts system.
B . Justices de Paix a Attributions Correctionnelles
These courts, of which there are only four, 
exist only in the Francophone Provinces and still function 
as they were before the current judicial organisation, 
the only novelty being that appeals from here now lie 
direct to the Court of Appeal. Like the Customary Courts
24these courts have also been maintained Tfor the time being’.
C . Courts of First Instance
25This rather confusing label is the new name for 
what 'is known in the Anglophone Provinces as the Magistrate’s 
Court. On paper there is a Court of First Instance for each
24. S. 26 of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance.
25. A court of first instance is any court exercising original 
jurisdiction. The High Court for example is a court of 
first instance since it exercises only original juris­
diction .
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sub-Division. In practice the area of jurisdiction of 
most Courts of First Instance comprise several sub-Divisions. 
There are currently only 40 Courts of First Instance as 
opposed to 133 sub-Divisions.
Section 12(1) of the Judicial Organisation Ordi­
nance provides that a Court of First Instance shall be com­
posed of a President, one or more rJudges', a State Counsel,
one or more deputy State Counsel, a Chief Registrar, and
2 6one or more Registrars. This has remained largely the­
oretical. There is not enough personnel to staff all the 
courts as envisaged in the Judicial Organisation Ordinance.
All existing Courts of First Instance have a President.
But only a few have in addition a ’judge’ and a State 
Counsel. The general practice is to attach State Counsels 
to the Procureur General's Chambers from where they could 
be sent by the Procureur General to go and prosecute in any court 
in the Province. In the Anglophone Provinces the shortage of pro­
secuting counsel is mitigated by the continuation of the old prac­
tice whereby police (and gendarme) officers as well as certain 
private persons (such as the health authorities of the local coun­
cils) prosecute.In Francophone Provinces police and gendarmes do not 
prosecute. The shortage of legal personnel is mitigated by 
having a magistrate-cum-prosecutor (president du tribunal
26. There is no requirement that the President must be a 
judicial officer. Although in practice he always is, 
he may be a legal officer. ’Judge’ here is not used 
in the sense of a judicial officer of the superior courts. 
The ’juge’ in the Court of First Istance is hierarchi­
cally below the President of that court and is often a 
fresh graduate from the School of Magistracy at the 
beginning of his judicial career.
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charge de 1 Taction publique) in some courts.
Section 12(2) of the Judicial Organisation Ordi­
nance is worthy of note. It provides: ,TA11 cases brought
before the Court of First Instance shall be heard by a 
single judicial officer except in labour matters when the 
court shall be completed according to s. 143 of the Labour 
Code and shall.apply the procedure provided for by the said 
Code." This provision would appear to contradict s. 12(.1), 
which provides that the composition of the court includes, 
inter alia, a President and one or more judges. But the 
ambiguity is only apparent. The Court of First Instance 
is not a collegiate court.
The jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance is
both civil and criminal. The court tries offences other
than felonies. This means that its criminal jurisdiction
(which includes matters of juvenile delinquency) is limited
27to misdemeanours and simple offences. The court has
jurisdiction in civil, commercial and labour matters where 
the amount of the action does not exceed 500,000 francs cfa 
and is competent to rule on matters concerning urgent orders
27. The Cameroonian Penal Code operates a threefold classi­
fication of offences: felonies, misdemeanours, simple
offences. This classification is based on the principal 
penalty provided for each offence. By s . 21 of the 
Code a felony is an offence ’punishable with death or 
with loss of liberty for a maximum of more than ten years'. 
A misdemeanour is defined as an offence punishable with 
loss of liberty or with fine, where the loss of liberty 
may be for more than ten days but not for more than ten 
years, and the fine more than 25,000 francs. A simple 
offence is defined as an offence punishable with impri­
sonment for up to ten days or with a fine of up to 
25,000 francs.
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and orders on an ex parte petition and to entertain actions 
for the recovery of commercial debts through simplified 
procedures. Decisions of the Court of First Instance are 
appellable to the Court of Appeal.
D . High Courts
In theory the chief town of each Division has a
High Court,, whose territorial jurisdiction covers the
Division in which it is located. In practice, it has not 
been possible to establish a High Court in each Division.
Often therefore, the jurisdiction of one High Court covers 
several Divisions. In the Anglophone Provinces for 
example, the Buea High Court hold High Court assizes in Meme, 
Manyu and Ndian Divisions while the Bamenda High Court hold 
sessions in all the Divisions of the North West Province.
A similar situation obtains in the Francophone Provinces.
Each High Court is composed of a President (who
must be a judicial officer and member of the Court of
Appeal), one or more Judges (members of the Court of Appeal), 
a State Counsel, one or more deputy State Counsels, a chief 
Registrar and one or more registrars. Judges of the High 
Court are necessarily members of the Court of Appeal.
The High Court therefore has no proper personnel of its 
own but draws its judicial personnel from the Court of Appeal. 
The court is not collegiate. Cases before the court are 
heard by a single Judge except in labour matters where the 
Judge sits with two assessors. The President of each High
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Court is appointed from among judicial officers of the 
Court of Appeal by the President of the Court of Appeal 
with the agreement of the Minister of Justice.
All felonies are tried at first instance by the 
High Court. Any civil, commercial or labour suit, the 
pecuniary value of which is more than 500,000 francs cfa 
is tried at first instance by the High Court. The court 
is also competent to try actions and proceedings relating 
to the status of persons, civil status, marriage, divorce 
and affiliation, subject however, to the legal provisions 
relating to the ratione personae jurisdiction of customary 
courts. The High Court has jurisdiction to issue the pre­
rogative orders of mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, 
and certiorari restraining excess and abus.es of jurisdic­
tion by inferior courts and public officials. By s. 16(1) 
of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance, the High Court 
has jurisdiction
Mc) To hear and determine all applications for 
immediate release made by or on behalf of 
persons imprisoned or detained which appli­
cations are based on the illegality of, or 
the absence of authority for, such depri­
vation of liberty;
"d) To hear and determine applications for
the prohibition of all persons or authori­
ties from doing or performing any acts 
which they are not entitled to do by law;
"e) To hear and determine all applications for 
orders commanding all persons or authori­
ties to do or perform any acts which they 
are required to do by law;
Mf) To order the transfer to the High Court of 
any proceedings pending before a lower 
court.M
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These powers of the High Court are familiar to Anglophone 
courts but novel to those in the Francophone Provinces where 
the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and the 
order of prohibition were unknown. On paper these writs 
have since 1972 been functioning in Francophone courts as 
well. In practice however Francophone judges are yet to 
become familiar with them. Anglophone advocates appearing 
before Francophone courts always complain that whenever 
they refer to any of the writs jusdges there look at them 
as though they were speaking Chinese.
2. Courts with appellate jurisdiction
Courts with appellate jurisdiction are the Courts 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
A . Courts of Appeal
There is an Appeal Court for each of the seven 
Provinces of the Republic. Each Appeal Court is composed 
of a President, one or more vice-Presidents, one or more 
Judges or alternate Judges, a Procureur General, an Advo­
cate General, one or more deputies, one or more legal 
assistants at the Procureur General’s Chambers, a chief 
registrar, and one or more registrars. As a collegiate 
court, decisions of the Court of Appeal are given by a bench 
of three Judges. However, any one Judge of the court is 
competent to give a ruling on behalf of the said court on
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appeals against judgments referred to the court, except
in the following cases: (i) in the case of judgments in
respect of which a sentence of life imprisonment or the '
death penalty may be incurred, collegiality is compulsory;
(ii) in the case of judgments from a Military Court, the
Court of Appeal must be composed of two civil Judges and
one military Judge or a military officer; a Court of Appeal
2 8otherwise composed is irregular; (iii) in labour matters 
the court is completed by two assessors with a deliberative 
voice in conformity with art. 143 of the Labour Code.
This means that the President of the Appeal Court sits with 
two assessors. An Appeal Court otherwise composed while 
sitting on a labour matter is illegally constituted. In 
Isaac Guh Forcho v. Royal Exchange A s s u r a n c e *^ the appel­
lant sued the respondent for wrongful dismissal. Three 
Judges of the Buea Court of Appeal decided the case on 
appeal and gave judgment for the respondent. The appellant 
appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the Court 
of Appeal had been improperly constituted. Held, by the 
Supreme Court, that the constitution of the Court for the 
purposes of deciding that labour dispute was illegal. A
similar decision was reached in the analogous case of Joseph
30B. Nyambi v. C.D.C. where the Supreme Court annulled the
28. CSC, Pourvoi No. 292/P, Arret No. 209/P du 24 Avril 1975, 
unreported.
29. CSC, Pourvoi No. 27/74-75/S du 24 mai 1973, Arret No. 15/S 
du 17 mars 1977, unreported.
30. CSC, Pourvoi No. 19/73-74/S du 26 aout 1973, Arret No.
14/S du 17 mars 1977, unreported.
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judgment of the Buea Court of Appeal and referred the case 
to the Bamenda Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction is exclusively 
appellate. It hears appeals against judgments delivered 
by the lower.courts including appeals against the ruling 
of the investigating magistrate as well as appeals on 
matters such as bail., rehabilitation and so on. As a 
general rule, decisions of the Military Court are appealable; 
an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme 
Court. However, no appeal lies from the decision of the 
Military Court, in respect of an offence relating to subver­
sion, the internal and external security of the State and
31firearms legislation.
B. The Supreme Court
There is now one Supreme Court for the entire 
Republic with its seat in Yaounde, the capital city. It 
exercises the powers which-hitherto were exercised by the 
defunct Federal Court of Justice and the two Supreme Courts 
of the former West and East Cameroon.
a). Composition of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is composed of a President,
Bench Presidents, Substantive or Alternate Puisne Judges,
31. S. 29(2) of Ordinance No. 72/5 of 26 August 1972 (Mili­
tary Judicial Organisation).
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a Procureur General, an. Advocate General, Deputies to the 
Procureur General, a Chief Registrar and Registrars. Any 
case submitted to the Court is tried by three Judges, 
members of the Court. In administrative matters hovrever, 
the composition of the Court is different. Up to 1976 
the President of the Supreme Court (or a Judge delegated 
by him) could rule alone on matters concerning urgent orders 
and orders on an ex parte petition. This power was 
repealed by omission by Law No. 76/28 of l4th December 1976 
which amended Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26th August 1972 fixing 
the organisation of the Supreme Court. The inescapable 
inference must be that matters concerning urgent orders and 
orders on an ex.parte petition must necessarily be heard by 
a panel of three Judges.
Whenever the Supreme Court sits as a body the 
presidency is entrusted to the most senior Judge of the Court 
in the highest scale. The number of Judges of the Supreme 
Court may be increased by five persons nominated for one 
year by the President of the Republic in view of their spe­
cial knowledge or. experience. This happens whenever the 
Supreme Court is called upon to give a ruling in the cases 
contemplated by articles 7 (vacancy of the Presidency of 
the Republic), 10 (reference by the Head'of State of an un­
constitutional law to the Supreme Court), and 27(4) (doubt 
or dispute as to the admissibility of a bill or amendment 
to be referred to the Supreme Court, by either the Speaker 
or the Head of State) of the Constitution.
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b ) Competence of the Supreme Court
Technically the Cameroonian Supreme Court is not 
32a final court of appeal. It is primarily a court of
cassation and only rarely does it decide a case on its 
merits. It hears applications alleging an error of law 
in a judgment of a court below. If the Court grants an 
application (pourvoi) it will give ’judgment in cassation’: 
this sets out the error(s) of law in the contested judgment, 
and is accompanied by a cassation order, setting aside the 
earlier judgment, and an order of renvoi (ordonnance de 
renvoi), sending the case back to be retried (on facts and 
law) by a court of the same jurisdiction as the one whose 
judgment was set aside. If the Court dismisses the appli­
cation, the previous judgment stands and there is no renvoi. 
The Supreme Court reviews the judgment not the case. It 
does not make an appreciation of facts which have been fully 
established by the judges at the lower level. It may 
reverse a judgment referred to it only for an error in law 
or for vice of form (i.e. where there is a- defect in the 
form of the lower court’s proceedings or a clear error on 
the face of the records). The main function of the Court 
is to ensure that the judgments of the lower courts are in
32. A ’pourvoi ’ is not, technically speaking, an appeal.
The nearest English equivalent is an appeal by case 
stated. A pourvoi or a recours en cassation is admis­
sible against every decision of any court which is final 
(i.e. not subject to appeal). See, s. 5(l)(a), Ord.
No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972 as amended by Ord. No. 76/28 
of 14 December 1976 (Organisation of the Supreme Court).
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accordance with the law, thereby seeing to the unity of 
case-law. The Court also exercises control over the inter­
pretation of law and custom.
When a pourvoi is made to the Supreme Court, it 
may either confirm the decision under attack by dismissing 
the pourvoi (its judgment is then known in the literature 
as an 1 arret de rejetT) or disallow the decision under attack 
by quashing and nullifying it (arr£t de cassation). If 
the decision under attack is quashed, the case is then refer­
red to a court of the same jurisdiction as the one whose 
judgment has been set aside. However, this judgment in 
cassation is not binding on the court to which the case is 
sent back for retrial. If the court of renvoi does not 
comply with the Supreme CourtTs judgment in cassation, it 
is probable that the previous applicant will take the case 
back to the Supreme Court. When this happens, it is known 
in the literature as le deuxieme pourvoi. This time the 
Pull Bench of the Supreme Court would have to sit and deal 
with this second application in one of three ways. First, 
it may reject the pourvoi; in effect admitting that it was 
wrong in having previously quashed the case and sent it 
back for retrial. Alternatively, it may again quash the 
decision under attack and not make an order of renvoi (arret 
de cassation sans renvoi). Here, the Full Bench will 
itself decide the case on its merits and give a judgment.
This is the only situation where the Supreme Court has 
power to judge the merits of a case. Finally, the Full
Bench may quash the decision under attack and again refer 
the case to another court of the same level as the previous 
one for retrial. At this stage the ping-pong ends. The 
new court of renvoi is bound to comply with the position 
adopted by the Full Bench.. This is the only circumstance 
in which there is something like the application of the 
doctrine of precedent in the Anglo-American sense. How­
ever, the Supreme Court is not bound by its own decisions. 
The procedure just outlined is typically French and is 
applied even to cases from courts in the English-speaking 
part of Cameroon.
Any judicial act which has become final and is 
contrary to law may be referred to the Supreme Court by 
the Procureur General at that Court either on his own ini­
tiative in the sole interest of the law or on the orders 
of the Minister of Justice. In the former case, the 
appeal is made solely in the interest of the law and the 
parties may claim no benefit under it. In the latter case, 
a party is entitled to take advantage of the appeal if it 
succeeds.
The Supreme Court is empowered to resolve cases 
of ’positive’ and ’negative’ conflicts. A postivie con­
flict arises where two authorities or courts of law assume 
jurisdiction in the same matter; and a negative conflict 
arises where two authorities or courts of law decline 
jurisdiction in the same case. In either of these two 
situations the parties may refer the matter to the Supreme
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Court for it to decide as to which court should exercise 
jurisdiction in the matter. The same applies (i) when­
ever non-suits either in Appeal Courts or in courts not 
located in the area of one and the same Appeal Court reveal 
a conflict leading to a denial of justice; and (ii) where 
there is a request for a case to be transferred from one 
court or Appeal Court to another on grounds of public 
security and legitimate suspicion. In either of these 
cases the parties have two months, from the date of ren­
dition of the court decision, within which to refer the 
matter to the Supreme Court. J
The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to decide 
all administrative cases, that is, litigation involving 
the State, local authorities and public corporations. 
Administrative litigation includes, inter alia, petitions 
for cancellation of acts on the grounds of ultra vires, 
claims for damages for loss caused by an administrative 
measure, disputes concerning state lands , administrative
trespass on private land and any arbitrary step by the
34administration against liberty and property. For the
purposes of the exercise of jurisdiction in.administrative 
matters, the Supreme Court is divided into an Administrative 
Bench having original jurisdiction in administrative cases,
33. Ss . 7 and 8 of Ord. 72/6 of 26 August 1972 (Supreme 
Court Organisation) as amended.
34. S. 9) ibid.
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and a Pull Bench exercising appellate jurisdiction in 
administrative cases as well as other matters. The Adminis­
trative Bench is constituted by a substantive or alternate 
Puisne Judge (president), two Judges of the Court, the 
Procureur General (or his deputy, or the Advocate General), 
and a Registrar. All administrative cases begin in the 
Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court therefore exercises original and appellate juris­
diction in administrative matters. Due to lack of person­
nel and the fact that only a comparatively small number of 
administrative disputes come before the court, it has 
neither been possible nor advisable to have, as in France, 
a separate set of ’administrative courts’ to handle adminis­
trative litigation. An appeal from the Administrative 
Bench lies to the Full Bench which is constituted by five 
Judges (excluding any Judge who heard the case at first 
instance in the Administrative Bench), the Procureur General 
(his deputy or the Advocate General), and the Chief Regis­
trar or Registrar, all of the Supreme Court.
Finally, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in 
constitutional and institutional matters. Whenever it sits 
in the exercise of this jurisdiction It is enlarged by 
five personalities appointed for one year by the President 
of the Republic by reason of their special knowledge and 
experience. Article 7(b) of the Constitution empowers the 
Supreme Court to ascertain the death or permanent physical 
incapacity of the Fresident of the Republic; article 10
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entitles it to rule on the constitutionality of any 
alleged unconstitutional law referred to it by the Head of 
State; and art. 27(4) gives it power to decide on any 
doubt or dispute on the admissibility of a bill or an 
amendment referred to it by the Speaker of the National 
Assembly or by the President of the Republic. The Court 
also performs a number of minor and purely ceremonial 
functions: proclamation of the results of presidential
elections and of referenda, participation in the swearing- 
in ceremony of the President-elect of the Republic, adminis­
tering the oath to fresh- advocates and judicial and legal 
officers, and nomination of some of the members who sit 
in the Higher Judicial Council.
c ) Procedure in non-administrative cases in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court holds a solemn re-opening cere- 
35mony each year to mark the official beginning of the 
judicial year which runs from 1st October to 30th Sep­
tember of the following year and is divided into two parts:
a period of regular sessions (1st October to 30th June)
3 6during which it holds one or more sessions per week,~
35. The date and time of the reopening are fixed by the Head 
of State. The ceremony is presided over by the Head of 
State or the Minister of Justice and must be attended by 
all legal and judicial officers, advocates and auxiliary 
officers of justice present in Yaounde. See, s. 3,
Law No. 75/16 of 8 December 1975 fixing the procedure 
and functions of the Supreme Court.
36. S. 2(1)(a), ibid. The dates and times of ordinary 
hearings are fixed by order of the Minister of Justice 
upon the joint recommendation of the President of the 
Supreme Court and of the Procureur General of that Court. 
However, upon the recommendation of the Procureur 
General, the President may order additional hearings to 
ensure prompt settlement of cases before the Court.
See s. 4, ibid.
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and a .recess period (1st July to 30th September) during
which it must hold at least one session each month devoted
37to urgent matters. The Court is required to keep a
central card index of all its decisions and to forward, 
every year, to. the Minister of Justice, a report on the 
state of cases, the period taken to settle each case, and 
the difficulties encountered in the application of the
O Q
law. • This, central card index system could be used to
assist the elaboration of consistent legal practice and
the production of regular law reports in English and
French. In this way, a harmonised integrated uniform
legal doctrine may be evolved.
(1) Lodging of appeals
Appeals to the Supreme Court must be Ci) made by
written motion or petition lodged at the Registray of an
Appeal Court, a High Court, or a Court of First Instance;
(ii) lodged by appellant in person, or his counsel, or a
representative of his holding special power of attorney;
and (iii) lodged within ten clear days in criminal cases
39and thirty in all others. However, the Supreme Court
President may, on a reasoned application from the appellant, 
and after consultation with the Procureur General of the
37- S. 2(1)(b), ibid. Urgent appeals are appeals brought 
against a judgment (i) in a criminal or labour case,
or a case involving alimony, (ii) delivered in view of
accelerated hearings. See also s. 2(2), ibid.
38. Ss. 4 and 5, ibid.
39. Ss. 6 and 8, ibid.
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Supreme Court, order the normal period of appeal to be
40extended to fifteen days. The appeal fee, even where the
appellant has obtained legal aid, is 5,000 francs cfa
4lpayable to the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court, who
must grant the appellant fifteen days within which to pay
42 . . .the fee. The appeal is rejected if at the end of this
period the fee has not been paid. An appeal will also be 
rejected if within thirty days following the Registrar's 
written notice to that effect the appellant fails to forward 
to the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court the name of his
counsel or his application for legal aid if he is eligible
43 . .for it. The registrar of the. relevant court receiving
the appeal must record it and send a copy of the record to
the Chief Registrar of the relevant court which delivered
44the judgment appealed against.
40. S. 7(1), ibid.
41. Appeals by the legal department or the State as well as 
those against judgment in labour and criminal cases are 
exempted from fees. S. 8(3), ibid.
42. S.. 13(1) (b), ibid.
43. S. 9(1), ibid. The application for legal aid will be
rejected unless it is accompanied by a certificate of 
lack of means issued by the Mayor of the applicant’s 
local council. An appellant may not appear before the 
Supreme Court without being assisted by counsel; for, 
by s. 1 of the Bar Law. 1972 the assistance of counsel 
is obligatory before the Supreme Court. So, in
Jean Montapam alias Jean Bekoe c. Dame Emma Ngo Bivick, CSC, 
arret du 28 Oct. 1974 , Penant, No. 759, 1978, P* 139, 
the appellant was held to forfeit his right of appeal 
because he failed to engage counsel and did not apply 
to be granted legal aid.
44. S. 9(3) (4), ibid.
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(2) Examination of the appeal.
When he receives the notice of appeal, the regis­
trar of the court which delivered the judgment appealed
against has fifteen days within which to serve notice of
45the appeal on the opposing party. The appeal, file which
has to be completed within sixty days and forwarded to 
the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court must contain a 
copy of the judgment appealed against, copies of interlocu­
tory rulings (.if any), the grounds of appeal, pleadings,
46and arguments of the parties.
Civil appeals must be duly registered; an appeal 
not registered within thirty days is rejected. When the 
appeal has been duly registered, notice is served on the 
appellantfs counsel that he has thirty days, from such ser­
vice, within which to put in his statement of claim setting
47out and amplifying the legal grounds for the appeal. When
the statement of claim is lodged, notice is served on the
48respondent to reply within thirty days. Upon receipt
of the respondent's reply, the Chief Registrar at the Supreme 
Court must again notify the appellant that he has fifteen
45. S. 10(1), ibid. The usual mode of effecting service is 
either by registered letter or through a bailiff.
46. S. 10(2)(3), ibid.
47. S. 13(1)(2), ibid. Failure to observe this time limit 
entails forfeiture (the penalty of which is civil fine 
of 10,000 frs) without prejudice, as the case may be, to 
action for damages against the defaulting counsel, for 
professional negligence.
48. S. 14, ibid.
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days to make a counter reply if he so desires. The
50exchange of pleadings comes to an end at this stage.
The case file, already thick, Is then forwarded to the pre­
siding Judge who passes it over to the 1juge rapporteur' 
for his examination and report thereon. When he makes 
his report, the rapporteur sends it under confidential 
cover to the President of the Supreme Court who transmits 
a copy of it to the Procureur General of the Court. In 
addition to being empowered to 'make appropriate proposals 
for the settlement of the dispute', the Procureur General,
like the rapporteur may, of his own motion, raise grounds 
51of claim. After writing his submissions, which he must
do within thirty days, the Procureur General forwards them
together with the rapporteur's report to the presiding
Judge who communicates them to the.other members of the
Court. At the end of these 'behind the scenes’ activities,
the case is then entered on the cause-list and a date fixed
for hearing. The parties are informed of the date of
52hearing by publication of the cause-list.
For litigants and lawyers accustomed to the common 
law tradition, a striking feature of this procedure is the 
involved role of the Procureur General in the decision­
making process of the Court irrespective of whether the
49. S. 15, ibid.
50. S. 17, ibid.
51. Ss. 18 and 19, ibid.
52. S. 20, ibid.
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decision under review is civil or criminal. It is as 
though the Procureur General belonged to the bench and 
not the legal department. It is clear-beyond peradven- 
ture that this procedure has been adopted straight from 
France. On the face of it each judgment of the Court is 
the work of a collective examination by all the members 
of the Court. In practice, the report made, by the juge 
rapporteur (it is always formulated like a judgment) is 
invariably adopted as the judgment of the Court. Although 
the report is circulated among members of the Court they 
(with the exception of the President and the Procureur 
General) seldom study it in detail.
(3) Judgment
The Supreme Court normally sits as a panel of 
three judges. However, it must sit as a Full Bench of 
at least five Judges in the case of a second appeal against 
a death sentence or in a case where the President of the 
Court, after consultation with the Procureur General, 
deems it necessary.. Judgments of the Court sitting as 
a panel of at least five Judges are binding on lower courts 
(they do not bind the Court itself) on matters concerning 
points of law brought before it.
At the hearing, the rapporteur- reads his report.
This is followed by the oral arguments of counsels and the
Procureur General in support of their pleadings and sub- 
53missions. Judgments of the Supreme Court are not required
53. S. 24(1), ibid.
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to contain arguments. They must only set out and examine 
the grounds of the claim, the grounds of the decision, and 
at the end state whether the appeal is allowed or dis- 
allowed. There is no summing up by the Judge. The
Judge does not, as do Judges in common law jurisdictions, 
review the whole case for and against the appellant.
After the Procureur General and counsels have had their 
say, the Judge reads a cryptic judgment cast in the form of 
a decree. Another thing likely to raise eyebrows for any­
one trained in the common law system is the provision that
an appeal lodged by the legal department at an Appeal Court
55must be heard even when no grounds of appeal are stated.
(4) Challenges to and suing of Judges
Section 30 of Law No. 75/16 of 8 December 1975 
(Procedure and Functions of the Supreme Court) enables 
parties appearing before the Supreme Court to challenge any 
of the judges on panel with a view to having him replaced 
in regard to any particular appeal. But no challenge may 
be made against members of the legal department. Appli­
cations (the applicant need not be represented by counsel) 
to challenge Judges of the Supreme Court must contain 
reasons for the challenge and must be lodged at the Court’s 
registry. The Court rules on the matter within thirty days.
54. S. 26(1), ibid.
55. S. 26(2), ibid. In this case, the juge rapporteur 
and the Procureur General at the Supreme Court would 
have to fish for grounds of appeal in the case-file.
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Proceedings are held in camera and if the challenge is up-
56held, the Judge who has been challenged is replaced.
Perhaps the most startling aspect of the procedure
of the Supreme Court, as far as common-law-trained Judges
and lawyers are concerned, is the fact that Judges of the
57Supreme Court may be sued. They may be sued in any of
these circumstances: (i) where there is fraud, perversion
of justice, undue demand or professional misconduct;
(ii) where the law expressly provides therefor; (iii) where
the law holds Judges liable to damages; and (iv) where
58there is denial of justice. However, no Supreme Court
Judge may be sued without prior authorization of the 
Supreme Court President who shall rule on the issue after 
consultation with the Procureur General at that Court.
No appeal lies against the decision of the President.
This is evidently intended to be a check on possible reck­
less and vexatious suits against Judges.
This is the first time ever that a uniform pro­
cedure has been worked out for a Supreme Court in Cameroon. 
This is a positive step; one step forward in the task to 
work out a unified legal system in the country. It has in
56. S. 31, ibid.
57. Ss. 33-39, ibid.
58. There is a denial of justice when a Judge refuses to 
answer applications or fails to hear pending matters or 
matters ready for hearing. For example, the adjournment 
sine die of a case is a denial of justice: CSC, Arret
No. 109/P du 17 janv. 1974, 6 R.C.D. 144 (1974).
355.
fact been suggested that this new procedure of the Supreme
Court makes the Court both in name and in substance a
supreme court and that it will henceforth play its assigned
judicial role as a tribunal at the apex of the hierarchy 
59of courts.
Ill. Courts with Special Jurisdiction
A court with special jurisdiction is one which 
deals either with specific matters formally provided for 
by statute or with a particular class of persons. In 
Cameroon, there are two courts with special jurisdiction: 
the Court of Impeachment and the Military Court.
1. The Court of Impeachment
This court which existed under the 1961 Consti­
tution as the Federal High Court of Justice is provided 
for in article 34 of the 1972 Constitution.
"Art. 34. There shall be a Court of 
Impeachment which shall be regulated as to 
organisation and taking of cognizance and 
in other respects by law.
"The Court of Impeachment shall have juris­
diction, in respect of acts performed in 
the exercise of their offices, to try the 
President of the Republic for high treason
59. V.M. Ngoh, ’The new functions and procedure of the
Supreme Court’, Cameroon Tribune, No. 79, 31 December 
1975, p. 9.
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and the Prime Minister, Ministers and 
Vice-Ministers for conspiracy against the 
security of the State."
The Court of Impeachment is governed by Ordinance No. 72/7
of 26th August 1972.
A . Composition of the Court of Impeachment
The Court of Impeachment sits in Yaounde, is 
composed of 9 Substantive and 6 Alternate Judges, and is 
assisted by an Investigation Commission. It operates 
on the budget of the National Assembly and its members and 
those of the Investigation Commission receive no payment 
for their services.
Judges of the Court are elected by the National 
Assembly within twenty days of the beginning of the first 
session of each, legislative year. Six substantive and 
three alternative Judges are elected on an absolute majority 
by secret ballot from among Parliamentarians. The 
remaining three substantive and three alternate Judges are 
also elected by the National Assembly, this time from among 
non-Parliamentarians. After they have been elected the 
Judges of the Court elect their President and Vice-President 
from among the substantive Judges of the Court. The Procu­
reur General, Advocate General and Chief Registrar of the 
Supreme Court also serve the Court of Impeachment in their 
various capacities. The Investigation Commission is made 
up of a President elected from among Parliamentarians by 
the National Assembly, and two Supreme Court Judges appointed
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by the Pull Bench of the Supreme Court. Within ten days 
of their election members of the Court and of the Inves­
tigation Commission are required to take the following 
oath:
"I swear and undertake to discharge my functions 
well and faithfully, to keep religiously the 
secret of all deliberations and votes and to 
conduct myself in all ways as a worthy and 
loyal Judge."
A Parliamentarian elected Judge of the Court but 
who subsequently ceases being a Parliamentarian ceases 
ipso facto to be a member of the Court. The same goes for 
the President of the Investigation Commission. The func­
tions of member of Government of the Republic are incom­
patible with the functions of Judge of the Court of Impeach­
ment and of President of the Investigation Commission.
B . Jurisdiction of the Court of Impeachment
Its jurisdiction is spelt out in article 3^(2)
of the Constitution.
"Art. 3^(2). The Court of Impeachment shall 
have jurisdiction, in respect of acts per­
formed in the exercise of their offices, to 
try the President of the Republic for high 
treason and the Prime Minister, Ministers 
and Vice-Ministers for conspiracy against 
the security of the State."
The Court of Impeachment therefore has jurisdiction over a
limited category of persons: the Head of State and members
of his Government; and is competent to try only cases of
’high treason’ committed by the President of the Republic,
and cases of ’conspiracy against the security of the State’
committed by members of Government.
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By conspiracy against state security within 
the meaning of art. 3^ of the Constitution is meant any 
felony or misdemeanour against the internal or external 
security of the State as defined in the Cameroonian Penal 
Code. Such off-enc-e^-j (ss. 102-117 of the Penal Code) 
include subversion, hostility against the fatherland, 
injury to the defence of the nation, failure to report any 
activity liable to injure the defence of the nation, 
espionage, contact with the enemy during wartime, secession, 
civil war, revolution, insurrection, and so on. A member 
of Government who conspires to commit any of these offences 
may be indicted before the Court of Impeach for conspiracy 
against the security of the State. It does not however 
seem that the Court of Impeachment has jurisdiction to try 
a member of Government who goes beyond the conspiracy stage 
and commits any substantive offence against State security. 
In such a case the member of Government involved would 
have to be tried by the Military Court.
No definition is given of the crime of ’high 
treason’. Ordinarily however, treason simply means 
treachery, betrayal of the Government or an attempt to over­
throw it; and high treason is any offence against the 
State. A legalistic definition of treason, as may be 
inferred from sections 102 and 103 of the Penal Code, is 
that it is an offence against the external security of the 
State committed by a citizen and carrying the death penalty.
”S. 102. - Hostilities against the Fatherland.
Any citizen:
(a) Taking part in hostilities against the
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Republic; or
(b) Assisting or offering to assist the said 
hostilities - shall be guilty of treason and 
punished with death.”
"S. 103. - Other Felonies Punishable with Death 
’’Whoever -
(a) Instigates a foreign power to undertake 
hostilities against the Republic; or
(b) Surrenders or offers to surrender to a 
foreign power or to its agents any troops, 
territory, installations or equipment employed 
in the defence of the nation, or any defence 
secret, or who in whatever manner acquires 
such a secret with intent to surrender it to
a foreign power; or
(c) With intent to injure the defence of the 
nation, damages any construction, installa­
tion or equipment, or commits any malpractice 
liable to prevent their normal working or to 
lead to an accident, -
shall, if a citizen, be guilty of treason and, 
if a foreigner be guilty of espionage, and 
shall in either case be punished with death."
C . Procedure by the Court of-Impeachment
The President of the Republic may be committed 
for trial in the Court of Impeachment only upon an absolute 
majority vote, on secret ballot, by the National Assembly.
If the House votes in favour of impeachment, it takes a 
resolution to that effect summarising the allegations 
against the President of the Republic. Parliamentarians 
who are Judges of the Court of Impeachment and President of 
the Investigation Commission must not take part in the 
debate and the vote on whether to commit for trial or not. 
When the resolution committing for trial is taken, it is 
communicated without delay to the Procureur General who 
immediately acknowledges receipt thereof and in turn notifies
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it, within twenty four hours, to the President of the 
Court of Impeachment and the President of the Investigation 
Commission who must forthwith convene the Investigation 
Commission. A member of Government, together with co­
offenders and his accomplices, charged with conspiring 
against State security are committed for trial in the Court 
of Impeachment by decree of the President of the Republic. 
The President’s decree committing for trial must relate 
briefly the facts of the case against the accused and must 
also mention the legal provision under which the charge 
is being preferred. The said decree is communicated to 
the Procureur General who has to notify it without delay 
to the President of the Court of Impeachment and the 
President of the Investigation Commission.
Before the Investigation Commission meets, its 
President may undertake any inquiry necessary for the 
ascertainment of the truth. The Commission does likewise 
when it meets. Any investigation must however be conducted 
in accordance with the rules of criminal procedure, espe­
cially those relating to the rights of the defence. The 
Commission is entitled to order a commission rogatory and 
its decisions are not appealable.
If the accused is the President of the Republic 
the Investigation Commission must find out whether there is 
sufficient evidence to sustain the charge stated in the 
National Assembly’s committal resolution. The Commission 
is however not entitled to alter the charge as contained 
in the resolution. If it discovers facts which disclose
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an offence other than that originally charged, it must send 
the case-file to the National Assembly through the Procureur 
General. The Assembly has fifteen days within which to 
adopt a motion on additional charges. If it fails to do 
so, the Investigation Commission resumes its inquiry on the 
original charge. Where, on the other hand, the accused 
are members of the Government, the Commission conducts its 
inquiry only in respect of the persons named in the Presi­
dential decree committing for trial. If the accussed com­
mitted other offences connected with that of conspiracy 
against State security, the Commission must conduct inquiries 
in respect of those offences as well. At the end of these 
inquiries, the Commission commits, if need be, for trial 
before the Court of Impeachment. The committal order must 
specify the criminal law provision under which the charges 
are made. The committal order is signified to the accused 
at least eight days before the scheduled date of the trial.
The date of the opening of the trial is fixed by 
the President of the Court on the motion of the Procureur 
General and members of the Court are convened at least 
eight days to the date of the trial. Any victim of an 
offence with which the accused is charged may constitute 
himself partie civile before the Court. A Judge of the 
Court may be refused on any of the following grounds:
(i) that he is a parent or relative of the accused, (ii) that 
he has given evidence in the case or has been summoned as a 
witness in the case, and (_iii) that there is serious reason
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for enmity between him and the accused. A Judge knowing 
himself to be open to recusation must decline to sit in 
the case.
All proceedings of the Court must be- held in open 
court. Exceptionally, proceedings or parts thereof may 
be held in camera. At the end of the proceedings the 
Court decides on the guilt of the defendant in chambers.
If the verdict is one of guilty, the members of the Court 
then proceed to vote, by a simple majority, on the proper 
sentence to be imposed, taking into account, where necessary, 
mitigating circumstances. Sentence is read by the Presi­
dent in open court. An accused may be tried and sentenced 
in absentia. So far, the Court of Impeachment exists only 
on paper. There has never been any impeachment proceedings 
in Cameroon.
2. The Military Court
The Military Court is governed by Ordinance 
No. 72/5 of 26th August 1972 which consolidates previous 
legislation on the subject.
A . Organisation
In theory, there is only one Military Court for 
the entire country with its seat in Yaounde. But the 
Court may, on the decision of the Head of State or, by 
special delegation, the Minister of Armed Forces, hold
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sessions in any locality in the country. Moreover, one 
or more Military Courts may, if there is such a need (in 
fact one exists in Buea), be established by decree. The 
decree determines the number of such Military Courts to be 
established, their location and their territorial juris­
diction.
B . Composition
The Military Tribunal comprises: (i) a president
who may be either a civil Judge or a military Judge or an 
officer of the Armed Forces; in time of war or during a 
state of emergency both civil and military judges.are 
replaced by senior officers of the Armed Forces; (ii) two 
titular and two deputy assessors with a deliberative voice; 
these assessors may be either civil judges or Non-Commis­
sioned Officers of the Armed Forces; (iii) a commissaire 
du gouvernement and one or more deputies, military or civil 
judges or in default, officers of the Armed Forces, 1 charge 
de soutenir faction publique'; (iv) one or more judges 
in charge of conducting an inquiry into those cases which 
require a preliminary investigation; and (v) one or more 
civil or military registrars. All members of the Military
Court are appointed by decree. In any trial, the trial
judges must be at least of the same rank as the accused.
C. Jurisdiction
The Military Court is alone competent to try all
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persons of over 18 years in respect of the following 
offences: (i) offences of a purely military nature pro­
vided for in the Code de Justice Militaire; (ii) offences 
of all sorts committed by soldiers, with or without civilian 
co-offenders or accomplices, either inside a military 
establishment or in the course of service; (iii) felonies 
and misdemeanours against the security of the State;
6f)
(iv) offences punishable under the law with detention;
(v) offences provided for in Ordinance No. 62/OP/18 of
12 March 1962 (Subversion Ordinance); (vi) offences relating 
to firearms legislation; (vii) offences of any nature in 
which a soldier is involved, committed in an area subject 
to a state of emergency; and (viii) offences related to 
those heretofore listed.
Offenders and accomplices of between 14 and 18 
years of age may be tried only by the ordinary criminal 
courts. Offenders who are aliens are, subject to the law 
on diplomatic immunity and International Convention gran­
ting court privilege, fully justiciable before the Military 
Court. With the exception of offences against state 
security and firearms legislation, decisions of the Military 
Court are appealable to the Court of Appeal and ultimately
60. S. 26 of the Penal Code defines ’detention’ as ’’loss
of liberty imposed for a political felony or misdemeanour, 
during which the offender shall not be obliged to work, 
and shall be confined in a special establishment, or 
failing such establishment separately from those con­
victed under the ordinary law.” This means that an 
offence is political if the legislator prescribes deten­
tion as its punishment. The detention is always for an 
indeterminate duration.
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to the Supreme Court.^
IV. Advisory Bodies
An advisory body may be said to be one which hands 
down an opinion on an issue on which its opinion was sought. 
Unlike a court of law seised of a contentious issue, an 
advisory body does not hand down a judgment having force of 
res judicata. An advisory body may or may not be a court. 
What makes it advisory (at least with regards to the issue 
on which its opinion is sought) is that when consulted on 
an issue it gives an opinion and not a judicial decision.
Generally, the requirement of a case or contro­
versy as a condition for the exercise of judicial power 
precludes the court from giving an advisory opinion. But 
this does not mean that recourse may not be had to the 
court for its opinion on a particular issue. Thus in the 
United States for example, a person can sue in his capacity 
as citizen merely to have the law 'straightened out'.
In such a case an advisory opinion situation arises. How­
ever, the device of advisory opinion is normally a procedure 
whereby the political departments or particular institutions 
thereof may consult and obtain the opinion of the court upon 
some pending measure or upon some question of law or fact
6l. The jurisdiction of the Military Court is exhaustively 
treated in chapter 16, infra.
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6 2without resort to conventional litigation. But the
body that may be thus consulted need not be a court of law. 
It may be some other body specifically set up for that 
purpose.
An advisory opinion is not a judicial decision 
because it is not concerned with a justiciable issue.
Not being a judicial decision it is not enforceable. It 
is not a res judicata. The person who seeks such an 
opinion is not bound to accept it. He may act on it. He 
may ignore it. However, it is not to be expected that a 
Government which seeks and obtains such advice from the 
court or other body with such attributes would lightly dis­
regard it or refuse to give effect to it where that is 
necessary.
In Cameroon, there are two bodies which have the 
prerogative of giving advisory opinions to the legislature 
and the executive. The two bodies are: the Supreme Court
acting in an advisory capacity, and the Higher Judicial 
Council.
1. The Supreme Court acting in its advisory capacity
The principal function of the Supreme Court is 
to give final judgments on justiciable issues. But it may
62. B.O. Nwabueze, Judicialism in commonwealth Africa - 
the role of the courts in government, Hurts & Co., 
London, 1977, p. 84.
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also be consulted for an advisory opinion In respect of 
certain matters provided for in the Constitution. By 
art. 7 of the Constitution, the Court is empowered to 
ascertain the death or permanent physical incapacity of 
the President of the Republic. Under art. 10, the Presi­
dent of the Republic is required to refer to the Supreme 
Court any law which he considers to be contrary to the 
Constitution. Article 27(4) provides that any doubt or 
dispute on the admissibility of a bill or amendment shall 
be referred for decision by the President of the National 
Assembly or the President of the Republic to the Supreme 
Court. Article 33 of the Constitution says that in all 
these cases, ’’the Supreme Court is called upon to give an 
opinion” . Moreover, when the Court sits to hear any of 
these matters, its membership is doubled by the addition 
of five persons nominated for one year by the President of
the Republic by reason of their special knowledge and
experience.
A. Temporary prevention of the President and vacancy 
of the Presidency
Both issues are governed by art. 7(1) of the
Constitution and Law No. 73/10 of 7 December 1973 fixing
the conditions for election to the Presidency of the
Republic. Article 7(1)(a) enacts:
"Art. 7(1)(a). In case of temporary preven­
tion, the President of the Republic may
instruct the Prime Minister or, in case of
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the latterrs prevention, another member of 
the Government to exercise his duties within 
the framework of an express delegation of 
powers."
This provision is evidently intended to cater for the 
situation where the Head of State is temporarily absent.
Such absence may be physical, as where he is on a trip 
abroad; or political, as where impeachment proceedings 
have been initiated against him. But what is 'temporary 
prevention'? Would the fact that the President of the 
Republic is lying in bed at home or in a hospital for 
health reasons or for medical check-up amount to 'temporary 
prevention'? How temporary must the prevention be? It 
would seem from a construction of the provision that it is 
the President of the Republic himself who' decides these 
matters.
When however, the prevention ceases being tem­
porary and becomes permanent either as a result of death 
or permanent physical incapacity, the Supreme Court must 
step in to ’ascertain' such death or incapacity. Article 
7(1)(b ) provides:
"Art. 7(1)(b). In the event of vacancy of
the Presidency as a result of death or 
permanent physical incapacity, duly ascer­
tained by the Supreme Court, the powers of 
the President of the Republic shall without 
more devolve upon the President of the 
National Assembly and, if in turn is preven­
ted from exercising these powers, upon the 
Prime Minister, until election of a new 
President."
There would be a vacancy of the Presidency if the incumbent’s 
term of office prematurely comes to an end as a result of
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6 ?
death, resignation, or permanent physical incapacity.
When the President of the Republic resigns, he tenders his
resignation to the President of the National Assembly or,
if he is not available.,, to the President of the Supreme 
64Court and then informs the Nation by broadcast. The 
resignation however takes effect only as from the day on
65which the newly elected President takes the oath of office.
It is odd that the only incapacity that would is- 
qualify an incumbent from Presidential office is a physical 
one. A President of the Republic who is suffering from 
mental incapacity or senility may cling to office until he 
breathes his last.
The President’s permanent physical incapacity or 
death has to be duly ascertained by the Supreme Court.
Article 63 of Law No. 73/10 of 7 December 1973 provides that 
the Supreme Court shall be seised by the President of the
63. Art. 7(l)(b)(c) of the Constitution; art. 6l to 63 of 
Law No. 73/10 of 7 December 1973. There is one situ­
ation to which the draftsman of the Constitution did not
advert his mind. Supposing the President were to dis­
appear without leaving any instructions as regards his 
office or were to be kidnapped and in either case there 
is compelling evidence or reason to believe that he is
still alive. The country would be in an extremely awk­
ward situation because legally no one would be able to 
take over the Presidency. The P.M. or other Government 
member cannot do so because art. 7(1)(a) envisages the 
case of ’temporary prevention’ and says it is the Presi­
dent who has to ’instruct the Prime Minister or ... another 
member of the Government to exercise his duties within the 
framework of an express delegation of powers’. Nor can 
the National Assembly President nor the P.M. take over by 
virtue of art. 7(1)(b) because even though the Presidency 
is in fact vacant, it is not ’as a result of death or 
permanent physical incapacity’.
64. Art. 64 of Law No. 73/10 of the 7th December 1973.
65. Art. 7(l)(c) of the Constitution.
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National Assembly on the advice of the Medical Council.
This medical council is yet to be named. It is clear 
beyond peradventure that what the Supreme Court is invited 
to do is not to make a medical but a judicial ascertain­
ment . In other words, the Court is merely called upon 
to take, as it were, judicial notice of the Head of State’s 
permanent physical incapacity or death, the biological 
reality having already been certified by the competent 
medical experts. The importance of the ascertainment by 
the Court stems, it is submitted, from the fact that for 
legal purposes, the Presidency is deemed vacant only as 
from the time the ascertainment was made. If this is the
position, as it is submitted it is, it is hard to see in
what sense the Supreme Court is said to be giving an 
’opinion’ here.
B . An alleged unconstitutional law
An alleged unconstitutional law may be referred 
to the Supreme Court for a ruling as to its constitutionality. 
But only the President of the Republic is empowered to 
exercise this right. Article 10 of the Constitution sti­
pulates :
’’Art. 10. The President of the Republic 
shall refer to the Supreme Court ... any law
which he considers to be contrary to this
Constitution.TT
This reference is made simply for the purpose of obtaining 
the Court’s advisory opinion on the matter, although it seems
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unlikely that such an opinion would be disregarded.
When the President refers the alleged unconsti­
tutional law to the Supreme Court, he is in fact claiming 
that the law enacted by the legislature is in violation 
of the Constitution and therefore an injury to the com­
munity as a whole. Here, there is clearly an element of 
adverseness, a controversy with regards to the measure 
passed by the National Assembly. The President’s locus 
standi to refer the alleged unconstitutional law to the 
Supreme Court stems from his position as the Head of the 
State, the personification of the State, symbol of the
whole community. Moreover, the division of legislative
66power between the legislature and the executive, an 
inheritance from Gaulli.st France, has made it necessary 
to give to the President of the Republic a right of recourse 
to the Supreme Court for an opinion on the constitutionality 
of laws.
• In the case under discussion, recourse is had to 
the Supreme Court after a bill has been passed into law.
But recourse may also be had to that Court even before a 
bill is passed into law.
66. In Cameroon, as in France and in most Francophone 
African countries, Parliament is not omnipotent.
The National Assembly can deal only with those matters 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution (art. 20) 
while the residue (unspecified) is made the subject of 
rule-making by the executive(art. 22). Moreover, the 
National Assembly may empower the Head of State to legis­
late, by way of ordinance, for a limited period and for 
limited purposes with regards to subjects listed in the 
legislative domain (art. 21). The reason for this 
delimitation of powers is probably to avoid incompetence 
and impotence.
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C . Doubt or dispute over the admissibility of a bill
This is the situation contemplated by art. 27(4)
of the Constitution which provides:
"Art. 27(4). Any doubt or dispute on the 
admissibility of a bill or amendment shall 
be referred for decision by the President 
of the Assembly or by the President of the 
Republic to the Supreme Court."
It is doubtful whether in this case it is called upon to 
give a judicial decision. The ambiguity arises because 
art. 27(4) talks of a decision while art. 33 talks of 
an opinion. The position is probably this. Where there 
is merely a doubt as to the admissibility of a bill or an 
amendment the Supreme Court gives an opinion. But where 
there is a dispute on that issue, then there is adverse­
ness, a ripened controversy, a clash between the legis­
lature and the executive and the Supreme Court is called 
upon to give a decision.
There is clearly an advantage in referring a bill
or an amendment over which there is doubt or dispute as
to its admissibility to the court for a decision thereon.
By means of this mechanism a would-be unconstitutional law 
is nipped in the bud; it is destroyed before it becomes 
law. This device also servies the need for certainty in 
the law. When a disputed bill is pronounced by the Supreme
Court to be constitutional it may no longer be challenged
for unconstitutionality when it subsequently becomes law.
This procedure, aptly termed preventive adjudi­
cation, should probably be among the concerns of a court of
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law. A court of law, it has well been pointed out,
should not only provide a machinery for the administration
of law for, law may be administered by means other than
its.application to the determination of real disputes
61
between adversary litigants. One commentator has put
the argument more cogently:
"We have become accustomed to thinking of 
courts only as machinery for handling 
conflicts between opposing individuals or 
groups after they have already come into 
clash. Certainly, that is their chief 
function, as it is the chief function of 
the medical profession to deal with malig­
nant disease. But the medical profession 
has long since abandoned the notion that 
its work is accomplished if it relieves 
suffering, and much of its energy is now 
devoted to preventive medicine. The 
legal profession has not similarly widened 
its sphere. It is true that most lawyers 
devote much of their time to precautions 
against future controversy. But we have 
made slow progress toward developing what 
might be called preventive adjudication, 
and the notion widely prevails that the 
judicial branch of the legal profession 
must necessarily confine itself to ripened 
conflicts." 68
No dispute as to the constitutionality of a law has yet
come before the Supreme Court of Cameroon.
2 . The Higher Judicial Council
Established by the Constitution, the Higher Judicial
67. Cf. Nwabueze, op.cit., chapter IV, The advantages of 
preventive adjudication.
68. Manley Hudson, ’Advisory opinions of national and inter­
national courts’, Harvard Law Review, 37 (1923), p. 971, 
cited by Nwabueze, op.cit., at p. 93.
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Council is an advisory body and is governed by Ordinance 
No. 72/8 of 26 August 1972.
A. Composition
The Higher Judicial Council is presided over by 
the President of the Republic and comprises the following 
persons: (i) the Minister of Justice, or in default some­
one else appointed by the Head of State; the Minister of 
Justice is vice-chairman of the Council; (ii) three par­
liamentarians chosen by the National Assembly by secret 
ballot on a two-thirds. majority of its members; (iii) one 
person chosen by reason of his knowledge by the President 
of the Republic. The person so chosen must belong neither 
to the National Assembly nor to the Judiciary; (iv) three 
Judges in active service chosen by the Full Bench of the 
Supreme Court. These are titular members of the Council.
Each titular member has a substitute. A titular member 
who is unable to sit in the Council either as a result of 
death, resignation or otherwise, is automatically replaced 
by his substitute. Members of the Council are bound by 
oath taken before the President of the Republic to keep 
secret anything discussed in the Council.
B . Duties
The Higher Judicial Council is the institutional 
adviser to the President of the Republic on matters concerning
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the judiciary: independence, appointments, discipline.
It also advises the President of the Republic on the exer­
cise of the prerogative of clemency.
a) Prerogative of mercy
By art. 9(5) of the Constitution, the President 
of the Republic shall ’exercise the prerogative of clemency 
after consultation with the Higher Judicial Council’.
But the President need in fact not consult the Council 
before exercising this prerogative. Section 6 of Ordinance 
No. 72/8 of 26 August 1972 makes the prior consultation of 
the Council compulsory only in the case of a death sentence. 
For all other sentences, he need only get the opinion of 
the Minister of Justice. The Minister gives such an 
opinion in the name of the Council. But in fact the Council 
need not have met at all.
b ) Independence of the judiciary
Article 7 of Ordinance No. 72/8 provides that the 
Higher Judicial Council ’may’ be consulted by the Head of 
State on all matters relating to the independence of the 
judiciary. The use of the discretionary may and not the man­
datory shall would seem to suggest that the President is not 
bound to consult the Council on this matter. In practice 
however, he always does. Bills or statutory rules and 
orders concerning the independence of the judiciary are 
first submitted to the Council for its opinion thereon.
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c) Appointments and discipline
Article 31 of the Constitution enacts:
"Art. 31. Justice shall be administered 
in the territory of the Rpublic in the name 
of the people of Cameroon.
"The President of the Republic shall ensure 
the independence of the judiciary, and shall 
appoint to the Bench and to the legal ser­
vice .
"He shall be assisted in this task by the 
Higher Judicial Council, which shall give 
him its opinion on the proposed appointments 
to the Bench and on disciplinary sanctions 
concerning them."
This constitutional provision is reiterated in sections 8
and 9 of Ordinance No. 72/8. The Council gives its opinion
on proposals for appointments, promotions, transfers,
secondment and the award of honours to members of the Bench.
It draws up the Promotion List for members of the bench and
gives its opinion on disciplinary sanctions concerning any
member of the judiciary.
C . Operation
Convened by the Head of State (the Council's 
chairman), the Higher Judicial Council holds its meetings 
in the Presidency. Six members constitute a quorum and 
the majority opinion on any point discussed prevails.
The agenda for each meeting is drawn up by the Head of 
State and a copy attached to the convocation to members of 
the Council. The Council has a standing secretariat run 
by a Judge on service in Yaounde. He is appointed by the
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President. Funds for the running of the Council are dis­
bursed from the budget-of the Presidency of the Republic.
Petitions for clemency are first examined by the 
Minister of Justice before being forwarded, together with 
his opinion thereon, to the Council’s secretariat. When 
the Council has given its opinion on a petition for clemency, 
the President would then have to decide on the petition.
In the case of disciplinary measures, the action 
is begun by the Minister of Justice, acting as the accuser.
He formally informs the Head of State of the allegation 
against the Judge concerned supporting his case with all 
useful evidence. The Head of State would then appoint 
a three-man disciplinary committee to conduct inquiries 
into the matter. At the end of the inquiries, the commit­
tee writes its report, a copy of which is given to the 
accused. The accused has access to all the files concerned 
with the case. Summoned at least ten days to the trial, 
the accused must appear in person save for cases of act of 
God duly ascertained. But he is entitled to have an advo­
cate to conduct his defence. The entire proceedings are 
conducted in the manner of an ordinary court trial save 
for the fact that they take place in camera. At the end 
of the trial the accused may be found ’guilty' or 'not 
guilty'. If guilty, the Council gives its opinion on the 
sanction to be imposed. It is then pronounced by the 
President of the Republic and made public, where necessary, 
by decree.
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE CAMEROONIAN MAGISTRACY
A completely professional judiciary or one consis­
ting of professional and lay judges - this is a debatable 
issue. But the debate is a futile one. The same argu­
ments - many courts, a small number of available lawyers, 
the time and cost entailed in training a professional 
judge, the fact that many litigants are unrepresented by 
counsel, the need to administer the law properly, etc. - 
may be advanced for or against a wholly professional judi­
ciary. At the end of the day therefore, the choice between 
a wholly professional and a professional-cum-lay judiciary 
is a matter of policy decision. In England for example, 
unlike in France where there is a preference for a wholly 
professionalised magistracy, the tradition has always been 
to have a judiciary consisting of professional and lay 
judges. In Cameroon too, the judiciary used to comprise 
professional and lay judges, the latter found mainly in 
the customary courts. Since 1972 however, government’s 
policy has been to have a wholly professional judiciary.
To achieve this goal, an increasing number of law graduates 
are being encouraged to enter the magistracy and the 
training of judges has been stepped up, customary courts 
have been removed from the mainstream of the courts system 
and are eventually to be abolished, some customary courts
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are in fact now presided over by professional magistrates, 
and the lay judges who continue to preside over customary 
courts do not come within and are not treated as forming 
part of the magistracy. In Cameroon today therefore, 
the magistracy is completely professionalised and members 
recruited into it follow a career with prospects of advance­
ment from the lower to the higher echelons of the profes­
sion. The policy of having a completely professional 
magistracy is probably desirable. A legal system cannot 
function efficiently without a highly skilled judiciary.
This is the more so in developing countries where, as one 
commentator has rightly pointed out,^ because of the small 
number of lawyers, a person is usually unrepresented, and 
therefore'the judge or magistrate must take a more active 
role in the proceedings. However, the policy of having a 
fully professional magistracy and the corresponding rejec­
tion of lay magistrates has meant making do with an inade­
quate manpower strength for, in Cameroon, it takes at least 
six years of post-secondary school education to train a 
professional magistrate.
The Cameroonian magistracy is still numerically 
small. In 1976 It counted a mere 137 ’magistrats1 employed 
at the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, seven Courts
1. S.D. Ross, fA comparative study of the legal profession 
in East Africa’, [1973] J.A.L., 286.
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of Appeal, thirty-nine High Courts and forty Courts of 
2
First Instance. There was therefore just one magistrat 
to roughly 60,000 Cameroonians. In 1978 the number of 
magistrats had increased to 160, bringing the ratio by 
population down to approximately 1:46,000. Of these 160 
only 144 are engaged in actual court work while 13 work in 
various administrative capacities at the Ministry of 
Justice.^ The 144 include 4 expatriates on contract
5
and serving in various capacities as well as 3 greffiers 
deldgud aux fonctions de magistrat, two of whom are Cameroonian.
g
According to the Judicial Organisation Ordinance and the
7
ordinance fixing the organisation of the Supreme Court, 
there are supposed to be at least 4 magistrats at each Court
2. ’Doumba spells out national role of justice’, Cameroon 
Tribune, Wed. August 18, 1976, No. 112, p. 2.
3. The statistics used here were all obtained from the
Ministry of Justice, Yaoundd.
4. These 160 do not include 17 who are detaches, that is to 
say, on secondment. Among these are Messrs Enoch 
Kwayeb, Tab! Egbe, Ayissi Mvondo, Philomon Yang - all of 
them Ministers; Mr Ngumba Eko, Secretary General at the 
Ministry of Labour & Social Insurance; Mr Mbella Mbappe, 
Chancellor of Yaounde University; and Mr Mongo Soo, 
ambassador.
5. There is one Frenchman serving as greffier contractuel
ddldgue & la fonction judiciare; one Ghanaian, Mrs Hagan,
working at the Procureur Gdneral's Chambers In Buea;
and two West Indians who are judges, Mr Justice Oliver 
Inglis from St Lucia and Mr Justice Rupert Thomas from 
Guyana.
6. No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972, as amended by No. 72/21 of 
19 October 1972.
7. No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, as amended by Law No. 76/28 
of 14 December 1976.
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of First Instance, 4 at each High Court, 7 at each Court 
of Appeal and 10 at the Supreme Court. There is further­
more statutory provision for a Court of First Instance 
in each sub-Division, a High Court in each Division, a 
Court of Appeal for each Province and a single Supreme 
Court for the whole country. Now, there are in Cameroon,
g
7 Provinces, 39 Divisions and 133 sub-Divisions. This 
works out at a minimum of 532 magistrats for all the Courts 
of First Instance, 156 for the High Courts, 47 for the 
Courts of Appeal and 10 for the Supreme Court. Conse­
quently, in order to set up and fully staff all the courts 
previewed in the Judicial Organisation Ordinance of 1972, 
Cameroon would need at least 747 magistrats. But at the 
moment the country cannot boast of 200.
The Cameroonian magistracy is also a male-dominated
 ^ 9profession. There are only 6 lady magistrats in Cameroon.
By the standards of the developed countries, the Cameroonian
magistracy is also a youthful magistracy. Most of the
magistrats fall within the 35-45 years age bracket. There
are none who are sixty. The reason is that the retirement
age for judges is 55.
a. There are also 37 Districts. See, Minister of Terri­
torial Administration, Ministerial Order No. 63 of 28 
March 1973 to fix the call-signs of administrative units 
of the United Republic of Cameroon.
9. I have omitted Mrs Nchouta who has been placed en dispon-
ibilite, i.e. on reserve, and is considered therefore as 
no longer in the service. The six lady magistrats are 
Dame Justice Lucy Gwanmesia, Appeal Court Judge and Their 
Worships Miss F.R. Arrey, Mrs H.E. Ebai, Mrs H.M. Elad,
Mrs C. Ntoko, Miss Ndemou M.
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Even more important from the point of view of 
the administration of justice is the fact that the vast 
majority.of these magistrats are monolingual and monojural. 
There are of course a handful Call of them graduates of 
the Law Faculty of the University of Yaounde) who speak 
and understand English and French as well as being familiar 
with both the common law and the civil law systems. But 
these constitute only a small number. Moreover, they are 
to be found mainly in the Anglophone Provinces. Further­
more, most of them are professionally still young tyros 
at the bottom rung of the professional ladder."^ Grosso 
modo therefore, judicial and legal officers in the Anglophone 
and Francophone Provinces live professionally cloistered 
lives with barely a nodding acquaintance with each other’s 
legal system.^ The magistrat in the Francophone Provinces 
still reasons and talks in terms of the Napoleonic codes,
while his learned brother in the English-speaking Provinces
12still reasons and talks in terms of the common law.
10. Their Lordships, Deba, Mbuagbaw and Gwanmesia JJ., 
are the exceptions.
11. Judicial and legal officers in each sector have never 
officially set foot in courts operating in the other 
sector. No programme exists for such exchanges.
The young legal probationer at the School of Magistracy 
gets his practical training and forensic experience in 
the Anglophone courts if he is Anglophone and in the 
Francophone courts if he is Francophone.
12. A Judge in the Anglophone Provinces is apt to see the 
Judge as one who 'should be an expert in the construction 
of statutes, should be properly versed with common law 
tenets and principles of equity and jurisdiction’, see, 
’Endeley spells responsibility of judges’, Cameroon 
Tribune, Wednesday January 25, 1978, no. 187, p. 4.
This is all Greek to a judge in the Francophone part of 
the country.
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In Cameroon the French expression 'magistrat1 
is a generic term which refers to any member of the bench 
or legal department.. A Supreme or an Appeal Court Judge 
is a magistrat (haut magistrat, he is sometimes called) 
and so too is a magistrate at the smallest Court of First 
Instance. Similarly, a State Prosecutor, whether at the 
appellate court or at the court below, is. also known as a 
magistrat. All of them belong to one professional corps, 
la magistrature or magistracy, which is however function­
ally bifurcated: la magistrature assise (the bench) and
la magistrature debout (also known as le Parquet or again 
le minst£re public) - the legal department. The nomen­
clature 1magistrat1 is pregnant with meaning. It under­
scores three significant facts. First, that organically, 
judge and state prosecutor belong to a single service, the 
Judicial and Legal Service. Section 1(1) of the Rules
13and Regulations governing the Judicial and Legal Service 
enacts that the Judicial and Legal Service comprises "mem­
bers of the bench and of the legal department in service 
in the courts of law, judicial and legal officers of the 
central administration of the Ministry of Justice, legal 
assistants and legal probationers". Secondly, that both 
have had basically the same training and so can serve in 
one or the other capacity whenever required to do so.
13. Decree No. 75/596 of 25 August 1975 as amended by 
Decree No. 76/247 of 24 June 1976.
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The Cameroonian magist.rat is therefore polyvalent: at
one time during his career he may be a judge, at another
a prosecutor or even prosecuting and judging at the same 
14time, and at another time a bureaucrat doing adminis­
trative work at the Ministry of Judice. Thirdly, that 
members of the bench and of the legal department are 
recruited (but not removed) in the same way and are 
governed by the same rules and regulations.
I . Recruitment into the Magistracy
In order to ensure the good administration of 
justice every legal system has a double task; on the one 
hand to establish a system of guarantees that will ensure 
the independence of the judges, and, on the other hand to 
develop a system of rules governing the recruitment of 
judges that will ensure that the candidates selected have 
both the necessary technical (legal expertise, forensic 
and human experience, intelligence, and common sense) and 
moral qualities. Both are two sides of the same coin.
The method of recruitment of judges is in itself an essen­
tial factor in the personal independence of the judge.
14. This is the office of the president charge de 1 Taction
publique, that is, the magistrate-cum-prosecutor. There 
is a close resemblance here with the C olonial Legal Ser­
vice in colonial territories under Britain. In those 
territories there was a unified colonial Legal Service, 
like the French but unlike England, unifying judges and 
Crown counsel.
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There are three main methods by which recruitment of
judges may be made: nomination or appointment by the
executive as in France, Germany, England and Wales;
election by.those subject to their jurisdiction as in
15Poland, U.S.A. and in the Soviet Union; and selection
by the judiciary itself (the system of co-option) as in 
1 &Belgium. In Cameroon the method of recruitment into
the magistracy is by appointment by the executive, usually 
after the aspirant has successfully completed a period of 
training at the Judicial Section (hereinafter referred to 
as the School of Magistracy) of the Ecole Nationale 
d ’Administration et de la Magistrature, E.N.A.M.
15. In the Soviet Union all judges are elected. Judges for 
the lower courts are elected directly by those subject 
to their jurisdiction. Judges of the higher courts
are elected by the various legislative assemblies.
The law demands no legal qualifications from a candi­
date for judicial office-: every enfranchised citizen
of the Union over the age of 25 is eligible to be 
elected judge or peoples’ assessor (art. 29, Principles 
of the Soviet Judicial System). In practice no one 
is proposed as a candidate who has not received some 
legal training or had some practical experience of the 
law. The nomination of candidates is made■by the Party 
or by various collective organisations, which in the 
last resort are dependent on the Party. A Russian 
judge's term of office lasts only 2 to 5 years (art. 19,
20 of the Principles concerning judicial organisation) 
and may even be terminated earlier on a resolution of 
those whose right it is to elect him (art. 35).
16. In Belgium there is a fusion of the principle of nomi­
nation by the executive with that of co-option. The 
judges of the appeal courts are chosen by the King from 
two lists of names, one drawn up by the court in ques­
tion, the other by the Provincial Councillors. Judges 
for the Cour de Cassation are chosen from similar lists, 
one from the Senate and the other from the Court itself. 
All courts elect their own presidents and vice-presidents.
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1. Appointment to the Judicial and Legal Service
All appointments into the Judicial and Legal
Service are made by the Head of State on the advice of
17the Higher Judicial Council. Article 31 of the
Cameroonian Constitution enacts:
"The President of the Republic shall ensure 
the independence of the judiciary and shall 
appoint to the Bench and the legal service.
He shall be assisted in this task by the 
Higher Judicial Council, which shall give 
him its opinion on the proposed appointments 
to the Bench and on disciplinary sanctions 
concerning them."
This arrangement is ostensibly aimed at ensuring freedom 
from politics in judicial appointments. But the Council 
is chaired not by the president of the Supreme Court but 
by the Head of State himself. Furthermore, judges are 
in the minority on the Council. So, apart from the ques­
tion whether it is entirely desirable to remove political 
considerations completely from such appointments, it is 
interesting to speculate whether the Council can always 
perform its functions divorced from politics. Much would 
probably depend on the individual members, their weaknesses, 
hopes and ambitions and the incumbent Head of State.
The educational and moral qualifications demanded 
of aspirants to the Judicial and Legal Service are pre­
cisely laid down by law. This is in order both to ensure
17. For the role of the Higher Judicial Council, see supra, 
chapter 8, Section IV.
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a properly qualified magistracy and to prevent the govern­
ment using arbitrary methods of selection. The required 
qualifications are based upon a double principle; 
namely, that judges are both servants of the state (they 
are said to be performing a public, service) and of the 
law. Thus, no one may be appointed a member of the Judi­
cial and Legal Service unless, (1) he fulfils the con­
ditions prescribed by the Public Service Rules and Regu- 
18lations, (2) he holds the licence en droit of the
19University of Yaoundd, and (3) he holds the Diploma of
the National School of Administration and Magistracy
(Judicial Section) or has completed a training period as
20legal assistant. In Cameroon, as in France and Germany,
18. By s. 51(1) of Decree No. 74/138 of the 18 February 
1974 (General Rules and Regulations of the Public 
Service), "No person may be appointed to a post as a 
civil servant: (a) unless he is of Cameroonian nation­
ality, (b) unless he is at least 17 and at most 35 
years of age ..., (c) unless he is of good character, 
(d) unless he is found to be physically fit for the 
post in question by a health board and is free from 
any disease giving entitlement to special extended 
leave, (e) if he has been convicted ..." Indeed mem­
bers of the magistracy are governed, where there is 
silence in the Service's Rules, by the general rules
of the Public Service: ss. 1(2) and 68 of Decree No.
75/596 of 25 August 1975, and s. 3(2) of Decree No. 
7^/138 of 18 February 1974.
19. This degree may however be replaced by a foreign law 
degree (such as the LL.B.) recognised as equivalent by 
the Ministry of Education and approved by the Minister 
of Justice or dispensed with in the case of success in 
the Bar Final Examination at one of the Bars appearing 
on the list drawn up by decree upon the recommendation 
of the Promotion Board.
20. Decree No. 75/596 of 25 August 1975: Rules and Regu­
lations governing the Judicial and Legal Service,
s. 10(1).
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but unlike in England, the magistracy is a creer. The 
young Cameroonian can therefore choose the profession of 
magistrat by obtaining his licence en droit from the 
University and the Diploma from the School of Magistracy. 
This is the usual road to judicial office, although there 
is statutory provision for direct appointment of law 
teachers and practitioners to the bench.
A. Appointment from among graduates of the School of 
Magistracy
In order to obtain the Diploma of the School of 
Magistracy the student must have successfully completed 
the prescribed course of study and training at the School. 
The course is intended to give the future judges the 
necessary technical qualities. Candidates for the School 
of Magistracy are recruited on the basis of their qualifi­
cations within the limits of the number of places fixed
each year by a joint order of the Ministers of Justice
21and of Public Service. If the number of candidates
exceeds the number of available places, then selection into
the School is effected by means of a concours or competi-
22tive examination. Successful candidates who are admit­
ted into the School are appointed audlteurs de justice 
(legal probationers) by joint order of the Ministers of
21. Rules & Regulations of the Judicial & Legal Service, 
s. 11(2).
22. Ibid., s. 11(3).
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2 7Justice and of the Public Service J and are treated as
24probationer civil servants.
The normal duration of the.course at the School
25of Magistracy is two years,  ^ at the end of which period
the legal probationer sits for the Diploma Examination.
2 6If he succeeds he is awarded the Diploma of the' School
27and is absorbed into the Judicial and Legal Service.
But if he fails, his appointment as legal probationer is
either terminated, or converted into one of attache de
2 8Justice (legal assistant). The legal assistant is then
placed at the disposal of the Procureur General at an
29 70Appeal Court for a training period of at least one year
71before being absorbed into the Judicial and Legal Service.
23. Ibid., s. 12(1).
24. By s. 62 of the General Rules & Regulations of the
Public Service, ’’Probation shall be the period of obser­
vation during which the public employee seeking to be 
confirmed in a grade of the Public Service must prove 
his professional ability, good character and physical 
fitness to perform the duties to which he aspires.
25. S. 13(1), Rules & Regulations of the Judicial & Legal 
Service. However, candidates who are docteurs en droit 
or who hold the Ph.D. degree in law may be admitted 
directly into the second year. S. 13 (2), ibid.
26. The pass mark is an average score of 12/20. S. 13(6),ibid.
27. S. 14(1), ibid. Before 1976, this absorption was auto­
matic and as of right. This is no longer the case.
See, Decree No. 76/247 of 24 June 1976.
28. This will depend upon the approval of the School’s 
Managing Board and the availability of credits.
29. Rules & Regulations of the Judicial & Legal Service, 
s. 15(1)(2).
30. His appointment will be terminted if after 2 years he 
has not improved.
31. Rules & Regulations of the Judicial & Legal Service, 
s. 15(3)(4)(5).
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In theory graduates from the School of Magistracy
are all required to put in at least one year of effective
service at the Chambers of the Procureur General at an
Appeal Court before being appointed to specific posts on
32the bench or in the legal.department. But in practice
this is not the case. It is not uncommon for fresh gra­
duates of that School to be appointed straight away as
33magistrates or state prosecutors. J However, these 
appointments are made only to posts within the lowest 
scale of the profession. A fresh dipl6m€ from the School 
of Magistracy cannot be appointed to the High or Appeal 
Court. He must start his career .at the bottom, at the 
Court of First Instance, slowly climbing up- the ladder by 
way of promotion through his own hard work, luck and the 
good relations he succeeds in maintaining with those res­
ponsible for his promotion.
B . Appointment from among advocates and law teachers
The School of Magistracy is not the exclusive 
gateway to a career in the Cameroonian magistracy. There 
is.provision in the Rules and Regulations of the Judicial 
and Legal Service (Statu.t de la Magistrature) for direct 
appointment into the magistracy other than via the School 
of Magistracy, although such appointments are extremely
32. Ibid., s. 16 C1)C 2)(3).
33. Fieldwork observation and interviews.
391.
rare. Section 10(2)(b) of the Rules and Regulations of
the Judicial and Legal Service provides:
"(b) the requirement of a diploma from the 
National School of Administration and 
Magistracy may be replaced by adequate pro­
fessional experience acquired in Cameroon, 
subsequent to the licence degree in law or 
equivalent qualification within the 
meaning of paragraph 2(a) above, of five 
years as advicate or barrister, ’aggrege’ 
teacher of a law faculty or holder of the 
LL.D. (Doctor of Laws) degree, bailiff, 
notary or solicitor or as an established 
civil servant where the competence and 
professional activities of the candidate 
in legal or social matters qualify him 
for the exercise of judicial duties.”
The poor draftsmanship here has obscured the meaning of
this provision. What the provision would seem to be
saying is that law teachers of high academic standing
and certain auxiliary personnel of the law may be appointed
straight to judicial office without having to pass through
the School of Magistracy. However, before he can hope
to be appointed to such office, the law teacher or the
auxiliary of justice must have had at least five years of
'professional experience’ which may or may not include
forensic experience. This provision however remains a
dead letter.
In the days of the federation it was normal
practice in the former West Cameroon to have an experienced
34and brilliant barrister appointed to the Bench. This
34. Before his appointment to the Bench, His Lordship Mr 
Justice S.M.L. Endeley had had six years of brilliant 
practice at the bar. Mr A.T. Asonganyi was also a 
practising barrister before his appointment to the 
Bench.
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was not surprising. The Bench enjoyed much prestige 
and independence and a judgeship was regarded as the climax 
of an advocate’s career. Consequently, there was no 
unwillingness on the part of barristers to accept appoint­
ment to judicial office. Today however, few advocates 
in Cameroon would accept appointment to the bench, even 
though there is statutory provision that they may be 
appointed straight to the High or Appeal Court. There 
are two main reasons for this unwillingness on the part of 
advocates to accept judicial appointment. First, advo­
cates enjoy their freedom and independence and are extremely 
reluctant to join a judiciary whose independence they 
regard as merely theoretical. Secondly, apart from the 
social prestige which he enjoys, the advocate makes far 
more money in private practice than his colleague in the
magistracy. In fact people have tended to move from the
37magistracy to take up private practice rather than the 
other way round.
There is provision for the appointment of Univer-
Q O
sity law teachers as Appeal Court Judges. But as yet
no such appointments have been made. The reasons are not 
hard to divine. First, the salary is unattractive and the
35. S. 16(6), Rules & Regulations of the Judicial & Legal
Service.
36. Fieldwork interviews.
37. E.G. Messrs Ben Muna, A.T. Asonganyi, Ngondo-Otou.
36. S. 16(6), Rules and Regulations of the Judicial & Legal
Service.
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39bench dull and boring. Secondly, the requirement of
LL.D. or agrdgation is unrealistic, irrational, prepos­
terous and undefendable. There is clearly a lack of
understanding on the part of the draftsman as to what the
French agrdgation and the English LL.D.. are. In France, 
personal research is the essential element in obtaining 
a post in higher education. Access to these posts has as
a prerequisite, depending upon the discipline, success in
40the agrdgation £ 1 1enseignement supdrieur or enrolment 
on a list of those qualified for appointment as maltre de 
confdrence. The agrdgation de 1 Tenseignement supdrieur
is a competitive examination open to persons who are, in
the case of law, docteurs en droit, and which renders
successful candidates eligible for a post as maltre de 
conference or professeur in higher education. The English 
LL.D. on the other hand is a totally different thing. The 
LL.D. may be awarded by an English University after a can­
didate (whether with an LL.B., LL.M., M.Phil., or Ph.D. or 
all of them), usually a senior University teacher (and you 
do not have to hold the LL.M. or M.Phil. or Ph.D. to be one),
39. Fieldwork interviews.
40. In France, there are two types of agrdgations just as 
there are two types of professeurs; the agrdgation 
de 1 Tenseignement secondaire and the agrdgation de
1 ♦ enseignement supdrieur. Both are competitive 
examinations. The former agrdgation is open to can­
didates who have first obtained a licence and then a 
maltrise. Those who pass the concour are styled 
agrdgds~and may be allocated a teaching post in secon­
dary education as professeurs agrdges.
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has submitted for consideration a number of learned works, 
which have usually already been published. The LL.D., 
like the D. Litt. or D.Sc., is conferred in recognition 
of an outstanding contribution to scholarship in a par­
ticular field and is usually awarded to persons of high 
academic distinction and on the basis of previously 
published work. The LL.D. is therefore not a degree one 
studies for at the University any more than the agregation 
is. Thirdly, the draftsman is- grossly in error in empha­
sising on a high academic standard rather than insisting 
on practical and forensic experience.. As things stand, 
a law teacher without the LL.D., be he a Professor with 
so many years of professional and forensic experience, 
does not qualify for a judgeship in Cameroon. This, it 
is submitted with force, is unrealistic and nonsensical.
In America, professional teachers in the law faculties or 
equivalent training institutions may be appointed to the 
bench. This is largely because American law professors 
have usually had some practical, including forensic, 
experience and not because they hold the LL.D. Moreover, 
the tone of American University law teaching is highly 
professional. The case method and frequent use of moots 
and 'legal clinics' as teaching aids inject into these 
schools an atmosphere not unlike that of apprentice training.
Besides law teachers and advocates, an estab­
lished civil servant whose competence and professional 
activities in legal and social matters qualify him for 
the exercise of judicial duties may be appointed straight
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to judicial office. Thus it is normal practice in the
Francophone Provinces for court clerks to be appointed
to the bench. Again, a civil servant with a law degree
but who has not exercised professional activities may be
appointed to judicial office after he has undergone
4i
training as legal assistant. Furthermore, there is
provision for the ’delegation' of 'foreign jurists' to
42judicial and legal posts. This provision therefore
empowers the government to recruit expatriate legal per­
sonnel into the Judicial and Legal Service of the country.
Once appointed, the judicial or legal officer 
remains in the service until he either resigns, retires 
or is dismissed from office (as a disciplinary measure 
upon the commission of a professional offence or as a 
result of unfitness for the service). Retirement marks 
the normal end of the active employment of a civil servant
and entitles him to either a long-service pension or a
43proportional pension. A judge may voluntarily ask to
44be retired at 50; but the normal retiring age is 55.
2. Discipline
Members of the bench and of the legal department;
41. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
Service, s . 1)(3).
42. Ibid., s. 74.
43. General Rules and Regulations of the Public Service, 
ss. 170, 172.
44. Fieldwork interviews.
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are all subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. But the 
degree of subordination Is not the same In both cases. 
Members of the bench are comparatively freer vis-a-vis 
the Ministry of Justice than those of the legal department. 
To give the former some measure of independence, it is 
statutorily provided that they are irremovable and may not, 
except in the case of disciplinary sanction or application
of the interim rules, receive another posting, even as a
4 5
promotion, without their express consent. This pro­
vision which is intended to give judges security of tenure 
by ensuring against their arbitrary removal from office, 
does not apply to members of the legal department.
Although the procedure for the application of disciplinary 
sanctions differs in either case, members of the bench 
and of the legal department are subject to the same profes­
sional discipline and disciplinary sanctions.
A.' The sanctions applicable
46
There are nine disciplinary measures applicable
47
to judicial and legal officers. They are, in ascending
45. Judicial & Legal Service Rules, S. 3(2). But contra 
s. 73 which provides, "In the interests of the service 
... a member of the bench may be transferred or pro­
moted without his consent; ..."
46. They used to be ten. But Decree No. 76/247 of 24 
June 1976 repealed compulsory transfer as a disci­
plinary sanction.
47. Judicial & Legal Service Rules, s. 48(1).
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order of gravity: reprimand, removal from post,,
4 9
deferment of advancement in incremental position, re­
duction in incremental position, interdiction for a
50period of three months, striking off the promotion
51list, deferment of promotion, reduction in group or in 
52
scale,. and dismissal with or without loss of pension
rights. If an officer is charged at the same time
with several disciplinary offences, only one of these
53penalties may be imposed. . Sanctions are pronounced
by decree of the Head of State after the relevant proce-
54dures have been followed.
Sanctions are imposed for any failure by a 
judicial o r ■legal officer to fulfil the duties and obli­
gations attaching to his rank, in particular any serious
48. This consists in maintaining the member of the service 
on the bench or in the legal department of the same
court in a post corresponding to his group or scale
but subordinate to the one he previously occupied.
Ibid., s . 49(1).
49. This may not be for less than one year nor may it
exceed three years. Ibid., s. 49(2).
50. During this period the officer loses his salary but 
continues to receive the fringe benefits he is entitled 
to, such as children’s allowance, house allowance, etc.
51. The deferment of promotion in scale or group or promo­
tion to the super scale may not be for less than one 
year nor may it exceed four years. Ibid., s. 49(3) -
52. This entails grading as from the day on which it takes 
effect, in the group or scale immediately below the 
incremental position within the said group or scale 
being fixed by the disciplinary authority as from the 
same date. Ibid., s. 49(4).
53. Ibid., s. 50.
54. Ibid., s. 48(2).
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professional offence or impropriety, breach of honour of 
55dignity.  ^ In the case of a member of the legal department,
the disciplinary offence is determined in the light cf
56obligations resulting from his subordinate rank. Prima
facie, these sanctions may be imposed only for serious
professional misconduct as such or conduct unbecoming a
member of the Judicial and Legal Service. But there is
no reason to suppose that it would not include, for
example, concerted activity which may interfere with the
administration of justice such as strike, collective resig- 
57nation. 1 It may also include certain political acti­
vities, such as for example being highly critical of the 
one party system.
Apart; from any disciplinary action that may be 
taken against any judicial or legal officer, the President 
of the Supreme Court, the Presidents of Appeal. Courts, 
procureurs general, the secretary general at the Ministry 
of Justice as well as the directors in that Ministry, 
have authority to issue a warning to the judicial and 
legal officers whom they are empowered to report upon and 
propose for promotion. The Minister of Justice has the 
same right as regards the Secretary-General and Directors 
in his Ministry as well as the Presidents of courts and 
heads of legal departments. Such warning (avertissement),
55. Ibid., s. 46(1).
56. Ibid., s . 46(2).
57. Cf. s. 124 of the Cameroonian Penal Code.
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which must be consequent upon a request for a written
explanation (demande d ?explications £crites), are filed
in the records of the judicial or legal officer concerned.
Moreover,.a judicial or legal officer who proves to be
unfit for, the service or to be a notorious alcoholic
may, after consultation with the Higher Judicial Council
or the Permanent Disciplinary Board, as the case may be,
be dismissed or compulsorily retired. Furthermore,
where the Minister of Justice receives a complaint or is
informed of facts which appear to call for disciplinary
action against a judicial or legal officer he may on his
sole authority suspend the officer in question for up to 
60six months.
The imposition of a disciplinary sanction is
without prejudice to any criminal sanction that may flow
61from the officer's act. The Rules and Regulations of
the Judicial and Legal Service do not say so expressly.
But it would be absurd to hold that when a legal or 
judicial officer is guilty of conduct which amounts to
58. Rules & Regulations of the Judicial & Legal Service, 
s. 47.
59• Ibid., s . 69(1).
60. Ibid., s. 51(1)(2) .
61. Cf. s. 130 of the General Rules and Regulations of 
the Public Service: "Disciplinary sanctions shall be 
separate from penal sanctions or sanctions resulting 
from a financial decision. Provided that the disci­
plinary board may in the event of legal proceedings 
concomittant with disciplinary proceedings, defer its 
opinion until the final ruling of the court hearing 
the case."
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both a disciplinary and a criminal offence, the imposition 
of a disciplinary sanction bars any subsequent criminal 
proceedings against him. That the rule against double 
jeopardy does not apply here can be inferred from s. 51(3) 
of the Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
Service. It provides that any judicial or legal officer 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall, without more, 
be suspended, with effect from the day of his imprzi sonment 
until the day he has served his sentence, without prejudice 
to any disciplinary measure which may be taken against
Disciplinary sanctions are not the only means 
by which the profession obligations of magistrats are 
enforced. Serious violations of professional duties 
may amount to criminal offences. Thus it is a criminal 
offence punishable with imprisonment for from three months 
to two years for any person exercising judicial functions 
to decline after having been duly moved in that behalf to
6 o
issue a decision. Moreover, in the Francophone Provinces,
62. S. 51(4) enacts, "Where a warrant of arrest or a com­
mittal order is issued against a judicial or legal 
officer, the suspension shall take effect as from the 
day of his arrest." S. 51(3) and (4) ensure that a 
judicial or legal officer is stripped of his office 
before he is tried for or convicted of a criminal offence.
63. C.P.C., s. 147. See also s. 33(d) of Law No. 75/16 
of 8 December 19 75 fixing the procedure and functions 
of the Supreme Court. This refusal to decide a case 
ripe for decision is known as denial of justice (deni 
de justice). Other serious violations of professional 
duties which are criminal offences are: refusal to 
enforce any provision of lav; or usurping legislative
or executive functions (ss. 125, 126 C.P.C.), corruption 
(s. 134 C.P.C.), undue demand (s. 142, C.P.C.), ren­
dering a decision from ill-will or favour (s. 143 C.P.C.),
/Continued over
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members of the bench, the legal department and la police
.1 udiciaire may be sued for damages on account of their
64official actions. The procedure for bringing suits of
this nature is known in the literature as la prise & 
partie, and it has intentionally been made cumbersome to 
avoid burdening the courts with numerous suits by dis­
gruntled parties. A person desiring to sue say, a Judge 
of the Supreme Court, must first obtain leave from the 
President of that Court, who must consult with the Procureur 
General at that Court, before making a decision whether to 
grant leave or not. A suit can be brought against a 
Judge, legal officer, or member of the judicial police for 
fraud, perversion of justice, undue demand, professional 
misconduct, unreasonable delay in rendering a decision, 
and so on. This procedure, alien to the common law edu­
cated lawyers cf Anglophone Cameroon, has however never 
been used probably because of the ignorance of litigants 
or because the occasion for its invocation has never arisen.
B . Procedure for the application of sanctions
Upon receipt of information or complaint of facts
Footnote 63 continued from page 400.
refusal of service (s. 148, C.P.C.), prosecuting or
trying a member of government or Parliament in vio­
lation of immunity (s. 127, C.P.C.).
64. Law No. 75/16 of 8 December 1975, ss. 33-35;
Codes d'Instruction Criminelle.
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which appear to call for disciplinary action against a
judicial or legal officer, the Minister of Justice brings
the matter before the Permanent Disciplinary Board (if
the matter concerns a member of the legal department),
or the Higher Judicial Council (if the matter concerns a
member of the bench). If the officer is a president
charge de faction publique (magistrate-cum-prosecutor)
the relevant disciplinary body will be determined according
to whether the disciplinary offence was committed in the
exercise of his duties relating to the bench or to the
65legal department.
The Higher Judicial Council deals, inter alia, 
with the discipline of members of the bench. In disci­
plinary proceedings the Minister of Justice acts as the 
complaining party. The Council is convened by the Head 
of State at the Presidency and he is its chairman. The 
accused judge and his counsel (if he is so minded to have 
one) are entitled to examine the complete file of the case 
and to be heard. If the accused judge is found guilty 
one of the disciplinary sanctions is imposed on him. It 
is doubtful whether a decision of the Council may be re­
viewed by the court. Although the law does not say so, 
it seems the Council’s decision is not subject to judicial 
review. But on principle, there is no persuasive reason
65. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
Service, s. 72.
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why a decision of the Council may not be challenged before 
the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court.
While disciplinary sanctions against members of 
the bench are imposed on the advice of the Higher Judicial 
Council, those' for members of the legal department are 
imposed on the advice of the Permanent Disciplinary Board, 
a less prestigious body. The Board, established at the 
Ministry of Justice, consists of the President of the 
Supreme Court, chairman, the Procureur General at the 
Supreme Court, vice-chairman, the Secretary General at 
the Ministry of Justice, and four senior judicial or legal 
officers appointed for two years by the Supreme Court.
When a case is brought before this seven-man Board, its 
chairman appoints a rapporteur from amongst the members.of 
the Board and instructs him, if necessary, to undertake 
an inquiry into the matter. During the inquiry, the rap­
porteur hears the officer accused and causes him to be 
heard by a member of the service at least equal to him in 
rank. The complainant and witnesses are also heard, if 
need be. The rapporteur carries out all necessary 
investigations and then makes a written report. At the 
end of the inquiry (or if no inquiry is deemed necessary) 
the accused legal officer is summoned to appear before the 
Baord at least ten days to the day on which the Board is 
convened. The officer must appear in person. But he
66. Ibid., ss. 52-60.
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may be assisted and, in the case of certified illness or 
impediment, he may be represented by one of his colleagues 
or counsel. At least ten days before the hearing, the 
officer must be given access to his personal file, all the 
documents of the inquiry and the report drawn up by the 
rapporteur.
When the Board meets on the day scheduled for 
the hearing, the rapporteur reads his report and the 
accused officer is called upon to explain his conduct and 
defend himself. His counsel or representative may then 
plead on his behalf.. Absent the case of force majeure, 
if the accused officer fails to put in appearance, the 
matter is not adjourned but proceeded with all the same.
The Board always sits in camera. No resolution may be 
taken unless at least five of its members including either 
the chairman or the vice-chairman, are present. After 
its deliberations the Board submits to the Minister of 
Justice, at least two months after having taken cognizance 
of the case, its reasoned opinion concerning the penalty 
which the facts seem to warrant. The decision is then 
notified to the accused officer through the administrative 
channels. The penalty inflicted takes effect from the 
date of such notification. It is hard to know how often 
judicial and legal officers in Cameroon are dis ciplined 
and for what specific professional misconduct. The 
authorities are very reticent on this point. Furthermore, 
most of the sanctions (reprimand, deferment of advancement, 
reduction in incremental position, striking off the
405.
promotion list, deferment of promotion, reduction in group 
or scale) are never made public and are in themselves 
not outwardly visible. This is however not the case with 
dismissals because here, the dismissal is in itself pub­
licity of the sanction imposed. However, during the last 
decade at least ten judicial and legal officers appear 
to have been dismissed from the service mainly for such
C 7
unbecoming conduct as bribery or corruption.
II. The Myth of Judicial Independence and Neutrality
Independence of the judiciary is one of the oft- 
vaunted principles on which the administration of justice 
in Cameroon is founded. Article 31 of the Cameroonian 
Constitution provides that the "President of the Republic 
shall ensure the independence of the judiciary". This 
is of course a circuitous way of saying that the judiciary 
is independent and this independence shall be ensured by 
the Head of State. ’Independence’ in this context is 
generally taken and understood to include impartiality and 
neutrality. The judiciary is therefore expected to be 
independent, impartial and neutral. But this principle, 
which rests on the traditional view that the only function 
of the judiciary is to decide disputes between litigants, 
is more theoretical than real.
67- Fieldwork interviews.
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1. The traditional view
For a long time the role of the judiciary has 
been seen as merely that of a neutral arbitral force. 
Several safeguards have therefore been devised throughout 
the ages to ensure that it is independent and protected 
from all situations which might imperil its objectivity.
A. The role of judges and the independence of the judiciary
The primary function of the judiciary is to
render justice and to do so with impartiality.
"The basic mission of justice in the nation 
lies in guaranteeing the rights that the law 
acknowledges to every citizen, in protecting 
his person, in settling disputes which may 
arise among citizens, in preventing crime, 
or failing that, in identifying delinquents gg 
so that they may be prosecuted and punished."
It is of interest to note that the basic mission of the judi­
ciary in Cameroon is .defined as not only that of settling 
disputes (which evidently includes the safeguard of the 
person of the individual, his rights, property and honour 
vis-a-vis other individuals and, more importantly, vis-a-vis 
the state) but also that of crime prevention. This is a 
slight shift from the traditional role often assigned to
68. Address by President Ahidjo while opening the 1975/76 
Judicial Year, see, ’President defines role of judi­
ciary', Cameroon Tribune, No. 70, 29 October 1975, p. 1; 
see also, E.T. Egbe, 'Some principles and character­
istics of justice’ ABBIA, No. 5, 1964, p. 93.
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judges. This ’new1 role does not mean that the judiciary
would have to usurp the functions of the police and the
gendarmerie. It is simply another way of saying that
the judiciary should be as much conerned as the executive
with the preservation of law and order in society. This
vision of the role of the judiciary stems from the fact
that the judiciary is one of the principal organs of a
democratic society without whom government would be carried
on only with great difficulty.
"Democracy requires that some group of persons 
acts as an arbiter not only between individuals 
but also between Governmental power and the 
individual. In criminal matters this Govern­
mental power will be exercised through the police 
to bring a wrongdoer before the court. It 
will ensure that the order of the court is 
enforced, that prisons are provided, that fines 
are paid. But there must be somebody other 
than the Government which hears the case, makes 
the decision, and decides the sentence. By 
this means the daily use, by the Government and 
its agencies, of force is legitimated and so 
made acceptable to society at large. Judges 
then, ... are an essential part of government 
but exist to operate as a part of democratic 
organisation." 69
It is in this way that the judiciary, like the 
executive, is concerned, in a rather passive but indispen- 
sible manner, with the maintenance of law and order in 
society.
"In fact, it is not enough for the judicial 
officer to be independent vis-a-vis the 
Government. Mo one would dare reproach a
69. J.A.G. Griffith, The politics of the judiciary, 
Fontana Books, Manchester University Press, 1977,
p . 188.
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Government because, conscious of its great 
mission and respect of the law, responsible 
for public order and security, for stimu­
lating progress, and for defending the legi­
timate interests of the State and Society, it 
uses its legal machinery to track down and take 
action against offenders of all sorts, upholds 
the. prosecution, follows the course of justice, 
and ensures the proper application of the 
law while leaving to the members of the Bench 
the responsibility of passing judgment accor­
ding to their conscience." 70
The role of the judiciary in crime prevention is cast not 
in terms of preventive adjudication but in passing deter­
rent sentences. The judiciary is often called upon to 
’deal severely7 with those guilty of offences such as
corruption, armed robbery, smuggling and evasion of customs 
71duties. The apparent contradiction in the judiciary’s
position as both upholder of law and order and protector 
of the Individual’s rights, honour and property is 
explained in the American constitutional concept of 
7 checks and balances’ or countervailing power.
The judge is expected to be independent, neutral 
and impartial. He must decide issues in accordance with 
the law. His personal bias and prejudices as well as 
his political and religious views must not be allowed to 
influence his decisions for, litigants expect a fair and 
full trial from him. The judge must be in every sense 
of the word an impartial arbiter of disputes. For,
70. Address by President Ahidjo on the ceremonial re­
opening of the Supreme Court on 15 November 1977, 
see, ’Rentrde solonnelle de la cour supreme7,
Cameroon Tribune, No. 1024, jeudi, 17 Nov. 1977, p. 4.
71. Ibid., loc. cit.
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Tt. . . impartiality is the first essential in 
any judge. And that means not only that he 
must not appear to favour either party. It 
also means he must not take sides on political 
issues." 72
Impartiality is an essential attribute of judicial inde­
pendence .
"The material guarantee of the independence 
granted to the judicial corps must have as 
its spiritual counterpart an absolute neut­
rality and objectivity ... freely accepted by 
each of its members. There can be no 
impartiality in a judge without this neutrality 
in the independence of his functions." 73
Accordingly, the judge must decide cases fearlessly. He 
must ignore any personal consequences, adverse or other­
wise, that might flow from his decision. He must, in 
the words of the Cameroonian judicial oath,
"render justice impartially to all in accor­
dance with the laws, regulations and customs 
of the Cameroonian people, without fear, 
favour or malice." 74
In carrying out his judicial functions the judge must be
75subject only to the law and his conscience. In short,
the judge Is required to ’act like a political, economic
and social eunuch, and have no interest in the world out-
7
side his court when he comes to judgment’.
72. Lord Reid, ’The judge as law maker’, J.S.P.T., vol. 22,
No. 1, 1972, p. 23.
73. Ahidjo address,. 15 Nov. 1977j op.cit.
74. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal
Service, s . 22(1).
75. Ibid., s. 3(1).
76. Griffith, op.cit., p. 187.
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A judiciary that lacks these attributes, it Is 
feared, would be regarded as merely an instrument of 
repression in the hands of the executive. Such a judiciary 
would give the ordinary man the distinct impression that 
the court is aiding and abetting oppression and corruption. 
The result in the public eye would be to bring the law 
and the court into disrepute. This can generate unrest 
and a return to the law of the jungle. Such a situation 
would evidently be indicative of the system and would 
amount to a subversion of the whole governmental set up. 
Hence, the requirement that the judiciary should be an 
independent, impartial and neutral arbiter of disputes 
stems from the overriding concern to promote the people’s 
confidence in the system of justice set up by the govern­
ment. This much was evident in the Minister of Justice’s
speech in Bamenda while installing the Hon. Mr Justice 
Nyo’ Wakai as President of the North West Provincial Court 
of Appeal.
”In your capacity as Magistrate of the Bench," 
the Minister reminded the learned Judge,
"your main occupation is to deliver impartial 
judgments based on the law and your conscience.
In the application of our laws, you must
constantly maintain a high sense of profes­
sional ethics and objectivity combined with 
the highest degree of equity. The population 
should be able to confide in the judiciary 
and have the assurance that justice will be 
rendered to all manner of persons, irrespec­
tive of social status, tribal origin or any 
other discriminatory consideration. As you 
know, justice is supposed to punish, to 
correct and to protect equally the employer 
and the employee, the weak and the powerful,
4 l l .
rr rj
the poor and. the rich.”
Since the role of’ the judge is to render justice 
and with impartiality, he is expected to> live a cloistered, 
existence, uninterested in the world outside his court. 
Concomitant with this view is the attitude that the 
judiciary must be self-denying, exercise self-restraint 
and not show initiative. The judiciary, unlike the 
Government., is denied the power to> legislate or initiate 
legislation. In fact it is a criminal offence punishable 
with up to five years' imprisonment for any Judge to pur—
7g
port to do> so. 1 Judges may not, strieto s e n s u s » make 
Tlawrr for the Constitution confers; on them no such powers. 
Their job is merely to apply the law and to show no creati­
vity; even when construing, an obscure statute they are 
not entitled 1 to make any far-fetched interpretation of
79
the law or of just i c e ’ . Furthermore, the judge has no
power, except in the case of contempt sedente curia„ to 
initiate process (even of.review of legislative and execu­
tive; measures). If the; law has been violated by the 
government or an individual, however flagrant, the court 
canmot intervene on its own initiative and commence procee­
ding's against the wrongdoer. It must wait until it Is
77- Speech by Mr Charles Doumbe., Minister of Justice, at
the installation of Mr Justice N y o f Wakai as Appeal
Court President, 2 5 November 19 77, mimeograph.
78. C.P.C,, s. 125(a); c f . C.F.C., s. 126(b).
79. Ahldjo -address, 15 November 1977, op.cit.
moved by someone. Judicial adventurism is frowned upon.
"A meddlesome judiciary poses the danger of 
abuse, and "of conflict with the government, 
and is well calculated to undermine, if 
not destroy, the court’s popular image of 
an impartial, disinterested arbiter between 
contestants in a dispute. It is this pos­
ture of impartiality and disinterestedness 
that makes a decision invalidating a govern­
ment act tolerable to the government ...
It might well feel some disappointment or 
embarrassment, but not antagonism.” 80'
The fear is that judicial charisma, preserved for purely
court purposes, may be frittered away if judges are turned
into troublemakers for the other branches of government.
B . Safeguards aimed at ensuring the independence of the 
j udiciary
The nature of the judge’s activity demands that 
he be independent, in the sense that he be subject only to 
the law. In other words his judgments must be delivered 
without interference from other organs of the state.
But such legal freedom from state interference is not 
enough in itself. It must be supplemented by personal 
independence, which may however be threatened by the state, 
by pressure groups or by parties. While it is true that 
such independence is primarily a question- of the character 
and stature of individual judges, it remains nonetheless
80. B.O. Nwabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa - the 
role of the courts in government, Hurst & Co., London, 
1977, p. 49.
413.
equally true that the institutions themselves can and 
must facilitate and encourage the judge’s, resistance to 
pressures, corrupt influences, threats and possible 
temptations. The guarantees aimed at ensuring the indepen­
dence of judges in Cameroon stem from conventions and 
from statute.
Judicial officers are required to take the 
judicial oath before taking up their judicial functions. 
Standing before the full session of the Supreme Court in 
solemn occasion and in the presence of the Premier Magistrat 
of the country (that is, the Head of State), the newly 
appointed judicial officer, with his right hand raised, 
takes the following oath:
"I, XYZ, swear before God and all men honestly 
to serve the people of the United Republic of 
Cameroon in my capacity as a member of the 
Judicial and Legal Service, to render justice 
impartially to all in accordance with the laws, 
regulations and customs of the Cameroonian 
people, without fear, favour or malice, and 
in all ways, in all places and at all times 
to bear myself as a worthy and faithful member 
of the service."
It is not expected that this oath would be taken lightly.
Nor is it. From time immemorial the ritual of oath- 
taking has been used as an initiation, a. deterrent and a 
means of ensuring conformity.
There are other conventions associated with 
the independence of the judiciary. It is expected that 
judges will be sober, orderly and discreet in their per­
sonal lives. A judge is expected to live
"a life which always reflects the qualities 
of competence, independence, integrity,
4l4,
dignity and moderation ..., an. exemplary 
life in every sense of the word ..., his 
official as well as his private life must 
be irreproachable." 8l
He must keep himself a little bit aloof from the people 
and maintain a high standard of respectability and morality. 
He must avoid company or social situations which might be 
used to discredit the judiciary. What would be thought 
of a judge who is a gambler? a drunkard? or who is always 
running after women?
Some of the features of court-house architecture 
are directed to ensure protection of judges from close 
contact with the public and even practitioners, when 
entering or leaving the court. To some extent all this 
is designed to prevent imputations of bias against a judge 
due to his having contact with persons concerned in a 
particular case. Thus the court-room arrangement, whereby 
the judge alone sits on the dais, is intended to have a 
psychological effect on litigants. It is designed to 
reflect the judge’s isolation and detachment from the 
heat and controversy of the conflict. Indeed, in and 
out of court, the judge is required to maintain ’a chill 
and distant height’. That judges are expected to live 
an irreproachable life is emphasised by the statutory pro­
vision that any ’impropriety, breach of honour or dignity’
8 2constitutes a disciplinary offence. Moreover, a judge
81. Doumba speech, 25 November 1977s op.cit.
82. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal Service, 
s . 46(1).
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who ’proves to be unfit for the service or to be a
notorious alcoholic’ may be dismissed or compulsorily
, • , 83retired.
Conventions, even if backed with the possibility 
of sanctions in the event of breach, are not enough to 
ensure a judge's neutrality and impartiality. There 
are stautory guarantees of the judge's independence. It 
is provided that judges shall in carrying out their judi­
cial functions be subject only to the law and their own 
84conscience. The principle of the separation of powers
shields them from orders, from any organ of the executive. 
Moreover, it is a criminal offence punishable with up to 
five years’ imprisonment for anyone who, being the repre­
sentative of the executive authority, issues any order or
85prohibition to any court. Thus a minister, prefect,
governor who does so falls foul of the law and can be 
properly convicted and sentenced.
The principle of irremovability of judges stems 
from an attempt to ensure their personal independence. 
Section 3(2) of the Rules and Regulations of the Judicial 
and Legal Service provides that they shall be irremovable 
and may not, except in the case of disciplinary sanctions 
or application Of the interim rules, receive another 
positing, even as a promotion, without their express con­
sent. Thus, in theory, the Cameroonian judge can neither
83. Ibid., s. 69(1).
84. Ibid., s . 3(1).
85. C.P.C., s. 126(a).
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be transferred nor even be promoted without his consent. 
Measures may be taken against judges for unprofessional 
conduct; but these are taken only as disciplinary 
sanctions 1.
For the rest the legislator has taken the pre­
caution of declaring certain activities to be incompatible 
with the holding of judicial office. These include the 
holding of any public office or of any other paid employ­
ment, commercial or otherwise.
’’The following shall be incompatible with 
the status of judicial or legal officers:
(a) the exercise of any trade or industry 
or of any duty whatsoever in a commercial 
or industrial establishment.
(bj the capacity of auxiliary officer of 
justice, in particular that of advocate, 
notary or bailiff. Provided that the 
Minister of Justice may authorise, by 
order, the registration or the maintenance 
of the registration, excluding the exer­
cise of the profession, at a .foreign 
bar." 87
The legislator has also laid down certain cases.in which 
a judge is excluded from exercising jurisdiction, in par­
ticular where there is a close relationship of affinity
86. This apparently originates from the view that judges 
should not after appointment to a particular position 
be promoted, because the possibility of promotion might 
tempt them to seek through their decisions the favour 
of the authority which could promote. But this is
the very thing which the practice in Cameroon encourages 
- advancement of judges from court to court.
87. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal Ser­
vice, s. 17. Before 1977 the prohibition in s. 17(a) 
was absolute. The exercise of any trade etc. was for­
bidden ’whether or not through an intermediary'. But 
the amending decree of June 1976 repealed the words
in quotes. The practical effect of this is that a 
judge may, through an intermediary, engage in trade etc.
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or consanguinity between the judge and the litigant.
"Spouses, blood relations and relations by 
marriage up to and including the degree of 
uncle and nephew may not:
(a) at the same time be members of the same 
court,
(b; belong at the same time, one to the bench, 
the other to the legal department of the 
same court,.
(c) hear, in any capacity, appeals against a 
decision which has involved either their 
spouse, or a blood relation or relation 
within the prohibited degrees." 88
Besides, litigants are given the right to raise objection
89against a judex suspectus.
In a further attempt to ensure that judges are 
independent and free from corrupt financial influences, 
attempts have been made recently to make conditions of 
judicial service more attractive. Judicial salaries have 
been increased. The judge now receives a basic monthly 
salary which is better than what he used to get before 1975
90as well as a number of allowances by way of fringe benefits. 
Salaries for all public employees in Cameroon are based on 
a system of index numbers. under this system positions 
are assigned index numbers, the lowest paying position 
receiving the number 100. The index number indicates the
88. Ibid., s. 18. This provision attempts to ensure that 
the judge is not placed in a situation in which he might 
be suspected of bias or collusion.
89. Cf. ss. 30-32 of Law No. 75/16 of 8th December 1975 
(Procedure and Functions of the Supreme Court).
90. For example, upon leaving the School of Magistracy, the 
newly appointed officer is paid a basic monthly salary 
of roughly 9d,000 frs cfa plus various allowances which 
bring his net monthly salary to at least 120,OOu frs cfa.
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salary for the position as a percentage of the lowest 
salary. Anything after the index number 1,±50 is ’ super 
scale’ for, there is no index point after that. Index 
lOu corresponds to a monthly salary of roughly 20,000 francs 
cfa (450 frs cfa = £1 sterling).
The salary index scales of judicial and legal
officers and legal assistants is set out as. schedule B to
the Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal Service.
Upon leaving the.School of Magistracy a newly appointed
magistrat enters the first scale, first incremental position
which corresponds to index 530 and gives him a basic monthly
salary of roughly 100,000 francs cfa. Increments within
91each scale accrue automatically every two years. After
four years of service in the first scale he may be promoted 
to the second scale, and he enters the first incremental 
position which corresponds to index 740 and gives a basic 
monthly salary of roughly 140,000 francs cfa. He gets the 
same periodic increases thereafter.
By and large however, the financial position of 
the Cameroonian magistrat is improved by a number of fringe 
benefits. He receives a family allowance calculated on 
the .basis of number of children up to a maximum of five.
He is housed or receives a house allowance in lieu, the
91. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal Service, 
s. 9(2).
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amount of which varies according to the magistrat's 
position. He is also paid an indemnite de fonctions 
which depends on the position held and the place where 
the magistrat lives. Thus judges serving in Douala and 
Yaounde are paid, higher duty allowances than their col­
leagues elsewhere. The purpose of this is apparently to 
adjust salaries to variations of the cost of living in 
these two towns and the rest of the country. Travelling, 
car and out-of-station allowances are also paid to judges. 
These allowances are also apparently intended to compen­
sate for not otherwise reimbursable expenses occasioned 
by official duties. These various allowances increase 
the base salary of the magistrat by about 10 to 25 per cent.^ 
A small deduction is made from the salaries of all judicial 
and legal officers, like all civil servants, for retirement 
benefits. Retired judges receive pension benefits the 
exact amount of which depends on the length of service of 
each judge.
Cameroonian judges are held in high esteem and 
enjoy a high and respected social position. They have 
never been publicly accused of partiality or of being poli­
tically motivated.
"LTindependance qui leur est assuree sure le
plan des principes et par leur application
donne §L ce corps une place eminente dans l'Etat.
92. Allowances paid to civil servants of comparable rank 
are in fact higher than those paid to judicial and 
legal officers. This has been a source of much dis­
content on the part of the latter.
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Jusqu’S. ce jour, aucune critique de quelque 
ordre qu'elle soit, n'a ete formulee par la 
presse, 3. l ’encontre des magistrats qui, par 
ailleurs dans l ’exercice de leurs fonctions, 
n ’ont eu a faire face a aucune intervention 
d 1aucune sorte obdissant k des preoccupations 
etrangdres k la distribution d ’une saine 
justice." 93
However, it is quite difficult for a Cameroonian judge to 
attain personal fame in his profession. In England and 
the United States 'of America as well as in most common 
law jurisdictions, it is almost impossible to appraise 
the role of the judiciary without reference to contribution 
by individual judges. Not so in Cameroon. There is no 
single judge who, as an individual, is famous nationally 
or in academic circles. The Cameroonian judiciary has no 
equivalent of such great judges as Holmes, Marshall, 
Atkinson, Denning and so on. The reasons for this are 
two-fold. First, there is an insistence, in the judiciary, 
on an esprit de corps. This engenders court solidarity 
rather than judicial individuality. Secondly, the 
principle that cases are decided by a panel without dis­
senting opinions and the tradition, in the Francophone
courts, of making opinions brief and casting them in a 
94standard style, make it virtually impossible for an
93* Victor Kanga, fLe role du pouvoir judiciaire et du 
barreau dans la protection des droits de l ’individu 
au sein de la societeT, Penant, vol. 713 1961, p. 494. 
This statement is apparently still true today.
94. In the Anglophone courts, judgments are delivered in 
typical Anglo-American style; the judge may expatiate 
on what he is doing, why he is doing it and its con­
sequences .
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Individual judge to put his personal stamp on his decisions. 
This principle is reinforced by the so-called ’secret de 
la deliberation’ rule. Except for judgments delivered by 
single-judge courts, every court judgment in Cameroon is 
delivered per curiam, that is, as the unanimous decision 
of the court. In other words, each judgment is the pro­
duct of a collective examination by all the judges concerned.
A dissenting judgment may be written but it is filed and 
not read in open court - once more to ensure court solidarity. 
The desire seems to be to prevent personal ambition and 
aggrandisement on the part of judges. A judge who succeeds, 
through his judgments, in carving a niche for himself in 
the judiciary may become too popular and consequently begin 
to nurse political ambitions. Whatever the reasons for 
insisting on court solidarity, there is no doubt that the 
system kills personal initiative.
Cameroonian judges are entitled to civil and mili- 
95tary honours. But their low position in protocol has
remained a matter of bitterness on the part of judicial 
and legal officers. At public ceremonies they come well 
after local- administrators and party officials.
2. The reality of the situation
Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers
95. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal Service, 
s. 27.
9bhas, although it has not escaped criticism, come to stay
as the foundation of governmental structure; at least in
97the Western Democracies. Each arm of the government
maintains its separateness but also acts as a counter­
vailing force vis-a-vis the other. Any encroachment by 
one on the domain reserved for the other is unconstitutional. 
Thus the power of the executive or the legislature to make 
law for peace, order and good government does not entitle 
either of them to usurp the judicial power of the judica­
ture. Any such legislative or executive usurpation is
98ultra vires and void.
This constitutional law theory has however not
96. "There are no legislative or executive organs. There 
is a Head of State or a President of the Republic, 
Assemblies, a Ministerial Cabinet, Ministers, a Presi­
dent of the Council. All these organs participate in 
the accomplishment of a single function, the govern­
mental function. But they do so with varied powers
and authority, by acts which, at times are only political 
and at other times have in addition a legal value."
Georges Burdeau, Traite de science politique, tome V, 
p. 38, cited by P. Mbome in, TLes emp§chements du president 
de la rdpublique au Camerounf, R. Jur. Pol. Ind. Coop., 
t. 32, p. 9053 Paris, Sept. 197b* The translation is 
mine.
97. In the Eastern Countries, Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
utterly rejects the principle of the separation of 
powers. It is regarded as a bourgeois principle the 
purpose of which is to restrict the sovereignty of the 
people. The foremost tasks of justice are seen as the 
defence of existing socialist order, the protection of 
socialist legality, and the education of the people 
towards socialism.
98. E.g., the vesting of strictly judicial power in persons 
or authorities other than the court, as was the case 
under the colonial system of administration, is a 
usurpation of judicial powers.
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prevented the judiciary being subjected to the executive. 
Under the Cameroonian Constitution, legislation in respect 
of the judicial system and creation of new classes of
QQ
courts falls within the legislative domain. But Parlia­
ment may empower the President of the Republic to legislate, 
on these and other matters reserved for the legislature, 
by way of ordinance for a limited period and for given 
purposes. 100 It was therefore the executive which by 
ordinance, organised the judicial set up of the country.
The Constitution furthermore provides that the President 
of the Republic shall make judicial appointments and pro­
nounce disciplinary sanctions concerning judges. He is 
assisted by the Higher Judicial Council. The Head of 
State is also the guarantor of the independence of the 
judiciary.101 Thus in the governmental troika, the judi­
ciary, though indispensable, is in a subordinate position. 
Not only does the judiciary depend on the executive to 
ensure its independence, it also depends on the executive 
to enforce its decisions.
The judicature lacks an independent machinery for 
enforcing judgments. The machinery to enforce a decision
99. Art. 20.
100. Art. 21.
101. The Constitution mentions this matter of independence 
only obliquely. Besides, nowhere is it said how the 
President is to ensure this independence, it being left, 
presumably, for the President himself to decide how to 
do so.
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owes all its sanctions to the organised coercive force of 
the State; the police, prisons service and the army, all 
of which are arms of the executive, by whom their adminis­
tration and operational use are controlled. The execu­
tory formula for copies of judgments and judicial warrants, 
together with engrossments and copies of contracts and
all documents capable of enforcement, is a direction to any
bailiff or process-server shown the document or judgment 
to levy execution according to its tenor. It reads:
"Wherefore, the President of the United 
Republic of Cameroon commands and enjoins 
all bailiffs and process-servers to enforce 
this judgment Cor order, etc.) the Procureurs 
General and the State Counsels to lend them 
support, and all commanders and officers of
the Armed Forces and Police Forces to lend
them assistance when so required by law.
In witness whereof the present judgment (or 
order, etc.) has been signed by the president 
and the registrar Cor the president, the 
assessors and the registrar)." 102
The point should not escape notice that it is the Head of
State who, and not the court which ’commands and enjoins’.
The reasons for this is not hard to see. It is no more
than an acknowledgement of the reality of power in the
governmental set up.
The court has no independent force of its own.
The bailiff or process-server who levies execution upon
the property of the defaulting judgment debtor does so
102. Art. 9 of Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972 (Judi­
cial Organisation).
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relying upon the organised forces of the State to step in
in support of hi.s authority should resistance be offered.
The police and/or gendarmerie are present in court to
watch over the judge, to deal with any show of violence
by an angry or a dissatisfied defendant, to take custody
of a convicted prisoner, and to have him delivered to the
prisons authorities. The judiciary is indeed the weakest
of the three departments of power. It has no influence
over either the sword or the purse. In the rare extremity
of a showdown, the executive may order or direct its
agencies (police, ministries, etc.) not to execute or obey
10?any court decree or judgment. Such a showdown is how­
ever an extremely remote possibility, if only because no 
one wants anarchy. Besides the executive needs the judi­
ciary not only to legitimize its actions but also to ensure 
good, orderly and peaceful government. In some cases the 
judiciary acts merely as a branch of Government service.
The Cameroonian judiciary, like the French,
German and Japanese, is a branch of Government service 
and judges may be used for extra-judicial activities.
Being a judge in Cameroon implies membership of the judicial 
civil service under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Justice.
103. Cf. Nwabueze, op.cit., chap. IX, The limitation on
judicial power in favour of legislative and executive 
power.
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A. The judiciary Is a branch of Government service
A tradition of independence and neutrality and 
impartiality is difficult to develop in circumstances 
where the judiciary is under the control and supervision 
of the Ministry of Justice, an arm of the Government. 
Furthermore, a system which admits of annual reports on 
and frequent transfers of judges cannot be seriously put 
forward as conducive to judicial independence.
a) Supervision by the Ministry of Justice
The constitutional provision which makes the 
executive the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary 
does not assure tne Cameroonian judiciary of control over 
matters of judicial administration. Rather, the Ministry 
of Justice exercises considerable control over such 
matters. The judiciary, like the legal department, Is
administratively under the sole control of the Ministry of
T <-■ 104Justice.
The Ministry closely supervises the functioning
of the courts and collects pertinent data and reports con-
105cerning them. It fixes the calendar for the courts. 
Presidents of courts and Procureurs must file various 
periodic and detailed reports concerning the status of the
104. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
Service, s. 2.
105. No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972, as amended by Ord. No. 
72/21 of 19 October 1972 (Judicial Organisation), 
s. 10.
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court calendar, types of litigation handled, and similar 
matters as well as reports concerning court equipment, 
transport and. the administrative staff doing clerical work 
at the court. These reports are forwarded to the Ministry 
either directly or through the Procureur General or the 
President of the appropriate Court of Appeal. In 
addition, the Presidents of the seven Courts of Appeal in 
Cameroon must annually inspect the courts within their 
respective Provinces and report their findings to the 
Minister of Justice. A similar Inspection and report 
must be made by the Procureur General at the seat of each 
Court of Appeal in respect of the work of his subordinates. 
The Minister of Justice may also appoint high officials 
of the Ministry to inspect the courts generally or to 
investigate specific matters. Finally, at the beginning 
of each judicial year, around October to November, the 
Minister of Justice (or his representative, usually the 
Secretary General at the Ministry of Justice) undertakes a 
tour of the Provinces to Install the Presidents and 
Procureurs General who have been appointed or transferred 
to the Courts of Appeal. On such occasions the Minister 
goes through the records of the Courts of Appeal and, as 
is the custom, makes a public address in which he spells 
out Government policy on the administration of justice 
and what the Government expects of judges.
The reports filed with the Ministry are important 
in connection with the Ministry's functions concerning the
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transfer and promotion of judges. They may also induce 
the Minister to begin disciplinary proceedings or, in 
appropriate cases, to issue warnings to judges.
b ) Classification and promotion of judges
There is much substance in the contention that 
the possibility of advancement might tempt judges to be 
pliable and to seek through their decisions or by other 
means the favour of the authority which could promote or 
influence promotion. In Cameroon however, as, for example, 
in France and in West Germany, classification of judges 
and their promotion from court to court - the very thing 
which is shunned in some jurisdictions (such as in 
England and the U.S.A.) as inconducive to judicial inde­
pendence - is actually the norm.
For purposes of promotion and the payment of
salaries, all positions opened to judicial and legal officers
have been grouped In five classes. Judicial and legal
officers are graded, in descending order of rank, into
super-scale (which comprises two groups), fourth scale,
106third scale, second scale and first scale. Those in
the super scale are on at least index 1,150. Those in 
the fourth scale are either on index 1,000, 1,050, or 1,115 
which correspond to the first, second and third incremental 
positions respectively. There are also three incremental
106. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal Ser­
vice, s. 6.
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positions in. the third scale, the first corresponding to 
index 8553 the second to index 920 and the third to index 
950. The second and first scales have four incremental 
positions each. The first, second, third and fourth 
incremental positions in the second scale correspond res­
pectively to indices 740, 790, 855 and 920. Thus a 
magistrat in the second scale, third incremental position 
would earn the same basic salary as another magistrat 
on the third scale first incremental position. Similarly, 
a magistrat on the fourth incremental position in the 
second scale earns the same base salary as his brother on 
the second incremental position in the third scale.
The salary of judges does not, as in England, 
come from a special fund voted by Parliament. Judges in 
Cameroon, like all other civil servants in the country, 
receive their salaries and allowances from the Government 
Treasury through their various bank accounts. If a judge 
has any query about his salary and/or allowances, he must, 
like everyone else, make the pilgrimage to the Ministry of 
Finance in Yaounde and try to iron things out the best 
way he can.
All magistrats in active service are the sub­
stantive holders of judicial or legal posts corresponding
107to the group or scale to which they belong. For
example, a magistrat in the super scale will hold the post
107. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal
Service, s. 8(1) and Schedule A.
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of either President, Substantive Puisne Judge, Procureur 
General, or Advocate General at the Supreme Court; or 
President of or Procureur General at an Appeal Court. 
Appointment to the first scale corresponds to the post 
of President, TjugeT, State Counsel, or Deputy State 
Counsel at the Magistrate’s or High Court. In the interest 
of the service however, a judicial or legal officer may 
be temporarily appointed to a post on a scale immediately
1 pi o
above that to which he belongs. But no judicial or
legal officer may be the substantive holder of a post, 
either as President of a court or as head of the legal 
department, giving him a power of supervision or control 
over a. judicial or legal officer senior to him in the
10Q
promotion list. As a general rule, no member of the
service may be promoted to super scale or to a higher 
group or scale without a concomitant appointment to a post 
corresponding to the group or scale to which he is pro­
moted .
To be promoted, a judicial or legal officer must 
have previously been entered on a Promotion List.^^
10b. Ibid., s . 73(b).
109. Ibid., s. 8(2).
110. Ibid., s. 29(1).
111. However, promotion to the super scale or promotion 
in a group within the super scale may be effected 
without previous entry on a promotion list after 
consultation with the Promotion Board or the Higher 
Judicial Council.
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There are two Promotion Lists drawn up on the 1st July
each year; one by the Promotion Board, for members of
the legal department, and the other by the Higher Judicial
Council, for members of the Dench. But a member of the
service may, at his request, be entered on both Promotion 
112Lists. This requires a certain amount of seniority
114in each scale, usually four years. All authorities
vested with the power of proposing personnel for pro­
lixmotion must transmit before 15th March of each year, to 
each member of the service forming the subject of a report, 
the alphabetical list of the judicial and legal officers 
whom they nave proposed for promotion.11  ^ The minutes 
or acknowledgement of such notification are forwarded to 
the Ministry of Justice. Any member of the service not 
included in the proposals may, before 15th April of each 
year, submit his personal request through his superior
112. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
service, s . 8(1).
113. Ibid., s. 31l2). There is however statutory pro­
vision for the appointment and university law pro­
fessors to the second and third scales respectively.
In practice, this provision remains a dead letter.
In any case any such appointment is apt to be regar­
ded with a somewhat jaundiced eye by many career 
judicial officers (Fieldwork interviews).
114. Ibid., s. 30.
115. They are, the Minister of Justice, the President of 
the Supreme Court, the Procureur General at the Supreme 
Court, the Procureurs General at the Courts of Appeal, 
the Directors at the Ministry of Justice and the Presi­
dents of courts. See Judicial Service Rules, ss. 33-38.
116. Ibid., s. 39(2).
officers to tne Ministry of Justice for entry on tne 
117Promotion List. Tne proposals for promotion (together
with the personal requests for entry on tne promotion list;
and the files of the members of the service concerned
are forwaraed by the Minister of Justice to the Secretary
of the Higher Judicial Council (as regards members of the
bench) and the Chairman of the Promotion Board (as regards
ll8members of the legal department). The number of
names entered for promotion to each scale is always 
limited to about tnree or four, depending on the availa-
119bility of finance and having regard to foreseeable needs.
In discharging their functions nere the Council and tne
Board are guided mainly by the annual reports and opinions
120of the authorities empowered to report on the officers.
Judicial positions are classified together with 
positions m  the legai department and in the Ministry of 
Justice, so that a person holding a judicial position may
117. Ibid., s. hO.
118. Ibid., s. h1. The promotion ooard consists of the
President of the Supreme court (chairman), the Pro­
cureur General at tne Supreme uourt (vice chairman;, 
the Secretary General at tne Ministry of Justice,
the Directors at the Ministry of Justice, and the Pro­
cureurs General at the Appeal courts. The Secretary 
to the board is a magistrat attached to the Department 
of General Administration at the Ministry of Justice. 
The Board cannot properly conduct business unless all 
its members were convened at least eight days before 
the scneduled date of the meeting and unless at least
8 of its members including the chairman (or his vice) 
are present. s. 42.
119. Ibid., s. 43(1).
120. Ss. 3b-39. A magistrat entereu on the Promotion List 
who has not been promoted before tne expiry of the 
budgetary year must be entered as of rignt in the 
following year's list. Once entered on the List, the
officer may not be struck off except as a disciplinary
measure. ibid., s. 44.
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be transferred or promoted to a position in the legal
121department or Ministry or Justice and vice versa.
c) Transfers and budgetary dependence
One of the measures intended to give judges
security is the- principle against arbitrary removal from
office coupled with the statutory provision that they
may not- receive another posting, even as a promotion,
122without their express consent. However, the pro­
vision against unsolicited postings is honoured more in 
breach than in its observance as members of the judicial
and legal service are transferred ana promoted without 
123their consent. Transfers are frequent and are seen
as necessary ±n tne interest of the service.
’’Life generally tends to become boring and 
uninteresting wnen it is static. For it 
to be interesting and meaningful, there must 
be provision for change. Then it becomes 
dynamic and fruitful. So it is with the 
Public Service. The element of dynamism is 
kindled and rejuvenateu in public service when, 
thruugn the machinery of transfers, public 
servants are called upon to move from one 
office to another. For, as it has been said, 
variety is the spice of life.” 124
121. E.g., the post of Supreme Court President which is 
reserved exclusively for magistrats in the super, scale 
curresponds to the post of Procureur General at that 
Court and that of Director at the Ministry of Justice.
In other words all three are in a coordinate position. 
Members of the service consider this system of classi­
fication to be noxious as the director at the Ministry 
tends to regard any judge who is not in a coordinate 
position with him as his subordinate who therefore 
owes him obedience.
122. Rules and Regulations of tne Judicial and Legal Service, 
s. 3(2).
123. Ibid., s. 73(a).
124. Charles Doumba, speech in Bamenda-on November 25,
1977, op.cit.
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There are two types of transfers; one Is functional and 
the other is geographical. A functional or vertical 
transfer occurs when a member of the bench is appointed to 
the legal department or vice versa. On the other hand, 
w^en a magistrat is moved from one geographical locality 
to another, a geographical or horizontal transfer takes 
place. Sometimes both transfers are concomitant. But 
they need not'be.
The Cameroonian magistracy is founded on the con­
cept of the le magistrat polyvalent. This means that any 
member of the magistracy, whether initially appointed to 
the bench or the legal department, may be transferred at 
any time in the course of his career to serve either on the 
bench, in the legal department or at the Ministry of Justice. 
A magistrat must be able to judge, to prosecute and to
administer. Indeed, he must even be able to prosecute
*
and judge at the'same time. This is the office of the 
president chargd de 1 ’action publique. He is both the
accuser and the judge. This clearly does violence to the 
principle of judicial impartiality. The State'Prosecutor
12 5. There is a feeling among members of the magistracy
that courageous judges are transferred to the Ministry 
to be cowed before being sent back to the courts.
There is also the suspicion that such transfers are . 
made as a disciplinary measure. Only the Supreme 
Court President and Procureur General appear to.be 
immune from transfers. (.Fieldwork interviews).
126. This officer exists only in the Francophone Provinces.
There are however not many presidents chargd de 1 Taction 
publique.
125
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is a party in a criminal trial. "When, therefore, he again 
sits as a judge to decide the merits of the same case which 
he as prosecutor has framed against the accused, he will 
find it difficult if not impossible to give judgment against 
his own case. Even if in fact there is enough evidence to 
convict the accused and he is convicted, then although jus­
tice has in fact been done, the public does not see this 
127as justice." In fact what the president chargd' de
1281 ’action publique does is conduct an inquisition. This
situation should not obtain. There is no compelling reason 
why police and gendarme officers who have been given some 
prosecutorial training may not, as happens in the Magis­
trate’s Courts in the Anglophone Provinces, be allowed to
prosecute in those same courts operating in the Francophone 
129Provinces.
Quite apart from the fact that functional trans­
fers raise problems of adaptability and adjustment, they 
put into serious doubt the claim of judicial independence.
127. Gorji-Dinka (President of the Cameroon Bar Council), 
’Memorandum on aspects of administration of justice’,
•submitted to the Minister of Justice on August 8th 1976.
128. This has undoubtedly contributed to the ingrained 
belief among many Cameroonians that in the Francophone 
courts the presumption of innocence has been supplanted 
with a presumption of guilt.
129. Cf. Gorji-Dinka Memorandum, op.cit. The judge-cum- 
prosecutor exists for reasons of expediency, the 
penury of legally qualified personnel. For much the 
same reason, in certain areas, also in the Franco­
phone Provinces, the presiding judge at the Magistrate’s 
Court acts too as State Prosecutor in the High Court.
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The legal department is directly under and subordinate to 
the Ministry of Justice from which it receives orders.
The judiciary, according to statute, is merely 'adminis­
tratively’ under that Ministry. A State Prosecutor who 
has for. over the years been receiving his orders from the 
Minister of Justice cannot, by being appointed to the bench,
suddenly become independent and fearless. He would tend
130to act more as an inquisitor than as an impartial judge.
Interestingly enough however, judicial and legal officers
do not complain much about functional transfers although
they are all agreed that service on the bench is better
because comparatively more independent and legally more
rewarding (the judge deals with civil and criminal matters
whereas the State Prosecutor hardly ever deals with
131civil matters) than in the legal department.
Rather, it is the geographical transfer which has
132come under bitter criticism. It is not the transfers
130.There seem to be more transfers from the legal depart­
ment to the bench than vice versa. In the Anglo­
phone Provinces a transfer from the legal department 
to the bench is regarded as an honour and, in a sense, 
as a promotion. The opposite attitude prevails in 
the Francophone Provinces where the post of Procureur 
is regarded as a strong and strategic one. This is 
because the State Prosecutor is identified more with 
the Government than the judge is. Moreover he has 
wider administrative powers, controls the court budget 
and the police judiciaire, exercises prosecutorial 
discretion, releases on bail, and suggests the sentence 
the court ought to pass on the accused. (Fieldwork 
interviews).
131. Fieldwork observations and interviews.
.132, Fieldwork interviews.
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per se which are criticised. It is the frequency with 
which they are made that is attacked. Save for the judges 
at the Supreme Court who enjoy some degree of permanence, 
the average length of time a Cameroonian judge serves in 
one court is three years. Often it is less. Cases 
have occurred when judges have been transferred twice in 
one year. There seem to be at least two reasons why 
these transfers are made so frequently. First, a judge 
may be transferred for necessity of service. Secondly, 
transfers, especially to remote parts of the country, 
are made as a disciplinary measure.
But frequent transfers are sometimes detrimental
to the service. They kill incentive and the zeal to work.
They encourage indolence and inefficiency. They are a
contributory factor to delays in the disposal of cases.
Moreover, they disrupt family life (each time there is a
transfer of a judge, his wife too must be transferred if
she is a civil servant too - often however, such transfers
are not simultaneous; the children too must change schools;
items of household property are either lost or damaged in
the course of moving). It is strongly submitted that once
a judge has been appointed to a specific court he should
be kept there for at least six years unless he is promoted
to a higher court or he asks to be transferred or is guilty
133of a gross professional misconduct.
133. In a country where tribal and sectarian allegiances
are still very strong, the transfer of judges to serve 
in various parts of the country may be a way of fos­
tering the quest for national unity. But the transfer
/continued over.
438.
Another factor which is prima facie incosistent 
with judicial independence is the budgetary dependence of 
the judiciary on the legal department. Any court needs 
furniture, stationery and various items of equipment, and 
transport facilities. For all these things and other 
ancillary needs in connection with his office, a judge 
needs a budget. Under the former West Cameroon funds 
for the Judicial Department were controlled by the Chief 
Justice through the chief registrar. Since 1972 however, 
the system in the Francophone Provinces whereby funds for 
the judicial department are controlled by the legal depart­
ment, has been extended to the Anglophone Provinces.
What this means is that whenever a judge needs money for 
anything in connection with his court or office he has to 
ask this of the Procureur. The argument advanced for this 
state of affairs is that judges should not be placed in a 
position where they would be likely to receive directives 
from the Ministry of Justice.
In reality however, this modus operandi is no 
guarantee that the Minister would not interfere with the
Footnote 133 continued from page 437.
of judicial and legal officers have so far been con­
fined to their juridico-linguistic sectors. No 
Francophone judge or prosecutor has been transferred 
to serve in courts in the Anglophone Provinces.
Save for transfers to the Ministry of Justice and to 
the Supreme Court, no Anglophone judge or prosecutor 
has been transferred to serve in the Francophone 
courts. The fact that most of these officers are 
mono-jural and monolingual clearly means that such 
transfers are just not feasible yet.
judiciary if he were minded to do so. He can do so through 
the legal department. Since the Procureur controls the 
purse he is made to look stronger than and superior to 
the judge. True, he cannot go as far as giving him 
instructions. But he can make things nasty and difficult 
for the judge, for example, by deliberately delaying in 
meeting the judge's request for funds. Indeed, cases 
are not unknown of "unscrupulous Procureurs who have black­
mailed judges into taking decisions to please the Procureur
when financial claims due to the judge are still subject
134to approval of the Procureur” .
d) Reports on judges
A feature of the colonial judicial system which 
bears upon-the independence of the judiciary was the prac­
tice whereby judges were reported upon by the Chief Jus­
tice to the authority responsible for- promoting them.
This was justified on the ground that this was unavoidable 
as the authority responsible for promoting them needed to 
be properly informed about their competence and general 
suitability. Independence has not altered this system.
And the same argument, as of yesteryears, is still put 
forward to justify it. Judges (as well as members of the 
legal department) are reported upon. The reports emanate
134. Fongum Gorji-Dinka, 'Memorandum on aspects of adminis­
tration of justice', 8 August 1976, op.cit. It 
would seem that attempts are being made to give judges 
control over funds for their various courts.
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from two sources: reports made by hierarchically superior
judicial and legal officers, and those made by security
1 oc
officers (police and gendarmes). Both reports are
confidential and are sent to the Ministry of Justice under
1 o
confidential cover.
1) Reports by senior members of the service
These are of two types: a ’general report1
and a ’confidential report’. Both are made annually.
The general report, made by the competent authority, sum­
marises before 1st March of each year, the activities and 
merits of each member of the bench (the President of the 
Supreme Court excepted) and Of the legal department. It 
may contain proposals for promotion of any member of the
service who possesses the requisite seniority for pro- 
137motion. The confidential report bears on more specific
issues concerning the professional activity of the officer
1 n O
being reported upon. The authority making the report
135. Attempts to verify claims that local Party bosses make 
similar reports yielded no success.
136. These reports are crucial as they are used in deter­
mining whether to transfer, discipline, or promote
an officer. By s . 70 of the General Rules and Regu­
lations of the Public Service, "the advancement of a 
civil servant shall be subject to a favourable report".
137. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
Service, s. 28.
138. Confidential reports on the Procureur General at the 
Supreme Court, the Directors at the Ministry of Jus­
tice, the Procureurs General at the Courts of Appeal 
and officers on secondment or on study leave, are made 
by the Minister of Justice (s. 33). The President
of the Supreme Court reports on the Puisne Judges of 
that Court as well as on the Presidents of the Courts 
of Appeal (s. 34(1)).. The Procureur General at the 
Supreme Court reports on the Advocate General and
/Continued over
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must make a value-judgment on the officer being reported 
upon, state his considered opinion of him, and say whether
or not he proposes him for promotion. The assessment which
is made on a special form supplied for that purpose by 
the Ministry of Justice, is based on the following list 
of twenty items: carriage and appearance, physical con­
dition (health), good sense and judgment, capacity to syn­
thesise, general knowledge and intellectual curiosity, 
authority and force of character, good balance and sense 
of proportion, taste for responsibility, capacity for work, 
whether methodical (organising capacity), knowledge of the 
law, ability to apply the law, drafting ability, ability 
to preside in court, facility of speech, relations with 
superiors, relations with equals, relations with subordi­
nates, relations with administrative authorities, and 
relations with the Bar and the Police.
Against each of these items, the reporting authority
Footnote 138 continued from page 440.
Deputy Procureurs General at the Supreme. Court (s. 34 
(2)). The Secretary General and Directors at the 
Ministry of Justice report on judicial and legal 
officers under them (s. 35). The President of each 
Court of Appeal makes a confidential report on members 
of the bench within his jurisdiction (s. 37).
Finally, the Procureur General at each Court of Appeal 
does likewise to members of the legal department 
within his jurisdiction (s. 38). In practice how­
ever confidential dispatches of Procureurs General do 
sometimes contain reports on members of the bench 
and even recommendations for their transfer (Field­
work interviews). This has at times resulted in 
strained relations between the bench and the legal 
department.
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must indicate whether the judge (or prosecutor, as the case
may be) is outstanding, very good, good, average, poor,
or bad. Each confidential report must be signed, dated
and stamped by the authority making the report and then
forwarded to the Ministry of Justice where it is filed in
139the records of the officer concerned.
Whatever the merits of this system of confiden­
tial reports, there is little doubt that It does Induce 
in the mind of the officer being reported on some kind of 
fear and respect for the authority charged with the res­
ponsibility of reporting on him and also of proposing 
him for promotion. It is difficult to know the extent
to which these reports are made with objectivity or
140favouritism or in bad faith.
2) Reports by security officers
Reports by police and gendarmerie officers on 
judges (and on members of the- legal department as well) 
are of a general nature. For example, in 1975, the police 
reported a heavy backlog of cases pending before the Bamenda 
Magistrate’s Court and noted that this was cause for much
139. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
Service, s. 39(1).
140. General Rules and Regulations of the Public Service, 
s. 73 provides, ’’The competent superior shall be 
bound to report objectively on the personnel placed 
under his direction and authority. It shall be a 
disciplinary offence for him (i) to abstain from 
the obligation to report on such personnel, and 
(ii) to report on them without due care or in bad 
faith” .
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complaint and discontent among litigants and persons 
awaiting trial in prison."^1 In 1974 the police reported 
that the people of Manyu Division were against the require­
ment that a non-conviction certificate must be produced 
by anyone seeking a public employment and added that fles
fonctionnaires de justice' were very slow in making this
142document available to those who requested it. That
same year the gendarmes at Kumbo despatched to Yaounde 
a report which reads in part: "The presiding magistrate
of the court here is reproached with a certain lack of 
professional conscience because his court sessions always 
begin late and are, though begun with considerable lateness, 
shortened because the magistrate’s wife has arrived and 
must go home in the company of her husband ... Sometimes 
also, the magistrate comes to court and simply adjourns 
the cases to another session ...” The report closed with 
a remark that although the population tend to think that 
gendarmes are responsible for the delays in dealing with 
cases this was not true, as the fault lay with the magis­
trates .
141. Bulletin de renseignements of September 1975, 
Ministry of Justice, Yaounde.
142. Bulletin de renseignements No. 3539/DGSN/DRG/SC1 of 
13 September 1974, Ministry of Justice Yaounde.
143. Bulletin de renseignements, 28 September 1974, 
Ministry of Justice Yaounde.
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144These reports, which may be' sent in at any time, 
need not concern only -the.judge’s professional activities. 
They may extend to his social life. A judge who is 
often seen in company or social situations which are 
deemed incompatible with his profession is sure to be the 
subject of a security report. In one case a magistrate 
was the subject of one such report simply because he had 
a friend who was an advocate practising in his court, 
the view being taken that in such circumstances the advo­
cate in question could not lose a case in that particular 
* 145court.
144. Police and gendarmes send their reports under confiden­
tial dispatches known as 'bulletins de renseignements'. 
These reports are not sent directly to the Ministry of 
Justice. The police send their reports to the Delegation 
G^nerale & la Sflrete Nationale, Direction de Renseigne­
ments Generaux. On receipt of a report, the General 
Delegate at the National Security forwards a copy of
it 'a l'intention de Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice*. 
The gendarmes send their own reports first to the Dele­
gate General at the Gendarmerie who also forwards a 
copy of the reports to the Minister of Justice.
In Cameroon all civil servants are the subject of 
confidential reports made by their immediate superior 
officers. These reports are made on special forms 
(known as bulletins de notes or mark sheet) supplied 
by the Ministry of Public Service for that purpose.
Each report covers the functionary's professional quali­
ties (there are five items - spelling, writing ability, 
assiduity, efficiency, and sense of duty - each of 
which has to be scored out of 20), his character, 
ability, conduct and suitability for a higher post.
The system of making confidential reports on staff is 
governed by the following enactments: Decree No. 74/138
of 18 February 1974 (General Rules and Regulations of 
the Public- Service), Decree No. 76/570 of 4 December 
1976 to grant certain powers relating to personnel 
management to Governors of Provinces and Prefects, Order 
No. 3277/MFP/DP of 27 October 1977 to outline the pro­
cedure for making confidential reports on staff, and 
Circular No. 6327/MFP/DP of 11 November 1977 relating 
to confidential reports on public officers.
145. Fieldwork interviews. In this instance the conclusion 
seems to have been hasty and preposterous.
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B . Pressures on the judiciary
Independence of the judiciary also means that 
when arriving at a decision in a matter which is sub 
judice, judges must 'be subject only to the law and their 
conscience' and must not be influenced by extra-legal 
considerations. A judiciary which is subject to pressures, 
be they governmental or otherwise, when coming to decisions 
in individual cases can lay no claim to impartiality. 
Impartiality is a great virtue of any judiciary worth 
its mettle. And it means that judges must not only be 
impartial but must also be seen to be so.
The question then is whether there are pressures 
on Cameroonian judges to act and speak in court in certain 
ways rather than in other ways and whether some of their 
decisions are influenced by purely extra-legal consider­
ations (fear of offending the Government - which may mean 
for example running the risk of forfeiting promotion, 
political allegiance, social or class considerations, 
religious affinity etc.). Often, it is the Government 
that is indicted for threatening the independence of the 
judiciary by meddling with the administration of justice. 
This charge levelled at -the Government has been categori­
cally rebutted by the Head of State, who saw the blame as 
lying somewhere else.
MIn Cameroon under our administration, it is 
not the Government that is threatening the 
independence of the judiciary; rather it is 
the Government that is protecting it through 
the status given to the judicial officers,
446.
through the vigilance and discipline which 
my constitutional powers require that I 
exercise over the functioning of the judi­
cial services.
’'What are threatening the independence of 
the judiciary are, in fact, the pressures 
exerted from other sources such as tribal 
or professional solidarity, social affi­
nities, and complicity with certain 
interests, which tend to numb consciences 
and lead to partiality and injustice.” 146
It is therefore common ground that the independence of the
judiciary in Cameroon is being threatened. But by whom
or what?
a) Tribal solidarity and social affinities
These do exist and may be decisive in influencing 
a decision one way or the other. A judge may be extremely 
reluctant to convict a person from his own village (and a 
fortiori, a relative) or a friend within his social circle. 
(In England, a judge would not, as a matter of judicial 
practice, try a case if the person involved is someone 
he is acquainted with.) How far the judge would be 
prepared to go out of his way to get the accused before 
him Toff the hook’ or, in the case where conviction is 
unavoidable, to give him the minimum sentence, may depend 
on how strong the tribal, professional or social soli­
darity is.
Professional solidarity as a corrupt influence 
may take the form of connivance or collusion between judge
146. President Ahidjo address at the ceremonial opening 
of the Supreme Court, 15th November 19113 op.cit.
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and defence counsel to get a relative, friend or tribesman 
who is on trial (and who ought normally to be convicted) 
off the hook; or between judge and state prosecutor to 
drop the charge by entering a nolle prosequi; or between 
defence counsel and public prosecutor dressed up as plea 
bargaining. Generally, the quid pro quo is not money 
but only an understanding to render similar services if 
the other's friend, relative or tribesman happens to be in 
trouble as well. Tribal solidarity and social affinity 
may also be used negatively. For example, a judge or pro­
secutor who has a particular animosity toward a particular 
tribe will find little sympathy with litigants or accused 
from that tribe who happen to appear before his court.
It has even been suggested that these factors are sometimes 
used as intruments of revenge. "Local, political and 
social pressures, personal and tribal vendettas, etc., 
sometimes lead some appeal court presidents to use their
147
judicial offices as handy tools of revenge and policy."
In civil cases also, tribal solidarity and social 
affinities may be crucial in determining whether to find 
for the plaintiff or for the defendant and also the quantum 
of damages, if any, to be made; excessive or niggardly. 
This is where 'complicity with certain interests' comes 
in. The 'certain interests' here are undoubtedly some
147. V.M. Ngoh, 'The new function and procedure of the 
Supreme Court', Cameroon Tribune, No. 79, 31st 
December 1975, p. 9.
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insurance companies and certain private companies and 
firms which offer bribes to judges to render judgment in 
their favour. What is less obvious however, is the extent 
to which these corrupt practices exist. They are probably 
fairly common. First of all the Head of State saw fit 
to allude to them in his speech. Secondly, a senior 
Judge has appealed to members of the public to refrain 
from corrupting any judicial officer, arguing that "if 
you do not offer to corrupt him, he will remain uncorrupted; 
if you do not subject him to tribal or social pressures, 
he will remain free to judge in obedience to his con­
science; if you respect him he will be compelled to live 
a respectable and exemplary life". He however went on to 
regret that "all too often one came up against judicial 
officers who looked on their office as a means for self­
aggrandisement ... There are judicial officers whose 
sense of justice and fair play was polluted by downright 
corruption, or by pressures arising from social, tribal
or professional affinities, or by complicity with certain
148interests with mercenary motives". These remarks,
like those of the Head of State, are weighty remarks and 
a serious indictment of the judiciary.
b ) Meddling by the administration
The treatment of the judiciary as. a branch of
148. ’Justice Endeley appeals to public to refrain from 
corrupting judicial officers’, Cameroon Outlook, 
vol. 10, No. 14, 15th April 1978, p. 5~.
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Government service produces an identification of the judi­
ciary with the bureaucracy in general and with the outlook 
of the Government of the day. But this identification is 
closest in the early.years of judicial service and once a 
person begins regular service as a judge., especially at 
the Supreme Court (and sometimes also at the Court of 
Appeal) he acquires a substantial degree of independence 
which increases with age and with promotion in the service.
However, until he reaches that stage, fa court judge is
149
just another state functionary and nothing more’.
Thus the temptation has sometimes been great on the part 
of the administration to meddle directly or indirectly 
with the course of justice.
The Minister of Justice may for example interfere 
with any criminal matter under judicial consideration.
He cannot do so directly though. He may do so through 
his subordinate at the courts, the Procureur. He.may at 
any time in the proceedings instruct the Procureur to dis­
continue the case. He may instruct him to prefer a 
charge or not to do so or again to withdraw one that has 
already been preferred. He need give no reason for his 
action. The Minister’s power to act in this wise stems 
from his prosecutorial discretion which he exercises 
through the State Prosecutor. There is nothing inherently 
objectionable about this.
149. Ngoh, op.cit.
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What is objectionable however is the situation 
where the administration’s conduct is, deliberately or not, 
aimed at undermining the authority of the courts. For 
example, where a dissatisfied accused or litigant, instead 
of going on appeal to have what he considers an erroneous 
decision vacated, petitions to the Minister of Justice, 
whoorders the case-file to be sent to him. Or again where 
the Minister (or Director at the Ministry) on his own 
initiative (perhaps because he has a vested interest in 
the case) or following a petition from a dissatisfied party 
in a case, requests of the judge who tried the case an 
explanation why he decided the matter as he did. This 
is a dangerous interference with and limitation on judicial 
authority. It is unacceptable even if it happens only 
rarely.
Equally unacceptable is the more common situation 
where some misguided local administrators attempt to exer­
cise control over judges and to meddle with the working
of the judicial process. There are many reasons for this
150impulse to interfere with the course of justice. First,
in terms of protocol the local administrator comes before 
the judge. Secondly, the Minister of Justice’s insistence 
on collaboration between the courts and the local adminis­
tration is invariably construed by administrators to mean
150. Fieldwork interviews.
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151that judges must be subservient to him. Thirdly,
local administrators are empowered to make rules and regu­
lations, enforceable by the police, gendarmerie and the
152courts, for their various administrative units.
These rules and regulations generally deal with such petty
but vital matters as local council taxes, market fees,
155the movement of persons, the sale of foodstuff, the
plying of roads, sanitation, closure or re-opening of
certain establishments (e.g. a nightclub, a bar), proscrip-
154tion of certain societies or organisations, etc. As
officiers de police judiciaire and in exercise of their
151. This attitude is encouraged by the fact that the local 
administrator oversees all the Government services in 
his area. The Provincial Governor, for example, is 
the representative of the Head of State and of all 
the Ministers and supervises all Government services, 
with the exception of the Judicial and Legal Service, 
in his area. However, most administrators choose
to ignore the fact that judges are excepted from such 
supervision.
152. Decree No. 72/437 of 1 September 1972 to organise the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration; Law No. 74/23 
of 5 December 1974 to organise Councils; Decree No. 
77/91 of 25 March 1977 determinant les pouvoirs de 
tutelle sur les communes; Arrete No. 7255 of 1 November 
1959 (pouvoirs de police dans les communes).
153. E.g., in August and September 1977 the Prefects of Meme 
and Fako respectively banned foodstuff leaving their 
administrative areas, whether by Tair, sea or land’,
to other parts of the country.
154. E.g., the proscription by ’prefectorial order’ of the 
Nso Ngiri Secret Society in 1973, a proscription held 
to be lawful in Fai Ndichangong & 3 Ors v. The People, 
Bamenda Court of Appeal, No. BCA/12.c/73, unreported.
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pouvoirs de police, local administrators may order the
arrest and detention of persons. Finally, Prefects
and Governors do report, officiously it seems, on judges
in their administrative areas. These reports consist of
general observations and remarks on the work and conduct
of the judge. Some Prefects use this medium as a means
155of settling private scores. Because of all these
factors, some Prefects, inflated with a sense of their own 
self-importance, imagine they have the right to issue 
orders or prohibitions to the courts. It is however an 
offence punishable with a minimum of six months’ imprison­
ment and a maximum of five years’ for ’whoever being the
representative of the executive authority, issues any
156order or prohibition to any court’. But a case of
this nature has never come before the courts.
Direct interference, in an official capacity, 
with a matter which is sub judice is rare. A Prefect 
is more likely to meddle with the course of justice pri­
vately in his personal capacity and by way of a request
157and not an order. How far the Prefect succeeds in
achieving his purpose will depend on his personal re­
lation with and the integrity of the judicial or legal 
officer concerned. Most interferences take place at the
155. Fieldwork interviews.
156. Cameroonian Penal Code, s. 126(a).
157. Fieldwork interviews.
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pre-trial stage of the criminal process (e.g. ordering a
158person lawfully detained or imprisoned to be released). 
Invariably, when the Prefect acts in this manner, he is 
merely using his office to achieve his private goals.
There would also be an interference with the 
administration of justice where the administrator qua 
administrator criticises or attacks the ruling of a court 
in a particular case. An incident of this nature occurred 
some years ago at the time of the Nigerian civil war.
At that time there were hundreds of Ibos resident in 
Bamenda and engaged in trading. Towards the end of the 
civil war, one of the Ibos declared for ’One Nigeria’.
This angered his fellow tribesmen, who destroyed his shop 
and set fire to his car. A riot developed between the 
pro-Gowon and the pro-Ojukwu factions of the Nigerian 
community in the town. The police and the gendarmerie 
intervened and thirty-eight arrests were made. They were 
tried by Mr Justice Dervish, an expatriate judge (the case 
would normally have been tried by Mr Justice Keisero, the 
Bamenda resident Judge; but it was feared that since he 
was Yoruba the Ibos might not get a fair trial from him).
Only three of them were convicted and sentenced. This apparent!} 
surprised Mr J.C. Ngoh, the then Federal Inspector of 
Administration for the federated State of West Cameroon, 
who;Awent on to allege that the court had not done its job
158. Fieldwork interviews.
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properly. At a working session in Bamenda with the then
sflAd to Uev
Minister of Justice and members of the Bench, he^bitterly
<*1K5«c|Uj
criticised the court’s handling of the case. HeAwon- 
dered how it was that only 3 out of the 38 accused persons 
had been convicted .If
for. It was the more inappropriate as the matter was
still sub judice. The appeal made by the Legal Department
in that case was still pending before the courts.
Members of the Bench were understandably very indignant at
Mr Ngoh’s criticism. Mr Ngoh probably had two things at
the back of his mind. He may have been trying to insinuate
that the trial judge in that case had been bribed to decide
the case as he did. This was therefore a slur on the
judiciary. Secondly, since Mr Ngoh knew the matter was on
appeal his remarks were probably intended to intimidate
the appeal Judge into convicting most of the accused,
159irrespective of the merits of the case.
Another incident occurred in Kumba some time 
between 1965-66. A certain Mr Black, a European, was the 
accused in a case before the Kumba Magistrate’s Court 
presided over by Mr Mensah. When summoned to appear in 
court, he was counselled by Mr H.B. Sone, the local 
Prefect, to disregard the court summons. The learned 
Magistrate then issued a bench warrant against the Prefect.
159. Cf. s. 169(1) of the Cameroonian Penal Code.
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The incident, like the one just narrated, exacerbated 
the relations between the judiciary and the administration.
It is not easy to determine how widespread these
interferences are. What is certain is that incidents do
occur here and there. They are often petty and isolated;
’minor local frictions between some local administrators
160and some judges but nothing to cause a crisis’.
C . The judiciary in politics
Only in recent years have legal scholars and 
political scientists begun to investigate what may be 
termed ’the role of the judiciary in politics’ or simply, 
’judicial politics’. Interest in this area has been 
kindled partly because of the political role the American 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, have played in a 
number of key issues such as racial integration, ghetto 
riots, Watergate, the use of secret wiretaps and military 
surveillance to control internal opposition, environmental 
protection, equal rights for women, civil rights and the 
legalization of abortions.1^1 That interest in this area 
should only be recent is rather surprising as more than a 
century and a half ago, the French political scientist, 
Alexis de Tocqueville, was struck by ’’the immense political
160. Fieldwork interview.
161. Petra T. Shattuck, ’Law as politics’, Journal of 
Comparative Politics, October 1974, p. 127.
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power which the Americans have entrusted to their courts
l62of justice” . But there are a number of reasons for
this benign neglect of the role of the judiciary in 
politics.
In the first place, the common belief that there 
is a rule of law which can be implemented through legal 
machinery implies that there is no need for an investi­
gation of judicial politics. Regarded as a safeguard 
against tyranny, the rule of law is the philosophical 
idea that we should be ruled by laws and not by men and 
that power should not be exercised arbitrarily by rulers 
and their officials. Secondly, the great secrecy 
of judicial decision-making (le secret de la deliberation) 
and the impenetrability of the jury’s reasoning process 
are frustrating barriers for the investigation of judicial 
politics. Thirdly, and more importantly, there is the 
tacitly held assumption that the judiciary is by nature 
apolitical. ”Much of the legitimacy of the court’s de­
cisions rest upon the fiction that it is not a political
1 C n
institution but exclusively a legal' one.” Underlying
this mystique of the judicature is the time-honoured notion 
that politics, especially dirty politics, should play no 
role in the working of the judicial machinery. In accord
162. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York, 
19^5, p. 106, cited by Shattuck, op.cit., at p. 127.
163. Robert Dahl, ’Decision-making in a democracy: the 
Supreme Court as a national policy-maker’, Journal of 
Public Law, VI (1958), 28l, cited by Shattuck, op.cit.,
p. 130.
457.
therefore with the desiderata of liberal constitutional 
theory, and contrary to Marxist-Leninist theory, the judi­
ciary is supposed to be removed and insulated from political 
influence and personal or social prejudices. For judicial 
independence also means independence from political 
influence, whether exerted by the political organ of 
Government or by the public or brought in by the judges 
themselves through their involvement in politics. Judi­
cial involvement in politics may take three forms: 
decisions biased in favour of a ruling party, judicial 
membership of a political party and the use of the judi­
cature as an instrument for political purposes.
a) Decisions biased in favour of a party
The judge is a human being and like any member 
of the species homo sapiens he has his prejudices and 
weaknesses and holds personal political views. To what 
extent these factors influence his decision is difficult 
to say, for it is difficult to know what goes through a 
judge’s mind whenever he sits in judgment.
In a multi-party system nothing is more calcu­
lated to undermine the image of a judge as an impartial 
arbiter than his membership of a political party. Such 
an open identification with the interests of one of the 
groups engaged in the struggle for power suggests that the 
judge can easily become an interested party in a case 
pending before him. In such circumstances the judge may 
be tempted to give a decision biased in favour of the party
458.
whose political views he ascribes to, especially if that 
party be the party in power. However, bias by judges in 
their decisions is always very difficult to prove as most 
of the time it is a matter of impression. Bias is never 
obviously displayed. A judge who means to be biased can 
easily mask it by couching his judgment in fine, seemingly 
learned, arguments and rationalisations. The circumstances 
may leave a distinct impression that a judge in a case has 
been anything but unbiased. But that impression cannot, 
by itself, be any proof of bias. Accordingly, bias should 
not be lightly imputed to a judge. But although bias may 
be difficult to prove, suspicion of bias can undermine 
public confidence in the courts. Similarly, a judge may 
be known publicly to be of a particular political persuasion, 
but his formal membership of the party of his political 
colour will open to serious doubt, try as the judge may, 
his neutrality and objectivity. Hence political self- 
abnegation by judges is vital to a healthy administration 
of justice.
Previously a multi-party State, Cameroon became
a de facto One-Party State (the sole political party in
the country is known as the Cameroon National Union - C.N.U.
- political party) as from September 1966. But neither
before nor after that date has the judiciary shown any
164involvement in the political scene. There are two
164. Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, in 
Gwendolen Carter (editor), Five African States- Res­
ponses to Diversity, Pall Mall, London, 1969, p. 342.
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explanations for this. First, there is a strong tra­
dition of judicial non-involvement in politics and a 
consensus that the judiciary should keep away from politics. 
Secondly, until lately, the judiciary was dominated by 
expatriate judges. Their very visibility imposed consi­
derable restraint upon them and so they tended to perform 
the tasks required.of them quietly and without publicity.
That the presence of expatriate judges should produce a 
certain amount of judicial passivity is not surprising.
An expatriate judge has no stake in the government of the 
country. He is therefore very reluctant-to risk his 
tenure of office or expose himself to public criticism by 
making unpopular decisions, especially by ruling against 
the government. Of course, the indigenous judge too may, 
for fear of reprisals of some sort from the government, be 
reluctant to risk his tenure of office by handing down 
judgments which may be regarded by the authorities as 
anti-government.
For these reasons, the Cameroonian judiciary 
has never been charged by the press with bias in favour 
of the Government even though the courts have had occasion 
to decide volcanic political cases. This does not however 
mean that Cameroonian courts have never been us_ed, deliberately 
or not, as instruments of partisan political conflict.
In the multi-party days, politically flavoured cases were 
brought to the courts either as civil or criminal libel 
suits (this was the favourite technique employed in former
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West Cameroon) or as sedition or subversion (this was the 
favourite technique in former East Cameroon).
In E.L. Woleta & M.N. Namata v. The Commissioner
165
of Police, the appellants, the owner and the editor 
respectively of newspaper, the Cameroon Champion, were 
convicted of knowingly and falsely published a defamatory 
article in their paper on 25th May 1962 and were each sen­
tenced on 10th August 1962 to terms of three months’ impri­
sonment at the Victoria Magistrate’s Court. On appeal 
to the High Court of West Cameroon, conviction and sentence 
were both confirmed. Per Gordon, C.J., at page 4, ’’The 
totality of the evidence and the article itself prove 
every justification for the Magistrate’s finding of fact 
that the article in question was false and scurrilous and 
that it was likely to injure the reputation of Mr.Vincent 
Nclhami, the Senior District Officer to whom it unmistak­
ably referred.” On the face of it, this was simply a 
case of criminal libel. But it had political undertones. 
The appellants in the case were known members of the Oppo­
sition Party in West Cameroon, the C.P.N.C., and the news­
paper they ran was in fact owned by the C.P.N.C. The 
party in power at that time in West Cameroon was the K.N.
D.P. and Mr Nchami had been appointed Senior District 
Officer by the K.N.D.P. Government. In C.P.N.C. eyes
165. WC/20 CA/1962, (1962-1964), W.C.L.R.3.
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therefore, by authorising prosecution in this case the 
Attorney-General was furthering the interest of the 
K.N.D.P. This explains why in May 1962, following the 
arrest of the appellants, the Cameroon Champion attacked 
the Attorney-General and his Assistant (Messrs Cross and 
Smith respectively, both of them West Indians) and demanded 
their dismissal.
The case of E.M.L. Endeley v. P.M. Frambo & J.
166Talbot also illustrates the use of libel suits for 
decisive confrontations between the party in power and the 
opposition; a way of forcing political antagonists to 
expose their activities to judicial (and therefore public) 
scrutiny. The circumstances out of which the proceedings 
in the case arose may be summarised as follows. The 
plaintiff/respondent, a member of the then Southern Cameroons 
House of Assembly, and leader of the C.P.N.C. which at the 
time had an equal number of elected seats in the House with 
the K.N.D.P., contrived to conclude an arrangement with 
the first defendant/appellant, a member of the K.N.D.P. in 
the House. The arrangement in effect was that for the 
payment of £2,000 (On 1st April 1962 the cfa franc was 
introduced into West Cameroon and the exchange rate was 
£1 = 692 frscfa.) said to be due by the first defendant/ 
appellant to his previous party, the first defendant/appel­
lant undertook to resign from his then party in the House,
166. WC. SC/lA/1963, (1962-1964) W.C.L.R.19.
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and to join the party of the plaintiff/respondent. After 
some negotiations matters were finalised on the night of 
8th May I960 at'Tali in.Mamfe Division, when the defendant/ 
appellant signed eight copies of a document which purported 
to be his resignation from the K.N.D.P-., and received from 
the plaintiff and Mr Mbile the sum of £2,000 in cash.
On 9th May when the first defendant/appellant failed to 
travel to Buea in accordance with the arrangement, it was 
discovered that he had made a report to the police of the 
district to the effect that he had been forced at gun point 
by the plaintiff/respondent and Mbile to sign the document 
purporting to be his resignation from his party, but that 
he had no intention of doing so. He followed this 
report with a letter to the same to the Acting Commissioner 
of the Cameroons. The libel complained of was contained 
in the letter to the Acting Commissioner which, the 
plaintiff/respondent alleged, was not only published by 
the first defendant/appellant but also by the second defen­
dant/appellant, the paid Secretary of the K.N.D.P. On 
5th June the plaintiff/respondent filed his writ against 
the defendants/appellants, and some time later a commission 
fo enquiry was appointed by the Government to enquire into 
the circumstances of the transaction between the plaintiff/ 
respondent and the defendants/appellants.
Held, that the court cannot agree with the con­
tention implied in the argument by the learned defence 
counsel that a Commission of Enquiry appointed by the
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Government to enquire into a specific circumstance an in 
any way arrest the rights of an individual if so minded 
to pursue an action brought-by him in court, neither can 
the court agree that a Commission of Enquiry takes prece­
dence over a court or that with the appointment of a 
Commission any matters before a court related to the sub­
ject of the enquiry should be stopped.
In W.N.O. Effiom v. Mpame Ashu^ ^  the libel 
complained of was alleged to have been made in a circular 
letter by the defendant as ’Secretary for the Ejagham Block 
Victoria’ during the election campaigns for members to 
the West Cameroon House of Assembly In 1961. The defen­
dant was said to have made allegations of corruption 
against the plaintiff (Minister of Natural Resources in 
the K.N.D.P. Government and running on the K.N.D.P. ticket) 
in furtherance of the campaign of one Mr J.O. Takim, a 
prospective rival candidate for the elections. The 
plaintiff won.
A further case in which political confrontation
was shifted to the cockpit of the court was that of W .M.
Wilson, P. Wule & Mesumbe Publications (appellants) v.
168Anthony Ngunjoh (respondent). In that case, the res­
pondent, a businessman, and Organising Secretary of the 
K.N.D.P., claimed damages against the appellants, the
167. WC/3/1962, (1962-1964) W.C.L.R.21.
168. WC/39/65, (1965-1967) W.C.L.R.24.
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Editor-in-Chief, Editor and Publishers respectively, for
libel. The libel complained of was published in an issue
of the newspaper The Citizen of 7th September 1965 and the
article in question read:
"BIG NEWS - HOT TIME FOR KNDP - NGUMJOH IN
FOR FRAUD
"Sources close to the Victoria Police say 
that Mr. Anthony T.- Ngunjoh, Principal 
Organising Secretary of the KNDP has been 
reported to the police for alleged fraud 
by a French businessman Mr Penziat. Mr 
Ngunjoh also a businessman- in Victoria and 
recently described by Vice President Foncha 
during a Decoration ceremony as an honest 
man, was said to have bought two tippers
and two concrete mixers from Penziat but
allegedly paid him with a false cheque to 
the tune of about two million francs cfa."
Held (Kesiro and Mitchell JJ, with Stewart C.J. dissenting), 
reversing the judgment of Gordon, C.J. in the High Court, 
that the words were not defamatory in their ordinary 
meaning and that the respondent had failed to prove the 
meaning alleged in the innuendo.
It is of interest to note that the parties in 
this case had opposing political affiliations and sym­
pathies. The- respondent was a member of the KNDP while 
the appellants were members of the C.U.C.'political party.
To members of the public at least the case was nothing 
but a skirmish between the KNDP and the CUC. The political
antagonism between the two parties once more came to the
fore and to public attention in the much talked-of case of
Augustine N. Jua v . Fongurri Gorji-Dlnka, Hope Printing' Press 
l69& Dynx Press. It was also a libel suit. - The plaintiff,
169. WC/37/66, (1965-1967) W.C.L.R.22.
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then the Prime Minister of West Cameroon and the vice- 
president of the KNDP party, successfully sued the defen­
dants in the High Court and was awarded damages (which 
the court ordered to be paid within a week) of 2.7 million 
francs cfa. The first defendant, a practising barrister 
and owner of the' Printing Press involved in the case, was 
at that time counsel and legal adviser- to the CUC. This 
case made : " newspaper headlines and was the talk of
every household, principally because it involved the Prime 
Minister. Moreover, people saw the case as another mani­
festation of political rivalry between the plaintiff and 
Mr S.T. Muna (the Federal Minister and leader of the CUC). 
This was the only case in former West Cameroon in which a 
judge, in the instant case Mr Justice Charles Stewart, 
was alleged to have been biased. The case against the 
defendants wasA not watertight and it \a i g i that the learned 
Judge was reluctant to rule against the Prime Minister for 
fear of losing his job-. Moreover, a few hours before he 
came to deliver judgment in the case, the judge was seen 
having a tete-&-t§te with the Prime Minister in his 
chambers. Furthermore, the Judge unwittingly mentioned 
that the first defendant had been motivated by ’political 
ambition’, a statement which would seem to suggest he saw 
the case as a partisan struggle between the KNDP and the 
CUC. Finally, the award of 2.7 million frs cfa against 
the defendants was, by West Cameroon standards of award of 
damages by the courts, excessive and smacked of retribution.
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The award of punitive damages betrayed the Judge’s bias.
The defendants however applied to the Bamenda High Court 
(Kesiro J. presiding) for a stay of execution of the judg­
ment of Stewart J.and were successful. They then appealed 
against the Prime Minister. By the time the appeal came 
up for hearing, the various political parties in Cameroon 
had merged to form one party, the CNU. As a gesture of 
goodwill,, appellants then withdrew their appeal against 
the Prime Minister in open court. This coup de theatre 
only went to confirm the belief that the case was nothing 
more than a KNDP/CUC clash dressed up as a lawsuit.
Criminal proceedings may also be used to perform 
political functions; for example by treating certain 
political manifestations or activities as ordinary crimi­
nality (what American scholars call the ’criminalization 
of political opposition’). This is crucial because 
criminal sanctions can remove political opponents tempo­
rarily or permanently from the political arena. In 
Cameroon ’criminalization of political opposition’ has
170been achieved principally through the laws of sedition 
171and subversion.
Take the case of Walter Mesumbe Wilson (appellant)
172v. Commissioner of Police (respondent). The appellant,
170. Ss. 154, 235, 240 of the Cameroonian Penal Code.
171. Ordinance No. 63/OF/18 of 12 March 1962 as amended by 
Laws No. 63/30 of 10 October 1963 and No. 64/LF/12 of 
26 June 1964.
172. WC/2/CA/65, (1965-1967) W.C.L.R.6.
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publisher and printer, was the president of an organi­
sation with a political bias known as Vikuma (an acronym 
of Victoria, Kumba and Mamfe Divisions). As spokesman 
of this organisation he published at Kumba on 28 November 
1964, an article in pamphlet form which he distributed to 
members of the public and to members of the KNDP who were 
attending a session of the Annual Convention of the party. 
The article which was marked ’Open letter to the life 
President-General and Members of the KNDP’ and copies of 
which were addressed to the Head of State, the Federal 
Inspector for West Cameroon and the Federal Security, read 
in part,
’’National unity cannot be achieved no matter 
how loudly it is preached, when one section 
of the community, on account of numbers, has 
to lord it over the rest, converting public 
property to their own private ends to the 
extent of even administering Government Depart­
ments as though they were family undertakings
... Vikuma is at the verge of asking the
President of the Federal Republic to declare 
West Cameroon an emergency area, suspend the 
West Cameroon Government and appoint an admin­
istrator to take charge of affairs until 
matters are settled.”
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to six months’
imprisonment with hard labour for publishing a seditious
article. Per Gordon, C.J. at page 9S "The only inference
to be drawn from this, is that local conditions are so bad,
due to maladministration in the ways he enumerated, that
the only solution opened to the President of the Republic,
to save West Cameroon from itself, its administrators and
ultimate bankruptcy, is to withdraw its constitutional
rights ... Whether construed piecemeal or as a whole, the
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article is clearly calculated to stir up discontent, dis­
affection, ill-will and even hostility among different 
elements of the population, and further to bring the 
Government into hatred and contempt ... The article is 
unquestionably seditious in its content."
A case similar to this was that of Minist&re
170
Public c. Victor Kanga & Ors. In August 1966 there
was a federal cabinet reshuffle and Mr Victor Kanga was
moved from the prestigious position of Federal Minister
of Finance to the less prestigious Ministry of Information
and Tourism. He -was apparently not happy with this
change in his fortunes. In November 1966 an anonymous
pamphlet entitled ’A Victim of Duty’ began to circulate
in Yaounde and Douala. It claimed that Kanga had been
removed from his post of Finance Minister because he had
tried to expose misappropriation and other malpractices
by certain Ministers in Ahidjo’s cabinet and especially
fraudulent acts in the Yaounde- Central Pharmacy. On
November 22, 1966 he was dismissed as Information Minister
and a week later arrested on charges of ’publishing false 
174news’. There were talks of subversion and rumours of
an attempted Bamileke c o u p  d ’<§tat. There was no evidence
173. Cameroon Times, November 12, 1966, p. 1; Africa 
Confidential, No. 4, February 17, 1967, p. 5;
• Enonchong, Cameroon constitutional law, op.cit., 
pp. 138-140; Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal 
Republic, Cornell■University Press, Ithaca & London, 
1971, pp. 157-158.
174. This is the charge of sedition contained in art. 240 
of the CPC.
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of any such attempt although security was tight during 
Kanga's four hours trial. Kanga contended that he was 
being prosecuted because he had stumbled across damaging 
evidence of embezzlement and that those concerned were 
determined to be rid of him. The State argued that the 
pamphlet was intended to discredit the Government.
Kanga was convicted and sentenced to five years' imprison­
ment plus a further period of five years during which he
176was disqualified from holding public office.
The case concerning Andre Marie Mbida, Charles 
Okala, Bebey Eyidi and May! Matic^ ^  further illustrates 
how the courts may be used to deal with political recal­
citrants and insurrectionaries. It arose from the 
activities of the opposition in the former East Cameroon.
By late 1961 Ahidjo's Union Camerounaise political party 
was the majority in the East Cameroon Assembly, a majority 
further increased by the decision of Charles Assale's 
Mouvement d TAction Nationale Camerounaise (MANC) and Pierre 
Ninyim Kandem's Front pur 1'unite et de la paix (FPUP) to 
join the UC . However, a number of opposition parties 
(Matip's legalised UPC, Mbida's Parti des Democrates 
Camerounais - PDC -, and Dr Eyidi's Parti Travailliste) 
still existed. On 23rd January 1962, the UPC party
175. Eleven other persons were also convicted including two 
important civil servants, both of them Bamileke 
(Pierre Tchanke, Secretary General at the Ministry of 
Finance and Joseph Foalem Fotso, Assistant Director of 
Broadcasting).
176. Chronologie politique africaine, No. 3, p. 4l, No. 4, 
p~. 43, No. 6] p . 42, 1962; W. Rubin, Cameroon - an 
African federation, Pall Mall, London, 1971, p . 146.
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177was broken up by armed soldiers. But this did not
signal the end of the UPC or the demise of the other 
opposition parties.
Fearing that Ahidjo was determined to eliminate 
them politically* the opposition leaders (Mbida, Okala,
Matip, and Eyidi) formed a Front National Unifi£ in April 
1962 and in J^une published an open letter vigorously 
attacking Ahidjo and alleging that he was intent on 
creating a dictatorship through the establishment of a 
one-party state. This was followed a few days later by 
a minfesto, TDes intellectuels prennent position’, pub­
lished in pamphlet form. It repeated the charges against 
Ahidjo and went on to reject specifically the concept of 
the parti unifi£ as advocated by AhidjoTs UC. The Front 
argued that the one party was no more than a disguised 
attempt to accomplish political uniformity in Cameroon and 
that it would be achieved by reducing ’’the other Cameroonians 
to the rank of slaves” and would lead to a ”fascist-type 
dictatorship". The Front’s manifesto said, inter alia,
"Loin d'avoir mobilise la nation entiere & l ’assaut de 
grands probl&mes herit£s de l ’gpoque coloniale, l'inddpen- 
dance, pourtant si ch^rement acquise, a avive plutdt les 
divisions du passd ... La virulence des particularismes
177. Earlier, on 18th January, Ahidjo had in a speech in 
Douala warned, "there were no half-measures and it 
is unacceptable that certain-political figures should, 
by making learned speeches, condemn and excuse terrorism 
at the same breath." Chronologie, op.cit. My 
translation.
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ethniques est allle en s'emplifiant, remettant gravement
1 V ft
en cause la notion mime de nation."
On June 29th, Mbida, Okala, Matip and Eyidi were 
arrested, and their homes searched on the orders of the 
local Prefect acting ’ au nom du gouvernement’. They 
were accused of subversion and brought before the Yaounde 
Tribunal Correctionnel to answer four charges, to wit,. 
’Inciting hatred against the Government, encouraging sub­
versive enterprises, lack of due respect to authorities,
and disseminating rumours or news prejudicial to public 
179authorities’. The defendants pleaded not guilty.
They argued that they were being accused of a press offence, 
that they had parliamentary immunity and that the court 
had, in any case, no jurisdiction to try them. But the 
court had no difficulty in finding them guilty as charged.
On July 11th, they were each sentenced to 2^ * years’ imprison­
ment. They appealed to the Yaounde Court of Appeal 
against conviction and sentence. On December 3rd 1962, 
the Appeal Court not only confirmed the conviction but 
increased the sentence of each defendant to three years’ 
imprisonment plus a fine of 250,000 frs- cfa and the loss 
of their political rights.
178. Chronologie, op.cit.
179. See the Subversion Ordinance of 1962. There were 
also allegations that arms and ammunition had been 
found in their possession and that they were plotting 
against the Government. There was, however, little 
evidence of this.
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b ) The use of the courts to achieve certain political 
desiderata
In Cameroon the judiciary is not seen as merely 
a cloistered institution charged only with the resolution 
of disputes. "As members of the political elite, court 
authorities also have to fulfil another core political 
function of the state and preserve, §L la Hobbes, public 
order, for the maintenance of order is viewed by the citi­
zenry at large as the sine qua non of political responsi- 
l80bility." The judiciary must therefore assist the
Government in the maintenance of law and order and in the
fight against crime.
"At a time when the Government, the Parlia­
ment and the Party are doing all they can 
to preserve the country from these evils 
and more particularly from corruption, 
smuggling and evasion of customs duties 
which, if left unchecked, could undermine 
its credibility, its policy of social 
justice and moral, economic and social 
well-being of the nation, the judiciary 
at all levels must deal severely with 
them." l8l
The judiciary is also seen as inextricably involved in the 
struggle for national development. In this fight the 
judiciary cannot sit on the fence but "must play a useful 
role in the process of the economic, social and cultural 
development of the nation through the judicious enforcement
180. Shattuck, op.cit., at p. 147.
181. Ahidjo address at the Supreme Court on 11 November 
1977* op.cit.
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of laws". Judges must therefore be forward looking;
progressive and not conservative, although how progressive, 
is another question. Judges must always have the national 
interest at heart. But what 'national interest’ is, 
is clearly a political question.
The Government may also enlist the services of 
the courts to propagate its political doctrines. Thus in 
Cameroon the courts are seen by the Government as instru­
ments in the service of ’Cameroonian humanism’.
"After almost 20 years during which I have 
observed and appraised the principles and 
functioning of justice in Cameroon, the 
courts still appear to me to be the most 
precious instruments in the service of 
our humanism, which is not only the core 
of our political doctrine but also a real 
and living force in this country." 183
Clearly then courts are seen as political institutions
(which in fact is what they are) with a political role to
play. This is particularly the case in a one-party
state. And Cameroon is a de facto one-party state. The
CNU, supposedly a mass party, is the only political party
that exists in Cameroon. The concept of an apolitical
judge in Cameroon must therefore be taken with a pinch of
salt.
Judges may well not be required to be card-bearing 
members of the Party. But local party bosses do expect
182. Address by the Hon. Mr Justice S.M.L. Endeley at the 
opening of the Mundemba Magistrate's Court. See,
'Justice goes nearer Bertoua and Mundemba populations’, 
Cameroon Tribune, No. 72 of 12 November 1975, p. 3.
183. Ahidjo address, op.cit.
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them to attend party rallies, and they invariably do, 
sometimes in party uniforms. There are possible reasons 
why a judge may engage in open political activity: 
either because he holds the same political convictions 
as those the CNU preaches, or because, seeing that the 
distinction between Party and Government is blurred, he 
feels he must be an active party member so as to keep his 
job and gain promotion. But how far party militancy does 
act as job security and helps in career advancement is 
hard to ascertain. However, there seems to be a general 
feeling that an uninterested attitude towards the Party 
may adversely affect one’s career. It is perhaps signi­
ficant that although not many judges are to be found openly 
militating in the Party, their wives are almost always 
actively involved in it and are card-bearing members.
In a country-which is a one-party state and 
where the courts are seen as instruments in the service 
of political doctrines and are required to play an active 
role in the developmental process, there is nothing 
incongruous or inherently wrong with a judge being a 
card-bearing member of the Party and openly militating in 
it. That the concept of an apolitical judge needs re­
thinking in a one-party system has been put forcefully by 
Mr Justice Georges, former Chief Justice of Tanzania.
"The concept of the judge as the neutral, 
belonging to no party in the multi-party 
democracy, can have no meaning here where 
there is one party. If he stands aloof, 
seeming to play the apolitical role which 
is supposed to be his, his motives will 
doubtlessly be suspect. A new way must 
be found ...
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"In the case of the elected American judge 
or the English lawyer-politician appointed 
to the bench, whatever posture of Impar­
tiality may be adopted, it is difficult to 
believe that political convictions or pre­
judices acquired over a life-time and per­
haps deeply encrusted can suddenly be 
jettisoned by the mere fact of appointment 
to the bench. What does happen is that 
the judicial officer’s sense of profes­
sional integrity and his professional com­
petence secure some objectivity in the 
handling of legal affairs, despite political 
commitment. It is my view that despite a 
political commitment to TANU, the judicial 
officer in Tanzania, once he is of the 
right calibre, can secure an equal degree 
of objectivity in his legal work ...
"Seen in that context it seems to me that 
the judicial officer should, if he wishes 
to, become a member of TANU, and that at 
this stage this is perhaps desirable. 
Although politics is much concerned with 
the struggle for power and position, it 
is not concerned solely with that. In 
Tanganyika a tremendous task of educating 
people still lies ahead and no one should 
be better fitted to instruct in the essen­
tial parts which the courts play in main­
taining human rights and helping to secure 
for society that basis of order and respect 
for law without which economic advancement 
would be considerably hampered. This 
work can best be done from within the party 
which officers a platform largely respected 
because of its achievement in the struggle 
for independence.
"It is too much to expect the politicians 
to do that job-for the judiciary.
Largely we would have to do it ourselves 
so that public opinion will gradually be 
created, permeating throughout the party, 
that the courts must be preserved because 
of the indispensable role which they play. 
The leaders at the top realise it and 
often stress it. But the task demands 
more than the occasional pronouncement.
For these reasons., I see no harm and much 
good in party membership by members of the 
judiciary and use of the opportunities 
which membership offers to show a positive 
interest in helping the process of rapid
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national development and to stress the 
importance of the courts in-the achieve­
ment of that goal.” 184
This thought-provoking statement is relevant in the 
Cameroonian context because, like Tanzania, Cameroon is 
a one-party state. However,, the proposal has been criti­
cised; first, because it would seem to ignore the interest 
of those who may be out of sympathy with the party; 
secondly, because it would raise strong doubts as to 
the judge’s ability to be impartial.
"Given a people's party, widely and popu­
larly based throughout the country, member­
ship of it by judges may perhaps be 
tolerated; even then the proposal seems 
careless of the interest of the small 
minority who for one reason or another may 
be out of sympathy with the party and what 
it stands for, and for whom the idea of a judge- 
cum-partyman presiding over their cases repre­
sents the very travesty of justice. The 
proposal would be even more reprehensible if 
the party were an elitist one, for, on such 
a case the non-sympathisers would not only 
be a small minority. Membership of even a 
one party remains a voluntary affair and 
indeed the majority of the people are not 
registered, card-bearing members, though 
they may support the aims and objectives of 
the party. When a person registers as a 
member, the presumption is that his commit­
ment to the party is stronger than that of 
most people, and this at once raises a doubt 
as to his ability to maintain an unbiased 
position in a matter in which the vital 
interests of the party conflict with those 
of an individual or a private organisation.
Most people, it may be assumed, would not 
feel confident about the impartiality of 
a judge who is so staunch in his support
184. P.T. Georges, 'The court in the Tanzania one-party 
system’, in Sawyerr (ed.), East African Law and 
Social Change, 1967* pp. 44-45.
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of the party as to take up a membership 
card. It is not enough that the judge 
may in fact be■impartial; appearance is 
equally important. When the judge 
addresses a political meeting or rally 
on the theme of the court’s vital role 
in development, he will do so as a party 
politician, and very soon he may be 
lumped together with the other party 
politicians and tarred with the same 
brush. Public support for independence 
of the judiciary should not be bought 
at such a cost.” 185
That may in fact not be too high a price to pay. To ignore
the wishes of a minority, especially a small minority, is
democratic enough. The minority, according to democratic
principles, must always bow to the wishes of the majority;
and the majority must respect the right of minorities.
Ill. The Minist^re Public, Adjunct of the Executive
The minist^re public, in effect the legal depart-
186ment, is also known as le parquet. Historically, its
origin may be traced to the procureurs et avocats du Roi 
in France during the Ancien Regime. This group of attor­
neys who acted as counsel for the French King did not, 
like the judges, sit on the dais but in the well of the 
courtroom (parquet) . Hence the reference to it as le_
185. Nwabueze, op.cit., p. 282.
186. Members of the ministere public are said to belong to 
la magistrature debout; so called because, unlike the 
judge, the State Prosecutor must stand each time he 
wishes to speak while the court is in session. During 
a criminal trial the ministere public is sometimes 
referred to as 1 ’accusation, that is, the prosecution.
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parquet. This appellation has stuck even though the Pro- 
cureur has left the well of the court and has gone up to
i 07
meet the judge on the dais. Members of the ministere
public are directly subordinate to the Minister of Justice,
their ultimate boss, who closely supervises, controls and
188directs their work.
1. Structure and role of the ministere public
The ministere public is hierarchically structured. 
It conducts public prosecutions and plays an important 
role in certain civil matters.
A . Hierarchical structure of the minist&re public
The overall boss of the minist&re public is the
Minister of Justice himself. Under him are the Procureurs
Generaux and their deputies and Procureurs de la Republique
and their assistants, all of whom are in charge of conduc-
189ting prosecutions at the courts. There is a ministere
187. This is to emphasize the equality between the two. 
Neither of them has powers of discipline and control 
over the other. The equality between judge and state 
prosecutor is also apparent from the similarity of 
their professional costumes.
188. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal 
Service, s . 4(1).
189. In ancient times the accuser in a criminal matter was 
either the victim himself or his close relative.
If the prosecutor or prosecutrix failed to prosecute 
or if he withdrew his accusation no one else could 
prosecute and so the offence went unpunished.
/Continued over
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public attached to every court in Cameroon. The minist£re 
public attached at each court is known as le parquet. If 
the court is appellate the proper terminology is parquet 
general; but if the court is one of first instance, the 
correct designation is parquet. d Tinstance - the Procureur 
General's Chambers and the State Counsel's Chambers res­
pectively .
a) The parquet g£n£ral
This is the name given to the department of public 
prosecutions attached to each appellate court (the Pro­
vincial Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court). The
parquet general at the Supreme Court is headed by the
190Procureur General. His is a small staff made up of
Advocates-General and Deputies to the Procureur General,
Footnote 189 continued from pate 478.
As this was thought to be unfair, Greek and Roman laws 
required the accuser to swear to pursue the accusation 
until judgment was given. But then private prose­
cution entailed serious risks for the prosecutor.
He had to take the initiative to prosecute. He had 
to bear all the expenses of the trial. If the trial 
ended in the acquittal of the accused, the prosecutor 
was visited with the penalties that would have been 
imposed on the accused had he been found guilty. This 
situation called for change. In France, as early as 
the 13th century, a class of agents known as procuratores 
(cf. the Russian prokuratura) acted in courts as attor­
neys for litigants. The King, Lords and Barons began 
to hire procureurs to defend their financial interests 
in the courts. By the middle of the l4th century the 
office of procureur du roi was firmly established in 
the French criminal process. His main duty was to 
initiate and conduct criminal proceedings in the name 
of society.
190. To distinguish him from the P.G. at the Court of Appeal, 
the Criminal Procedure Commission has proposed to 
style him Monsieur 1'Attorney-General (Interviews).
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191that is, of not more than five maglstrats. The
parquet general at each Court of Appeal is headed by the
192Procureur G£n£ral prls la cour d ’appel. His staff,
larger than that of his counterpart at the Supreme Court,
consists of an Advocate-General (who for the moment exists
only on paper), one or more deputies, and one or more
193legal assistants. In reality however, the numerical
strength of the legal department at each Court of Appeal 
varies. At the Bertoua and Garoua Courts of Appeal for 
example, the legal department at each of those courts has 
a manpower strength of only two or three legal officers.
In Yaounde, Douala and Bamenda, the staff strength in 
each case is not less than six legal officers. The 
prosecutorial corps at the Court of Appeal handles all 
prosecutions at that Court and all prosecutions in all 
courts within the Court of Appeal’s ratione loci juris­
diction without a Procureur de la Republique attached to 
them.
The Procureur General at the Court - of Appeal is 
the head of the prosecutorial corps at that court and also 
the hierarchical superior of all State Counsels at the 
courts of first instance within the territorial juris­
diction of the Appeal Court. After the Procureur General
191. Ord. No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, s. 2(1) as amended by
Law No. 76/28 of 14 December 1976.
192. Ord. No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972, s. 25(2).
193. Ibid., s. 19.
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comes the Advocate General, his senior Deputy. Next 
comes the substitut general, that is, the deputy to the 
Procureur General. As there are at the moment no Advo­
cates General at the Courts of Appeal, the substitut 
general is the most senior state prosecutor next to the 
Procureur General. The so-called attaches au parquet 
general are legal assistants working in the Procureur 
General's Chambers. By rank, they are at the bottom of 
the prosecutorial corps. The Procureur General at the 
Supreme Court does not exercise supervisory rights over 
the Procureurs General at the Courts of Appeal. The 
Minister of Justice is their direct and immediate superior 
and it is he who makes confidential reports on and pro­
poses them for promotion.
b ) The parquet d'instance
The parquet d'instance is the department of public
prosecutions attached to courts of first instance, namely,
194the Magistrate's and the High Courts. The department
is headed by a Procureur de la Republique (State Counsel)
and comprises an assistant•and a substitut du procureur de 
195la republique. In practice however the parquet d'instance
is often a one-man office made up of the Procureur de la 
Republique alone. In some cases he prosecutes both in the
194. Ibid., s. 25(3)(4).
195. Ibid., ss. 15(1) and 12(1) as amended by Ord. No.
72/21 of 19 October 1972.
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High and in the Magistrate Courts. Indeed, in some 
Francophone courts, the presiding judge at the Magistrate’s 
Court also acts as Procureur de la Republique in the High 
Court.
A Procureur de la Rdpublique may only prosecute 
in the specific court(s) to which he has been attached.
He cannot however prosecute in the Court of Appeal.
But a State Prosecutor attached to an Appeal Court may 
prosecute in both the Court of Appeal and any Magistrate 
or High Court in the area of the Appeal Court. This is 
why the legal department at the courts of first instance 
is called the parquet d ’instance while that at the Courts 
of Appeal is known as the parquet general.
The Military Court and the Court of Impeachment 
are courts of particular jurisdiction and each of them 
has a minist^re public attached to it. The prosecu­
torial corps at the former court is made up of the commis-
196saire du gouvernement and one or more assistants, while
that at the latter court consists of the 'Procureur General
197and the Advocate General at the Supreme Court.
B. Role of the minist^re public
It ensures the enforcement of laws, regulations
196. Ord. Mo. 72/5 of 26 August 1972, s. 3 (Military 
Judicial Organisation).
197. Ord. No. 72/7 of 26 August 1972, s. 5, to organise 
the Court of Impeachment.
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and judgments and may, in the interests of the law, make
198any request it considers necessary to any court. Its
role is not limited to criminal proceedings but extends 
also to the civil process.
a) In criminal proceedings
The legal department is the Public Prosecutor
in all criminal matters whether the offence committed is
against private or state interest and whether it is a
contravention, a misdemeanour or a felony. The department
is, as it were, counsel for the community, acting on
behalf of society.
State Prosecutors share with the Minister of
Justice the discretion whe.ther to prosecute or not. In
theory, where the legal department fails or refuses to
prosecute, it may be compelled to do so or to give its
199fiat for a private prosecution to be brought. In
practice this is seldom done.
The legal department’s role in the criminal 
process is not only to institute and conduct prosecutions. 
Without prejudice to the civil party, who is always free to
198. Ord. No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972, s. 24(l)(a) as 
amended by Ord. No. 72/21.
199. The victim of an offence may do this by petitioning 
the Minister of Justice praying him to order the 
legal department to prosecute or for it to give its 
fiat for a private prosecution to be brought. The 
victim may simply constitute himself partie civile 
thereby forcing the department to prosecute.
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se constltuer partie civile in the criminal case, the 
legal department also investigates and records offences, 
undertakes judicial inquiries and investigations, issues 
any imprisonment warrants, orders any measure of investi­
gation, notably, searches, seizures, visits to the locus 
in quo, and expert appraisement. Nor is that all.
The department also exercises the functions of the old 
juge d finstruction. It is the legal department which,
in felonious offences, conducts the preliminary inquiry
201before committal for trial at the High Court. Again,
the department may issue any warrant of imprisonment and
202may, of its own motion, release on bail. Finally,
State Prosecutors perform administrative functions in 
their department, including the supervision of advocates, 
officiers minist^riels and la police judiciaire in their 
respective areas of jurisdiction.
b ) In the civil process
Whereas in the Francophone Provinces it is and 
has always been normal practice (as in other civil law 
jurisdictions) for the legal department to intervene in 
certain types of civil matters, in the Anglophone Pro­
vinces (as in other common law jurisdictions) the legal
200. Ord. No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972, s. 24(l)(b), as 
amended by Ord. No. 72/21.
201. Ibid., s. 24(4)-(7) .
202. Ibid., s. 24(2) .
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department has always and continues to be seen as. con­
cerned only with the criminal process. However, the power 
of the legal department to intervene in the civil process 
stems from s. 24(1) (a) of Ordinance No.- 72/21 of 19th 
October 1972 which provides, inter alia, that the legal 
department may "in the interests of the law, make any 
request it considers necessary to any court". Thus any 
request, provided it is in the interest of the law, may 
be made by the legal department to any court whether exer­
cising criminal or civil jurisdiction.
The role of members of the legal department in
civil matters is to be the watchdogs of the law. They
203are, as it were, ’institutionalised amici curiae’.
Although they are agents of the Government at the courts,
they represent not the executive but the public interest;
they represent the law. Their job here is to present
the law to the court, to give an objective appraisal in
the light of the previous jurisprudence (case-law), and
........... 204
to make a formulated proposal known as conclusions for 
action.
203. Otto Kahn-Preund, Claudine Levy and Bernard Rudden,
A sourcebook on French Law, O.U.P., 1973, p. 258.
204. The conclusions in the Francophone Provinces resemble 
in their style a judgment by an Anglophone court, 
far more so than do the Francophone court judgments 
themselves. They are, like the submissions of defence 
or prosecuting counsel in the Anglophone courts, both 
personal and argumentative. The activity of the 
minist£re public is quite often the channel through 
which academic doctrine influences the courts.
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There are two ways in which the legal department 
may participate in civil actions, either as a joined 
party (partie jointe) or as a main party (partie princi- 
pale). When it participates in litigation between other 
parties as representative of the public interest, it is 
said to be partie jointe and to be acting par voie de 
requisition. Here, the legal department intervenes in 
a case it never initiated to give the judge its considered 
legal opinion, as a kind of juris-consult or amicus curia 
on how the issue ought to be resolved. Generally, it is 
discretionary with the legal department whether to inter­
vene in civil proceedings. However, it has an obligation
205to do so whenever the court requests its participation, 
or, in certain cases, when a statute specifically so provides. 
Usually, the department intervenes mainly in the area of 
family law, often to safeguard the interests of the child. 
Hence the department may intervene in actions concerning 
personal status (divorce, annulment of marriages, guardian­
ship, custody, adoption and legitimation), proceedings to 
obtain a declaration of presumed death, matters involving 
infants or incompetents, matters concerning charitable 
bequests, and so on. Although the department has no right 
of appeal when it intervenes merely as partie jointe, it 
may, in certain cases lodge a pourvoi en cassation in the
205. French Code de Procedure Civile, art. 83(8). The code 
is still in force in the French-speaking part of 
Cameroon.
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Supreme Court in the interest of the law.. However, only
the Procureur General at the Supreme Court may, either
on his own initiative or on the orders of the Minister
206of Justice, lodge such an appeal. The Procureurs
General at the Courts of Appeal (and less still, the Pro­
cureurs de la Republique) have no competence to do so.
Accordingly, it was held in Procureur General pres la Cour
207d*Appel de Yaounde c . Dame Nguini Madeleine that an 
appeal lodged by the Procureur General at the Yaounde 
Court of Appeal in the interest of the law cannot be enter­
tained as he was not competent to make such an appeal.
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in the ana­
logous case of Procureur General at the Court of Appeal,
208Bamenda v. Mathias Tantoh Naseh.
The legal department is a partie principale in 
a civil case where it initiates proceedings, pursuant to 
statutory authority, in its own name or as representative 
of a litigant (natural or artificial person). In this 
case the department is said to be acting par voie d Taction. 
Here, the department is in fact the plaintiff and may 
appeal in the event of an adverse decision. However, it 
may never be ordered to pay costs although, ordinarily, as
206. Ord. No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, s. 6 (Organisation of 
the Supreme Court) as amended by Law No. 76/28 of
14 December 1976.
207. C.S.C., arret no. 306/p du 14 aout 1975, unreported.
208. C.S.C., arret no. 118/P du 05 mai 1977, unreported.
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209losing party, it ought to. The instances in which the
department may proceed in its own name include: actions
for the annulment of a void marriage, adoption pro­
ceedings, proceedings concerning the custody of infants, 
actions to deprive a parent of his parental authority, 
actions to correct official birth, death and marriage 
records, proceedings to have an insane person adjudicated 
an incompetent, actions in certain cases involving testa­
mentary dispositions in the nature of future interests 
210and so on.
2. Nature of the minist&re public
Two main features characterise the legal depart­
ment. It Is the representative of the executive branch of 
government at the courts. It is also the necessary and 
the principal party in any criminal.trial.
A . The representative of the executive at the courts
As representative of the executive, the legal
211department is independent of the court but subordinate
209. Cf. French Code de Procedure Civile, art. 156.
210. See articles 99, 184, 191, 353, 491 and 1057 of the 
French Code Civil. This code is still applied in 
the French-speaking part of Cameroon.
211. ’Court’ in the narrow sense of a judge or judges 
sitting in judicial capacity. In the broad sense, 
a court consists of the judge, registrar and state 
prosecutor. See Ord. No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972 
(Judicial Organisation).
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to the Minister of Justice.
a) Hierarchical subordination
The fundamental trait of the organisation of the 
legal department is its hierarchical subordination.
Members of the department are subordinate to the Minister 
of Justice. They receive directives and orders from 
their immediate superiors to whom they owe respect and 
obedience. At the top of the hierarchy is the Minister 
of Justice. He is not a member of the legal department 
and has no such status. But as head of that Government 
Department which deals with-justice in general, the 
Minister of Justice is the overall boss of the legal 
department. As the embodiment of the executive in this 
area, he may issue orders to the Procureur General at the 
Supreme Court, Procureurs General at the Courts of Appeal, 
to the Procureurs de la Republique and in fact all legal 
officers.
The Procureur General at the Supreme Court may 
issue orders to his deputies. Procureurs General at the 
Courts of Appeal give orders to their deputies and assis­
tants, to Procureurs de la Republique and the judicial 
police (including gendarmes who are officiers de police 
judiciaire) within their respective jurisdictional areas. 
Procureurs de la Republique also give orders to their 
assistants and judicial police and gendarme officers within 
their respective areas of work. Members of the legal 
department are bound to obey their immediate superiors.
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It is extremely unwise not to do so. Firstly, legal
officers are reported on and recommended for promotion
212by their immediate superiors. Secondly, a disciplinary
offence by a legal officer is determined in the light of
213the obligations resulting from his subordinate rank.
However, to- give legal officers some measure
of protection from the whims and caprices of their superiors
and from arbitrary dismissals, disciplinary sanction against
an officer, it is statutorily provided, can only be taken
214by the Permanent Disciplinary Board. Besides, there
are two exceptions to the rule of hierarchical obedience.
In the first place, Procureurs General and Procureurs de
la Republique are invested with definite powers of theirs.
They may prosecute or refrain from prosecuting.without
orders or even against the orders of their superiors.
If they refuse to prosecute in defiance of orders from
their superiors to do so, the latter cannot step into
215their shoes and prosecute in their place. Secondly,
the obligation of legal officers to obey the orders of 
their superiors relates only to the preparation and filing
212. Judicial and Legal Service Rules and Regulations, 
ss. 33(1), 34(2), 35 and 38.
213. Ibid., s. 46(2) .
214. Ibid., ss. 51 and 52.
215. Within a given parquet however, assistant and deputy 
prosecutors must obey instructions on prosecutions 
given to them by their boss, irrespective of their 
personal legal views of the matter concerned.
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of written submissions. On oral argument they are free
? 1
to take any position they choose. This is often
expressed in the French aphorism, la plume est serve,
mais la parole est libre, which means, Tthe pen is slave,
but the word is freeT. But it is very rare for a procureur
to defy his superior’s instructions. To begin with, if
the procureur intends in his oral arguments to go against
his superior’s instructions, the law requires that he
must "have previously and in due time, informed his- direct
superior of his intention of orally differing from the
submissions or pleadings filed in accordance with the
217instructions received". Furthermore, oral arguments
seldom carry much weight in the Francophone courts. The 
written submissions or pleadings filed in the dossier are 
what the judge, for most of the time, considers before 
arriving at a decision in any given case.
b ) Independence and homogeneity
As servants of the executive, legal officers 
are independent of the bench and. are not bound by the 
views and attitude taken by the victim of an offence.
A member of the bench, be he so high, can neither reprimand 
nor give orders to any legal officer, be he so low.
Generally, the judge cannot take cognizance of
2-16. Rules and Regulations of the Judicial and Legal
Service, s. 4(1). This however seldom happens.
217. Ibid., s. 4(1).
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an offence and himself initiate criminal proceedings.
He must wait until he has been seised of the matter by
21 Q
the legal department. In deciding whether to prosecute
or not the legal department is not bound to take into 
consideration the wishes of the victim of the offence. 
Supposing the department does not wish to prosecute.
The victim of the offence may compel it to do so by 
simply constituting himself civil party. But the depart­
ment may initiate proceedings and then refuse to proceed 
with the case by simply withdrawing the charge. It is 
not bound to give any reason for doing so. On the other 
hand, the victim’s acquiescence, his withdrawal from the 
case or of the complaint (.except where such a withdrawal 
would amount to prosecution being barred) would in no way 
prevent the legal department from going, ahead with the 
prosecution of the case, asking for conviction and sentence 
or going on appeal in the event of an acquittal. Simi­
larly, the victim's failure or refusal to lodge a complaint 
(except where the offence is one of those which requires 
the victim's complaint before the offender can be prose­
cuted) or his wish to forgive the criminal, would not 
prevent the legal department from prosecuting if it were so 
minded.
Each department of public prosecutions is legally
218. In certain cases however, the court may itself take
cognizance of an offence and proceed to try the offen­
der. A classic example is the case of contempt of 
court. Ss. 152(1) and 154(a) of the Cameroonian 
Penal Code.
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regarded as one homogeneous, indivisible entity. Although 
it is made up of several members, it is referred to and 
regarded as though it were one. person. No member of the 
legal department acts in his own personal name. When he 
speaks in court, when he prosecutes, it is the legal 
department speaking, it is the legal department prosecuting. 
The members of the department are, as it were, anonymous 
entities with one common nomenclature - the Legal Department 
or the Prosecution. One important consequence of this 
is that in the course of a trial, members of the depart­
ment may replace each other in prosecuting a single case. 
Thus, PI may start the case, at some later stage in the 
trial P2 may take over, while P3 may take over at the 
closing stages. This is something which members of the 
bench are not permitted by law to do. If a judge sits in
a case he must see it.right through and pass judgment.
He cannot be replaced by another judge in the course of 
that same case. If for some reason the judge.cannot sit 
through to the end in a particular case, the new judge
who takes over must start the case all over. Failure to
do so will render the entire proceedings completely null 
and void.
This was indeed what happened in Andrew Nwacha
219v. Commissioner of Police. The appellant, who was a
customs clerk at Lobe, collected customs duty to the extent
219. WC/22 CA/64, (1965-1967) W.C.L.R.10.
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of 29aOOO francs cfa from two traders, on goods brought 
into West Cameroon by them. He gave them official 
receipts for a total amount of only.5,750 francs cfa, 
thus, accounting in his books for only this latter amount.
He was arraigned before His Worship Mr Wyatt sitting at 
Kumba and pleaded not guilty after he had elected summary 
trial. Several adjournments followed and later, His 
Worship Mr Allahar who by then was presiding over the 
court began taking the evidence in the case. At the 
end of the trial, he convicted the appellant on two counts 
of making false entries with intent to defraud and sentenced 
him to thirty months’ imprisonment with hard labour on each 
count, sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, held, 
per Gordon C.J., that there having been a number of 
adjournments in the case and the case coming finally 
before a Magistrate different from the Magistrate who com­
menced the case the appellant should have been put to his 
election and, if summary trial chosen, a plea taken afresh. 
The failure of that Magistrate to do so rendered the trial 
null and void ab initio.
B . The necessary party in a criminal trial
Because the legal department is the necessary 
and the principal party in any criminal trial, no .challenges 
may be made, during a trial, against a legal officer and 
neither damages nor costs may be awarded against the 
department.
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a) No challenges
Although they are representatives of the executive
at the courts no challenges may, in the course of a trial,
220be made against members of the legal department. This
is because the legal department is the necessary party in
a criminal trial. Judges, assessors, and jurymen may be
221challenged for various reasons. Not so a member of
the legal department. One party to a case cannot make 
challenges against the other.
b ) Immunity
When the victim- of an offence constitutes him­
self partie civile, he may, in the event of an acquittal, 
be ordered to pay damages to the person against whom he 
had constituted himself a civil party. He may, in 
addition be ordered to pay costs. Not so in the case 
of the legal department. If it has wrongfully or erro­
neously prosecuted someone who is eventually acquitted, 
the department can neither be ordered to pay damages nor 
costs. The department's immunity is however not abso­
lute. If it is reckless in bringing charges against
someone, if it is guilty of gross negligence or mistake, 
it can be sued civilly for damages using the special
procedure (which also applies to judges) known as la prise
> 4-. 222 a partie.
220. Law No. 75/16 of 18 December 1975, s. 30(4), fixing 
the procedure and functions of the Supreme Court.
221. Ibid., s . 30(1).
222. Cf. ibid., s. 33.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
It is not known exactly when the legal profession
began. It was probably evident in 4th century Attica
among the orators and rhetoricians who wrote speeches
for parties to deliver in court.'*' In ancient Rome there
existed the institution known as advocatus. The
advocati were friends of litigants whom they defended in
their lawsuits. Among the advocati the-most eloquent
and best in the science of law were styled oratores.
By the time of the Roman Empire the orator-friend, an
amateur who rendered his services gratis, had become a paid
2
professional orator. The modern advocate is therefore 
more directly a successor to the orator than to the Juris- 
consult of Rome. In England in Norman times (about the 
11th to the 13th century) it was common for a litigant to 
have assistance in the conduct of his case by a friend not 
by a professional expert. The friendTs function was to
1. Geoffrey Sawer, Law in society, O.U.P., 1965, pp. 110- 
113. Orators also existed in traditional African 
society (although there was no legal profession as such) 
and were often hired for their eloquence and glib tongue 
to defend parties in court.
2. Y.R., TDe la deontologie des avocats du barreau de 
Madagascar’, Penant, No. 758, 1977, p. 441; Pierre Sire, 
’The legal profession and the law: the bar in France’, 
J.I.C.J., vol. 1, no. 2, 1958, p. 244.
recite the formal words necessary in the making of a claim 
of defence. The reason for having a friend was that if he 
made a mistake the party could disown the case with 
impunity whereas if one party were to make an error him­
self, it would be fatal to his case. More expert assis­
tance arose when court procedure was developed by courts 
which enforced it became very complicated. As a conse­
quence the friend of the party became a professional 
pleader or narrator who conducted oral pleadings and argued 
questions of law on behalf of his client. It is from 
the narrator that the barrister of present times is des- 
cended.
Historically, and as part of the now extinct 
view that a profession suffers loss of prestige if its 
members depend on their professional activity for their 
livelihood, the services of the advocate were rendered 
without financial reward, though he could accept a volun­
tary remuneration spontaneously offered to him by his 
client. Such a reward was. accepted merely as a present 
offered in acknowledgement of the work the advocate had 
put into the case. Advocates were therefore not only 
amici curiae but amici populi as well. Folk hostility 
against him and the diminution of his social prestige 
came about when the advocate began to receive fees for his
3. William B. Boulton, ’The legal profession and the law: 
the bar in England and Wales’, J.I.C.J., vol. 1, no. 1, 
1957, p. 106.
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work. The hostility and cynical attitude towards him 
have survived to this day. It represents a folk dis­
approval of the notion that a special class of persons 
should earn their living by the performance of the social 
functions associated with a rlegal profession’. This 
hostility stems from an ingrained belief among many lay­
men that lawyers foment social strife .in order to earn 
their fees and that they have a vested interest in 
telling lies, in deceiving and in misrepresenting issues.
Little wonder that, throughout all ages and 
countries, literature treats lawyers badly. In Prance 
in the 15th century, a satirical play, Maitre Patelin, 
described the characteristics of a lawyer of that name, 
a much less scrupulous advocate who boldly deceived his 
judge by suggesting a disreputable line of defence but 
who, himself, as a. result of an identical strategem by 
his client, lost payment of the fee he had been demanding 
so ruthlessly. Napoleon Bonaparte had no love for lawyers. 
"They are seditionmongers," he said, "artisans of crime 
and treason. I wish it were possible to cut out the
4
tongue of any barrister who uses it against the Government." 
Similar scathing remarks against lawyers have come from 
England. Swift wrote in his Gulliver’s Travels, "I 
said there was a society of men among us, bred up from 
their youth, in the art of proving, by words manipulated
4. Pierre Sire, op.cit., p. 255.
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for the purpose, that white is black, and black is white, 
according as they are paid. To this society, all the 
rest of the people are slaves." But while Swift was 
content grossly to misrepresent the legal profession, 
Shakespeare would rather have no lawyers at all. "The 
first thing we do," he wrote in Henry V I , Part II, Act 4, 
Scene 2, "Let’s kill all .the lawyers." This hostility 
however proves nothing.
*****
After giving a brief history of the legal pro­
fession in Cameroon (.Section I) and an account of the 
situation of private practice in that country (Section II), 
this chapter goes on to analyse how entry is gained into 
the Cameroonian Bar (Section III), the functions, rights 
and duties of the Cameroonian advocate (Section IV), how 
an advocate may cease being a member of the legal profes­
sion (Section V), and the role of the Cameroonian Bar 
Association (Section VI). Section VII gives a run down 
of other auxiliary personnel of the law.
I . History of the Legal Profession in Cameroon
Although the legal profession is several cen­
turies old in some countries, it is only recently that it 
began in Cameroon. Its development however, has not been 
the same in the French-speaking and in the English-speaking 
parts of Cameroon.
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1. In Francophone Cameroon
The private practice of law in the French Cameroun 
was a drudgery; neither exciting nor rewarding. Often, 
it attracted no barristers from France (or from elsewhere 
for that matter) or, if it did, only mediocre ones who 
could not hold their own in the metropole. Up to 1930 
there was not a single private practitioner in the French 
Cameroun. There was- therefore no need to organise prac­
tice at the bar in the territory. In 1935 however there 
were three avocats-defenseurs et agents d ’affaires, all 
French, in the territory. An arrete of the 20th April 
1936 created un corps d ’avocats-defenseurs pres les 
tribunaux francais du Cameroun, but did not set up any Bar 
as such, probably because the number of practitioners was 
still small. In 19^7 the number of practitioners 
increased to four and then to twenty-one in 1952. None
of them was a Cameroonian. And although these practitioners 
were styled avocats-defenseurs they combined the duties per­
formed in France by the avocat, avoue, and notaire. More­
over, they included people who were not, strictly speaking, 
lawyers. Indeed law practice was not the monopoly of 
qualified lawyers. Here and there people received fees 
to give advice to others on legal matters or even appear 
in court. They paraded themselves under the name of- agents 
d ’affaires and also used the title, maitre.
Practitioners were attached to specific
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court areas and only appeared before les trlbunaux francais
and sometimes before the chambre speciale d ’homologation,
mainly in capital offences. A barrister listed in any
Bar in the Metropole or some other French colony could
practise law in the French Cameroun. To qualify for
practice, the aspiring advocate had to satisfy the following
conditions: be at least 25 years of age, be of good moral
character, be a citizen of France or an assimile, hold a
licence en droit, possess an aptitude for the profession
and pay the relevant fees.
This situation was unaffected by independence.
There was still no organised Bar in the former East
Cameroun. The corps d ’avocats-defenseurs continued to
exist. Although it was sometimes called.a barreau, it
was in fact not an autonomous and independent organisation.
Barristers were enrolled and attached to particular court
jurisdictions. Discipline within the corps was ensured
by the Minister of Justice who could warn, reprimand or
censure a defaulting advocate. If a lawyer committed a
serious professional offence the Minister of Justice could
propose to the Head of State that the advocate in question
5
be suspended or barred from practising.
2. In Anglophone Cameroon
Although the legal profession in the British
5. Victor Kanga, ’Le role du pouvoir judiciaire et du
barreau dans la protection des droits de l ’individu au 
sein de la society’, Penarvt, vol. 71, 1961, p. 489.
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Cameroons was- derived from England, it was slightly dif­
ferent from the English Legal profession in that it was 
a fused one and that the dichotomy between barristers and 
solicitors, and between equity lawyers and common lawyers, 
did not exist. For most of the colonial period, the 
British Cameroons did not attract practising lawyers. 
Although occasionally a lawyer coming all the way from 
Nigeria took up a case in the territory, it was not until 
the 1950s that a significant number of lawyers from Nigeria 
began to hold briefs for clients in the territory. As 
there was not a single resident barrister in the territory, 
it was very expensive hiring a lawyer all the way from 
Nigeria. Moreover, as communications were very poor in 
the territory, Nigerian lawyers were reluctant to travel 
there. Furthermore, most cases coming before the courts 
of the territory were minor ones: larceny and petty
assaults. Again, it was only in 1955 that a High Court 
was set up in the Southern Cameroons.
There was therefore no Bar in the Southern 
Cameroons. There was instead the Nigerian Bar. Most 
legal personnel serving in the territory came from Nigeria. 
In the early years of British suzerainty over the territory 
this personnel consisted mainly of British lawyers serving 
in the colonial service in Nigeria. Later came Nigerian 
lawyers, either as law officers of the Nigerian Govern- 
ment, members of the judiciary or private practitioners.
6. Law Officers Ordinance No. 4 of 1910, No. 4 of 1936; 
the Nigerian Constitutional Order-in-Council, 1951.
Law officers of the Government were known as officers 
of the Crown and represented the Crown in criminal 
matters and disputes in which the Crown was a party.
Law officers of the Crown included the Attorney General, 
the Solicitor General, Crown Counsels and the Legal 
Secretary._______________________________________________________
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The basic qualification for barristers was the
same as for legal and judicial officers. To practise law
one had to be called to the Bar of one of the four Inns 
7
of Court in London or be a member of either the Scottish 
or Irish Bar. Qualifications from other Commonwealth 
countries and other countries with recognised legal
g
training were accepted.- A lawyer who qualified to prac-
9
tise was enrolled as Ta barrister and solicitor' of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria and became a member of the 
Nigerian Bar.
Up to I960 there was no Southern Cameroonian 
engaged in the private practice of the l a w . ^  In i960 
Mr S.M.L. Endeley (now the Hon. Mr Justice Endeley) was 
the second Anglophone Cameroonian to qualify as barrister
7. In early times in England, the education of all lawyers 
was placed in the hands of the judges who had authority 
to decide which of them might practice before the courts. 
Gradually, groups of junior practitioners and students
(apprentices) gathered in the house of some great lawyer 
or judge under whom they studied. These groups in the 
course of time formed themselves into permanent societies 
each with its Inn or premises where its members lived a 
more or less communal life. Of these Inns, only four 
survive today: Lincoln’s Inn, Gray’s Inn, Inner Temple
and the Middle Temple. They have changed little in 
their organisation during the 600 years or more since 
they were founded. See, Boulton, op.cit., p. 110.
8. Supreme Court Ordinance No. 4 of 1876 and Cap. 211 of 
the 1948 Laws; Legal Practitioners Ordinance, Cap. 110 
of the 1948 Laws and Cap. 101 of the 1958 Laws.
9. Almost all practitioners were barristers because it was 
shorter, less expensive and less difficult to study for 
the bar qualifications than for that of solicitor.
10. The first Anglophone Cameroonian to qualify as barrister, 
Mr P.B. Engo, now a career diplomat, was called to the 
bar in 1958 but he joined the Legal Department.
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but the first to get into private practice. After six 
years of brilliant practice at the bar, he was appointed 
in July 1966 to the Bench, again the first Cameroonian ever 
to be so appointed. Between 1961 and 1964 five more 
Cameroonians were called to the Bar.'*"'*' It therefore 
became desirable to form an association of barristers.
This desire led to the formation of the West Cameroon Bar 
Association (hereinafter abbreviated WCBA). The Nigerian 
Legal Practitioners Ordinance, which governed practice at 
the Bar before the courts of West Cameroon, was repealed 
in 1963 but substantially re-enacted as Federal Law No. 
63/LF/37 of 15th November 1963. Lawyers appearing before 
the courts of West Cameroon had to be listed on the roll 
of members of the WCBA. They were enrolled as. Tbarristers 
and solicitors of the Supreme Court of West Cameroon’.
The first president of the WCBA was Mr S.M.L. 
Endeley, who provided a dynamic leadership. When he was 
appointed to the Bench in July 1966 the Association vir­
tually entered a period of unrest as it moved from crisis 
to crisis and its existence was challenged by some of its 
members. For the most part, these crises were provoked 
by professional rivalry, mutual jealousies and bitterness 
among barristers. Things came to a head in 1970 when
11. Messrs E.T. Egbe in 1961, A.J.T. Asonganyi in 1963,
F. Gorji-Dinka in 1964 together with F.W. Atabong and 
P.D. Koti. By 1968 there were at least 10 Cameroonians 
and a further 10 Nigerians practising in West Caermoon.
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12some members of the Association called for the disso­
lution of the WCBA and the creation of a national bar 
association covering both East and West Cameroon.
On this issue the WCBA was split into two camps.
On the one hand were those who advocated the dissolution 
of the WCBA and the formation of a national bar asso­
ciation. Led by Mr Gorji-Dinka, this minority group 
included Messrs Asonganyi, Enonchong and Benjamin Matip, 
a Douala-based Francophone barrister. The other group 
was made up of all the remaining members of the Association. 
This latter group was not so much opposed to the formation 
of a national bar as the way its.proponents had decided to 
go about it.
What had happened, as far as this writer was 
able to determine from interviews and the perusal of the 
files of the WCBA, was this. In June 1970 Mr Gorji-Dinka 
had taken the initiative to invite West Cameroonian barris­
ters and members of the Bench to a meeting in the House 
of Assembly, Buea. The invitation was also extended to 
East Cameroonian barristers (.probably to give the meeting 
a national outlook) and in fact three from Douala attended 
the meeting, which was duly held on June 28th 1970 under 
the chairmanship of Mr O.M. Inglis in his capacity as 
president of the WCBA. On the agenda was the question of
12. At this time the president of the Association was 
Mr O.M. Inglis and the secretary Mr P.D. Koti.
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the formation of a national bar. It is not clear what 
exactly was decided at this meeting. But it seems, as 
events later showed, that no consensus was ever reached 
on this issue. The minutes, of the meeting do not say 
that a national bar was created or that there was agree­
ment to form one in future. The meeting was perhaps only 
an exploratory one. Two weeks after the meeting however, 
an article appeared in the Cameroon Times which infuriated
most members of the WCBA. The article in question was
13captioned ’National Bar Association Formed’ J and reported 
that West and East Cameroonian barristers had agreed at 
the meeting held in Buea on June 28 to form a National Bar 
Association. What in effect the publication wanted its 
readers to believe was that the WCBA had committed suicide. 
As this was not true, the publication was properly con­
strued by the WCBA as nothing but a manoeuvre by ’Dinka 
and his gang of three’ to undermine the authority of the 
WCBA, a legally constituted body. The Association
issued a statement denying that a body known as the National 
Bar Association had been formed and described the press 
story as a complete falsehood.
But, if the press story was a pack of lies, why
14did the Dinka faction cause it to be published? Why
13. Cameroon Times, vol. 10, no. 66 of l4th July 1970, p. 4.
14. As the press was not present at the meeting it must be
reasonably assume that it got its story from the Dinka- 
led group. Besides, such a publication was clearly in
the interest of the group.
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did Mr Dinka and Mr Matip use papers headed ’Cameroon 
National Bar Association’? Was it out of their deter­
mination to scuttle the authority of the WCBA? If so, 
why? First, it would seem there was opposition to 
Mr P.D. Koti being secretary to the WCBA. This oppo­
sition was allegedly motivated by jealousy and envy.
Mr Koti was apparently getting too many briefs. Secondly, 
it would seem that Messrs Enonchong and Dinka were eager 
to extend their practice to the East Cameroonian town of 
Douala, where they hoped to make more money as the town 
was a prosperous business centre. After all, Mr Enonchong 
had come into contact with the civil law system while 
working in Yaounde and while on study leave in France.
Both he and Dinka had a working knowledge of French.
The belief by the leadership of the WCBA that
Messrs Dinka, Enonchong, Asonganyi and Matip were out to 
undermine the authority of the Association found support 
in Mr Asonganyi’s hostile attitude towards it. Dinka and 
Enonchong had never denied the legal existence of the 
WCBA. Asonganyi on the other hand was rather a hard­
liner and an extremist. He had persistently argued that 
the WCBA had no legal existence; in fact that the body 
did not exist at all. On 14th July 1970 he had circu­
lated a tract entitled, ’Does a body called the WCBA
really exist?’. He harped on this same theme in an 
address to the West Cameroon Chief Justice in Buea on 19th 
September 1971. The address was captioned, ’The collapse
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of the learned and honourable legal profession’. On 23rd 
March 1972 he circulated a letter among members of the 
WCBA in which he said, inter alia, ’’The West Cameroon 
Bar has never had a Bar Association. There were only 
proposals to form one. But it was never actually formed. 
Opportunists have been harping on the suggested name of 
these proposals and have been exploiting it immensely 
and in the most degenerating and unprofessional ways pos­
sible .
Indeed the troubles of the WCBA were not yet 
over. During a meeting of the Association held in Buea 
on 23rd January 1971, Messrs Dinka, Enonchong and Ason­
ganyi staged a walk-out upon a disagreement arising, on 
the question of the formation of a national bar. In 
September that year the Association elected Messrs Ben 
Muna, Luke Sendze and Hans Ngalame respectively as its 
president, secretary and auditor. These officials were 
allegedly elected unanimously. But their election was 
vigorously opposed by Mr E.E. Ebai, although he was not 
present at the meeting during which those officials were 
elected. He argued that both Muna and Sendze were young 
in age and junior in practice and that Mr Ngalame could 
not be a member of the Bar Association since he was a 
state prosecutor in the legal department. Mr Ebai’s
15. Letter BA/70/3 from A.T.J. Asonganyi, Telelen Chambers, 
Victoria.
16. ’Ebai challenges unanimity of Bar Association on Muna's 
election’, Cameroon Outlook, vol. 3, No. 79, 17th 
September 1971, p. 1.
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attack brought a counter-attack from Mr Nyo1 Wakai (then 
Procureur General at the Supreme Court of West Cameroon)
'In his capacity as leader of the Bar'. He vouched for 
the propriety of the elections and noted that It was 
Illogical and curious that Mr Ebai, who was absent at 
the meeting, should challenge the unanimity of the elec­
tions which were held; he added that length of time in
17private practice did not determine seniority at the Bar.
Mr Ebai's attack may have been 'illogical and 
curious'j but so was the wrangling within the WCBA. By 
the end of 1971 the Association existed more in name than 
in deed. Most of its members had either virtually deserted 
it or lost faith in it. Meetings were fewer and those 
that were called were uninteresting and had a poor atten­
dance. The death-knell of the organisation was already 
tolling. The finishing-off blow to what had become a 
moribund organisation was delivered in May-June 1972 when 
a unitary system of government came into being in Cameroon. 
The Bar Law (Law No. 72/LF/5) of 23rd May 1972 effectively 
dissolved the WCBA. Section 51 of that Law enacts,
"All provisions contrary to this law shall 
be repealed, in particular: the orders of
20 April 1936 and 21 December 1946 to set up 
a corps of 'avocats defenseurs' and 'secre­
taires d'avocats defenseurs' of the French 
courts in Cameroun, articles 49(2) and (3),
52 and 60(2) of Ordinance No. 59/86 of 17 
December 1959 to set up the judicial
17. 'The Bar Association wrangle: Wakai levels Ebai',
Cameroon Outlook, vol. 3, No. 80, 22nd September 1971,
p. 1.
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organisation of the state and Federal Law 
No. 63/LF/37 of 5 November 1963 to organise 
practice at the Bar of West Cameroon.”
With the abolition of the East Cameroon corps d ’avocats
defenseurs and the dissolution of the WCBA, a National
Bar Association was created. All that remained was the
setting up of its various organs. This task was for the
time being entrusted to the Minister of Justice. The
incumbent at this time was Mr Simon Achidi Achu, who took
over from Mr Felix Sabba Lecco, but up to the time of his
dismissal from office in 1976 Mr Achu had not set up the
organs of the Bar. It was only in May 1976 that the
various organs of the Cameroon Bar Association were set up.
II. The Bar in Cameroon
The Bar is a professional organisation of lawyers 
engaged in the private practice of the law. Lawyers 
engaged in private practice are said to be ’practising at 
the bar’.
1. The meaning of ’practice at the bar’
19In Cameroon, ’practice at the Bar’ consists in
18. Most advocates reminiscing over Mr Achu’s term of office 
regard it as unsuccessful and they often claim that his 
failure for four years to set up the organs of the Bar 
was a contributory factor to his dismissal. Alleged to 
be insulting towards and contemptuous of private prac­
titioners, most advocates literally celebrated when he 
fell from office (Fieldwork interviews).
1
19* It is governed by Law No. 72/LF/5 of 23rd May 1972 as 
amended by Decree No. 72/706 of 13 December 1972, Law
/Continued over
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exercising for a financial consideration the following 
20duties. First, assisting and representing parties in
law, conducting suits, presenting pleadings, and giving 
legal advice. Secondly, drawing up any procedural docu­
ment or-documents to confer, transfer, limit or extinguish 
any right, title or interest in property, moveable or 
immoveable, real or personal. Thirdly, pursuing the 
enforcement of judicial decisions, in particular instituting 
and following up any extra-judicial procedures, receiving 
payments and giving discharge thereof. It follows that
the duties of the advocate in Cameroon embrace those per-
21formed in England by the barrister and the solicitor or
again those performed in France by the avocat, the avoug
22and the notaire.
Footnote 19 continued from page 510.
No. 74/11 of 16 July -974, Law No. 76/16 of 8 July 1976 
and Law No. 77/13 of December 1977. For convenience 
this law of 23rd May 1972 together with its amendments 
shall be referred to as Tthe Bar Law'. Practice at 
the Bar is also governed by the Internal Rules and Regu­
lations of the Bar. These Regulations have not yet 
been made official.
20. The Bar Law, s. 1.
21. The solicitor in England is descended from the attorney 
who emerged during Edward I fs reign (1272 - 1307). He 
was not a mere assistant in the conduct of litigation 
but a person who was competent to act in place of his 
client as his agent. A need for such a representative 
arose because some litigants, especially large land­
owners found it difficult or inconvenient to attend court 
or carry through their cases in person. See, Boulton, 
op.cit. , p . 110.
22. There is a feeling among notaires that by allowing advo­
cates to do work traditionally theirs (e.g. drawing of 
legal documents and deeds), the Government was trying to 
put them out of business. This fear is however unjusti­
fied. Seven years after the passing of the Bar Law, 
notaires are still well in business with no real threat 
to their position.
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However* the conduct of a suit In the law courts 
Is not the monopoly of the professional advocate. Repre­
sentation by the professional advocate is compulsory only
when a case goes to the Court of Appeal or to the Supreme 
21Court. Subject to this caveat* all natural persons
are entitled* without being represented by advocate* to
appear before any court for the purpose of conducting any
suit and pleading* on their own behalf, or on behalf of
their spouse, ascendants and descendants, privileged col-
24lateral or ward. Such natural persons may also be
assisted or represented by any other representative of 
their choice armed with a power of attorney. But it is 
not sufficient that the representative be armed with a 
power of attorney. His services must be gratuitous (other­
wise he would be conducting himself as the professional 
advicate who gets paid for his job). Furthermore, there 
must be an insufficient number of professional advocates, 
in the jurisdiction of the court to which the case has been 
referred, to represent all the parties. Provided these 
conditions are satisfied any person involved in a case in 
the lower courts may duly mandate any person of his choice 
to conduct the suit for him.
Public administrations (such as a Government 
Department) need not be represented by a professional advo­
cate before any court of law. A civil servant may be
23. Bar Law, s . 2(1).
24. Idem.
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nominated by the competent authority to act as agent for
25such bodies before any court.  ^ This has always been the 
situation with respect to litigation in administrative 
matters. A civil servant is always appointed to con­
duct the case of the administrative body concerned in an 
administrative dispute. In this way the Government has 
cleverly avoided having to hire private lawyers, at high 
fees, to conduct or defend cases in which it is involved.
Private practice of the law may be undertaken
individually or in a group. In either case the advocate(s) 
may only have one chambers on the territory of the United 
Republic of Cameroon. Where two or more advocates prac­
tise together they must do so in the form of a partnership
constituted in accordance with the laws and regulations in 
2 6force. The partners must have their chambers only at
27their registered office. An advocate may not belong to
2 8more than one professional partnership. A partnership
agreement is by its very nature intuitu personae. There­
fore the right of the partners in the partnership is per­
sonal and may not be transferred without the consent of
one or the other co-partners who, in any case, do not have
2Qto justify their decision.  ^ Moreover a partner is free
2 5. Bar Law, s . 2(3).
26. Ibid., s . 3(1).
27. Internal Rules and Regulations of the Bar (hereinafter 
referred to as the Bar Regulations), s. 33(9).
28. Bar Regulations, s. 33(2).
29. Ibid., s. 33(10).
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to withdraw from the partnership at any time. Any
partnership agreement must contain a proviso to the
effect that each'partner may at any time withdraw in
conformity with the clauses and time provided for in the 
30agreement. Besides, if an advocate is unable to
carry on his profession in accordance with the rules of
the Bar he may not continue as a member of the partner-
"31ship. Furthermore, an advocate is entitled to renounce
the partnership agreement if his partner has been punished 
by disciplinary sanction of more than two months sus­
pension.
An advocate is not bound to accept a brief
simply because he is practising in partnership. Indeed,
the partnership agreement cannot circumscribe each partner’s
^•5
freedom to refuse or accept a case or a client. But
one partner is not entitled to accept a case or a client
if one of the partners refuses it or him. Nor must the
partners accept any brief whatsoever in favour of one
party whose interests would be in conflict with those of
35the client of a member of the partnership. Again, a
30. Ibid., s. 33(111)
31. Ibid., s. 33(3).
32. Idem.
33. Ibid., s. 33(4).
34. Ibid., s. 33(5) .
35. Ibid., s. 33(6).
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partnership must not represent, accept any brief or give
any advice to one party against whom one of the partners
had previously been briefed in the same or related
matter. No act prohibited of an advocate by law and
the Internal Rules and Regulations of the Bar or usages
37may be undertaken by the partners. Whether they are
in partnership or not, advocates must retain the same 
ideals and discipline.
This provision for practice of the law in the
3 8
form of a partnership is a progressive step. This
technique of teamwork may be better adapted to modern 
economy and is certainly less expensive. However, most 
Cameroonian advocates have not yet availed themselves of 
this provision. The first reason is that the advocate 
here has been used to practising alone. He is an indi­
vidualist who is not easily drawn to the idea of a partner­
ship. Secondly, s. 3(2) of the Bar Law provides that 
advocates may not exercise their profession in the form of 
a partnership if the number of chambers (and not advocates) 
in the town in which the partnership is to be set up, are
36. Ibid., s. 33(7); Bar Law, s. 27.
37* Bar Regulations, s. 33(8).
38. In the U.S.A. and in Nigeria for example, it is common 
practice for barristers to constitute law firms. In 
England, it is still prohibited for barristers to 
practise in partnership. It was only in the early
1950s that the practice of law in partnership was per­
mitted in France. Such partnerships are still rare.
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39less than three. Thirdly, past experience of law
40partnership has not been encouraging. However, group
practice need not take the form of a partnership. Advo­
cates may practice in collaboration with each other.
So, beyond the context of a professional partnership, an 
enrolled advocate may associated with an enrolled col­
league or a partnership in consideration for a remuner-
4lation freely agreed to.
2. The situation of private practice in Cameroon
The Cameroonian Bar is an infant Bar both in 
terms of age and size. It is small and untested. The 
Roll of advocates available at the Ministry of Justice 
shows that at the beginning of 1978 there were only 52 
advocates (25 French-speaking and 27 English-speaking) in 
Cameroon. The recent census put Cameroon’s population 
at 7j million inhabitants. This means a ratio of one 
advocate to approximately 150,000 inhabitants. There 
are 17 advocates-in-training (14 French-speaking and 3 
English-speaking) who appear on the 1978 list of pupil
39. The idea is probably to obviate the danger for litigants 
of advocates forming monopolies in the various towns. 
Given this provision a partnership can now be pro­
perly constituted only in Yaounde and Douala.
40. Dinka was eager to form one but he found no interested 
partner. Sendze and Koti formed one but it did not 
survive two years. The Ninine Alice Nkom Pokossi 
partnership also failed. The Viazz - Aubriet - Battu 
partnership however seems to be holding out rather well. 
(Fieldwork interviews).
41. It would seem that the Sendze - Njobarra and the 
Ntamark - Ndobedi practice are in the form of collab­
oration rather than partnership. (Fieldwork obser­
vations ).
517.
barristers. If this number is added to that of advocates,
there would still be as many as 115,000 people to one
advocate. What this means is that it is not always easy
to have access to a practising lawyer in Cameroon. Only
a small percentage of the population can easily contact
an advocate. A private practitioner cannot always be
found in the poorer areas. He tends to go where there
is a prospect of more profitable business. As a result
42the private bar is concentrated in the large towns,
particularly in the economically prosperous and socially
43advanced parts of the country.
This structure of the legal profession (small 
manpower and location in the big urban centres) affects 
the administration of justice in general. It partly con­
tributes to the delays in the disposal of cases, as the 
court adjourns a case when counsel is not ready or is 
handling another.case in another court. It is also par­
tially responsible for the general tendency among litigants
42 . There are 16 advocates and 8 pupil advocates in Yaounde, 
14- advocates and 6 pupil advocates in Douala, 4 advo­
cates plus 2 pupil advocates in Bamenda, 3 advocates 
and 1 pupil advocate in Nkongsamba, 10 advocates in 
the three neighbourhood towns of Buea-Victoria-Tiko,
3 advocates in Kumba, and 1 advocate each in Mamfe and 
in Bafoussam. See, Roll of Advocates (1978) available 
at the Ministry of Justice, Yaounde. There are no 
advocates in the other towns of the country.
43. There is not a single advocate practising in either the 
Northern Province (2,233,257 inh.) or the Eastern Pro­
vince (366,235 inh.). There is only one advocate lo­
cated in the Western Province (1,035,597 inh.). Liti­
gants here have to hire advocates, if they need one, 
all the way from Douala or Yaounde. See, TWe are 
7,663,246’, Cameroon Tribune, Wednesday, 5th September 
1977, p. 1.
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to settle their disputes out of court because they can 
hardly do otherwise. People in the rural areas hardly 
ever come in contact with advocates. Moreover advocates 
seldom appear before the courts located outside the big 
towns. They complain of low fees (a litigant in the 
rural area cannot afford the advocate’s fees), the pettiness 
of the matters which often come before- such courts, bad 
roads and constant adjournment of cases. Again the more 
successful advocates tend more and more to refuse briefs 
for the Magistrate’s Courts, preferring instead the courts 
above which handle more serious matters and for which the 
advocate charges higher fees.
Many advocates lay great emphasis on money-making. 
As law is practised as a profession rather than as a vo­
cation, commercial incentive tends to outweigh consi­
derations of what is best-in the interest of the advocate’s 
client and, sometimes, even of the community among whom he 
works. Provided he is paid his fees, an advocate con­
fessed to this writer with some cynicism, he would litigate, 
lose a case and advise on going on appeal without consi­
deration for the cost to his client. It is this same 
commercial incentive that has pushed some advocates to 
specialize, usually, in handling insurance cases. By and 
large however, the Cameroonian advocate is a legal jack-of- 
all-trades and a specialist in none. He is both barrister 
and solicitor, a criminal lawyer and a civil lawyer. But 
he spends most of his time doing court-work and often fails 
to seek settlements. The chambers of a good many advocates
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are poorly organised and equipped and lack an adequate
library. There is need for creativity on the part of
lik
the Cameroonian advocate and for a more involved role 
(an active not a passive or an indolent attitude) in the 
problems of law- and, its administration in a rapidly deve­
loping society.
It is intriguing, although by no means surprising,
that the clientele of the Cameroonian advocate is divided
45
along sectarian and ethnic lines. English-speaking
advocates, nine of whom have their chambers in the Franco­
phone towns of Douala and Yaounde, have mainly English- 
speaking clients, while Francophone advocates attract 
mainly Francophone clients. Within each of these sectarian 
polarisations, there are smaller polarisations based on 
ethnic or tribal lines. A client from a given tribe tends 
to seek an advocate who comes from that tribe. This is an 
expression of tribal solidarity which, in this context, 
stems from the belief, not altogether unjustifiable, that 
one’s own tribesman would not charge a high fee and yet 
still put a great deal more effort into the case. In 
'any- case, political, social and tribal connections are very 
crucial to an advocate who is a debutant because in private 
practice it takes a long time to acquire a clientele and
44. Writing of articles of legal interest (or even writing 
in general) is something the Cameroonian advocate never 
indulges in. The Cameroonian Bar itself runs no legal 
periodical.
45. Fieldwork observations and interviews.
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to make a name as a successful advocate, a fact which might 
tend to discourage many without independent means.
In the case of overseas companies and aliens 
involved in litigation the polarisation is based on cul­
tural and linguistic considerations. Foreigners who are 
English-speaking tend to consult English-speaking advocates 
while those of them who are French-speaking tend to go to 
French-speaking advocates. French-owned companies invariably 
hire the French advocates (about a dozen of them) prac­
tising in Cameroon dr Cameroonian French-speaking advo­
cates. Advocates with political or social connections 
draw clients from nationalised and government-controlled 
corporations (important especially with regards to obtaining 
a retainership). A few advocates however draw clients 
from all sectors of the community. These are those who 
have established a reputation for themselves. But they 
constitute- the exception rather than the rule.
The legal profession in Cameroon has not been 
politicised. Its members individually are active members 
of the country’s single political party, the Cameroon 
National Union. But none is known to have any overt 
political leanings whether to the left, right or centre. 
Accordingly, clients do not go to advocates on the basis 
of political affiliation. Nor is the advocate's clientele 
divided along sex lines, although at first female liti­
gants tended to seek female advocates. But the legal pro­
fession in Cameroon is still basically a man’s profession.
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Of the 52 advocates on the 1978 Roll of the Bar, only 5 
46were women, even though women constitute 5155 of
47Cameroon’s population. Again, social background has
little or no influence whatsoever on the clients an advo­
cate is likely to attract. Most advocates come from 
humble peasant homes. Moreover, the bourgeois class is 
too small and those within it seldom litigate.
Ill. Entry Into the Bar
To gain membership into the Cameroonian Bar, 
the candidate must have the requisite qualifications, do 
pupillage and be enrolled.
1. Conditions of admission
Any person wishing to practice at the Bar must
48satisfy a number of conditions. First, he must be of
Cameroonian nationality and enjoy his civic and political 
rights. Any person who has been deprived of his civic or 
political rights cannot be admitted into the Bar. An alien
46. But an increasing number of women are now entering the 
profession. Of the 15 pupil advocates in 1978, 5 
were women and should be practising by 1980.
47. ’We are 7,663,246’, Cameroon Tribune, Wednesday, 5th 
September 1977, p. 1.
48. Bar Law, s . 4.
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may also not be admitted. However, subject to the exis­
tence of reciprocal agreements, a member of a foreign Bar
may be authorised by. the President of the court seised of
4g
the matter to plead in a given case. Moreover, within
the framework of agreements, permission to practise may
be granted to members of a foreign Bar by decree of the
50President of the Republic.
The candidate wishing to practise at the Bar 
must also be at least 23 years of age. In reality however
49. When so authorised, the member of the foreign Bar must 
then inform the President of the Bar Council, the coun­
sel for the opposing party and the Public Prosecutor’s 
Department of the fact within 2H hours and must also 
elect domicile in the chambers of any advocate estab­
lished in Cameroon. See, s. 50 of the Bar Law.
50. Bar Law, s. 50. For example, Cameroon and France have 
signed reciprocity agreements on matters relating to 
justice. Under these agreements Cameroonian and French 
advocates may practise in each other’s country. (As a 
matter of fact there are about a dozen French lawyers 
practising in Cameroon.) See, Accords de cooperation 
franco-camerounais du 21 fevrier"197^, articles 32 and 
33 of which provide:
’’Art. 32. Nationals of each of the two States 
may apply for enrolment at a bar of 
the other State, subject to satisfying the legal 
conditions required for such enrolment in the State 
where enrolment is sought. They shall have access to 
all posts of the Bar Council save for that of President. 
’’Art. 33. Cameroonian advocates enrolled in Cameroon 
may assist or represent parties before all 
French courts. .Reciprocally, French ' advocates' enrolled 
in France may assist or represent parties before 
any Cameroonian court. An advo­
cate duly briefed to assist or represent parties 
before the courts of the other State must first 
obtain the authorization of the President of the 
court seised of the matter and elect domicile 
with an advocate of the said State.”
(My translation). For full texts of this and other 
Franco-Cameroon cooperation Agreements, see J.P.
Guiffo-Mopo, Constitutions du Cameroun. Documents 
politiques et diplomatiques, Edition Stella, Yaounde,
1977.
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it is rare for one to qualify as an advocate in Cameroon
51at the age of 23. Thirdly, the candidate must hold
the licence en droit degree or the Bar Final Examination
or a legal qualification recognised as equivalent by the
competent authority (.undoubtedly the Ministry of Education
since it is that Ministry which deals with the equivalence
52of certificates) and approved by the Minister of Justice. 
Fourthly, he must be of good character. Fifthly, he 
must have undergone apprenticeship and obtained the certi­
ficate of apprenticeship or, alternatively, he must possess
53the Post Final Certificate of the Bar. Sixthly, he must
51. A child enters primary school in Cameroon at the age of 
6, spends seven years there, seven in secondary school, 
four in the Law Faculty in Yaounde, and two doing 
pupillage. The minimum age at which he is called to 
the Bar is 26.
52. The equivalence established by the Ministry of Education 
does not bind the Minister of Justice who may refuse to 
approve any equivalence established. In this regard it 
may be noted that whereas the Bar Final marks the end of 
a three yearsT professional course the Yaounde licence 
en droit marks the end of a four years’ academic course. 
However, whereas the licencie is required to acquire a 
professional qualification by doing pupillage for two 
years, there is no corresponding obligation on the hol­
der of the Bar Final Certificate to make up for his 
lack of academic qualification by taking an academic 
degree in law. What should have been equated to the
licence en droit here should have been the LL.B.
53. It is submitted that the Post Final Certificate of the 
Bar ought not to have been equated to the training 
certificate provided for under s. 9(1) of the Bar Law
as they sanction the end of programmes of training
which are not the same both in duration and content.
In England, until three years ago, the educational level 
for admittance of overseas students to an Inn of Court 
was lower than that for Universities and anyone who got 
through the examinations returned to his own country 
as a 'barrister-at-law’, apparently fully fledged, yet 
without any academic education or practical training or 
experience of courts. The post final programme of 
the Bar was devised to give overseas students some 
court experience. It is a three months crash programme 
which is not even properly organised.
be entered on the Roll of the Cameroonian Bar. Finally, 
he must have been authorised to practise by the President 
of the Republic. A candidate who satisfies the first 
six conditions would still be unable to practise until 
the President of the Republic grants him his commission to 
practise. The grant of this commission does not seem to 
be automatic and as of right when the other conditions 
have been satisfied. Sometimes applicants wait for 
months or years before they can get their commission. If 
the Head of State refuses to grant the commission, he is 
not bound to give reasons for his refusal. Nor does it 
seem an action may be brought against him to show cause 
why the applicant should not be granted the commission.
Below is a sample of an advocate’s commission granted by 
the Head of State:
United Republic of Cameroon Peace - Work - Fatherland
Decree No......of .............. 19 . ..
Authorising Mr ..........  to exercise
the profession of advocate.
The President of the Republic,
Mindful of the Constitution of•the 2nd June 1972
Mindful of Law No. 72/LF/5 of the 23rd May 1972 
to organise practise at the Bar 
Decrees
Article 1 . Mr .............  is hereby authorised to
exercise the profession of advocate.
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Article 2 . Mr ........... who shall be resident at
........... must, before starting to
practise, prove to the Bar Council:
1- that he has taken out an insurance 
policy as provided, by s . 14 of Law 
No. 72/LP/5 of the 23rd May 1972,
2- that he has a suitable chambers,
3- and that he has taken the prescribed 
oath before the Supreme Court.
Article 3 . The Minister of Justice, Keeper of the 
Seals is charged-with the execution of 
this decree which shall be registered 
and published in English and in French 
in the Official Gazette.
Made in Yaounde, this ...... day of ......... 19...
The President of the Republic 
El Hadj Ahmadou Ahidjo 
(Seal)
Persons who have directly or indirectly obtained
a scholarship from the State may be allowed to practise at
the Bar or be enrolled for apprenticeship only when they
must have discharged their ten years1 bond to serve in the
54public administration. The Head of State may however
waive this condition and authorise any beneficiary of a
54. Bar Law, s. 5.
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Government grant to practise or be enrolled for apprentice­
ship. Many have in fact already benefited from this 
waiver. All students entering the Faculty of Laws (and 
other Faculties) of the University of Yaounde on Govern­
ment grant are required to sign a bond to work for the 
Government for ten years. This was originally deviced 
as a stop-valve of needed manpower trained at Government 
expense, from escaping to the private sector which is 
generally more lucrative. Students are however not 
opposed to bonding. In the first place, the bond is 
seldom invoked. Secondly (and this also explains why the 
bond is seldom invoked) the Government cannot offer jobs 
to all law graduates who have benefited from a Government 
grant. Most students therefore sign the bond without 
reading its provisions or giving it any thought. Thirdly, 
most students are poor and badly in need of a Government 
grant to be able to undertake their studies. Fourthly, 
as a result of the environmental setting, the fact that 
the teaching of Law in Yaounde University is not viewed as 
necessarily linked to professional practice, and the job 
security which work with the Government provides, law 
graduates from Yaounde University are reluctant to get 
into private practice although recently more and more of 
them have been taking up private practice.
2. Pupillage
Unless he falls within the class of persons
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undergoing training, any candidate for the profession of
advocate must do pupillage for two years. The exemption
56from pupillage applies to four classes of persons. The
first class of persons so exempted are former judicial 
and legal officers possessing the licence en droit or 
the Bar Pinal or any other recognised and approved equi­
valent law certificate. Such former judicial and legal 
officers must have accomplished at least five years of 
service with the Judicial and Legal Service. Furthermore, 
they must not have been dismissed for breaches of propriety, 
probity or honour. The second group of persons exempted 
from pupillage are Professors or Lecturers of law at the 
Law Faculty of the University of Yaounde who have accom­
plished five years of effective service as professor or 
lecturer. Also exempted are advocates of Cameroonian 
nationality who are members of a foreign Bar (provided . 
they have not been struck off the Roll of that foreign Bar) 
as well as advocates-in-training possessing the end of 
course certificate issued in a foreign country. The 
last group of persons dispensed with the need of doing 
pupillage are former civil servants possessing the licence 
en droit Cor its recognised and approved equivalent) who 
have accomplished ten years of service in a public adminis­
tration. They must not have been, dismissed for breaches
55. Ibid., s. 6(1).
56. Ibid., s. 10.
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of propriety, probity or honour. The Bar Council may,
through the Minister of Justice, be authorised to study
their disciplinary file in order to determine the circum-
57stances in which they left the Civil Service. Further­
more, they may be required to undertake the deontological 
training of the profession. Until the establishment of a 
distinct method of teaching professional ethics, this 
training takes, for the time being, the form of a three
months gratuitous pupillage in the chambers of a barrister 
58on the Roll.
Persons exempted from pupillage need only apply
for their commission to practise. Those not exempted
must submit to the President of the Bar Council their
59application for admission to training. The application
must be accompanied by the following documents: (i) a
certificate of Cameroonian nationality, (ii) a birth certi­
ficate, (iii) the licence en droit degree or its recog­
nised and approved equivalent, and (iv) the Proficiency 
Certificate for the Profession of Advocate (certificat 
d Taptitude a la profession d Tavocat, CAPA). Section 6(2) 
(e) of the Bar Law provides that the conditions for the 
award of the Proficiency Certificate shall be laid down by 
joint order of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of 
National Education after consultation with the Bar Council.
57. Bar Regulations, s. 15(2).
58. Ibid., s. 15(3).
59. Bar Law, s . 6(2).
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But so far the conditions for the award of that certifi­
cate have not yet been fixed. The requirement of the 
Proficiency Certificate therefore remains ineffective.
In Agbor. Nkongho Mathias v. Minister of Justice, Keeper 
60of the Seals the plaintiff applied to be admitted to 
training as advocate-in-training but did not produce the 
Proficiency Certificate as required by s. 6(2) (e) of the 
Bar Law. The Minister of Justice (who at that time was 
performing the duties of the Bar Council since the various 
organs of the Bar had not yet been established) therefore 
rejected the application.. The plaintiff availed himself 
of s. 7(2) ot the Bar Law and referred the matter to the 
Supreme Court for a decision thereon. Held, that since 
the modalities of obtaining the Proficiency Certificate 
have not yet been fixed, s. 6(2)(e) lacks legal substance; 
accordingly, the decision rejecting an application for 
admission as probational barrister only founded on the 
default of presentation of the said certificate is null and 
void.
When the application to do pupillage together
with the relevant documents have been filed in, the Bar
Council undertakes an inquiry into ’the moral conduct’ of 
61the candidate. It also obtains evidence from him of the
60. Supreme Court Judgment of 9th January 1975, Recueil 
des Grands Arr§ts de la Jurisprudence Administrative 
de la Cour Federale de Justice, Tome II, 1970-1975, 
p.' 144.
61. Bar Law, s . 6(3).
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6 2acceptance by a member of the Bar to patronise his training. 
After which the Council gives its opinion on admission and 
forwards the candidateTs file to the President of the
£ Q
Republic through the-Ministry of Justice. Non-transmis­
sion of the candidateTs file to the President of the
64
Republic for two months constitutes a negative opinion.
Section 7(1) of the Bar Law provides that admission for
training shall be done by an order of the President of
6*5
the Republic to do so. Upon notification of the Head
of State's order authorising him to be admitted to 
training, the applicant must then take the oath provided 
for in s. 14(2) of the Bar Law. The prescribed oath 
reads:
"I swear never to say or publish anything 
as counsel for the defence or as counsel 
contrary to the laws and regulations, 
public morals, the security of the State 
and law and order and never to depart from 
the respect due to the courts, tribunals 
and public authorities.”
The oath is taken before the Court of Appeal of the place
6 6where training is to be effected. - Admission for 
training takes effect from the date of swearing-in and,
62. Bar Regulations, s. 14(2).
63. Idem.
64. Idem.
65. Ibid., s . 14(3) .
66. Ibid., s. 14(4); s. 7(4) of the Bar Law. The oath 
is word for word that taken by avocats staglaires in 
Prance.
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at the suit of the President of the Bar Council, the
fresh trainee is entered on the list of advocates-in-
training according to the date of his swearing in.
A candidate who has been accepted for pupillage
and has been sworn in is entitled to use the title
6 8'advocate-in-training1. The nature of his training
6 9is three-fold. First, it consists of regular atten­
dance at training courses and lectures - the•so-called 
Probationers' Conference (conference du stage). These 
courses and lectures are organised according to the pro­
visions of the Internal Rules and Regulations of the Bar.
At these meetings the pupil barristers are supposed to 
plead in mock trials presided over by the Batonnier, who 
in addition teaches them the traditions of the Bar. 
Attendance at these courses is obligatory. Any indolence
or unjustifiable absence is sanctioned by disciplinary 
70measures. When the conditions of obtaining the profi­
ciency certificate would have been determined pupil advo­
cates would be required to meet twice a year at the invi­
tation of the President of the Bar Council or his represen­
tative. The object of such meetings would be to verify 
if the pupil advocates possess sufficient knowledge of the 
professional rules and conditions to exercise the profession
67. Bar Regulations, ss. 14(4) and 16(1 ); Bar Law, s. 7(4).
68. Bar Regulations, s. 35(2); Bar Law, s. 8(2).
69. Bar Law, s. 8(1).
70. Bar Regulations, s. 16(3) (4).
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71of advocate.
Secondly, the pupil advocate’s training includes 
attendance at court hearings - an extremely vague obli­
gation and not easy to check in view of the large number 
of hearings. However, the pupil advocate cannot, on his 
own, take up briefs. Only in two situations may he plead 
in cases: (1) Where he is appointed ex officio by the
competent judge or the President of the Bar Council to
represent any natural person before a court in accordance
72with the enactments in force. (2) Where he is entrusted
with a case by the President of the Bar Council or the advo-
73cate in whose chambers he is undergoing his training.
The President of the Bar Council seldom entrusts pupil
advocates with cases. Briefs which pupil advocates handle 
74in court are, for the most part, entrusted to them by 
their trainers. A pupil advocate may not, however, repre­
sent, defend or advise a party who had previously been the
client of his former trainer while he was in training under
75him m  the same matter.
The third aspect of the probationer advocate’s
71. Bar Regulations, s. 16(1)(2).
72. Bar Law, s. 25(4). Thus pupil advocates may be com­
missioned to defend defendants under the Legal Aid 
Scheme. This is the practice in France.
73. Bar Law, s . 8(3).
74. At the Douala Appeal Court this writer witnessed two 
pupil advocates (both of them at the fag end of their 
pupillage) handling cases admirably well.
75. Bar Regulations, s. 19(3).
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training concerns office work in the chambers of advocate. 
The type of office work involved includes the drafting of 
legal documents such as motions, deeds, affidavits, state­
ments of claim and of counter-claim, etc. He also learns 
the techniques of consultation.
If need be, the advocate in whose chambers the 
pupil advocate is to undergo his training may be desig­
nated by the President of the Bar Council. This situation 
would arise where a pupil advocate cannot furnish proof 
of the consent of a member of the Bar for training in his 
chambers. In such an eventuality the pupil advocate is
handed over to a willing sponsor who must come from among
7 5
the members of the Bar Council. A pupil advocate owes
to his trainer absolute devotion, deference and obedience
of all instructions relating to his training received from 
77him. The relationship between advocate and his pupil
advocate is one of a contract of apprenticeship. The pay
which the pupil advocate receives throughout his training
period is freely- agreed on between the trainer-advocate
and the trainee-advocate, outside the provisions of any
7 8
collective agreements. The trainee-advocate does not,
as in England, pay his trainer for the training he receives. 
But the trainer does not, as in the U.S.A., pay the pupil
76. Ibid., s. 18.
77. Ibid., s. 19(2).
78. Ibid., s. 18(4).
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a salary. Both negotiate and agree on the remuneration
(often an allowance) the trainer is to pay the pupil.
Collective bargaining is not allowed although, clearly,
the trainer-advocate is in a stronger bargaining position
than.the pupil.
Overall supervision of the pupil advocate’s
training is carried out by the President of the Bar Council
79or an appointee of his from the Bar Council. If he
is found guilty of a disciplinary offence, the pupil advo­
cate may be.visited with any, depending on the gravity of 
the offence, of the following sanctions: warning, call
to order, extension of period of training, and removal from
80the list of advocates-in-training. If a pupil advocate’s
contract is revoked he may not exercise any professional
81activities until he has obtained a new contract.
The pupil advocate’s period of training is normally 
82two .years. The end of training is attested by a
training certificate conferred by the President of the Bar
O n
Council after consultation with the Bar Council. Although
the normal period of training is two years, the Bar Council
79. Bar Regulations, s. 17.
80. Ibid., s. 20(1); Bar Law, s. 40(2).
81. Bar Regulations, s. 18(5).
82. Bar Law, s . 6(1).
83. Ibid., s . 9(1).
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may, after having heard the person concerned, allow a
pupil advocate who has not fulfilled the obligations
referred to in s. 8 of the Bar Law, to undergo a further
training period of one year which may be renewed on one
occasion only. At the end of the fourth year of
training, the Bar Council may only refuse to award the
training certificate purusant to a well-founded decision
against which an appeal may be.made to the Pull Bench of
84the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court must rule on the
issue within one month. When they have completed their 
probationary period, pupil advocates come off the 
probationers’ list and ’go up to the Roll’, which means 
that henceforth their names will be entered on the Roll 
of the Bar.
3. Enrolment
Except he falls within the class of persons
exempted under s. 10 of the Bar Law from doing pupillage,
any candidate for enrolment as advocate, must produce a
certificate showing that he has duly completed his pupil- 
85lage. The application for enrolment is made to the
President of the Bar Council. The Bar Council has two
months from the date of receipt of the application within
86which to decide whether to order enrolment or not. •
84. Ibid., s. 9(2).
85. Ibid., s. 11(1).
86. Ibid., s . 11(2).
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Should the Council decide not to order enrolment it is 
bound to notify the applicant who would then be entitled 
to refer the matter to the Full Bench of the Supreme
O  «■7
Court. If the Supreme Court invalidates the negative
decision given by the Bar Council, it has to order the
88enrolment of the applicant. The applicant is also en­
titled to refer the issue of enrolment to the Supreme
Court if the Bar Council fails to issue a decision within
89two months of receipt of the application for enrolment.
90Enrolment is made in order of seniority and
persons so enrolled are entitled to use the title ’Advo-
91 /xcate in the Cameroon Barf. By s. 12(2) of the Bar Law
the Roll of the Bar must be reprinted at the beginning of
each judicial year and then lodged with the registries of
all courts, posted up at the entrance to law courts and
published in the Official Gazette at the suit of the Presi-
92dent of the Bar Council. When making such reprints
the following advocates are ipso facto omitted from the 
93Roll: an advocate who, subsequent to his enrolment, is
87. Ibid., s . 11(3).
88. Ibid., s. 11(4).
89. Ibid., s. 11(3).
90. Ibid., s. 12(1). It is not clear whether this refers 
to seniority of age.
91. Bar Regulations, s. 35(1).
92. So far however, this requirement remains no more than a 
pious declaration, respected more in breach than-in its 
observation.
93. Bar Law, s. 13-
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94disqualified under s. 28 of the Bar Law; and an advocate
who, within the time limits prescribed by the Internal
95Rules and Regulations of the Bar, does not pay his 
contribution to the cost of the Association or cannot prove 
payment of the insurance premium provided for in s . 20 of 
the Bar Law.
The enrolment of a lawyer as 'advocate in the 
Cameroon Bar’ marks his formal and legal entry into the 
profession of advocate. Once in it, the advocate acquires 
certain rights but is also shouldered with obligations.
IV. Functions, Rights and Duties of Advocate
An advocate is one whose profession is to assist 
by his advice or speech litigants who come to him. He 
places his legal know-how at the service of litigants and
94. S. 28(1) provides that practice at the Bar shall be 
incompatible with: the function of member of the
Government, all public or private salaried employment 
excepting that of professor or lecturer in the Faculties 
and Schools, the office of law official (officier public 
ou ministeriel), the post of company director or manager 
or accountant, and all forms of trade or business even 
through an intermediary or spouse. S. 28(2) provides 
that an advocate who holds a parliamentary mandate may 
not perform any act of his profession in any affair 
concerning the State, a public authority or establish­
ment. By s. 28(3), an advocate who holds a municipal 
mandate may not perform any act of his profession in any 
affair of the local council to which he is elected.
And s. 28(4) enacts that practice at the Bar shall pre­
clude any dependence on external interests.
95. By s. 32 of the Bar Regulations, subscriptions, the 
amount of which is- fixed at the beginning of each judi­
cial year, must be paid spontaneously within the month 
they become due.
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other persons who may require it. He collaborates in the 
administration of justice in his capacity as auxiliary.
He belongs to a profession (styled grandiloquently as 
’learned’) whose ancestry may be traced to the chevaliers 
es lois of the Middle Ages, a profession whose ideals and 
ethics bring back faint echoes of the days of knights and 
of a class structure which has long since disappeared.
1. The functions of advocate
The advocate’s primary occupation is his practice 
at the Bar. Consequently he may not engage in any other 
occupation which could adversely affect the reputation of 
the Bar. His job is basically that of assisting and repre­
senting parties in law. He has practically an exclusive
96right of audience in all courts. Section 2 of the Bar
Law which gives a right of lay representation in the lower 
courts remains in practice nothing more than a well- 
meaning provision.
The advocate is a specialist in advocacy, that 
is, the oral presentation of a case before the judge.
Oral evidence of witnesses and the oral presentation of 
legal argument play a large part in trials. Advocacy 
is therefore important in court. The advocate learns 
the skills of analysing and presenting issues of both law
96. The only courts in which advocates may not appear are 
the customary courts.
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and fact. He learns to sift evidence, to assess the
weight of conflicting evidence, to elicit the facts of
a case by examination and cross examination, and to
marshall and present arguments. The advocate must ensure
that his client's case is presented in the best possible
way. At the same time however, he is duty bound to
assist the court to get at the truth so that justice may
be done according to the law. The vocation of advocates
is to fight for truth. "The light of truth is their
97weapon; goodwill is their shield."
It is also part of the advocate’s job to draft 
and present pleadings. He also drafts other legal docu­
ments (affidavits, writs, memoranda, petitions, claims, 
motions, etc.) necessary in the judicial process. He 
draws up legal documents to confer, transfer, limit or 
extinguish any right, title or interest in property 
(moveable or immoveable, real or personal). He gives 
legal advice when consulted and advises on the evidence 
needed to support the client’s case. He pursues the 
enforcement of judicial decisions; in particular, he 
institutes•and follows up any extra-judicial procedures, 
receives payments and gives discharge therefore.
The practising advocate is one whose principal 
occupation is practice at the Bar. Some advocates how­
ever are ’employed' by commercial houses under a retainership
97. Pierre Sire, op.cit., p. 244.
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agreement. Others still, enter into salaried employment
as legal advisers. Although practice at the Bar is not
incompatible with being retained, generally, an advocate
who has a salaried employment must relinquish his private
practice. The exercise of the profession of advocate
is subject to the incompatibility provided under sections
28 and 29 of the Bar Law and is, in general, incompatible
with all activities in a manner likely to put in jeopardy
the independence and dignity of the advocate. Practice
at the Bar is incompatible with (i) the function of member
of the Government, (ii) all public or private salaried
employment excepting that of professor or lecturer of law,
(iii) the office of law official, (iv) the post of director,
manager or accountant, and (v) all forms of trade or business
98even through an intermediary or spouse. In short, an
advocate may not carry on any other profession or business 
or be an active partner in or a salaried official or 
servant in connection with any profession or business.
The origin of this rule probably lies in the centuries-old 
conception that the engagement by a member of a gentlemanly 
calling in business was something to be regarded as dero­
gatory. But today a perhaps more cogent reason which 
underlies the principle is the importance of maintaining 
the position of complete detachment and independence in
98. Again this provision would appear to be honoured more 
in breach than in its observance. Some advocates in 
Cameroon do engage in forms of business or trade.
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which an. advocate is expected to hold, himself. Were it 
possible for an advocate readily to practise also in 
another profession or to enter into business transactions, 
a danger would arise of his being subjected to external 
influences which might affect detrimentally his objec­
tivity towards the client for whom he is retained to act
QQ
in the course of his legal practice. Practice at the
Bar precludes any dependence on external interests. More­
over, any advocate subject to military service may not 
exercise any professional activity while serving with the 
colours.
The general rule is not without exceptions. An 
advocate may be professor of Law, Minister, member of 
Parliament, member of a local council, a village chief or 
chairman of a sporting, social or cultural organisation. 
However, an advocate who is a Parliamentarian may not per­
form any act of his profession in any affair concerning 
the State, a public authority or establishment. This 
in effect means that an advocate elected to Parliament 
cannot handle criminal cases as well as cases on adminis­
trative litigation. Also, an advocate who holds a muni­
cipal mandate may not perform any act of his profession 
in any affair of the local council to which he is elected.
99. Cf. Boulton, op.cit., p. 117.
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2. The rights and prerogatives of advocate
The advocate is entitled to wear the professional 
robe^^ and to use his professional title. The title
of advocate is not merely a title; it corresponds to a 
social function which the advocate must fulfil in accor­
dance with the relevant regulations and with tradition, 
failing which he loses the title. As yet there is no 
common robe for advocates in Cameroon. Those trained in 
the common law tradition continue, as in the U.S.A. and in 
England, to wear their professional robe which consists of 
a wig, black stuff gown and white collars and bands. Those 
trained in the civil law system wear, as in France, a black 
gown with white bands but no wig. Section 39 of the 
Internal Rules and Regulations of the Bar provides that 
’advocates shall have the right to wear the robes the 
description of which shall be according to the General 
Assembly of the Bar’. That Assembly has not yet reached 
agreement on this point although it has been suggested
that it will adopt the robe worn by French barristers and
102the wig worn by English barristers. If this is
adopted, the Cameroonian advocate in his professional dress 
would look like a French advocate wearing the wig of an 
English barrister.
100. The advocate's professional robe in France and in 
England has not changed for over 200 years.
101. Bar Law, s. 18(1); Bar Regulations, s. 39.
102. Fieldwork interviews.
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Another prerogative which the advocate enjoys
is that he is covered by immunity when conducting a case
in court. An advocate is free to choose the means of
defence he desires and the form in which he wishes to
present them.1^  He may speak for as long as he wishes.
No words spoken or documents produced by him in the course
of his pleadings may give rise to any action for defa-
105mation, abuse or contempt. But he must be careful
that his choice of the means and form of defence is not in
conflict with his moral obligations and the laws in force.
107The chambers of an advocate are inviolable and
10 8cannot be the object of a conveyance or attachment.
No search may be made in it except to seize documents 
bearing on criminal proceedings where the advocate himself 
is being prosecuted or where the documents in question 
are unrelated to the practice of.his profession. In 
such a case the President of the Bar Council or his repre­
sentative must then be present at the search.
The first rule of the Bar is independence, and 
as the advocate partakes in the judge’s search for an
103. Bar Law, s. 15(1); Bar Regulations, ss. 44(1) and 
52(1).
104. Bar Regulations, s. 45(1).
105. Bar Law, s. 15(2).
106. Bar Regulations, s. 44(2).
107. Bar Law, s. 15(3).
108. Ibid., s. 49.
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elusive truth, he must therefore have a free mind, a
mind which precludes any form of subjection. So, apart
from the exceptional case where a brief is imposed by the
109B&tonnier or by the President of a court, an advocate 
is free to accept or refuse a brief^^^ or even to withdraw 
from a case when he is in disagreement with his client 
on the conception or progress of the procedure.^"*" The 
Cameroonian advocate’s right to accept or refuse a brief 
accords with the situation in France but contrasts with 
that in England. The English barrister likens himself 
to a taxi driver at the disposal of all passers-by. He 
is bound to accept briefs, a rule established in 1792 as
a result of the trial of Tom Paine. Tom Paine had
written a book called the Rights of Man which contained 
some offensive remarks about William III and George I.
He was prosecuted for seditious libel. Thomas Erskine, 
a member of the English Bar, felt that it was his duty as
a barrister to defend the accused to the best of his
abilities. Despite pressures on him to refuse the brief, 
he accepted it and when he came to address the jury, he 
declared:
"I will forever, at all hazards, assert the 
dignity, independence and integrity of the 
English Bar without which impartial justice, 
the most valuable part of the English Con­
stitution can have no existence. From the
109. Bar Law, s . 25(4)(5) .
110. Ibid., s. 25(1).
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moment that any advocate can be permitted 
to say that he will or will not stand between 
the Crown and the subject arraigned in the 
court where he daily sits to practise - 
from that moment the liberties of England 
are at an end. If the advocate refuses to
defend from what he may think of the charge 
or defence, he assumes the character of 
the judge; nay, he assumes it before the 
hour of judgment; and in proportion to his 
rank and reputation puts the heavy influence 
of perhaps a mistaken opinion into the 
scales against the accused in whose favour
the benevolent principle of English law
makes all presumption and which commends 
the very judge to be his counsel." 112
The advocate is entitled to emoluments and
113fees. He may accept annual fees from a client for whom
he is counsel as payment for advice given by him in his
114
chambers. The advocate’s emoluments are fixed by
decree and, where necessary, taxed by the President of
115the court empowered to hear the case. The fees due to
an advocate for pleadings and consultations are freely dis­
cussed between his client and himself^^ before the advocate
117takes up the brief. Nevertheless, all incidental or
evolutional proceedings in a matter which could not have 
been initially foreseen may entitle the advocate to agree
112. Quoted by Boulton, op.cit., p. 119. In that case Tom 
Paine was found guilty and Erskine lost his post of 
Attorney General but later was appointed Chancellor.
113. Bar Law, s. 16.
114. Bar Regulations, s. 61.
115. Bar Law, s. 16(1).
116. Ibid., s. 16(2).
117. Bar Regulations, s. 58(1).
546.
-| i O
with his client for additional fees. Moreover, to
the extent that work has already been done the advocate
is entitled to his fees even where the matter is with-
119drawn from him before judgment. If any dispute arises
concerning emoluments, consultation and fees, it must 
first be subject to attempted arbitration before the 
President of the Bar Council before being submitted to 
court.
In ancient Rome there were both prejudices and 
rules against the giving of paid legal advice and until 
about the 18th century the old notion prevailed that the 
litigant merely recompensed the advocate by way of a gift. 
Indeed, by a curious blend of social snobbery and legal 
antiquarianism , the Roman rule was revived in 17th cen­
tury England and attached to the English barrister who then 
became unable to sue either lay client or instructing soli­
citor for his fees. This theory is now exploded and in 
Cameroon it is commonly accepted that the advocate, who
must earn his living, has a right to his fees and can
121therefore sue his clients for them.
The law is silent as to the mode of payment of
118. Ibid., s. 58(2).
119. Ibid., s. 58(3).
120. Ibid., s. 62; Bar Law, s. 16(3).
121. Cf. Dennis Okon v. 0. Adesanya, (1962-1964) W.C.L.R.14.
The situation is likewise in France.
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an advocateTs fees. However, as a matter of practice 
payment is made in cash or by cheque, most advocates pre­
ferring cash payment than payment by cheques. Generally, 
a litigant who wants to brief an advocate must pay the 
consultation fee to the advocate’s clerk before he can 
be conducted to the advocate. The actual fee for con­
ducting a case is discussed freely with the client. Advo­
cates often require part payment of the' agreed amount 
before initiating proceedings.
Finally, an advocate has the right to insert his 
name, first names, his designation as advocate in the 
Cameroonian Bar, address and telephone numbers, his 
University degrees, position (where applicable) as Presi­
dent of the Bar Council, member of the Bar Council, Secre­
tary, former member of the Bar Council, secretary, Presi-
122dent, etc. , in their letter heads and business cards.
The advocate may also display a signboard, tablet, or
plate of modest dimensions bearing his names and title as 
123advocate.
3. Duties which the profession of advocate entail
The advocate owes towards himself, his clients, 
his confreres, and the courts before which he practises, 
certain duties.
122. Bar Regulations, s. 37(1).
123. Here and there however, one finds signboards which are 
far from being of ’modest dimensions’. Advocates 
tend to start off with large signboards, reducing them 
only when the location of their chambers- becomes 
better known to the public. (Fieldwork observations).
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A. Duties of the advocate towards himself
The advocateTs dignity is a corollary of his 
independence. A s ■an immediate participant in the adminis­
tration of justice, he owes himself respect and must com­
mand respect. Before starting to practise, the advocate 
must swear the following oath before the Supreme Court:
"I swear never to say--or publish anything as 
counsel for the defence or as counsel con­
trary to the laws and regulations, public 
morals, the security of the State and law 
and order and never to depart from the res­
pect due to the courts, tribunals and public 
authorities." 124
He must contribute towards the Bar Association’s expenses
125by means of annual subscriptions. He is bound scrupu­
lously to observe the duties imposed on him by rules, 
tradition and professional usage in relation to judicial 
and legal officers, his professional colleagues and his
friends. He must place above all else his obligations of
126loyalty and propriety, independence and honour.
He must therefore refrain from all manner of 
127personal publicity. An advocate's professional dig­
nity forbids him to seek clients either directly or indir­
ectly. So, the external evidence of the existence of his
124. Bar Law, s. 14(2). Under s. 4(3) of the Legal Prac­
titioners Law 1963 the oath was simply: "I swear to
show perfect respect to the courts and never to deceive 
any court; to conduct myself in a manner becoming my 
profession; and to respect the constitution and laws 
of Cameroon."
125. Bar Law, s. 19.
126. Ibid., s. 24(1).
127. Bar Regulations, s. 38.
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chambers and his designation on his letter paper must be 
unobtrusive. An advocate may not normally describe or 
permit himself to be described as such, save in conjunction 
with articles written by him for a legal periodical. He 
may not give press interviews concerning any case or 
matter in which he is or has been engaged. He may not 
take steps to procure or permit the publication of his 
photograph as a member of the Bar in the press or any 
periodical. However, this rule against personal publi­
city is sometimes circumvented. Some advocates' do publi­
cise themselves indirectly through agents-. Sometimes too 
an advocate may conduct himself in court in a manner which 
leaves little doubt that he is performing for the public 
gallery and the press. Furthermore, although it is 
patently impossible to prevent newspapers from reporting 
on legal matters especially on the more sensational or 
notorious criminal cases, it does happen sometimes that 
their accounts read like publicity in favour of this or 
that advocate. The boundary between straight reporting 
and publicity is not always easy to draw. An advocate’s 
encouragement of, complicity in, or condonation of, the 
journalist’s blatant indiscretion sometimes happens but 
often it is difficult to prove. In any event, the pro­
hibition of any form of publicity remains a hard-and-fast 
rule, the principle of which is undisputed and which the 
disciplinary authorities endeavour in all honesty to 
uphold.
The advocate is expected above all to display
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evidence of honesty, scrupulousness, dignity, moderation, 
moral integrity, delicacy, disinterestness, independence 
and honour which are prerequisites for the exercise of the 
profession. He must respect the rules, usages and 
traditions of the profession. In a nutshell, the advocate 
must comport himself with the dignity, fearlessness and 
uprightness becoming of a member of a profession that is
learned and noble. Finally, but not the least, a good
advocate must keep abreast with the times. He must read 
widely, be aware of current legal problems, and be up to 
•date with his case law. The lawyer must know the society
and the world in which he lives. ■
B . Duties of the advocate towards his clients
When he undertakes to defend the interests of 
his client, the advocate must act with complete indepen­
dence, free from any subordination. Once briefed, the
advocate is the sole judge of the choice and his mode of
12 0
defence and the procedure to be followed. The relation­
ship between the advocate and his client varies according 
to the nature of the kind of professional activity the
advocate is called upon to exercise. If the advocate
accepts to defend the client, then a contractual relation­
ship is created. However, this contract remains special
128. Bar Regulations, s. 52(1).
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in nature on account of the professional rules which pro­
hibit advocates from being subjected to external influences 
and which require him to withdraw from the case if his 
conduct of it would lead to a violation of these rules. 
Besides, when conducting a case, the advocate collaborates 
in the discharge of a public service - that of the adminis­
tration of justice. He therefore has to serve the sup­
erior interest of justice. This superior interest must 
precede the private interest of his' client. If the 
two interests conflict, then that of justice must prevail 
and the advocate has to withdraw from the case. Quite
apart from any criminal sanction with which he may be visit- 
129ed, it is unprofessional and against justice for an advo­
cate to assist his client to escape from the arms of the 
law. This means that if he is convinced of the guilt of 
his client (especially when the client has made a voluntary 
confession to him ) he must not attempt to get him ’off 
the hook’. He must not accept a matter or defend a cause
which he considers to be illegal, contrary to the truth or
130against his conscience.
Generally, the legal relationship between advo­
cate and client is in the nature of a contract of agency 
since the advocate represents and acts for and on behalf 
of his client. Because of its legal character no special
129. Cameroonian Penal Code, s. 193(2).
130. Bar Regulations, s. 52(2).
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power of attorney is required. But the advocate should be
able to prove that he has been duly instructed. The
Cameroonian advocate therefore, might not only act as
consultant and plead in court; h e  is also his client Ts
representative, his trustee, his agent.- The agency ends
when the matter is finally disposed of whether at first
instance or on appeal for, unless otherwise expressly
agreed, the briefing of an advocate implies authorisation
131to lodge an appeal.
An advocate who accepts to defend the interests
132of his client is deemed regularly appointed and choice
133of an advocate implies choice of domicile in his chambers.
But, as a general rule, the advocate is not bound to accept 
134a brief. He is guided by his conscience and has the
right to accept, withdraw from, or refuse to accept a case 
135or matter. Personal interest should not be the main
consideration to influence his decision. Thus he must
131. Bar Law, s. 25(6). The agency may in fact continue 
well after, as when counsel pursues the enforcement 
of a court decision.
132. Ibid., s. 25(2).
133* Ibid., s. 25(3). This is important because the ser­
vice of judicial documents on and correspondence with 
the client is effected through counsel’s chambers.
Few people in Cameroon have personal postal addresses.
134. Ibid., s. 25(1).
135. A client too may at any time revoke the engagement of 
counsel by notifying the counsel and the appropriate 
court. And besides, no advocate may release himself 
from.his retainer unless the client has been notified 
by registered letter. See Bar Law, s. 26.
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refuse a brief, no matter the amount of fees, if it cannot 
be defended in law or in fact. On the other hand he may 
not refuse a brief merely out of fear of offending the 
political establishment or of alienating public opinion.
So an advocate may not refuse to defend a notorious cri­
minal or a political offender simply because he is afraid- 
the public or the regime of the day would think the worse 
of him. If he accepts a brief the advocate must fear­
lessly uphold the interests of his client (avoiding of 
course any deception of the court) without regard to any 
unpleasant consequences, social or political or otherwise, 
to himself or to any other person. He must work on the 
case conscienciously and devotedly.
During or after the performance of any work on
behalf of a client, the advocate must not accept any brief
or give any advice in the same matter or in a related
affair to any person whose interests are wholly or partly
incompatible with those of his client. This applies also
to advocates forming a partnership. It means that an
advocate is forbidden from holding brief simultaneously
or successively for two opposing parties. It also means
that he may not contact an opposing party who has briefed
137another advocate. Nevertheless, before he initiates
any proceedings the advocate may contact the opposing
136. Ibid., s . 27.
137. Bar Regulations, s. 64(1).
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party to ask him if he has briefed an advocate. If the 
answer is in the negative the advocate may then discuss
1 qO
amicable settlement with him. In this case the advo­
cate must manifest evidence of the highest degree of pru-
139dence and circumspection.
Although the advocate is free to accept or refuse
a brief, he is duty bound to accept and discharge any
140brief in which he has been appointed ex officio unless
he can produce reasons recognised as valid by the competent
141member of the Bench or the President of the Bar Council.
142The advocate must have only one chambers and
must, save with justified exception, receive and consult
143only in his chambers. An advocate’s dignity requires
him to meet his clients in his own chambers and nowhere 
else. This injunction is not always easy to enforce. 
Important clients do not easily agree to inconvenience them­
selves when they wish to see an advocate, who may often 
be younger than they or of an inferior social standing. 
Furthermore, an advocate may visit a bedridden client and 
consult with clients in detention at the place where they
138. Ibid., s. 64(2).
139. Ibid., s. 64(3).
140. Bar Law, s. 25(4) .
141. Ibid., s. 25(5).
142. Ibid., s. 3. By s. 14(1) the chambers must be ’suit­
able’ and approved by the Bar Council. 'Suitable’
chambers is a vague and imprecise notion.
143. Bar Regulations, s. 53(1).
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are confined. Again it has been recognised that an advo­
cate cannot oblige a whole Board to meet him in his 
chambers. Accordingly, an advocate of a body corporate 
may, if he is requested in the proper manner, and if he 
considers it useful and convenient, agree to go to its 
registered office for consultation on judicial matters
144during meetings of shareholders and general assemblies.
Justice cannot be the subject of a contract.
The advocate must therefore not (i) agree with his client 
for a fee to depend on the outcome of the case, in parti­
cular by stipulating that he shall receive a share of the 
award granted by way of emoluments or fees; (ii) offer to 
acquire any rights subject to ligitation or acquire any 
interest in matters entrusted to them; (iii) accept fees
from parties whom he has been appointed ex officio to 
14 5defend. Although it is strictly forbidden to enter
into quota litis agreements, some advocates continue to 
make it a practice of taking over the case of victims of 
motor-vehicle accidents against the party at fault, their 
fee being a percentage - usually a very high one - of the
144. Ibid., s. 53(2).
145. Bar Law, s. 17; Bar Regulations, ss. 59 and 60. An 
advocate appointed ex officio to defend a client is 
paid by the State under the Legal Aid Scheme. There 
are offices for this purpose at every court, which 
establish whether or not a litigant is without means. 
See, chapter 19, infra. As for the advocate’s fees, 
they are not fixed by any tariff. Their fees are 
traditionally reckoned on the basis of four factors: 
the amount of difficulty involved in the work, the 
importance of the case, the advocate’s personal stan­
ding, and, sometimes, the extent of the client’s finan­
cial distress. Advocates seldom take the fourth 
factor into consideration and few would claim a modest 
fee from a needy client.
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damages that may be awarded. Practices of this nature are 
unethical for they are an exploitation both of distress 
and of justice. The rule against quota litis agreements 
also stems from the realisation that such agreements are 
likely to make the advocate lose his independence by asso­
ciating him with the outcome of the case and thereby 
making him an interested party.
Advocates are strictly bound to observe profes- 
146sional secrecy. The reason for this rule is not hard
to see. Life is so organised in society that individuals 
sometimes have to confide their secrets to certain classes 
of specialists (doctors, priests, judges, advocates) whose 
services they seek. These intermediaries are confidants 
and depositories of information which they must keep secret 
if they must maintain their credibility and the trust and 
confidence the public has in them. Advocates, are, 
because of the nature of their profession, invariably- en­
trusted with secrets by those who come to them for assistance.
They are morally and legally bound not to divulge those 
147secrets. - The advocate must neither deliver nor release
146. Bar Law, s. 24(2).
147. It is an offence, punishable with up to three years1 
imprisonment, for any person, without permission from 
the person interested in secrecy, to reveal any confi­
dential fact which has come to his knowledge or which 
has been confided to him solely by reason of his pro­
fession or duties. See ss. 310 and 311 of the CPC.
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information on documents in his possession, nor testify
in proceedings whatsoever against his client, nor inform
any person whatsoever of any matters that have come to
148his knowledge as a professional. Furthermore, an
advocate must not, either in court or in his written
submissions, refer to attempts or drafts of settlements
and agreements between parties, if those attempts or drafts
l4Qoccurred through the intermediary of briefed advocates.
The requirement of professional secrecy also covers pro­
fessional correspondence between advocates. Such corres­
pondence is strictly confidential. But when a particular 
correspondence crystallises into a final agreement between 
the parties, in matters wherein the advocate legally re­
presents his client, it may be deposited in court procee- 
150dings. Besides, an advocate personally charged (as
distinct from being called upon to give evidence as witness 
in a case) before a legitimate authority (i.e., a legally 
constituted court or disciplinary committee or tribunal or
a commission of inquiry) is no longer bound by professional
4- 151secrets.
It is a gross professional misconduct for an 
advocate to advertise or tout for business. Touting for 
clients directly or indirectly- or through agents is
148. Bar Regulations, s. 55(1).
149. Ibid., s. 55(2).
150. Ibid., s. 55(3).
151. Ibid., s. 55(4).
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prohibited of an advocate. The advocate must discourage
any proposition or suggestion likely to brings in consi-
152deration for remuneration, a client in his chambers.
An advocate may not solicit, in any manner whatsoever, 
for clients. The practice of giving out visiting cards 
to persons especially around the court premises or prisons 
is clearly an indirect way of soliciting for clients.
It is professional debauchery.
As a further duty towards his clients the advo­
cate is required to keep a special bank account for his
155clients. This account, known as Clients Account, is
not liable to attachment and the advocate may not pay 
personal monies into it. Save with the formal consent 
of the client, he may not withdraw monies out of it. If 
the advocate does withdraw money from that account for his ' 
personal benefit, he must repay the sum withdrawn within 
a maximum period of three months. Once every year, the 
Procureur General at the relevant Court of Appeal must 
check the accounts and the deposits situation of the advo-
154
cates within the jurisdiction of the Court. This check
is followed by an audit report which is sent to the Minister
of Justice and a copy to the Bar Council. The President
152. Ibid., s. 57(1). ■ It is doubtful whether it is unpro­
fessional, as happens frequently, for an advocate to 
allow visitors (potential clients) to make social 
calls on him in his chambers.
153. Bar Law, s. 22.
154. Ibid., s. 23.
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of the Bar Council may at any time check the accounts of
155advocates.
The advocate is also required to keep three
156types of books, a Journal, a Ledger, and a Register.
The Journal must show entries made by the advocate him­
self in chronological order and without leaving gaps, of 
all moneys received, paid and disbursed in such capacity. 
Counsel may not receive any sum without giving a detailed 
receipt for it, detached from a counterfoil book and 
bearing, with its serial number, the name and address of
the payer, the amount of the sum paid and the date of pay­
ment. The Journal must further mention, day by day, the
titles or certificates entrusted to the advocate and those
received in the post, their nature and value. Each entry 
in the Journal, with its serial number must be stamped.
Counsel is required as well to open a debit-credit 
account in a Ledger in the name of each client and for 
each affair. The Ledger records in the debit and credit 
columns opposite the items entered therein the folio of 
the Journal from which they were reproduced. The ’debit 
column’ includes all items of expenditure such as monies 
deposited at the Registry, the amount of sundry expenses 
paid to bailiffs and process-servers, costs of engrossments, 
etc. The ’credit column’ records all items of revenue
155. This provision is hardly ever enforced.
156. Bar Law, s. 21.
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received in full or in part such as deposited monies that 
have been refunded. Should the balance of the account 
show that the advocate is in his client’s debt he must 
reimburse him within three months following the settlement 
of the case.
The Register shows entries of all correspondence 
relating to counsel’s duties as auxiliary officer of jus­
tice. All three books must be numbered and initialled 
by the Procureur General of the relevant Court of Appeal.
Quite apart from disciplinary (or even criminal 
sanctions in certain cases) the advocate may be held 
civilly liable to his client, in tort or on contract.
He may be held liable for fraud, deceit, misrepresentation 
or gross negligence. But he cannot be held liable simply 
because he lost the case or did not do his homework pro­
perly or did not conduct the case to the client’s satis­
faction or that his advocacy left much to be desired.
This however does not mean that the advocate is wholly 
immune. He runs professional risks and is- required to 
insure against them. Within the first three years of prac­
tice the advocate must pay into the Government Treasury 
three million francs cfa and take out an insurance policy
with an approved insurance company to cover his profes- 
157sional risks.
157. Bar Law, s. 20. Insurance companies operating in
Cameroon are bound to insure advocates, upon request, 
against their professional risks. Quare, whether it 
would not be easier if the Bar Association took a 
collective insurance policy covering the professional 
risks of its members.
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C . Duties of the advocate towards the courts
As the foremost auxiliary personnel of the law,
the advocate must act with due courtesy to and respect
for the courts and judicial officers. He must show to
courts the respect and deference consistent with that 
158institution. He must never, in the words of his pro­
fessional oath, ’depart from the respect due to the courts, 
tribunals and public authorities’. He must avoid de­
ceiving or misleading the court. This respect must not
only be shown in court but outside the court too and in
legal writings. The advocate must wear his robe when
159presenting himself at the Bar. ^  Save where usage pro­
vides otherwise, the advocate is bound to appear in court 
16 0robed. This does not mean that he is permitted to put
on or take off his robes in the court-room. It is a 
professional misconduct for an advocate to do so.1^1 The 
advocate's robe is the symbol of dignity and of the prin-
1 C p
ciple of equality between advocates. Counsel may not
therefore hold a brief in court without his robes on.
158. Bar Regulations, s. 42.
159. Bar Law, s. 18(1).
160. In the Francophone part of the country the advocate 
must be in his robe whenever he appears before any 
court. In the Anglophone part however, advocates 
need not appear in robes in the Magistrate’s Court, 
but must do so in the other courts.
161. Bar Law, s. 4l(l). But old habits die hard. Advo­
cates do sometimes put on and take off their robes in 
court. (Fieldwork observation).
162. In olden days the robe distinguished the advocate from 
the rest of the crowd in court.
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As a further mark of respect for the bench the 
advocate must, when he travels, and where possible, intro­
duce himself to the judge presiding over the court in
1 C o
which he appears. 2 He must be punctual at all court 
164appearances. Punctuality is the soul of business.
If the advocate is going to be absent for as long as
three months and he has no partner to carry on with the
case he is handling, he must notify the President of the
Bar Council at least one month in advance, of his date
165of departure and of his return. Should the length of
absence extend beyond three months and there are no legi­
timate grounds to justify such a prolonged absence, an
advocate who has no partner may be struck off the Roll
166
on the proposal of the President of the Bar Council.
Counsel must show respect for his client, his 
colleague and the court by asking for adjournments only 
when he is obliged to do so, especially in the interest 
of his client. When the case is enlisted he must be 
ready to go on with it the first time it is called up for 
hearing. Litigants often come from a far way off and 
legitimately expect fair but speedy justice without unneces­
sary financial burdens on them, so the advocate must not
163. Bar Regulations, s. 46.
164. Bar Law, s. 18(1).
165. Ibid., s. 18(2).
166. Ibid., s . 18(3).
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cause delays or paralyse the smooth running of proceedings
- \ f . ' J
by dilatory and unjustified adjournments. It is this
type of conduct which litigants often decry and which the
1 fO
Press has continually castigated.
When conducting a case the advocate must do so
with humility and courtesy. He must avoid any form of
personal attack. He must not bully or try to browbeat
the witness. He must act with restraint and not get into
a temper and shout. He must not shirk in his respect for
the Bench. Nor must he insult his colleague or the
opposing party or a witness. Under no circumstances
must he, save as amicus curie., intervene in a matter in
which he has not been previously briefed or spontaneously
associate himself with a party who had not briefed him.
He is not to engage in any private demonstration or conver-
l6bsation likely to disturb proceedings. His performance
in court must be beyond reproach. He must address the
presiding judicial officer in the traditional manner: Your
Worship, Your Lordship or Your Honour, or Monsieur le
170President, as the case may be.
167. Bar Regulations, s. 48(2).
168. See for example, ’Overhaul the judiciary’, Cameroon 
Outlook, vol. 1, No. 45, 19th September 1969, p. 2.
169. Bar Regulations, s. 43.
170. In the Francophone courts the passepartout form of 
address for all judicial officers is Monsieur le Presi­
dent . In the Anglophone courts the Magistrate is 
addressed ’Your Worship’ and the Judge ’Your Lordship’ 
or ’Your Honour'.
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Although the advocate is free to choose his mode 
of defence and is covered by immunity for what he says in 
court, he must not have any private relationship with a
Magistrate or Judge in a procedure in progress and in
171respect thereof. He must avoid deception, all misrepre­
sentation of apparent compromise, and refrain from all 
financial dealings with judicial, legal and prison 
officers. Some unscrupulous advocates do engage in finan­
cial dealings with judges or magistrates. This kind of 
practice speaks ill of the Bar and undermines the adminis­
tration of justice. It is. the bounden duty of the Bar 
Council to investigate alleged practices of this nature.
The advocate must also avoid being personally
involved in incidents with magistrates or judges before
172whom he appears. If the advocate considers it■useful
and necessary as much for the defence of the rights of his 
clients as for the respect for the robes he wears, he may 
initiate against a magistrate impeachment proceedings
173based on legitimate suspicions as provided for by law. 
Occasionally, he may leave the courtroom, being careful to 
avoid aggravating the incident. He must then refer the 
matter to the President of the Bar Council or a member 
thereof who shall intervene at once to restore the serenity
171. Bar Regulations, s. 44(2).
172. Ibid., s. 45(2).
173. Ibid.
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174of the proceedings. It is not often that counsel
get involved in incidents with magistrates. But two well
known incidents may be cited; one involving Dr Enonchong
and the other Mr Ngoh. By some strange coincidence the
same magistrate was involved in both incidents which
occurred at three years interval. The first incident
occurred in September 1970 and concerned Dr H.N.A. Enonchong,
a practising barrister. The incident which was carried
175as a lead story in the Cameroon Outlook took place at 
the Tiko Magistrate’s Court presided over by Magistrate 
J.P.C. Nganje. According to the newspaper report, the 
learned Magistrate "had passed judgment on a case in which 
Dr Enonchongfs client was involved. His client ... had 
only been cautioned by the Magistrate and allowed to go-.
But Dr Enonchong ... was pressing further on more points 
of argument which, according to the learned Magistrate, 
were out■of place. The Magistrate then issued an arrest 
order and charged Dr Enonchong with contempt of court."
The learned counsel was however released on self-recog­
nisance and the case against him scheduled to come up for
hearing the following week. But it never did. Dr
1 7
Enonchong seised the Chief Justice of the matter, who
174. Ibid., s. 45(3).
175. ’Dr Enonchong Arrested’, Cameroon Outlook, vol. 2,
No. 69, 11th September 1970, p. 1.
176. At this time, the West Cameroon Bar Association, torn 
by internal strife, had neither authority nor respect. 
Moreover, Dr Enonchong was one of the advocates for 
the dissolution of the WCBA and the formation of a 
national bar,. These reasons explain why the Chief 
Justice and not the Bar was called to intervene.
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then caused his chief registrar to issue an order of pro­
hibition restraining Mr Nganje from proceeding with the
177matter against Mr Enonchong.
Respect for the courts, must not be one-sided.
The bench must reciprocate the courtesy and respect accor­
ded it by advocates. The court must also treat advocates 
with consideration and due respect. As a mark of mutual 
respect judges address advocates as 'learned counsel' (in 
the Anglophone courts) or iriaftre (in the Francophone 
courts). Although he may decide otherwise, a magistrate 
or judge is generally expected, when calling cases, to
■I 70
take into consideration the seniority of enrolment.
However, the President of the Bar Council has priority 
over his colleagues and after him, advocates who have come 
from exceptionally distant places. But an advocate who 
has priority may renounce it in favour of a colleague who
179has a reasonably legitimate cause to request them for it.
The general rule that the order of calling cases should 
take into account seniority of' enrolment at the Bar is an
attempt to cater for the sort of situation that gave rise to
i n
the case of Victor Mukwelle Ngoh v. The People. In that
177. 'Bench Warrant for Dr Enonchong', Cameroon Outlook, 
vol. 2, No. 70, 16th September 1970, p. 1.
178. Bar Regulations, s. 50(1).
179. Ibid., s. 50(2).
180. Criminal Appeal No. CASWP/17 C./73, Buea Court of 
Appeal, unreported.
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case Mr Ngoh, a practising barrister, was on 27th August 
1973j convicted by Magistrate J.P.C. Nganje at the Kumba 
Court of First Instance under s. 15^ of the Penal Code of 
contempt of court and was sentenced to a fine of 300,000 
francs cfa or in default of its payment, to serve one 
year’s imprisonment. The facts of the case were as fol­
lows. The learned trial Magistrate began the day’s 
session in his court by calling a junior barrister to indi­
cate his interest in the cause list for the day. The 
appellant then stood up and told the Magistrate that as 
he was senior he ought to be given priority to indicate 
his interest in the cause list. The Magistrate refused, 
saying that he had a right to call any barrister of his 
choice to indicate his interest first. The appellant 
then said the Magistrate was talking nonsense, whereupon 
the Magistrate ordered him to leave the court, saying that 
if he did not leave he would have him arrested. The appel­
lant refused to leave, saying that the Magistrate was 
talking nonsense and rubbish. The Magistrate then ordered 
his arrest and detention. He was subsequently charged, 
tried, convicted and sentenced as indicated above. On 
appeal to the Court of Appeal at Buea, the court went 
through the memoranda of submissions filed by both the 
Procureur General (Mr Nyo’ Wakai) and the appellant’s 
counsel (barristers Gorji-Dinka and Enonchong) and lis­
tened to arguments advanced orally in court to amplify the 
filed written submissions^ Held, per Endeley, C.J.,
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dismissing the appeal, that by English law,, contempt
sedente curia, that is, contempt committed in open court
while the court was in session, is tried summarily and is
l8lnot subject to appeal.
It is a matter of regret that an incident of 
this nature should have occurred as the only purpose such 
incidents serve is to poison the relations between the 
Bar and the Bench. Judicial officers and advocates must
1 Q o
be able to exercise self-control and restraint. The
same applies to State Prosecutors. Take this other inci­
dent which happened at the Yaounde Tribunal de Grande 
Instance during the much publicised Proces de la Huiti&me 
Coupe1^  of 1973. At one stage during the trial, argu­
ments between defence advocates and the State Prosecutor 
raised, passions on both sides and quickly developed into 
an altercation. The audience, clearly in sympathy with 
defence counsel, made derisive noises (and at one stage 
even jeered) each time the State Prosecutor made a submission.
181. On further appeal to the Supreme Court both conviction
and sentence were quashed.
182. In the above case the Magistrate could have for
example handled the matter tactfully by simply asking 
the court to rise for some minutes.
183. It was a sensational but scandalous case in which 
several people including Ministers, high Government 
officials and businessmen were accused of theft, fraud 
and of embezzling money for the 8th African Cup foot­
ball competitions which took place in Cameroon that 
year. This writer was the court’s official inter­
preter during the whole trial.
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The presiding Judge had some difficulty trying to restore 
calm. In a furious mood, the State Prosecutor ordered 
the armed policemen in the court to clear the public gal­
lery, which they promptly did. The Judge then asked the 
court to rise for a while, evidently to enable-tempers to 
cool down and to restore calm and serenity in the court.
D. Duties of the advocate towards his colleagues
The relationship between advocates inter se is
one which is voluntarily accepted and based on esteem,
equality and mutual respect and courtesy. Professional
rules and usages give this relationship its natural force.
The equality between advocates is symbolised by the robe 
18^they wear and excludes any pre-eminence based on poli­
tical, diplomatic, traditional or other titles. For 
example, an advocate is not above his colleagues simply 
because he is a village chief, a member of Parliament or 
a former Minister.
Courtesy among advocates expresses itself in 
attitude and language not only in court but also out of 
court. In conducting a case the advocate must show res­
pect towards his colleague, avoid personal attacks and
184. The discrimination in England ’within the bar’ between 
Queen’s Counsel or ’silk’ and 'juniors’ does not exist 
in Cameroon. Nor is there any comparable form of 
discrimination within the Cameroonian Bar.
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185not share the animosity of his clients. His lan­
guage must be refined and his comportment urbane. He 
must not exchange words with his colleagues but must always 
address the court. If his colleague stands up to make a 
point he must stop talking and sit down. The advocate 
should give due respect to his seniors, former Presidents 
of the Bar Council as well as the incumbent President.
The mutual respect and esteem among advocates is typified 
in the manner they address each other in court. The 
advocate always addresses his colleague as ’my learned 
friend’ or mon confrere (as is the case in the Francophone 
courts); for the advocate’s colleague is not only ’learned’ 
but is also his ’friend’. The relationship between advo­
cates must always be one of confraternity. The advocate 
must always behave like a thorough gentleman. If he has
made promises to his fellow advocate, he must adhere to 
l86them. A gentleman never breaks his word. The advo­
cate must not behave like an opportunist. He must not 
therefore take advantage of the accidental absence of his 
colleague whom he knows has been briefed by the opposing 
party, so as to benefit by it, notwithstanding pressure 
from his client.
Advocates should assist each other whenever
185. Bar Regulations, s. 48(1).
186. Ibid., s. 48(2).
187. Idem.
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necessary, must be honest, and must avoid rivalry and
soliciting for clients. Thus, as a man of integrity,
the advocate must transmit to his colleague, advocate of
the opposing party, all the documents which he intends to
188deposit in the court’s case-file. This transmission
189must be complete, preliminary and spontaneous. The
advocate who receives these documents must not relinquish 
them but must return them to his colleague. In default 
of the spontaneous return of the documents before the 
hearing, the advocate who transmitted them shall deposit 
his written submissions with the court expecting the docu­
ments to be returned, and refer the matter to the President
190of the Bar Council for disciplinary measures.
Furthermore, every advocate who receives an
offer of a brief from a client or in a matter must ensure,
before accepting that offer, that no colleague has been
previously briefed in favour of the client whose defence
191is being proposed. When he replaces a colleague, he
must ensure that that colleague has been completely paid 
192off.  ^ In default of this, he is personally liable on 
the payment of expenses and fees due to the colleague pre­
viously briefed, subject to the arbitration of the President
188. Ibid., s. 49(1).
189. Ibid., s. 49(2).
190. Ibid., s. 49(5).
191. Ibid., s. 51(1).
192. Idem.
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193of the Bar Council. In matters of urgency, however,
he may appear in court, but on condition that he has
obtained prior authorisation from the President of the
Bar Council. In any case, an advocate who is a former
magistrate or civil servant may under no circumstances
accept a brief in a matter which had come to his know-
194ledge in his former office.
Every violative practice on the part of an advo­
cate must be brought to the attention of the President of
195the Bar Council. No advocate may lodge a complaint
against a magistrate, an advocate, or an auxiliary of jus­
tice without having first referred it to the President of
196the Bar Council. One should not wash one’s dirty linen
in the streets. Quarrels among advocates should not be 
taken to the public place, whether through the press, tracts 
or even court suits. There is the overriding need to 
preserve, in the public eye, the image of a cohesive Bar. 
This image is vital because it sustains the profession and 
gives it its grandeur. Public confidence in advocates 
would be dangerously undermined as soon as brotherhood and 
harmony cease to exist in the profession. That is why 
internal quarrels among advocates must be viewed as a 
symptom of grave malady of the Bar which must therefore be 
cured as soon as possible.
193. Idem.
194. Ibid., s. 56.
195. Ibid., s. 57(3).
196. Ibid., s. 47.
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V. End of Practice at the Bar
There are three ways in which an advocate may 
cease to practise at the Bar: upon death, on being struck
off the Roll and by resignation.
1. Upon death
Death puts an end to a person's physical existence 
and so to his activities, the advocate not excepted.
So when the advocate dies his career at the Bar comes to
an end. Similarly, an advocate who is seriously and
irrevocably incapacitated, mentally or physically, would 
cease to practise at the Bar. . In either of these cases 
(death and serious incapacity) the President of the Bar 
Council shall cause seals to be placed on the chambers 
occupied by the advocate and appoint a fellow member of
the Bar who shall administer and wind up under the former's
197control, all current affairs. The Bar Council shall
then settle all disputes relative to the fees of the 
appointed advocate.
The President of the Bar Council himself or a
member of the Council appointed by him, shall make an inven­
tory of all pending matters in the chambers of the deceased 
colleague and take all measures necessary to ensure the
197* Bar Law, s. 48(1). 
198. Ibid., 48(2).
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progress of these matters unless the colleague had himself
before his death arranged for the devolution of these
199matters and his archives.
2. Resignation
The issue of resignation is referred to in the
Bar Law and in the Internal Rules and Regulations of the
Bar only tangentially.- It is provided that an advocate
who has enrolled for twenty years may voluntarily resign.
But there is no compelling reason why an advocate may not
resign his membership of the profession, if he no longer
wishes to practise at the Bar, even though he has not
enrolled for twenty years. He should be able to resign
at any time. The resignation may only be refused "if the
advocate cannot justify that he has taken sufficient steps
to ensure the devolution of matters pending in his chambers,
201his archives and his accounts". The law is silent on
the question of procedure and formalities to be followed 
when resigning (for example, whether notice must be given? 
to whom? the period of notice required, if any? when resig­
nation becomes effective?). It would seem that all that is
199* Bar Regulations, s. 65(1).
200. Bar Law, s. 47(1); Bar Regulations, s. 31(1). An 
advocate who resigns after twenty years of practice 
at the Bar may be conferred the title of honorary 
advocate; in which case he would remain subject to 
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Council. 
Bar Law, s. 47(2); Bar Regulations, s. 31(2-16).
201. Bar Regulations, s. 65(2).
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necessary is for the advocate to write to the Bar Council 
informing it of his resignation. The Council would then 
have to accept or refuse the resignation.
The law gives no instances or situations when an 
advocate may be required to resign. Evidently, the 
reasons for resignation would be personal to the advocate 
concerned. Section 28(1) of the Bar Law spells out 
functions which are incompatible with practice at the Bar. 
But it does not require an advocate who wishes to exer­
cise any of the functions therein listed to resign his 
membership of the Bar. An advocate who, subsequent to his 
enrolment, is disqualified under s. 28 of the Bar Law or 
who, within the prescribed time limit, fails to pay his 
contributions to the cost of running the Bar Association 
or who cannot prove that he has paid the insurance premiums
provided for in s . 20 of the said Bar Law, is merely
202omitted from the Roll. Omission here simply means
that when reprinting the Roll of the Bar at the beginning 
of each judicial year the names of those advocates who 
have offended against sections 13, 20 and 28 of the Bar Law 
will, ipso facto, be left out. There is no requirement 
that an advocate whose name has been so omitted should 
resign. All that happens is that his right to practise 
is temporarily suspended. It remains in abeyance until 
the incompatibility no longer exists. When his name re­
appears on the Roll he is entitled to resume his practice.
202. Bar Law, s . 13•
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So, if subsequent to his enrolment an advocate is appointed 
a Government Minister or a legal adviser to a corporation 
or director of a firm, he is entitled to fall back on his 
practice at the Bar should his appointment come to an end.
3. Upon being struck off the Roll
An advocate who has been struck off the Roll of 
the Bar can no longer practise at the Bar. Striking off 
the Roll is however an extreme measure resorted to only 
when the other forms of disciplinary action have either 
been exhausted or are deemed inadequate in the circumstances. 
Every breach of discipline by an advocate is subject to 
sanctions. M w U a n i a  breach of discipline: any dere­
liction of duty by an advocate, particularly any serious 
professional offence; any breach of honour, propriety or
dignity; and every violation of the Internal Rules and
203Regulations of the Bar.
All breaches of discipline are taken cognizance
of by the Bar Council sitting as the Disciplinary Court of 
204the Bar. In the case of the President of the Bar Coun­
cil in office or a member of the Bar Council, disciplinary 
proceedings against them are, after consultation with the 
Council, brought before the Pull Bench of the Supreme Court
203. Bar Law, s. 39(1); Bar Regulations, s. 21.
204. Bar Law, s. 39(2); Bar Regulations, s. 22(1).
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by the Procureur General at that Court acting either in an
205ex officio capacity or upon complaint laid before him. 
Natural justice requires a person to be heard before he is 
condemned. Hence, disciplinary sanctions may not be pro­
nounced against an advocate unless he has first been
summoned and heard, together with his witnesses, if need 
206be. Any disciplinary sanction pronounced in disregard
of this requirement is void and of no effect.
The decision of the Disciplinary Court must, 
within eight days of it being taken, be notified by regis­
tered letter to the advocate, concerned who may lodge an
207appeal against it at the Pull Bench of the Supreme Court.
Any disciplinary sanction pronounced by the Disciplinary 
Court is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. If the 
Disciplinary Court fails to give a decision within three 
months, the Procureur General at the Supreme Court has to
refer the matter to the said Court which must then summon
^  • 208 the case and give its ruling m  camera.
No disciplinary action may be taken against an
advocate if one year has elasped since the date on which
205. Bar Law, s. 44.
206. Bar Law, s. 4l; Bar Regulations, s. 26.
207. Bar Law, s. 42.
208. Ibid., s. 43.
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209the alleged infraction was committed. However, if
disciplinary action is taken within time, an advocate
found guilty incurs one of the following sanctions (in
ascending order of gravity): warning, call to order,
suspension for a period not exceeding three years, and
210striking off the Roll. Nothing is said about what
offending conduct would attract either of these sanctions. 
But it seems reasonable to assume that much would depend 
on the nature of the breach, when and where and how it 
was committed, the frequency with which it has been com­
mitted, and the character and disciplinary record of the 
advocate involved. Most breaches would either attract a 
warning or a call to order. For example, any breach of 
the duties imposed on him by his oath, committed in court 
by an advocate may, either automatically or at the request
of the Public Prosecutor’s Department, be forthwith sanc-
211
tioned by a call to order. Suspension is a serious
sanction and would certainly be resorted to only in grave 
cases. Striking off the Roll is obviously an extreme 
sanction and ought, on principle, to-be resorted to only 
in equally extreme cases of breach of discipline or of pro­
fessional misconduct. A series of minor breaches of dis­
cipline or professional ethics might however add up to a
209. Ibid., s. 45(3).
210. Ibid., s. 40(1).
211. Bar Law, s . 45(4).
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mighty act of professional misconduct justifying a 
decision to strike off the Roll. Take the case of an 
advocate who persistently touts for clients or who 
repeatedly engages in financial deals with judicial and 
legal officers or who always places mercenary consi­
derations above those of the interest of his client or 
of justice in general. Striking off the Roll of the Bar 
would be perfectly in order on any of these circumstances.
Disciplinary sanctions against the advocate are, 
moreover, punishment for breach of the rules and ethics 
of the profession he exercises; so the taking of disci­
plinary action against an advocate in no way- bars any pro­
ceedings which the legal department or private individuals 
may institute against him before the criminal courts in 
accordance with the ordinary law, nor does it bar any civil
action for damages arising out of a misdemeanour or tech- 
212nical offence.
V I . The Bar Association
Practising advocates in Cameroon belong to a
professional organisation known as the Bar Association or
211Bar instituted at the courts of the Republic. The
214organisation has legal status; it is a body corporate
212. Bar Law, s. 45(1).
213. Bar Law, s. 30(1); Bar Regulations, s. 2(1).
214. Bar Law, s. 30(2); Bar Regulations, s. 2(2).
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215with its headquarters in Yaounde. Although an auto­
nomous body it is expected to cooperate with the Ministry 
of Justice in matters relating to the administration of 
j ustice.
The Bar Association comprises a General Assembly
p -j £
and a Council each headed by a President. The govern­
ment of the organisation is therefore made up of four 
organs: the general assembly, the president of the general
assembly, the bar council and the president of the bar 
217council.
1. The General Assembly of the Bar
The General Assembly of the Bar meets only to
vote. It is made up of all advocates authorised to
218 219practise and whose names appear on the Roll of the Bar.
215. Bar Law, s. 30(3); Bar Regulations, s. 2(4). After 
a heated debate as to whether Douala or Yaounde should 
be the headquarters of the Association the Association 
chose Douala but said that it could be moved to Yaounde 
upon the decision of the General Assembly. The 
Ministry of Justice however decided that the seat of 
the organisation shall be in Yaounde. For discussion 
on this issue, see, Minutes of the General Assembly of 
the Bar held at Akwa Palace Hotel, Douala, on the 3rd 
April 1976.
216. Bar Law, s. 31.
217. Bar Regulations, s. 3.
218. Bar Law, s. 32(1).
219. Bar Regulations, s. 4(1).
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It meets In ordinary and extraordinary sessions. The
ordinary session meets once a year when convened by its
220President by registered letter. It meets in extra­
ordinary session only when it is requested to do so either 
by the Bar Council or by an absolute majority of its 
members. Where the request is made by the Bar Council 
the General Assembly is convened by the President of the 
Bar Council and where the request is made by an absolute 
majority of members of the Bar, it is convened by the 
President of the General Assembly. When it meets, the 
Assembly considers all urgent matters relating to the
221exercise of the profession that have been submitted to it.
The Assembly also draws up the internal rules of
the bar which are subject to the approval of the Minister 
222of Justice and also votes the budget of the Bar upon the
proposition of the President of the Bar Council. It
elects its President (eligible for re-election) and members
223of the Bar Council for a term of two years. Decisions
of the Assembly are arrived at by secret- ballot and by a
224two-thirds majority of the members present or represented. 
Although pupil advocates may participate in General Assembly
220. Bar Law, s. 32(2); Bar Regulations, s. 4(2).
221. Bar Regulations, s. 6(4).
222. Bar Law, ss. 33 and 3^.
223. Bar Law, ss. 32(3), 33, 37; Bar Regulations, s. 8(1).
224. Bar Law, s. 36(1).
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225meetings and speak therein, they have no vote. Advo­
cates. who have been suspended by virtue- of a disciplinary
226sanction also have no vote. Decisions of the-: General
Assembly meeting constitute the .minutes which are then
227signed by the members of the pro tern executive.
2. The President of the General Assembly of the Bar
Elected for a renewable term of two years, the
President of the General Assembly convenes and presides
over Assembly meetings and supervises the election of
22 8members of the Bar Council. He draws up the agenda for
229the ordinary general meeting, * which agenda must deal
only with matters relating to the exercise of the profes- 
2 70sion. The Minister of Justice, the President of the
Bar Council and members of the’ Bar may refer to the Presi­
dent of the General Assembly, one month before the session,
225. Bar Regulations, s. 4(4).
226. Bar Law, s. 36(2).
227. Bar Regulations, s. 7(1). During its first General 
Meeting in April 1976, the General Assembly elected 
Messrs Pierre Aubriet and Ade Moma respectively as its 
President and vice-President. Mr Tabetando and Mrs 
Batayene were elected Anglophone and Francophone pro 
tern secretaries, respectively.
228. Bar Regulations, s. 9(3)(6)(8).
229. Bar Law, s. 35(2); Bar Regulations, s. 6(1).
230. Bar Law, s. 35(1). The agenda may not, for example, 
include the discussion of political matters. But 
quare whether the Assembly may discuss a political 
issue which affects the Bar.
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2 31issues they wish included in the agenda.
It is the duty of the President of the General
Assembly to transmit the minutes of the General Assembly,
within eight days of the meeting, to the President of the
232Bar Council for execution. The duties of the Presi­
dent of the General Assembly are incompatible with those
233of President of the Bar Council and they determine at
the expiration of two years or upon death, resignation,
striking off the Roll, suspension or upon dismissal by the
234
General Assembly on serious grounds of special urgency.
3. The Council of the Bar Association
The Council of the Bar is the administrative and
235disciplinary organ of the Bar Association and is elected
2
for two years by the General Assembly. The size of the
Council depends upon the number of enrolled advocates at 
each one time. It is composed of five members if the 
number of advocates is more than ten but less than twenty; 
of seven members if the number of advocates is between twenty
231. Bar Law, s. 35(2) .
2 32. Bar Regulations, s. 7(2).
233. Ibid., s. 8(3).
234. Ibid., s. 8(2).
2 35. Bar Law, s. 38(1).
236. Ibid., s. 37(1); Bar Regulations, s. 9(1).
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and fifty; of nine members where the number is more than
fifty but less than one hundred; and of fifteen members
if the number of advocates in the country exceeds one 
237hundred.. Election of members to the Bar Council must
take into account the number of advocates practising in
2 OQ
each Province of the country.
With the exception of those suspended by virtue
of a disciplinary sanction, any advocate is eligible for
219membership of the Bar Council. Save for those suspended,
any advocate who is dissatisfied with the elections may,
by simple petition lodged at the registry of the Supreme
Court within fifteen days of the announcement of the
results, refer it to the Full Bench of the Supreme Court
240which shall rule on it in chambers within one month.
The principal functions of the Bar Council are to 
maintain the standards, honour and independence of the Bar,
237. Bar Law, s. 37(1). Since the Bar has less than one 
hundred members the Bar Council is made up of only 
seven members. The first Bar Council was made up of 
Messrs Sendze, Ebai, Dinka, Tokoto, Muna, Sende and 
Mrs Siwe.
238. Bar Regulations, s. 9(2). As there are no advocates 
regularly practising within the Garoua and the Bertoua 
Courts of Appeal areas, the current distribution is as 
follows: 1 from the Bamenda and Bafoussam Courts of 
Appeal areas (5 advocates practise within both areas),
2 from the Buea Appeal Court area (14 advocates prac­
tise within the area), 2 from the Douala Appeal Court 
area (17 advocates practise there) and 2 from the 
Yaounde Appeal Court area (16 advocates practise there).
239. Bar Law, s. 37(2).
240. Ibid., s. 37(4) (5) .
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to promote, preserve and improve the services of the Bar, 
and to represent and act for the Bar in its relations with 
others and in all matters affecting the administration of 
justice. Section 38(2) of the Bar Law enacts:
"S. 38(2). The terms of reference of the
Bar Council shall be as follows -
1- to ensure respect for the principle of 
integrity, impartiality, moderation and 
fellowship upon which the Bar Association 
and the exercise of the profession of 
advocate are based;
2- to pronounce on admission to training courses, 
inscription and re-inscription on the Roll 
and rank;
3- to administer the property of the Association 
and ensure strict compliance with the pro­
visions of section 20;
4- to authorise the President of the Bar Council 
to go to law, to accept any donations and 
legacies made to the Association, to effect
a compromise, to agree to any transfers or 
mortgages, and to contract any loan;
5- to deal, generally speaking, with all matters 
concerning the exercise of the profession of 
advocate and the smooth functioning of the 
Association."
The Bar Council meets within the week following
the Annual General Assembly and thereafter every three
months. But in the interest of the administration of the
Bar the President of the Bar Council or a majority or a
majority of its members may convene a meeting of the 
24lCouncil. Decisions are taken in the Council by majority
vote and executed by its President who has a casting vote
242in the event of a tie. However, no decision of the
Council is valid unless there were at least two-thirds of
241. Bar Regulations, s. 10.
242. Ibid., s. 11(1)(2).
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24?the members of the Council present at the meeting.
The Council elects its President, Secretary and Treasurer
244for two years from among its members. The Secretary
is responsible for the preparation and service of the
meetings of the Bar and the Bar Council. He keeps the
245correspondence register. The Treasurer controls,
under the authority of the President of the Council, the 
funds and the property of the Bar: He recovers all sub­
scriptions giving receipts therefor and keeps proper 
account of the Bar. The funds are deposited in an 
unattachable bank account entitled ’The Cameroon Bar’.
All commitments or cheques are jointly signed by the Presi­
dent of the Council and the Treasurer. They may not give
246a power of attorney to each other or to someone else.
The functions of the President of the Council, 
the Secretary and the Treasurer are honorary. But adminis­
trative expenses which touch and concern their functions
247are chargeable- to the Bar. The duties of a member of
the Bar Council determine at the end of his elective
period, upon death or resignation, or where he is too
248incapacitated to exercise his dutes.
243. Bar Regulations, s. 11(3)-
244. Ibid., s. 12(1).
245. Ibid., s. 12(3).
246. Ibid., s. 12(4).
247. Ibid., s. 12(5).
248. Ibid., s. 10.
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4. The President of the Council of the Bar Association
This is the most important office in the Bar
Association. So, every member of the.Bar is required to
accord the President of the Bar Council all the respect
249and deference due to the leader of the Bar. The
President of the Bar Council is the executive organ of 
the Bar Association. He is elected by the Bar Council 
from among its members for a renewable period of two years 
by secret ballot on a two-thirds majority on the first
2 50ballot and on a relative majority on the second ballot.
The president of the Bar Council is vested with
four kinds of duties, viz., representative, administrative,
251consultative, and conciliatory. He personifies the
Bar and represents it in all civil acts and especially, in 
the judicial process, and vis-a-vis public authorities.
But he may neither acquire, alienate, lease, nor mortgage 
immoveable property in the name of the Cameroon Bar nor 
contract loans without the prior consent of the General 
Assembly. However, he acts as plaintiff in all cases.per­
taining to or in the interest of the Bar. He represents 
the Bar at all ceremonies and leads the Council where the
249. Ibid., s. 13(9).
250. Ibid., s. 13(1); Bar Law, s. 37(3). Mr Gorji-Dinka
became the first President of the Bar Council when he
was elected to that post in 1976. He was re-elected 
for another two-year term in 1978.
251. Bar Regulations, s. 13.
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occasion arises. He conveys to the bereaved family of a 
deceased colleague all the condolences of the Bar and at 
the funeral makes a funeral oration. The president of 
the Bar Council is expected to give a dinner annually to 
the honour of the Minister of Justice,- judicial authori­
ties, his colleagues, and representatives of auxiliaries 
of justice.
The administrative duties of the President of the 
Council of the Bar are many and varied. He draws up the 
agenda for each meeting of the Bar Council. He appoints 
various commissions to look into matters of interest to
252the Bar. Thus for example, when a Douala-based advocate
255 254withdrew from one law partnership and joined another
under circumstances which were allegedly suspect, the
President of the Bar Council temporarily halted all forms
of legal practice by the advocate in question and appointed
255a two-man commission of inquiry  ^ to look into the matter
256and report its findings and make recommendations.
The President of the Bar Council appoints and 
exercises authority over the employees and salaried staff 
of the Bar. He supervises the training of probational
252. Maitre Alice Nkom Pokossi.
253. The Ninine/Nkom Pokossi partnership.
25^. The Viazzi/Aubriet/Battu law firm.
255. The Tokoto-Tabetando Commission of Inquiry.
256. See, President of the Bar Council’s letter No. PCB. 
002/1/68 of 22 November 1976.
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advocates and may appoint a member of the Bar ex officio 
to handle a matter in court. In short he is in charge 
of all matters which touch and concern the Bar. He per­
sonifies the Bar, exerts an educational control over pupil 
advocates and a discreet but effective domination over his 
colleagues. The President’s consultative duties consist 
in giving his opinion on issues referred to him and answering 
inquiries emanating from foreign Bars. He may consult 
the Bar Council where the matter is one of a delicate nature. 
Breaches of the Internal Regulations of the Bar are reported 
to the President of the Bar Council. Upon the receipt of 
a complaint against an advocate made by his colleague, a 
judicial or legal officer, or a client, the President of 
the Bar Council proceeds to hear the parties and attempts 
a reconciliation. He may refer the matter to the Bar 
Council or decide that the matter be closed. Complaints 
by advocates against people other than their colleagues 
are also referred to the President of the Bar Council who 
is vested here with unlimited powers to seek conciliation 
and to give protection where necessary. The authority of
the President of the Bar Council who is also known as 
257Bdtonnier is expected to carry a lot of weight. But
257. In France, "A Brotherhood, which was entirely religious, 
had established itself at the Law-Courts, in St. 
Nicholas’s Chapel, as early as 13^2. It included bar­
risters and attorneys. The logical head of this Bro­
therhood was therefore a barrister. This barrister 
was called B^tonnier, or staff-bearer, since, when there 
was a procession, it was his duty to carry the staff 
from which the Saint’s banner hung. At first this 
office was held by the most senior barrister. By the 
end of the l6th century it became elective. The 
BcLtonnier ’ s moral authority established itself more
/Continued over
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any member of the Bar may refer any act of the B&tonnier
258to the Full Bench of the Supreme Court.
VII. Other Auxiliary Personnel of the Law
The Francophone part of Cameroon has inherited
from France the practice whereby any person, whether or
not legally trained, may give legal advice. The general
practice of law is, generally speaking, open to the public,
except for those activities directly related to litigation.
As in France, anyone, whether trained in law or not, may
give legal advice, prepare legal documents and even appear
25Qon behalf of litigants before some courts. They prac­
tise law under such names as conseiller juridique, agent 
d ’affaires and so on. In addition, many business organi­
sations and private as well as public corporations fre­
quently have persons on their staff who,.although legally 
trained, are not members of any of the legal professions. 
Thus, it is not uncommon for a licencie en droit to be 
recruited by a company as a conseiller juridique.
Footnote 257 continued from page 589.
firmly in the period that followed. In addition, by 
the l8th Century a Committee of Elders already had 
real disciplinary powers: this is the origin of our
modern Council of the Bar (Conseil de l ’Qrdre)." 
Pierre Sire, op.cit., p. 255.
258. Bar Law, s. 38(4).
259. Cf. Rene David & Henry P. de Vries, The French legal 
system, Oceana Publications, New York^ 1958, p. 17"!
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However, the administration of justice is pri­
marily the concern of judicial and legal officers. Other 
persons whose profession it is to assist in the accomplish­
ment of this key task of the State are regarded as auxi­
liary personnel of the law. Barristers, solicitors, 
bailiffs, process servers, registrars or court clerks,
and members of the judicial police are known as les
2 6 0auxillalres de la justice, that is, auxiliaries of
justice because they fulfil an auxiliary role in the adminis-
261tration of justice. The avocat or advocate is the
foremost auxiliary of justice and has already been treated. 
This section shall deal with the other auxiliaries of jus­
tice who, for purposes of exposition, may conveniently be 
divided into two groups: the officiers ministgriels and
the officiers de police judiciaires, OPJ.
1. The Officiers de Police Judiciaire
Those members of the Gendarmerie and of the 
National Security (whether constables or officers of 
police) who are directly involved with the work of the
260. The concept of auxiliaire de la justice is one which 
has been borrowed from France; evidently familiar to 
lawyers in the Francophone part of Cameroon, it is 
novel to the common law trained lawyers of Anglophone 
Cameroon.
261. It is significant that the title maitre is no longer 
the monopoly of the avocat. Notaires, huissiers and 
greffiers all use the title ’maitre’.
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court are collectively known as officiers de police judi- 
ciaire. These officers have the right and duty to inves­
tigate every allegation of commission of a criminal offence. 
There exists at the National Security (that is, the Police 
Force) a Judicial Police Department which is responsible, 
inter alia, for coordinating techniques of criminal investi­
gation and carrying out criminal and economic investigations.
The judicial police is concerned essentially with 
criminal investigation and the apprehension of offenders. 
Judicial police officers conduct searches, make arrests 
and bring offenders to court. Some police officers, parti­
cularly in the Anglophone Provinces, act as court ushers,
maintaining order in and around the court house when the
262court is in session. In fact police and gendarme
officers prosecute, in some Magistrate’s Courts. In their 
capacity as auxiliaries of justice members of the judicial 
police come- under the authority and control of the local 
Procureur. The importance of the judicial police as 
auxiliary personnel of the law cannot be overemphasised.
The maintenance of law and order, the investigation of 
crime and the bringing of offenders to justice depend on 
the police judiciaire and on the police as a whole. With­
out their assistance the criminal process will grind to a 
standstill.
262. In the Anglophone courts, it is a policeman who shouts 
’C-O-U-R-T’’ when the Magistrate or Judge enters or 
leaves the courtroom. It is he also who snaps ’ORDER’.’ 
when court proceedings are momentarily interrupted by 
laughter from the public gallery.
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2. The Officiers Ministerlels
These constitute a limited group appointed by 
the state and having monopoly in certain matters. An 
officier ministdriel is a professional appointed by the 
Government on the application of the prior holder of an 
office, from whom he has purchased it together with the 
good will and the exclusive right to render specified ser­
vices within a given locality.2^  If an officier minis­
terial dies before having sold his office, his heirs can
264sell it and ’present’ the purchaser to the Minister of 
Justice. The requirement that persons who want to become 
officiers ministeriels must purchase the right to exercise 
their Occupation goes back to pre-revolutionary France, 
when most public officers were subject to sale and pur­
chase. But this is no longer the case in Cameroon. At 
least since independence. Anyone who satisfies the neces­
sary conditions may apply to the Minister of Justice to be
265appointed officier ministdriel. J Greffiers, avoues,
huissiers, and notaires - these are all officiers minis­
teriels .
A . The greffier
A greffier is a court clerk or registrar. He
263. David & de Vries, op.cit., p. 24.
264. Read ’introduce’.
265. Cf. Order of 7th July 1955 (Agents d ’Affaires); 
Decree No. 60/172 of 20th September i960 (Rules and 
Regulations governing Notaries).
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is an essential component in the composition of every
court. Each court in Cameroon is defined as including
not only the bench and the legal department but also the
266greffe (court registry). The greffier must be present
at all court sessions since he is a member of the court.
A court sitting without its greffier cannot act legally.
Even when the court moves to the locus in quo or goes to
hear a witness too ill to be heard in court, the greffier
must be present.
In the Francophone courts, the greffier sits
with the presiding judge. He it is who is responsible
for recording the minutes of the hearing from the beginning 
P ft 7
to the end. This is quite the reverse of what happens
in the Anglophone courts where it is the presiding judge 
or magistrate himself and not the court clerk who takes 
down the evidence. The registrar also keeps the official 
copies (minutes) of the judgments which he must countersign 
(the presiding judge must also sign each judgment) and 
prepares summaries of the court’s proceedings for, in 
Cameroon, no facilities exist for an official stenographic 
transcript of court proceedings. Any judicial act not
266. See, Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972 (Judicial 
Organisation) as amended.
267. In the language of art. 91 of a French decree of 30th 
March 1808 dealing with the internal organisation of 
French courts, "The greffier shall hold the pen at 
the hearing from the beginning until they are termi­
nated." Quoted by Peter Herzog, Civil Procedure in 
France, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague^ 1967} at p. 98.
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performed or executed in the presence of the greffier and
268with his signature is void. The records of the court
are preserved by the greffier and it is he who prepares and 
issues certified copies upon proper request. He must 
also prepare the various required reports and statistics 
concerning the work of the court and transmit them to the 
appropriate authorities. The' greffier, depending upon 
the volume of work handled by the court to which he is 
attached, sometimes has one or more assistants and a 
clerical staff under him.
As a civil servant, the greffier is paid a monthly 
salary by the Government. He also receives part of the 
fees (.the percentage he receives is specified in an official 
fee schedule) payable by litigants for the various acti­
vities the greffier performs in the course of a lawsuit, 
such as enlisting the case (that is, putting the case on 
the calendar), preparing and filing the judgment and deli­
vering certified copies thereof.
B . The avoue
The avoue (solicitor) is the client’s formal 
representative in court, his agent. "During the l4th 
Century there appeared in France and in England, at the 
same time, lawyers whose task was not to plead but to
268. See, ss. 9 and 10 of Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26 August 
1972 as amended.
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represent litigating parties. They were called ’attor­
neys’ in England and ’procureurs’ in Prance, and have
269become the ’solicitors’ and ’avoues’ of today.” The
avoue is concerned with procedural details. He does not
present oral arguments in court, the plaidoirie being
the monopoly of the avocat. He takes out the writ, puts
in appearances for the client, formulates the statement
of claim or of defence, prepares the written pleadings,
arranges for services of process and exchange of evidence,
negotiates settlements, and handles clients' funds.
However, the legal profession in Cameroon is a fused one
and all the functions traditionally reserved to the avoue
270and the notalre may be performed by the advocate. In
fact there are no avouds as such in Cameroon, for every 
barrister is also a solicitor.
C. The huissier de justice
A huissier or bailiff is a court officer whose 
main function is the service of legal papers. Service 
of process may be by post. But often, it is the huissier 
who personally effects service. He also levies attach­
ments and executions and may draw certain types of legal 
documents necessary for his activity. The executory 
formula of judgments in Cameroon directs the huissier
269. Pierre Sire, op.cit., p. 25^.
270. Bar Law, s. 1. Xirv Frcv^ ce 0U0 -tV\£, Wjpv\,
d; ^cvvj o(- V&u l
S<vr L cvm; C L c v v w c W \ ^  Fvcmac*_ -
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271to levy execution according to the tenor of the judgment.
In localities where there are no official auctioneers 
(commissaires priseurs), auction sales of personal pro­
perty may be conducted by huissiers. Sometimes too, the 
huissier de justice acts as business agent (agent d ’affaires), 
collecting debts and writing letters relating to a legal
272matter or a business transaction for private individuals.
D. The notaire
The notaire, like the avocat, is a key figure in
law administration. He is often a trained lawyer or
someone who has some legal knowledge. Completely removed
from the area of litigation, he performs numerous functions'
in law administration that far transcend the- duties of
271Anglo-American notaries. This is why the office of
271. The executory formula reads: ’’Wherefore, the President 
of the United Republic of Cameroon commands and enjoins 
all bailiffs and process-servers to enforce this judg­
ment, the Procureurs General and the State Counsels to 
lend them support, and all commanders and officers of 
the Armed Forces and Police Forces to lend them assis­
tance when so required”, s. 9, Ordinance No. 72/^ 4.
272. The occupation of agent d ’affaires is still governed 
by an arr§td of 7th July 1955. The Minister of Jus­
tice grants, and where necessary, withdraws authori­
sation to engage in that occupation. He would with­
draw it for example, where a person engaged in that 
occupation is convicted of embezzlement of public funds 
and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment: Akono Assam 
Ella Jean Lebon c. Republique Unie du Cameroun, C.S.C., 
Jugement No. WJk du 8 nov. 1973•
273. See, The Notaries Public Ordinance, Cap. l6l of the 
19*48 Laws of Nigeria. This statute is still in force 
in the Anglophone Provinces of Cameroon.
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notary in the Anglophone Provinces of Cameroon is not the 
same as that of notaire in the Francophone Provinces of
274the country. Promises of a unified notarial profession
have not yet been translated into practice.
Notaires were originally officers of the court.
Their modern functions may be traced to their ancient duty
of drawing up agreements acknowledged (like the English
’recognizance') before a magistrate. The notaire is
often the confidential adviser of families and of business
enterprises. He is empowered by law to impart the quality
275of ’acte authentique' to certain writings which must be 
executed before and by a public officer. The legal sig­
nificance of his office stems partly from the much stronger
P 7
force (force probante) which notarial acts have compared
277with private documents (les actes sous seign prive).
274. "Doumba spells out national role of justice” (press 
conference by the Minister of Justice), Cameroon 
Tribune, No. 112, 18th August 1976, p. 2.
275. Art. 1317 of the French civil code defines ’acte 
authentique’ as ’’one which has been drawn up by public 
officers authorized by law to draw up documents at 
the place where the act was transcribed, and with
the requisite formalities” .
276. The ’acte notarie’ is a species of a category which 
includes a wide variety of other acts such as writs, 
court records, registers of birth, death and mar­
riages, the proces verbaux of police officers, etc. 
’Actes notaries’ are documents drawn up by notaires 
at the request of a private person.
277. See, art. 1319 and 1324 of the French code civil.
See generally, M.S. Amos and F.P. Walton, Introduction 
to French Law, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1935, 
pp. 19-21; Freund, Levy & Rudden, A sourcebook on 
French law, 1973, p. 263; David & de Vries, op.cit., 
p. 23.
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Instruments that must be prepared by a notaire include
ante-nuptial agreements, notarial wills, mortgages,
gifts inter vivos and contracts of sale of real estate.
The notaire may be retained for the administration of
property in deceaseds' estates and in the organisation 
? v
of companies. Since the passing of the Bar Law how­
ever, the notaire no longer enjoys a monopoly in the 
exercise of these functions.
By making it obligatory for certain types of 
instruments to be drawn by the notaire or avocat the law 
ensures that documents that are important or the subject 
of complex legal rules governing their form and substance 
are drawn by a competent person. In addition the use 
of the notaire prevents fraud and claims of fraud. Before 
preparing any instrument the notaire is under a strict
obligation to ascertain the correct identity of the parties
279and to make sure that they have legal capacity to act. 
Furthermore, notaires do not give the original instrument 
prepared by them (minute) to the parties; the original 
is kept permanently in the notaire’s office and thus
278. The French language edition of Cameroon Tribune fre­
quently devotes a whole page to 'annonces l^gales’ - 
legal notices by notaires dealing with the consti­
tution or dissolution of companies.
279. Decree No. 60/172 of 20 September i960. A notarial 
act commonly takes the form of a declaration, which 
is recorded as having been ’received' by the offici­
ating notary: "Par devant maitre ... notaire ..., a
comapru M. ... et M. ... demeurant a ....  etc. etc.”
protected against alterations by the parties. Only certi­
fied copies (expeditions) of notarial documents may be 
issued to interested parties. Since the notaire is a 
quasi public officer, a notarial document offers the addi­
tional advantage of having ’authentic’ force. Subject 
to the possibility of attacking the accuracy of the docu­
ment in a special proceeding known as 'inscription de .
280faux’, any statement made in the notarial document by 
the notary as to the matters he has performed or seen per­
formed and as to the date on which the document was exe-
pOi
cuted has conclusive force. If a document purports
to have been signed before a notary, and the signature is
282denied, he who denies it has the burden of proof.
When the notaire apposes the executory formula 
on a copy of a notarial document, the document becomes 
what is known in the literature as a grosse and execution 
may be levied without court proceedings. In view of 
the probative and executory force attaching to notarial 
acts, and of the fact that notaires are not only specia­
lists in conveyancing but occupy a place corresponding to
280. It has for example been held that ”la minute de la 
decision qui est un acte authentique fait fois 
jusqu'S. inscription de faux": Ndjee Leonard c.
Ministere Public & Etamane Emmanuel, C.S.C., arret 
no. 19 du 20 dec. 1973, Bull., No. 29, 1973, p. 4089.
281. Peter Herzog, Civil procedure in France, Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1967, p. 103.
282. The opposite is true of a document sous seing prive.
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that of 'family solicitor’, many documents are in practice 
made in authentic form which, so far as the law is con­
cerned, need not be so.
The profession of notaire in Cameroon is governed 
by Decree No. 60/172 of 20th September I960. Before I960 
the functions of notary were performed by an official 
known as greffier-notaire who was and is still governed 
by article 5 of the Decree of 24th September 1938 portant 
statut des greffiers. A notaire is defined in the I960 
decree as an officier ministeriel who receives or draws up
pOo
instruments to guarantee their authenticity. Limited
by a numerus clausus and authorised to practise only in
certain defined localities, notaires are appointed by the 
284Head of State.
283. "Notaires are public functionaries instituted for the 
purpose of making all acts and contracts which the 
parties are required by law, or desire, to invest 
with the character of authenticity attaching to the 
acts of a public authority, of establishing the date 
thereof, of having the custody of the originals, and 
of furnishing copies both common and executory."
This has been lifted straight from the French law of 
25 ventose, An XI (i.e. the 16th of March 1803).
284. Decree No. 73/767 of 18 December 1973 makes provision 
for the establishment of 44 additional offices of 
notaries in the Francophone part of Cameroon. Their 
territorial distribution is as follows: Douala 7, 
Yaounde 6, Garoua 4, Nkongsamba 3, Bafoussam 3,
Bertoua 3, Edea 2, Maroua 2, Sangmelima 2, Ngaoundere 
2, Mbalmayo 2, Abong-Mbang 1, Bafang 1, Eseka 1,
Kribi 1, Ebolowa 1, Bafia 1, Monatele 1, and Foumban 1. 
This large number of notaires compensates for the 
small number of practising barristers in the country.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
In most countries, unlike in Britain, one finds 
a ministry of justice. The policy of having such a 
ministry is certainly desirable and stems from the need 
to prevent the haphazard administration of justice and to 
ensure that government policy in this area is properly 
carried out. A ministry of justice fulfils a crucial 
role: centralises, directs, coordinates and supervises
government policy with regards to the administration of 
justice, drafts various pieces of government legislation, 
oversees and administers the various personnel of the 
law. In Cameroon, the creation of a ministry of justice 
is a post-independent development. In neither the 
British Cameroons nor the French Cameroun was there fa 
ministry of justice'. The supervision and control of 
judicial matters was ensured in the French Cameroun by 
le service des affaires judiciaires headed by the Procureur 
de la Republique (later, Procureur General) who was 
answerable to the Commissaire de la Republique (later,
Haut Commissaire). Prosecutions were conducted by the 
Procureur (or more often by the president charge de 1'action 
publique) in the name of the minist^re public. On attain­
ment of independence on 1st January I960, the French Cameroun 
became known as the Republic of Cameroon. A ministry of
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justice was created to control and supervise all judicial 
matters in the new republic.
In the Southern Cameroons judicial matters came 
under the supervision of the Chief Justice, who was ulti­
mately answerable to the Governor-General in Lagos. The 
Legal Department was headed by the Attorney-General and 
prosecutions were conducted mainly by the Police either in 
the name of the Crown or the Commissioner of Police.
The Attorney-General also sat in .the Executive Council, 
gave legal advice to the Government and drafted Government 
bills. The unification of the Southern Cameroons and 
the Cameroon Republic on 1st October 1961 and the creation 
of the Federal Ministry of Justice by Decree No. 60/DF/13 
of 1961 did not immediately lead to the abolition of the 
post, of Attorney-General.
Under the 1961 Constitution, Justice was a Federal 
concern. The West Cameroon Attorney-General was placed 
under the Federal Ministry of Justice and was paid from 
Federal Funds. He was both Attorney-General for West 
Cameroon and a federal legal officer. In other words he 
had a dual capacity; legal adviser to the Government of 
West Cameroon and a federal legal officer responsible to 
the Ministry of Justice.
With regards to his functions vis-&-vis the 
federated State of West Caermoon the Attorney-General’s 
powers were not catalogued anywhere. However, articles 7 
and 3^(3) of the West Cameroon Constitution1 provided that
1. Law No. 61/LW of 26th October 1961.
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the Attorney-General could attend meetings of the House 
of Assembly and the Executive Council and address either 
of them as though he were a member thereof but that he 
was not entitled to vote. Under article 24(5) he was 
responsible for ’legal matters’ including the ’initiation, 
conduct and discontinuance of civil and criminal proce­
dures’. Section 11 of the Prisons Ordinance made him a 
Prisons Visitor. By and large however, the state 
functions of the Attorney-General rested on practice and 
convention. He was head of the Legal Department which 
advised all Government Departments on legal matters and 
was responsible for the drafting of all state legislation.
He chaired the Customary Courts Commission.
The Attorney-General’s federal - functions were set 
out in Ordinance No. 61/OF/9 of 16 October 1961 and related 
mainly to criminal matters. He was empowered to institute 
criminal proceedings, to take over and continue such pro­
ceedings instituted by any other person and to discontinue 
the same. Specific provision was*made for these powers 
to be exercisable solely by the Attorney-General. _ In 
the exercise of his powers he was not supposed to be subject 
to the direction or control of any other person or 
authority. The Attorney-General was also the Advocate- 
General at the Federal Court of Justice and a member of 
the Criminal Law Reform Commission. But under Law No. 
66/LF/3 of 10 June 1966, all functions of any kind belon­
ging to the Attorney-General and to the Assistant Attorney-
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General under any law passed before the 1966 law were
transferred to the Procurator General at the Supreme Court
of West Cameroon, save only those functions performed in
his capacity as officer of the West Cameroon Government.
The post of Procurator General at the Supreme Court of
West Cameroon was one created by the above 1966 law. The
Attorney-General was left with only those functions he
performed as an officer of the federated State of West
Cameroon. His status however did not change. The 1966
law made it clear that he was a federal officer delegated
to the Government of West Cameroon. In 1967 however, the
title ’Attorney-General' was changed to that of ’Legal
Adviser’ to the West Cameroon Government, and ’Procurator-
2
General' became Procureur General’. Both the Legal 
Adviser to the West Cameroon Government and the Procureur 
General at the Supreme Court of West Cameroon continued to 
be federal officers under the Federal Ministry of Justice.
With the institution of a unitary system of 
Government in the country in June 1972, the Federal 
Ministry of Justice became simply the Ministry of Justice.
2. Law No. 67/LF/3 of 12 June 1967. This Law provided that 
the Procureur-General (he was termed in English as 
'Director of Legal Proceedings') of the West Cameroon 
Supreme Court may appeal either on a point of law, or 
on a question of fact or on a question of mixed law and 
fact, against all decisions in any criminal matter 
either on first instance or on appeal, except decisions 
by military courts, within 30 days. The first holder 
of this post of Procureur General was an expatriate legal 
officer, Mr J.A.'O. Quinn who had been appointed Assis­
tant Attorney-General in 1964 and then Procurator-General
in 1966.
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It is headed by a Government Minister appointed by decree 
of the President of the Republic. The full title of the 
incumbent is ’Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals'. 
Often,, though, he is referred to in French as simple 
le Garde des Sceaux.
This chapter describes the organisation (Section 
I) and functions (Section II) of the Cameroonian Ministry 
of Justice.
I . Organisation of the Ministry of Justice
The organisation of the Ministry of Justice com­
prises two sets of services, the external services and 
the central services.
1. The external services
The external services of the Ministry of Justice 
consist of the courts. Section 1 of the Judicial Organi­
sation Ordinance 1972 provides that justice shall be
3. The Minister of Justice is styled 'Keeper of the Seals' 
because it is the Ministry of Justice which keeps and 
apposes the State Seal. Although persons who have read 
law have been appointed Minister of Justice (Messrs 
Victor Kanga, Emmanuel Tabi Egbe, and Simon Achidi Achu), 
a Minister of Justice need in fact not be someone who 
has read law (e.g. Messrs Sanda Oumarou, Felix Sabal 
Lecco and Joseph Charles Doumba). In fact, however 
technical may be the work of a Ministry, the Minister who 
heads it is usually appointed not because of expert 
knowledge; rather, political considerations and a 
person’s general capacity weigh heavily in making such 
appointments.
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administered by the following courts: Courts of First
Instance, High Courts, Military Courts, Courts of Appeal, 
and the Supreme Court. Situated at the apex of the 
courts system is the Supreme Court, which sits at the 
Palais de Justice, significantly located next door to the 
Palais Presidentiel in Yaounde. Below the Supreme Court 
are seven Courts of Appeal, one for each of the seven 
Provinces of the country. The Court of Appeal for each 
Province sits at the headquarters of that Province. 
Immediately below the Courts of Appeal are the High Courts, 
one of which is supposed to be at the chief town of each 
Division. It has - in fact not been possible, due to short­
age of judicial personnel, to set up a High Court in each 
of the 39 Divisions of the country. Judges do go on tours 
to Divisions without permanent High Courts and hold High 
Court sessions there. At the bottom of the ladder of the 
courts organisation are the Courts of First Instance (that 
is, Magistrates’ Courts) situated at Sub-Divisional level.
All these courts fall under the Ministry of Justice 
and are treated as ’external services’ of the Ministry.
4. The conscious omission of Customary Courts from the main­
stream of the courts system has led to legitimate specu­
lations that these courts, although given a certain lease 
of life by s . 26 of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance, 
would eventually be abolished. Another peculiar fea­
ture of the Customary Courts is that whereas those in 
the French-speaking part of the country come under the 
Ministry of Justice, those in the English-speaking part 
come under the Ministry of Territorial Administration - 
a continuation of the old situation in former West 
Cameroon whereby customary courts came under the Ministry 
of Local Government. See, infra, chapter 12.
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2. The central services
The central services of the Ministry of Justice 
are governed by Decree No. 78/188 of 2nd June 1978 (re­
organisation of the Ministry of Justice). They comprise: 
two technical advisers, a private secretariat headed by a 
chief of service, a mails office (all these three come 
directly under the Minister of Justice personally), and 
a central administration. The central administration is 
made up of: the General Secretariat, the Department of
General Administration, the Department of Judicial Affairs 
and the Seal, the Department of Legislation, and the 
Department of Control of Judicial Services.
At the head of the General Secretariat, under 
which are the Office of the Secretariat General and the 
Translation Office, is the Secretary General. He is 
the man next to the Minister and his principal collaborator. 
The Department of General Administration is headed by a 
Director who is assisted by a Deputy Director. The 
Department consists of three services(the Service of Judi­
cial and Legal Officer Personnel, the Service of Non-Judi- 
cial and Non-Legal Officer Personnel, and the Service of 
Budget and Accounting) each of which is headed by a Chief 
of Service. The Service of Non-Judicial and Non-Legal 
Officer Personnel is divided into four bureaux, each of 
which is headed by a Chief of Bureau: the Bureau for
Established S t a f f t h e  Bureau for Non-Established Staff,
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the Card-Index Bureau, and the Coordination Bureau.
The Service of Budget and Accounting on the other hand 
is divided into six bureaux, each headed also by a Chief 
of Bureau: the Budget Bureau,the Accounting Bureau, the-
Financial Management Bureau, the Maintenance of Property 
Bureau, the General Affairs Bureau, and the Bureau of 
Impression and Binding.
A Director, assisted by a Deputy, heads the 
Department of Judicial Affairs and the Seal which consists 
of four services (the Service of Civil Affairs and the 
Seal, the Service of Criminal Prosecutions, the Service of 
Penalty Enforcement, and the Service of Administrative 
Litigation) and three bureaux (the Card-Index Bureau, the 
Criminal and Civil Archives Bureau, and the Administrative 
Litigation and Archives Bureau). The Department of Legis­
lation is made up of the Studies Service (consisting of a 
Library Bureau and a Studies Bureau), the Legislation and 
Codification Service (split into two bureaux: the Legis­
lation Bureau and the Codification Bureau), and the 
Nationality Service (also divided into two bureaux: the
Acquisition and Loss of Nationality Bureau and the 
Nationality Litigation Bureau).
Finally, there is the Department of Control of 
Judicial Services which is made up of three services, 
namely, the Judicial Control Service (divided into a Statu­
tory Law Bureau and a Traditional Law Bureau), the Judicial 
Professions Service (which has two bureaux: the Lawyers
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Bureau and the Ministerial Officers Bureau), and the Judi­
cial Statistics Service (comprising two bureaux, one in 
charge of statistics from customary courts and the other in 
charge of statistics from non-customary courts). A 
’department' is headed by a director, a 'service’ by a 
chief of service, and a 'bureau’ by a chief of bureau. 
Directors and chiefs of services have deputies. The 
designation of each department, service or bureau is self- 
explanatory as to the type of matters it is concerned with.
II. Functions of the Ministry of Justice
Staffed with a team of technocrats who- are mostly 
lawyers, the Ministry of Justice is a highly technical 
ministry vested with specific functions. It recruits, 
manages, and disciplines judicial and legal officers.
All Magistrates, Judges and State Prosecutors serving in 
courts in Cameroon are recruited, deployed and disciplined 
(where it is entitled to do so) by the Ministry of Justice. 
The Ministry also oversees civil matters tried in the 
courts. This is so because sometimes, the State, through 
the legal department, has to intervene in certain categories 
of civil suits. In such cases, it is the Ministry which 
directs the legal department as to the line of pleading it 
should adopt.
Another function of the Ministry of Justice is 
to examine and, in appropriate cases, approve applications
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for change of names. This, In the eyes of anyone brought 
up under Anglo-American culture, may appear too petty a 
matter for a Ministry of Justice to occupy itself with.
This is understandable because in England and in America 
not great prominence is given, as in France, to the law 
relating to names. This difference in attitude towards 
names is reflected in Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon.
In former West Cameroon, it was sufficient for anyone who 
wanted to change his names to insert a notice in one or 
more of the local newspapers saying: "I, formerly known
as ABC, now wish to be known and addressed as XYZ. All 
documents bearing my former names remain valid.’1 This 
was in order and no other procedure was necessary. Not 
so in the former East Cameroun. There, all change of 
names had to be done through the court. Even today, there 
is still a difference in the order in which the Anglophone 
and the Francophone write their names. The Anglophone 
has been taught in school to write his names in this order: 
Christian name, middle name, surname. For example, Peter 
Ntutu Kolwezi, or simply, P.N. Kolwezi. But the Franco­
phone has been taught to write his names the other way round. 
For example, Peter Ntutu Kolwezi will be written, Kolwezi 
Peter Ntutu or Kolwezi Ntutu Peter. All this has caused 
and continues to cause confusion particularly when it comes 
to writing out cheques, postal orders, certificates and so 
on. No legislation has been passed dealing with the order 
in which people should write their names.
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But over a decade ago, Law No. 68/LF/3 of l4th 
June 1968 was passed dealing with the use of names, fore­
names and assumed names. Prenoms are the so-called 
Christian names or first nam^j and nom patronymique (often 
confusingly written simply as ’nom’) refers to a person’s 
family name (what the English call ’surname’) which in 
the ordinary case is that of his father. Furthermore, 
anyone wishing to change his names must seek the approval 
of the Minister of Justice. The Minister must make public 
any application for change of name. This is often done 
by inserting a notice of the proposed change of name in 
the local newspapers or by putting up such notice in front 
of the local town hall or court. Anyone with valid 
objections to the proposed change of names has six months 
within which to make them known to the Minister. The 
authorization to change names is given by decree of the 
President of the Republic.
It is also the function of the Ministry of Justice 
to control, direct and supervise the activities of the 
legal department and to monitor all sentences passed by 
the criminal courts. It examines applications for the 
remission of penalties, ensures the carrying out of measures 
of clemency, oversees procedures for rehabilitation, moni­
tors matters pending before the Supreme Court, studies and 
prepares draft laws and subsidiary legislation submitted 
to it, compiles and keeps official enactments, disciplines 
advocates and other auxiliaries of justice, and examines all 
matters relating to the grant, acquisition, loss and for­
feiture of Cameroonian nationality.
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PART FOUR
THE ADMINISTRATION OF NON-REPRESSIVE JUSTICE
So far law reform in Cameroon has concentrated 
more on the criminal law area. In the civil law area, 
laws introduced by Britain and Prance during the colonial 
period are, for the most part, still in force. The 
received French Code Civil and Code de Procedure Civile 
et Commerciale are still applicable in the French-speaking 
part of the country. In the English-speaking part, civil 
matters (except those subject to customary law) are still 
governed by the common law of England, pre-1900 English 
statutes of general application (as well as the law ’for 
the time being’ in force in England with regards to divorce 
and matrimonial causes), and a number of English-derived 
statutes from Nigeria. However, there are two subjects 
in the civil law area which are now governed entirely by 
locally enacted statutes, although those statutes have 
invariably had to borrow from English and/or French laws. 
The subjects in question are Labour Law and the Law on 
Administrative Litigation, that is, le Contentieux 
Administratif. This part of the thesis deals with these 
two subjects and also with Customary Law.
6 l k .
CHAPTER TWELVE
CUSTOMARY LAW
Customary law in Cameroon, as in most African 
countries south of the Sahara, is made up of two compo­
nents: indigenous or traditional law (native to Cameroon)
and localised extraneous systems of law and juristic ideas 
(partly Islamic and partly English or French derived).
In other words Cameroonian customary law consists of an 
amalgam of a law that is autochthonous and one that is alien 
in origin.1 This has come about because although tradi­
tional law continued to evolve under the influence of 
traditional factors, it has also been influenced in a 
decisive way by Muslim invaders and European colonisation. 
European legal systems were superimposed on the pre-existing 
law and legal institutions of the people. As a result,
certain aspects of traditional law ceased, after a time, to
1. However, the terms ’customary law’, ’native law’,
’traditional law’, ’native law and custom’ tend to be 
used interchangeably. This is probably a reflection of 
the failure to find a single suitable label denuded of 
any trappings of European ethnocentric prejudices which 
these terms had acquired in the colonial days. This 
semantic problem had been collectively faced by scholars 
on African Law at the London Conference on ’The future 
of law in Africa’ held from 28 December 1959 to 8 January 
I960. No consensus was reached on a satisfactory ter­
minology although the Conference itself used the expres­
sions ’native law’ and ’customary law’ interchangeably 
throughout the remainder of its proceedings. See,
A.N. Allott (ed.), The future of law in Africa- record 
of proceedings of the London conference, Butterworth, 
London, 1960T
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be indigenous. The pressure on traditional law did not 
end with the departure of the colonial powers. Economic 
and social factors as well as national enactments in the 
name of modernisation have continued to make serious 
inroads into various aspects of autochthonous law.
Traditional law judicial process has been affected. The 
received law has come to stay as the ordinary law, claiming 
superiority over traditional law. This chapter therefore 
inquires into the fate of traditional law in Cameroon (I), 
examines the procedure followed in present-day ’customary 
courts' with a view to ascertain the extent of deviation 
from the procedure followed in native courts in pre-colonial 
days (II), and discussed how problems of internal conflicts 
of laws are resolved (III).
I . The Fate of Traditional Law
At first, colonial policy towards indigenous law 
was not rigidly established. Each colonising power came 
along with his own system of law. But the imported law 
applied only to Europeans and 'Europeanised' Cameroonians, 
while the indigenous populations were allowed to continue 
with their own system of law and legal institutions.
However, as each colonial government consolidated its 
tenuous hold over the territory and contacts with traditional 
authorities increased, the hitherto laissez-faire policy
towards traditional law was abandoned and 'civilising1
restrictions were imposed on it. A traditional-law rule
became enforeceable by the courts only if it has passed
a certain test. Such were the restrictions that by the
end of the colonial period indigenous law and judicial
institutions had been decisively affected. This process
2
of 'acculturation judiciaire' marked the beginning of the 
erosion of traditional law. This erosion was made the 
more easy by the projection of the imported law as a 
superior legal system to traditional law. Nor did the 
erosion stop with the attainment of political independence. 
It has continued, and at-times the process is pursued with 
even greater vigour. The government is clearly moving 
in the direction of abolishing customary law. This it 
hopes to achieve after integrating aspects of customary 
law into the received law.
1. Judicial acculturation
The extent of this judicial acculturation varied, 
depending on the articulation of the colonial policy pur­
sued (indirect rule by the British and assimilation mixed 
with variants of indirect rule by the French). Its nature 
was however the same. In both the British and the French
2. E. Le Roy, 'Justice africaine et oralite juridique', 
I.F.A.N., Tome 36, No. 3, juillet 197^, p. 562.
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Cameroon^ indigenous courts were (and still are) con­
trolled and supervised by the government, traditional law 
was (and continues to be) cut down by legislative and judi­
cial processes, and Islamic law was (and is still) treated 
as merely a variant of indigenous law.
A . Control over indigenous courts
When the colonial power just arrived it did not 
immediately proceed to exercise control over traditional 
courts. Rather, these courts were at first used as 
instruments through which the colonial government reached 
the local people. Gradually however, the colonial govern­
ment began to exert influence and exercise control over 
them. This was done through district officers who were 
given wide powers of inspection, supervision and transfer 
of cases before their courts. The composition of tradi­
tional courts was altered as the colonial government arro­
gated to itself the right to designate and dismiss those 
who were to preside over them. No longer was a tradi­
tional court constituted, as of right, by the quarter head 
or the village chief and his council of elders. In the 
French Cameroun, local French administrators presided over 
some traditional courts and were assisted by two appointed 
natives acting as ’assesseurs avec voix deliberative'.
Final appeals for native cases lay to the chambre speciale 
d Thomologation, a division of the Appeal Court presided
over by a French judicial officer. In the British
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Cameroons the district officer was introduced into the indi­
genous legal system as an appellate body with the powers of 
revision. Ultimate appeals lay to the High Commissioner.
Another aspect of control over traditional courts 
was the fact that instruments were made setting- up the so- 
called ’native courts’ (subsequently re-named ’customary 
courts’) or ’tribunaux indigenes’. These statutory native 
courts were in principle and practice different from 
courts in pre-colonial days and their number and location 
were set forth in the instrument (’warrant’ in the British 
Cameroons, and ’arr£te * in the French Cameroun) establishing 
them. These courts were often located at district level 
(whereas in the pre-colonial days each village had its own 
traditional court) and their composition was altered, often 
changing the persons traditionally qualified to sit as 
judges. The High Commissioner established such customary 
courts as he considered necessary and appointed thereto such 
persons as he thought fit; he also dismissed therefrom 
such persons as he thought unfit. In the British Cameroons 
five judges were usually appointed to a customary court, 
three forming a quorum. In the French Cameroun the rule 
was to have a Frenchman sitting with two native assessors. 
The courts were also graded: ’A ’, ’B ’ and ’C ’ in the
British Cameroons and ’Premier degre’ and ’second degre’ in 
the French Cameroun. Subsequent legislation introduced 
the application of specific rules of procedure and evidence, 
for the most part alien to indigenous law procedures.
619.
Since these courts were also a major source of government 
income, administrative and financial controls were also 
introduced. For all the innovation that was introduced 
however, these statutory native courts were never integ­
rated into the mainstream of the judicial structure.
They operated as a parallel system of courts with their 
own appeal hierarchy.
The control and supervision of customary courts 
have continued to this day. Customary courts established 
in the English-speaking part of Cameroon during the 
colonial days continue to function and are governed by 
the Customary Courts Ordinance, Cap. 142 of the 1948 
edition of the laws. In the French-speaking part of the 
country the judicial organisation decrees of 17 and 18 
December 1959 maintained the Ttribunaux indigenes’ set up 
by decrees of 31 July 1927 and 26 July 1944.^ District 
administrators still preside and exercise control over 
these courts. In fact customary courts in the English- 
speaking part of Cameroon still come under the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and not under the Ministry of 
Justice like other courts. In the French-speaking part 
the government’s policy of having only professional judges 
to man the courts has been extended to customary courts. 
The tribunaux de premier degre are now presided over by
3. Decrees No. 69/DF/544 of 19 December 1969 and No. 71/DF/ 
607 of 3 December 1971 did no more than change the labels 
of some of these courts.
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professional magistrates. Each magistrate sits with two 
appointed assessors.
Today’s customary courts are nothing but a pale 
shadow of the indigenous courts of pre-colonial times both 
in structure and in the manner in- which they operate.
They derive their authority not from indigenous law and 
custom as they previously did, but from the imported law 
•for, although they still purport to be applying native law 
in the matters they handle, the rules of procedure and 
evidence they follow and the judgments they hand down bear 
all the stamp and hallmarks of the imported law. In 
fact the eventual abolition of these courts has already been 
foreshadowed. Section 1 of the Judicial Organisation 
Ordinance (No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972) as amended by 
Ordinance No. 72/21 of 19 October 1972 provides that jus­
tice shall be administered in Cameroon by the following 
sets of courts: Courts of First Instance (i.e. Magistrates’
Courts), High Courts, Military Courts, Courts of Appeal, 
and the Supreme Court. Customary courts are not Included 
in the list and have just been maintained 'for the time 
being’. It is however very unlikely that these courts 
will be abolished in the immediate future. They still 
perform a vital function to persons in the rural areas 
and far removed from the ’modern’ courts. Besides, the 
abolition of customary courts would mean that more Courts 
of First Instance would have to be set up if the existing 
ones (already overworked) are not to be brought to a
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standstill with a heavy load of cases. More courts means 
more judges, not easily available particularly as Cameroon 
insists on a completely professionalised magistracy. The 
existing courts are even severely under-staffed with 
judicial and legal officers. For all these reasons there­
fore, it may well be that customary courts still have a 
long lease of life ahead.
B. Legislative and judicial pruning of indigenous law
The basic law applicable in the colonial native 
courts was the indigenous law. But this law was subject 
to restrictions both in its content and application. Some 
limitation was initially placed on the criminal juris­
diction of native courts and the nature of the punishment 
which they could impose. Cases of treason, sedition, 
homicide, corruption, child stealing, trial by ordeal, 
slave dealing, rape, and forgery were removed from the
jurisdiction of native courts which were then allowed to
4
deal with only minor criminal matters. Later however, 
even this limited criminal jurisdiction was taken away.
In the French-speaking provinces the criminal jurisdiction 
of native courts was suppressed in 1946. In the English- 
speaking provinces however, customary courts continued to
4. Customary Courts Ordinance, 1948; decret du 31 juillet 
1927.
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exercise jurisdiction in petty criminal matters until 1977 
although their attention was drawn in 1973 to the Judicial 
Organisation Ordinance of 1972, section 26 of which ousted 
the criminal jurisdiction exercised by customary courts in
5
the English-speaking provinces.
Indigenous law applied (and still applies) only 
to causes and matters concerning natives. Besides, rules 
of native law were modified whenever deemed necessary.
In the French Cameroun native law rules were pruned in 
the process of ’codifications speciales’. In the British 
Cameroons native authorities were empowered to make rules 
declaring or embodying indigenous law and to modify them 
or adopt any enactment as part of customary law. The 
jurisdiction of customary courts was (and still is) limited 
to matters of personal status (marriage, succession, divorce, 
adoption) and land held by customary communities. The 
decree of 31 July 1927 gave customary courts in the French- 
speaking provinces jurisdiction in ’civil and commercial 
matters’. This was an ambitious provision. It is not 
in all civil matters that customary courts exercise juris­
diction. This, is particularly true of commercial matters,
5. See Letter No. LB.346/vol.1/69 of 3rd February 1973 from 
Mr Nyo Wakai, then Procureur General at the Appeal Court 
for the South-West Province, to the Senior Divisional 
Officers at Victoria, Kumba, Mamfe, and Mundemba.
For judicial authority to the effect that customary 
courts in the English-speaking provinces never had, 
since 1st October 1961, any criminal jurisdiction, see 
the judgment of Inglis, J. in the Bamenda High Court 
- case of Godfred Fogum v. Mankon Customary Court, Suit 
No. HC/82.M/72, unreported.
6. S. 14, Customary Courts Ordinance, 1948; Abomo Ondoua
c. Belinga, C.S.C.O., 21 mars 1972, Penant, 1972, p. 398. -
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an area in which customary courts have hardly ever exer-
7
cised jurisdiction.
Indigenous law was (and is) administered only 
insofar as it has passed the 'repugnancy1 or 'civilisation' 
test. Only rules of native law which were not 'repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor incom-
3
patible with any legislation for the time being in force' 
could be enforced by the courts. The equivalent of this 
'repugnancy clause' in French-speaking Cameroon was (and 
still is) that a traditional law rule must not be 'con­
trary to public order, good morality, or incompatible with 
written law'. Any rule, of indigenous law which was incom­
patible with notions of French civilisation, against 
'l'ordre public ou bonnes moeurs', -or 'manifestement
contraire aux conceptes et principes modernes' was struck 
g
down. Moreover, in case where no.indigenous law rule
7. For a notable exception, see the case decided by the 
then East Cameroun Supreme Court on 26 March 1968,
Penant, No. 729, 1970 (with a note by Lampue), in which 
a Bamileke custom was successfully prayed in aid to 
rescind a contract of sale.
8. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, s. 27.
9. C.S.C.O., Arr£t No. 103/L du 25 mar# 1969, et No. 135/L 
du 10 juin 1969; M. Nguini, 'Droit moderne et droit 
traditionnel', Penant, 1973, p. 9; S. Melone, La parente 
et la terre dans la strategle du developpement,
Klincksieck, Paris, 1972, p. 75; S. Melone, 'Le code
civil contre la coutume: la fin d'une suprematie',
l.R.C.D. 12 (1972).
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was applicable to any matter in controversy the courts 
had to fill the gap simply by referring to the written law 
(i.e., the Code Civil or some local legislation) or ’les 
principes generaux du droit1.10 In English-speaking 
Cameroon the court had to fill the gap by drawing on the 
’principles of justice, equity and good conscience’.
The ’repugnancy clause’ proved (and still proves) to be 
a powerful instrument in the hands of administrators and 
judges'who used (and still use) it to strike down any 
rule of traditional law of which they disapproved, espe­
cially if it differed from their own ideas of justice,
morality and civilisation.11 Courts reject any rule of
12native law deemed by them to be pernicious.
Ironically, Cameroonian parliamentarians and 
judges are less tolerant towards traditional institutions, 
customs and laws than colonial administrators and judicial 
officers. The ease with which they limit or proscribe, 
by legislative or judicial process, traditional institu­
tions and rules of traditional law considered backward and 
obstacles to modernisation .and national development, is
10. Circulaire du Garde des Sceaux en date du 22 septembre 
1961; C.S.C.O., Arrets No. 14 du 14 janv. 1965*
Bull., 1965, p. 212, and No. 129 du 23 mai 1967, Bull., 
19673 p. 1695; C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 37/L du 15 fevr.
1973, 6 R.C.D. 172 (197^) .
11. A.N. Allott, Essays in African Law, Butterworths, London, 
i960, p. 198; A.N. Allott, New Essays in African Law, 
Butterworths, London, 1970, pp. 162 et seq.
12. C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 130/L du 25 mars 1969, unreported.
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amazing. Thus for example, today’s chiefs, already a
pale shadow of the chiefs of old, are no longer chosen
and anointed by their own people but appointed by the
government. A law to this effect was passed in 1977.
It is illegal to form any association or organisation with
11a tribal of sectarian leaning. Such associations are
forbidden on the ground that they may be used to undermine
national unity. Certain traditional institutions, such
14as for example the N g i n  Secret Society of Oku, have
been proscribed and the practice of ’witchcraft’ made a
15criminal offence. Serious inroads have been made into
such traditional institutions as polygyny, marriage con­
sideration or bride price, and the native law on adoption,
16custody and affiliation. The Civil Status Registration
Law of 11 June 1968 has been judicially construed as
requiring all marriages in Cameroon to be celebrated by a
17civil status registrar to be valid.
13. Law No. 67/LF/19 of 12 June 1967.
14. Prefectorial Order No. 3/1972 proscribing the Ngiri 
Secret Society of Oku; Fai Ndichangong & 3 Others v.
The People, Bamenda Court of Appeal, No. BCA/12c/73 •
15. Penal Code, s. 251; cf. West Cameroon Legal Notice 
No. 8 of 1961 banning witchcraft.
16. Law- No. 66/COR/2 of 7 July 1966 on marriages in Franco­
phone Cameroon; Law No. 68/LF/2 of 11 June 1968 on 
civil status registration. For an enlightened de­
cision on adoption, see, Minist^re Public c. Nouck Andre, 
C.S.C., Arret No. 17/L du 20 dec. 1973, 7 R.C.D. 66 
(1975). In this case it was held, reversing an 
earlier decision of the Douala Appeal Court, that the 
respondent was entitled to adopt the illegitimate chil­
dren of a female relative of his.
17. C.S.C., Arr§t No. 3 V L  du 15 fevr. 1973, 6.R/C.D. 175 
(1974) .
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In a great deal of matters, courts have virtually
dictated the direction in which traditional law is to move,
particularly in matters of marriage, divorce, bride price,
widowhood, succession, and custody. One commentator
adequately summed up the attitude of the courts when he
18spoke of a process of Civilisation by assimilation’.
Under traditional law it is the nearest male relative of
the deceased, and not the deceased’s widow, who has rights
of custody over the deceased’s infant children and of
administration of the deceased’s estate. This rule of
traditional law has been declared repugnant by the courts
on the ground that it is based on a concept of female
IQinferiority. In Veuve Moukoko Mouelle p the defunct East
Cameroun Supreme Court held that this traditional law rule
was contrary to the principle of equality between the sexes
proclaimed in the preamble to the constitution and went on
to grant custody of the deceased’s infant children to the
20deceased’s widow. In Bollo c. Bollo the same court
advanced much the same reason in ruling in favour of equal
partition of matrimonial property following the dissolution
21of a customary law marriage.
18. M.Y. Nkouendjin, ’Le r6le de la jurisprudence dans les 
nouveaux etats d ’afrique francophone’, Penant, 1973, p.
19- C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 43/L du 16 janv. 1968.
20. C.S.C.O. Arr§t No. 86/CC du 15 mai 1971, 1 R.C.D. 64 
(1972).
21. See also, Dayas c. Dayas, C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 30/L du 
12 janv. 1971, 1 R.C.D. 64 (1972); Eding c. Eding, 
C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 138/L du 6 juin 19677 1 R.C.D. 69 
(1972); S. Melond, ’Le code civil contre la coutume ... 
op.cit.
11.
f 5
627.
In matters of paternity courts have consistently
held that affiliation is based on blood relation between
father and child and that payment or non-payment of bride
price does not, as is the position under traditional law,
22affect the affiliation of a child. In Ngeh v. Ngome 
the defendant and one Paulina Mekong were married under 
traditional law. They lived together for ten years without 
issue. Paulina then left the defendant and eventually went 
to live with the plaintiff (Ngeh) by whom she had twin sons. 
The defendant brought a suit in the Kumba Native Court 
against Paulina for a declaration that the twins were his. 
Under traditional law, if a woman deserts her husband, A, 
and goes to live with another man, B, by whom she has 
children then, until B has fully refunded the bride price 
paid by A on the woman, the children were deemed to be those 
of A who was therefore entitled to claim them. In the 
instant case the plaintiff had not refunded the defendant’s 
bride price. So the Kumba Native Court had no difficulty 
in granting the declaration sought by the defendant. On 
appeal to the Special Appeals Officer (that is, the local 
District Officer) the decision of the Native Court was 
upheld. On further appeal to the then West Cameroon High 
Court, it was held that the traditional law rule upheld 
by the Native Court and the Special Appeals Officer was
23repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
22. WC/22/63 and WC/23/65, (1962-1964) W.C.L.R.32.
23. For another decision along the same lines, see C.S.C., 
Arr§t No. 10/L du 7 dec. 1972, 6 R.C.D.173 (1974).
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C . Islamic law as part of indigenous law
Islamic (or Moslem or Muhammedan) law has, since 
the colonial period, been regarded and treated as part of 
traditional law. In reality however, Islamic law. is not 
native to Cameroon at all. It was introduced into the 
northern part of Cameroon via Northern Nigeria in the 
early nineteenth century shortly before German coloni­
sation. Intimately related to Islamic religion and 
politics, Islamic law is no less a product of colonisation 
(by conquest and otherwise) than English or French law in 
Cameroon. All of them are extraneous legal systems and 
have drastically affected, each in its own way, the 
socio-legal institutions of indigenous Cameroonian polities.
Although Islamic influence in Africa dates back to the
24 r,seventh century A.D. it was only in the early 1800s
that Islamic influence spilled over from Northern Nigeria 
into Northern Cameroon. At first Islamic influence pushed 
southwards across the Sahara Desert through trade which had 
been established with the peoples and polities in the 
Sudanic belt. But between the eleventh and the nineteenth 
century Muslim empires and emirates were established across 
West Africa (e.g. the empires of Songhai and Mali, the 
emirate of Sokoto) through politico-religious wars of con­
version known as jihads. It was through one of these
24. It was during this period that Arabs invaded Egypt and 
the north African Kingdoms hithero under Byzantium.
The conquered kingdoms and polities were annexed and 
administered as provinces of Damascus by Arabic governors 
who carried with them Islamic legal system and habits of 
legal thought and imposed them as the fundamental legal 
culture of the provinces.
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so-called holy wars that Islam was Introduced Into Northern 
Cameroon in the early l800s. In fact, about the same 
time as European traders were busy establishing trading 
posts along the West African coast, Muslim invaders were 
also busy pushing southwards from the Sudanic belt. By 
the time German penetration into the Cameroon hinterland 
reached the north Islamic influence was already strong in 
various areas there.
Sharia and cognate courts were already exercising 
general jurisdiction over all the indigenous inhabitants, 
even though these included large non-Muslim elements who 
steadfastly held to their native institutions and religious 
beliefs. "Given the Muslim principle of non-accommodation, 
the colonial administration had to re-work itself to accom­
modate Islamic institutions in its colonial legal and judi­
cial arrangements. This policy of accommodation varied in 
degree and extent depending upon, e.g., the presence or
absence of Muslim political and judicial authority within 
2 5the territory." As a result of muddled thinking among
colonial jurists and administrators, Islamic law was 
lumped together with indigenous law under the spurious 
umbrella of a so-called ’native law and custom’. In other 
words Islamic law was viewed and treated merely as a species 
of ’native law and custom'. It has even been claimed that
25. A.K. Mensah-Brown, Introduction to law in contemporary 
Africa, Conch, New York, 1976, p. 49.
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Islamic law is not really so different from ’native law
and custom’ for, the reasoning goes, the Sunna is partly
founded on old pre-Islamic customs, artificially attached
26to the conduct and teachings of the Prophet. It is
submitted that this Is an erroneous and misleading claim. 
Islamic law differs fundamentally from native law.
Islamic law is a body of rules which gives prac­
tical expression to the religious faith and aspiration of 
27the Muslim. The fundamental tenet of Islam is total
and unqualified submission to the will of Allah which is
defined by Islamic law in terms of a comprehensive code of
behaviour covering all aspects of life. Islamic law
derives from Muhammed’s mission and its base is the Qur’an
and the Sunna. Its object and limits are Islam, as both
the Faith and the community of the faithful. In theory
this law expresses God’s religio or binding ordinance
2 8but in practice its sources are heterogeneous.
There are four sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an,
29the Sunna, the Ijma’, and the Qiyas. The Qur’an is
the sacred book of Islam just as the Bible is the holy book
26. P.F. Gonidec, Les droits africains - evolution et 
sources, 2e edTj L.G,D.J., Paris, 1976, p . 57
27. Cf. Coulson, Noel James, A history of Islamic Law, 
University Press, Edinburgh, 1964.
28. Hilda & Leo Kuper (eds.), African law: adaptation and
development, University of California Press, Berkeley
& Los Angeles, 19655 p. 43.
29. Mensah-Brown, op.cit., p. 42 et seq.
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of Christianity. It is believed to be a collection of a 
series of revelations transmitted by Allah to Muslims 
through his messenger the Prophet Muhammed, founder of the 
first Muslim community in Medina in A.D.622. The Qur’an 
contains not only the basic formulation of the Islamic 
religious ethic but also many regulations of a more strictly 
legal tone although however, there is no attempt to deal 
with any one legal topic or relationship comprehensively. 
Nevertheless, the Qur’an contains a great number of moral 
precepts of a general nature (for example, just retribution, 
fairness in commercial dealings, and compassion for the 
weak) which are generally translated into any legal struc­
ture of rights and duties. Wine drinking and usury for
example, are simply declared to be forbidden and polygyny 
30is permitted; there is no indication as to their precise 
legal significance. In theory therefore legal procedure 
and the substance of legal rules are well-defined; but in 
practice they are somewhat ambiguous in various spheres. 
Ambiguities are resolved not by the qadis or judge inter­
preting the Qur’an (a thing he is not allowed to do) but 
by the qadis consulting Islamic legal experts for an 
authoritative interpretation.
The Sunna refers to the practices of the Prophet 
Muhammad during his lifetime, when he used to solve legal
30. A husband is allowed up to a maximum of four wives at 
any one time, provided he treats them impartially.
632.
problems by Interpreting the relevant Qur’anic reve­
lations. These practices are found in the hadith or 
traditions of what the Prophet had said and done on 
particular occasions. This tradition has been handed 
down through a continuous chain of intermediaries. In 
the event of a lacuna in the Qur’an, the judge must find 
the Sunna from the hadith, rather than speculate on 
Allah’s law. The ijma’ on the other hand is said to be 
the unanimous doctrine of qualified legal scholars in a 
given generation, which is accepted as infallible. The 
ij m a ’ is used to fill lacunae in the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
Qiyas is a deduction of solution from established rules by 
means of analogy. It is a supplementary source of law 
which is resorted to only where reference to the other 
three sources has failed to provide a solution.
There are four mutually orthodox schools of Islamic 
legal thought, each one named after the scholar upon whose 
teaching it is founded: the Hanafi after Abu Hanifa, the
Maliki after Malik, the Shafii after A1 Shaft*i, and the 
Hanbali after Ibn Hanbal. The literature classifies the 
followers of these schools as belonging to the sunni, 
meaning, orthodox Islam as distinguished from heretical 
sects such as the Shi’itf the Wahhabi, and the Abad! or 
Hariqite. The school of Islamic legal thought in Cameroon 
is the Maliki school and so Maliki law predominates.
Islamic law itself is administered through courts known as 
Shari’a or Alkali courts. As the concept of an independent
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judiciary was unknown in classical Islamic jurisprudence 
Muslim judges were simply delegates of the political ruler 
who alone wielded supreme executive and judicial power. 
Islam, it has often been said, is not only a religion; 
it is a political system.
Theoretically, Islamic law is immutable, for 
Islam recognises no authority as having the power to modify 
it. However, in practice, Shari’a courts do deviate from 
the strict doctrine of the Shari’a texts either in res­
ponse to changed socio-economic conditions, or where the 
strict doctrine is insupportable in practice. Moreover, 
over the years, there have been accretions to, modifications 
of, or derogations from Islamic law. Much of this develop­
ment has been in response to the needs of changed con­
ditions and have been accepted as such because the modifi­
cations that have been introduced by legislative process 
have not affected areas regulated in detail by Islam.
Since Islamic law is treated as simply a variant 
of indigenous law, its application is also limited. Such 
limitations that have been placed on the operation of indi­
genous law apply also to Islamic law. Thus for example, 
a rule of Islamic law is enforceable by the courts only if 
it has passed the repugnancy test and is not incompatible 
with any written law for the time being in force. Islamic 
courts have legally no criminal jurisdiction (in practice 
they still exercise jurisdiction in petty criminal matters) 
and their civil jurisdiction is limited to matters of
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personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, affiliation,
and inheritance) governed by Islamic law. In Anglophone
Cameroon, Alkali courts still operate in parts of the
North-West Province. In Francophone Cameroon no statutory
Islamic courts were established by the French. All cases
concerning Muslims, as those concerning other natives,
were tried in the tribunaux indigenes (which later became
tribunaux de premier degre, tribunaux de second degre, and
tribunaux coutumier). Nowadays, they are tried in the
tribunaux de premier degre presided over by a professional
magistrate and assisted by two assessors, one drawn from
the Muslim community (the Foulbe) and the other from the
31non-Muslim community (the Fall).
In practice however a large proportion of cases 
are dealt with not by the tribunal de premier degrd but by 
other agencies. Non-Muslim litigants may take their dis­
putes either to the non-Muslim assessor of the tribunal de 
premier degr<§ (if the issue involved is a minor one) or 
to the local sous-pr^fet. However, the decisions given by 
the assessor or the local district officer (sous-orefet) is 
not binding on the parties until it has been approved by
31. In the Northern Province there are more tribes or com­
munities than just the Fali and the Foulbe. The divi­
sion is however not between tribes but between Muslims 
and non-Muslims. The Muslim community is constituted 
by the Foulbe (the predominant Muslim group), the Arab, 
the Hausa and the Bernoua. The non-Muslim community 
is constituted by the other tribal groups, such as the 
Fali, the Chari, and the Kirdi.
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the parquet attached to the Garoua Appeal Court. Muslim 
litigants may, and do, refer their disputes to the Modibo, 
a personality said to be versed in Qur’anic studies.
The Modibofs judgments are written in Arabic and these 
are translated into French every three months. Generally, 
complaints by Muslims and non-Muslims are made either to 
the district officer or the Lamido (the lamido heads a 
lamidat or chiefdom), each of whom may deal with the matter 
if it is sufficiently serious. As a matter of practice, 
the district officer adjudicates upon serious issues 
involving non-Muslims while the lamido deals with difficult 
cases involving Muslims. If a simple case is brought 
before the district officer or the lamido it is referred to 
the Djaourou (who, depending on whether the litigants are 
Muslims or non-Muslims, would apply either Muslim or non- 
Muslim law), or to the modibo (if the parties are Muslims), 
or to the non-Muslim assessor of the tribunal de premier 
degre (if the litigants are non-Muslims). In a case 
involving a Muslim and a non-Muslim and there are con­
flicting rules of law, an attempt is made to reconcile 
both; if this fails, the Islamic law rule prevails.
In the Northern Province, the tribunal coutumier 
is located at the level of the canton or lamidat and is 
invariably presided over by the lamido assisted by two 
assessors. Cases decided by the tribunal coutumier are 
subject to appeal to the tribunal du premier degre which, 
in many areas, is presided over by the local district
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officer. In the North-West Province, disputes involving 
Fulani litigants (the fulani constitute a closed and 
secluded community) are taken to the fulani quarter head, 
the wahkili, or alternatively to the fulani chief, the 
ardo. If the case eventually reaches the village court, 
the ardo sits with the other members of the- court as an 
assessor so that the fulani is tried in accordance with 
fulani customs.
It is noteworthy that of the 7^ - million people 
in Cameroon about one million of them profess to be Muslims. 
Islamic influence is however limited to the north and 
Foumban. Moreover, many people who claim to be Muslims 
are in reality only nominal Muslims; they embrace the 
Muslim way of life without embracing Islam and less still 
Islamic law. This is particularly true of the vast 
majority of aboriginees (particularly those around Yagoua) 
who continue to follow their own traditions and customs.
2. Elevation of the imported law
The conscious elevation of the received law above 
indigenous law was the overall effect of control by colo­
nial governments of traditional institutions. The colo­
nial government was convinced of the superiority of its own 
civilisation, its own laws, and its own judicial system.
So, although it evinced an intention to maintain and respect 
indigenous laws and habits of legal thought, it regarded
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them with a certain disfavour which translated itself in 
the use of restrictive provisions to cut back native law 
and also in the deliberate projection of its own law as 
superior to indigenous law. It is ironical that this 
attitude still persists even today. Indigenous law is 
still regarded and treated as an inferior law. This 
attitude manifests itself in many ways.
First, certain traditional legal institutions 
have been denuded of any legal significance. Bride price 
no longer has any legal consequence on marriage or affi­
liation. Communal tenure has been replaced (as yet only
32in the statute books) with individual tenure. Cus­
tomary law marriages are in a somewhat precarious and 
uncertain situation: under the civil status registration
law all marriages must be celebrated by a civil status 
registrar and marriages not so celebrated are presumably 
void. In practice however, people in the villages con­
tinue to contract their marriages under customary law as 
though the civil status registration law (passed in 1968) 
did not exist.
Secondly, the received law is regarded and 
treated as the primary law while indigenous law is treated 
as something of an exceptional law, a foreign law that
32. Ordinance No. 7^/1 of 6 July 197^ (Rules governing 
land tenure); cf. Ordinance No. 7^/2 of 6 July 197^ 
(Rules governing State lands).
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must be specifically proved in court. Courts have con­
sistently held that a rule of indigenous law must be 
specifically proved in court before it can be upheld 
and the Supreme Court has always insisted that any court
upholding a rule of indigenous law must enunciate that
34rule and indicate the tribe in which it prevails.
There is therefore no such thing as judicial notice of a
rule of indigenous law. Judicial attitude seems to be
that a rule of traditional law must become notorious by
repeated proof and only then- would it be taken judicial
notice of as law. In fact.courts have at times gone to
35extremes. On two separate occasions the then East 
Cameroon Supreme Court took the untenable view that indi­
genous law was not ’law' as only custom reduced into
writing was law, a view vigorously rejected (correctly,
3 6
it is submitted) in another case decided a year later.
33. C.S.C.O., arr§t du 22 janv. 1963, Bull., No. 8, p. 573; 
C.S.C.O., arr^t du 27 nov. 1962, Bull., No. 7, p. 370; 
C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 103/L du 25 mars -1969 (unreported); 
C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 135/L du 10 juin 1969 (unreported).
34. C.S.C.O., arret du 21 oct. 1976, Penant, No. 760,
1978, p. 253; C.S.C.O., arr§t du 15 avril 1976, Penant, 
No. 761, 1978, p. 382. A mere indication of a custom 
or a simple reference to a customary law rule will not 
do. See M. Nguini, 1Le divorce en droit coutumier 
camerounais1, Penant, No. 763, 1979, p. 5.
35. C.S.C.O., arr§t du 29 mai 1962, Bull., No. 6, p. 315;
C.S.C.O., arr§t du 3 avril 1963, Penant, 1963, p. 230 
(with a note by Lampu<§).
36. C.S.C.O., arr§t du 22 dec. 1964, Penant, 1965, p. 370 
(with a note by Lampue).
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Thirdly, the sphere of application of indigenous 
law is extremely limited. Customary law applies only in 
matters of personal status under customary law and land 
held under indigenous tenure. Even in these areas, cus­
tomary law does not reign supreme. In matters of family 
law, a person can opt out of customary law by contracting 
a civil status marriage. In the case of succession he 
may oust customary law by making a valid will in conformity 
with the received law. Furthermore, land commissions have 
now been set up to deal with disputes which hitherto used 
to be dealt with in the customary courts.- Indeed, the 
Land Ordinances of 6 July 197^ have radically affected 
the traditional system of land tenure (at least on paper) 
and the land commissions set up to deal with land cases 
have robbed customary courts (and the non-customary courts)
of their jurisdiction over disputes concerning land held
37under customary law.
Finally, another way in which the received law 
has been projected as a superior law can be seen from the 
rule according to which the received law must prevail 
whenever there is a conflict between customary law and the
o O
received law.
The chief reason why indigenous law is still
37. Land disputes which were pending before customary courts 
were to be transferred to the new land commissions for 
adjudication. In practice however courts continue to 
deal with land cases.
38. Southern Cameroons High Court Law 1955, s. 11; C.S.C.O., 
arr£t du 5 mars 1963, Bull., No. 8, p. 5^1.
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regarded as an inferior law is the ingrained belief that
it constitutes an impediment to progress and modernisation.
"Depuis 1 ’intervention directe des pays 
europdens dans les affaires africaines, la 
seule possibility qui semblait offerte aux 
populations autochtones de sortir de l ’etat 
de sous-ddveloppement dans lequel elles se 
trouvent enferm^es dtait l 1adoption, plus au 
moins totale, d ’un cadre juridique de droit 
moderne, tant en mati^re de droit privy que de 
droit public. Les institutions traditionnelles, 
condamndes h terme par les progrds dconomiques 
et par la scolarisation, devaient cdder le pas 
& un droit nouveau. Quand il s ’est agi d'en
definir le contenu, la seule solution a paru ^g
• ■ rdsider dans une adaptation du droit europden."
In the war between customary law and the received
law, the former is already condemned to lose. "La coutume
est appelde cl disparaitre car elle reprdsente vraiment
trop le contraire d ’un facteur d ’unite; pour l ’instant elle
rdsiste et la victoire d ’un droit moderne ne sera longtemps
40qu’une apparence." All the evidence points to the
eventual abolition of customary law under the disguise of 
codification. Already a civil law commission has been set
up to unify and standardize the plethora of civil laws
(English, French, indigenous) in force in Cameroon. Certain 
rules of customary law will be integrated into the received 
law and once this process is completed there would be 
nothing like a separate body of customary law administered 
by separate courts.
39* E. Le Roy, ’Droit et developpement en afrique noire
francophone apres dix annees d ’independance politique’, 
Revue Senegalaise de Droit, mars 1971, No. 9, p. 54.
40. J. Pannier, ’Les sources du droit au Cameroun Oriental’, 
Ann. Fac. de Droit du Cameroun, 1972, No. 3, p. 114.
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II. Organisation of and Procedure In Indigenous Judicial 
Institutions
Officially there is in Cameroon only one set of 
indigenous courts, the statutory customary courts. These 
courts were established during the colonial period and 
have continued to operate ever since. However, each 
village in Cameroon has a village or traditional council 
which also exercises judicial powers; although one can 
find no official authority for them to do so (or not to do 
so) .
1. Statutory customary courts
The official customary, courts operating in 
Cameroon were set up by instrument during the colonial 
period. Two types of statutory customary courts operate 
in Francophone Cameroon, the tribunal de premier' degre 
(presided over by a professional magistrate or a district 
officer and assisted by two assessors) and the tribunal 
coutumier (presided over by a chief, an elder or a profes­
sional magistrate and assisted by two assessors). Cus­
tomary court assessors are not chosen ad hoc but are 
appointed yearly by the Minister of Justice. The position 
is different in Anglophone Cameroon. Customary court 
judges are appointed by warrant of the Minister of Territorial
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4lAdministration. A customary court is made up of five
lay judges and one or more court clerks or scribes. In 
addition, each customary court has at its disposal a number 
of.’court messengers’ who help it in maintaining order in 
court and in serving process.
Of the five judges appointed to each customary 
court, four must be natives of the area in which the court 
is located. Before taking up their appointments customary 
court judges take the same judicial oath as that taken by 
professional judges. All five judges of the court do not 
sit at the same time. Three constitute a quorum and the 
presidency of the court rotates on*a monthly basis. Judges 
do not hold office for a fixed term although the appoint­
ment of most of them is often terminated after two years.
A customary court judgeship is not supposed to be a full­
time job or a career and so judges are paid only a ’sitting 
allowance’ which is roughly 5.000 francs cfa (about £12)per 
month. The president of the court receives about 12.000 
francs cfa per month.
No special qualification is necessary to become 
a judge of the customary court. Any Cameroonian adult 
(male) of good character who is knowledgeable in customary 
law may be appointed judge. Illiteracy is apparently no
41. In the days of the Federation, customary court judges 
were appointed by warrant of the Prime Minister of West 
Cameroon on the recommendation of the Customary Courts 
Commission. This Commission no longer exists and the 
Minister of Territorial Administration has inherited 
the Prime Minister’s power to appoint customary court 
judges in Anglophone Cameroon.
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barrier. But in practice only persons who can read and
write now get appointed. Customary court judges attend
periodical seminars organised for their benefit at the
Local Government School in Buea. Most of those appointed
as customary court judges are persons above forty years
of age. A judge may be suspended or removed from office
42at any time if he is guilty of misconduct.
The customary court clerk is the centre of the 
customary court machinery. Like the greffier in courts 
in Francophone Cameroon, it is he who does all the paper 
work of the court. He administers the oath (it is the 
same as that administered in the non-customary courts) to 
witnesses, he takes down the evidence in court, he summar­
ises the arguments advanced by the litigants, he prepares 
statements of claim on behalf of plaintiffs, he issues 
court warrants and summonses, and he reduces the judgment 
of the court into writing. The customary court clerk is 
always a literate person and his job is a full-time employ­
ment .
Employed by the local council and placed at the 
service of customary courts are persons known as ’customary 
court messengers’. Their uniform is simple: a khaki
42. The practice in former West Cameroon was to have every 
allegation of corruption against a judge investigated 
by the Customary Courts Commission. The Commission 
made its findings and recommendations to the Minister 
of Local Government, the competent authority to suspend 
or dismiss from office.
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shirt worn over a pair of khaki trousers. Their black 
berets carry a copper insignia which still bears the 
inscription N.A., meaning Native Authority - which is the 
old name of the present day local councils. Customary 
court messengers play a vital role in the administration 
of customary justice. The role they play is analogous 
to that played by court ushers, process-servers and bailiffs. 
They keep order in court, execute writs, serve court 
processes, and arrest absconding defendants and tax 
defaulters.
In Francophone Cameroon the criminal jurisdiction 
of customary courts had been withdrawn as far back as 1946. 
But in Anglophone Cameroon these courts have until recently 
continued to exercise limited criminal jurisdiction; pri­
marily in respect of petty criminal matters. It was only 
in 1977 that customary courts in Anglophone Cameroon ceased 
to exercise any form of criminal jurisdiction. These 
courts had continued to exercise criminal jurisdiction in
defiance of statutory provision forbidding them from exer-
43cising such jurisdiction and also in defiance of judicial 
authority to the effect that ’customary courts have not, 
and never had since October 1, 1961, any criminal juris­
diction' . That ruling was made in the case of Godfred
44Fogum v. Mankon Customary Court. The facts of that case
43. Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972 (Judicial Organi­
sation ), s . 26 .
44. Bamenda High Court, Suit No. HC/83.M/72, unreported.
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are as follows. On 30 October 1972 the applicant,
Godfred Fogum, was charged before the Mankon Customary 
Court for farming in a grazing area. He was tried, 
found not guilty and acquitted. But on 16 November he 
was again arrested and detained until 22 November when 
the said court sat and read out a letter of 22 November 
1972 addressed to the said court by the district officer. 
The court then wrote in its record: ’Case revoked on the
strength of the D.O.'s letter'. The court proceeded to 
convict the applicant without any trial. He was ordered 
to be imprisoned for three months without the option of a 
fine. The applicant then moved the Bamenda High Court 
for an order of certiorari to remove into that High Court 
and quash the proceedings in the Mankon Customary Court. 
Relief was sought on the ground, among others, that the 
penal jurisdiction of customary courts had been repealed 
by s . 26 of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance of 1972. 
The court held, per Inglis, J., that the order of cer­
tiorari will be granted, for 'customary courts have not, 
and never had since October 1, 1961, any criminal juris­
diction' . The learned Judge cogently argued that the 
Customary Court Ordinance, Cap. 142 of the 1948 laws and 
the Customary Courts (Jurisdiction in Miscellaneous Cri­
minal Offences) Order-in-Council were in conflict with the 
Federal Constitution, 1961, to the extent of conferring 
criminal jurisdiction and powers to impose penalties on 
customary courts.
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Proceedings in the statutory customary courts 
are substantially the same as those in the Courts of First 
Instance but with the difference that it is simplified 
and less formal. A case is begun by the plaintiff going 
to the appropriate customary court and informing the 
court clerk that he wishes to take out a summons against 
so and so. The clerk takes down the digest of the 
plaintiff's story and puts in a statement of claim. The 
plaintiff pays a fee -of 1.100 francs cfa. The summons 
is then served on the defendant by one of the customary 
court messengers. The summons states the date, time and 
place of appearance to answer the summons. The statement 
of claim is often cryptic: 'debt', ’declaration of title
to land', 'arrears of house rent', 'disturbance in business 
premises', 'return to matrimonial home', 'breach of mar­
riage peace', 'refund of dowry', 'next of kin order', 
'divorce of customary marriage', and so on. After the 
clerk has written out the summons, he then registers the 
case in the 'Civil Summons Booklet* and also in the 'Cus­
tomary Court Cause Book'. On the day of the hearing the 
case is called up. The defendant and the plaintiff step 
forward. The defendant is asked a simple question by the 
court after the plaintiff's complaint has been read out to 
him: 'Are you liable or not liable?' If the defendant
replies, 'I am liable', judgment is entered for the plain­
tiff. But if he contests liability, each party would then 
step into one of the two witness-boxes and give his evidence
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4sfrom there.
The plaintiff states his case and the- clerk takes 
the essential points of his story. A party may ask his 
testimony to be read back to him. But this request is 
seldom made. At this stage of the proceedings the presi­
dent of the court only interposes when he has not under­
stood or heard anything said by the plaintiff. At the 
end of the plaintiff’s story, the defendant is allowed to 
ask him questions and thereafter to give his own version of 
the story. He is also cross-examined by the plaintiff.
At this stage, the court may ask the plaintiff and the 
defendant any question it thinks appropriate. At the end 
of it all, the judges retire into their chambers from 
whence they will emerge some minutes later to deliver their 
judgment. A dissatisfied party has thirty days within 
which to go on appeal. A party to a dispute in a customary 
court may be represented by a spouse or a relative. But 
most litigants prefer to conduct their own cases. To 
maintain the simple and uncomplicated procedure followed 
in customary courts, barristers have been barred from 
appearing before them. This does not however mean that a 
Cameroonian whose profession is that of barrister may not 
be sued in a customary court if he is involved in a dispute 
over which customary courts have jurisdiction.
45. One of the boxes previously served as dock for the 
criminal defendant.
648.
2. Village councils as traditional courts
Each village in Cameroon has what is known as a
’Village Council’ or a ’Traditional Council’. Officially, 
as far as the central government is concerned, a village 
council performs only administrative functions. In 
practice, a village council also performs judicial functions. 
In fact the village council acting as a court is authen­
tically more of an indigenous judicial institution than 
the statutory customary court. In the village, disputes 
are resolved by either the family head, the quarter head 
or elder, or by the village court over which presides the 
village chief, assisted by his council of elders. The 
village court is nothing other than the village council 
acting in a judicial capacity. Most cases in the village
end at the level of the village council. But there is no
prohibition on a dissatisfied party going on appeal to 
the statutory customary court and even beyond.
The jurisdiction of the village council as a 
court embraces both civil and criminal matters. In the 
civil area they deal with matters concerning customary 
marriages, divorce, inheritance, custody, bride price, 
land disputes, and debts contracted under customary law.
In the criminal area they try cases of allegations of 
malevolent witchcraft or sorcery, murder- by esoteric means, 
theft of livestock or farm produce, minor brawls or assaults, 
and violations of customs, injunctions or prohibitions.
Secret societies such as the nqumba, kwlfon, and obasinjom
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still play a vital role in the judicial process. So too 
ordeals and divinations.
Trial by ordeal rests on religious■beliefs, espe­
cially the belief that the deity can be summoned to inter­
vene in the screening of the guilty from the innocent.
46The poison ordeal is still used by the Namchi. The
ordeal of immersing hands in a pot of boiling water still
47survives among the Massa and the Tupuri. ' The Pali still
have recourse to the poison ordeal known as laourou and
48the means of divination known as hadti. Various other
forms of ordeals, means of divinations, and oath rituals 
are practised in other parts of Cameroon. A person 
accused of psychic murder (for example, in places like the 
Eastern Province where allegations of witchcraft prac­
tices are commonplace) may be required to swear over the 
deceased's grave, a fetish, or venerated object inviting 
the spirit of the dead person to take its revenge on him 
if the murder had been committed by him. Furthermore, it 
is common practice to invite a diviner to come and help 
in detecting an offender who presumably cannot otherwise
46. L. Salasc, ’Une ordalie en pays Namchi’, Etudes 
Camerounaises, No. 3, juillet, 19^3, p. 61.
47. J.J. Mouchet, ’Pratiques et divination Massa et 
Tupuri’, Etudes Camerounaises, No. 4, nov., 1943, p. 63; 
Joanny Guillard, Goloupoui - analyse des conditions de 
modernisation d ’un village du Nord Cameroun, Mouton,
Paris, MCMLXV, p. 14 8.
48. J.G. Gauthier, Les Fali de Ngoutchoumi - montagnards
du Nord Cameroun, Anthropological Publications, Oosterhput, 
The Netherlands, 1969; J.P. Lebeuf, L ’habitation des 
Fali, montagnards du Cameroun septentrional, Hachette,
Paris, 196l7
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be detected. These practices are believed in and accepted 
by the ordinary man. No one complains to the police or 
gendarmes who, in any case believe and sometimes take part 
in them. Take these two incidents.
In Bota some years ago, a man mysteriously deve­
loped an extraordinarily large appetite and was always 
eating although his stomach never grew large. Conven­
tional scientific analysis in the hospitals failed to 
provide a diagnosis and a therapy. It was alleged that 
the man had been bewitched. The matter was reported to 
the gendarmes who had the principal suspect and his alleged 
accomplices arrested and detained. They protested their 
innocence. There was no point taking the matter to court. 
The court would not believe-the story and in any case an 
allegation of witchcraft practice cannot be proved in court. 
So a diviner was brought to the gendarmerie station and 
the suspects were brought out of their cells. Everyone 
stood watching while the diviner set himself to work and
he was able to 'prove’ that the suspects had indeed commit-
Z| 9
ted the evil act with which they were suspected of.
In another incident, a public request was made for 
the Bamileke ’black dog’ ordeal to be used in detecting per­
sons who had collaborated with individuals seeking the 
overthrow of the government. The circumstances under which
49. ’Soothsayer called to prove allegation of poisoning’, 
Cameroon Outlook, vol. 2, No. 63, Friday, August 21, 
1970, p. 1.
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this call was made arose from the Ouandie/Ndogmo Affairs.
On August 19, 1970, Ernest Ouandie, leader of the pro­
scribed Union des Populations du Cameroun which had taken 
to guerrilla warfare against the French and then the 
national government, was arrested along with several of 
his lieutenants and charged with terrorist activities and 
armed Insurrection. About a week later, on August 27,
Bishop Ndongmo was also arrested and charged with acces­
sory to terrorist activities and plotting to carry out a 
coup d ’etat and assassinate the Head of State. At the 
end of the month, a public demonstration in support of 
the government was held in Nkongsamba. Speaker after 
speaker mounted the rostrum and denounced the plot and the 
plotters. One of the speakers condemned terrorist acti­
vities and suggested that the ’black dog’ordeal be used 
to detect those aiding and abetting terrorist activities.
Now, the black dog ordeal is a collective test used in 
judicial inquiries in some Cameroonian traditional societies, 
particularly the Bamileke. The suspect is made to go 
through a ritual which includes swearing on the eye of a 
black dog. A liar or guilty person, it is believed, would 
be killed by the black dog. In the instant case, persons 
suspected of aiding terrorists were to be made to swear on 
the eye of a black dog. The crucial factor in the black 
dog ordeal is the element of fear: it is believed that
50anyone who falsely swore would be killed by the black dog.
50. Chronologie politique africaine, Paris, No. 4, juillet- 
aout, 1970, p. 78.
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Ill. Internal Conflict of Laws
An Internal conflict of laws situation may arise 
in two ways. There may be a conflict between a rule of 
traditional law and a non-traditional law rule. A con­
flict situation may also arise between two conflicting 
systems of traditional law.
1. Conflict between traditional and non-traditional law
When this type of conflict arises, two questions 
must be answered. First, which law should govern the 
case, traditional law or non-traditional law? Secondly, 
if it be decided that traditional law should govern the 
case then the further question arises as to which tradi­
tional law.
As a general rule, cases between natives are
51governed by traditional law. But there are three
exceptions to this general rule. First, traditional law
does not apply where the parties had agreed that the
52matter shall be governed by non-traditional law. Secondly,
traditional law does not apply where the matter in question
5^
is one which is unknown to traditional law such as, for
51. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, s. 27(2);
Decret du 31 juillet 1927 (creation des tribunaux indigenes).
52. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, s. 27(2).
53. Idem.
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example, company shares, bank transactions, and so on.
Thirdly, native law will not apply where the issue is one
5 ii
covered by legislation. Moreover, a rule of customary
law is not enforceable if, although it has passed the 
repugnancy test, it is nevertheless incompatible directly 
or by necessary implication with any written law in 
force.^
In general, in cases between natives and non­
natives, non-customary law applies. But that law would 
be ousted in favour of customary law where it may appear 
to the court that substantial injustice would be done to
56either party by a strict adherence to non-traditional law.
Moreover, the Authorities may direct that some or all of
the powers of customary courts should not be exercised over
57any natives or class of natives, or, that persons or class 
of persons not normally subject to the jurisdiction of cus­
tomary courts should be subject to a particular customary
5^. Cf. C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 40 du 5 mars 1963, Bull., No. 8, 
p. 541. In this case the then East Cameroun Supreme 
Court laid down a principle which the courts have since 
then always followed. The Supreme Court declared:
’Dans les matieres ou il a ete legifere la loi l ’emporte 
sur la coutume.’
55. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, s. 27(1); 
Customary Courts Ordinance, Cap. 142 of the 1948 laws, 
s. l8(l)(a).
56. Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, s. 27(2).
57. Thus, customary courts have no jurisdiction over 
members of the Armed Forces, the Police and the Gen­
darmerie .
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58court or class of customary courts.
Each customary court applies the customary law 
prevailing in the area over which it has territorial 
jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is set out in the war­
rant establishing the court.
2. Conflict between different systems of customary law
This type of conflict has arisen as a result of
population movements. As means of communication between
villages and tribes have improved so too has mobility
among the people. People have tended to move away from
the rural to the urban areas in search of jobs and a new
way of life.
"In the days when virtually all the persons 
living in a particular area were members of 
the same tribe (and when hardly any members 
of that tribe lived elsewhere) all disputes 
arising in the area would inevitably be deci­
ded under the tribal law. Now, the situation 
has changed. Most of the inhabitants of a 
particular locality still do belong to one 
tribe, but in every area there is a minority 
whose origins lie in different communities.
It is principally in relation to such mino­
rities that the problem is presented. When 
a member of one of them becomes involved in 
a legal action arising in the area, assuming 
that [the received law] or local statute law 
do not apply, the issue is whether the case 
is to be decided in accordance with the local 
law or under what may be called the 'personal 
law' of the man involved." 59
58. For example, one such direction was made in former West 
Cameroon extending the ratione personae jurisdiction 
of customary courts to Nigerians and all Africans living 
in Cameroon who, though not normally subject to the 
authority of customary courts, nevertheless agree to 
accept their jurisdiction.
59. A.E.W. Park, The sources of Nigerian law, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1963, p. 136.
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In Cameroon there are no laid down internal 
conflict rules. But the resolution of conflicts presents 
no problem. Each customary court applies its own law, 
conflicts being avoided by the rules for distribution of 
jurisdiction. The court of the site deals with land 
matters, the court of the deceased’s tribe deals with 
his succession, and otherwise the defendant’s court has 
jurisdiction. If a matter gets to the court it applies 
the relevant law which would have been applied by the 
appropriate court if its jurisdiction had stretched to 
the subject-matter. Thus in land matters the proper court 
and the applicable law is that of the place where the land 
is situated. In any dispute relating to marriage, bride 
price, child custody, and matrimonial property rights, 
the applicable customary law is that of the place where 
the marriage was celebrated. This is usually the home 
of the wife’s parents because it is there that bride price 
(which is essential for the validity of a customary law 
marriage) has to be and is paid. This is why paragraph 15 
of the Manual of Practice and Procedure for Court Clerks 
provides: "Cases involving marriage and dowry are always
considered to have arisen at the home of the wife’s parents. 
If the wife’s parents live outside the area of jurisdiction 
of your court, you may not accept the case." In that 
eventuality the matter is referred to the appropriate court. 
But if the court does assume jurisdiction, as in practice 
it does, it must apply the law of the place where the
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parents are domiciled - which it does after hearing the 
’expert1 testimony of persons from that area and conver­
sant with the customary law which obtains there. In 
matters of inheritance the court applies the personal law 
of the deceased.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
LABOUR LAW
Labour legislation is a late 19th century 
development. It was prompted by the liberal ideas and 
campaigns of European reformists scandalised by the 
appalling conditions under which men, women and children 
worked in the nascent industries of Europe.. Legislation 
concerning industrial accidents and workers’ right to 
form trade unions were precipitated by the social crisis 
which erupted all over Europe from the French Revolution 
to the 1850s. However, it was well over another half 
a century before there was any major industrial legis­
lation. The 40-hour week, paid holidays, social insur­
ance, and so forth, were all post-First World War develop­
ments .
During the German colonial period in Cameroon 
the problem of labour force was resolved by a system of 
requisitioning of persons to work in the plantations.
This system was criticised by traders and missionaries 
who advocated a free system, the extension of medium-sized 
European enterprises and the practice whereby natives grew 
industrial products in family set-ups. Although the re­
quisitioning of persons and the system of forced labour 
were never totally abandoned, there were, in the last few 
years of German colonial rule in the territory, some 
relaxations and changes in the methods of recruiting labour.
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Soon after acquiring a mandate over that part 
of Cameroon which became known as the French Cameroun, 
France proceeded to regulate the issue of labour in the 
mandated territory. A decree of 4th August 1922 was 
passed to that effect. It was later amended by another 
decree of 9th July 1925. These two decrees provided 
that the recruitment of labour could be carried out freely 
and in any manner by factories or undertakings recruiting 
natives to be employed in their areas of origin. No 
contract of service was necessary. Moreover, female and 
child labour was only regulated in 1935 by a decree of 
September 4th. A decree of 1937 deals more specifically 
with native labour. In 1944 an arrete was passed dealing 
with industrial accidents and in 1946 the much castigated 
system of forced labour known as 1 ’indigdnat was pro­
scribed. A decree of 17th October 1947 instituted, a 
common Code du Travail for all the territories (the French 
Cameroun inclusive) under the Ministry of Overseas France. 
This labour code was baptised ’Code Moutet’, from the name 
of the French Minister who was instrumental to its insti­
tution. The code was in effect an adapted version of the 
metropolitan Code du Travail. The Code Moutet was tin­
kered with from time to time and in 1952 it re-emerged as 
’Law No. 15/1322 of 15 December 1952 instituting a labour 
code in the territories and associated territories under 
the Ministry of Overseas France’. This is what became 
commonly known as the Code du Travail d ’Outre-Mer. It
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was this code which continued to govern labour relations 
between employers and employees in the private sector in 
the former East Cameroun (now the Francophone Provinces 
of Cameroon) until the passing of the 1967 Federal Labour 
Code. There were in addition before 1967 a number of 
subsidiary legislation dealing with labour matters.'*'
The situation in former West Cameroon was ana­
logous to that in former East Cameroon notwithstanding
the error of the handful of persons who have written on
o
Cameroonian Labour Law in giving the impression that no 
labour law existed there. Although Le Faou concedes that 
labour legislation existed in that part of the country he 
hastens to add that, "la r&glementation du travail, faute 
d favoir dtd vivifide par des apports extdrieurs, s'est 
cristallisde au niveau des textes de 1945 et sous cette 
forme y a rdgi les rapports de travail jusquT& la mise en 
application de la legislation fdddrale en 1967-68.
1. Arrete No. 4297 of 23rd June 1956 instituting family 
allowances; arrete No. 4298 of 23rd June 1956 setting 
up a family allowance fund; law No. 59-25 of 11th
April 1959 on family allowances fund; a law of 1955 
dealing with labour accidents.
2. Pierre Malet, Guide de legislation et d Teducation 
sociale, 3rd ed. C.E.P.M.A.E., Yaounde, 1973; Roger 
Doublier, Manuel de droit du travail au Cameroun,
L.G.D.J., Paris, 1973; R. Le Faou, Precis de droit du 
travail de la Republique Unie du Cameroun, Imprimerie
OFFSET ENAM, Yaounde, 1976.
3. Le Faou, op.cit., p. 11.
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This does not however correspond with reality.
In the former West Cameroon there were a number of 
statutes, just as fragmentary as in the former East 
Cameroon,governing labour matters. Even before the 
Labour Ordinance NO. 1 of 7th February 1929, the following 
statutes governed labour relations in the Southern 
Cameroons: the Master and Servant Ordinance, Cap. 70,
the Native Labour (Foreign Service) Ordinance, Cap. 71, 
the Employment of Women Ordinance, Cap. 72. After the 
Second World War the following labour laws were applicable 
in that part of the country: the Trade Unions Ordinance,
Cap. 200 of the 1958 revised edition of the Laws, the 
Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 222 (an Ordinance 
to provide for the payment of compensation to workmen for 
injuries suffered in the course of their employment), the 
Labour Code Ordinance, Cap. 91 (an Ordinance to amend and 
consolidate the law relating to labour and to consolidate 
the Labour Code for Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons), 
the Factories Ordinance, Cap. 66 (an Ordinance to make 
provision for the health, safety and welfare of persons 
employed in factories and other places and for matters 
incidental thereto and connected therewith), the Wages 
Boards Ordinance, Cap. 211 (an Ordinance to provide for 
the establishment of Wages Boards and otherwise for the 
establishment of Wages Boards and otherwise for the regu­
lation of remuneration and conditions of employment in 
certain circumstances), and the Trades Disputes (Arbi­
tration and Inquiry) Ordinance, Cap. 202 (an Ordinance to
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make Federal provision for the establishment of an Arbi­
tration Tribunal and a Board of Inquiry In connection 
with trade disputes and for the purposes of inquiring 
into industrial conditions).
Thus, not only did labour legislation exist in 
the former West Cameroon, it was also up-to-date. The 
ignorance on labour legislation in former West Cameroon 
stems from two sources. First those who have so far 
written on the subject of labour law in Cameroon are not 
only monojural (in the French legal system) but also 
French monolingual. Secondly, labour legislation was 
not visible. There was for example, a lack of manufac­
turing industry in the territory and relatively few 
skilled and semi-skilled workers were in employment, which 
even in the 1950s was confined largely to government 
service, public works, mercantile firms and the railways 
and ports, together with the Cameroon Development Corpor­
ation plantations and an unknown amount of employment in 
peasant agriculture. The proportion of adult males who 
were engaged in wage-earning at any one time was very 
small, and the main centres of wage employment tended to 
be concentrated into the coastal areas. In the plan­
tations the labour force was largely migrant in character, 
and in other industries such as public works rather short
spells of work were general among locally employed labour,
4
even where employment was not casual. The Southern
4. Cf. W.A. Warrington, A West African Trade Union. A
case study of the C.D.C. Workers Union and its relations 
with the employers, 0. U . P . , London, i960, p~! 5~.
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Cameroons economy was essentially a plantation-based 
economy. The major employer was the C.D.C. and the 
first trade union in the territory was the C.D.C. Workers' 
Union which was formed in 19^7. Because of lack of 
manufacturing industry and hardly any labour disputes 
reaching the courts the phenomenon of labour law was not 
much in evidence in the territory. Indeed, much of the 
law existed only in the statute books and never in 
practice.
A Federal Labour Code was instituted for the 
entire Federal Republic by Law No. 67-LF-6 of 12th June 
1967. In 1972 a unitary form of Government was adopted 
and a unified workers Trade Union was created. It became 
necessary to amend and consolidate the 1967 Labour Code 
to bring it in line with the changed political situation 
of the country. Accordingly, a bill was tabled before 
Parliament for this purpose. The White Paper accom­
panying the bill said, inter alia,
"Intervenant un epoque de transition 
comprise entre la Reunification et l finstitu­
tion de la Republique Unie, le Code de 
Travail de 1967 etait lui-m§me un instrument 
de transition et ce, sur le double plan de 
droit et des institutions ... La ndcessite 
se faisait done sentir, dans le cadre de la 
transposition en mati£re sociale de la 
Revolution pacifique du 20 mai 1972, d ’une 
part d 1adapter le Code de Travail aux nou- 
velles structures de la Rdpublique Unie, 
d T autre part d ’ent^riner Involution qui s ’est 
produite dans les relations professionelles 
ddpuis 1967 et de prevoir les structures ^
permettant a cette Evolution de se poursuivre.11 ^
Le Faou, op.cit., p. 21.
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On 27th November 19^7 the Bill was passed into law as 
Law No. 7^-1^ instituting the Labour Code. However, 
regulations made under the 1967 law remain in force as 
long as they have not been repealed and replaced by regu­
lations issued under the current law. Furthermore, 
international labour conventions to which Cameroon is 
signatory, continue to be applicable.
The Cameroonian Labour Code has undoubtedly 
drawn a great deal from French law, particularly from the 
old French Code du Travail d ’Outre-Mer. But French law 
has not been its only source. The Code also drew from 
relevant conventions of the International Labour Organi­
sation and from the Nigerian Labour Code Ordinance, Cap.
91 and the Trade Unions Ordinance, Cap. 200 of the 1958 
edition of the laws. The Code regulates in detail 
matters such as contracts of employment, working conditions, 
payment of wages, labour administration, and trade unions 
and employers’ associations. However, the Code is con­
spicuously silent on the question of compensation to workers 
injured at work and does not deal with conditions of work 
in places such as mines.
Most workers are not acquainted with the pro­
visions of the Code and are therefore ignorant of most of 
their rights as workers. Furthermore, the machinery for 
the effective enforcement of the provisions of the Code 
is still inadequate. For example, the number of labour 
inspectors and medical labour inspectors is still small.
6 6 k .
Ignorance of the law coupled with an Inadequate machinery 
for enforcement has meant that often the provisions of 
the Code are not actually being observed. A fair number
of labour disputes do reach the courts. But these are
often cases of wrongful dismissals.
Scope of the Labour Code
By s. 1(1) of the Labour Code, labour law is 
that branch of the civil law which governs ’labour 
relations between wage-earning workers and employers 
and also between apprentices under their authority’.
The scope of the Labour Code is narrow. Provisions of 
the Code do not apply to: civil servants (they are
governed by the General Rules and Regulations of the 
Public Service), auxiliary administrative employees (they 
are subject to special rules and regulations), members of 
the Armed Forces, the Police Force and the Customs, and 
persons subject to customary law and working within the 
framework of the family. The Code is concerned only with 
the labour relations between wage-earning workers and 
employers, and apprentices under the authority of employers. 
The term ’worker’ is used in the Code to mean "any person, 
irrespective of sex or nationality, who has undertaken to 
place his gainful activity, in return for remuneration, 
under the direction and control of another person, whether 
an individual or a public or private corporation, who is
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styled the T employee111. The legal position of employer 
or employee is irrelevant in determining whether a person 
is a worker or not. Moreover, the Code applies to all 
types of undertakings, large, medium-size, or small. It 
applies to an undertaking with hundreds of workers as well 
as to one with just a handful. Thus a shopkeeper with 
say two employees is governed by the Code. The Code 
also applies in a master and servant situation as for 
example where a person engages a houseboy, a cook or a 
gardener.
The preamble to the Cameroonian constitution 
proclaims that every Cameroonian has the right and duty 
to work. The Labour Code carries this right further by 
declaring work to be a ’sacred right’ and a ’national duty
7
incumbent on every able-bodied adult citizen’. It does 
not however seem that it is the bounden duty of the State 
to provide citizens with employment. The State’s duty 
here is apparently only to ’’make every effort to help citi-
g
zens to find and to remain in employment". Indeed, the 
question of unemployment has never been a key political 
issue in Cameroon.
g
Forced or compulsory labour is absolutely
6. Labour Code, s. 1(2).
7. Ibid., s. 2(1) (2).
8. Ibid.
9. This is defined in s. 2(3) of the Labour Code as any 
labour or service demanded of an individual under threat 
of penalty, being a labour or service which the indivi­
dual has not freely offered to perform.
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forbidden in Cameroon. The term does not however include 
(1) any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory 
military service laws for work of a purely military charac­
ter, (2) any work or service forming part of the civic 
obligations of citizens as defined by the laws in force,
(3) any work or service exacted from any person as a con­
sequence of a conviction in a court of law, (4) any work 
or service exacted in cases of force majeure,^  (5) communal 
service in the general service."^
This chapter shall proceed to deal with employ­
ment (S. I), unions and other organisations (S. II), and 
the resolution of labour disputes (S. III).
I . Employment
Employment means the state of being employed, 
that is, having a regular occupation, trade or profession. 
The employee works for the employer under an oral or 
written contract of service which always stipulates, among 
other things, the wages to be paid for the work done and
10. That is to say, in the event of war, rebellion against 
legal authority, or of a disaster or threatened dis­
aster, such as fire, flood, famine, earthquake, vol­
canic eruption, violent epidemic or epizootic diseases, 
invasion by animals, insects or plant pests, and in 
general any circumstance that would endanger or threaten 
to endanger the existence or the well-being of the whole 
or part of the population. Labour Code, s. 2(4).
11. These are community works defined by administrative, 
municipal and village authorities and regarded as normal 
civic obligations.
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the conditions of service.
1. Contracts of employment
A contract of employment is a contract of ser­
vice. Every time an employer engages a new employee, he 
makes a contract of service. Writing has nothing to do 
with it. A contract of service is as binding if made 
orally as if every word were inscribed on precious parch­
ment in letters of gold. As soon as there has been an 
unconditional offer by the employee to serve and an uncon­
ditional acceptance by the employer of that offer, the deal 
is concluded. The consideration (that quid pro quo 
required by English law) is the wage. So both sides are 
bound. Contracts of employment are of two types, indi­
vidual and collective.
A . Individual contracts of employment
There is no restriction on the freedom to make 
contracts of employment. However, for economic or social 
reasons, and in particular in the interest of public health 
and hygiene, the Head of State may prohibit or limit cer­
tain types of labour recruitment in specified areas after
12consultation with the National Labour Council. Moreover,
it is a trite contract law principle that a contract must
12. Labour Code, s. 28.
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be neither illegal nor offend against public policy.
The proper law of every contract of employment which is 
to be performed in Cameroon, is the Cameroonian Labour 
Code and any other Cameroonian law on the subject. In 
other words, the lex loci solutionis governs the contract 
of employment. The locus contractus and the residence 
or domicile of either party are irrelevant. Nor does it 
make any difference that the contract of employment was 
initially made under other legislation and is to be per-
1 Q
formed only partially in Cameroon.
Although a contract of employment may be made
orally, it may be recorded in writing (in which case it
is exempt from stamp and registration fees). Any form
of evidence is admissible to establish the existence of a
1^1
contract of employment. However, contracts of a speci­
fied period exceeding three months, or contracts of employ­
ment with employees of foreign nationality, must be in 
15writing. Furthermore, a contract of apprenticeship
must, under pain of being declared null and void, be made 
in writing.1^
13. Labour Code, s. 29.
14. Ibid., s. 29(3)(4).
15. Ibid., ss. 31, 33.
16. Ibid., s. 51. A contract of apprenticeship is defined 
in s . 50 as ’a contract whereby the head of an indus­
trial, commercial or agricultural establishment, a 
craftsman or a jobbing workman undertakes to give or 
cause to be given to another person complete and system­
atic training and whereby the latter undertakes in 
return to obey the instructions which he receives and to 
perform the tasks assigned to him for the purposes of 
his apprenticeship.’
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a) Making and performance of contract
A contract of employment may be made for a speci-
17fied or an unspecified period or task. A contract of
employment for a specified period is one which is made for 
a maximum duration of two years. If services continue 
after the expiry of two years, the contract automatically 
lapses into one of unspecified duration. This rule how­
ever applies only in respect of workers who are Cameroonians. 
Upon the expiry of two years the contract of a worker who 
is an alien may only be renewed upon the visa of the Minis-
-j o
ter of Labour.
An employer may, by expressly saying so in
writing, engage an employee for a trial period or for trial
periods not exceeding six months in all, save in the case
of supervisory and managerial staff for whom the trial
period(s) may be for up to one year. If at the end of
the trial period, no new contract is made and the worker
continues to render his services, the parties would be
deemed to have entered into a contract of unspecified
duration taking effect from the day the employee began work
19on a trial basis.
17. Ibid., s. 30(1). A contract of employment is one of 
specified duration where its termination is fixed in 
advance by the will of the parties or subject to the 
occurrence, which does not depend exclusively on the 
will of the parties, of a future but certain event 
that is precisely indicated. On the other hand, a 
contract of employment is of an unspecified duration 
if it may be terminated at any time by the will of 
the worker or the employer upon notification of the 
other party as provided by law.
18. Ibid., ss. 30(2), 31.
19. Ibid., s. 32.
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An employer may make Internal regulations for
his establishment provided that such regulations relate
only to matters of technical organisation, work, discipline,
safety, and hygiene and that they are necessary for the
20proper functioning of the establishment. But he is
not entitled to make any regulation touching on the private
lives of the employees. In Eglise Presbyterienne
21Camerounaise & HOpital de Donenkeng c. Engoute, the 
respondent was an employee of a mission hospital owned by 
the Eglise Presbyterienne Camerounaise. He was also a 
shop steward. By Rule 9 of the Internal Regulations of 
that hospital only communicants of the church may be 
employed to work in that hospital. After working in that 
hospital for some time, the respondent who had all along 
been a monogamist became a polygamist. He was therefore 
barred from receiving communion on the ground that polygamy 
offended against Christian teachings. Being no longer a 
communicant, he was dismissed from his job. The respon­
dent successfully obtained judgment against the appellants 
both at first instance and on appeal. On further appeal 
to the Supreme Court, held, Cl) that Rule 9 of the hospital's 
Internal Regulations was manifestly contrary to s . 3^ of
20. Ibid., s. 3^. The regulations thus made may only be 
brought into operation after they have been communi­
cated to and approved by shop stewards and the Inspector 
of Labour. Regulations relating to matters other than 
those listed are null and void.
21. Cour Supreme du Cameroun, Arr§t No. 71/S du 6 juin 1973, 
8 R.C.D. 177 (1975).
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the Labour Code; (2) that the appellants’ contention 
that It was the respondent who had terminated his contract 
of service by embracing polygamy was untenable as. In 
fact It was the appellants who had dismissed the respon­
dent; and (3) that the respondent being a shop steward, 
the appellants were in breach of s. 137(1) of the Labour 
Code in having dismissed him without the prior authori­
sation of the local labour inspector as required by law.
An employer may make regulations in his industry 
relating to- discipline. But it is unlawful for him to
sanction with a fine any breach of such discipline by 
22the employee. The only disciplinary penalty involving
loss of wages which an employer may legitimately impose on
an employee is suspension from work for a maximum period
of eight days from the time of the imposition of the
penalty. He must notify the employee of the suspension.
A verbal notification is not enough. The notification
must be in writing clearly stating the reason(s) for the 
23suspension. Furthermore, a copy of the notice of sus­
pension must be sent to the competent Labour Inspector 
within forty-eight hours.
Save as otherwise provided in the contract of 
employment, the employee must devote all his gainful
22. Labour Code, s. 35*
23. If the suspension is challenged in court and the reasons
advanced to justify the suspension are found to be 
insufficient the aggrieved worker is entitled to recover 
his lost wages and to be awarded damages if he can prove 
any.
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activity to the industry. However, unless otherwise
agreed, he may engage, outside his working hours, in any
gainful activity which is not liable to compete with the
industry or harm the due performance of the agreed
24services.
b ) Termination of contract
A worker talks about ’his job’. But who owns 
a man's job? At one time it used to be the employer for, 
although an employee talked of ’my job', it did not belong 
to him in any real sense. That has changed. A man has 
what amounts to a property in his job. That is why he is 
given job security. His protection is divided into two
categories. If he does not receive his proper notice or
pay in lieu, then he is wrongfully dismissed for, the 
employer is not entitled to dismiss the employee at will 
or just anyhow. If this happens the employee has a claim 
for damages in the civil courts. He may also claim com­
pensation for unfair dismissal. Damages are designed to
compensate the employee who has suffered as a result of the 
employer’s breach of contract. The employee ipso facto 
suffers if he is wrongfully dismissed. The object of 
damages is to put the innocent and sacked employee in the 
same position, financially at least, as he would have been 
had the contract been honoured by the employer.
24. Labour Code, s. 36(1)
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This does not mean that a contract of service may 
not be terminated. A contract of employment of an unspeci­
fied duration may indeed be terminated at any time at the 
will of either party provided that written notice, not 
subject to any condition precedent or subsequent, is given 
setting out the reasons for the termination. The 
employer may not keep silent when dismissing, however 
golden silence may be said to be. Unless an employee 
has repudiated his contract, he is entitled to his notice 
or his equivalent payment in its place (pay in lieu). The 
duration of such notice is often one to three months.
But much depends on the worker’s length of service in the 
industry and the occupational group to which he belongs.
The respective obligations of the employer and the employee 
do not cease during the period of notice. However, to 
enable the employee to seek alternative employment, the 
employer must allow him one day off (wages being fully paid) 
each week throughout the period of notice. The period of 
notice is unenforceable if the employer fails to do so. 
Moreover, the employee may claim damages if he was suffered 
any injury.
If a contract is terminated without notice being 
given or without the full period of notice being observed, 
the aggrieved party is entitled to compensation. The 
amount of compensation corresponds to the remuneration plus 
any bonuses and allowances which the employee would have 
received for the period of notice not being observed.
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However, a contract may be terminated without notice in 
cases of serious misconduct duly ascertained by the competent 
court of law. If the employee for example, sets fire to 
the factory, steals from his employer, is guilty of persis­
tent rudeness, negligence, lateness, absenteeism or the 
like, then it may well be that the employer is entitled to 
dismiss him.
Where the contract of employment is one of speci­
fied duration, it may not be terminated unilaterally by 
either party before its normal time of expiry. This is 
however not a hard and fast rule. Such a contract may in 
fact be terminated by either party or by mutual consent at 
any time if the contract so stipulates. Furthermore, the 
contract may be terminated at any time in the event of a 
serious offence. But as in the case of a contract of 
unspecified duration, it is the court and not the employer
who has to determine the seriousness of the misconduct or
2 5
offence. This reverses the old law, exemplified by cases
2 6such as Lobe Francois c. Societe P.Z. and Tantoh Peter c.
27Agence Camerounaise de Presse, under which it was the
25. Ibid., ss. 39 and 40.
26. CSCO, Arret No. 64/S du 2 fev. 1971, 1 R.C.D. 57 (1972).
27. CSCO,Arrgt No. 105/S du 9 mars 1971, 1 R.C.D. 58 (1972).
In this case the appellant had been dismissed from his 
job on the ground that he had occasioned a ’scandalous 
scene’ in his director’s office. The then East 
Cameroun Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, refusing to 
disturb the findings of fact by the court below.
Generally, one act of temper, one insolent out­
burst, should not merit so severe a punishment as dis­
missal. Such an act may earn a dismissal only when it 
was the last straw or when the worker had previously 
behaved with dumb insolence.
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employer who determined the seriousness of the misconduct 
or offence.
Every wrongful termination of a contract of 
employment gives rise to a claim for damages In the civil 
courts. There are many instances in which dismissal 
would be wrongful. A dismissal would be wrongful if 
effected because of the opinions of the employee, his 
trade union activity or his membership of a particular 
trade union. It is also wrongful if the employer fails, 
for no proper reasons, to renew a contract of service for 
a fixed term of two years or more, the contract being 
renewable yearly. To refuse an employee his proper salary 
or wage is a serious contractual breach. So if the boss 
decides to cut working week and pay drops along with it, 
the employer has broken his contract and this may amount 
to a wrongful dismissal. So too cutting of pay for no 
proper reasons. An employee would probably also be taken 
to have been wrongfully dismissed where, although his 
salary is kept at the same level, his status is reduced. 
Furthermore, an employee who ’resigns’ may be deemed wrong­
fully dismissed where there has been a constructive dismissal. 
A constructive dismissal takes place where the employee 
has not left his employment voluntarily but as a result of 
being constrained by the employer to do so.
In all cases of wrongful dismissal the onus is 
on the employer to satisfy the court that he had reasons 
for dismissing and that the reasons were proper ones.
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Once the employee has shown that he was dismissed (easy 
because it is required to be in writing) and that he did 
not leave voluntarily, then it is up to the employer to 
show the reason for the dismissal. In a good many cases, 
this is easy. Reasons include the employee’s conduct;
redundancy; lack of qualification or capability; 
absence of sufficient technical qualification; curtail­
ment of activities; and so on. Once there is a dismissal 
and a reason shown for it, then the employer has to prove
that he acted reasonably in treating the reason as suffi-
2 8cient in depriving the employee of his job.
In assessing the quantum of damages due to the 
plaintiff regard is had to all factors indicating that 
prejudice has been suffered. For example, the nature of 
the employment, length of service, age, and accrued rights 
are relevant factors which are taken into account. The 
award made must include compensation for failure to give 
notice.
A dismissal on the grounds of curtailment of 
activities in the industry, internal reorganisation, or 
staff reduction is proper provided the employer determines 
the order of dismissals (taking into account length of 
service, professional proficiency, and family responsibilities
28. Under the old law the onus was on the employee to show 
that the reason given by his boss was not sufficient to 
warrant his dismissal: Societe SOCAPAR c. Manga Jacques,
CSCO, Arrit No. 93/S du 2 mars 1971, 1 R.C.D. 57 (1972).
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of workers) and notifies the list of workers he proposes 
to dismiss to the shop stewards. An employer proposing 
to dismiss as redundant an employee must consult with the 
shop stewards and give notice to them and the Labour 
Inspector. He must disclose in writing not only the 
reason for his proposals and the numbers and description 
of employees whom it is proposed to dismiss as redundant, 
together with the total number of employees of any such 
description employed by him at the establishment in question 
but also (and more important) the proposed method of 
selecting the employees who may be dismissed and the pro­
posed method of carrying out dismissals, with due regard 
to any agreed procedure, including the period over which 
the dismissals are to take effect. If the employer claims
to have dismissed an employee on the grounds of ’staff
29reduction’ as he is entitled under the law to do it is
for him to show that the dismissal was in fact for that
purpose. The dismissal would be wrongful if it was in
reality made for another undisclosed reason. In Mamadou
10Namadina c. Societe des Grands Travaux de l ’Est the 
respondent purported to have dismissed the appellant for 
reasons of ’staff reduction’ as provided under s. 43(6) of 
the Labour Code. It was found as a fact that the respon­
dent had done so in order to deprive the appellant of his
29. Labour Code, s. 43(6); CFAO c. Nd,~j eng Enock, CSCO, 
Arret No. 103/S du 9 mars 1971, CSCO, Arr§t No. 109/S 
du 23 mars 1971, 1 R.C.D. 58 (1972).
30. C.A. de Garoua, Arret No. 8/S du 10 jan. 1975, Le 
Monde du Travail, No. 4, 1977, p. 17-
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seniority benefits. Held, by the Garoua Court of Appeal
11that this was a case of wrongful dismissal.
An employee’s contract of employment with the 
employer is unaffected by any subsequent change in the legal 
status of the employer. The contract remains fully effec­
tive and it makes no difference that the change in status 
has been brought about through succession, sale, amal­
gamation, financial reorganisation, or transformation into 
a partnership or company. Similarly, the closure of the 
establishment, except brought about by force majeure, does 
not absolve the employer from his obligation to adhere to 
the rules laid down by law. A closure brought about by 
bankruptcy or liquidation is not a closure as a result of 
force majeure. If an employee wrongfully terminates his 
contract of service and enters the service of another 
employer, he may be sued for damages. The new employer 
may also be joined in the action if he can be shown to have
(i) enticed the employee away from his previous employment,
(ii) engaged the employee knowing him to be already bound 
by a contract of employment, or (iii) kept the employee in 
his service after learning that he was still bound to 
another employer by contract of employment.
A contract of employment may be suspended.
31. In Chambre de Commerce c. F. Philippe, CSCO, Arrdt 
No. 77/S du 6 juin 1972, 8 R.C.D. 178 (1975), a dis­
missal was held to be wrongful where the employee had 
dismissed a worker without verifying whether he had 
received a message ordering him to report back for work 
or be considered as having resigned.
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Suspension is proper in the following circumstances:
(i) where the employee or the employer is required for 
military service, (ii) where the worker is absent as a 
result of illness medically certified, (iii) during the 
period of maternity leave, (iv) during any period of 
disciplinary suspension of the worker, (v) during any 
period of leave for workerTs education, (vi) during the 
period of absence as a result of industrial accident or 
occupational disease, (vii) by mutual consent for the 
period of a parliamentary mandate or during the exercise 
of duties of member of Government, and (viii) during the 
period of preventive detention of an employee where such 
an employee is eventually given a nonsuit or a full dis­
charge. Save as otherwise provided by law, the general 
contract law principle remains that a contract which is 
suspended produces no effect while it remains suspended.
The situation where a contract of employment is suspended 
following the preventive detention of the employee, calls 
for particular comment. First, the determination whether 
the contract is suspended or not is made ex post facto: 
only when a full discharge or a non-suit has been given is 
one in a position to say the contract was in suspension 
during the period of the employee’s detention; if there is
32. In either of these two cases, the worker must be com­
pensated by the employer where the contract is one of 
an unspecified duration. Labour Code, s.47. This 
is an exception to the general principle in contract 
law whereby a contract which has been suspended pro­
duces no effect whilst it remains suspended.
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no non-suit or full discharge the contract is taken to have 
been terminated as from the first day the employee was 
thrown in detention. Secondly, although a non-suit or 
a full discharge revives the contract, it is in effect 
treated as though it were a fresh one. Take the case 
of Debalou Njila where an employee of that name had been 
in preventive detention for three and a half years.
After he had been given a full discharge he went back and 
resumed his previous job. On a claim to be entitled to 
promotion, seniority, and pay, it was held by the Supreme 
Court of Cameroon, (1) that he could claim neither pay, 
seniority, nor right to be promoted for the period he was 
in detention, (2) that a court sitting as a labour court 
has no jurisdiction to award damages for illegal detention. 
It makes no difference, it would seem, that the detention 
had come about as a result of a frivolous or malicious 
complaint made to the police by the employer against the
34employee.
33. CSCO, Arret No. 45/S du 12 juin 1975, Le Monde du 
Travail, No. 5, 1978, p. 21.
34. Cf. CSCO, Arr§t du 2 juin 1967, Bulletin, p. 1755, 
where an employee was detained for five months following 
a malicious complaint by his employer. See also, CSCO, 
Arr§t No. 110/S du 23 mars 1971, Arret No. 166/S du
29 juin 1971, and Trzonkawski c. Botto, CSCO, Arret 
No. 60/S du 19 jan. 1971, 1 R.C.D. 59 (1972). In 
these cases, decided under the old Labour Code, it was 
held that an employer is entitled to dismiss an em­
ployee who has been detained, particularly so if 
during the period of detention the employer had en­
gaged another employee. The fact that the employee was 
eventually given a full discharge was held to be irre­
levant. These decisions are no longer good law under 
the present Labour Code.
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On the expiry of a contract of employment, 
whether by effluxion of time or termination (whatever the 
reason for it) the employer must deliver to the employee 
a certificate (exempted from stamp and registration fees) 
stating only the dates of his arrival at and departure 
from the establishment and the nature and dates of the 
various posts held by the employee.
c) Sub-contractors
A sub-contractor is defined in s . 54 of the 
Labour Code as a person who enters into an oral or written 
contract with a contractor to carry out specified work 
or furnish specified services for an agreed price and him­
self recruits the necessary workers. His legal position 
is one of an employee in certain respects and one of an 
employer in other respects. He is an employee vis-a-vis 
the head contractor but an employer vis-a-vis the workers 
he recruits. Ordinarily, obligations (pecuniary or 
otherwise) towards the workers are met by the sub-contractor. 
But in the event of the sub-contractor being insolvent 
the head contractor must shoulder all the obligations of 
the sub-contractor towards the workers. For example, he 
becomes liable to pay the workers’ wages. Even absent the 
case of the sub-contractor’s insolvency, an employee who
has suffered loss has a right of direct action against the
35head contractor. It is partly for this reason that the
35. Labour Code, s. 55.
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sub-contractor is required to put up permanent notices in 
all workshops or other business premises used indicating 
that he is a sub-contractor and giving the name and
o C.
address of the head contractor.
B . Collective agreements
By s. 58(1) of the Labour Code, a collective 
agreement is "an agreement intended to regulate labour 
relations between employers and workers either of an 
undertaking or group of undertakings or of one or more 
branches of activity. This agreement shall be con­
cluded between: the representatives of one or more trade
unions or a federation of trade unions on the one hand; 
the representative of one or more employers’ association 
or any other group of employers or one or more employers 
acting individually on the other hand."
Any collective agreement may, subject to public 
policy considerations, contain terms which are more 
favourable to workers than those of the laws and regu­
lations in force. In fact this is the primary objective 
of any collective agreement. Any collective agreement 
must define its scope of application (which may be local, 
inter-divisional or national). Employees and employers 
not involved in any collective agreement may nevertheless,
36. Labour Code, s. 56.
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through their unions, decide to contract in. This is 
effected by the trade unions requesting the Minister of 
Labour to extend the provisions of the collective agree­
ment to and render compulsory for all employers and 
employees within the territorial and industrial scope of 
the agreement. They are also free to contract out if 
they so wish. If it appears that the agreement is no 
longer in keeping with the conditions of the branch of 
activity in the area concerned, its extension may be 
revoked.
Collective agreements must comply with certain 
conditions as to form and substance. These conditions 
are laid down in Decree No. 75/50 of 22 January 1975 
(Rules as to form and substance governing collective 
agreements). Under this decree a collective agreement 
is concluded for an indeterminate period. The agreement 
must stipulate in what form and at what time in the course 
of its implementation it may be terminated or revised.
It must specify in particular the period of notice of the 
termination. If no such specification is made, the 
period of notice shall be three months. Any collective 
agreement must contain provisions concerning such matters 
as the right to form trade unions and freedom of opinion, 
conditions of recruitment and termination of workers, 
duration of trial period and conditions and period of notice, 
compensation for termination of employment, wages applicable, 
special conditions concerning the grant of housing, special
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working conditions, travelling allowances, leave, trans­
portation, and so on. Each collective agreement must be 
deposited at the Registry of the Court of First Instance 
of the place where it has been concluded. The date of 
deposit is crucial because it serves as a starting point 
for the period of application of the agreement, of notifi­
cation or revision, of termination, of contracting in or 
out. On the 2nd September 1976 a collective agreement 
governing agricultural undertakings and related activi­
ties was signed between The Union des Syndicats professionels 
agricoles et activites connexes du Cameroun (U.S.P.A.C.) 
and the Syndicat des Planteur de 1 ’Est-Cameroun on the one 
hand, and the National Union of Cameroon Workers (N.U.C.W.) 
on the other hand. This Agreement was, by Decree No. 77/201 
of 29 June 19775 extended to and rendered compulsory for 
all employers and workers included in its industrial scope 
throughout the territory. Similarly extended by Decree 
No. 77/202 of 29 June 1977 was the collective agreement 
governing undertakings in public works, building and related 
activities concluded on 16 June 1976 between the Union des 
Syndicats Professionnels du Cameroun (U.S.P.C.) and the 
National Union of Cameroon Workers (N.U.C.W.).
In order to adapt the provisions of collective 
agreements to the particular conditions in designated 
establishments (especially the conditions of award and rules 
for calculating payment by results, bonuses based on indi­
vidual or group output, and productivity bonuses) agreements
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relating to one or more specified establishments may be 
made between an employer or group of employers, on the one 
hand, and representatives of the trade unions which are 
most representative of the personnel of the establishment 
concerned, on the other hand. These agreements are known 
as company agreements and may include new provisions and 
clauses which are more favourable to the employees. If 
no collective agreement exists, a company agreement may 
deal only with wages and payments accessory to wages.
2. Wages
The term ’wages' as used in the Labour Code means 
"remuneration or earnings, capable of being evaluated in 
terms of money and fixed by mutual agreement or by the 
provisions of regulations or collective agreements, which 
are payable by virtue of a written or unwritten contract 
of employment by an employer to a worker for work done or 
to be done or for services rendered or to be rendered".
A. Determination of wages
The law forbids any form of discrimination. So 
there must be no discrimination whatsoever in determining 
the wages payable to an employee. For the same type of
37. Labour Code, s. 67(1).
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work, qualifications and output, workers are entitled to 
the same remuneration, irrespective of their colour, origin, 
sex, age, status in society, or belief. Equal pay for 
like work. The rates of remuneration for task and piece 
work must be so calculated that they provide a worker of 
average capacity, working normally, with a wage at least 
equal to that of a worker engaged on similar work and paid 
by unit of time. The employer must put up in the pay 
office or other place where workers are paid, the minimum 
wage rates and the conditions of remuneration for task or 
piece work.
Housing and alimental facilities must be provided 
to the workers by the employer. The obligation to provide 
housing however arises where the employer has transferred 
the employee to perform a contract of employment necessi­
tating the installation of the worker outside his normal 
place of residence. The accommodation provided must be 
adequate, correspond to the family status of the worker, 
and satisfy the conditions fixed by the Minister of Labour. 
If suitable accommodation cannot be provided, the employer 
must pay the employee a housing allowance, the minimum rate 
of which is fixed by the Minister of Labour.
The obligation to provide alimental facilities 
(furnishing a daily food ration) arises where the worker 
to whom the employer provides accommodation cannot, 
through his own efforts, obtain for himself and his family 
a regular supply of foodstuffs. The provision of this
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facility is however not gratuitous. It is subject to 
payment. A similar but optional facility which the 
employer may provide is what is known as ’company stores’. 
This is an arrangement whereby an employer directly or 
indirectly sells or supplies goods to workers in his 
employment for their normal personal requirements. An 
employer may operate a company store provided the workers 
are free to obtain or not to obtain their supplies from 
there, alcohol and spirituous liquors are not offered for 
sale, and the accounts of the company store are kept separate 
and subject to inspection by a workers’ committee.
Wage zones and rates of the guaranteed minimum 
industrial, commercial and agricultural wage; occupational 
categories and the minimum wages applicable to such cate­
gories; the minimum rates of remuneration for overtime, 
night work, work on Sundays and public holidays; the rates 
of compensation for termination; travelling allowances 
and attendance bonuses - these are all fixed by decree 
after consultation with the National Labour Council.
Where the remuneration of the services of an 
employee consists in whole or in part of commissions or of 
sundry bonuses and allowances or compensation in lieu of 
such allowances, such remuneration (insofar as it does not 
constitute a refund of expenses) must be taken into account 
in calculating remuneration during paid holidays, compen­
sation in lieu of notice and damages.
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B. Payment of wages
a) Mode of payment
Wages must be paid in legal tender, the Cameroonian 
CFA francs. Payment by any other currency or method is 
illegal. Nor may payment be made by cheque. How often 
wages should be paid depends on the nature of the trade or 
occupation. As a general rule however, wages are payable 
at regular intervals not exceeding fifteen days in the 
case of workers engaged by the hour, and one month in the 
case of monthly paid workers. Such monthly payments must 
be made not later than eight days following the end of the 
month of employment in respect of which the wages are 
payable. Wages are payable on working days only and at 
or near the work place. They may not be paid in licensed 
premises or in a shop or store except in the case of 
workers who are normally employed there.
Every payment of wages made is required to be 
evidenced by a document (which must be preserved and pre­
sented for inspection if required) made out or certified 
by the employer or his representative and initialled by 
each worker or by two witnesses if the worker is unable 
to sign. In addition, the employer must, at the time of 
payment, give the worker an individual pay slip or other 
document prepared by a modern accounting procedure, in 
the form prescribed by the Minister of Labour.
However, the fact that a worker has signed an 
entry of the words Tin full settlement1 or any similar
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expression either during the performance of his contract 
of employment or after its termination, whereby he pur­
ports to waive all or part of his rights under the con­
tract of employment is inadmissible in court as evidence 
of satisfaction. Similarly, acceptance of the pay slip 
by the worker without protest or reservation does not 
amount to a waiver by him of payment of all or any part 
of any wages, allowances or supplementary payments which 
may be payable to him by virtue of laws, regulations or 
contractual provisions.
The employee is entitled to his wages whether the 
establishment runs at full tilt or is operating at half 
steam. While this is true of salaried staff, the situation 
is otherwise for daily paid workers and those who are paid 
by the unit. Unless they have opportunity to work they 
have no claim to payment and cannot be paid. The law 
also gives protection to the employee of an insolvent 
undertaking. So, up to the limit of the percentage of 
wages not liable to attachment wages debts are preferred 
debts having priority over all other general or special 
privileged debts. An employee may bring an action for the 
recovery of his wages. But the action is barred after 
three years. Time begins to run from the date on which 
wages fell due. It ceases to run in the case of either 
a written or an oral claim by the worker to the Labour 
Inspector concerning payment of the wage or making up of 
account, private acknowledgement of debt or unexpired 
summons.
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b ) Deductions from wages
Apart from compulsory levies, reimbursement of 
the value of any facilities provided and any deposits 
which may be stipulated in collective agreements or indi­
vidual contracts, deductions from workers’ wages are per­
missible only in the following cases: (i) where there is
a court order of attachment, (ii) ordinary trade union 
contributions due from workers, (iii) voluntary assignment 
to which the worker has subscribed in person, (iv) where 
a friendly society providing for payment of contributions 
by workers has been instituted. Any contractual pro­
vision authorising any other deduction from the employee's 
wages is null and void. Furthermore, any sum withheld 
from a worker without proper justification bears interest 
payable to the worker at the statutory rate from the date 
on which it should have been paid and may be claimed by him 
at any time (unless the right to do so becomes statute 
barred).
In calculating any reductions regard must be had 
not only to the wages proper but also to all payments 
supplementary thereto. The following payments are 
however disregarded: allowances specified as unattachable
by regulations in force, and sums payable by way of reim­
bursement of expenses incurred by the worker and any bene­
fits due under the social insurance legislation and regu­
lations issued thereunder.
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3. Working conditions
Subject to exemptions made by decree, the working 
week In all public and private non-agricultural establish­
ments In Cameroon may not exceed 48 hours. In agricul­
tural or similar undertakings the hours of work are based 
on a total of 2400 hours per year within the maximum limits 
of 8 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Night work 
(i.e. from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) may be undertaken by adult
male workers only. As a general rule admitting of only
rare exceptions, the employment of women and children for 
night work in industry is prohibited. All employees must 
be granted a weekly rest (usually on Sundays) of at least 
24 consecutive hours; this rest may under no circumstances 
be replaced by an allowance as compensation. Women and 
children employees are in addition entitled- to at least 12 
consecutive hours of rest every day.
A . Women and children
a) Women
Women, whether pregnant or not, may not be 
employed to do any job which is dangerous or insalubrious. 
Jobs of this nature are specified in a joint order of the
Ministers of Labour and Health. A pregnant female
employee has, in addition, a number of rights and privi­
leges. She may terminate her contract of employment 
without notice. She is entitled to do so with impunity.
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She may not be sued for damages for breach of contract.
No action for compensation lies against her for failure 
to give notice.
She is entitled to paid maternity leave. This 
leave starts 4 weeks before the presumed date of confinement 
and ends 10 weeks after the last day of confinement.
She has in effect a right to at least a total of 3^ - months 
maternity leave. This leave may, in any case, be extended 
by another l-^- months in the event of a duly certified ill­
ness resulting from either the pregnancy or confinement.
An employer may not terminate the contract of a female 
employee on maternity leave. While on such leave the 
female employee is entitled to the various benefits pro­
vided for by legislation in matters of social and family 
welfare. She is entitled to a daily allowance payable 
by the National Social Insurance Fund. This allowance 
is equal to the amount of the wages actually received at 
the time of suspension of the contract of employment.
The female employee on maternity leave is also entitled to 
retain the right to benefits in kind.
Any female worker who has just had a baby is 
entitled to nursing breaks (not exceeding one hour per 
working day) for a period of fifteen months following the 
birth of the child. During this period, the mother also 
has the prerogative of terminating (if she so wishes) her 
contract of employment without giving notice. She may 
not be sued for damages or for compensation in consequence 
thereof.
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b ) Children
No child who has not attained the age of fourteen 
may be employed in an undertaking, even as an apprentice. 
However, taking into account local circumstances and the 
nature of the job the child may be required to do, the 
Minister of Labour may exceptionally authorise the employ­
ment of a child who is below fourteen years of age. Young 
persons (that is, children of between 14 and 18 years of 
age) may be employed on board ships in certain circumstances. 
But only a person of over 18 years of age may be employed 
on board ship as a trimmer or stoker.
The Labour Inspector may order women and children 
to be medically examined by an approved medical practitioner 
in order to ascertain that the job allotted to them is not 
beyond their strength. The Inspector must, on the request 
of the child or woman, give such an order* If a job is 
found to be beyond the strength of the woman or child, he 
or she must be transferred to a more suitable job. If 
this is not possible, the contract may be terminated without 
previous notice and without liability on either party.
B. Holiday and travel
Leave is granted to the worker so that he might 
rest and recuperate his energy. So, every employee is 
entitled to leave which, except otherwise stipulated in 
collective agreements or individual contracts, after a 
period of actual service of one year. Collective agreements
694.
or individual contracts may stipulate otherwise; but a 
contractual proviso under which holiday accrues for any 
period longer than two years is null and void. The 
employee must claim his leave as soon as he can. Any 
leave not claimed after three years may no longer be 
claimed. If the contract of employment is terminated 
before the employee has claimed his leave, he is entitled 
to compensation in lieu thereof. This is the only 
situation in which compensation may be paid in lieu of 
leave. It is prohibited to make such payments in other
cases. There are two types of holiday, paid and unpaid.
a) Paid holiday
Subject to more favourable contractual provisions, 
an employee is entitled to paid holiday (paid by the 
employer) at the rate of one and a half working days (2 -^ 
for children and 2 for women) each month of actual service. 
He is also entitled to a maximum of ten days, per year, of 
paid special leave of absence (not deductible from annual 
holiday) on the occasion of family events directly concer­
ning his home.
38. Any period equivalent to 4 weeks’ or 24 days work is 
deemed to be one month of effective service. In 
determining leave entitlement periods of unavaila­
bility by reason of industrial accident or occupational 
disease, absence due to illness for up to a limit of 
six months certified by a medical doctor, and absence 
on maternity leave are deemed to be periods of service.
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b ) Unpaid holiday
Unpaid holiday the duration of which may not be 
deducted from the annual paid leave, may be granted, at 
his request, to a worker or apprentice who wishes to attend 
a course exclusively devoted to workers’ education or 
trade union training and arranged either by a centre attached 
to a workers’ trade union organisation recognised as repre­
sentative at national level or by an organisation, institu­
tion or agency specially approved to this effect by the 
Minister of Labour.
The duration of the holiday, which may be split up, 
is 12 working days if the course is held inside the national 
territory or 18 working days if it is held elsewhere. In 
either case the period of leave is deemed to be one of 
actual service for the purposes of calculating the employee’s 
paid holiday, his entitlement to family allowances, and his 
total period of service in the establishment. For pur­
poses other than these, the contract of employment is deemed 
to be suspended during this holiday period.
c) Travelling expenses
The employer is liable for the travelling expenses 
of the employee, his spouse and minor children normally 
residing with him and the cost of transportation of their 
luggage, where performance of the contract of employment 
requires or has required an employee to move from the place 
in which he usually resides. Costs of travel and transport 
are regarded as allowances in kind. They are therefore
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paid only in case of actual travel by the worker and his 
family. An employee who has terminated his service is 
also entitled to transport, provided by the employer, to 
take him to his usual place of residence. Entitlement 
to travelling and transport expenses must be claimed within 
three years.
C . Hygiene, safety and medical facilities
Employees must not merely be protected from the 
vagaries of business disaster; against wrongful and unfair 
dismissal and redundancy; or against the contractual 
miseries of working life. They must also be protected
against loss of limb and life.
a) Hygiene and safety
Industry produces each year deaths, accidents 
and diseases contracted at or resulting from work and 
causing disablement or death. The law has in various ways 
sought to see to it that industrial injuries are prevented. 
All work places are required by law to be hygienic and 
safe: adequate lighting and ventilation, proper toilet
facilities, safety on floors, fencing of dangerous machinery, 
defective equipment not to be used, alarm system, incendiary 
precautions, safety exits, and so on. The minimum hygiene 
and safety conditions required of any place of work are laid 
down by orders of the Minister of Labour issued after 
consultation with the National Commission for Industrial
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Hygiene and Safety. The orders take into account local 
conditions and contingencies. Generally, they aim at 
securing for the employees standards of hygiene and safety 
conforming with those recommended by the International 
Labour Organisation and other technical bodies inter­
nationally recognised.
It is the duty of the Medical Labour Inspector 
to see to it that the laid down standards are adhered to 
by the employer. Where working conditions endangering 
the safety or health of the employees but not covered by 
the Minister1s orders are found to exist, the Labour or 
Medical Labour Inspector must request the employer to 
remedy the situation. If he objects, the dispute is 
referred to the National Commission for Industrial Hygiene 
and Safety for a ruling thereon. Flouting of safety rules 
is not to be countenanced. An employer may be held liable 
for defective equipment. One thing which the law should 
do is to give workers protection through compulsory 
insurance. Every employer should be required to insure 
and maintain insurance under one or more approved policies 
with an authorised insurer or insurers against liability 
for bodily injury or disease sustained by his employees 
and arising out of and in the course of their employment.
As a.general rule, it is forbidden to bring and/or 
consume alcoholic beverages into any place of work during 
working hours. However, such beverages may, upon authori­
sation, be consumed within the establishment only during
698.
normal break periods and exclusively within the canteens 
and dining rooms placed at the disposal of workers by the 
employer.
b ) Medical services at places of employment
39Every undertaking and establishment of any kind 
must provide a medical and health service for its workers. 
It is the duty of such a service to supervise conditions 
in respect of hygiene in the establishment, the risk of 
contagion, the state of health of the workers (including 
that of their wives and children) and to take appropriate 
preventive measures including the provision of necessary 
medical care. The medical and health service may be 
organised in the form of a separate service within the 
establishment concerned, or in the form of a joint service 
for several establishments, or on the basis of a contract 
or agreement made with a public or private hospital.
Employees must undergo a medical examination 
within eight days of their employment. Thereafter they 
are subject to periodical medical supervision. It is the 
duty of the employer to provide free medical care to his 
employees (and their families, if housed by the employer), 
free board for every sick worker detained in the infirmary 
at his establishment, and to arrange for the removal to the
39. Public or private, lay or religious, civilian or mili­
tary, including those where persons are employed in 
connection with work in the professions and those 
belonging to trade unions or employers’ associations.
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nearest medical unit of any sick or injured person fit 
to be moved and who cannot be treated with the facilities 
at the employer’s disposal.
II. Workers’ and Employers’ Organisations and Other Bodies
This section deals with trade unions and employers’ 
associations (para. 1), labour administration (para. 2), and 
professional institutions (para. 3).
1. Trade unions and employers’ associations
Employers’ associations are to employers what 
trade unions are to employees; each seeks to protect and 
to defend the interests of its members.
A . Formation of trade unions and employers’ associations
The law recognises the right of workers and 
employers, without distinction whatsoever, to establish 
freely and without prior authorisation organisations (trade 
unions and employers’ associations) for the study, defence, 
promotion, and protection of their interests, particularly 
those of an economic, industrial, commercial or agricultural 
character, and for the social, economic, cultural and 
moral progress of the members. However, all political 
activity by such unions and associations which is not con­
nected with the furtherance of these objectives are
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prohibited.^
Any persons forming a trade union or an employers’
association must register it in the proper manner with the
4lregistrar of trade unions and employers’ associations
who would then issue a certificate of registration if
satisfied that all the necessary conditions for registration
have been fulfilled. Application for registration must be
made within three months of the formation of the trade
42union or employers’ association. The union or asso­
ciation must also be dissolved within three months of the
date on which the registrar notifies his refusal to effect
43the registration or his cancellation of the certificate
44of registration. Every application for registration must
40. Labour Code, s. 3*
41. The registrar is a Government civil servant appointed 
by decree.
42. The trade union or employers’ association legally comes 
into existence only on the day the certificate of 
registration is issued.
43. By s. 14 of the Labour Code, any person aggrieved by 
a decision of the registrar to refuse or to cancel 
registration of a trade union or an employers’ asso­
ciation may, within thirty days of the notification of 
such decision, refer the matter to the competent court.
44. The registrar will cancel the registration if he is 
satisfied: (i) that the certificate of its regis­
tration was obtained by fraud or mistake, (ii) that
its registration has become void on grounds of unlawful 
purpose, (iii) that there has been on the part of the 
organisation a wilful violation of the law, or (iv) 
that the registered organisation has ceased to exist. 
See Labour Code, s. 13.
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be signed by at least twenty workers, in the case of a 
trade union, and at least five employers, in the case of 
an employers’ association. The persons applying for 
registration and members responsible for the organisation’s 
management and administration must possess their civil 
rights and must not have been convicted of any offence 
involving the forfeitures laid down in s. 30(1 )(2)(6) of 
the Penal Code.
Trade unions and employers’ associations have the 
right to draw up their own constitutions and rules, to 
elect their representatives freely and to organise their 
administration. However, the constitution of any trade 
union or employers’ association must include, inter alia, 
the name of the union or association, its registered office 
to which all communications and notices may be sent, its 
objects, provision for keeping full and accurate accounts, 
provisions for appointment and removal of members, and 
dissolution.
An employer is free to join or not to join an 
employers’ association. Similarly, every employee has 
the right to join or not to join a trade union. An 
employee cannot be dismissed from or made to relinquish or 
be refused a job on the sole ground of his membership or 
non-membership of a union. An employee wishing to join a 
trade union must be gainfully employed at the material 
time. His membership of the union does not however cease 
simply because he is out of work. If a worker never joined
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a trade union while he was gainfully employed, he may not 
do so when he becomes unemployed.
Trade unionism began in Cameroon after the 
Second World War and by 1972 there were no less than five 
large recognised unions with a total membership of about 
100,000 workers: the Cameroon Federation of Unions
(Federation des Syndicats du Cameroun, FSC), the Union of 
Denominational Workers Organisations (Union des Syndicats 
Croyants du Cameroun, USCC), the National Teachers Union 
(Syndicat National des Enseignants du Cameroun, SNEC), 
the National Federation of Private Schools Teachers 
(Fdddration Nationale des Enseignants prives du Cameroun, 
FNEPCAM), and the Cameroon Development Corporation Workers 
Union. In 1972 the various trade union organisations 
in the country merged together to form the National Union 
of Cameroonian Workers. Employers’ associations include 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Agriculture and 
associations of those engaged in industry and the import- 
export trade.
45. In 1973/74 there were only 180,482 wage earners in
Cameroon. They worked in agriculture, mining, manu­
facturing industry, chemical industries, public works, 
electrical industries, transport, commerce, public 
service and as contract workers and labourers. Of 
the 180,482 wage earners 169,394 were men and 11,088 
were women. In 1975 2,985,000 persons out of an 
African population of 6,425,000, were estimated to 
be economically active. See, African South of the 
Sahara 1978-79, Europa Publication, London, 1978, 
p. 283.
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B . Functioning of trade unions and employers’ associations
Every trade union or employers’ association must 
have a treasurer who must keep a true account of all 
monies received and paid by him since he last rendered a 
like account. Union accounts and those of employers’ 
associations are subject to Government control. The 
treasurer of each union or association must transmit to 
the registrar of unions and associations, before September 
1st of each year, a general statement of the receipts, funds, 
effects and expenditure in respect of the proceeding 
calendar year. The statement must show fully the assets 
and liabilities as at the end of the financial year and 
the receipt and expenditure in respect of the various 
objects of the union or association. In addition, the 
registrar may at any time call upon the treasurer or 
management committee of the union or association to render 
detailed accounts of its finances. If the registrar is 
of the opinion that the general statement of account is 
unsatisfactory or that the accounts are inaccurate, he may 
order all the account books, records and documents to be 
sent to him for examination or, alternatively, appoint an 
auditor to do so.
Registered trade unions and employers' asso­
ciations may have legal status. They may sue and be sued 
in any court of law. They may acquire moveable and 
immoveable property by way of purchase, gift inter vivos, 
legacy or bequest and put them into any lawful use in the
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Interest of its members. They may also engage in any 
lawful activity that would benefit its members socially, 
educationally, culturally, financially or otherwise.
Trade unions and employers’ associations may also act in 
concert. In particular, they may form federations of any 
kind and under any name.
An employer may deduct from the wages earned by 
a worker under his control the ordinary trade union con­
tribution due from the worker, provided that the employer 
immediately pays the contribution so deducted to the 
trade union specified by the worker. These deductions 
may be made only under the following situations: (i) where
an agreement to that effect has been freely concluded bet­
ween the employer concerned and the trade unions to which 
the contributions are to be paid, (ii) where the worker 
has signified his consent thereto in writing, by signing 
or affixing his finger prints to a form jointly accepted 
by the employer and the trade union; this consent may be 
withdrawn or renewed by tacit agreement, and (iii) where 
the trade union undertakes to devote a proportion of the 
income so acquired to social security services for its 
members.
2. Labour administration
The Labour and Social Insurance Administration 
comprises all services responsible for all matters relating
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to the conditions of workers, labour relations, employment, 
manpower movements, vocational guidance and training, 
placement, the protection of workers’ health, and social 
insurance problems. In labour administration, the Labour 
and Social Insurance Inspector (often referred to as the 
Labour Inspector) is a key figure. He has a wide range of 
duties and prerogatives. It is through him that control 
is exercised over the various industries and other estab­
lishments .
A. Duties of the Labour Inspector
A Labour Inspector is a civil servant placed at 
the head of a Labour and Social Insurance Inspectorate.
His is a stable job and he is expected to have no interest 
whatsoever in the establishments under his supervision. 
Before assuming his dutes, the Labour Inspector swears 
before the relevant Court of Appeal to carry out his duties 
well and faithfully and not to reveal, even after leaving 
the service, any manufacturing secrets or other processes 
with which he has become acquainted in the course of his 
duties.
The inspector receives all complaints about defec­
tive installations and machinery as well as any flouting 
of safety rules or administrative regulations in the 
industry. He must keep the source of such complaints con­
fidential. When he proceeds to inspect any factory or 
establishment he must not intimate that the inspection is
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being carried out following a complaint. Labour Inspec­
tors are required to go on inspection tours of and to 
make inquiries about undertakings to ensure that labour 
laws and regulations are not contravened.
.A Labour Inspector with the proper credentials 
is empowered to inspect any establishment at any time 
(day or night) and without notice. Once there he may 
carry out any examination or test, interrogate employer 
and employees, inspect any books or registers, or remove 
any sample of materials for analysis. If any labour law 
or regulation has been flouted such infringements are 
recorded in an official report, having force of prima 
facie evidence in the event of prosecution of the employer.
B . Control of establishments
No establishment of any kind may be opened 
without a declaration having first been submitted to the 
Labour Inspector. Every employer, whether public or 
private, and irrespective of the nature of his activity, 
must supply to the Labour Inspector detailed information, 
in the form of a declaration, concerning the situation of 
the manpower employed by him. Every employer must also 
maintain at the work place and keep constantly up to date 
a register called the ’employers’ register’ which records 
such information as would enable the control services of 
the labour administration to exercise supervision.
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3. Professional institutions
A . The National Labour Council
This Council has a twofold function. First, 
it studies problems relating to labour, employment, 
vocational guidance and training, placement, movements 
of labour, migration, improvement of material conditions 
of workers, and social insurance. Secondly, it gives 
advice and formulates proposals and resolutions concerning 
laws and regulations to be made in these matters.
The Council is presided over by the Minister 
of Labour and consists of two members from the National 
Assembly, two from the Economic and Social Council, two 
from the Supreme Court, an equal number of permanent and 
substitute representatives of workers and employers 
appointed by the Minister of Labour, and, where appro­
priate, experts and technicians sitting in an advisory 
capacity appointed by the Minister of Labour.
B . The National Joint Collective Agreements and Wages Board
Also presided over by the Minister of Labour, this 
Board consists of an equal number of employers’ and workers’ 
representatives designated by the most representative 
employers' and workers' organisations. The Board has the 
following terms of reference: (i) make any suggestions
and recommendations in the matter of collective agreements,
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(ii) make any recommendations to the employers’ asso­
ciations and union organisations concerning any provision 
deemed advisable to include in the collective agreement 
and the fixing of the general level of wages in the private 
sector and eventual wage increases, and (iii) come to any 
decision binding upon employers and workers of the private 
sector concerning the standard national classification of 
occupations, minimum wage rate and the rate and conditions 
of granting bonuses, allowances and social benefits.
C . The National Commission for Industrial Hygiene and 
Safety
This Commission comes under the Minister of Labour. 
Its principal function is to study all problems relating 
to industrial medicine and to the hygiene and safety of 
workers. It is made up of technicians or experts of 
’unquestionable’ competence in the fields of industrial 
medicine, and industrial hygiene and safety. Workers 
and employers are represented in equal numbers within the 
Commission.
D . Shop stewards
Shop stewards are elected by their fellow workers 
on secret ballot. They hold office for two years. The 
term of office is renewable. The number of shop stewards 
in a given shop depends on the total labour force in that
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particular establishment. The actual numbers are fixed 
by order of the Minister of Labour but each undertaking 
must have at least two shop stewards. Any dispute con­
cerning eligibility or the regularity of elections must 
be referred to the Court of First Instance having terri­
torial jurisdiction. If the dispute concerns eligibility 
either to vote or to stand for election the matter must 
be referred to the court within three days of publication 
of the electoral list. But if the dispute relates to 
the manner in which the elections were conducted it has to 
be referred to the court within 15 days of the announce­
ment of the results of the elections.
The duties of shop stewards are: (i) to refer
to the employers any individual or collective demands 
which have not been directly acceded to, in respect of 
conditions of employment, workers’ protection, the appli­
cation of collective agreements, classification of occu­
pations, and wage rates; (ii) to refer to the Inspectorate 
of Labour any complaint or representation in respect of 
the application of the laws and regulations which the said 
Inspectorate is responsible for enforcing; (iii) to ensure 
that the rules relating to hygiene and safety of workers 
and to social insurance are observed, and to recommend 
any necessary action in these matters; and (iv) to trans­
mit to the employer any useful suggestions for improving 
the organisation and output of the undertaking. Although 
shop stewards serve as intermediaries between workers and
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the employer, workers are not denied direct access to the 
employer. Each worker Is entitled to submit his demands 
and suggestions personally to the employer.
The law gives shop stewards protection against 
the possible wrath of the employer. No shop steward 
may be transferred or fired without the prior authori­
sation of the Labour Inspector. Any purported dismissal 
without the requisite authorisation from the Labour 
Inspector is null and void and of no effect. So in
Egllse Presbyterlenne du Cameroun & Hopital de Donenkeng 
46c. Engoute the dismissal of a shop steward was held to 
be wrongful where, among other things, the prior authori­
sation of the Labour Inspector had not been obtained. A 
dismissal would however be in order if the necessary autho­
risation has been sought and obtained; and it makes no
difference that the dismissal was effected before the
47expiration of the period of notice. Moreover, if a
shop steward is guilty of serious misconduct, the employer
is entitled to suspend him while waiting for the Labour
48
Inspector's authorisation to dismiss him. A request for
authorisation to dismiss a shop steward is deemed granted
where the Labour Inspector fails to reply within three
49months of the request being made.
46. Footnote 21.
47. CSCO, Arr§t No. 40/S du 15 fevr. 1973, 6 R.C.D. 169 
(1974).
48. Labour Code, s. 137(2).
49. Ibid., s. 137(3).
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Ill, Resolution of Labour Disputes
A labour dispute between employee(s) and 
employer(s) may arise as a collective or an individual 
dispute. Each type is resolved in its own way.
1. Resolution of collective disputes
A collective dispute is one which is character­
ised by (i) the intervention of a group of wage-earning 
workers, whether or not the said workers are organised in 
a trade union; and (ii) the collective nature of the 
interests at stake. The resolution of collective disputes 
is done extra-judicially. Such disputes are settled 
administratively by conciliation or failing which, by arbi­
tration.
A . Conciliation
Whenever a collective dispute arises, the parties 
to it must bring it to the notice of the competent Labour 
Inspector who would then proceed to convene them and 
attempt to bring about an amicable settlement. The 
parties need not attend the convened meeting personally. 
They may send their agents to represent them at the recon­
ciliation talks. If a party fails to appear and sends 
no representative he may be sentenced to a fine of between 
5,000 to 200,000 francs cfa. The Labour Inspector must
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then convene another conciliation meeting within the next 
48 hours.
At the end of the attempt at conciliation, the 
Inspector must make a report stating whether one of three 
results has been reached: (1) the parties have reached
agreement, (11) the parties are only partially In dis­
agreement, (111) the parties are totally In disagreement.
The report Is then signed by the parties, each of whom Is 
given a copy. Any agreement reached by conciliation Is 
binding and enforceable as If It were a court decision.
If the attempt at conciliation falls the Labour Inspector 
is bound to refer the dispute for arbitration.
B . Arbitration
Arbitration is undertaken by an Arbitration Board. 
Each Appeal Court area has an Arbitration Board made up of 
a judicial officer of the Court of Appeal (chairman), an 
employer assessor, and a worker assessor. The two 
assessors are designated by the chairman of the Arbitration 
Board from among assessors appointed by the local High Court.
The Board may take.an award only in respect of a 
matter set down in the statement of non-conciliation as 
well as in respect of a matter that has arisen out of 
events subsequent to the making of the statement of non­
conciliation and are a direct consequence of the dispute.
50The Board may give its award in law and in equity. It
50. The Board gives its award in law in disputes regarding
/Continued over
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has unfettered powers to obtain information on the 
economic situation of the undertaking and on the situ­
ation of the workers concerned in the dispute. It may 
seek the assistance of experts and may make any investi­
gations necessary.
When the Board has made its award, it must 
notify it to the parties. Any party wishing to apply 
for a stay of execution must do so within eight days by 
registered letter. If no application for stay of exe­
cution is made the arbitration award becomes mandatory
51and effective as from the date indicated in the award. 
Conciliation and arbitration proceedings are free of 
charge.
No lock-out may be made or strike action taken 
in contravention of a conciliation agreement or an arbi­
tration award. An employer who makes a lock-out would 
have to pay wages to the workers for the days lost. He 
may also be declared unfit for membership of a Chamber of 
Commerce. On the other hand, workers who take strike 
action in disregard of conciliation or arbitration award 
may be fired and fined up to 30,000 francs cfa. Again, any
Footnote 50 continued from page 712.
the Interpretation and application of laws, regu­
lations, collective agreements and companies agree­
ments. It gives Its award in equity in other dis­
putes, particularly those relating to wages and 
conditions of employment. Labour Code, s. 170.
51. Labour Code s. 172; see also Law No. 75/18 of 8 
December 1975 (Recognition of arbitration awards).
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strike or lock-out before the conciliation and arbitration 
procedures have been exhausted is unlawful. The Govern­
ment may requisition, individually or collectively, any
workers involved in any strike undertaken in a vital sec-
52tor of economic, social, or cultural activity.
2. Resolution of individual labour disputes
An individual labour dispute (it usually arises 
out of contract of employment between an employee and an 
employer) may be resolved administratively through conci­
liation or judicially.
A . Jurisdiction and composition of court
A Court of First Instance is competent to hear
and determine any individual labour dispute where the claim
involved does not exceed 500,000 francs cfa. Jurisdiction
is exercised by the High Court if the amount of the cliam
involved is in excess of 500,000 francs cfa. These courts
are also competent to deal with all counter-claims or
applications for set-off which by their nature fall within
their jurisdiction. If one of principal counter-claims
or applications for set-off exceeds the powers of the court,
51it must declare its lack of jurisdiction in that respect.
52. Labour Code, s. 165(3).
53. Ibid., s. l6l. Cf. the case of Debalou Njila, foot­
note 33, where it was held that a labour court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain a counter-claim for damages 
for preventive detention.
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As a general rule, the competent court Is that of the 
place of employment. An appeal from the Court of First 
Instance or from the High Court lies to the relevant Court 
of Appeal.
A court sitting to hear and determine a labour
dispute must be composed of a presiding judge (a judicial
officer) and two assessors (one representing employers and
the other employees). The two. assessors who are to sit
in any particular case are designated by the president of
54
the court before which the matter has been brought.
If the president of the court sits alone without assessors
the court is illegally constituted and its purported judg- 
55
ment a nullity.
B. Procedure
The procedure may be divided into three stages: 
first, attempt at conciliation, secondly, the court
54. Assessors are appointed from a biennial list for a 
term of two years by the Minister of Justice on the 
proposal of the Minister of Labour. They must be 
literate Cameroonians and -ust not have been convicted. 
They swear to discharge their duties with zeal and inte­
grity and to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings.
The office of assessor is gratuitous.
55. Garoua Court of First Instance, Judgement No. 28/S of 
8 June 1971 (court illegally constituted); CSC, Arr§t 
No. 34/S du 1 fevr. 1973, 6 R.C.D. 171 (1974). At 
the Appeal Court also the President must sit with two 
assessors. If the president sits alone, the court is 
illegally constituted: Isaac Forcho v. Royal Exchange
Assurance, and Joseph Nyambi v. C .D .C .,CSC, Nos. l4/S 
and 15/S of 17.03.1977, unreported.
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hearing, and finally judgment. Proceedings are entirely 
free of charge. No fees whatsoever are paid. Decisions 
and documents produced are registered free of charge. 
Procedural costs are treated on the same footing as costs 
In criminal proceedings in respect of their payment, 
settlement and collection. The fact the proceedings in 
labour matters are free of all charges is of great sig­
nificance. It is an attempt to ensure that the ordinary 
worker is not prevented from asserting his rights in the 
courts of law because of lack of means.
a ) Attempt at conciliation
Any individual labour dispute must first be sub­
mitted to the local Labour Inspector or his representative 
for an attempt at an amicable settlement. The parties 
cannot go directly to court. Only when this attempt at 
conciliation has failed may the next step, which is that 
of going to court, be taken. If the parties go to court 
without first submitting the matter for an attempt at 
conciliation, the court must stay the action until the 
Labour Inspector has attempted an amicable settlement and 
failed. If the court does not stay the action for the 
attempt at conciliation to be made but proceeds to hear 
the matter, the judgment delivered in the case would be 
null and void. Similarly, if the court proceeds to hear 
and give judgment in the case without having first satis­
fied itself that the matter had in the first place been
717.
submitted for conciliation, the judgment delivered is void
5 6and of no effect'. Equally null and void is a judgment
based on a claim which had not previously been submitted
57to an attempt at conciliation. This procedure, which
gives administrative authorities a crucial role to play 
in the resolution of labour disputes, prevents the courts 
being flooded with cases; to ensure that frivolous and 
vexatious cases do not get to the courts and take up much 
of their valuable time. This precaution is necessary 
in view of the fact that proceedings are free.
An attempt at conciliation may succeed or fail.
If it succeeds the terms on which settlement has been 
reached are embodied in a statement of conciliation made 
out by the Labour Inspector (or his representative) and 
signed by him and the parties to the dispute. The state­
ment becomes binding when it has been endorsed by the 
president of the competent court and marked for enforce­
ment. On the other hand if the attempt at an amicable 
settlement fails (whether totally or partially) the Labour 
Inspector has to make out a statement of non-conciliation.
If the failure is partial only the Inspector has to mention 
the points on which agreement has been reached. The 
statement of non-conciliation must be signed by the Inspector
56. M.. P.. c. Z.. M.., CSCO, Arrdt du 24 aoUt 1971, 
Penant, 1971, p. 567, note Mbella Mbappe; CSCO, 
Arr§t No. 96 du 20 dec. i960, Bulletin No. 2, p. 58.
57. CSCO, Arr^t No. 39/S du 8 fevr. 1972, unreported.
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and the parties to the dispute. A copy of the statement 
is forwarded to the president of the competent court and 
other copies to the parties.
A copy of the statement of non-conciliation is 
sent to the court, it is submitted, solely to serve as 
evidence of the fact that an attempt at conciliation has 
been made. The statement sent to the president of the 
competent court does not ipso facto seise the court of 
the dispute. The parties still have to initiate court 
action if they wish to. Action is initiated by an oral 
or written declaration made to the chief registrar of 
the co-petent court. The declaration must be accompanied 
by a certified copy of the statement of non-conciliation.
Once received the declaration is entered in a register 
kept for that purpose and a certificate of the entry 
delivered to the party instituting the action. The 
declaration or petition is then forwarded by the registrar 
to the president of the court.
b ) The court hearing
Within two days of receipt of the petition 
(Sundays and public holidays excepted) the President of 
the Court summonses the parties to appear before him 
within the next 12 days at an appointed court, date and 
hour. The summons which must state the name and occupation
58. There appears to be a tendency among litigants to treat 
this statement as a statement of claim.
of the plaintiff is served by post or through a bailiff. 
Parties appearing before the court may be accompanied or 
represented by a worker or an employer engaged in the 
same branch of activity or by a representative of the 
trade union or employers1 association to which the party 
belongs. An employee may, moreover, be represented by a 
manager or employee of the establishment. All represen­
tatives (save for counsels) must be armed with a power of 
attorney.
Plaintiff and defendant (or their duly mandated 
agents) must appear in court on the day fixed for the 
hearing. The case is struck off the cause-list if the 
plaintiff fails to put in appearance (especially after 
successive adjournments) and does not satisfy the court 
that he was prevented by act of God from appearing. The 
plaintiff is however allowed the opportunity to start the 
action afresh; right from the initial stage. In other 
words, he must start all over again from the conciliation 
stage. If he does not, the action will be void. If it 
is the defendant who fails to put in an appearance, the 
court examines the case and proceeds to give judgment in 
default, awarding plaintiff all or part of his claim.
The defendant or his agent need not however appear in per­
son. The defendant may stay away and submit his defence 
in a written memorandum. In such a case appearance would 
be deemed to have been entered and the judgment deemed to 
have been given after a hearing of both parties. It makes
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no difference that throughout the entire trial the defen­
dant has in fact appeared in court only once. Every 
judgment (whether delivered in default or after hearing 
both parties) must be notified to the other party who may 
apply for a stay of execution or lodge an appeal within 
15 days of delivery of the judgment.
One aspect of interest in these proceedings is 
that a married woman is empowered to accept conciliation 
and to act as plaintiff or defendant in court without the 
permission of her husband. . This is a departure from the 
usual principle according to which a party in a case must 
have a locus standi in it. This power may be put into 
effective use by the married woman in a situation where 
the plaintiff or the defendant is too ill to act or where 
he has died (although in this latter case it is arguable 
that if the plaintiff dies then his cause of action dies 
with him).
Before the start of oral proceedings in court 
any assessor of the court may be recused: (i) if he has
a personal interest in the matter, (ii) if he is related 
by blood or marriage up to the sixth degree to one of the 
parties, (iii) if in the year preceding the recusation 
there had been litigation involving the assessor and one 
of the parties or his relatives, (iv) if he has expressed 
an opinion in writing or orally on the matter in dispute, 
and (v) if he is the employer or employee of one of the 
parties to the case. The President of the court must make
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a ruling Immediately on any objection to an assessor.
If the objection is over-ruled, the trial proceeds; but 
if it is upheld, the case must be adjourned and the 
recused assessor replaced.
In examining the case, the court may decide on 
its own motion or at the request of the parties, to 
adjourn the matter for up to fifteen days. The court
t
may also order (giving reasons for the order) an inquiry, 
an inspection of premises or any other procedure for pro­
curing information. At the end of the hearing, the court 
retires and deliberates in chambers. Unless there is 
postponement for further deliberation (the postponement may 
not be for more than eight days) a reasoned judgment must 
be handed down immediately and .the record of the judgment 
signed by the President and the registrar.
c) Execution of judgment and appeals
Orders and judgments must bear the usual execu­
tory formula directing process-servers and bailiffs to 
execute them according to their tenor. A worker is 
entitled as of right to the assistance of the court in the 
execution of an order or a judgment given in his favour.
This assistance takes the form of the designation of a 
bailiff by the President of the court to levy execution 
on behalf of the judgment creditor. If execution of the 
judgment involves the distraining of property and a third 
party claims to be the owner of all or part of such property, 
the third party may, before the sale, submit his claim to
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the President of the court either orally or in writing.
Where the evidence produced and the arguments put forward
so warrant, the President may suspend the sale of the
articles and effects claimed and then summon the parties
within eight days to appear before him. After hearing
them he makes an order for or against the appropriation
of the property distrained.
After judgment has been delivered in any labour
matter, an appeal may be made against it. The appeal
59must be made within fifteen days by an oral or written 
declaration made to the chief registrar of the court that
decided the.matter. In Epoupa Mool Mbella c. Etat du
6 0Cameroun, the Supreme Court held, (1) that an appeal made 
after 15 days was a late appeal and could therefore not be 
entertained; and (2) that the date on which the declar­
ation was entered on the special register provided for 
that purpose was conclusive evidence as to the date on 
which the appeal was made; and that the question as to 
the date of an appeal is a question of fact, the findings 
on which having been made by the court below may not be 
disturbed by the Supreme Court.
After the declaration has been made it must be 
transmitted, within eight days to the registrar of the
59. This time limit may, however, be extended (but for not
more than 30 days) in the interest of justice and at
the request of one of the parties.
60. CSC, Arr§t No. 102 du 5 juillet 1973, Bulletin des
arrets de la Cour Supreme du Cameroun, No. 29, 1973, 
p. 4101.
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competent Court of Appeal together with a copy of the 
judgment and any letters, memoranda and other documents 
that have been submitted by the parties or party. An 
appellant who has made an improper or dilatory appeal 
may be fined from between 10,000 to 50,000 francs cfa. 
Judgments of courts of first instance (save for those con­
cerning the court’s own jurisdiction) are final and without 
appeal if they relate to applications for delivery of 
certificates of employment or pay slips.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION
In Cameroon there is a separate body of law, 
borrowed almost in toto from France, which describes 
aspects of governmental administration and governs liti­
gation involving State agencies (including public utility 
corporations and local government bodies) and private 
parties. This body of law is known as Droit Administratif 
and is classified and taught in the Law Faculty of the 
University of Yaounde as an autonomous branch of droit public.1 
Droit Administratif, it has been said, is the ’law’ of
2
public law as Droit Civil is the heart of private law.
1. In Francophone Cameroon, the most characteristic trait 
of the structure of substantive law is the dichotomy of 
private and public law. Even the law section of the 
Yaounde Faculty of Laws and Economics is divided into a 
’private law’ and a ’public law’ department. Law 
students graduate from the Faculty as either ’publicistes’ 
or ’privatistes’ although during their four years at 
the Faculty their fields of inquiry occasionally overlap. 
This structure of the substantive law into a private 
and a public law matrix has also been borrowed from 
France where "the fundamental division, the summa divisio, 
is between private law and public law. The dividing 
lines may be unclear, the logical bases may be disputed, 
but the traditional dualism recognised in Roman Law 
remains the most significant division of French Law.
In legal theory this dualism, unknown to the ancient 
Germanic law, rests on the Roman law reference of Ulpian 
in the Digest: ’Publicum jus est, quod ad statum rei
Romanae spectat; privatum, quod ad singulorum utilitatem’. 
In theory, some rules of law concern the State - the 
rules of public law; others concern relations of pri­
vate persons - the rules of private law.’’ David & de 
Vries, The French legal system, Oceana, New York, 1958, 
p. 45.
2. David & de Vries, op.cit., p. 49.
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That part of Droit Administratif which deals specifically 
with litigation involving state agencies and private 
parties is known as le contentieux administratif; in 
fact, the judicial process in administrative law.
There are various means by which disputes 
between the citizen and some organ of the State may be 
resolved. The parties may decide to resolve the contro­
versy themselves by bargaining or by resorting to arbi­
tration. In some jurisdictions, a special public body 
deals with such controversies; for example, the Scandina­
vian Ombudsman, the Soviet Prokuratura. In other juris­
dictions redress against administrative wrongs may be 
obtained only within the administrative hierarchy itself. 
This happens in certain instances in England. In France 
too, it is a condition precedent, in certain cases, that 
the aggrieved citizen must have, before seeking the aid of 
the court, unsuccessfully referred the dispute to the
administration itself. This is known in the literature
4
as recours gracieux pr^alable. Most countries however
3. The term ’contentieux administratif’ has here been 
rendered in.English as ’administrative litigation’ in 
preference to ’judicial review’, an expression familiar 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence. ’Judicial review’ is 
however not a term of art. ”It is sometimes used to 
mean judicial scrutiny and determination of the legal 
validity of instruments, acts, decisions and trans­
actions.” (S.A. de Smith, Judicial review of adminis­
trative action, 3rd ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1973, 
p~] 25. ) Moreover, in Anglo-American law, judicial 
review concerns review of administrative acts by the 
ordinary courts whereas in France it is by special courts 
known as tribunaux administratifs.
4. Cf. recours hierarchique and recours de tutel.
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entrust the resolution of administrative disputes to
courts which may either be the ordinary civil courts (as
for example, in England and in the United States) or
specialised courts known as administrative courts (as
for example in Prance).
"In some countries, redress against adminis­
trative wrongs is normally obtainable only 
within the administrative hierarchy itself.
But most legal systems demarcate sets of 
relationships between the governors and 
the governed, the areas of administrative 
activity, in which claims and controver­
sies may be resolved and grievances redressed 
through the medium of courts. These courts 
are not necessarily the ordinary courts of 
law, they may be special administrative 
courts. If they are special administrative 
courts, they will almost certainly apply 
substantive and procedural rules distinct 
from the ordinary law of the land, rules which 
recognise the disparities between the adminis­
tration and the citizen, between the situations 
that characteristically arise in public law 
and in private law." 5
As a result of Cameroon’s chequered colonial 
history, the development of the law on administrative 
litigation has not been the same in the English- and the 
French-speaking parts of the country. Before reunifi­
cation of the two Cameroons on 1st October 1961, Anglophone 
Cameroon was administered by Britain as an integral part 
of Nigeria which was then a dependent territory with its 
sovereignty vested in the Queen of Britain. The consti­
tutional set up of the time made the Governor-General of
5. S.A. de Smith, op.cit., p. 3*
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Nigeria and Cameroons the direct representative of the 
Queen. He therefore enjoyed the state immunity which 
he derived from the Queen. Later, when a Commissioner 
was appointed for the Southern Cameroons as the represen­
tative of the Queen there he also enjoyed these immu­
nities .
"The English doctrine of Crown immunity arose 
in a constitutional system where the whole 
national sovereignty was vested in the King 
and where the State (as distinct from the 
King) was not conceived as having as cor­
porate status or personality capable of 
having rights and duties or of suing and 
being sued in a court of law. The courts 
were the King’s courts and he was the foun­
tain of all justice which was administered 
in his name. This doctrine by degrees 
crystallised into a common law principle of 
immunity of the Crown, the state departments 
or any crown agents under the British domi­
nion, from legal process. The remedy 
against the Crown was by way of petition 
of right in the High Court, put on a statu­
tory footing by the Petition of Rights Act, 
i860. This availed not only against the 
sovereign in his public capacity, but also 
against the sovereign in his private capa­
city, the common law drawing no distinction 
between the two.". 7
The principle that the King could not be impleaded in his
own courts meant that proceedings against the Crown for
breach of contract or restitution of property could only
be taken after obtaining a fiat by the inconvenient procedure
6. Nigeria Letters Patent, 19^6; Nigeria (Protectorate 
and Cameroons) Order in Council, 19^6; Martin Wight, 
British colonial constitutions, Oxford at the Clarendon 
Press, 1952, pp. 219 et seq.
7. H.N.A. Enonchong, ’The position of the Cameroon state 
in litigation’, ABBIA, No. 11, November, 1965, p. 63.
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of petition of right. The principle that the King could
not be impleaded in his own courts coupled with the doctrine
that the King could do no wrong also meant that the Crown
could not be proceeded against at all in tort.
"No action lay at common law against the 
Sovereign personally, whether for public 
or private acts. Also - contrary to the law 
of agency and of master and servant - no 
action lay against the Sovereign for breach 
of contract or torts committed by Ministers, 
other officers or departments acting as 
servants or agents of the Crown. In certain 
cases, however, a petition of right would lie.
The maxim ’the King can do no wrong’ meant 
not only that the King could not be made 
liable by action, but also that wrong could 
not be imputed to the King, and therefore he 
could not be said to have authorised another 
to commit a wrong. This ruled out the maxim 
qui facit per alium facit per se where the 
Crown was the employer. As there is no con­
cept of the State in English law, and as 
government departments are merely groups of 
Crown servants this meant that the citizen 
could not claim satisfaction out of public 
funds for torts committed by the Crown." 8
The remedy against the Crown by way of a petition of right
was based on the theory that as the King was the fountain
of justice, he would cause justice to be done as soon as
the matter was brought to his notice. The remedy was
therefore obtainable as a matter of grace and not as a
matter of right. Moreover, the remedy was unavailable
in cases of torts unconnected with the wrongful taking
of property such as negligence or trespass, contracts of
8. 0. Hood Phillips & Paul Jackson, Hood Phillips’ consti­
tutional and administrative law, 6th ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1976, p . 637•
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service with members of the armed forces, contracts that
fetter future executive action, and contracts dependent on
g
grant from Parliament.
Now, the English doctrine of Crown immunity 
became applicable in Anglophone Cameroon by virtue of s. 11 
of the Southern Cameroons High Court Law, 1955, which makes 
provision for the application in that part of Cameroon 
of the common law, the doctrines of equity, and the sta­
tutes of general application in force in England as of 
January 1, 1900. In Cameroon, the English Petition of 
Rights Act, i860 was subsequently replaced by the Petition 
of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 149 of the 1958 laws, under which 
the fiat of the Governor General was necessary for any 
suit against the government. Hence, at the time of reuni­
fication of the two Cameroons, the position with regards 
to administrative liability in Anglophone Cameroon was sub­
stantially the same as it was in England before the passing 
of the 1947 Crown Proceedings Act.^ Also available 
against administrative actions were the common law prero­
gative remedies - habeas corpus testificandum and ad
9. Idem., p . 640.
10. The main objectives of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 
were, as far as practicable, to make the Crown liable 
in tort in the same way as a private person, and to 
reform the rules of procedure governing civil liti­
gation by and against the Crown, especially by allowing 
an action without a fiat where petition of right 
obviously lay. Being a post-1900 statute, the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947 was however not applicable
in Cameroon.
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subjiciendum, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and 
inj unction.
Following reunification however, it became unclear 
whether the Petition of Rights Ordinance was still appli­
cable in Anglophone Cameroon. This uncertainty arose 
from the doubt whether a carry-over of the previous Royal 
Prerogative could be said to be in keeping with the new 
status of Anglophone Cameroon as a constituent state of 
the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The then West Cameroon 
High Court was presented with an opportunity to pronounce 
on this issue in the consolidated cases of Eric Dikoko Quan 
v. Attorney-General of West Cameroon (for the Government 
of West Cameroon) and Peter Moki Efange v. Attorney-General 
of West Cameroon (for the West Cameroon Government).11 
The plaintiffs in these cases claimed they had been wrong­
fully dismissed by the then West Cameroon Government and 
so took action against the defendants. They made appli­
cation to the then West Cameroon High Court for an order 
for pleadings in a writ. At the hearing of the application 
counsel for the defendants raised a preliminary objection 
that by virtue of s. 53(1) and (4) of the West Cameroon 
Constitutional Law, 1961, ss. 4 and 5 of the Petition of 
Rights Ordinance applied and that no suit against the 
Government could be filed without the fiat of the Prime
11. Suits Nos. WC/12/64 and WC/13/64, (1962-1964) W.C.L.R.45.
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Minister. The substance of defence counsel’s contention 
was that since the issues before the court could not have 
been brought as of right but as a matter of grace depen­
dent on the discretion of the Prime Minister the plain­
tiffs were technically wrong to have begun their case by 
the issue of a writ of summons. Counsel for the plain­
tiffs argued that his clients had rightly started off 
the action by writ of summons since the substance of his 
clients’ claim was like any other one in which any person 
may apply to the court for the issue of a writ under 
Order II rule 1 (Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules).
He further urged that to follow the procedure as laid 
down in the Petition of Rights Ordinance would in effect 
deprive a citizen of certain of his fundamental rights 
which the constitution has specifically preserved.
The court ruled that the Petition of Rights Ordinance,
Cap. 149j applied and that the procedure laid down in s . 4 
of that Ordinance should be followed. Per Gordon, C.J., 
at page 46, "The argument of counsel for the plaintiffs 
that to follow the procedure as laid down in Cap. 149 
would in effect be depriving an individual of his rights, 
is somewhat previous, it presupposes that the Prime Minis­
ter’s fiat would be refused, as of course. Until there 
has been an application for it and a refusal to grant it 
the question of the fundamental rights of the citizen can­
not arise."
Despite this ruling, opinion continued to differ
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as to whether the Petition of Rights Ordinance applied
12in West Cameroon. The matter was however put beyond
all doubt by the repeal of the Petition of Rights Ordi­
nance by s . 7 of Law No. 65/LF/29 of 19 November 1965 * 
which law set up separate Benches of the Federal Court 
of Justice in Yaounde and Buea, for the hearing and deter­
mination of administrative suits against the federal and 
state governments and government agencies.
The situation in Francophone Cameroun was alto­
gether different. As early as 1920 the French had set 
up there an organ known as the conseil du contentieux
administratif to review, to some extent, administrative
13actions and omissions. This organ had a similar role
to that of the tribunaux administratifs in France. How­
ever, it had jurisdiction only in respect of contentieux
12. Enonchong, ’The position of the Cameroon state in liti­
gation’, ABBIA, No. 11, 1965, p. 59. Enonchong 
argues that the case just discussed was decided per 
incuriam as art. 2 and 46 of the Federal Constitution 
were not adverted to in construing art. 53(1) and (4) 
of the West Cameroon Constitution, 1961. ”The Federal 
Constitution only permits the continuation of Federated 
State law ’in so far as it does not conflict with the 
provisions’ of the Federal Constitution ... The Petition 
of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 149) ... is in conflict with
article 2 of the Federal Constitution, which gives 
the federation corporate personality and for this and 
other reasons, already mentioned, void. On similar 
grounds the whole common law principle of immunity is 
also void.”
13. Decret du 14 avril, 1920 portant creation de conseil 
du contentieux administratif dans les territoires 
occupes de 1'ancient Cameroun; Emile Mbarga, ’Devolution 
de la juridiction du conseil d ’Etat francais sur le 
Cameroun’, Ann. Fac. de Droit du Cameroun, No. 7, 1974, 
p. 3.
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local, as distinct from contentieux de l ’Etat francais, and 
only then in recours de pleine juridiction: le recours
pour exces de pouvoir du contentieux local and le conten­
tieux de l ’Etat francais were reserved to the Conseil d ’Etat 
in Paris. The procedure before the conseil du contentieux 
administratif was laid down in an arr£te of 16 December 
1921. In a sense, the conseil du contentieux administratif 
was nothing other than the conseil d 1 administration 
sitting in a judicial capacity. It was presided over by 
the Haut Commissaire sitting with two civil servants or 
magistrates annually appointed by himself. Although
repeated attempts were made to divorce the conseil du con-
14tentieux from the conseil d Tadministration it was not
until 1952 that separation of the two organs was finally 
15achieved.
In 1959 Francophone Cameroun gained internal
autonomy and the conseil du contentieux administratif
became the Tribunal d ’Etat but retaining the composition
16and organisation of the old conseil du contentieux.
However, the dichotomy between contentieux local and 
contentieux de l ’Etat francais was abandoned. All cate­
gories of administrative disputes were simply contentieux
14. Decret du 13 avril 1927; decret du 3 nov. 1928.
15. Decret du 8 juillet 1952. The president of the conseil 
du contentieux became an appeal court judge and no 
longer the Haut Commissaire.
16. Decrets du 4 et 9 juin 1959.
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local, jurisdiction over which became exercisable by the 
Tribunal d ’Etat.
The Tribunal d TEtat was a court of first and 
last resort in administrative matters. Its decisions 
were not subject to appeal. The reason was that the 
authorities wished to preserve, as in France, the autonomy 
of juridiction administrative. However, it was distres­
sing to litigants that there was no channel by which a 
party dissatisfied by a decision of that court, could have 
its erroneous decision vacated. Cries for Tdouble degre 
de juridiction’ led to the passing of a law of June 20,
1961 empowering the East Cameroon Supreme Court to entertain 
appeals against decisions rendered by the Tribunal d TEtat. 
This law was given retrospective effect so as to enable 
previous judgments by the Tribunal d fEtat to be appealed 
against (if a dissatisfied litigant was so minded to do so). 
The East Cameroon Supreme Court was also empowered to 
resolve, as does the French Tribunal des Conflits, con­
flicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary courts and 
the administrative court.
17. By s. 1 of the decree of 4 June 1959, contentieux 
administratif included: appeals for annulment of
administrative acts on grounds of ultra vires; liti­
gation concerning administrative contracts, conces­
sions of public services, public property, the rights 
of civil servants; actions against local authorities, 
public establishments and public law bodies; plaints 
for interpretation of law and disputes concerning the 
legality of administrative acts. Section 2 of the 
same decree provided that an administrative decision 
could be challenged on any of the following grounds: 
’vice de forme, incompetence, detournement de pouvoir, 
violation de la loi’.
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On October 1, 1961, Anglophone and Francophone 
Cameroon unified under a federal constitution. Article 33 
of that constitution set up the Federal Court of Justice, 
organised soon afterwards by an ordinance of 4 October 
1961. This court was empowered to deal, inter alia, 
with administrative litigation concerning the federal 
government. Cases concerning the federated state of East 
Cameroun were tried at first instance by the Tribunal 
d ’Etat and on appeal by the East Cameroun Supreme Court 
while those against the West Cameroon government were tried 
by the ordinary courts subject to the immunity from pro­
cess, inherited from the British Crown, which that feder­
ated state enjoyed. This cumbersome, incoherent and 
unsymmetrical system of administrative litigation was swept 
away by Law No. 65/LF/29 of 19 November 1965, which 
established a uniform and simplified system of adminis­
trative litigation. This law was subsequently consoli­
dated by a law of 14 June 1969 fixing the composition and
-| o
procedure of the Federal Court of Justice.
The unitary constitution of 1972 abolished the
Federal Court of Justice and the Supreme Courts of the two
federated states and vested their jurisdiction in a single
19Supreme Court of Cameroon, newly created. No separate
18. On the Federal Court of Justice, see for example, 
Emile Mbarga, La cour federale de justice, these, 
Paris, 1970; Marcel Nguini, ’La cour federale de 
justice du Cameroun', 3 R.C.D. 35 (1973).
19. See, supra, Chapter 8.
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administrative courts now exist in Cameroon. Adminis­
trative cases are adjudicated by the Supreme Court; at 
first instance by the Administrative Bench of that Court, 
and on appeal by the Full Bench of the Court.
There is now a uniform law governing adminis­
trative litigation in both Anglophone and Francophone 
Cameroon. This chapter gives an outline of that law 
which, for clarity of exposition is treated under three 
headings: scope of administrative litigation (I), con­
tentious proceedings before the administrative court (II), 
and procedure before the administrative court (III).
I . Scope of Administrative Litigation
It is not every case involving the State or any 
of its agencies that is justiciable before the adminis­
trative court. There are cases which appertain to the 
administrative jurisdiction and other which appertain to 
the civil order of courts. Moreover, borderline cases 
are bound to arise which give rise to difficulties. This 
problem calls for a determination or delimitation of the
respective spheres of the administrative and civil order
20of courts. Over what type of cases would the Administrative
20. In France, in the years immediately following the Revo­
lution, the principle of the separation of powers as 
between judiciary and executive was expressed in a 
Law of August 16-24, 1790, art. 13: ’Judicial functions
are distinct and shall always remain separate from 
administrative functions. Judges may not, on pain of
/Continued over
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Bench of the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction? If a 
case arises over which both the civil and the adminis­
trative order of courts are claiming or declining juris­
diction how is such a conflict to be resolved?
1. Delimitation of jurisdiction between the civil and 
administrative order of courts
The law has expressly reserved certain categories
Footnote 20 continued from page 736.
forfeiture, interfere in any manner with the operations 
of administrative bodies, or summon administrators to 
appear before them to account for the exercise of their 
functions.’ This law was used to deprive the ordinary 
courts of jurisdiction in any matter connected even 
remotely with administrative activities. In the early 
19th century a number of criteria were adopted to demar­
cate those disputes which fell within the respective 
competence of the two order of courts. The first cri­
terion was that of the state as debtor (l ’Etat debiteur) 
under which the Conseil d'Etat denied the ordinary courts 
competence to condemn the state to any money payment.
The second was the criterion of ’the act of public 
authority’ (acte de la puissance publique or acte d ’autorite). 
This drew a distinction between those actions of the ad­
ministration which involved their public authority and 
mere acts of management (actes de gestion) which did not: 
the former were outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts, the latter were within it. The third criterion
was that of ’public administration’ (gestion publique) 
as distinguished from ’private administration’; in the 
latter the administration used the same processes as the 
private citizen and came therefore within the scope of 
the ordinary courts. On the other hand disputes arising 
out of gestion publique belonged to the administrative 
courts. These early criteria were discarded in the well- 
known case of Blanco, T.C., 8 Feb., 1873, D. 1873. 3. 17 
conl. David. In that case, a new principle, that of 
’public service’ was adopted. A little girl was injured 
by a wagon crossing the road between different parts of 
a state-owned tobacco factory. Held, that the injury 
arose out of the activities of a public service and that 
the administrative court had jurisdiction to entertain 
the claim for damages,
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21of controversies Involving the administration for reso-
22lution by the administrative court. The scope of
administrative litigation is set out in s . 9 of Ordinance
No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, as amended by Law No. 76/28
of 14 December 1976, which enacts as follows:
"S. 9(1). The Supreme Court shall have juris­
diction over all administrative cases against 
the State, local authorities and public cor­
porations .
(2) Administrative matters shall include:
(a) Petitions for cancellation of acts 
or of failure to act on the ground
of ultra vires and, except in criminal 
proceedings, interlocutory challenges 
to the legality of such acts, an act 
or failure being ultra vires for the 
purpose of this section where:
- it is bad in form,
- it is made without jurisdiction,
- it is contrary to statutory or 
administrative regulation,
- its making is an abuse of authority.
(b) Claims for damages for loss caused by 
an administrative measure.
(c) Disputes on contracts (unless conclu­
ded expressly or by implication under
21. In Cameroon, as in France, the term 'administration’ is 
not limited to Government (in America the term is 
synonymous to Government) or the Civil Service (in 
England ’administration’ has the narrow meaning of 
Civil Service). It is generally used to refer to the 
permanent framework of governmental activity carried
on despite changes of government.
22. The French speak of competence par determination de la 
M  as opposed to systeme de la clause generate de 
competence (i.e. the method of delineating competence 
whereby the legislator merely states a general prin­
ciple from which it may be logically inferred the type 
of cases appertaining to the administrative courts and 
those cognisable by the ordinary courts). See, Andre 
de Laubadere, Traite de droit administratif, 6e ed.,
L .G .D . J . , Parii-^ 1973, p. ^05 .
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the ordinary law) or on concessions 
to run public services.
(d) Disputes concerning State land.
(e) Any dispute expressly referred by law 
to the administrative courts.
(3) The ordinary courts shall have juris­
diction over any other claim or dispute in 
accordance with the ordinary law, whether 
or not any juridical person described in 
subsection 1 be a party, the liability of 
the said juridical person replacing without 
more that of any agent who has caused loss, 
whether or not in the cause of his employ­
ment .
(4) They shall further have jurisdiction 
over administrative trespass on private 
land and any arbitrary step by the adminis­
tration against liberty and property, with 
power to make any order to bring it to an 
end. A ruling shall be given by the Full 
Bench of the Supreme Court on any interlo­
cutory plea made in the case of an arbi­
trary step by the administration against 
liberty or property.
(5) No court shall have jurisdiction over 
an act of State.”
Section 9(2) would seem to suggest that the 
categories of matters that may be adjudicated by the adminis­
trative court is not closed. This is borne out by the 
clause, ’administrative matters shall include’. This for­
mulation, it is submitted, leaves open-ended the categories 
of possible administrative matters that may be brought 
before the administrative court for adjudication. If 
this construction be correct, then the enumeration in 
s. 9(2) is only indicative not exhaustive. Support for 
this view is found in s. 9(2)(e) which provides that adminis­
trative matters shall include 'any dispute expressly 
referred by law to the administrative courts'. This in 
effect means that Parliament may still add other heads of 
administrative matters to the existing list. Thus, for
example, the administrative court has jurisdiction to
entertain controversies relating to income tax and other
forms of direct taxation since taxation is peculiarly an
administrative activity and one conducted through the
special processes and prerogatives of the fiscal authori- 
21ties. However, while le contentieux fiscal properly
belongs to the administrative judge, indirect taxation 
(customs and excise duties, stamp duties, sales tax, and 
other forms of contributions indirectes) falls within the 
competence of the ordinary civil courts.
A . Matters over which the administrative court exercises 
j urisdiction
As the court which deals with administrative 
disputes, the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction over three types of administrative con­
troversies: litigation concerning unilateral adminis­
trative acts, litigation concerning administrative con­
tracts and concessions to run public services, and disputes 
concerning state land.
a) Disputes concerning unilateral administrative acts 
The concept of ’unilateral administrative
23. Cameroon General Tax Code, s. 240; Law of 10 November 
1969 and Decree of 30 June 1969 (Financial liability 
of public accountants).
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24acts’ is a familiar one in French administrative law.
It covers measures of general application (actes reglemen- 
taires) such as governmental decrees, ministerial regu­
lations or local by-laws, as well as any decision which 
applies to a single individual (actes individuels) or to 
a group of individuals (actes collectifs). These actes 
administratifs are characterised as unilateraux because 
they are taken without the consent of those affected by 
them. They are commonly contrasted with administrative 
contracts which are said to be les actes administratifs 
bilateraux because they require the consent of the other 
contracting party. They are also distinguished from les 
mesures d ’ordre interieur administratives, that is, mea­
sures of purely internal organisation within the adminis­
tration. These mesures d ’ordre interieur are, in general, 
regarded as matters within the complete discretion of the
administration and are therefore not normally open to judi-
25
cial review at all.
24. Andre* de Laubadere, op.cit., pp. 217 et seq.; M.
Waline, Droit administratif, 9e ed., Sirey, Paris,
19635 PP~ 434 et seq.
25. Thus, one cannot challenge a departmental circular
giving advice (as distinct from directives) on the 
interpretation of a statute; nor an instruction about 
school uniform or curricula: so in Chapou, C.E., 20
oct.1954, Rec. Lebon 1954, 541, the Conseil d ’Etat 
refused to entertain proceedings to quash a headmistress’s 
rule forbidding the wearing of ski-trousers. A simi­
lar attitude is taken towards disciplinary measures in 
the armed forces, an attitude not dissimilar to that 
adopted In the much criticised decision (on the ground 
that it cast doubt on the scope of natural justice) of 
the English Court of Appeal in Ex parte Fry, [1954]
2 All E.R. 118.
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In Cameroon, the concept of ’unilateral ad­
ministrative acts’ was judicially enunciated for the 
first time by the then Federal Court of Justice in 1968.
It was in the leading case of Ngongang Njanke Martin c.
2 6Etat du Cameroun. In that case the court defined ’an
administrative act’ as ’a unilateral legal act conferring 
rights and imposing obligations on individuals and taken 
by an administrative authority in the exercise of an 
administrative power’.
(i) An administrative act is a ’legal act’
This limb of the definition means that decisions 
of the administration must have a legal basis and conform 
to law. It underscores the fundamental principle that the 
administration is subject to the Rule of Law. A legal 
act may be said to be one aimed at producing legal effects, 
at altering an existing legal situation. In law every 
person is, at any given point of time, the centre of a 
cluster of rights and obligations which constitute his 
legal situation at that given time. A legal act effects 
a change in that situation. For example, the appointment 
of a person as a civil servant is a legal act because it 
confers upon him certain rights, powers, duties, and obli­
gations as a civil servant.
However, physical activities (operations 
matdrielles) carried out by the administration may also
26. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 20 du 20 mars 1968, unreported.
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produce legal consequences or effects. Thus, if in the 
course of undertaking a certain activity (e.g. constructing 
a road) the administration were to occasion loss to some­
one, it would be legally bound to repair the damage caused. 
But a distinction does exist between operations mat£rielles
(also known as les faits juridiques) and les actes juri- 
27digues: in the former case the legal effect produced is
incidental to the primary objective of the administration 
in engaging in the activity. Suppose for example that a 
regiment of the Cameroonian army, out on a shooting exer­
cise, negligently injure somebody in the course of the 
shooting practice. Evidently, the regiment did not set 
out to injure anyone; but the administration would none­
theless be held liable. Furthermore, whereas, in prin­
ciple, disputes arising from les actes juridiques are 
justiciable before the administrative court, those flowing
from les faits juridiques are justiciable before the
2 8ordinary civil court. In practice however, not all dis­
putes flowing from les faits juridiques are justiciable 
before the ordinary civil courts. A distinction is made
27. To tar or construct a stretch of road for example, is 
a mere physical act. The distinction between fait
juridique and acte juridique may also be illustrated
with the case of arrest. The arrest warrant is a
legal act (acte juridique) while the apprehension or 
capture of the person against whom the arrest warrant 
was issued, is a mere physical act (fait juridique). 
Sometimes, however, it is not easy to draw the line 
between the two concepts.
28. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 9 du 15 oct. 1969: Bollo Joseph c.
Etat du Cameroun, unreported.
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in the literature between 'voluntary' and ’involuntary'
faits juridiques. Disputes arising from involuntary
faits juridiques (such as accident cases) are resolved by
the ordinary court while those arising from voluntary
faits juridiques (for example the demolition of houses)
29
are adjudicated by the administrative court. In Meka
10Charles c. Etat du Cameroun the Customs Department seized 
and sold goods smuggled into the country. The Federal 
Court of Justice held that the action by the Customs 
Department amounted to une operation materielle. Having 
done so the court should have claimed jurisdiction over 
the dispute on the basis that the action was clearly a 
voluntary one. Instead, the court, it is submitted, 
advanced a tenuous argument for claiming jurisdiction in 
the case. It characterised, doubtfully, it is further 
submitted, the action by the Customs Department as un acte 
juridique unilateral, arguing that the action taken pre­
supposed that a decision (though neither published nor 
notified to the appellant) had earlier been taken by the 
Customs Department to seize and sell the goods.
(ii) An administrative act is a unilateral legal act
'conferring rights and imposing obligations on individuals' 
This second limb of the definition of an adminis­
trative act distinguished an administrative act from such
29. Georges Vedel, Droit administratif, 4 ed., Themis, 
P.U.F., 1968, p. 495.
30. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 1, 1968.
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administrative measures as those concerned merely with 
internal administrative organisation (circulars, instruc­
tions, directives) and which therefore do not, in prin­
ciple, directly affect individuals. Any petition for 
redress based on any of these measures is outside the 
province of the administrative court. Administrative 
circulars, instructions, and directives do not, strictly
Q1
speaking, constitute a source of legality. They cannot
therefore be prayed in aid in any proceedings before the 
administrative court.
The fact that an administrative act is charac­
terised as ’a unilateral act' does not however mean that 
the administrative court may- not take cognisance of dis­
putes arising out of administrative contracts. It may. 
But its jurisdiction in this sphere is narrower than in 
the case of ’unilateral administrative acts’. This is
because of the all-pervading contract law principle of
31. Decret-loi, decret, ordonnance (all of these emanate 
from the President of the Republic), and arr§te
(this emanates from a Minister) are all administrative 
instruments having force of law like loi (emanating 
from the National Assembly). Administrative circu­
lars, directives and instruments whether emanating 
from heads of local councils, administrative units or 
parastatals, government ministers or the Head of 
State, have no force of law.
32. Procureur General pres la cour supreme c. Pauchet 
Claude et Etat du Cameroun, C.P.J. Arr§t No. 20 du 
16 mars 1967, unreported; Onana Jean Pierre c . Etat 
du Cameroun, C.F.J., Arr§t No. 43 du 30 avril 1968, 
’Recueil Mboyoum’ 1962-1970, p. 29.
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privity of contract: only a person who is a party to a
contract can sue on it; and no person can have obligations 
imposed on him by a contract to which he is not a party.
As a general principle, a recours en annulation 
pour exces de pouvoir does not lie against an administrative 
contract (or any other contract for that matter). So a 
party to an administrative contract cannot petition the 
administrative court to have the contract annulled on the 
ground of ultra vires. Proceedings for the rescission 
of a contract may be instituted in the administrative court 
only at the instance of a party to the contract and then 
only by way of a recour juridictionnel. However, there is 
an exception to this general rule, an exception based on 
the theory of actes detachables. This theory rests on a 
distinction, sometimes too subtle, between the contract 
itself (which may not be attacked by third parties) and 
acts which are said to be detachable from the contract.
The theory postulates that certain acts by the adminis­
tration in the course of concluding a contract, or in 
carrying out the provisions of a contract, are separable 
from the contract itself. For example, if the executive
of a municipal council were to take a decision authorising 
the mayor to contract on behalf of the council, the decision 
authorising the mayor to contract is characterised as an
33. Cf. the following French cases relating to the classifi­
cation of council houses (the decisions relating to the 
classification of those houses were held to be actes 
detachables): Martin, C.E., 29 dec. 1905a R.D.P. 1906.
249, concl. Romieu, note Seze; Societe Anonyme des 
Livraisons Industrielles et Commercialese C .E ., 24 avril 
1964, D3 1964. 665* note Debbasch.
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acte detachable and may be challenged by a third party to 
the contract on grounds of ultra vires. Where the action 
succeeds, it is the offending acte detachable and not the 
contract itself which is nullified, although should such 
an annulment affect the substratum of the contract any of 
the contracting parties is entitled to bring an action for 
rescission of the contract.
(iii) An administrative act is an act ’taken by an adminis­
trative authority in the exercise of an administrative 
power’
This limb of the definition eliminates acts of 
private bodies and acts of authorities which though public 
are in fact not administrative, from the category of 
’administrative acts’.
Acts of private bodies. Nowadays, owing to 
the growth of State activity (the modern state has become 
the largest employer, contractor, occupier of property, 
and the owner of large enterprises) the administration often 
acts through intermediaries. This is particularly so in 
the area of public services. Not infrequently, private 
bodies are granted rights to run public services. Anxious
34. A public service is any activity of a public authority 
aimed at satisfying a public need. In Terrier, C.E.,
6 fevr. 1903, S. 1903. 3. 25, concl. Romieu, note 
Hauriou, a local authority organised a viper-destruction 
service in the public interest and promised payment for 
every viper killed by a member of the public. Terrier 
was refused payment for his dead vipers. He sued the 
local council in the Conseil d ’Etat which held it had 
jurisdiction to entertain the matter since a public ser­
vice was involved. A similar view was taken by the 
Conseil d ’Etat in Therond, C.E., 4 mars 1910, s. 1911.3.17, 
concl. Pichat, note Haurio, where the town engaged the 
complainant to catch stray dogs and collect dead ones.
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to see that these services are properly run the State has
found it necessary to vest in these private bodies the
’prerogatives of public authority’ (prerogatives de puissance
publique). For example, the right to take unilateral
executory decisions. Thus in the leading French case of 
ISMontpeurt , the Conseil d ’Etat held that unilateral 
decisions of general or individual application (les decisions 
unilaterales reglementaires ou individuelles) emanating 
from private bodies running public services and vested . 
with the prerogatives of public authority may be challenged 
in the administrative court in the same way as though they 
had been decisions taken by an administrative authority.
In that case, the concept of service public was 
extended to a statutory ’professional committee’ of manu­
facturers formed after the German occupation of France in 
1940 to co-ordinate glass production in view of the acute 
shortage of materials. But the court failed to specify
the legal nature (public or private law body) of that ’pro-
17fessional committee’. It was in Magnier that the
35. C.E., 31 juillet 1942, D.1942, p. 138, concl. Segalat.
36. In Caisse Primaire Aide et Protection, C.E., 13 m'ai 
193%~, D. 1939 • 3• 65, concl. Latournerie, the court held 
that although provident societies (caisses) were pri­
vate and not public law bodies, they were engaged in 
providing a public service. Again, in Bouguen., C.E.,
2 avril 1943, S.1944.3.1, concl. Lagrange, note Mestre, 
it was held that the governing body of the medical 
profession was participating in the functioning of a 
public service, although not itself a public insti­
tution .
37- C.E., 13 janv. 1961, Rec. Lebon, 1961, p. 33.
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Conseil d ’Etat specifically characterised the body as a 
private law one. In France therefore, decisions from
private law bodies executing a public service and using 
public law prerogatives are considered, from the point of 
view of their litigation, as administrative acts.
The law is otherwise in Cameroon. Only acts 
which emanate from 'an administrative authority’ are 
administrative acts. Acts from private law bodies are 
not administrative acts and it makes no difference that 
the private law body has been invested with the prero­
gatives of public authority. In Bernard Auteroche c.
Ordre National des Medecins, the court held decisions 
taken by the National Order of Doctors to be adminis­
trative acts. Although the court did not say whether it 
considered the body to be a private or a public law one, 
the decision would seem to suggest that the court regards 
professional bodies as public law bodies for, there is 
judicial authority to the effect that the jurisdiction 
of the administrative court is limited 'to the taking of 
cognizance of actions against decisions of public law 
bodies’.
Acts of public but non-administrative authorities. 
In Cameroon laws passed by the National Assembly cannot be
38. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 50 du 27 janv. 1968, unreported.
39- Obam Etame Joseph c. Republique Federale du Cameroun, 
C.F.J., Arr§t No. 98 du 27 janvier 1970, unreported.
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the subject of judicial review by the administrative court. 
Judicial review has also been ousted in the case of 
decisions taken by the various organs of the National 
Assembly (Bureau, Speaker, Parliamentary Commissions) when 
such decisions relate to the elaboration of laws. How­
ever, acts of the administrative services of the National
Assembly may be proceeded against in the administrative 
4lcourt. Decisions which, in terms of their content,
may be likened to law, but which originate from the execu­
tive, are deemed to be administrative acts. For example, 
regulations on public administration made by the executive 
at the request of Parliament, in order to complete the 
provisions of a law; ’r&glements autonomes1 made by the 
President of the Republic on subjects other than those 
reserved for Parliament under art. 20 of the Constitution. 
On the power of the Executive to legislate by way of
40. Societe de Grand Travaux de l’Est c. Etat du Cameroun 
Oriental^ C .F.J., Arr6t No. 4 du 28 oct. 1970, unre­
ported; Claude Halle c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, 
C.F.J., Arr§t No. 105 du 8 dec. 1970, unreported. 
Articles 7 and 33 of the Cameroonian Constitution spell 
out a special procedure for judicial review of legis­
lative actions before the Supreme Court sitting as a 
constitutional court. This review may be initiated 
only by the Head of State.
41. This is the position in France since the passing of an
Ordinance of 17 November 1958. It was this special 
legislation in the form of a loi organique that has
made it possible in France for the State to be sued in
the administrative courts for accidents caused by par- 
laimentary officials in the course of their duties. 
Hitherto, this could not be done: Compagnie Generale
d 1 Assurances, D.1953.J.718, note Morange.
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ordinances , art. 21 of the Constitution enacts as follows:
"Art. 21 - Provided that with regard to the 
subjects listed In article 20, the National 
Assembly may empower the President of the 
Republic to legislate by way of Ordinance 
for a limited period and for given purposes.
2) Such Ordinances shall enter into force 
on the date of their publications. They 
shall be tabled before the National Assembly 
for purposes of ratification within the 
time limit fixed by the enabling law.
3) They shall remain in force as long as
the Assembly has not refused to ratify them."
Such Ordinances clearly have the force of law even before 
they have been ratified by the National Assembly. This 
being the case, it has been suggested, rightly, it is sub­
mitted, that such Ordinances are not subject to judicial
42review by the administrative court.
In France, no action may be brought before the
Conseil d'Etat upon the decision of the government to
4 2introduce a bill into Parliament, or of the Prime Minister 
to reshuffle his cabinet, or of the President of the 
Republic to submit a bill to referendum or to exercise 
the exceptional powers conferred upon him by article 16 of 
the French Constitution in the face of a national emergency. 
In Cameroon, the law on this point is still obscure.
42. Eric Boehler, ’Reflexion sur la nature juridique des 
ordonnances de l rarticle 21 de la constitution du 2 
juin 1972’, 5 R.C.D.8 (1974).
43. Mutuelle Nationale des Etudiants de France, C.E. 9 mai 
1951, Rec. Lebon, 1951, p. 253.
44. Rubin de Servens, C.E. 2 mars 1962, J .C .P .1962.12613, 
concl. Henry.
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However, one commentator has stated with confidence that
in Cameroon, Tpeuvent faire egalement partie de la cate-
gorie des actes administratifs les decisions prises par le
President de la Republique dans le cadre de 1 ?article 11
(etat d fexception) lorsquTelles portent sur le domaine 
4 5r^glementaire’.
The administration of justice is a public ser­
vice. It is one of the foremost areas in which public 
authority is exercised. By virtue of the principle of 
the separation of powers, the judiciary and not the exe­
cutive administers justice. However, the organisation 
of the judicial service is the responsibility of the exe­
cutive and not the judiciary. Thus any measure taken by 
the executive relating to the organisation of the judicial
service is an administrative act and may be challenged in
46the administrative court. Accordingly, decisions
creating or suppressing courts as well as those concerning
the career and discipline of judicial officers may be
47challenged in the administrative court. The position is
45. Henri Jacquot, 1Le contentieux administratif au 
Cameroun1, 7 R.C.D.24 (1975).
46. Tagny Mathieu c. Etat du Cameroun, C.F.J., Arr§t No.
19 du 16 mars 1967, 'Recueil Mboyoumr 1962-1970, p. 73.
47. Cf. the French cases of Falco and Vidaillac (selection 
of judicial officers to sit in the Conseil Superieur de 
la Magistrature): C.E. 17 avril 1953, J .C .P.1953•2.
7596, note Vedel; Ratzel (measures affecting the career 
prospects of a judge), CTe . 22 janv. 1954, Rec. Lebon, 
1954, p. 46.
753.
otherwise with regards to the functioning of the judicial
service. All matters concerning the operation of courts
are outside the purview of the administrative court.
Thus for example, the administrative court may not take
cognisance of suit based on a decisions to prosecute or
48not to prosecute, the grant or refusal of a pardon, or
on the activities of the police judiciaire. The police
administrative are however subject to the jurisdiction of
49the administrative court.
Act of State. Neither the administrative 
court nor any other court has jurisdiction over an act of 
State. This absolute prohibition is based on the theory 
that certain governmental acts are so important from the 
point of view of the preservation and defence of State 
that they must not be limited by legal considerations.
An act of State (acte de gouvernement) is a measure which, 
though taken by the government, is completely immune from 
challenge in any court. This means there is a zone in 
governmental activity into which the judge has no access; 
a field within which the government has an unfettered
48. Cf. French case of Gombert, C.E. 28 mars 1947, R.D.P. 
1947.95, note Waline.
49. Cf. French cases of Lecomte and Daramy, C.E. 24 juin 
1949, D.1950.75; Societe Frampar (prefect's seizure 
of a newspaper as an act of police administrative), 
C.E. 24 juin i960, R.D.P.i960.815, concl. Heumann.
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50prerogative of action.
In France, in the early part of the nineteenth
century, this ’free zone’ of governmental activity used
to be defined by the government itself. Any measure
touching on la haute politique and prompted by a political
51motive Qnobile politique) was said to be an act of State. 
This in effect meant that any measure which the executive 
took could, so long as the government claims it was moti­
vated by political considerations, be considered an act
of State and therefore outside the reach of judicial con- 
52trol. This 'political motive' criterion effectively
gave the government a free hand to determine the extent 
to which it was prepared to be subject to the rule of law. 
It was a dangerous criterion and so was abandoned towards
50. The term 'act of State' has no technical definition in 
British constitutional law. The expression is gener­
ally used for an act done by the Crown as a matter of 
policy in relation to another State, or in relation
to an individual who is not within the allegiance of 
the Crown. Acts done under the authority of the Crown 
in relation to an alien outside British territory or 
to an enemy within Britain are characterised as act of 
State so as to prevent the aggrieved person from 
obtaining redress for damage done. Acts of state in 
relation to foreign states include the declaration of 
war and peace, the making of treaties, the annexation 
and cession of territory, the sending and receiving of 
diplomatic representatives, and the recognition of 
foreign states and governments. An act of State cannot 
be used as a foundation of an action because such acts 
cannot be questioned and are outside the jurisdiction 
of British courts. Acts of State are non-justiciable. 
See generally, 0. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, 
op.cit., pp. 28l et seq.
51. Georges Vedel, op.cit., pp. 208 et seq.
52. Due d'Aumale (book seized from the editor), C.E. 9 
mai 1867, S .1867.2.124 , concl. Aucoc, note Choppin.
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51
the end of the nineteenth century. The landmark in
the evolution of the doctrine of act of State was the
54
case of Prince Napoleon Bonaparte. The annual Army
List of 1873 omitted the name of Prince Napoleon who had
been appointed general by the emperor in 1853* The
Conseil d ’Etat to whom the Prince appealed rejected the
argument of the Minister of War that the plea of acte de
gouvernement could be raised in any case of a political
complexion such as this undoubtedly was. The importance
of this case lies in the fact that it established the
right of the Conseil d ’Etat to determine for itself what
matters fall within the doctrine of act of State. Since
this case it is the court and no longer the government
itself which determines the extent to which the government
can be subjected to law. The modern trend of the case-law
however, is to curtail this doctrine. Decisions after
55
Prince Napoleon have progressively pared it down so much
so that today it extends only to the relations of the
56
government, on the one hand, with Parliament, and on the
53. J.M. Auby & R. Drago, Traite de contentieux adminis­
tratif, Tome I, 2 ed. , L.G.D.'J. , Paris, 1975, p . 96 •
5*1. C.E. 19 fevr. l8753 D.1875.3.18, concl. David; see 
also, Marquigny, T.C. 5 nov. 1880, D .1880.3•121;
Due d ’Aumale et Prince Murat, C.E. 20 mai 1887, S.I889. 
3.19.
55. Auby et Drago, op.cit., pp. 98-IO8 .
56. For example, decree dissolving Parliament, the Head
of State's decision to exercise the exceptional powers 
conferred upon him by the constitution in the face of 
a national emergency, a decree of the Head of State to 
submit a bill to a referendum, a decree by the Head of 
State passing a law ...
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57other, with foreign States or international organisations. 
Both international relations and parliamentary proceedings 
are now recognised as areas of peculiar sensitivity not 
suitable for judicial review in the administrative courts.
The exclusion of judicial review in the above 
areas is usually explained by the fact that the action 
criticised is closely linked with bodies over which the 
Conseil d'Etat has no control, namely, Parliament or a 
foreign State. Even here, the doctrine of act of State 
is sometimes whittled down further by the theory of acte 
detachable. Under this theory, the administrative court 
regains competence to review if it can separate off some 
acte administratif from the act of State. For example,
57- For example, acts relating to the conduct of war, acts 
relating to the negotiation and conclusion of inter­
national treaties and acts relating to the execution 
of treaties directed towards the international order 
(as opposed to those directed towards the internal 
order). The plea of act of State would therefore be 
upheld in a case of international complexion. An 
interesting example is afforded by the case of Radio­
diffusion Francaise (also known as the Radio Andorra 
case), T.C. 2 fevr. 1950, S. 1950.3.73, concl. Odent; 
J.C.P.1950, II, 55^2, note Rivero. The principality 
of Andorra had a commercial radio station. It put 
out transmissions on wavelengths reserved by inter­
national conventions for other users. The latter com­
plained to the French government. The government 
ordered the state-controlled French radio to jam Radio 
Andorra. A French company had the exclusive programme 
rights on Radio Andorra. It sought an injunction to 
stop the jamming. The injunction was sought in the 
ordinary civil court which accepted the argument that 
the jamming was a flagrant illegality (voie de fait) 
giving rise to civil liability. It granted the 
injunction. On appeal however, the Tribunal des Con- 
flits accepted the contention that the jamming had the 
character of an act of State and so non-justiciable.
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measures relating to the execution of an international 
treaty directed towards the internal order (as opposed 
to those directed towards the international order) are 
deemed to be detachable from the treaty itself and 
therefore fall within the competence of the administrative 
court. So, where a French consul expelled a French citi­
zen from a foreign country as being undesirable, his
decision to do so was detachable from his other diplomatic
58activity and held to be subject to judicial review.
In the matter of international relations the doctrine has
been to some extent outflanked by extending the principle
of liability without fault to the consequences of an
59international convention.
In Cameroon, there is as yet no case-law on the 
theory of act of State and nowhere is that theory defined. 
It is doubtful whether the court would, when the occasion 
presents itself, follow French case law in taking a res­
trictive view of act of State. It has indeed been sug­
gested that it would be unwise for the Cameroonian judge 
to adopt the position in France as this may lead to a vio­
lent clash between the judiciary and the political authori- 
6o
ties. It is however submitted that while Cameroon, as
a developing country which therefore requires greater
58. Colrat, C.E. 4 dec. 1925.
59. Compagnie Generate d'Energie Radioelectrique, C.E. 
30 mars 1966, R.D.P. 1966.774, concl. Bernard.
60. Henri Jacquot, op.cit., p. 25.
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freedom in governmental activity, must perhaps take a 
broader view of act of State, it should not go so far 
as to adopt the ’political complexion’ criterion.
b ) Disputes arising from administrative contracts and 
concessions to run public services
The law does not say what an 'administrative 
6 1contract' is and there are no Cameroonian decided cases 
to provide guidance on this point. So, once more one 
must fall back on French administrative law for guidance. 
Disputes arising from administrative contracts are justi­
ciable in the administrative court while those arising from 
'private contracts’ are justiciable in the ordinary courts. 
There can be no administrative contract unless at least 
one of the parties is a public authority - a collectivity 
locale (such as a commune or a departement), a public 
corporation or parastatal, a government department or 
other state agency. A contract between private persons 
or bodies cannot be an administrative contract. But
61. The only category of contracts statutorily designated 
as administrative are public tenders (marches publics) : 
Decree No. 70/530 of 29 Oct. 1970, s. 33. Contracts 
for the recruitment of non-civil servant personnel 
of the administration are not administrative contracts 
although such persons are said to be contractuels: 
Labour Code, s. 1; Ekindi Joel c. Etat du Cameroun, 
C.F.J. Arr§t No. 31 du.15 nov. 1966, 'Recueil Mboyoum' 
1962-1970, p. 8l; Atangana Martin-Camille c. Etat du 
Cameroun, C.F.J. Arr§t No. 26 du 15 nov. T966, unre­
ported; C.S.C.O., Arr§t No. 16 du 29 dec. 1964. 
However, disputes concerning the non-renewal of such 
contracts are justiciable in the administrative court: 
Olinga Norbert c. R .F .C ., C.F.J., Arr§t No. 46 du 
30 avril 1968.
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contracts of public works (marches de travaux publics) 
concluded between entrepreneurs and mixed economy cor­
porations (societes d Teconomie mixte) granted concessions
6 2to undertake public works are administrative contracts. 
Sometimes, certain types of contracts are specifically 
designated by statute as administrative. Often however, 
this is not done and it becomes difficult to determine 
whether a given contract is administrative or not. To 
resolve this difficulty, the courts often apply one of two 
tests: the criterion of clause exorbitante de droit commun
and that of participation gj. l ’execution du service.
Participation & 1*execution du service. The 
administration may grant concessions to private persons 
or bodies to run public services. Contracts concluded 
for such purposes are administrative contracts and any 
dispute arising therefrom may properly be laid before the 
administrative court. Thus, contracts with an adminis­
trative agency for the supply of goods are administrative 
in character if the supplier himself carries out the ser­
vice for which the goods are needed. In one case, the 
contractor undertook under a verbal contract, subject to
62. Entreprise Peyrot c. Societe de l fAutoroute Esterel
Cdte d ’Azur (construction of a motorway and collection 
of toll on the road), T.C. 8 juillet 1963, D .1963*534, 
concl. Lasry, note Josse; Societe Francaise du Tunnel 
du Mont Blanc (construction of a tunnel through Mount 
Blanc), Cass. civile 2 dec. 1964, J .C .P .II.14357, 
note Auby.
63. Affortit et Vingtain, C.E. 4 juin 1954, Rec. Lebon,
1954, p. 432, concl. Chardeau; Lauthier, C.E. 20 mars 
1959, D.i960.J.280, note A. de Laubadere.
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payment of a fixed price per person per day, to provide
catering facilities at a camp for repatriated French
citizens. The Conseil d ’Etat had no difficulty in hol-
64ding the contract to be an administrative one. Admin­
istrative contracts, under the criterion of participation 
& lTexecution du service, include contracts for public 
works and contracts granting concessions for the running 
of public services, typically in the case of contracts
to run public utilities such as the supply of gas, elec-
65tricity, water, and the running of public transport.
On the face of it this criterion appears to be simple 
and straight forward. In fact however, it is not always 
easy to draw the line between mere collaboration and
6 6actual participation in carrying out the public service. 
Thus for example,, a contract with an independent contrac­
tor to supply a government department with furniture is 
not an administrative contract.
Clause exorbitante de droit commun. Sometimes 
a contract between the administration and a private person 
may contain what is known in the literature as a clause 
exorbitante. A contract containing such a clause is an 
administrative contract. Indeed the clause exorbitante
64. Epoux Bertin, C.E. 20 avril 1956, D.1956.433* note
A. de Laubadere.
65. Compagnie Generale des; Eaux, C.E. 12 mai 1933;
Compagnie Generale Francaise des Tramways, C.E. 21 
mars 1910, S.1911.3.1* concl. Blum.
66. See for example, Dame Veuve Mazerand, T.C. 23 nov. 1963.
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test is frequently used to distinguish administrative
from private contracts. The test involves an examination
of the terms of the particular contract rather than its
object. Clauses in a contract are fexorbitantT if they
are different in their nature from those which could be
7
included in a similar contract under the civil law 
or where their object is to confer rights or impose obli­
gations upon the parties quite unlike in their nature
those which anyone would freely agree to in the context
6 8of civil or commercial law. Generally speaking, it
may be said that contractual terms which bear the mark 
’administrative’ are those motivated only by consi­
derations of the general interest and cannot be found in 
private contracts. In principle, the presence of such
’exorbitant’ clauses in a contract automatically makes
69it administrative. Examples of such ’exorbitant' clauses
67. Cf. Soci-dtd des Combustibles et Carburants Nationaux, 
T.C. 19 juin 1952.
68. Stein, C.E. 20 Oct. 1950.
69. Except however, contracts made by industrial and com­
mercial public enterprises with users. Such contracts 
are not administrative but private law contracts:
Dame Bertrand, T.C. 17 dec. 1962, A.J.D.A.1963.105.
The recognition of a new genre of public service, the 
service public a caractere industriel et commercial, 
came about as a result of the fact that after World War 
I the State began to engage increasingly in commercial 
and industrial activities as various parts of the eco­
nomy were nationalised or brought under some degree of 
public control. The Tribunal des Conflits adopted the 
view that operating as they did under conditions com­
parable to private enterprise and with similar objec­
tives, industrial and commercial public enterprises fell 
within the competence of the ordinary courts. In
/Continued over
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are clauses imposing a penalty upon the contractor, or 
giving the administration (but not the contractor) an
Footnote 69 continued from page 761.
Bac d ’Eloka (also known as Colonie de la Cote d ’Ivoire) 
T.C. 22 janv. 1921, D.1921.3.1, note Matter, the 
government of the French colony of the Ivory Coast 
operated a ferry boat of this name across a coastal
lagoon for the convenience of the public. One night
it foundered and the owner of a motor car which it was
carrying claimed damages from the colony in the local
civil court. The colony challenged the competence of 
the court. The Tribunal des Conflits held that the 
civil court had jurisdiction since the colony was 
operating a transport service in the same conditions 
as an ordinary businessman. An extension of this prin­
ciple occurred in Naliato, T.C. 22 janv..1955* R.D.P. 
1955.716, note Waline, where a boy- of this name was 
injured while playing games at a holiday camp run by 
the government for the benefit of workers in certain 
state-owned factories and their families. The court 
classified this activity as a service public social 
no different from similar welfare services provided by 
private firms and therefore subject to the ordinary 
courts. The courts now appear to have shifted from 
this principle and have adopted a broader idea of pub­
lic service subject to the jurisdiction of the adminis­
trative court: Effimief, T.C. 28 mars 1955, J.C.P.
1955.11.8786, note Blaevoet, - a syndicate of private 
firms employed by the administration to undertake 
schemes of redevelopment in slum areas held to be 
subject to the administrative court’s jurisdiction; 
Compagnie Air France c. Epoux Barbier, T.C. 15 janv. 
1968, where the court was of the opinion that although 
Air France was a private company operating under 
private law, a regulation requiring air hostesses to 
resign on marriage had ’an administrative character 
regulating the organisation of what was essentially a 
public service’ and therefore that the validity of the 
regulation was a matter for the administrative court;
Huban c . Society de l fAutoroute Esterel-C6te d ’Azur,
T.C. 2.8 juin 1965 - Liability of a private firm towards 
a user of the motorway, where the firm had been granted 
the concession of constructing the motorway and then 
of collecting the toll payable by motorists.
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option to rescind, or allowing the administration to 
vary the terms of the contract in the course of its 
performance. Many of these are standard form i n ■con­
tracts for public works, but their presence in other 
contracts will convert these too into administrative 
contracts. The doctrine of clauses exorbitantes leaves 
it open to the administration to choose, by the way it 
frames the terms of the contract, whether it wishes
its contractual obligations.to be subject to the
70administrative law or the ordinary civil law.
c) Disputes concerning State land
In Cameroon, the concept of State land has also 
been borrowed from France. In Cameroon property 
which belongs to the administration falls under two 
separate categories: le domaine public des personnes
publiques and le domaine prive des personnes publiques. 
The latter is governed, essentially, by the ordinary 
civil law while the former is subject to ’un regime 
ddrogatoire au droit commun de la propriete’. This 
distinction is a familiar one in France and it dates 
back to the nineteenth century. Under the Ancien 
Regime crown property of the State was inalienable.
The Revolution converted Crown lands into national lands
70. L.N. Brown & J.F. Garner, French administrative 
law, 2nd ed., Butterworths, London, 1973, p. 72.
7 6H.
and repealed the inalienability rule. In the nine­
teenth century however, national lands were divided 
into two categories; one (known as the private domain 
of the State) was subject to alienation, and the other 
(known as the public domain of the State) was inalien­
able. Thus the distinction between the two categories 
of State property rested on the theory that public 
property of the State was inalienable while private 
property of the State was. But the inalienability 
criterion was soon abandoned in favour of that of 
affectation de bien a l ’inter^t general. Under this 
new criterion, public property of the State was defined 
as property open to the use of the general public such 
as public ways, seashores, public parks and sports
grounds, land or buildings specially adapted to public
71needs, and so on. Public property of the State may
however be closed to the public (desaffecte). When 
this happens the particular porperty thus closed to 
the public ceases to be ’public' and enters the cate­
gory of private property of the State. Property of 
the State is regarded as ’private’ where it is managed 
by the public authority in the manner of a private 
owner.
In Cameroon, the content of public property of
71. Cf. Cass. civ. 7 nov. 1950, S .1952.I .173, note 
Tixier; Societe Le Beton, C.E. 19 oct. 1956.
J
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the State is defined in s . 2 of Ordinance No. 7^/2 of 
6 July 1974 (Rules governing State lands). It 
provides:
"S. 2(1) Public property shall comprise all 
personal and real property which, by nature 
or intended purpose, is set apart either for 
the direct use of the public or for public 
services.
(2) Public property shall be inalienable, 
imprescriptible and unattachable. Subject 
to the provisions of Article 5(3) below,
it shall not be liable to private appro­
priation.
(3) Public property shall be divided into 
natural and artificial public property."
This definition is not different from the concept of 
domaine public in French law: moveables such as paintings 
in Museums or objects of art come, as in France, within 
the meaning of public property and the definition is 
based, again as in France, on the theory of affectation 
k l'inter^t general.
Disputes concerning the demarcation or adminis­
tration of public property are justiciable in the 
administrative court. So too controversies arising 
from public rights of way (la grande voirie) and public 
works.^
B . Matters excepted from the jurisdiction of the 
administrative court
Certain categories of matters have specifically
72. Tchany Jean c. Etat federe du Cameroun Oriental,
C.F.J., Arr§t No. 113 du 8 dec. 1970, 1 R.C.D.
47 (1972).
be placed by law within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the civil courts. The most notable instances are 
questions of personal status, of the liberty of the 
individual, and of title to immovable property.
Section 9(*0 of Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972 
provides that the ordinary courts shall have juris­
diction over ’administrative trespass on private land 
and arbitrary step by the administration against 
liberty and property, with power to make any order to 
bring it to an end’. The subsection goes on to pro­
vide that ’a ruling shall be given by the Full Bench 
of the Supreme Court on any interlocutory plea made 
in the case of an arbitrary step by the administration 
against liberty or property’.
a ) Administrative trespass on private land (1’emprise) 
When land is expropriated by the administration 
the ordinary courts are alone competent to assess the 
quantum of compensation due to the dispossessed owner. 
This head of jurisdiction is not only limited to cases 
of expropriation. It extends to any act of dis­
possession, even if only temporary, on the part of the 
administration. A seizure of immovable in this way 
is known in the literature as emprise. An adminis­
trative trespass on private land (emprise) may be 
defined as any act of dispossession, whether temporary 
or permanent, by the administration of private immovable 
property. In Gaston Medou c. Etat Federe du Cameroun
767.
71Oriental a regiment of the Cameroonian Army encamped 
on a piece of private land for eight months. It was 
held that this amounted to emprise and that a claim 
for damages on injury done to the land was not cog­
nisable by the administrative court but by the ordinary 
court.
Two conditions are necessary for a trespass on 
land to qualify as emprise. First, there must be a 
trespass by the administration on immovable private 
property (that is, on private land), A seizure of 
movable property by the administration is not an 
emprise. Secondly, the trespass must take the form of 
an act of dispossession, be it temporary or permanent.
An emprise is a permanent or temporary expropriation of 
land. For example, the administration commits an 
emprise if, in order to carry out certain works, it 
occupies a piece of land privately owned by leaving 
equipment on it.
Whenever there is an emprise (regular or irre­
gular) the dispossessed property owner can look for 
compensation to the ordinary courts. Whether an 
emprise is irregular or not is a question for prior 
determination (question prejudicielle) by the adminis­
trative court. The ordinary court may not, on principle
73. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 157 du 23 mars 1971, 1 R.C.D. 
36 (1972), observation Jacquot.
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determine the regular or irregular nature of the emprise;
its function being only to assess the quantum of damages
due to the complainant. The damages would normally extend
to the whole of the plaintiff’ loss. For example, damages
for the irregular requisitioning of a hotel would extend
to the whole of the owner’s loss, including damage to
furnishings and movables.
It is noteworthy that s. 9(4) of Ordinance No.
72/6 of 26 August 1972 simply provides that the ordinary
courts have jurisdiction over administrative trespass
on private land. The nature of the emprise, whether
regular or irregular, is irrelevant. The ordinary court
is therefore entitled to assess damages irrespective of
7!
whether the emprise is regular or irregular. The
reason for this seems to be to avoid confusion and unneces­
sary complications. Moreover, the ordinary court is 
competent not only to assess damages.; it also has the 
power to make any order to bring the emprise to an end.
It may for example issue an order of prohibition or evic-
75tion against the administration.
7^. The law is otherwise in France. There, the assess­
ment of damages in the case of emprise irreguliere is 
done by the civil judge while that of emprise reguliere 
is done by the administrative judge: Werquin, C.E.
15 fevr. 1961, R.D.P .1961.321, concl. Braibant.
75. This is impossible in France. The law there on this 
point is that the civil judge has no power to issue 
orders against the administration. In one case for 
example, it was held that the civil judge had no com­
petence to order the eviction of the administration 
from premises it occupied: Societe Rivoli-Sebastopol,
T.C. 17 mars 194 9.
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b ) Arbitrary step by the administration against liberty 
and property (voies de fait)
A vole de fait is a flagrant irregularity. It 
indicates "some irregularity on the part of the adminis­
tration which is so flagrant and gross that it cannot be 
regarded as an administrative act at all but is treated as 
if it were the act of a private body, thereby losing the 
privilege of being adjudicated upon only by the adminis­
trative court and falling within the cognisance of the
7 6
ordinary courts". An illustration is afforded by the
77
French case of Carlier. A person of that name was a
lover of arts who had persistently criticised the Adminis­
tration des Beaux-Arts for having neglected or destroyed 
France's national monuments. One day, while taking photo­
graphs of the exterior of Chartres Cathedral, he was 
arrested, taken to the police station and had his pictures 
confiscated. Shortly afterwards, when he joined a queue 
of tourists about to visit the belfry of the cathedral, 
the guide, acting on superior orders, refused him admission. 
He brought an action for damages before the Conseil d'Etat, 
which held itself incompetent to adjudicate upon the arrest 
of Carlier and the seizure of his property; for these were 
voies de fait, being acts 'manifestly incapable of being 
connected with the exercise of a power belonging to the
76. L.N. Brown & J.F. Garner, French administrative law, 
2nd ed., Butterworth, London, 1973, p. 70.
77. C.E., 18 nov. 19^9, J.C.P.1950.II.5535, note Vedel.
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administration’. Carlier had, therefore, to seek his 
remedy for these flagrant irregularities in the ordinary 
courts. On the other hand, the Conseil d ’Etat decided 
that it could entertain that part of the claim which 
related to his being refused entry to the belfry; this 
refusal was undoubtedly irregular in the circumstances 
but did not lose its quality of an administrative act in 
respect of which the court could award damages.
An act would be held to be a voie de fait only 
if it presents certain characteristics. First, there 
must be an arbitrary step taken by the administration which 
infringes some fundamental right of the individual - 
liberty of the person or sanctity of property. There 
must be an actual arbitrary step; in other words, the 
flagrant irregularity must consist of a physical act 
(operation materielle). The mere existence of a decision, 
albeit flagrantly irregular, does not amount to a voie de 
fait. There would be a voie de fait in such a case only 
if the administration executes the decision or, at least, 
threatens to do so.
Secondly, the step taken by the administration
must be manifestly illegal. The legal error must be so
gross as to change the character of the operation and make
it lose its quality of an administrative act. In Mve
7 R
Ndongo et Procureur General c. Ngaba Victor a person
78. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 10 du 17 oct. 1968, ’Recueil Mboyoum’,
1962-1970, p. 110.
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named Mve Ndongo was prefect of Boumba Ngoko. He had the 
goods of Ngaba Victor, a tax defaulter, seized. No law 
authorised him to order the seizure of the property of 
tax defaulters. Only a special government department 
had the power to do so, and then only in accordance with 
certain procedures laid down by law. Ngaba Victor claimed 
that the prefect’s action was illegal. Held, by the 
Federal Court of Justice, that prefects are not responsible 
for tax collection and that the prefect’s action in this 
case was undoubtedly an arbitrary step taken against pri­
vate property; an action manifestly incapable of being 
connected with the exercise of a power belonging to the 
administration. The court went on to hold that the ordi­
nary court and not the administrative court had juris­
diction to entertain an action for damages arising from 
70
a voie de fait.
Where a voie de fait has been committed, it is 
the ordinary court and not the administrative court which 
has jurisdiction to assess the quantum of damages due to 
the plaintiff and to make any order to bring the voie de 
fait to an end. This means that the ordinary court may 
award damages against the administration, issue an 
injunction to it, or order it to put an end to the act, 
make restitution or restoration.
A voie de fait may stem either from a flagrantly 
irregular decision (what is known in the literature as
79. The same court had reached a similar decision in the 
earlier case of Etat Federal du Cameroun c. Max Keler 
Ndongo, C.F.J., Arrdt No. 8 du 16 oct. T968, unreported.
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la voie de fait par manque de droit, that is, an action 
or decision with no legal basis) or from the illegal exe­
cution of a decision even if such a decision was in the 
first place legal (.this is known as la voie de fait par 
manque de procedure). In a state of emergency however,
a voie de fait may become a simple illegality falling
8 0within the competence of the administrative court.
The question whether an alleged arbitrary step 
by the administration amounts to a voie de fait or not is 
a question of law for the Full Bench of the Supreme Court 
to decide. So whenever this issue arises in proceedings 
before the ordinary court or the administrative court, 
the proceedings must be stayed and the issue referred to
Q “|
the Full Bench of the Supreme Court for a ruling on it.
The Full Bench of the Supreme Court acts here as a kind of 
consultant. It is unclear why only the Supreme Court may 
rule on this particular issue. There is no compelling 
reason why the trial court should not be able to take the 
point itself. It is submitted that this 'mini renvoi' 
unnecessarily prolongs the proceedings and befogs the 
procedure. One commentator has however suggested that 
the reason for this ’mini renvoi' stems from "the concern 
to shelter the judges below, and to prevent judges from
8 2getting into personal difficulties with the administration".
80. Cf. dicta in Mve Ndongo and in Max Keler Ndongo.
81. Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, s. 9(4).
82. Henri Jacquot, op.cit., p. 29.
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This however pre-supposes that Judges of the Supreme Court 
have no fears about getting into personal difficulties 
with the government and that they can and are prepared to 
shelter their brethren in the lower courts from possible 
government reprisals in the face of any decision which 
the government may not take kindly to heart. That this 
is the case is extremely doubtful.
c) The appreciation and interpretation of administrative 
measures by the ordinary courts
Because of the dual system of law and of courts 
a preliminary question of law or of fact may on occasion 
arise in the course of proceedings properly brought 
before the administrative court, or the civil court, as 
the case may be, which falls for decision by the other
order of court. This is a general issue of procedure
and here, only one aspect of it shall be discussed; that 
is the right of the ordinary court either to interpret 
or to appreciate the legality of administrative measures.
The issue may be illustrated with an example. Suppose 
a motorist is charged in the criminal court with having 
offended against a provision of the Road Traffic Regulations. 
In his defence he argues that the provision under which he 
is charged is illegal. A preliminary question then arises 
as to whether the provision is in fact illegal- as the defen­
dant contends. Clearly, the court cannot properly go
into the merits of the case until a preliminary ruling on
this point has been made.
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If the criminal court itself is entitled to rule 
on the interlocutory challenge to the legality of the 
provision a question for prior decision (question prealable) 
is said to have arisen and the trial court (le juge de 
1 1 action) is said to be the juge de l 1exception as well.
But if the criminal court is not entitled to take the point 
itself but must stay proceedings so that the issue raised 
can first be determined by the administrative court, a 
’prejudicial’ issue (question prejudicielle) is then said 
to have arisen.
The first procedure whereby the trial court 
itself rules on the interlocutory challenge is shorter, 
expedient and more in the interest of litigants. This 
is probably why in Cameroon the criminal court is empowered, 
when the issue arises in the course of a criminal trial, 
to pronounce on interlocutory challenges to the legality
o q
of administrative measures. Ordinarily, interlocutory
challenges to the legality of administrative acts are 
cognisable by the administrative court. But where such 
interlocutory challenges are made in the course of a 
criminal trial, the criminal court is itself entitled to 
make a ruling on the issue. Section 9 of Ordinance No. 72/6 
of 26 August 1972 is silent on the question of interpre­
tation of administrative measures. This silence, it is
83. Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, s. 9(2)(a).
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submitted, must be resolved in favour of litigants.
Without fear of contradiction it may be asserted that the 
criminal courts, unlike the civil courts, have juris­
diction to decide on the legality of administrative acts,
whether such acts are of general or individual appli- 
84
cation. The reason is that in criminal matters the
liberty of the individual is at stake and so there must 
be no delay.in rendering justice.
With regards to non-criminal justice the issue 
at stake is not always as crucial as in criminal matters. 
Therefore, in civil matters there is apparently no need 
for great urgency. For this reason, the ordinary civil 
courts have no competence to decide on the legality (as 
distinct from the interpretation) of administrative acts. 
So, where the issue of the legality of an administrative 
measure arises in the course of proceedings in any suit 
before an ordinary civil court, it must stay the pro­
ceedings and refer the matter to the administrative bench 
of the Supreme Court for a decision thereon. But if the 
issue before the civil court is simply one of interpreting 
the administrative act challenged, the court is entitled
84. In the French case of Avranches et Desmarets, T.C.,
5 juillet 1951, S.1952.3.1, note Auby, two persons 
were prosecuted for poaching on the land of a third. 
They argued that they did so under a clause in the 
standard agricultural tenancy for the departement.
The landowner challenged the legality of this clause. 
The criminal court declared the clause illegal and 
proceeded to convict the accuseds. The Tribunal des 
Conflits upheld the jurisdiction of the criminal court 
to determine the legality of the administrative act.
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to proceed to do so itself. In the French case of 
85Septfonds a person of that name lost some bags of sugar 
consigned by train during the First World War. He 
claimed damages from the railway company. The company 
had been taken over by the government under war time regu­
lations which prescribed various time-limits for making 
claims for lost consignments. The question arose in the 
civil court as to the meaning of these regulations. Held, 
by the Tribunal des Conflits, that the civil court was 
competent to interpret them.^
2. Resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction
A dual system of courts inevitably leads to 
conflicts of jurisdiction. Ideas for the resolution of 
such conflicts have never lacked. In England for example, 
the rivalry between common law and equity was resolved by 
the passing of the Judicature Acts 1873-75 which made pro­
vision for the administration of equity and the common 
law in the same courts and ordained that where equity and 
the common law conflict the rules of equity shall prevail. 
In France however, conflicts of jurisdiction have assumed 
greater importance than they did in England before 1873.
85. T.C., 16 juin 1923a S.1923.3.^9, concl. Matter, note 
Haurio.
86. See also, Barinstein, T.C., 30 oct. 19^7, J.C.P.19^7. 
11.3966, note Frejaville.
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The reason lies in the fact that the French approach is 
to segregate according to the nature of the factual issue 
rather than according to the nature of the relief sought. 
Before the creation of the Tribunal des Conflits in 1848 
conflicts of jurisdiction in France were resolved by the 
head of State acting on the advice of the Conseil d ’Etat. 
Although the Tribunal des Conflits was abolished after the 
coup d ’etat of 1851, it was re-established in 1872. The 
function of this court is to resolve conflicts of juris­
diction between the administrative and the ordinary courts.
In Cameroon resolution of conflicts of juris­
diction was at first entrusted to the highest court among
O y
the ordinary courts. Now however, resolution of con­
flicts of jurisdiction between the ordinary court and the
administrative court falls within the competence of the
8 8Full Bench of the Supreme Court. The procedure laid
89down for the resolution of such conflicts is a simple one. 
The first phase of the procedure takes place in the court 
before which the dispute has been brought (the ordinary 
court or the administrative bench of the Supreme Court). 
Here, any of the parties, including the legal department, 
may, on the basis of s. 9 of Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 
August 1972, challenge the court’s jurisdiction to entertain
87. Decree of 21 June 1961.
88. Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, s. 15, as amended 
by Law No. 76/28 of 14 December 1976.
89. Idem.
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the dispute. Section 15(1) of the above Ordinance 
enacts3 "Any non-criminal court, including the Adminis­
trative Bench of the Supreme Court, shall be bound to 
decide immediately and without reserving the point to 
final judgment any protest to its jurisdiction founded on 
section 9 thereof.” Section 15(2) goes on to provide 
that ”such court may raise of its own motion and decide 
in like manner the question of its own jurisdiction".
In either case the judge must immediately make 
an interlocutory ruling (decision avant dire droit) on the 
issue. However, if the court rules that it has juris­
diction to entertain the matter it cannot at once proceed 
to try the substantive issue. It must stay the pro­
ceedings for ten days. The reason for this delay is to 
give the parties and the legal department time to appeal 
(If they are so minded) to the Full Bench of the Supreme
Court against the trial court’s decision claiming juris-
90diction to entertain the case. Such an appeal may be
validly lodged in the registry of the court against whose 
decision it is made.
When the appeal comes up for hearing, the court 
may do one of three things. It may confirm the trial 
court’s decision claiming jurisdiction over the matter; 
in which case the trial court will resume the proceedings 
and adjudicate upon the substantive issue. The court may
90. Ordinance No. 72/6, s. 15(3)*
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also confirm the trial court’s decision declining juris­
diction to deal with the case. Alternatively, the court 
may rule that the trial court erroneously claimed or 
declined jurisdiction to deal with the case. When the 
Full Bench of the Supreme Court makes such a ruling it 
must also designate the court which should properly be 
seised of the matter. It is noteworthy that a decision 
by a court having no jurisdiction to deal with the case 
will not go unchallenged simply because the parties failed 
to avail themselves of the procedure heretofore described. 
If judgment has been given by an incompetent court, the 
parties and the Procureur General may, within two months
of rendition of the judgment, appeal against it on grounds
Q1of lack of jurisdiction.
II. Contentious Proceedings Before the Administrative Court
Contentious proceedings before the administrative
court may be said to comprehend all the various actions
available under the law to the individual to enable him
to assert his rights in the administrative courts. These
remedies are: recours en annulation pour exces de pouvoir,
recours incident en appreciation de la legalite (which in
92Cameroon is part of le contentieux de la legalite), and
91. Ibid., s. 15(6).
92. In Cameroon no direct action lies in respect of inter­
pretation de la legalite: Messomo Atenen c. Republique
Federate du Cameroun  ^ cTf.J., Arret No. 89 du 30 sept.
/Continued over
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recours de pleine juridiction (concerned with the contrac­
tual and the tortious liability of the administration).
Of these courses of action, plaints for excess of power 
and plaints for indemnity are the more usual and conse­
quently the more important plaints that come before the 
courts. Accordingly, only both types of plaints will be 
discussed here.
1. Plaints for excess of power
Plaints for excess of power or ultra vires pro­
ceedings lie against any illegal administrative act. A 
person adversely affected by such an act is entitled to 
invite the administrative court, by way of a plaint for 
excess of power, to nullify the act. This course of action 
has proved an effective means of protecting the individual 
citizen against administrative arbitrariness as well as 
serving as a good and handy tool for judicial control of
Footnote 92 continued from page 779-
1969, unreported. In France, le contentieux de ^inter­
pretation ou appreciation de la legalite exists where 
the administrative court is called upon to interpret 
some administrative act or decision in the sense of 
explaining its legal meaning or significance and also 
where, it is called upon to declare as to the validity 
of an administrative act or decision. The field of 
this recours is however narrow, for, the administrative 
judge is always loth to act as a consultant, believing 
that if the difficulty of understanding the act is suf­
ficiently serious the interested party will be prepared 
to ask for it to be annulled or to claim damages in 
compensation.
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administrative actions. But the administrative court 
would entertain a plaint for excess of power only if it 
is satisfied that the conditions necessary for the exer­
cise of judicial review have been met. These conditions 
are known in the literature as les conditions de recevabilite 
du recours, that is, the conditions which must be present 
before the administrative court can take cognisance of a 
case and examine its merits. The first condition relates 
to the nature of the act complained of: the act must be
a unilateral administrative act (that is, one emanating 
from some organ of the administration) for, only such acts 
may be the object of plaints for excess of power. The 
second condition relates to the plaintiff’s locus standi.
The plaintiff must have some personal interests in the 
proceedings and an interest in seeing the act annulled.
The maxim is, pas d ’interet, pas d ’action. The plaintiff 
must also show that the act complained of is injurious to 
his interest and that he has the capacity to bring an 
action in court. Courts are reluctant to permit an actio 
popularis open to every citizen. This may open the
floodgates to abuse of process and to frivolous and vexa­
tious suits which would in turn hamper effective public 
administration. "Judicial review of administrative action 
is inevitably sporadic and peripheral. The administrative 
process is not, and cannot be, a succession of justiciable 
controversies. Public authorities are set up to govern 
and administer, and if their very act or decision were to be
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reviewable on unrestricted grounds by an independent
judicial body the business of administration could be
brought to a standstill. The prospect of judicial relief
cannot be held out to every person whose interests may be
91adversely affected by administrative action." The
third condition necessary for the invocation of judicial
94
relief concerns time limits for commencing proceedings.
The basic principle of judicial control of 
administrative actions is that the administration must be 
subject to the Rule of Law. All plaints for excess of 
power are ultimately founded on a violation of this prin­
ciple. In any proceedings concerning an allegation of 
excess of power the judge’s first task is to determine 
exhaustively the rules applying to the administrative act 
which is subject to attack. Any relevant enacted law 
must be examined. The administration must conform to the 
hierarchy of written rules (constitution, loi, decret-loi, 
decret, ordonnance-loi, ordonnance, arrete) applying to 
different situations. For example, a prefectorial order 
will be illegal if it contravenes a ministerial regulation,
in the same way as such a regulation will be illegal if it
95contravenes a statute. Moreover, once an administrative
93. S.A. de Smith, op.cit., p. 3.
9^. These various conditions will be fully discussed below
in the section on procedure before the administrative court.
95. Cf. the specialised application of the English doctrine of 
ultra vires to the by-laws and acts of local authorities 
or other government agencies: Blackpool Corporation v.
/Continued over
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agency has laid down rules for its own conduct, it will
be in violation of the law if it subsequently breaks
9 6those rules: legem patere quam ipse fecistl.
The principle of legality is not only concerned
with enacted law. The administration is bound to respect
individual rights created by its own previous decisions.
This is so even if those decisions were illegal at the
time but have since become immune from attack. The
administration is also bound to respect the decisions of
9 7the courts, that is, autorite de la chose jugee. The
idea of legality includes certain unwritten general
Footnote 95 continued from page 782.
Locker [1948] 1 All E.R. 85* where the town clerk’s 
action in requisitioning a house containing furniture 
was held to be ultra vires in that it violated the ’law’ 
contained in the Ministry circular giving him power to 
requisition only empty houses.
96. In France, it has been held that once an agency had 
decided that it would in future take certain measures 
only after consultation with a committee, the agency 
was acting illegally if subsequently it took those 
measures without that consultation: Societe Michel 
Faure, C.E., 20 janv. 1950. In the English case of 
Yabbicom v. King [1899] 1 Q.B. 444, a local authority 
was held to be incapable of authorising a departure 
from its own by-laws.
97. Of. the English plea of res judicata. In Francophone 
Cameroon, as in France, the autorite de la chose jugee 
binds only the parties; but where an administrative 
act is annulled by the administrative court and it is 
not challenged by way of appeal, it becomes valid 
erga omnes.
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98principles of law, les principes gdneraux du droit.
These have no constitutional validity but their operation 
can be excluded only by the clearest express statutory 
provision.
The principle of legality prescribes a line of 
conduct for the administration from which it cannot depart 
without committing an exces de pouvoir. Any violation of 
the principle of legality can be a ground for judicial 
review and will render the administrative act void.
Section 9(2)(a) of Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972 
provides that administrative matters shall include 'peti­
tions for cancellation of acts or of failure to act on 
the ground of ultra vires’. An act is ultra vires under
98. That is, "unwritten rules of law, which have legis­
lative validity and which consequently are binding upon 
the administration in its exercise of pouvoir regle- 
mentaire or administrative discretion, in so far as 
they have not been overruled by some express legis­
lative provision ... They cannot, however, be described 
as forming a system of customary administrative law 
as they have, for the most part, only recently been 
recognised by the administrative courts. These prin­
ciples are really a creation of the courts originating 
in equity and have been brought into being so as to 
assure the protection of the individual rights of 
citisens." (Bouffandeau, Les grands arrets de la 
jurisprudence administrative/] 5 ed. , p . 346, cited by 
Brown & Garner, op.cit., p. 119.) These principes 
g^neraux du droit may be compared to the English prin­
ciples of natural justice such as freedom from bias, 
and the principle that no one ought to be condemned 
unheard (audi alteram partem). Even God himself, it 
has been said, did not pass sentence upon Adam before 
he was called upon to make his defence. On the 
English principles of natural justice, see generally,
0. Hood Phillips & Paul Jackson, op.cit., pp. 602-609; 
Paul Jackson, Natural justice, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1973.
785.
the provision where it is (i) bad in form, (ii) made 
without jurisdiction, (iii) contrary to a statutory or 
administrative regulation, and (iv) where its making is 
an abuse of authority. It is for the plaintiff himself 
to raise, through the legal arguments in his plaint, one 
or other of these grounds for judicial review. Excep­
tionally however, the administrative court may, once 
seised of the case, raise on its own initiative a moyen 
d'ordre public which would call for annulment of the 
administrative act complained of. A moyen d Tordre public 
may be raised by the court (or by a party) where the 
illegality is so gross that the court considers it should 
be raised in spite of all ordinary procedural rules.
Such a moyen may even be raised outside the ordinary time 
limits.
A . Where an administrative act is made without
authority (1'incompetence)
If an official acts completely without authority, 
his decision will be declared void for want of authority.
The decision is illegal because the official had no power 
to act at all or no power to act the way he did, the power 
so to act being vested in another official. A decision 
made without authority can either amount to a usurpation 
of function or power, or a trespass on functions (empietement 
de fonction). The distinction between the two is a fine
one. There would be a usurpation of function or power 
where an outsider meddles with the administration by 
purporting to take an administrative measure when he Is 
not entitled to do so. For example, a person who Is 
not a public official would be guilty of usurping adminis­
trative functions if he purports to exercise such functions. 
This type of situation is however rare. More common is 
impietement de fonction. This happens when a public 
official acts outside the scope of his powers. The com­
monest cases arise when a public official purports to act 
in a domain which, by virtue of the principle of separation 
of powers, is reserved for either the judiciary or the 
legislature.
Both usurpation de fonction and empietement de 
fonction are in fact cases of usurpation of functions.
But the distinction between the two would appear to lie 
in the fact that in the former case a stranger to the 
administration purports to exercise a function which only 
a public official may; whereas in the latter case the 
usurpation is committed by a public official acting ultra 
vires his functions. So, if the administration takes a 
decision in a domain reserved for Parliament by the consti­
tution the decision will be annulled on the ground of 
empietement de fonction. Another example of empietement 
de fonction is where a civil servant is dismissed by his
immediate superior where the superior has not had delegated
787.
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authority from the Minister to take such action.
There can be empietement as between administrative 
authorities. The empietement can be either ratione 
materiae, ratione loci, or ratione temporis. In the 
first situation one administrative authority trespasses 
on the sphere of authority reserved for another adminis­
trative authority: a mayor purports to take a decision in
the place of a Minister, a superior purports to act in the 
place of his subordinate. In the second situation, an 
authority purports to take a decision applicable in the 
territorial jurisdiction of another authority: regulation
made by a mayor purporting to apply outside his own local 
council, an order made by a district officer purporting 
to apply outside his district. The third situation occurs 
when the incumbent of a post in the administration takes 
a measure which ought only to have been taken by his 
successor.
The effect of an act made without authority is 
that the act is absolutely illegal, the illegality having 
un caractere d Tordre public. This means that even if the 
plaintiff does not raise this point in his plaint, the
99. In the French case of Syndicat Regional des Quotidiens 
d ’Algerie, C.E., 4 avril 1952, S.1952. 3.49, concl. 
Devolve; J .C.P .1952.II.7318, note Vedel, a caretaker 
government in Algeria was carrying on the adminis­
tration until a new government had come into office. 
This government purported to extend to Algeria a requi­
sitioning statute passed in Paris. It was held by 
the Conseil d ’Etat that the caretaker government could 
only concern itself with ’current business’ and there­
fore their decision was void.
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court must itself take cognisance of it and annul the 
measure. If the administration usurps a legislative 
or judicial function the illegality is considered so 
gross that the administrative action is said to be void 
ab initio; that is, it is considered never to have 
existed at all. This is known in the literature as la 
theorie de 1 1 inexistence. This theory is based on the 
notion that an administrative act may be simply non-exis­
tent for want of some essential element. In such a case 
there is no need to annul it because, ex hypothesis, 
there is nothing for the court to annul. The court has 
only to declare its non-existence.100 Any effect the 
administrative act may have produced is retrospectively 
destroyed. Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum.
The argument that an act has no existence - is 
void ab initio - can be pleaded in any administrative pro­
ceedings by any person who has an interest so to plead 
and at any time, and the ordinary time limit of two months 
does not apply to the commencement of such proceedings.101
100. In the French case of Rosan Girard, C.E. 31 mai 1957, 
Rec. Lebon 1957, p. 355, concl. Gazier, the mayor of 
a commune in Guadeloupe had declared the results of a 
communal election on the basis of the votes contained 
in three only of four ballot boxes. The prefect 
thereupon declared the election void and set the pro­
cedure in train for a new election without referring 
the case to the local administrative court as he should 
have done. Held, by the Conseil d ’Etat that the 
prefect’s decision purporting to avoid the original 
election was itself void and had no existence in law.
101. In English law administrative decisions arrived at by 
a tribunal or government agency in excess of juris­
diction are void. Those, for instance, which are 
impeachable on the ground of having been arrived at 
contrary to the principles of natural justice are 
voidable as they may be impeached only by the party
/Continued over
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Exceptionally however, the administrative court 
may hold to be valid, on the basis of the theory of 
fonctionnaires de fait, an administrative act done ultra 
vires. This theory postulates that in certain periods 
of crisis, such as during war or a state of emergency, 
the common man is sometimes called upon to take the place 
of absent public officials. These de facto civil servants 
are then said to be acting in the public interest and for 
reasons of urgent necessity. Acts performed by them in 
these circumstances, even if ultra vires, are held to be 
valid.102
B. Where an administrative act is bad in form (vice de forme)
In taking an administrative measure the adminis­
tration is sometimes bound to follow a certain laid down 
procedure. The administration would have committed a
Footnote 101 continued from page 788.
affected. But whether such an affected party must 
have been prejudiced as a consequence of the proce­
dural flaw is still doubtful. In Annamunthodo v. 
Oilfield Workers Union [1961] 3 All E.R. 621, it was 
held that a trade union cannot expel a member without 
giving him adequate notice of the charges giving rise 
to the penalty of expulsion. In Malloch v. Aberdeen 
Corporation [1971] 2 All E.R. 1278, it was held that 
the dismissal of a school teacher without affording 
him the opportunity to be heard violated an elementary 
principle of natural justice.
102. Cf. the French case of Marion, C.E., 5 mars 19^8, 
Rec. Lebon 19^8, p. 113.
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procedural ultra vires if It took the measure without
103following the prescribed procedure. This Is based on
the fact that the taking of any administrative action 
is subject to a number of procedural rules, the non­
respect of which will invalidate the action taken. The 
whole body of these procedural rules is known as la procedure 
administrative non-contentieuse and may, as in Cameroon, 
be uncodified. The sources of these rules are various: 
directives, regulations, principes generaux du droit, case 
law. The rules include: rules requiring the adminis­
tration to consult an advisory commission, rules serving 
as safeguards to the governed such as the right to be 
heard in disciplinary matters, rules requiring the adminis­
tration to communicate its decision to the individual con­
cerned (by way of publication or notification) without 
which the decision is ineffective against him.
The illegal nature of procedural ultra vires 
is not characterised as d fordre public. Consequently, 
the court cannot of its own motion take cognisance of the 
flaw. It is for the plaintiff himself to raise and argue 
the point. If he fails to do so it is not for the court 
to do so in his place. Moreover, a successful plea that
103. Cf. the English case of Vine v. National Dock Labour 
Board [1956] 3 All E.R. 939- In that case a Board 
purported to delegate its disciplinary powers to a 
committee which then dismissed the plaintiff. Held, 
by the House of Lords, that the disciplinary powers 
of the Board were too important to be delegated 
without express power: delegatus non potest, delegare.
The dismissal was therefore held to be a nullity.
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an administrative act Is bad in form does not ipso facto
warrant nullification of the act. In each case the
court strives to reconcile two sets of conflicting interests.
Generally speaking, administrative formalities present
themselves either as guarantees to those being administered,
or as safeguards to ensure good administration. The
administrative court does not therefore insist on a rigid
observance of all procedural formalities as such a strict
requirement may produce a paralysis of administrative
action. Courts distinguish between mandatory and directory
procedural requirements. In the English case of Brayhead
104
(Ascot), Ltd. v. Berkshire County Council & Another per­
mission was granted to the appellant for the erection of 
a factory on condition that it was for light industrial 
use. No reason was stated for the imposition of this 
condition. The appellant was in breach of this permission. 
Notice was served on him that he had contravened the con­
dition and he appealed to the Minister alleging that the 
enforcement notice was invalid and should be quashed. The 
Minister dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to 
the court. Held, that the Minister’s decision that the 
enforcement notice in the present case was not invalid 
was right for, although the requirement that the reasons 
for imposing a condition should be stated in writing was 
mandatory it did not follow that non-compliance rendered
104. [1964] 1 All E.R. 149.
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void the notice of the planning authorityfs decision or
the decision that it notified.
A formality is directory where its violation
would not alter the meaning of the decision taken.
Failure to observe such a formality will not invalidate
the administrative action. In Emini Tina Etienne c.
105Etat Federe du Cameroun Oriental, failure by the
administration to stamp its decision was held to be an
infringement of a mere directory formality, a flaw without
any effect on the validity of the act. In the French
106case of Commune d TIssy-Les-Moulineaux, a slum clearance 
order had been posted in all the districts most concerned, 
but not (as was required by law) in every district of Paris 
within five kilometres of the building. It was held that 
this was an insubstantial error insufficient to invalidate 
the proceedings.
A procedural formality is mandatory when its 
violation is such as to change the meaning of the adminis­
trative action. Only a failure to observe a mandatory
formality will lead to avoidance of the subsequent proceedings.
107In Sitamze Urbain c. Etat du Cameroun it was held that 
failure by the administration to consult a disciplinary
105. C.F.J., Arrit No. 55 du 25 mars 1969, unreported.
106. C.E., 12 nov. 1909, Rec. Lebon 1909, p. 853.
107. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 121 du 8 dec. 1970, unreported.
commission before taking disciplinary action was failure
to observe a mandatory procedural formality and therefore
that the disciplinary action taken was null and of no
effect. Similarly, in Obam Etame Joseph c. Republique
10 Q
Federale du Cameroun where disciplinary action was taken
against the plaintiff without an opportunity being afforded
him to defend himself, it was held that this amounted to
an infringement of the right of defence, a procedural flaw
which rendered the action null and void. In the French
109case of Petalas, an order of extradition which was made 
without consultation with the appropriate government 
department was held void for want of compliance with a 
procedural rule of substance. In another case/^^ it was 
held that where the headmistress of a lycee had required 
the father of a pupil to remove her from school, she should 
first have stated the reasons for this requirement and 
given the father an opportunity of replying to those reasons. 
The headmistress’s decision was therefore quashed for vice 
de forme. Again, failure to communicate to a civil ser­
vant the contents of his dossier before some disciplinary 
action is taken against him is very commonly held to be a 
procedural irregularity. The administrative courts would 
also hold a decision of a Minister taken on the recommendation
108. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 98 du 27 janv. 1970, unreoorted.
109. C.E., 18 nov. 1955, G.P., 7 mars 1956.
110. Davin, C.E., 26 janv. 1966.
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of an advisory to be void, if it could be shown that some 
essential matter had not been investigated by the commission. 
However, in Onana Jean Pierre c. Etat Federe du Cameroun 
Oriental,111 a police constable was dismissed from his 
job and he claimed that the dismissal was improper and 
amounted to an abuse of power. The decision to dismiss 
him had been taken on the recommendation of an improperly 
constituted disciplinary commission before which the 
plaintiff had appeared without any reservation. It was 
held that there was no provision that disciplinary action 
be taken only on the advice of the disciplinary commission 
and that the dismissal was proper as the disciplinary com­
mission, the court reasoned, must be presumed to have been 
properly constituted (since the plaintiff had appeared 
before it without any reservation).
C . Where an administrative act is contrary to statute 
or administrative regulation
This course of action has become the justifi­
cation for most cases of review of administrative action 
by the administrative court. It sanctions all sorts of 
infringement by the administration, of rules binding on it 
irrespective of the nature of such rules. It sanctions 
the violation of written law, administrative regulations, 
and the principles of natural justice; in short, the
111. C.F.J., Arret No. 3 du 23 oct. 1970, ’Recueil Mboyoum'
1962-1970, P . 29.
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violation of the Rule of Law. Thus, it sanctions any
112violation of the constitution (including its preamble),
113treaties duly ratified, laws passed by Parliament,
decrees and ordinances passed by the Executive, les
114principes g^neraux du droit, and administrative regu­
lations, themselves in a hierarchy, depending on the capa­
city of the person making the regulation and the complexity 
of the procedure for edicting it.
This head of classification goes beyond a con­
sideration of the merely formal validity of the adminis­
trative act; a matter which comes within the province of 
imcompetence and vice de forme. Under this head the 
administrative court is called upon to examine the actual 
content of the administrative act itself in order to decide 
whether it conforms with the legal conditions set upon 
administrative action in the particular case. There would 
be a violation de la loi where the administration is guilty
112. Eitel Mouelle Koula c. Republique Federate du Cameroun,
C.F.J., Arr§t No. 178 du 28 mars 1972, 3 R.C.D. 54 (1973).
113. Compagnie des Chargeurs Reunis c. Etat Federe du 
Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., Arr§t NoT 163 du 8 juin 
1971, unreported.
114. These principles may be disregarded by parliament but 
not the administration: Societe de Grands Travaux de
1 1Est c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., Arret No.
68 du 30 sept. 1969, unreported; administration bound 
by the principle against ex post facto legislation:
Societe F.I.D. c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J.,
Arr§t No. 84 du 30 sept. 1969, unreported; the prin­
ciple of equality of all before the law: Foukoua Andrg
c. Commune de plein exercise de Mbalmayo, C.F.J.,
Arr§t No. 54 du 25 mars 19&9, unreported; equality of 
all citizens in bearing public burdens: Mortant
Thdophile c. Commune de Douala, C.F.J., Arr§t No. 52
du 25 mars 1969, unreported.
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either of a mistake of law (erreur de droit) or a mistake 
of fact (erreur de fait). If the administration acts in 
complete disregard of the rule of law or erroneously inter­
prets the law, it would have committed a mistake of law.
If, on the other hand, the administration has made a mis­
take as to the facts upon which its decision is based, it 
would have committed a mistake of fact. In this case 
the administrative court would verify the exactitude of 
the facts alleged by the administration. Thus if a civil 
servant is dismissed or brought before a disciplinary com­
mission, the administrative court would have to enquire
whether the facts upon which the administrative decision
115is based have been made out.
The administrative court also reviews the legal 
characterisation of the facts alleged. Supposing disci­
plinary action may be taken against a civil servant only if he 
is at fault. If such action is taken, then the court has
to enquire whether the facts alleged amount to fault so '
as to justify disciplinary action. In Balog Joseph-Emile
11^c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental a civil servant referred
to his boss as a clown (farceur). It was held that that
amounted to a fault deserving of disciplinary action.
117In one French case, a senior civil servant was admonished 
for having signed an open letter attacking the government.
115. Bida Theophile c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., 
Arr§t No. 53 du 25 mars 1969, unreported.
116. C.F.J., Arret No. 62 du 25 mars 1969, unreported.
117. Teissier, C.E., 13 mars 1953.
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He was held to be at fault on the ground that he had 
exceeded the limits of freedom of opinion which were per­
missible to an official in his position. The adminis­
trative court cannot however review the legal characteri­
sation of the alleged facts in an area where the adminis-
ll8tration is by law given discretionary powers. More­
over, the court has no power to enquire whether the fault 
committed by the civil servant should have carried a 
sanction different from that imposed by the administration
because the choice of disciplinary sanctions is within
119the discretionary powers of the administration.
The effect of an administrative act made in 
violation of the law is that the act is null and void.
This illegality is d'ordre public and so the court may of 
its own motion take cognisance of it if the plaintiff 
fails to raise it
D . Where the making of an administrative act is a misuse 
or abuse of power
The administration commits a detournement de
118. Essiane Aka'a Jean c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., 
Arret No. 44 du 30 avril 1968, unreported. In France 
the administrative court is empowered to enquire whether 
in the.exercise of its discretionary powers, the adminis­
tration has not committed une erreur manifeste:
Lagrange, C.E. 12 dec. 1961, A.J.D.A. 1961.228. This 
theory of erreur manifeste does not obtain in Cameroon.
119. Zoa Olinga Joseph c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., 
Arr§t No. 72 du 30 sept. 1969s unreported.
120. Dame Makongo Agn^s-Flore c. Etat Federal et Etat Federe 
du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., Arret No. 201 du 18 aoflt 
1972, 3 R.C.D. 76 (1973).
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pouvoir where "l1act a ete accompli par 1 Tadministration
dans un but autre que celui en vue duquel les pouvoirs
121dont elle dispose lui ont ete confies." In other
words, there is a misuse or abuse of power if an adminis­
trative power or discretion has been exercised for some 
object other than that for which the power or discretion 
was conferred. This ground for nullifying the act of a 
public authority enables the administrative court, as in 
the case of violation de la loi, to control the actual 
content of the act of a public authority. But this con­
trol is essentially subjective, involving an enquiry into
122the motives which inspired the administrator so to act.
The court will look into the intention with which the act 
was done. An act will be held to be bad if it was done 
with a motive, or for an end other than that for which 
the power was conferred. The court will look at the act 
itself and hold it to be a misuse of power if it finds it 
to be cynical or maladroit.
It is the duty of the court to see that the 
powers of the administration are properly used, that is, 
used honestly and reasonably for the purposes authorised 
by law and not for any ulterior motive. So when power is
121. Bilae Jean c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., Arr§t 
No. 120 du 8 dec. 1970.
122. In England, courts in dealing with similar issues tend 
to avoid the question of motive out of a desire not to 
usurp the discretion given to administrative authorities. 
If the purpose of the act is within the statute, courts 
invariably take the view that an enquiry into the motive 
is immaterial: Robins & Sons Ltd v. Minister of Health 
[1939] 1 K.B. 537.
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granted to be used in the furtherance of the public 
interest it must not be used oppressively or unreasonably. 
Nor must the exercise of such power be prompted by con­
siderations which are extraneous to the public interest.
For example, the exercise of the power was prompted by
123 124personal interests, the interest of an individual,
125or political considerations. Besides, if power was
granted to be exercised in respect of a particular public 
interest it must only be exercised in that wise. An 
official of the administration commits a misuse of power 
if he exercises that power in respect of a public interest
123. In the French case of Demoiselle Rault, C.E. 14 mars 
1934, Rec. Lebon 1934, p. 337a regulations made by 
the mayor of a commune controlling the holding of 
dances was quashed when it appeared that they were
made so as to encourage people to patronise his own inn.
124. In Demoiselle Soulier, C.E. 5 mars 1954, Rec. Lebon 
195 j^ p. 139, a decision to start a school was quashed 
when, as it eventually appeared, the decision to open 
the school was taken in the sole interest of the 
person it was proposed to appoint as director. In
England, it has been held that a local authority which has
the power of compulsory acquisition of land for civic 
extensions or improvements would not be entitled to 
acquire compulsorily if its purpose were merely to reap 
the benefits of enhanced value (Municipal Council of 
Sydney v. Campbell [1925] A.C. 338); nor an education
authority which has power to dismiss teachers on edu­
cational grounds dismiss them in order to effect economy 
(Hanson v. Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922]
2 Ch. 490).
125. Cf. Commission Departementale du Bas-Rhin, C.E., 12 
avril 1935, where a subsidy was made to a free school 
not in the interest of education but as a protest against 
teaching of religion in the local state school.
800.
other than the particular one for which the power was con- 
1 2 6ferred. The court will also intervene to prevent
misuse of power if in exercising its power a public 
authority fails to take into account things which it ought 
to, or if it takes into account things it ought not to.
For example, les pouvoirs de police are conferred on adminis­
trative authorities to enable them to maintain public order, 
security, salubrity and peace. If the exercise of these 
powers was prompted by financial considerations, there 
would be a misuse of power.
A public authority may commit what is known as 
'abuse of procedure'. If the law requires a power to be
exercised in a certain form, the neglect of that form
127renders the exercise of the power ultra vires. Simi­
larly if the administration is bound to follow a certain 
prescribed procedure and it chooses to follow a different
126. In Beauge, C.E. 4 juillet 1924, Rec. Lebon 1924, p. 64l, 
a mayor's order prohibiting dressing and undressing on 
the beach was quashed when it appeared that the purpose 
underlying the order was not public decency but to com­
pel would-be bathers to use the municipal bathing 
establishment. In R_^  v. Paddington Rent Tribunal 
[1949] 1 K.B. 606 the court held that power had been 
abused where a local authority referred tenancies in 
bulk to a rent tribunal so as in effect to turn the 
tribunal into a general rent fixing agency. In 
Westminster Corporation v. L. & NW Ry [1905] A.C. 426 
a local authority had power to construct underground 
public conveniences; the court considered whether 
this was the true purpose which the Corporation sought 
to effect in acquiring land compulsorily, or whether 
it was merely a colourable device to enable it to make 
a subway for pedestrians. See als, Grice v. Dudley 
Corporation [1958] Ch. 339.
127. Cf. Jackson Stansfield & Sons v. Butterworth [1948] 
2 All E.R. 558.
one for its own convenience and ease, the neglect of that
128procedure also renders the exercise of the power invalid.
When abuse of power is alleged, the court examines
not only the precise terms of the statute but also infers
an object from what is reported to have been said in the
National Assembly or from any other relevant travaux
preparatoires. In order to apply this ground for judicial
relief the examining court must ascertain what the object
behind the particular exercise of power was. Only when
this object does not agree with or fall within the object
of the statute would the court intervene on the basis of
misuse of power. This problem is not always easy to solve.
But here, the plaintiff in proceedings before the court
will be assisted by ’the general principle of administrative 
129morality’. If he can point to unexplained behaviour
on the part of the administration which on the face of it
is not within the object of the statute, it will be for
the administration to rebut these suspicions. Abuse of
power is concerned not only with the abuse of statutory
130powers but with abuse of discretionary powers as well.
128. Cf. R. v. Minister of Health, ex parte Yaffe [1930]
2 K.B. 98.
129. Brown & Garner, op.cit., p. 131.
130. See the French case of Barel, C.E. 28 mai 1954,
R.D.P. 1954, p. 509, concl. Letourneur, note Waline.
In England, since administrative authorities invariably 
derive their powers from statute, courts investigating 
the validity of an administrative act scrutinise the 
precise terms of the statute to see if these have been 
contravened in any way. In Roberts v. Hopwood [1925]
/Continued over
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Where the plea of abuse or misuse of power 
succeeds, the administrative act in question would be
nullified in part or in whole. If the plea fails the
administrative act will continue to be effective. Indeed, 
an administrative measure continues, as a rule, to be 
effective and is not suspended simply because its validity 
is being challenged in court. So when the court dis­
misses the plaintiff’s action, it in fact affirms the 
validity of the administrative act under attack and frees 
it from doubts of illegality; in effect the court impresses 
the impugned administrative act with the stamp of legiti­
macy. However, the effect of dismissing the case is only 
relative; that is, the same person cannot again challenge 
that same act on the same ground. But another aggrieved
party may challenge the same act on the same or any other
appropriate ground.
A decision declaring an administrative act null
Footnote 130 continued from page 801.
A.C. 578, the House of Lords was able to question the 
wages paid by a local authority, under a statutory 
power to pay such wages as they think fit, on the 
basis that the statute was to be construed as subject 
to a proviso that the authority must act reasonably. 
Again, in Hanks v. Minister of Housing and Local 
Government [1963] 1 All E.R. 47, the validity of a 
compulsory purchase order was scrutinised because the 
purposes for which the order could be made were speci­
fied in the statute. However, English courts do not 
intervene where a statute confers an unfettered dis­
cretion on an administrative agency: Westminster Bank
v. Minister of Housing & Local Government [1970]
1 All E.R. 734.
803.
and void has force of res judicata and is good as against 
the whole world. The offending administrative act 
becomes void ab initio - it is deemed never to have been 
made at all. However, there are two exceptions to this 
general principle. First, if the appointment of a civil 
servant is nullified, acts performed by him between the 
time he assumed office and the time the court’s judgment 
was notified to him are considered to be valid. Secondly, 
the nullification of an administrative act does not 
affect any court decision which has become res judicata and 
which was arrived at on the basis of the act now nullified. 
For example, if an administrative regulation creating 
offences is subsequently nullified by the administrative 
court, convictions under the regulation before it was 
nullified would remain valid.
2. Plaints for indemnity
If the administration (or any administrative 
agency) is in breach of any contract it has entered into 
or if any of its agents or employees commits a tort in 
the course of his duties, it would be held liable and must 
indemnify the aggrieved party. This principle of adminis­
trative liability is necessary because the right of the 
citizen to seek annulment of any unlawful administrative 
act may be of little or no value where the citizen is faced 
with a fait accompli: the mayor fails to take precautions
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against a riot with the result that the citizen’s shop is 
looted, the post office loses or misdelivers the citizen’s 
parcel, a munition dump blows up and destroys the citizen’s 
house, and so on. In such cases, annulment is of little 
or no value either because there is no administrative act 
to annul, or because the decision taken by the adminis­
trative authority has sp.ent its force and done its damage 
131to the citizen. The only mode of redress then open
to the citizen is to obtain compensation for the damage.
But the rules governing administrative liability
differ in important respects from those found in the
ordinary civil law applied by the ordinary civil courts
132in suits between private individuals. This means that
there is a co-existence of two laws of tort and two laws
of contract, the one private and the other public or 
133administrative. The liability which falls upon the
administration for damage caused to individuals by the 
act of persons which it employs in the public service is 
not governed by the principles which are laid down in the 
ordinary civil law for relations between one individual and
131. Brown & Garner, op.cit., p. 98.
132. Since the Crown Proceedings Act 19^7, the British 
Crown may be sued for damages in tort or contract.
As a general rule, the same law of tort or contract 
applies to public authorities as to private indi­
viduals .
133. Cf. the French case of Blanco, op.cit. English law 
by contrast has no theory of administrative or public 
contracts and no administrative law of tort.
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another. Nor is this liability general or absolute.
It has its own special rules which vary according to the 
needs of the service and the.necessity to reconcile the 
rights of the administration with private rights.
A . Circumstances under which the administration would be 
held liable in tort
Under what conditions would the administration 
be held liable for its torts? - the word 'torts' being 
used here (unlike in English law where it is restricted 
to nominate heads of liability) to cover delictual and 
quasi-delictual liability, that is, deliberate harm and 
unintended harm arising from negligence or risk. It is 
a trite observation that as artificial persons, public 
bodies can only act through the intermediary of natural 
persons who are their agents. When an agent of the 
administration commits a tort in the course of his dutes, 
there are two possible ways of resolving the issue of 
compensation to the victim. The public official who 
committed the tort may be required to compensate the victim 
out of his own pocket. Alternatively, liability may be 
placed on the administrative agency for whom the official 
was working at the time the tort was committed. Until 
1966 the law in Cameroon on the tortious liability of the 
administration was the same as in France. Since then 
however Cameroonian law has departed in important respects 
from the position in France.
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a ) The position before 1966
Up to 1966 the circumstances under which the
administration in Cameroon could be held liable for its
acts were the same as those in which the administration
in France may be held liable for its acts. Until the
Revolution the theory in France was the le Roi ne peut mal
faire. The Revolution purported to have abolished this
theory. But even after the Revolution it was still open
to doubt whether the State could be made liable for its
acts. It took the case of Blanco, decided nearly a
century after the Revolution, to establish firmly the
general principle of State liability. That case laid down
three principles: that the State is liable for the faults
of its servants, that administrative liability is governed
by rules which are separate and distinct from those of
the ordinary law, and that the question of liability of
the administration falls within the jurisdiction of the
administrative court. The administration may be held liable
in tort either on the theory of risk or where there has
been fault. However, the tortious liability of the
administration is based, first and foremost, on fault,
this consisting of some defect or failure in the operation
] qii
of the public service in question.
13^. In the French case of Feutry, T.C. 29 fevr. 1908,
S.1908.3*97, note Hauriou, concl. Teissier, a lunatic 
escaped from an asylum maintained by the administration 
and set fire to someone's hayrick. The administration
was held liable to indemnify on the basis of faute de 
service. Cf. the English case, Dorset Yacht Club Co. 
Ltd v. Home Office [ 1969It 2 W.L.R7 1008 where the 
administration was held liable for the acts of young 
delinquents who had escaped from a borstal maintained 
by the administration.
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For almost a century after the Revolution In 
France a victim there could not sue a civil servant at 
fault in his personal capacity in the ordinary courts.
This was not possible because of the existence of a con­
stitutional guarantee protecting civil servants from 
personal suits, save by express leave of the Conseil 
d ’Etat (seldom accorded unless the civil servant had 
acted wholly outside the scope of his duties). This 
guarantee, much criticised by liberals, disappeared in 
the 1870s, particularly after the classic distinction 
between faute personnelle and faute de service was laid 
down in 1873 by the Tribunal des Conflits in Pelletier.
There is said to be faute personnelle where 
there is some personal fault on the part of the official, 
that is, a fault which is not linked to the public service 
but reveals the man ’with his weaknesses, his passions,
1 o C
his imprudence’. Where such personal fault is present
the official can be sued personally by the citizen in the
ordinary court, and by the public authority under whose
137employment he is, in the administrative court. On
the other hand, where there is simply a faute de service
135. T.C., 30 juillet 1873, D .1873•3-5, concl. David. In 
that case the publisher of a newspaper sued for damages
a prefect and a general who had seized his paper.
136. Brown and Garner, op.cit., p. 101.
137. Laruelle, C.E., 28 juin 1951, S.1952.3.25, note
Mathiot; Delville, 28 juillet, 1951, J .C.P.1952.II. 
6734, note Eisenmann.
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(that is, a fault which is linked to the public service), 
the official preserves his immunity by reason of the prin­
ciple of separation of powers which prohibits the ordinary 
courts receiving actions against the administration or its 
officials. Instead, the injured party must sue the 
administration (and not the official himself) before the 
administrative court. The doctrine of faute de service 
covers not only misfeasance but also non-feasance and 
’late-feasance’ (that is, excessive slowness in functioning).
But not every illegal act nor every misdemeanour 
involving an official are held to be service-faults. A 
simple irregularity in form affecting the dismissal of a 
civil servant is an illegality but the court will refuse 
compensation if it believes the dismissal to have been in 
fact justified. The law governing administrative torts 
distinguishes between two degrees of fault, simple and 
serious. Which of these degrees of fault will suffice 
to render the administration liable will depend on the 
problem posed by the particular public service. Serious 
fault would be required to establish liability when the 
task of the public service is particularly difficult or 
delicate.
Where injury caused to someone is the product 
of the combination of a faute de service and a faute 
personnelle, the court will invoke the notion of cumul des 
responsabilites to hold the administration liable for the
■j q O
whole damages claimed. In Anguet a visitor to a post
138. C.E., 5 fevr. 1911, S .1911.3.137, note Hauriou.
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office was assaulted and his leg broken by two members 
of the post office staff because he left by the staff 
entrance, the entrance for the public having been prema­
turely closed. The court found that there were two dis­
tinct faults (a faute de service, constituted by the prema­
ture closing, and a faute personnelle constituted by the 
unwarranted violence) which combined to occasion the 
injury and held the administration liable for the whole
damages claimed. This notion of cumul was pushed a step
119further in Lemonnier. In that case a person was
injured during a shooting competition organised by a country 
commune at its annual fete. Earlier on the day of the 
injury some other persons had complained to the mayor of 
being narrowly missed by bullets. It was held that the 
mayor’s negligence in permitting the shooting to continue
constituted at one and the same time a personal and a
o -,,140 service fault.
139. C.E., 26 juillet 1918, S .1918-1919.3.4l, concl. Leon 
Blum.
1*10. See, Mimeur, Defaux, and Besthelsemer, all decided on 
the same day: C.E., 18 nov. 194-97 D . 1950. J . 667,
note J.G. All three cases concerned motor vehicles' 
belonging to the administration but being used by 
officials on private and unauthorised journeys. The 
negligent driving of the officials resulted in injury 
to the three complainants. Each official was clearly 
on a frolic of his own. But the Conseil d ’Etat held 
there to be a cumul of personal fault and service fault, 
the accidents not being deprived of all connection with 
the service. In Bernard, C.E., 1 janv. 1954, Rec. 
Lebon 1954, p. 505, concl. Laurent, a policeman on duty 
outside a bar went in to have a drink. He became 
involved in an argument and injured a customer with his 
revolver. Held, that the service will be held respon­
sible. In Dame Veuve Litzler, C.E., 23 juin 1954, Rec. 
Lebon 1954, p5 376, however, the fault was held not to 
be a service fault where a customs officer in uniform 
but off duty used his service revolver to commit a 
murder.
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The cumul doctrine does not permit the victim 
to obtain damages twice over. It gives him a right to 
obtain judgment both in the ordinary courts against the 
official for his personal fault and in the administrative 
court against the administration for its service-faults. 
Whichever of the two judgment debtors then pays the damages 
awarded has a right of action against the other for a con­
tribution or even a complete indemnity. The right of 
contribution or indemnity between the joint tortfeasors 
(that is, the official and the administration) has been 
gradually evolved by the Conseil d ’Etat. In Lemonnier 
the court indicated that once the commune had paid the 
damages to the complainant, it could require to be subro­
gated to the latter’s rights against the mayor for his 
personal fault. But this was recognised to be an imper­
fect and clumsy device. In cases of cumul most victims 
understandably sued only the administration having regard 
to its deeper pocket. Hence, the negligent official 
usually escaped liability. Fears were then expressed 
lest this immunity, in practice, of officials should 
encourage irresponsible and reckless behaviour in their 
dealings with the public. Prompted by such policy con­
siderations, the Conseil d ’Etat decided in Delville and 
in Laruelle that the administration should have a direct 
action for contribution or indemnity against the official.1
l4l. In Delville a government lorry was involved in an
accident partly because of the drunken state of the 
driver and partly because of the defective state of 
the brakes. The driver was held liable in the 
ordinary court and his claim for a 50% contribution
/Continued over
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This action will lie in the administrative court, and it 
would be for this court to apportion the ultimate share 
of responsibility between the official and the adminis­
tration in cases of cumul. The official who is at fault 
can be made to contribute proportionately towards the 
damage done where only the administration has been sued by 
the victim. What is an appropriate contribution is deter­
mined according to the official1s duties and responsi­
bilities in the particular service in which he is employed 
rather than by reference simply to the actual part played 
by him in causing the damage. For example, if several 
soldiers are travelling together in an army vehicle which 
is involved in an accident through being driven negli­
gently, the driver will not necessarily bear a heavier 
share of the consequences: each soldier’s responsibility
will be weighed by reference to his duties, and the
sergeant may be held liable to a greater extent than the
. . 142private.
b ) The position since 1966
Since 1966 the distinction between faute de
Footnote l4l continued from page 810.
from the administration on the grounds of the faulty 
brakes of the vehicle succeeded. In Laruelle a soldier 
knocked down a pedestrian while driving an army vehicle 
he had taken without authority on a private journey.
Held that there was a service fault by reason of the 
inadequate supervision of the garage where the vehicle 
was kept; that upon payment of the damages the adminis­
tration was entitled to require the soldier to reimburse 
the whole amount.
142. Jeannier, C.E., 22 mars 1957, D.1957-748, concl. Kahn, 
note Weil.
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service and faute personnelle no longer obtains In Cameroonian
143administrative law. Whenever an official under the
employment of the State, a parastatal or any other State 
agency causes loss to anyone the juridical person under 
whose employment the official is becomes ipso facto liable 
in the place of the official. This liability is in fact 
vicarious.
(i ) Vicarious liability
Section 9(3) of Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August
1972 enacts:
"The ordinary courts shall have jurisdiction 
over any other claim or dispute in accor­
dance with the ordinary law, whether or not 
any juridical person described in subsection 
1 be a party, the liability of the said 
juridical person replacing without more that 
of any agent who has caused loss, whether or 
not in the course of his employment."
Exclusive jurisdiction is given to the ordinary 
courts to entertain the victim's action. The ordinary 
courts exercise this jurisdiction in accordance with the 
ordinary law. The liability of the administration replaces 
without more that of its servant who caused the loss, 
whether or not the servant was in the course of his employ­
ment. The scope of the vicarious liability of the adminis­
tration is wider in Cameroon than it is in France. In 
France the administration is vicariously liable for injury 
caused by its servants only in respect of injury arising 
from road accidents. In Cameroon by contrast the
143. Law of 19 November 19653 s. 14; Law of 14 June 1969j 
s. 14.
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administration is vicariously liable for every loss or 
damage caused by its servants (save for damage or loss 
flowing from a judicial act) irrespective of the source 
of such loss or damage. The merit of the Cameroonian 
formulation is that it resolves in a very simple manner 
the issue of the servant’s liability vis-a-vis the victim. 
Whenever the servant or official causes loss, whether in 
the course of his employment or while on a frolic of his 
own, to an individual the liability of the servant is 
replaced automatically with that of the body concerned.
This system has a triple advantage. In the 
first place it is advantageous to the victim because the 
administration has a deeper pocket. Since the State is, 
on principle, always solvent, that victim is certain 
that his claim, if it succeeds, will be fully met. 
Secondly, the system saves the court from the headache of 
having to distinguish, as in France, between personal 
fault and service-fault. If the servant caused the loss, 
the administration must step into the shoes of its servant 
and make good-the loss suffered by the victim. The ques­
tion whether the loss complained of was caused as a result 
of a personal fault or a service-fault is irrelevant.
It may well be that state funds should not be used to bail 
out a functionary who has been guilty of gross negligence 
or mistake.. But personal initiative on the part of 
officials should not be discouraged. This would be the 
inevitable effect of holding out to them the possibility
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of having to compensate out of their own pockets persons 
to whom their actions may cause loss.
In deciding whether the administration should 
be held vicariously liable, the court need only be satis­
fied that the tortfeasor was at the time of commission of 
the tort, a servant of the administration. The concept 
of ’servant’ is a wide one. It embraces civil servants 
and auxiliary staff of the administration. But it 
excludes les collaborateurs occasionnels. These are 
persons who have been compelled, on the basis of some 
particular legislation, to assist temporarily in the 
running of public services. For example, persons requisi­
tioned to do community work. They also include persons 
who, though not requisitioned, have been invited or have 
spontaneously offered to assist in some public service.
For example, a passer-by doctor called upon to give 
emergency treatment to road accident victims. These 
persons assisting in the public service in a voluntary 
or requisitioned capacity, do not come within the meaning 
of ’servant’ of a public law juridical person and if they 
cause any loss they are personally liable. It makes no 
difference that they were acting in a benevolent capacity 
and assisting in a public service. The law is otherwise 
in France. If a collaborateur occasionnel causes loss, 
the administration would be liable in the same way as if 
the loss had been caused by a servant of the administration. 
If it is the collaborateur occasionnel himself who gets
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Injured while assisting in the public service, the
144administration is bound to compensate him.
Clear policy considerations lie behind the 
favourable treatment of collaborateurs occasionnels in 
France: people should not be discouraged from voluntarily
offering to assist in performing some public service 
where such assistance is required. In Cameroon however, 
collaborateurs occasionnels have no right of compensation 
if they get injured while acting as such. Moreover, if 
they injure anyone, they must compensate that person out 
of their own pockets. Anyone acting as a collaborateur 
occasionnel does so, as it were, at his own risk. He 
is treated more or less like a busybody. It is strongly 
submitted that this is unjust. The administration ought to
144. In Charat, C.E., 5 mars 1943, Rec. Lebon 1943, p. 62, 
the administration was held liable where an individual 
was injured when he went to help fight bring a fire 
under control. In Commune de Saint-Priest-la-Plaine, 
C.E., 22 nov. 1946, Rec. Lebon 1946, p. 275, a commune 
was held liable where the victim was injured by the 
premature explosion of a firework when he was helping 
to set off fireworks at a village carnival. In 
Gaillard, C.E. 9 oct. 1970, Rec. Lebon 1970, p. 565, 
concl. Rougevin-Baville, an elderly lady fell into a 
ditch on property belonging to the local commune.
Her cries for help attracted Gaillard to the spot.
He in turn fell into the ditch and suffered injuries. 
It was held that he could recover from the commune 
because he was, in attempting to rescue the old lady, 
undertaking a ’service public communal’. Again, in 
Pinguet, C.E. 17 avril 1953, D.1959.J.7, note Morange, 
a passer-by recovered damages when he went in pursuit 
of a thief and was stabbed. In England, a similar 
result would be achieved by the ex gratia procedure 
of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board set up 
under the Prerogative in 1964.
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be held liable to compensate an injured collaborateur 
occasionnel or any person injured by him. The law should 
not discriminate against those who have offered or who 
have been requisitioned to assist in performing some 
public service. Such persons should, for the purpose of 
compensation, be placed on the same footing as servants 
or officials of the administration. This need not be 
done by legislation. All the court need to do is to so 
construe ’servant of a public law juridical person’ as to 
include not only civil servants and auxiliary staff of 
the administration but also persons assisting voluntarily 
in some public service. The Good Samaritan should not be 
discouraged. Moreover, where the administration has 
requisitioned a person to render services for the public 
good it is extremely foul and vexatious of the adminis­
tration to refuse to compensate him for any injury he may 
personally suffer or to accept responsibility where injury 
is caused to someone.
If a servant of the administration causes loss
to anyone, the administration becomes vicariously liable
for the loss caused and it makes no difference that the
servant committed the tort in the course of his employment
or while on a frolic of his own. The locus classicus on
145
this point is Litty Hermann c. M ’Beleck. The respondent,
M ’Beleck was injured in a road accident through the reckless
145. C.S.C.O., arr§t du 18 juillet 1967, unreported.
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driving of the appellant. The appellant was under the 
employment of the administration and he was driving a 
vehicle belonging to the administration. He was convicted 
of unintentional wounding. At the criminal trial the 
respondent constituted himself partie civile and claimed 
compensation from the administration. The Douala Court 
of Appeal confirmed the appellant's conviction but refused 
to hold the administration liable to compensate the res­
pondent. The court reasoned that although the appellant 
was under the employment of the administration and was 
driving a vehicle belonging to the administration at the 
time of the accident, he was then on a frolic of his own.
The court characterised the fault committed by the 
appellant as 'detachable du service*. This reasoning 
of the Douala Appeal Court was rejected, on appeal, by 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said that the 
Appeal Court should have determined, in accordance with 
private law rules and not with those of administrative law 
as it erroneously did, whether the administration was 
liable as a result of the negligence of its servant and, 
in the affirmative to hold the victim entitled to compen­
sation by the administration. The Supreme Court admonished 
the Appeal Court for surreptitiously attempting to intro­
duce into Cameroonian administrative law, the distinction 
which obtains in France between personal fault and service 
fault.
In an action for compensation for a tort committed
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by a servant of the administration, the victim need not 
sue the servant and the administration jointly. He need 
only sue the servant. If it is shown that the servant 
was at fault and therefore liable the administration would 
be required to pay the compensation awarded the plaintiff. 
The task of the trial court is to determine in accordance 
with the rules of the ordinary law whether the servant 
(and not the administration itself) is at fault and there­
fore liable to the plaintiff. Once the servant has been 
held liable the administration would be required, without 
more, to pay the amount of compensation awarded the plain­
tiff. In law therefore, it is not the administration but 
the servant who is liable; the administration acting 
merely as a sort of insurer. In theory, in
deciding whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff 
or not, the trial court must turn a blind eye to the fact 
that he (the defendant) is a servant of the administration. 
In other words, the court in determining the issue of lia­
bility should not let itself be influenced by the fact that 
the defendant is a servant of the administration. This 
is probably intended to obviate the danger of judges 
becoming too disposed to holding the servant liable in 
circumstances in which they would probably not if they did 
not know that behind the servant stands the administration 
with a deeper pocket. In practice however, the court 
does know that behind the servant stands the adminis­
tration and in a close case would hold the servant liable
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(and therefore making the administration pay) instead 
of seeing a person who has clearly suffered injuries go 
uncompensated on perhaps a mere technicality.
(ii) Liability of the servant towards the administration
When the servant is held liable and the adminis­
tration is required to pay out the compensation awarded 
the victim, has it any right of contribution as against the 
servant? On what basis may the administration require
the servant to reimburse it in part or in full? There
146is a lacuna in the law on this point.
It is submitted that the administration should, 
after paying out to the victim, have a right of indemnity 
as against a servant guilty of gross negligence. Com­
plete immunity from liability may prove to be a charter 
for negligence and carelessness on the part of State func­
tionaries. In a developing country such as Cameroon is, 
the State has a central role to play in development and 
must therefore prove itself efficient. Experience has 
shown that civil servants here do not always have a sense 
of public duty. They are often inclined to act in their 
personal interest rather than in that of the State.
Under these circumstances, complete immunity for the offen­
ding servant may have disastrous consequences for the 
administration. It is desirable that state functionaries 
should be inculcated with a sense of duty and responsibility. 
It is not sufficient that the civil servant be disciplined 
when he offends against the civil service regulations.
146. Under a financial law of 14 June 1961, s. 21, a servant 
of the administration would be liable to it where he 
causes loss to the administration by damaging, des­
troying or losing any state property.
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If the servant causes loss to the administration he should 
be held liable to make good the loss. If a person is 
injured or if he suffers loss as a result of the servant’s 
gross negligence, the administration should, after indemni­
fying the victim have a right of indemnity as against the 
grossly negligent servant.
The competent court for the administration’s
action against its servant would be the administrative court.
14 7
In Mb£dey Norbert c . R^publique F^dgrale du Cameroun a 
car owned by the administration was put at the disposal
of the appellant and it was stolen from him. The Minister
of Finance issued against him an ordre de recette for 
518,000 francs, representing the value of the loss suf­
fered by the State. The appellant challenged the Minister’s 
order in the administrative court. He prayed the court
to nullify it on the ground that he was not liable for
the loss. Held, that the Minister's order was an adminis­
trative act, that the administrative court has jurisdiction 
to entertain the action, and that the appellant was liable 
to the administration.
B . Scope of the tortious liability of the administration
The administration may be held liable on the basis 
of fault or of liability without fault. The scope of this
147. C.F.J., 29 mars 1972, 3 R.C.D.64 (1973), observations 
Henri Jacquot.
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liability is narrower in Cameroon than in France.
a) Fault liability
The administration cannot be held liable on the
basis of fault until three conditions have been satisfied.
There must be (i) prejudice or loss suffered, (ii) fault
on the part of the administration, and (iii) a nexus
between the fault alleged and the loss suffered. Actual
loss must have been suffered. Potential or threatened
loss will not suffice. But provided such a loss is one
flowing from the infringement of a situation recognised
under the law, it may be a physical, pecuniary or moral
loss. Thus in Amougou Philippe et Dame Nkoa Martine c.
14 8Etat du Cameroun a lady was held to be entitled to 
compensation for mental anguish when her child was run 
over by a vehicle belonging to the administration and 
being negligently driven.
The administration is liable for any fault on
148. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 13 du 16 mars 1967, unreported.
In France the court has shown a parsimonious attitude 
in relation both to the categories of damage or pre­
judice for which it will allow compensation, and also 
in the actual amounts awarded. Thus, until Letisserand, 
C.E., 24 nov. 1961, D.1962.34, concl. Heumann, the 
Conseil d ’Etat refused to indemnify for mental anguish.
In that case, the court departed from its previous 
jurisprudence and awarded the father a pretium doloris 
of 1000 French francs when his son was killed in a 
collision with an administrative vehicle which was 
being negligently driven. The sum awarded, however, 
was still niggardly compared with what a civil court 
might have awarded in the circumstances.
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its part irrespective of the actual agency which caused 
149the loss. No distinction, as in France, is made, on
the basis of the difficulty of carrying out the service, 
between simple and serious fault. Although the adminis­
trative court does not say so, it does seem that it does 
apply the tort rules contained in ss. 1384 et seq. of the 
Code Civil. Thus, in certain cases the administration
is, on the basis, of contributory negligence on the part
150of the victim, held to be only partly liable. In
other cases, the administration is held not liable on the 
ground that there has been a novus actus interveniens such 
as force majeure or act of God, the victim’s own fault, 
or the fault of a third party. The administration would 
escape liability under this head only where the inter­
vening act was completely alien to the administrative acti­
vity or where it was unforeseeable and irresistible.
b ) Liability without fault
In certain special circumstances the adminis­
tration may find itself liable even when it is guilty of 
no fault. One of such special circumstances relates to
149. A contrary position obtains in France. There, the 
principle remains that laid down in Blanco according 
to which the liability of the State ’is neither 
general nor absolute’ and varies 'according to the 
needs of the service’.
150. Tchany Jean c. Etat Federe du Cameroun Oriental, op.cit.; 
Ngijol Pierre c. Etat Federe du Cameroun Oriental,
C.F.J., Arr§t No. 145 du 23 mars 1971, unreported.
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public works. A duty is placed on the administration to
compensate anyone injured as a consequence of the carrying
out of public works.
In droit administratif, the liability without fault
is based on two theories, the theory of risk and the
principle (originally contained in the French Declaration
of the Rights of Man but now also inscribed in the preamble
to the Cameroonian constitution) of the equality of all
citizens in bearing public charges.
(i) Equality in bearing public charges
"The activity of the State is carried on in 
the interest of the entire community; the
burdens that it entails should not weigh
more heavily on some than on others. If 
then State action results in individual 
damage to particular citizens, the State 
should make redress, whether or not there 
be a -fault committed by the public officers 
concerned. The State is, in some ways, 
an insurer of what is often called social 
risk." 151
Thus if the administration in the course of carrying out 
a certain activity were to cause damage to someone, it 
shall not lie in its mouth to disclaim liability on the 
ground that the activity was lawful and carried out in 
the public interest. What is done in the general interest, 
even if done lawfully, may still give rise to a right to 
compensation when the burden falls on one particular
151. Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 3e ed., 
p. ^69, cited by Brown & Garner, op.cit., p. 105.
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152 15 "3person. In Dame Ngue Andrge c. Commune de Mbalmayo
the court held, (1) that a prejudice suffered by an Indi­
vidual as a result of the carrying out of works of public 
interest can only give rise to compensation if it is 
exceptional, and (2) that there was in the instant case 
an infringement of the principle of equality in bearing 
public charges, an infringement sufficient to entail the 
liability of the public authority irrespective of any 
question of fault.
For the administration to be liable under this 
head the prejudice must be so grave that it imposes on the
victim fa sacrifice exceeding his normal participation in
154
bearing public charges’. The plaintiff must also
establish a direct relationship between the prejudice 
suffered and the administrative activity complained of.
(ii) The risk theory
In Cameroon the administration has not been held
152. Cf. the French case of Couiteas, C.E. 30 nov. 1923,
S.1923.3-57, note Bauriou, where a landowner was 
refused the assistance of the administration to evict 
squatters from his land. Held, that by refusing to 
assist the landowner, he was called upon to bear an 
abnormal burden in the public interest and to protect 
the principle of equality in bearing public charges 
he must be compensated in damages for his special 
sacrifice.
153* C.F.J., Arret No. 5 du 25 mars 1969, unreported.
154. Ngomha Salomon c. Commune de Douala, C.F.J., Arr§t No. 
59 du 25 mars 1969, unreported; Mortant Theophile c. 
Commune de Douala, op.cit.
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liable on the theory of risk. But there is no compelling 
reason, whether jurisprudential or out of policy consi­
derations, why the administration here may not be held 
liable on this theory. After all, the principle of 
equality of all citizens in bearing public charges is only 
a variant of the risk theory, based on the theory of 
’social risk’. In France liability without fault is 
based either on the theory of risk or the principle of 
equality of all citizens in bearing public charges. The
jurisprudential basis is however that of the risk theory
155- risque professionnel or risque anormal du voisinage
156(that is, risk arising from dangerous operations).
155. For example, as in the case of Carnes, C.E. 21 juin 
1895, S.1897.3.33, note Hauriou, where the Conseil 
d ’Etat allowed a claim for damages against the State 
by a workman in a State arsenal who had his hand 
shattered in an accident at work for which no blame 
could be attached to anyone.
156. In Regnault-Desrozier, C.E. 28 mars 1919, S.1919.3.25, 
note Hauriou, military authorities installed a large 
dump for grenades in a residential neighbourhood.
It blew up with considerable loss of life and damage 
to property. Held that the State was liable on the 
ground of risk and it was therefore unnecessary for 
the victims to establish any fault. In England a 
similar result would be achieved under the rules in 
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R.3 H.L.330 and Read v. 
Lyons & Co. Ltd L19^7] A.C. 156. In Daramy the com­
plainant’s wife was shot dead when a policeman was 
pursuing the assailant of a taxi-driver; and in 
Lecomte the properitor of a bar whilst sitting at the 
street door, was killed by shots fired by the police 
at a motorist apprently evading a road block. In 
both cases the State was held liable. In Thouzellier, 
C.E. 3 fevr. 1956, J .C .P .1956.II.9608, note D. Levy, 
it was held that advance liberal methods for re-edu­
cating young delinquents in an institution create an 
abnormal risk for the neighbours. Contra Dorset 
Yacht Club v. Home Office, op.cit., where in similar 
circumstances negligence had to be established to 
enable the court to find the administration liable in 
damages.
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Ill. Procedure in the Administrative Court
Procedure in the administrative court is
governed by chapter 4 of Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August
1972 (Organisation of the Supreme Court) as amended by
Law No. 76/28 of 14 December 1976. This procedure is
substantially the same as that which was applicable in
157the then Federal Court of Justice. The procedure is
both inquisitorial and adversary and relies heavily on 
written submissions. It is inquisitorial in that the 
court takes upon itself the task of finding out the facts, 
not being content to decide the case on the facts as 
established by the parties. The court pursues an inde­
pendent investigation, not being constrained to rely upon 
the investigations and arguments of counsels. However, 
the procedure is also contradictoire, that is, adversary. 
This means that each side is given an opportunity of 
contradicting what the other party has said. But by and 
large, much greater use is made of written procedures 
and there is almost complete absence of oral arguments by 
counsel; hence, the importance of the dossier before the 
court. In the dossier would be found the plaintiff’s 
requite containing his side of the story, his arguments, 
and authorities in support thereof. The sinews of liti­
gations in the administrative court are papers.
157- Law No. 64/DF/218 of 19 June 1964 (Procedure before 
the Full Bench of the F.C.J.).
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1. Initiation of proceedings
A . The rule, of prior complaint to the administration
A plaintiff may not commence proceedings in 
the administrative court until he has made a prior com­
plaint to the administration itself and has obtained.no
redress of his grievance. This is known as la regie du
15 8recours gracieux prealable. Section 12(1) of Ordi­
nance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972 provides that "no com­
plaint may be made to the Supreme Court until after 
rejection of a complaint made to the competent Minister or
158. The rule originated from France. There, a law of
16-24 August 1790 forbade the civil courts from con­
cerning themselves with the operation of the adminis­
tration, thereby closing the door to redress in the 
ordinary courts. But then some outlet had to be 
provided for the aggrieved citizen. The solution 
adopted in 1799 was that the citizen had first to
lodge his complaint with the appropriate Minister.
If still unappeased the citizen had a right of appeal 
from the Minister to the Conseil d ’Etat. The for­
mer process was known as the doctrine of ministre-juge
and the latter as the theory of justice retenue. These
twin concepts were soon discarded. A law of 24 May 
1872 conferred on the Conseil d ’Etat the proper juris­
diction of a court with power to render justice not 
in the name of the head of State but au nom du peuple 
francais. This represented a shift from la justice 
retenue to that of la justice deleguee. In Cadot,
C.E. 13 dec. 1889, S .1892.3.17, concl. Jagerschmidt, 
note Hauriou, the C.E. cast off the outworn-practice 
that there had first to be a complaint by the aggrieved 
citizen to the Minister. Henceforth cases could be 
taken directly before the C.E. which became le juge de 
droit commun des actes administratifs. But a survival 
of the old rule is to be found in the rule known as 
la r£gle de la decision prealable. See generally,
Brown & Garner, op.cit., pp. 19-21.
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authority empowered by the regulating instrument to 
represent a local authority or a public corporation” .
The rule of prior complaint (analogous to the French 
r£gle de la decision prealable) seeks to fulfil a three­
fold objective. First, to encourage the parties to 
resolve their differences amicably and to prevent idle 
and vexatious suits. Secondly, to ensure that before 
the administration is taken to court it has taken a stand 
on the issue. Thirdly, to facilitate the task of the 
court for the court can only entertain a complaint if it 
is directed against a decision already taken by the- adminis­
tration.
a) Scope of the rule of prior complaint
The rule is of general application. The plain­
tiff must first complain to the administration irres­
pective of the nature of the issue involved. The adminis­
trative court would only entertain a plaint brought before 
it if it is satisfied that a prior complaint had been 
made by the plaintiff to and rejected by the administration. 
The court will not go into the merits of the case if this 
condition precedent for the invocation of judicial relief 
has not been satisfied. However, there is judicial 
authority to the effect that the rule is not d'ordre public 
and therefore that if the administration does not raise
the point the court is entitled to assume that it has been
4-  ^ 159 respected.
159- Tagny Mathieu c. Etat du Cameroun, C.F.J., Arr£t No. 
19 du 16 mars 1967, ’Recueil Mboyoum1 1962-1970, 
p. 73.
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The rule of prior complaint requires that the 
complaint must have been made "to the competent Minister 
or authority empowered by the regulating instrument to 
represent a local authority or a public corporation".
This means that the complainant must make his complaint 
to the Minister in charge of the service that made the 
impugned act or decision. In the case of a local 
authority or a public corporation the complaint must be 
made to the Minister or authority empowered by regulating 
instrument to represent it. Thus if the complaint is 
against a decision taken by a commune or local council 
the complaint must be made to the Minister of Territorial 
Administration since all local councils come under the 
authority of that Minister. If the act complained of 
was made by, say, the Ports Authority, or Cameroons 
Airlines, or the Railway Corporation, the relevant autho­
rity to whom the complaint should be made is the Minister 
of Transport. The law is silent as to whom the complaint 
should be addressed where the offending decision was made 
by the Head of State or any of the services of the Presi­
dency. But there is no reason why such a complaint should 
not be addressed to the Head of State himself.
Any prior complaint must be made within the 
required time-limits. These time-limits are contained 
in s. 12(.3) of Ordinance No. 72/6 and depend on the nature 
of the complaint. The right of complaint to the relevant 
authority is barred (i) by the lapse of two months from
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publication or service of any decision complained of,
(ii) by the lapse of six months from the loss or know­
ledge of the loss in respect of which damages are claimed,
(iii) by the lapse of four years from the date on which
an authority legally bound to act was first in default.
These time limits are calculated on a monthly and yearly 
basis. Time begins to run from the day of the reali­
sation of the offending act or notification of the offen­
ding decision. Time is then said to begin running from 
the dies a quo, that is, from the initial day. The day 
on which the time limit runs out is also taken into 
account in the computation of time. This is expressed
by saying that time runs out on the dies ad quern, that
l60is, on the last or final day of the time limit. There
is no provision for the extension of time and the adminis­
trative court has always refused to do so. In Njoh Isaac 
c. Etat Federal du Cameroun the plaintiff who was 
challenging the validity of the results of a competitive 
public examination erroneously addressed his complaint to 
the wrong quarters. Held, that the plaintiff would not
160. Alai Belobo Nestor c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., 
Arr§t No. 137 du 26 janv. 1971, 1 R.C.D.44 (1972) - 
held that a two months time-limit running as from 28 
April 1989 expires on the 28 June 1969; Nkillia 
Abessolo Martin c. Etat du Cameroun, C.P.J., Arret 
No. 144 du 2 3 mars 1971, unreported - held that a 
four years time-limit commencing on 19 October 1966 
expires on 19 October 1970.
161. C.F.J., Arr§t No. 136 du 26 janv. 1971, 1 R.C.D.44 
(1972).
831.
be granted an extension of time to enable him to address
his complaint to the relevant authority. A similar
decision was reached In Moutackie Joseph c. Etat du
1 6 2Cameroun Oriental where the plaintiff who was attacking 
a decision revoking his licence to sell alcoholic drinks
had addressed his complaint to the wrong authority; and
1 f ) *3
in Tameze Joseph c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental where a 
nurse aggrieved by a decision retiring him, complained 
also to the wrong authority.
If a prior complaint is made to the appropriate 
quarters and relief is granted, the- matter ends there.
If no redress is given or if the complainant is not satis­
fied with that given, he is entitled to seek judicial 
relief. He is also entitled to do so where his complaint 
is rejected. A complaint may be rejected expressly or 
impliedly. A complaint would be deemed to have been 
impliedly rejected where there is "failure for three months
by the said authority to reply to a claim or complaint
16 4addressed to it". Provided however, that "where the
claim relates to damages the authority in question shall
have a further three months after admitting liability, in
165which to propose the amount of damages".
162. C.P.J., Arr§t No. 108 du 8 dec. 1970, 1 R.C.D. 42 
(1972).
163. C.P.J., Arret No. 123 du 8 dec. 1970, 1 R.C.D. 43 
(1972).
164. Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972, s. 12(2).
165. Idem.
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b ) Effect of the rule of,prior complaint
In principle, and subject only to any counter­
claims that may subsequently be made, the relief sought 
by the complainant in his recours gracieux sets the limit 
of his action. If the matter then goes to court the 
plaintiff is not entitled to seek additional remedies.
To allow the plaintiff such leeway would be to defeat 
the very raison d'etre of the rule of prior complaint.
By section 14(7) of Ordinance No. 72/6 "no new claim 
emanating from either party may be made before the Full 
Bench even if such a claim is a direct consequence of the 
original claim and seeks the same remedy". A claim is 
new and will consequently not be entertained if it is 
one which had not been made in the original suit. The 
fact that the subsequent claim seeks the same remedy as
the original one or that it is merely a limb, variant or
l6 6direct consequence of the original one is immaterial.
It is submitted that since the prohibition is only on new 
claims being made 'before the Full Bench' there is no 
reason why a claim which is not stricto sensu new (in the 
sense that it seeks the same remedy although supported by 
different legal arguments) should not be made before the 
Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court.
166. Etat Feddre du Cameroun Oriental c. Baba Youssoufa, 
C.F.J., Arr§t No. 5 du 31 mars 1971, 1 R.C.D. 41
(1972) .
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B . Presentation of the suit
As a general rule the plaintiff may bring a 
civil action only if he has a right (droit), an interest 
(inter@t), capacity (capacite) and is a proper party 
(qualite). . The action must also be brought within the 
prescribed time limits. Capacite d Tester en justice 
is the capacity to sue or be sued and certain categories 
of persons such as lunatics and infants have no such 
capacity. A person has an interest if he stands to 
derive some financial or moral benefit in the outcome 
of the action. • The interest must be a present, actual, 
and lawful one. ’Present and actual’ means in substance 
that the action may not be brought prematurely. A 
person without interest cannot bring an action in court. 
Courts are extremely reluctant to allow an actio popularis 
available to all and sundry. Such an action may lead 
to abuses and a clogging of effective public administration.
In plaints for indemnity the plaintiff’s 
interest in the action must be exclusively personal but in 
plaints for excess of power the plaintiff's interest need 
not be exclusively personal. Thus in Eitel Mouelle Koula 
c. Republique Federate du Cameroun, the plaintiff, an 
adherent of the Jehovah's Witnesses religious sect, was 
held to have an interest in challenging a government 
decision proscribing that sect on the basis that the ban 
deprived him of his freedom of practising a religion. In 
Erance the local tax-payer has an interest to challenge
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any measure which will have repercussions on the finances 
of the local authority. So in Casanova a tax-payer 
was held to be entitled to attack a decision of the prefect 
who had refused to annul the resolution of a municipal 
council to establish a clinic at public expense. Simi­
larly, in Syndicat des Proprietaires et Contribuables du
168Quartier Croix-de-Seguey-Tivoli the suppression of a
tramway service to one district of Bordeaux was challenged
by a ’users association’ and the court accepted that any
user of a public service had sufficient interest to act.
The interest may also be professional, as in 
169Lot et Molinier where a graduate whose degree was the
required professional qualification for archivists objected
to the appointment of a non-graduate by the National
Archives; collective, as in Association des Anciens Eleves
170de l’Ecole Polytechnique where an old boys’ association
took proceedings out of concern for the reputation of
their former school; private or public, as in Maire de 
171Nens-les-Bains where it was held that a local authority
167. C.E. 29 mars 1901, S.1901.3.75, note Hauriou.
168. C.E., 21 dec. 1906, S.1907.3.33, concl. Romieu, note 
Hauriou.
169. C.E., 11 dec. 1903, S.1904.3.113.
170. C.E., 13 juillet 1948, S.1949.3-36; see also,
Syndicat des Patrons Coiffeurs de Limoges, C.E., 28 
dec. 1906, where an association of traders challenged 
a Sunday-closing by-law, in defence of their collec­
tive interest.
171. C.E., 7 juin 1902.
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was entitled to challenge the decision taken by its 
administering authority and which was injurious to its
172interests; material; or even moral, as in Abbe Deliard
where.a regular worshipper was held to be entitled to object
173to the closing of a church, and as in Dol et Laurent 
where the immorality of their profession did not prevent 
some prostitutes from obtaining review of certain adminis­
trative decisions restricting their activities, as an 
infringement of personal liberty.
A person whose rights have been violated or who 
has suffered injury always has locus standi to bring an 
action in court. Interest and locus standi are not neces­
sarily synonymous. A person may have an interest in a
174
case and yet have no locus standi to maintain an action.
It is not sufficient that the person bringing the action 
has interest, capacity and is a proper party. He must 
bring his action within the prescribed time limit which 
is two months following the implied or express rejection 
of the prior complaint. The action is instituted in the 
form of a declaration. The declaration need not be 
formulated in any particular manner. It may be made 
orally or in writing by the plaintiff himself, his advocate
172. C.E., 8 fevr. 1908, S.1908.3.^9, concl. Chardenet, 
note Hauriou.
173. C.E., 28 fevr. 1919, S .1918-19.3.33, note Hauriou. 
17^. Wambo Telesphore c. Etat F^dere du Cameroun Oriental,
C.F.J., Arr§t No. 188 du 28 mars 1972, 3 R.C.D.59
(1973).
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or someone else duly mandated by him. The declaration Is 
lodged with the registrar of the Administrative Bench of 
the Supreme Court.
When the registrar receives the declaration he 
must make a note of the date of the declaration, the 
registry before which It Is made, the name of the regis­
trar who recorded the declaration, the name and address 
of the plaintiff or his advocate, and the reference of 
the administrative decision against which the complaint Is 
being made. After recording the declaration the registrar 
immediately sends a copy to the plaintiff who is then given 
45 days within which to file In a signed memoire ampliatif 
and to brief an advocate. The memoire ampliatif usually 
consists of a short statement of facts, the legal grounds 
on which the case is based, and the conclusion or the 
actual remedy which is being sought.
2. Court proceedings
A. Examination of the suit
After the suit has been filed in the case would 
then undergo what is known as instruction, that is, pre­
paring the case for eventual judgment. This process 
involves a piecing together of the elements of facts and 
law on which judgment would be based. This phase of the 
procedure may take weeks or months, depending on the
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complexity of the case and whether there is stalling or 
dilatoriness by the administration or the plaintiff’s 
advocate. The instruction is conducted by the judge 
acting as inquisitor. The task may be undertaken by 
the President of the Administrative Bench himself or a 
juge rapporteur to whom the case has been allocated.
The instruction is initiated by the registrar of the court 
handing the dossier to the president who would then desig­
nate a rapporteur to study the case.
The first thing the rapporteur does is to verify 
whether the plaintiff has satisfied all the conditions 
required for the initiation of proceedings in court. If 
he has only partially satisfied those conditions the 
rapporteur would instruct the registrar to notify the 
plaintiff of this fact, allowing him fifteen days from 
the date of receipt of the notification to fulfil the 
remaining conditions. If the plaintiff fails to do so 
within the fifteen days his case will be thrown out. The 
rapporteur may request the plaintiff to produce any docu­
ment he believes will be useful in finding a solution to 
the problem. He decides what measures of instructions 
are called for; he sees that those measures are carried 
out; and at the end of the instruction he must draft his 
report.
When the case-file is en etat the President of 
the court would then order the memoire ampliatif (together 
with annexed documents) to be sent to the defendant (that
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is, the administration). The registrar must do this 
within three days of the president’s order. This is 
known as la mise en cause de defendeur. In effect, the 
defendant is being formally summoned. He is expected to 
put in a defence and the exchange of pleadings (echange 
des memo!res) will then begin and will be conducted through 
the intermedium of the court’s registrar. The adminis­
tration files its m<gmoire en defense at the court registry 
and it is notified to the plaintiff by the registrar.
The plaintiff may then put in a memoire en rgponse to which 
the defendant may reply with a memoire en replique and so 
on until the legal arguments have been exhausted. Usually, 
if the memoire en reponse sets up no new moyen attacking 
the administrative decision the exchanges end there.
But if it does the administration may rejoin with further 
observations, giving a further right of reply by the 
plaintiff. Each party has thirty days within which to 
reply to the other’s submissions or pleadings. A failure 
to reply allows the court to draw the conclusion that the 
party in default has no case to make in answer to that put 
to it. However, the time limit may be extended by the 
registrar on a reasoned request by the party seeking the 
extension. But it may also be shortened by the President, 
on the advice of the Procureur General, in matters requiring
celerity. In practice, the time limit is often ignored
175as no consequence is attached to its non-observance.
175- Fouda Mballa Maurice c. Etat Federe du Cameroun Oriental, 
C.F.J., Arret No. U dOA du 8 juin 1971, 1 R.C.D .40 
(1972); Ekwalla Edoube Eyango Stephane c. Etat Federe 
du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., Arret No. 42 du 30 avril 
1968, unreported.
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In -the course of his correspondence with the 
government departments, the rapporteur cannot, in theory, 
be met with any plea corresponding to the English claim 
of ’Crown privilege’. In practice however, it is hard 
to see what the court can do if the court's request to 
see any document is met with the plea of ’State secret’.
At the end of exchange of pleadings, the dossier, 
now a fat document, is forwarded to the rapporteur who may 
call for further evidence if he believes this to be 
necessary. When the issues of fact and law have been 
sufficiently ventilated and the rapporteur believes the 
case to be en etat d ’etre juge, he proceeds to draft his 
rapport and a projet d ’arret. The rapport sets out the 
facts, summarises the views of both parties, and states 
the rapporteur’s view of the law relevant to the case.
The projet d ’arr§t is a draft order formulated in the form 
in which the rapporteur believes the court should issue 
its judgment. Having made his report and draft order 
the rapporteur will then forward the dossier to the Pro- 
cureur General’s office to enable the Procureur General to 
draft his conclusions and propositions. The role of the 
Procureur General here is the same as that of the commis- 
saire du gouvernement in France. When the Procureur
176. In France and as in England since Conway v. Rimmer 
[1968] A.C. 910, the court can be trusted to decide 
for itself whether any question of state secrecy is 
involved and in that case the document would not be 
disclosed to the plaintiff. If the administration 
refuses to answer a specific question the court is 
entitled to draw its own conclusions from it. In an 
exceptional case the court may not be permitted to see 
secret documents, but he will still expect an answer 
to the plaintiff's allegations. Cf. the French case 
of Coulon, C.E. 11 mars 1955, R .D .P .1955•9953 concl. 
Grevisse, and the English case of Duncan v. Cammel 
Laird & Co Ltd [1942] 1 All E.R. 5W -
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General is through with the dossier he sends It back to 
the registrar who would then proceed to enlist the case 
on the cause-list.
B . Urgent procedures
There are two of such procedures, stay of exe­
cution (le sursis §L execution) and special interlocutory 
procedure in a case of urgency (le ref£re administratif).
a ) Stay of execution
Judicial review of administrative actions can 
only be a posteriori, never a priori. Moreover there 
exists the rule, designed to ensure that administrative 
action is not paralysed, that the enforcement of an 
administrative act is not suspended simply because the 
act is being challenged in court. The operation of 
this rule may however produce hardship in certain cases 
because the implementation of an administrative act which 
is being impugned in court may cause loss or damage which 
cannot adequately be repaired by judicial decision. For 
example, the administration goes ahead to demolish the 
plaintiff’s house even though the decision to do so is 
being challenged in court. Stay of execution is there­
fore an interim measure designed to temper the operation 
of the above rule. A person affected may apply to the 
administrative court for an order directed against the 
administration requiring it to refrain from implementing
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a particular decision, the validity of which Is Impugned 
in proceedings before the administrative court. The 
court has power to make an order of stay of execution 
where the implementation of an impugned administrative 
decision is likely to do irreparable harm to the com­
plainant .
b ) Special interlocutory procedure in cases of urgency
This is a special procedure whereby the President 
of the administrative court may, on the application of 
the plaintiff in proceedings before the court, take without 
going into the merits of the case, measures to safeguard 
the plaintiff’s interest. For example, he may make an 
order appointing an expert to determine disputed facts 
in the case. The order would however be unavailable in 
matters concerning public order, security and tranquillity. 
Moreover, the procedure is available only in a case of 
urgency for, as it is said, urgency is the soul of inter­
locutory procedure. A case of urgency would arise for 
example in a dispute involving perishable goods or the
demolition of a building. In Nkwenkam Molhie Luc c.
177Commune de Yaounde it was held that since the Yaounde 
Urban Council could ’at one moment or another' proceed 
to demolish the plaintiff's property he was entitled to 
apply to the court to appoint a valuer to assess the pro­
perty. However, the administrative court would grant an
177. C.F.J., 6 janv. 1970, 1 R.C.D.37 (1972).
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application for an interlocutory order only where it has 
jurisdiction to deal with the principal suit. Accordingly, 
it was held in Nliba Nguimbous c. Etat Federe du Cameroun
1 7o
Oriental that the administrative court was incompetent 
to entertain an application for refere in a matter which 
it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon.
C. Taking of proof
As in the case of all civil matters before the
ordinary courts, the burden or onus of proof is on the
plaintiff. He must make out his case. The onus is not
discharged where the plaintiff is content merely to make
denials of facts without proving or even offering to
prove his allegation of abuse of power committed by the 
179administration. But the onus is discharged where the
plaintiff has made out what amounts to a prima facie 
case against the administration. In such a case the 
court would order the administration to make available 
to it the facts and documents on which the decision it 
took was based. Should the administration refuse to 
comply, the court is entitled to draw its own inferences
-1 Opj
from such a refusal.
178. C.F.J., 13 mai 1971, Arr§t No. 159, unreported.
179. Bilae Jean c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., 
Arr§t No. 120 du 8 dec. 1970, unreported.
180. Diwouta Loth Pierre c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental,
C.F.J ., Arr£t No. 18 du 4 nov. 1966 , unreported; 
Emini Tina Etienne c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental,
C.F.J., Arr§t.No. 55 du 25 mars 1969, unreported.
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Witnesses may be subpoenaed by the court itself 
or at the request of any of the parties. The parties 
are in fact required to submit to the court before the 
opening of the trial, a list of all the witnesses they 
would like the court to get evidence from. If a witness 
is out of the court’s territorial jurisdiction evidence 
may be got from him by means of rigatory commission. In 
principle, anyone with a direct personal knowledge of the 
matter in dispute may be heard as a witness except perhaps 
infants and relatives. Where the authenticity of a hand­
written document is in dispute the court may appoint ■an expert 
to examine the handwriting. In disputes concerning say 
land, the court may descend to the locus in quo and inspect
■j O n
the property about which the dispute is concerned.
The court may also order an inquiry into the facts of the 
matter. In any case requiring more formal investigations, 
the court may order an expertise, that is, a report to 
be made by an expert either on the whole or on some parti­
cular facet of the case. For example, a medical report 
may be called for to establish the extent of the injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff who is bringing an action for 
damages. The expert Is required to make his report on 
oath. An expert commissioned to make an expert report 
may decline to accept the commission. Moreover, any expert 
so commissioned may be recused.
l8l. Dame Ngue Andree c. Commune de Mbalmayo; Baccino 
Jules c. Etat du Cameroun Oriental, C.F.J., Arr£t 
No. 8*8 du 30 sept. 1969, unreported.
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D . Rendition of judgment
When the report of the rapportuer and the con­
clusions of the Procureur General are ready, the case is 
then en etat d ’etre juge and is listed for the seance de 
jugement which consists of two stages, the audience 
publique and the audience privee or le delibere. The 
cause list for each session is fixed by the President of 
the court on the advice of the Procureur General at least 
thirty days before the session. At least fifteen days 
to the opening of the trial the registrar of the court 
must notify the parties and their advocates of the sche­
duled date and time of the case. As a general rule, 
the trial takes place in open court; but a trial may be 
held in camera if a public trial will affect public order 
and decency.
The trial session opens with the clerk of court 
calling up the case. The rapporteur would then read the 
summary he would have prepared of the submissions put 
in by the lawyers for both sides. The parties or their 
lawyers may, if they wish, make oral pleadings. Oral 
pleadings are however of negligible importance in adminis­
trative litigation. So advocates seldom plead. If 
the advocate does decide to plead (and he may do so if he 
knows by prior inquiry that the Procureur General is 
proposing to make conclusions unfavourable to his client) 
he is permitted only to expand and comment on the points 
made in his written submissions. After advocates have
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made their oral pleadings (if any) the President of the 
court will invite the Procureur General to read his 
conclusions which are required to be an impartial expo­
sition of what, in the ProcureurTs considered opinion, 
the law is with regards to the matter in controversy.
After the Procureur’s address the case is then remitted 
for deliberation in chambers and the next case will be 
called with virtually no break in time. The procedure 
will be repeated. When the cause list for the day has 
been concluded to this extent, the audience publique 
comes to an end and the judges retire in chambers for 
deliberation. There, the conclusions of the Procureur 
General are discussed (the Procureur himself does not 
take part in the deliberation) before a decision is 
arrived at. The decision of the court takes the form 
of a concise judgment or arret, drafted by the rapporteur 
with the approval of the other members of the court (or 
at least a majority of them). When the judgment has 
been written, a date is fixed for another audience pub­
lique during which the judgment is delivered. The most 
important part of the judgment is the dispositif, the 
decretal paragraph in which the court awards relief or 
otherwise disposes of the case. Each judgment must also 
contain motifs, that is, an opinion indicating the court’s 
reasoning. The opinion must deal with each claim made 
by the parties in their conclusions, but need not refer to 
all arguments advanced. Cases are cited infrequently.
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A decision that has become res judicata is 
binding on the parties and has executory force. Exe­
cution of the court’s decision as against an individual 
poses no problems. But then only in rare circumstances 
would the administrative court have to give judgment 
against an individual since it has jurisdiction only to 
entertain actions against juridical persons. A problem 
arises where the administration refuses to execute a 
decision of the court. By s. 126(b) of the Cameroonian 
Penal Code it is a criminal offence for ’whoever being a 
legal or judicial officer, issues any order or prohibi­
tion to any executive or administrative authority’.
There is therefore no judicial remedy (as opposed to an 
attempt at persuasion by the Procureur General) where the 
administration defaults in executing a court decision.
There is no available machinery for ensuring that on a 
plaint for indemnity the administration will actually pay 
the damages that the court may award, or even that remedial 
action will be taken if an administrative decision is nulli­
fied on a plaint for excess of power. Thus, a decision 
stating that a civil servant has been wrongfully dismissed 
does not automatically secure his re-instatement, nor is
there any means whereby the court may compel the adminis-
1 8 2tration to re-instate him.
182. Cf. the French case of Rodi^re, C.E. 26 dec. 1925, 
Rec. Lebon 1925, p. 106F^
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Fortunately however, In most cases the appro­
priate Minister always implements the decision of the 
court. But this does not mean that the administration 
does not in certain cases refuse to bow to the court’s 
decision. The administration may default in giving 
effect to the decision of the administrative court if it 
thinks it will be complex putting the decision into 
effect. Much of the difficulty arises in connection 
with ultra vires proceedings because a court decision 
nullifying an administrative measure on grounds of excess 
of power has a retrospective effect. In certain cases, 
if an administrative measure is nullified, the adminis­
tration may find itself in a legal vacuum. This will 
happen for example where an administrative order setting 
up a body is subsequently nullified after the body has 
started functioning. It will also happen where an 
administrative decision dismissing a civil servant is 
subsequently declared null and void, the administration 
being faced here with the problem of recreating the civil 
servant’s career.
Sometimes, the administration may, out of bad 
faith, refuse to give effect to the decision of the court. 
An example is afforded by the case of EkwaXla Edoube Eyango 
c. Etat Federe du Cameroun Oriental. The plaintiff in 
that case obtained judgment against the administration.
The tenor of the court's judgment was that the plaintiff 
was entitled to and should be integrated 'dans le cadre de
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1 * agriculture ’ . The administration however obstinately- 
refused to integrate him. The administration may, as 
in the above case, refuse to give effect to the court’s 
decision by just remaining inert. It may also do so by 
not authorising payment of an award made by the court. 
Again, the administration may frustrate the effect of a 
court decision by using a technique known as validation 
legislative. The administration in effect appeals, as 
it were, against the court’s judgment to parliament by 
requesting it to validate by legislative process the 
administrative decision declared invalid by the court.
If parliament does put its stamp of approval on the invali­
dated decision, it becomes valid and may no longer be 
challenged or questioned. Still again the administration 
may refuse to give effect to a court decision by taking 
another decision with the primary objective of thwarting 
the court’s ruling. A classic example is afforded by
1 O ji
the French case of Breart de Boisanger. A person of
that name had been appointed administrateur of La Comedie 
Francaise for a period of six years by a decree. Ten 
months later he was dismissed from his post on the ground 
that he had committed a disciplinary fault. The decree 
dismissing him was subsequently nullified by the Conseil
183. Cf. the French case of Caucheteux et Desmonts, C.E. 
21 janv. 1944, S.1945.s.13, note, A .B .
184. C.E. 13 juillet 1962, D.1962.664, conclu. Henry.
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d ’ Etat. Instead of bowing to the court’s ruling, the 
administration amended the rules governing administrators 
of La.Comedie Francaise. The amendment allowed the 
government to dismiss these administrators at will even 
when they have committed no fault. This amended text was 
used to dismiss the plaintiff a second time.
E . Appeals
185An appeal lies from the judgment of the 
administrative bench of the Supreme Court to the Full 
Bench of that court, provided such a judgment has not 
become res judicata. No appeal lies against an inter­
locutory order save together with an appeal against the 
final judgment. The right to make such an appeal is not 
lost by reason of the order having been enforced condi­
tionally. The right of appeal is open to both parties 
to the case including the Procureur General (though not 
a party to the case) and is barred after two months from 
service of the judgment. In principle, an appeal sus­
pends enforcement of the judgment; the Full Bench of 
the Supreme Court may decide otherwise. There is no 
special procedure applicable in the case of an appeal to 
the Full Bench as it proceeds by way of re-hearing.
185. If the appeal is made to the same judge who delivered 
the judgment it is known as voie de retraction.
The appeal is made by the device known as voie de 
reformation where it is made to a higher court.
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An appeal is therefore lodged in the same way as a case 
coming before the Administrative Bench.
No right of appeal exists from a decision of 
the Full Bench. Exceptionally however, the Administrative 
or Full Bench, as the case may be, may be asked by a dis­
satisfied plaintiff to reconsider its decision in any of 
four cases. (l) Where the judgment has been entered in 
default of reply, the party who was in default may ask, 
within a time limit of fifteen days, for the matter to be 
re-opened by a process known as opposition. However, to 
avoid dilatory tactics, the remedy of opposition has been 
curtailed: opposition sur opposition ne vaut. (2) Where
a third party with an interest in the proceedings was not 
joined in them and the court’s decision causes him pre­
judice he may attack the decision using the procedural
l86device known as tierce opposition. The need for this
device is doubtful in view of the fact that judgments 
generally have no res judicata effect against persons who 
were not parties to the action. (3) The court may be 
ready to reconsider the case if the party raising the 
case can prove there is a case for revision. This is 
rigidly confined to cases where there is, inter alia, a 
very serious defect in procedure, or where judgment has 
been obtained in reliance on a forged document or through
186. Dame Larni Absatou bi Mohaman c. Fournial et Etat 
du Cameroun, C.F.J., Arr£t No. 112 du 8 dec. 1970, 
unreported.
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the other side wilfully withholding a document essential 
for the appellant’s case. The time limit for making 
this kind of appeal is two months from notification of 
the judgment. (4) Finally, a party to a judgment may 
apply for a recours en rectification d ’erreur materielle, 
within two months of notification of the judgment, where 
he can show that there was a material error of fact which 
would have had an effect on the judgment.
* % *
Having come to the end of this chapter one con­
clusion becomes inescapable: the law on administrative
litigation in Cameroon has been borrowed almost entirely
from France. French cases and textbooks on the subject
continue to be cited as authorities in Cameroon. Indeed, 
one may venture to assert, without fear of any contradic­
tion, that most of ’Cameroonian’ law on this subject is 
basically a re-statement of French law. The law contains 
nothing that has been borrowed from Anglophone Cameroon. 
This is partly because there was no separate body of law 
governing administrative disputes in Anglophone Cameroon, 
government agencies there being amenable under the ordinary 
law like private individuals and partly because Cameroon 
has adopted the French system of administration.
The extension of administrative law on the French 
pattern to Anglophone Cameroon, a common law jurisdiction, 
is not without some fascination and the difficulties the 
common-law trained Anglophone judge finds when dealing with
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this branch of the law are .the same difficulties an 
English judge would likely find were French administrative 
law to be made applicable in England. The difficulties 
faced by the common-law trained Anglophone judge in 
dealing with contentieux administratif may be compared 
to the difficulties faced by the civil-law trained Franco­
phone judge in dealing with the order of prohibition and 
the writs of mandamus, certiorari, and habeas corpus 
provided in the 1972 Judicial Organisation Ordinance.
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PART V
THE ADMINISTRATION OF 1 REPRESSIVE’ JUSTICE
The expression ’repressive justice', more current 
in France than in England, denotes that part of legal 
administration concerned with punishing individuals for 
offences committed against the ordinary criminal law or 
against military law. The commission of a criminal 
offence .gives rise to a criminal action against the offen­
der. The purpose of such an action is to punish the 
offender for his anti-social conduct. Criminal proceedings 
end, upon conviction, with the infliction on the offender 
of an appropriate penalty and/or measure prescribed by law. 
In the administration of ’repressive' justice a distinction 
is always made between civilians and the military. Civi­
lians are normally subject to the ordinary criminal law of 
the land (Chapter 15). But soldiers, in addition to being 
subject to the ordinary criminal law of the land, are sub­
ject to military law (Chapter 16).
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Since 1967 there has been a common Penal Code
in force in both Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon.
The Code is bilingual and bi-jural1 and deals with the
general principles of criminal law in Book I and with
particular offences in Book II. However, although there
has been a common criminal law for both parts of the
country for over a decade now, there are still in operation
two systems of criminal procedure, one based on the
adversary and the other on the non-adversary system.
For over half a decade now a Commission has been at work
trying to produce a common criminal procedure code for the 
2
entire country. It may not be long before the fruits 
of the Commission’s labours are laid before the public.
But until then, the existing two systems of criminal 
procedure shall continue to operate.
However, as will become apparent from the dis­
cussion that will follow in this chapter, there is already
1. Parant, Gilg et Clarence, TLe code pdnal camerounais: 
code africain et franco-anglais’, Revue de Science 
Criminelle et de Droit Penal Compare, 1967, p. 339;
J.A. Clarence Smith, ’The Cameroon penal code: prac­
tical comparative law', International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, vol. 17, 1968, p. 651; J.B. Herzog,
’Le projet du code pdnal federal du Cameroun', Revue de 
Science Criminelle et de Droit Penal Compard, 1965, 
p. 212; E. Langoul, 'Projet du code pdnal fdderal du 
Cameroun’, Revue Juridique et Politique, vol. 20, 1966, 
p. 189.
2. See infra, chapter 20.
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a great deal of uniformity In law and In practice on 
several key areas of the criminal process. Without 
delving into a fruitless analysis of minutiae, it would 
be shown that pre-trial proceedings, prosecutorial prac­
tice, sentencing and the penal system are practically 
the same in both parts of the country. This situation 
has been brought about largely because of the existence 
of a common police force, prosecutorial, corps, penal 
system and sentencing principles. Of course, attitudinal 
differences still exist. This is patently borne out in 
the trial phase of the criminal process, where there are 
still major legal differences particularly with regards 
to the law of evidence. Even here however, the two 
systems have tended to move closer in certain matters - 
a situation undoubtedly aided and abetted by the existence 
of a single Bar, advocates of which practise in courts 
in both halves of the country; and also by the fact that 
an increasing number of Cameroonian magi's t rats are now 
receiving an almost identical form of professional
training in one institution - the School of Magistracy 
24
in Yaounde. The procedure that has emerged from all 
this is what may be described as a mixed system of criminal 
procedure.
3. For example, Francophone courts now tend to allow cross- 
examination by defence counsel. Anglophone courts 
allow ’constitution de partie civile’ in certain cases 
and judges there sometimes take an active role in ques­
tioning the accused.
4. See infra, chapter 18.
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In this respect, the opinion is ventured 
that the would-be Criminal Procedure Code will, in 
several areas, do no more than confirm and clothe in 
legislative form practices which are already commonplace 
in the courts of both sides of the country.
This chapter, divided into four sections, 
describes and discusses the various aspects of the 
administration of criminal justice in Cameroon.
I. Pre-trial Procedures
When an offence is committed the criminal process 
is at once set in motion. The police intervene. Inves­
tigations are carried out. Arrests are made and suspects 
are detained. When the investigations are over charges 
are preferred and the accused are brought to trial before 
a competent court of law.
1. The police and the gendarmerie
Cameroonian law gives the right and duty to 
investigate every allegation of commission of a criminal 
offence not only to the police force (also known as the 
National Security) but also to the gendarmerie which is 
a part of the armed forces. How are these forces orga­
nised? What role do they play in the criminal process?
And what Is the public attitude towards them?
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A. Organisation
a) The Gendarmerie
The Cameroonian National Gendarmerie was created 
in I960, after the departure of the French Gendarmerie 
from Cameroon, as a military force. In 1966 the Gen­
darmerie regiment was transformed into a ’Delegation 
Generate’. Since then the Gendarmerie has been headed
by a Delegate-General for the Gendarmerie. Paradoxically, 
he has always been a civilian and not a soldier. The 
Gendarmerie is a single national force with some measure 
of autonomy but under the direct authority of the Minister 
of Armed Forces. There is some measure of decentralisation 
in its organisation. At national level is the ’etat-major’ 
(or supreme command), which is located in Yaounde. At 
provincial level there is a Gendarmerie Regiment (known 
as ’Ldgion1) stationed at the chief town of each Province. 
Each Gendarmerie ’Legion’ is headed by a ’legion commander’. 
At Divisional and District level are to be found Gendar­
merie Brigades, each headed by a Brigade Commander. Mobile 
units from these Brigades Patrol roads, the countryside and 
villages.
5. Ordinance No. 60/20 of 22 February i960 (organisation of 
the Gendarmerie), Decree No. 60/280 of 31st December 
i960 (Gendarmerie Service).
6. Decree No. 66/DF/54 of 7 February 1966 (Creation of the 
General Delegation of the Gendarmerie).
7. Except for the two English-speaking Provinces, which 
have a single Gendarmerie Regiment stationed in Bamenda.
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There is a Gendarmerie School in Yaounde which 
trains the lower cadres of the Gendarmerie. The edu­
cational qualification for recruitment as an ordinary 
gendarme is a primary school pass. But standards are 
getting higher. Some form of secondary school education 
is now necessary. This is reflected in the competitive 
examination which is always set for admission into the 
school. Fresh recruits undergo a six-months’ training 
at the Gendarmerie School. This consists of lectures 
(in such topics as the role of the Gendarmerie, general 
knowledge, Cameroonian institutions, etc.) and military 
training (warfare, the use of firearms, etc.). After his 
six months’ training, the recruit undergoes an eighteen- 
months’ programme of practical training working as a 
gendarme-in-training. A gendarme who, at the expiry of 
the eighteen months, shows particular aptitude is given 
another twelve months’ training to become an officier de 
police judiciaire. The officer corps of the gendarmerie
are recruited from persons who hold at least the Baccalaureat 
or G.C.E. ’A ’ Level. They undergo a four-year course of 
training at the Inter-Force Military Academy (EMIAC) in 
Yaounde. The training is the same as that for other
officers of the Armed Forces.
The Gendarmerie is a peculiar force because of 
the wide range of its duties. The I960 Ordinance creating 
the Gendarmerie defines it as 'a military force set up to 
oversee public security and to ensure the maintenance of
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order and the execution of laws'. The Gendarmerie is a 
military force and so takes part in all military activities 
and exercises and, in the event of war, fights alongside 
the other elements of the armed forces in the defence of
g
the nation. But the Gendarmerie also acts as a police
9
force, as la police judiciaire, administrative et militaire. 
The Gendarmerie ordinarily comes under the Minister of 
Armed Forces and it remains subject to the Ministry of 
Armed Forces when it acts as a military police. However 
when it acts as an administrative police (i.e. maintaining 
order and undertaking general surveillance - population 
control, control of public salubrity, patrol of highways) 
the Gendarmerie comes under the Minister of Territorial 
Administration and when it acts as a judicial police it 
comes under the Minister of Justice.
b ) The Police
The Police Force, also known as the Sftrete 
Nationale or the National Security, is a civil force placed 
under the authority of the President of the Keputrlic. its 
action, both preventive and repressive, is exercised through­
out the entire country.^ The powers of appointment,
8. Law No. 67/LF/9 of 12 June 1967 (National Defence 
Organisation).
9. Decree No. 60/2 80 of 31 December i960 as amended by 
Decree No. 63/DF/3 of 8 January 1963; Decree No. 
70/DF/264 of 4 June 1970 (Internal Security of the 
State).
10. Decree No. 73/458 of 16 August 1973 (Organisation of 
the National Security).
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administrative management and employment of officials 
belonging to the various cadres of the National Security 
is exercised by the Head of State who may delegate part 
of such powers to the Minister Secretary General of the 
Presidency or the Delegate General to the National 
Security. Powers of administrative management of offi­
cials belonging to the various cadres of the National 
Security have in fact been delegated to the Minister 
Secretary General of the Presidency. It is therefore 
he who approves all acts concerning recruitment, advance­
ment, training, probation and transfer of police per­
sonnel .
There are two police schools in Cameroon, the 
Police Training Centre in Mutengene for the training of 
police officers and the National Police School in Yaounde 
for the training of officers of police. The educational 
level of ordinary policemen is primary school pass. Only 
a few have had some form of secondary school education. 
However, to be recruited as an officer of police a can­
didate must have at least a secondary school education. 
Nevertheless, once a person has been recruited into the 
force, he can advance through the ranks by sitting and 
passing the periodic promotion examinations that are set 
for members of that force. Recently, there has been an 
attempt at creating a special ’officer class’ by re­
cruiting university graduates to a higher level in the 
force. This is regarded with a somewhat jaundiced view
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by officers of police who have risen through the ranks.
In any case, so far there is only a trickle of university 
graduates who enter police service. The need for 
increasing educational standards has stimulated the 
adoption of a system in which men who are already in the 
force are offered refresher courses, opportunities for 
higher education at the Yaounde Police School or at police 
schools in France, and the possibility of reading for 
and obtaining a university degree in Yaounde. The 
training programme of both the uniformed and the plain­
clothes branch of members of the National Security covers 
what may be regarded as a purely police training as well 
as military training. The Cameroonian policeman, 
whether in civvies or in uniform, is, like the American 
or French policeman, armed.
The National Security is headed by a Delegate 
General to National Security who is answerable to the 
President of the Republic. The force is organised into 
two sets of services, central services and external ser­
vices. The central services of the force operate at 
national level and are located in the capital, Yaounde. 
They include the Department of General Administration, the 
Judicial Police Department, the Department of Public 
Security, the Department of General Information, and the 
Central Service of Territorial Surveillance. Each of 
these departments is headed by a director and is divided 
into Services which have distinct responsibilities. The
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Central Service of Territorial Surveillance is ordi­
narily in charge of general intelligence and counter­
insurgency espionage. Members of this Service form part 
of the secret police and are always in mufti.
The Department of General Administration deals 
with general matters of administration•and is responsible 
for the training and management of both the uniformed 
and the plain-clothes personnel of the force. The 
Department of Public Security comprises three services and 
is responsible for (i) supervising the general maintenance 
of law and order and public security and health in built-up 
town areas and on railway property, (ii) supervising and 
processing the administrative and judicial activities of 
the public security police stations and posts, the special 
railway stations and ports, the Urban Police Forces and the 
Mobile Wings, (iii) taking part in the exercise of judicial 
police duties, (Iv) applying, in liaison with the sub- 
Department of Personnel, measures concerning National 
Defence and supervising the military training of uniformed 
and plain-clothes officials and reservists posted to 
police units.
The Department of General Information is respon­
sible for (i) the collection, processing, and dissemination 
of all information affecting the internal and external 
security of the State, (ii) following up and processing 
information of a political, economic and social nature, 
(iii) circulating to the government authorities, both civil
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and military, any information and syntheses concerning 
their respective fields, (iv) ensuring the application 
of statutory and administrative measures concerning emi­
gration, immigration and the conditions of entry and resi­
dence on the national territory of aliens. The Depart­
ment is constituted by four Services: the Central Infor­
mation Service, the Central Civil Inquiries Service, the 
Central Emigration and Immigration Service, and the 
Operational, Cross-Checking and Processing Brigade. The 
Central Information Service has a twofold duty: (i) the
collection and processing of information of a political, 
economic or social nature necessary to the governmental 
or administrative authorities, and (ii) the prevention 
of anti-national intrigues and keeping watch over the 
suspect activities of nationals and aliens on the national 
territory. The Central Emigration and Immigration Ser­
vice studies matters concerning emigration, immigration 
and the residence of aliens and ensures that the enact­
ments pertaining thereto are applied.
Of direct relevance to the administration of 
criminal justice is the Judicial Police Department.
The police forces in Britain have no such department but 
the SQrete nationale in France has. It co-ordinates 
techniques of criminal investigations; directs, guides 
and processes the activities of the provincial brigades 
of the judicial police; diffuses and ensures the execution 
of directives from the head of the Police Force and the
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judicial authorities; carries out criminal and economic 
investigations at national level; and supervises the 
activities of the National Interpol Bureau. The Depart­
ment consists of three Services - the Criminal Studies, 
Coordination and Investigation Service, the Economic and 
Financial Investigation Brigade, and the Judicial Identi­
fication Service.
The ’external’ services of the National Security 
consist of services located at provincial and divisional 
levels. Located in the chief town of each Province are 
the provincial services of National Security, the provin­
cial controls of the Urban Police Forces and Mobile Wings, 
the provincial Police Brigades and the Mobile Wings. At 
divisional level are to be found police stations: Public
Security Police Stations and Posts, Special Police Stations, 
Special Railway Police Stations and Posts, Emigration 
Police Stations at sea, river and airports, and Frontier 
Posts of the National Security.
B . Role
The role of both the Police and the Gendarmerie 
in the administration of criminal justice is basically 
the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension 
of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the pro­
tection of property and the due enforcement of all laws 
and regulations with which they are directly charged.
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Decree No. 73/^58 of 16 August 1973 on the organisation
of the National Security enacts:
"Section 2. General mission: The basic
mission of the National Security shall be 
to ensure the respect and protection of 
institutions, liberties, persons and pro­
perty. It shall help in administrative 
and judicial policing and ensure the enforce­
ment of laws and regulations. It shall par­
ticipate in defence and shall thereby form 
part of the regular forces.
"Section 3. Special missions: The National
Security shall more particularly be respon­
sible :
- for maintaining the internal and external 
security of the United Republic of 
Cameroon;
- for detecting and repressing criminal 
offences;
- for maintaining public order, security 
and health, more particularly in built-up 
urban areas;
- within the framework of defence, for 
protecting or intervention missions invol­
ving contacts with the population."
The action of the Police and the Gendarmerie in 
relation to the administration of justice may be charac­
terised as ’preventive’ and ’repressive’. The distinction 
between these two actions corresponds to the distinction 
between police administrative and police judiciaire - the 
term ’police’ being used in this context to include the 
gendarmerie. This distinction stems from the concept of 
separation of powers between the executive and the judi­
ciary. The ’administrative police’ is concerned with 
crime prevention and comes under the authority of the exe­
cutive when so acting. The judicial police on the other 
hand works hand in hand with the courts. It Is concerned 
with the investigation of crime, the. apprehension of
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criminals and bringing them to justice. When so acting 
the judicial police comes under the authority and control 
of the judicial authorities. In practice however, the 
distinction between administrative police and judicial 
police is functional not organic. The two are not 
separate police units or services. The ’preventive1 and 
’repressive’ activities of the police are exercisable by 
the same police officers.
The duty of the ’administrative police’ is to 
prevent crime by maintaining law and order. The policeman 
or gendarme walking his beat or cruising around in his 
patrol car is a powerful deterrent to crime. The whole 
object of crime prevention is to reduce the incidence of 
crime by deterring would-be offenders. Every policeman 
or gendarme may therefore interpose for the purpose of 
preventing, and must to the best of his ability prevent, 
the commission of any offence. A policeman or gendarme 
who receives information of a design to commit any offence 
is duty bound to take necessary steps to prevent the com­
mission of such crime. So if a policeman or a gendarme 
knows of a design to commit an offence he may arrest, 
without warrant, the person so designing, if it appears to 
such officer that the commission of the offence cannot be 
otherwise prevented.
When a riot or disturbance does occur it is the 
duty of the administrative police to restore and maintain 
law and order. Heads of the various administrative units
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(governors, prefects, sub-prefects, mayors) are invested 
with powers to cause the police, gendarmerie, and even 
the army to restore and maintain law and order in their 
various administrative localities. They may issue 
orders, enforceable by the police and gendarmerie and 
the courts, restricting the movements of persons and goods, 
prohibiting meetings (or gatherings or associations or 
organisations) and publications deemed likely to disturb 
the peace, ordering searches and seizures by day or by 
night, directing the detention of persons for an indefinite 
period, requisitioning persons and goods, and so on.
In point of time, the judicial police comes 
into the picture only when, despite the preventive efforts 
of the administrative police, an offence has actually been 
committed. In other words, the role of the judicial 
police begins where that of the administrative police ends. 
The judicial police detects crime, carries out criminal 
investigations, gathers evidence, makes arrests, and 
brings suspects to court for trial. Members of the judi­
cial police belong to the uniformed branch of the Police 
Force and the Gendarmerie and are styled officiers de 
police judiciaires, that is, judicial police officers.
The judicial police is directly concerned with the working 
of the courts in the administration of justice and judicial 
police officers are, like barristers, solicitors, bailiffs, 
process-servers and court clerks, also known as ’auxiliary 
personnel of the law’.
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The judicial police is constituted by various 
groups of persons - members belonging to the senior 
hierarchy of the Police and the Gendarmerie, various 
groups of junior members of the Police and the Gendarmerie, 
and a variety of civilian functionaries (mayors, deputy 
mayors, prefects, state prosecutors).^ Judicial police 
officers receive accusations (from persons other than the 
victims) and complaints (from victims) of alleged commis­
sion of criminal offences by known or unknown persons.
They make inquiries and searches, collect evidence and 
may detain suspects. Under s. 10 of the Code d 1 Instruction 
Criminelle a prefect "may personally undertake, or request 
judicial police officers, each one as it concerns him, to 
undertake all acts necessary for the detection of felonies, 
misdemeanours and contraventions, and to bring the authors 
of such offences to the courts charged with punishing 
them".
C . The citizen1s role in crime detection and public 
attitude towards policemen and gendarmes
It serves the public interest that every commis­
sion of an offence should be reported to the forces of law 
and order giving, in good faith and without malice, information
11. Code d 1 Instruction Criminelle (hereinafter abbreviated to
C .I .C .), chapters 2 and 5; Codes et Lois du Cameroun, 
vol. II, pp. 957, 959.
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that may lead to the identification of the perpetrator 
of the crime. That is part of every citizen’s civic 
responsibility. The forces of law and order cannot be 
everywhere at the same time. So the citizen, at least 
the good citizen, must lend them assistance in crime de­
tection .
’’The detection and prevention of crime, the 
administration of justice, and the resultant 
smooth and orderly functioning of our society 
are not, and cannot be, the exclusive jobs 
of the legal experts alone. It is the 
bounden duty of each and every one of us as 
responsible citizens to ensure that law and 
order reigns supreme in our country as a 
necessary condition for the nation’s continuous 
march to progress. ... Personnel of the Gen­
darmerie as well as those of the Police, let 
alone personnel of the legal and judicial ser­
vices, cannot be present everywhere at every 
given time. ... Therefore, it is a concomi­
tant responsibility of each and every one of 
us to report, without delay, to competent 
authorities, those who threaten or have 
actually committed a breach of the peace so 
that the machinery of justice can be set in 
motion for ’the greatest good of the greatest 
number’ of our citizens.” 12
The obligation of citizens to report the commis­
sion of any offence and to denounce criminals to the compe­
tent authorities is a civic obligation not a positive duty 
and in no way means that each citizen should spy and inform 
on his neighbour. If it were so, life would be intolerable 
and 1984 would be here already. The citizen’s duty to
12. Address by Charles Doumba, Cameroon’s Minister of 
Justice, at the installation ceremony of Mr Justice 
Nyo’ Wakai as President of the Court of Appeal for 
the North West Province, October 1977.
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assist in crime detection is not a legal but a social 
one springing from the civic concept of a ’good citizen’ 
or a ’responsible citizen'. There is generally speaking, 
no legal duty on the citizenry as a whole (as distin­
guished from public servants in certain cases) to assist 
in crime detection. The conduct of a person who fails 
to report a crime or to denounce someone he saw commit an 
offence may be morally reprehensible to the moralist and 
it may well be that he is a ’bad and irresponsible’ citi­
zen. But he has not offended against the criminal law 
of the land. There is no such offence in the Cameroonian 
Penal Code as ’failure to report a crime’, ’failure to
denounce a criminal’ or 'failure to assist the police in
13crime detection’. The old English offence of 'misprision
of felony’, under which it was a common law offence for 
any citizen to fail to report to the authorities any felony 
which came to his knowledge or notice has no counterpart
13. Sections 171 to 176 of the Penal Code deal with ’refusal 
to assist justice’. None of these sections however 
deals with the issue under discussion. Sections 173- 
176 deal respectively with defaulting witness, defaul­
ting expert, defaulting juror or assessor, and false 
excuse. Section 172 punishes anyone who ’refrains 
from communicating to the judicial or police authorities 
evidence of the innocence of any person in custody 
awaiting trial’. Section 171 punishes 'whoever 
being able so to do by his own immediate action and 
without risk to himself or to any other person, refrains 
from preventing the commission of any felony or of any 
misdemeanour against the bodily integrity of any per­
son’ . Section 283 deals with failure to assist a 
person in danger of death or grievous harm; it does not 
deal with failure to assist the police in crime 
detection.
871.
in Cameroonian criminal law. Nor does the offence of 
’concealment of treason' in the Nigerian Criminal Code.
To impose a general legal duty on citizens to report any 
alleged commission of an offence would be -intolerable and 
totally unacceptable. Life would become unbearable for
14blackmail and false and malicious reports would multiply.
Since the citizen's duty to help in crime detec­
tion is merely a socio-moral one, the extent to which 
citizens cooperate with the police/gendarmerie in crime 
detection obviously depends on the relationship between 
the two. Where that relationship is excellent people spon­
taneously offer to help. Thus it is the boast of the 
English that their police are not only respected but liked 
by the average citizen. Sporadic scandals do occur.
But on the whole the relations between the English police 
and the public are excellent. The police always receive 
a strong vote of public confidence and are always eager 
to keep the image of the 'Bobby' as a kindly father figure 
and a friend to all.
This contrasts enviably with the poor relations 
between the public and the police/gendarmerie in Cameroon. 
There is a general attitude of suspicion of a police force 
which is quasi-military in organisation and training.
As in the army, the police force also has ranks such as
14. Cf. Ss. 303 and 304 of the Penal Code which punish 
blackmail and false report.
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'brigadier1, ’lieutenant’, ’sergeant’, ’corporal',
’captain’ and so on. Like soldiers, policemen also carry 
15firearms. This is rather anomalous because the cri-
1 &minal population in Cameroon is not armed. The armed
policeman, like the armed gendarme, intimidates the 
ordinary citizen instead of winning his confidence and 
support and sympathy. This is why the police and gen­
darmerie get such little cooperation from the public in 
their fight against crime. It also explains why assault 
on a policeman or gendarme attracts little or no public 
sympathy at all. Besides there have been public outcries 
against the uncouth behaviour of policemen and gendarmes, 
their corruption and brutality. Brutality is nearly 
always contagious. In a conflict it engenders counter­
brutality. Cruelty is a contagious disease that leads 
to a degradation of human standards.
There is clearly a pressing need for the culti­
vation of better relations between the public and the 
police/gendarmerie. What is needed are officers who 
are not only better trained but better mannered and less 
likely to indulge in corrupt and cruel practices. Public 
relations programmes should be created. Psychological
15- Cf. Note de Service No. 0182/DGSN/DSP of 20 February 
1976 (Arming of personnel of the National Security).
16. The American policeman is always armed. But this 
seems unavoidable because the criminal population in 
that country is largely armed.
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tests should be used on recruits to weed out those likely 
to abuse or misuse police powers. Complaints against 
misuse of power by policemen and gendarmes should be 
investigated by an independent review body. Internal 
discipline works only in obvious cases of illegality.
It is ineffective in cases where there is a direct con­
flict of evidence and it is only the complainant’s word 
against that of the policeman or gendarme.. Moreover, 
where an offending policeman or gendarme is visited 
with a disciplinary penalty that is not sufficiently 
severe, the public is apt to feel strongly that justice 
has not been done. It is suggested that the judiciary 
should also be bold enough to condemn and criticise in 
strong terms police and gendarmerie malpractices, the use 
of the ’third degree’, and the obtaining of evidence by 
illegal means.
A policeman or gendarme who is guilty of assault 
or of false arrest may be prosecuted. A civil action 
for damages also lies against him. But the chances of 
success of such a civil action are very slender: the com­
plainant may not be the most persausive witness as there 
may be only his word as against that of the policeman or 
gendarme; the complainant may have a criminal record which 
may be used to impeach his evidence; the complainant may 
be a poor man unable to bear the expenses of litigation 
unless he is eligible for and is able to secure legal aid; 
even if the complainant succeeds in his action the assets
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of the policeman or gendarme may be too small to satisfy 
the judgment. It is submitted that a complainant against 
excesses committed by a policeman or gendarme should be 
eligible for legal aid and that such an action should not 
be against the individual policeman or gendarme concerned 
but against the Force which could, after paying out, take 
appropriate action against the offending officer.
2. Arrest, detention, and bail
A. Arrest
To arrest somebody is to restrain him. It 
means depriving him momentarily of his freedom to come and 
go. Policemen and gendarmes (as well as the ordinary 
citizen in certain cases) are empowered by law to make 
arrests when an offence has been committed or is about to 
be committed. Arrest puts in jeopardy the basic human 
right to freedom in movement and conduct. But, on the 
other hand, unbounded liberty jeopardises security of life, 
property and society. The solution has always been to 
prescribe restrictions which will provide an acceptable 
degree of security without unduly infringing upon indi­
vidual freedom.
The law has, in an effort to prevent arbi­
trariness, spelt out clearly cases in which an arrest may 
lawfully be made, the manner in which it is to be carried 
out, and those who are competent to do so. Any arrest
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made by persons not legally authorised to do so or which 
does not fall within the law is clearly a false arrest 
offending against s. 291- of the Penal Code which provides, 
"S. 291 - False arrest
(.1) Whoever in any manner. deprives another 
of his liberty shall be punished with 
imprisonment for from five to ten years and 
with fine of from twenty thousand to one 
million francs.
(2) The punishment shall be imprisonment for 
from ten to twenty years in any of the fol­
lowing cases:
a) where the deprivation of liberty lasts 
for more than one month; or
b) where it is accompanied with physical 
or mental torture; or
c) where the arrest is effected with the 
aid of a forged order from a public 
authority or of a uniform unlawfully 
worn, or pretending an appointment not 
held."
In Cameroon the right to arrest flows from two 
sources. First there is a legal right to arrest found 
in the Criminal Procedure Code. Secondly, there is an 
administrative right to arrest justified by the need to 
maintain public order and security. An administrative 
right to arrest flows either from a formal text or from 
mere police practice. For example, the power to arrest 
any person found in a drunken state is to be found in 
s. 15 of the Law of 1st October 1917 dealing with drunken­
ness in public. Other enactments empower the police to 
arrest lunatics, persons ordered to be placed under house 
arrest, persons served with an expulsion order, persons 
suspected of endangering the security of the State, and 
so on. Moreover, there are certain police practices
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which are not regulated by any enactment. Such prac­
tices are often dictated by the practical necessity to 
preserve public order and security and are generally 
limited in time. For example, during a cordon and 
search procedure anyone may be arrested for the purposes 
of ascertaining his identity or carrying out other forms 
of control. Arrest may also be made where there is a 
gathering or an unauthorised procession on the public 
highway in order to search for concealed arms, to prevent 
the holding of an illegal meeting, or to restore order. 
Provided these powers of arrest are not used oppressively, 
they are not censured by the courts.
Since the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (here­
inafter abbreviated C.P.O.) applies in Anglophone Cameroon 
and the C.I.C. in Francophone Cameroon one would ordi­
narily expect that policemen and gendarmes on service 
in the English-speaking part of the country would follow 
the law of arrest as contained in the C.P.O. But this 
is not the case. Gendarmes on duty in Anglophone Cameroon 
apply the provisions of the C.I.C. as they are more familiar 
with that code. The same is true of the younger gener­
ation of English-speaking policemen and gendarmes, for 
the training programme of gendarmes and policemen in 
Cameroon is French-orientated. This however does not 
make much difference because although the law of arrest 
in the C.I.C. is less explicit and less detailed than the 
law on the same subject in the C.P.O., the two laws are
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in.substance the same. In both the C.P.O. and the C.I.C. 
an arrest may be made with or without warrnat; an arrest 
with a warrant being the general rule and arrest without 
a warrant the exception.
a) Arrest with a warrant
As a general rule, arrest in respect of most 
offences may be made only upon a warrant from a magis­
trate ordering the arrest.of the person named in it.
The warrant is obtained by presenting written ’information' 
to a magistrate to the effect that the person named has 
committed an offence or is 'reasonably suspected’ of having 
committed one. This procedure is regarded as a check 
on police power. In certain cases a warrant of arrest 
may be obtained from the State Prosecutor. Administrative 
authorities may order arrest but they have no power to 
issue warrants of arrest. In practice, arrest warrants 
are obtained only in a small percentage of cases. Some­
times warrants are obtained after arrests have been made 
and often the police do not. bother to obtain a warrant 
at all.
Under the C.I.C. the police may legally carry 
out police inquiries•on their own authority only in res­
pect of ’flagrant offences’. All other offences must be 
the subject of a judicial Investigation carried out by or
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17under the direction of the juge d1instruction. In
practice police do conduct police inquiries in respect 
of offences other than flagrant ones . A blind eye has 
been turned to these unofficial police inquiries for two 
main reasons: to relieve the juge d finstruction of some
of his work load and to make up for the shortage of 
examining magistrates. However, whenever the police 
do carry out these unofficial inquiries they may not, at 
the end of such inquiries, make any arrest without a 
warrant issued by a magistrate. But the police bend the 
rules. They argue that it would be paradoxical to arrest 
only on warrant (or release) someone against whom they 
have overwhelming evidence. Informal arrests therefore 
take place daily. The police claim that those so arrested 
do not question the legality of such arrests and willingly 
submit because they know they are guilty. There is 
another case where the police may legally (though not in 
practice) arrest only if they have a warrant. If the 
police receive rogatory commission to carry out certain 
inquiries they may not, at the end of such inquiries, pro­
ceed to arrest without a warrant to that effect. In 
practice a rogatory commission to conduct inquiries always 
includes an order to arrest, if an arrest is warranted.
17. The juge d Tinstruction was abolished in 1972. All 
judicial inquiries and investigations (compulsory in 
the case of offences characterised as felonies) are 
now conducted by the State Prosecutor. See, Judi­
cial Organisation Ordinance 1972, s. 24.
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Even if there is no such order the police' do make 
arrests. In Cameroon, as in France, the device of a ro­
gatory commission is often used when evidence is required 
of a witness or suspect outside the court’s jurisdiction.
b ) Arrest without warrant
Under the C.P.O. any officer may, without an 
order from a magistrate, arrest (i) any person whom he 
suspects upon reasonable grounds of having committed an 
indictable offence, (ii) any person who commits an offence 
in his presence, (iii) any person who obstructs a police 
officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has 
escaped or attempts to escape from lawful custody, (iv) any 
person in whose possession anything is found which may 
reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with 
reference to such thing, (v) any person who has no osten­
sible means of subsistence and who cannot give a satis-
18factory account of himself.
The power to arrest without warrant is not the 
monopoly of police officers and gendarmes. Citizen 
arrest without warrant is also possible in certain circum­
stances. Any private person may arrest any person who in 
his view commits or whom he reasonably suspects of having
committed an offence which is a felony or having committed
19by night an offence which is a misdemeanour. Likewise,
an owner of property (or his servant or persons authorised 
by him) may arrest without a warrant any person found
18. C.P.O., s. 10(1). See also, Police Ordinance, Cap. 
15^ of the 1958 laws, s. 20(1).
19. Ibid., s. 12.
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committing an offence involving injury to his property. 
However, any person arrested without warrant must be 
taken without delay to a police officer or to the nearest 
police station. Any citizen who erroneously makes an 
arrest may find himself liable for damages at the suit 
of the victim of such an arrest.
A magistrate or judge also has the power to 
arrest personally or order any person to arrest an offen­
der. This power, is exercisable where an offence has been
20committed in the presence of the magistrate or judge.
Thus, if a person commits a contempt of court the judge 
or magistrate may order him to be arrested and committed 
to custody pending trial.
Under the C.I.C. an arrest without warrant may 
be made in the case of a flagrant delit, that is, where 
a person is caught in flagrante delicto. An offence in 
respect of which a person was caught red-handed, an offence
that has just been committed, and an offence deemed to be
flagrant are all characterised as flagrant delits. An 
offence is deemed to be flagrant where a suspect is being
pursued by the public (this is often accompanied by a hue
and cry), where a suspect is found to be in possession of 
incriminating evidence, or where there are indicia that 
a suspect took part in the commission of an offence that
20. Ibid., ss. 15 and 16.
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has just been committed. Anyone who disobeys an order
from the State Prosecutor forbidding persons to leave
the area where an offence has been committed may be
21arrested and taken Into custody. The arrest may be
made by the State Prosecutor himself, any of his subor-
22dinates, or any judicial police officer. An arrest
may also be made where there Is compelling evidence that
a flagrant delit is likely to lead to a conviction for 
21felony. The State Prosecutor may moreover issue a
mandat d ’amener against an escaped suspect for such a
person to be arrested and brought before him for an on-
the-spot interrogation.
A citizen may arrest anyone caught red-handed
committing a felony. ’’Any depository of the civil force
as well as any other person shall be bound to arrest a
suspect caught in flagrante delicto or pursued, either by
public clamour, or in the cases assimilated to flagrant
delict, and to bring him before the State Prosecutor
without the necessity of a writ of attachment, if the
felony or misdemeanour carries a corporal and degrading 
24punishment”. The citizen's right of arrest is not
limited to cases of felonies. A citizen may arrest anyone
21. C.I.C., s. 34.
22. Ibid., s. 49.
23. Ibid., s . 40.
24. Ibid., s. 106.
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committing an offence in his presence and take him 
straight away to the State Prosecutor. If the arrest 
is made by the police, it is generally accepted by the 
courts that the suspect may properly be detained at the 
police station for a few hours to enable the police to 
write out their report. Delays caused by distance from 
the nearest police station or State Prosecutor's office 
are not taken into account. Thus, although the law 
requires the period of detention at the police station not 
to exceed twenty-four hours, it often does. Generally, 
where there is power to arrest a person without warrant, 
a warrant for his arrest may be issued.
c) How arrest is effected
The C.P.O. requires any police officer or other
person making an arrest actually to touch or confine the
body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a
25
submission to the custody by word or action. As a
general rule a person arrested must not be handcuffed,
otherwise bound, or be subject to unnecessary restraint.
However, as an exception to the rule, a person arrested
may be handcuffed under any of the following circumstances:
(i) by order of the court or magistrate, (ii) where there
is reasonable apprehension of violence, (iii) where there
is an attempt to escape, (iv) where the restraint is
2 6necessary for the safety of the person arrested. In
25. C.P.O., s. 3.
26. Ibid., s . 4.
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practice most arrested persons are handcuffed because 
the police fear that they may try to escape or use vio­
lence on them.
The law further requires any person making an
arrest without a warrant to inform the person being arres-
2 7ted of the reasons for his arrest. In other words, the
arrested person must be told of the substance of the 
charge against him. However, the officer making the. 
arrest need not do so if the person being arrested is
(i) in the actual course of the commission of an offence 
(in which case the charge against him will be self-evident),
(ii) pursued immediately after the commission of the crime,
(iii) pursued immediately after escape from lawful custody, 
and (iv) if the person arrested makes it practically 
impossible for him to be informed of the charge against 
him, as by attacking the policeman or gendarme or by 
running away-. In theory, an arrested person who is not 
given the reasons for his arrest at the time of the arrest 
has an action for damages for false imprisonment. How­
ever, since police practice does not ordinarily include 
telling the arrested person of the reasons for his arrest
at the time the arrest is made (they prefer to do so only at 
the police station), courts take the view that an other­
wise lawful arrest-is not invalid simply because the 
police officer or gendarme did not inform at the time of the
27. C.P.O. , s. 5.
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arrest. Indeed* s . 9 of the C.P.O. enacts: "Any
person who is arrested, whether with or without a wrrant, 
shall be taken with all reasonable dispatch to a police 
station, or other place for the reception of arrested 
persons, and shall.without delay be informed of the 
charge against him. Any such person while in custody 
shall be given reasonable facilities for obtaining legal 
advice, taking steps to furnish bail, and otherwise making 
arrangements for his defence or release."
Furthermore, courts appear to take the view that 
if an arrest turns out to be justifiable on some other 
ground, it is not unlawful merely because it cannot be 
justified on the ground claimed for it at the time the 
arrest was made. In England however, an arrest in such 
circumstances would be unlawful: Christie v. Leachinsky
[1947] A.C. 573- The police and gendarmerie are impatient 
to make arrests when they have the slightest evidence or 
pretext for doing so. They do not delay making an arrest 
until they have built up a case against the suspect.
They arrest at an earlier stage when they are not yet in a 
strong position to justify a charge. They then complete 
their inquiries after arrest, often on the basis of 
admissions made by the suspect. If no case is made out, 
the suspect is released. No action for unlawful detention 
lies in such a case.
If a person is arrested in execution of a warrant, 
the warrant for his arrest must be shown to him at the time 
the arrest is being made. However, provided a warrant to
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that effect exists, it is not necessary that the person
making the arrest be in possession of it at the time of
the arrest. But the warrant must, on the demand of the
person apprehended, be shown to him as soon as practi-
2 8cable after his arrest. A policeman or gendarme making
an arrest may search the person being arrested using such
force as is reasonably necessary for such purpose. He
may also demand the person residing or in charge of a
place into which a suspected offender has taken refuge, to
allow him free ingress thereto to search therin for the
person sought to be arrested. If ingress to such a place
is refused, the officer may break into the place to
29
search for the person to be arrested. Once he has law­
fully entered for the purpose of making an arrest and he 
is detained therein, the officer has the right to break
30out of such a place for the purpose of liberating himself.
Under the C.I.C. an arrest is effected in a 
manner similar to the one just described. Besides, police 
and gendarmerie practices are the same in both parts of 
the country. An officer making an arrest may or may not 
touch the person being arrested. The code requires him 
to inform the person being arrested of the reasons for 
his arrest. But this is practically done only at the
28. C.P.O., s. 29.
29. Ibid., s. 7.
30. Ibid., s . 8.
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police station or gendarmerie post. If a warrant of 
arrest exists but the arresting officer has not got it on 
him at the time of effecting the arrest, he must show it 
to the arrested person on demand as soon as practicable.
The use of handcuffs when an arrest has been made is the 
exception rather than the rule. In practice, much 
depends on the discretion, personal judgment and esti­
mation of the arresting officer. Offenders caught in 
flagrante delicto are invariably handcuffed. The risk 
involved (le risque du metier), the appearance of the 
offender, the nature and gravity of the offence committed 
all weigh in the officer’s mind in deciding whether to 
use handcuffs or not.
Reasonable but not excessive force may be used 
in making an arrest. It is for example unwarranted for 
a policeman or gendarme to use his gun in effecting a 
simple arrest presenting no danger whatsoever. As soon 
as a person has been arrested he must be taken at once to 
the nearest police or gendarmerie station. The police 
must show due courtesy when arresting a person in his home. 
However, if ingress into the home is refused, the arresting 
officer may break in for the purpose of effecting the 
arrest. The magical incantations of arrest are, TI 
arrest you in the name of the law1 or some other words to 
that effect. An arrested person may be searched.
The police and the gendarmerie make a distinction 
between conduit and arrit, that is, between taking a suspect
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to the station for questioning and arresting him. In 
strict legal theory policemen and gendarmes have no 
power to detain anyone for the purpose of questioning 
unless they arrest him. If a policeman or gendarme 
wishes to detain and question anyone he must arrest that 
person. A person cannot be detained without being 
arrested. In law, any detention is an arrest. Police 
officers are free to ask questions of anyone. They are 
free to request whatever cooperation•they need. But 
whenever they take a person into custody or restrict his 
full liberty of movement their action constitutes one of 
two things: it is either a lawful arrest (justifiable on
their power to arrest without warrant) or a false impri-. 
sonment.
In practice however the police make a subtle 
distinction between conduit and arr§t, that is, between 
taking a person to the station for questioning and arres­
ting him. Conduit includes the power to make an on-the- 
street detention. Thus policemen and gendarmes may, 
without technically speaking making an arrest, compel a 
person to stand still and listen to, if not answer, ques­
tions. They may also ask a suspect to follow them to 
the station for questioning. In neither of these two 
cases are the officers prepared to take the definite step 
of arrest; at the same time their suspicions may have 
been so aroused by the general appearance and actions of 
the suspect that they would like to ask him a few questions
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and. cross-check his answers while technically speaking 
not making an arrest. A common example is the power of 
the police and gendarmes to stop the driver of a motor 
vehicle (in England the power of the police to do so 
is a statutory one) for the purposes of examining his 
particulars, and the powers of the police and the gendarmes 
to require inter-town travellers by motor vehicle to pro­
duce their national identity cards or tax receipts for 
inspection.
If a policeman or gendarme requests a suspect 
to go along with him to the station and he refuses to do 
so, he may then be arrested. However, most people do, 
out of fear and ignorance, accompany such officers to the 
station. Arrest proper takes place only at the station 
after the suspect has been questioned and the police are 
of the opinion that he should, be arrested. He is for­
mally arrested, charged and asked to make a statement 
(if he wishes to do so). In Anglophone courts, this 
emerges, after the arraignment, in the familiar police 
refrain: ’The defendant was then arrested, charged and
cautioned and he volunteered a statement.’
A police officer may arrest another officer.
But he has no power to arrest a gendarme, a soldier, or 
important personalities.such as ministers of the govern­
ment, senior government officials, senior party officials, 
and members of the National Assembly. Only gendarmes 
who are officiers de police judiciaires (among which are
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officers within the senior hierarchy of the gendarmerie) 
are empowered to do so. The reason for this is obscure.
It may well be one of those things blindly copied from 
France.
A suspect can be arrested in his home only on 
warrant. A mandat d'amener must be obtained from the 
State Prosecutor or magistrate in order to effect an 
arrest under those circumstances. A mandat d famener is 
technically speaking different from a mandat d Tarr§t.
The former is simply an order from the court or State 
Prosecutor directing that the person therein named be 
brought before the person issuing the order at such and 
such a place and time. When the person named in the 
warrant accompanies the officer to the place indicated in 
it, this is said to be conduit and not arr§t. If the 
person refuses to go along with the officer, he may then 
be formally arrested. A mandat dfarr§t (which may be 
obtained before or after the arrest) is necessary to effect 
this arrest.
B . Detention
A person is detained if he is confined in a 
place or on a spot against his wish and desire. The 
duration of the detention may be minutes, hours, days, 
weeks, months or years. Detention constitutes a serious 
infringement on the liberty of the individual. It is 
therefore an exceptional measure which ought not to be
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resorted to lightly. The preamble to the Cameroonian 
constitution provides that no one shall be arrested and 
detained except in accordance with the law. An accused 
person ought, on principle, to be granted bail and only 
deprived of his liberty when he has been convicted by a 
competent court of law. However, for reasons of expe­
diency, public security, and the better administration of 
justice, it.often happens that an accused person is 
detained and so deprived of his liberty even before his 
guilt has been established.
When a person is detained he is said to be in 
custody. There are two types of custody, custody for 
questioning (also known, as police custody or detention for 
questioning) and. custody awaiting trial (sometimes known 
as preventive detention or protective custody). Custody 
awaiting trial is however not the same thing as preven­
tive confinement which, under s. 37 of the Penal Code, is 
a preventive measure pronounced against a convicted 
habitual criminal.
a) Custody for questioning (.la garde k vue)
The police and the gendarmerie do hold suspects
in investigative detention. This is known in Anglophone
Cameroon as 'police custody' and in Francophone Cameroon
as la garde h vue. Under the C.P.O. the police are
empowered to take any person, arrested without warrant,
31into custody. Such a person must however be brought
31. Ss. 17 and 18.
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before a magistrate within twenty-four hours from the 
time he was taken into custody. If this cannot be done 
the police officer must inquire into the case and, unless 
the offence appears to be of a serious nature, discharge 
the person upon his entering into a recognizance with or 
without sureties for a reasonable amount to appear before 
a court at the time and place named in the recognizance 
to answer the charge against him. But if the inquiry 
into the case cannot be completed forthwith, the police 
officer may discharge the suspect on his entering into 
a recognizance, with or without sureties for a reasonable 
amount, to appear at the police station and at such times 
as are named in the recognizance. If the suspect’s 
attendance is not required, it is the duty of the officer 
of police in charge of that police station to give him 
written notice to that effect. An officer in charge of 
a police station is empowered under s. 19 of the C.P.O. 
to discharge a person in custody for want of evidence if 
at the end of the inquiry he is satisfied that there is 
not sufficient reason to believe that the person has com­
mitted any offence.
The C.I.C. is conspicuously silent on the question 
of. la garde k vue. So, in Francophone Cameroon the law 
on this subject is governed by sections 63 and 64 of the 
French Code de Procedure Penale. La garde §. vue, like 
detention for questioning, is the right to detain suspects 
and material witnesses for twenty-four hours (in theory)
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for interrogation. Much of the law on police custody is 
honoured more in breach than in its observance. In 
most instances of custody for questioning, it is uncertain 
whether a suspect voluntarily complied with a police or 
gendarme request or involuntarily yielded to police or 
gendarme pressures.
Under the law a person in custody for questioning 
must not be physically or morally maltreated and must not 
be deprived of food, water, rest or medical attention.
But dark police and gendarmerie cells and cases of ill- 
treatment are not unknown. The initial period for which 
a person may be detained is twenty-four hours, excluding 
road time. This period may be renewed by the State Prose­
cutor, or if there is no State Prosecutor around, by the 
local Prefect (District Officer). Legally, a suspect may 
be detained without being formally charged to court for 
a maximum period of five days. In practice, suspects 
are sometimes detained in police and gendarmerie cells 
for weeks without charges being brought against them.
One reason for this state of affairs is that sometimes 
the police and gendarmes are too hasty in making arrests; 
that is, they make arrests even when they lack grounds 
sufficient to justify their doing so on a specific charge. 
Having made such an arrest the suspect is then held for 
a prolonged period while investigations and questioning 
are going on to determine whether a specific charge 
against him can be supported.
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There is another technique which the police 
employ in order to hold suspects in investigative deten­
tion for long periods, even months. At the end of the 
five days time limit during which suspects may be lawfully 
held in police custody, the police may find that they have 
not yet completed their investigations. In such a case 
they send the suspect's case-file to the State Prosecutor 
informing him that investigations into the matter are not 
yet complete and that more time would be needed to do so. 
This in effect means that the State Prosecutor cannot as 
yet prefer a charge formally and go ahead and prosecute. 
So, he finds that he has to grant the police the extra 
time they need. He orders the suspects to be removed 
from the police cells to the prison to be held in custody 
awaiting trial.. At the same time he grants the police 
an extraction order authorising them to get the suspects 
out of prison and take them to the police station when­
ever they are needed for questioning. What happens in 
practice is that the suspects are never in fact removed 
from the police cell to the prison. The police simply 
take the State Prosecutor's remand order to the prison 
governor who signs that the suspects have been brought to 
the prison and at the same time he also signs the extrac­
tion order to the effect that the suspects have been 
taken out to the police station for questioning. Thus 
by technically (though not in practice) converting police 
custody into custody awaiting trial the police are able
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to hold suspects In their cells for as long as the police 
Inquiries may take. The police evidently favour this 
technique as It gives them more time to conduct their 
Inquiries and shields them. In the event of an unlawful 
detention, from an action for damages. In Cameroon a 
person who has been unlawfully held in custody awaiting 
trial has no action for damages against those who so 
detained him.
b ) Custody awaiting trial
During the course of a trial it may become neces­
sary to adjourn the case from time to time. In that
event the court may either admit the defendant to bail if
32he is in custody or remand him to prison to await trial.
The warrant remanding him into custody issued by the remit­
ting magistrate is sufficient authority to any person to 
whom it is directed to receive and detain the person 
therein named, and to carry him and deliver him up to the 
court to which the person charged is remitted for trial.
Under the C.I.C. a magistrate or State Prosecutor 
may also remand a defendant into custody by issuing a 
mandat de depot. A mandat de depot (in effect a remand 
warrant) is a warrant from a magistrate or State Prosecutor
32. Under s. 236 of the C.P.O. the period of such remand 
is eight days or for such longer periods as the court 
may consider advisable.
33. Cf. C.P.O., s. 67.
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directed to the police and all process servers to take 
the defendant therein named to a prison or similar 
place of detention where he must be received and detained 
by the prison governor. The period of custody is 
indeterminate.
In deciding whether to remand into custody or 
grant bail several factors are taken into account: 
whether the defendant is an adult or a juvenile, the nature 
and gravity of the offence and its social repercussions, 
and the likelihood of committing other crimes or tampering 
with evidence or witnesses if left at liberty. Juvenile 
delinquents are invariably released to their families on 
recognizance and seldom remanded into custody. In the 
case of adults, remand into custody is always made where 
the offender is charged with a felony or a serious mis­
demeanour, where the offender is of no fixed abode, where 
the offender is likely to tamper with evidence or suborn 
witnesses, where the offender is likely to escape the arm 
of the law, or where the offender cannot provide any 
sureties to bail him. Sometimes an offender is remanded 
in protective custody on the ground that the protection 
is as much for the better administration of justice as 
for the interest of the defendant himself (for example, 
protection from public anger or against retaliation by 
the victim of the offence).
The law on preventive detention in Cameroon 
leaves much to be desired. Detention is a serious trespass
on individual liberty and ought not to be resorted to 
lightly. But the large proportion of persons held on 
preventive detention in Cameroon’s prisons raises the 
legitimate question whether remand into custody has not 
become the rule rather than the exception. Besides, it 
is common practice to hold persons in custody awaiting 
trial indefinitely. One often hears of persons held for 
months and years. This is obnoxious and contrary to a 
humane system of the administration of justice. This 
is the more so as there is no compensation for an innocent 
person acquitted after having been held in custody for 
months or even years.
Under s. 53 of the Penal Code, where a person 
has been in custody awaiting trial and is eventually 
convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the 
duration of the custody is deducted from that sentence. 
This provision is useful only where the sentence of loss 
of liberty passed by the court exceeds the time spent 
in custody. It is of no assistance where the sentence 
passed is less than the time spent in detention or where 
the maximum penalty provided for the offence is below the 
time spent in custody. Some courts attempt to make an 
a priori justification of the detention by passing a sen­
tence of imprisonment of equal duration to the time spent 
in detention in cases where the accused ought either to 
have been acquitted or where a suspended sentence or a 
probation order would have been the proper penalty.
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Detention, particularly for long periods, gives 
accused persons and the general public the distinct 
impression that the detainees are already presumed guilty. 
In the long run the court may itself come to have that 
same impression and the effect would be to tilt the scales 
against the accused. It is submitted that courts should 
be empowered when remanding into custody to indicate in the 
remand warrant the duration of such custody. Custody 
for questioning by the police and custody awaiting trial 
should be subject to stringent judicial control.
C . Bail
When an accused person is brought before the 
court or when a convicted person goes on appeal the case 
may not be proceeded with forthwith. The prosecution 
or the defence may require more time to prepare. The 
court may be overloaded, as happens very often, with 
cases. Similarly, when the State Prosecutor conducts a 
preliminary inquiry there may be an adjournment. Also, 
when the police detain a person for questioning they may 
not be able to complete their inquiries within the legally 
permissible time during which they may hold a person in 
custody. In all of these situations there is always a 
choice between custody and bail. The police may continue 
to hold in custody (by applying to the State Prosecutor 
for an extention of the detention period) or grant police 
bail (usually in trivial cases). The State Prosecutor
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may remand in custody or grant bail and the court may do
likewise. The grant or refusal of bail by either the
police, the legal department, or the court is entirely
discretionary.
Bail is sureties, taken by a person duly
authorised, for the appearance of an accused person at
a certain day and place, to answer and be justified by 
84law. Bail is inherent in the presumption of pre-trial
innocence and the guarantee of individual liberty under
the law. An accused person should not, without due
cause, be detained before his guilt has been established
before a competent court of law. Bail is granted to a
defendant on his own recognizance with or without sureties
for a reasonable amount. This means that the defendant
undertakes to appear for trial or else forfeit the stated 
85sum of money. No deposit of cash or pledge of property
(as sometimes happens in some American states) is required 
at the time the recognizance is entered into. Where the 
recognizance is entered into with sureties, the sureties, 
sign a surety bond in which they undertake to forfeit the 
stated sum of money if they fail to produce the accused 
when and where required. The sum of money fixed generally 
depends on the gravity of the alleged offence.
If the defendant jumps bail, the sureties must
34. Archbold, paragraph 290; C.I.C., ss. 113 and 114.
35. C.P.O., s. 120; cf. C.I.C., ss. 114 and 120.
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then pay the amount of money stated in the recognizance. 
Bail-jumping in Cameroon is of minor proportions and when 
it does occur and the defendant is re-arrested he is 
remanded in custody. The sum of money stated in the 
recognizance is fixed by the court or the legal department, 
as the case may be, at its discretion. In fixing such 
sum however, due regard is often had to the circumstances 
of the case. The fixing of excessive or an impossible 
bail in a deliberate attempt to deny bail and so to give 
the defendant an immediate taste of jail, is rare. When­
ever the court or the legal department has been inclined 
to grant bail, they have almost always done so by fixing 
a reasonable bail within the reach of the accused.
The fact that no cash deposit is required at 
the time the recognisance is entered into is of tremendous 
importance, especially to accused persons who are truly 
indigent. If a cash deposit were so required, defendants 
who are poor (and the vast majority of criminal defendants 
in Cameroon are indigent) would always be remanded in 
custody because they would be unable to make the required 
cash deposit. In such a system bail would be available 
only to defendants who were rich.
Bail may be granted by the police or gendarmes 
(not on their own initiative but on the instructions or 
with the approval of the State Prosecutor), the legal 
department, and the court. After an arrest without warrant 
has been made, a police officer may, where he cannot bring
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the accused before a magistrate within twenty-four hours, 
release on bail after he has inquired into the case and 
decided that a charge shall be brought. If the inquiry
into the case cannot be completed forthwith, the officer 
may release the detainee on his entering into a recog­
nizance with or without sureties for a reasonable amount 
to appear at the police station. In practice, when­
ever the police have released a suspect on bail (which 
they seldom do on their own authority), they have always 
done so on the authority of the State Prosecutor. When 
this happens, bail is often set with the concurrence of the 
police. In trivial cases however the police and the 
gendarmes do release on bail on their own initiative.
Section 24(2) of the 1972 Judicial Organisation 
Ordinance empowers the legal department to release on 
bail. It may order the judicial police to release on 
bail anyone held in police custody. It may also release 
on bail anyone it is holding in custody for preliminary 
inquiries if such inquiries would take more than five days. 
However, where an accused person has been committed for 
trial by the legal department after its preliminary 
inquiries, the department becomes functus officio and 
cannot grant bail. Only the court to which the accused 
has been committed for trial may grant bail in this case.
36. C.P.O., s. 17.
37. Ibid., s. 18.
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The power of the legal department to grant ball is a 
novelty in Anglophone Cameroon. In Francophone Cameroon 
however, the juge d 1 instruction and the parquet always
o  o
have been empowered to grant la liberte provisoire.
In 1972 the juge d ’instruction was abolished and his 
powers and functions transferred to the legal department.
The legal department tends to lean in favour of bail 
where an accused is legally presumed to be less dangerous 
and it appears that he would not jump bail. Thus the 
legal department always makes a bail order (ordonnance de 
mise en liberte provisoire) where the accused is’of fixed 
abode, has no criminal record, and tfee offence for which 
he is charged carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment 
not exceeding six months. Bail is always revoked and 
the accused remanded in custody on fresh evidence of 
grave circumstances or where the accused has attempted to 
jump bail.
It has always been one of the court’s traditional 
functions to grant bail either on the request of the 
defendant or of its own motion. Application for bail is 
made to the High Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) by 
way of motion on notice. The court admits to bail if it 
thinks fit. It will admit to bail any person charged
39with an offence unless it sees good reasons to the contrary.
38. C.I.C., ss. 113-126.
39. Idem; C.P.O., s. 118.
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The legal department may oppose the grant of ball or even 
go on appeal if It is granted. But It seldom does so.
(It may be noted that in England no appeal lies against 
the grant of ball). A person admitted to ball enters a
40recognizance to appear before the court whenever required.
A convicted person who goes on appeal may apply to the
appropriate Appeal Court for ball until the determination
of his appeal. But such persons seldom apply for ball
(mainly due to Ignorance), and the courts are not generally
disposed to grant bail In such circumstances. Therefore
when a convicted person goes on appeal, he remains in jail
until the determination of his appeal. If the appeal
succeeds, he is then released. A Court of Appeal may
vary the bail fixed by a lower court, grant continuous bail,
reconsider the amount of bail, or revoke or require higher 
4lbail. An accused person admitted to bail may be required
to produce such surety or sureties as, in the opinion of
the court admitting him to bail, will be sufficient to
ensure his appearance as and when required and must with
the surety or sureties enter into a recognisance accor- 
42dingly.
In deciding whether to grant or refuse bail a 
number of factors are taken into consideration: the
40. A recognizance may be entered into to keep the peace
or be of good behaviour, to appear at a police station, 
to appear before a court to answer an accusation, etc.
41. C.P.O., ss. 124-132.
42. Ibid., s. 122; C.I.C., ss. 114 and 120.
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nature and gravity of the alleged offence (as a matter of 
practice bail is always refused in capital offences and 
offences against state security), the severity of the 
penalty which the offence carries, the character of the 
available evidence, the criminal antecedents of the 
accused, the likelihood of other offences being committed, 
the likelihood of escape from the jurisdiction or abscon­
ding from the country, and the likelihood of interference 
with witnesses, evidence and the investigation. Indeed, 
in deciding whether to grant or refuse bail a Cameroonian 
court is guided by the same principles as an English court
would. Dismissing an application for bail in Richard T.
43Jumbo v. The People, His Lordship Mr Justice Endeley, 
President of the Appeal Court for the South West Province 
said,
"In considering application for bail sub­
mitted by convicted persons we are guided 
by the principles laid down in Edgar Gordon’s 
application reported in 7 Cr. AppT R. 182.
These principles have on several occasions 
been adopted by the ex-West Cameroon Court 
of Appeal. They have therefore become 
binding on this court. We can find nothing 
in either the affidavit supporting this 
application or in counsel’s arguments which 
brings out the exceptional circumstances on 
which the applicant’s prayer can properly 
be granted. The application is accordingly 
dismissed.” 44
43. Buea Appeal Court, Motion No. CASWP/11. M/73, unreported.
44. See also, Ekabe Nadikowe v. The People, Motion No. 
CASWP/12.M/1973, unreported, in which the Buea Court 
of Appeal also dismissed application for bail.
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D . Legal control of wrongful arrests and detentions
Often the law has to walk a tlght-rope between
upholding individual liberty and freedom on the one hand,
and ensuring the security of society on the other hand.
The law-abiding members of society must be protected from
criminals. At the same time, citizens of the country
legitimately require that they should be free from constant
molestation and harassment by the police and gendarmes.
The law strikes a balance between these conflicting
interests. It does so by confining within specific and
known limits the power of the police and the gendarmes to
arrest, detain, search and interrogate. The law also makes
policemen and gendarmes accountable for their actions.
Any abuse by police officers or gendarmes with regards to
arrest and detention may be dealt with through the criminal
law, the civil law, or disciplinary action.
Any gendarme or policeman who deprives a person
of his liberty commits an offence under s. 291 of the Penal 
45Code in any of the following circumstances: (i) where
deprivation of liberty lasts for more than a month,
45. The ordinary penalty for this offence is imprisonment for 
from five to ten years and with fine of from twenty 
thousand to one million francs. But the penalty is 
doubled in the case where the offence is committed by a 
policeman or gendarme because the fact of being a public 
servant aggravates criminal responsibility and entails 
a doubling of the maximum penalty provided for the 
offence: Penal Code, ss. 89 and 132(2).
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(ii) where deprivation of liberty is accompanied with 
physical or mental torture, (iii) where an arrest is 
effected with the aid of a forged order or of a uniform 
unlawfully worn or pretending an appointment not held.
The essence of the s. 291 offence is the unwarranted dep­
rivation of someone of his liberty. So long as it is 
wrongful, the manner in which the deprivation of liberty 
is effected is immaterial. It may be an arrest or deten­
tion effected by trick or by force. Whether an arrest 
or detention by a policeman or a gendarme is false or 
wrongful depends on the circumstances of the case. An 
arrest or a detention will be false if it was manifestly 
unwarranted. An arrest will be false if it was effected 
with the aid of a false warrant of arrest or a uniform 
unlawfully worn (as for example where a policeman puts on 
the uniform of a gendarme or vice versa).
It is however doubtful whether an arrest is false 
where the officer who made the arrest told a lie that he 
had a warrant to do so when in truth he had no such warrant. 
Moreover, an arrest or detention is not necessarily false 
simply because the officer who effected it was prompted 
by hatred or a feeling of animosity against the arrested 
person if such arrest or detention was prima facie war­
ranted or otherwise lawful. Furthermore, it is lawful 
for any person lawfully making an arrest to use such force 
as may be reasonably necessary to make the arrest or to 
overcome any force used in resisting such arrest. No
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action or omission in execution of the law or authorised
by law, and performed in accordance with the conditions
46prescribed by law, constitutes an offence. So, a
policeman or gendarme who arrests, or detains, or uses 
force in effecting an arrest in execution of the law and 
in a manner authorized by law does not commit an offence. 
However, the degree of force which is justified is only 
that which is reasonably necessary in the circumstances.
If the force used was, in the circumstances, excessive 
the officer who used such force would be criminally respon­
sible for any excess, according to the nature and quality 
of the act which constitutes the excess. Under s. 132 of 
the Penal Code any public servant (the definition of which 
in s. 131 includes the police and the gendarmes) who uses 
force to any person is punishable with imprisonment for 
from six months to five years. It is submitted that s. 132 
does not prohibit a policeman or a gendarme from using rea­
sonable force in the execution of the law. The proper con­
struction to be placed on that provision is that an officer 
would be guilty under it only when the force used was 
either illegal or, although legal, was unreasonable or 
excessive in the circumstances.
The law on arbitrary detention is explicitly 
dealt with in the Code d TInstruction Criminelle. Anyone 
who knows a person to be detained in a place other than a
46. Penal Code, s. 76.
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prison or similar lawful place of detention is under a
legal duty to make such information available to the State 
i| 7
Prosecutor who would then proceed forthwith to release
the person so detained if the detention is unlawful. If
the detention is lawful the State Prosecutor must cause
the detainee to be taken forthwith before a magistrate.
A State Prosecutor who fails to act in this wise may be
48prosecuted as an accessory to arbitrary detention. But
these provisions only cater for the situation where a 
person is detained in a place other than a prison or simi­
lar lawful place of detention such as police cells. It 
does not take care of the situation where a person is 
detained (whether in a lawful place of detention or not) 
when he should not have been detained in the first place; 
nor does it take care of the situation where a detention 
is made without legal authority to do so. Moreover, it 
is doubtful whether, as ss. 615 and 6l6 of the C.I.C. 
would seem to imply, a detention becomes arbitrary merely 
because the place of detention is not an official place 
for detaining people.
It is an offence to use any force, other than
that permitted by law, in effecting an arrest or detaining 
49someone. It is an offence, punishable as arbitrary
47. C.I.C., s. 615.
48. Ibid., s . 6l6.
49. French constitution of 22 Frimaire,. An III, s. 82. 
Sections 77-82 of this constitution are still in force
in Francophone Cameroon by virtue of s. 615 of the C.I.C.
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detention, for anyone to order the arrest or detention
of any person when not empowered by law to issue such 
50an order. Under the law, a warrant ordering the
arrest of any person must (i) emanate from a person duly
empowered by law to issue such a warrant, (ii) formally
state the reason for the arrest and the law by virtue of
which the arrest is being ordered, and (iii) be signified
to the person arrested and a copy of the same left with 
51him. Breach of any of these requirements constitutes
52an offence characterised as arbitrary detention.
It is clear on general principles that an arrest,
effected by means of a ’warrant’ issued by a person not
empowered by law to do so, is illegal. But it is extremely
doubtful whether an arrest is arbitrary and therefore
illegal simply because an otherwise proper arrest warrant
has failed to state the reason for the arrest and the law
by virtue of which the arrest is being made. Even more
58problematic is the implied suggestion that an arrest is 
arbitrary merely because in effecting an arrest the per­
son being arrested was not told the reason for his arrest 
and a copy of the arrest warrant given to him.
Prosecutions for wrongful arrests or detentions 
are rare in Cameroon. This does not mean that policemen 
and gendarmes never abuse their powers of arrest and
50. French Constitution of 22 Frimaire, An III, s. 80.
51. Ibid., s. 77.
52. Ibid., s. 80.
53. Idem.
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detention. They certainly do. But what happens is 
that most complaints of this nature are dealt with at 
departmental level by disciplinary action. A victim of 
arbitrary arrest or unlawful detention may file a complaint 
with the local boss of the police or gendarmerie, as the 
case may be. Some people petition straight to the head
of the Police Force Cthe Delegate-General to the National 
Security) or even to the Head of State. An inquiry into 
the allegation may be opened and evidence taken from the 
complainant, the accused and their witnesses. At the end 
of the investigation the file on the matter is laid before 
the disciplinary committee of the police force which 
decides, where necessary, on the appropriate disciplinary 
action to be taken against the accused officer. Depending 
on the gravity of the offence committed, the officer may be 
visited with any of these sanctions: reprimand, warning,
withholding of promotion, reduction of rank, prosecution, 
dismissal from the service.
One method which has to some extent proved effec­
tive in controlling detentions by the police and the 
gendarmes is the requirement that all police stations and 
gendarme posts must keep a lock-up register (Tivre de garde 
a vue) showing each day the number of detainees held and 
their conditions. This register is inspected every 
morning by the officer of police in charge of the station 
and the State Prosecutor. The register shows the date 
on which each suspect was taken into custody, any extension 
of the period of custody and for how long the extension was
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granted, the date on which any suspect held in custody 
was released, and the objects in the possession of the
suspect at the time he was taken into custody.
The forcible detention of anyone is both criminal
and tortious. So the victim of an unlawful arrest and
detention can sue for damages. Furthermore, whenever
a person is unlawfully detained, he or anyone on his 
behalf is entitled to make an ex parte application sup­
ported by affidavit-to the High Court to determine whether 
his detention is lawful or not. The court will then, 
by issuing the writ of habeas corpus, command whoever is 
detaining the applicant, to bring him before the court, 
and, unless the detention is shown to be lawful, the court 
will at once set him free. Section 16(c) of the 1972 
Judicial Organisation Ordinance empowers the High Court 
"to hear and determine all applications for immediate 
release made by or on behalf of persons imprisoned or 
detained which applications are based on the illegality of, 
or the absence of authority for, such deprivation of 
liberty". The High Court is here empowered to grant the 
writ of habeas corpus. This relief is not new to Anglo­
phone courts but it is a complete novelty in Francophone 
Cameroon. The introduction of habeas corpus into the
54. So in John Nformi v. Stephen Forkum & Another, Suit
No. KM/92/1975, unreported, the plaintiff successfully 
claimed 500,000 francs general and special damages 
against the defendants (2 policemen) for unlawful 
arrest and detention.
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corpus of Cameroonian law is one of the major contri­
butions of Anglophone Cameroon to the Rule of Law in 
Cameroon. The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 
originated in .England in the seventeenth century and is 
today a writ of right which is available not only where 
the original detention is unlawful, but also when a man, 
who has been lawfully arrested on a criminal charge, is 
kept in prison without trial.^ In Anglo-American law 
the writ is a bulwark of personal freedom.
3. The investigation of alleged crime
When the police and gendarmes take cognizance
of allegation of commission of a criminal offence (for
example, a complaint or accusation is made, or the police
themselves arrest an offender in flagrante delicto) they
56are duty bound to investigate the matter. Such inves­
tigations are necessary because evidence must be gathered 
which would lead to the arrest of the offender and his 
eventual prosecution. Enough evidence must be gathered 
to sustain a charge and secure conviction. The police 
and gendarmes have several methods of conducting their
55. For a scholarly study of habeas corpus in common law
jurisdictions, see F.N. Kisob, Habeas corpus protection 
in common law jurisdictions, Ph.D. Thesis, University 
of London, 1970. See also, P.B. Engo, ’An aspect of 
personal freedom - leading star: habeas corpus’, ABBIA,
No. 5, 1964, p. 57.
56. C.P.O., ss. 59-63; C.I.C., ss. 8, 46, 64.
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investigations - interrogations, identification, search 
and seizure, eavesdropping, and the conduct of prelimi­
nary inquiries.
A. Interrogations
In conducting their investigations the police 
and gendarmes often hold people (witnesses, suspects, 
potential witnesses) for questioning. Questions asked to 
persons so held may serve to clear them. They may also 
serve, directly or indirectly, to lead the police to 
suspects other than the persons being questioned. They 
may moreover become the means by which the persons ques­
tioned are themselves made to furnish proof which will 
eventually send them to jail or the gallows. Such ques­
tioning, whatever its outcome, is often indispensable to 
crime detection. Its compelling necessity has been judi­
cially recognised as its sufficient justification.
This does not however mean that the police and 
gendarmes are given unbridled powers in the way they 
conduct their interrogations. The law frowns on oppres­
sive methods of police interrogations. In other words, 
oppression must not be used for the sake of getting 
people to confess their guilt or to implicate others; 
torture must not be used to extract confessions which 
could be used at the trial; nor may torture be used to 
induce the disclosure of confederates.
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If a suspect being questioned has to 
make a confession or disclose his associates then such a 
confession or disclosure has to be voluntary and not 
induced.
That the police and the gendarmes do sometimes 
resort to highly questionable methods in order to make 
’uncooperative’ suspects speak or to extort confessions 
cannot be seriously challenged. What is however less 
certain is the extent to which these coercive methods 
are resorted to. The police and the gendarmes of course 
strenuously deny that they use torture to make suspects 
speak or confess. They point out that it is not uncommon 
for suspects to refuse to speak when being interrogated 
or to sign a police report presented to them. But the 
public is not convinced. This public scepticism about 
police assurances has been fed and reinforced by tales of 
various forms of police and gendarme torture ranging from 
denial of food, water, rest and sleep, to other oppres­
sive techniques, allegedly commonly employed by the dreaded 
Brigade Mobile Mixte (B.M.M.), such as the use of electric 
shocks, suspension of the body upside down, exposure to 
very bright light for days and nights, and the use of 
various forms of mental aggression. These claims are how­
ever difficult to- verify because alleged brutality and 
torture of this kind happen almost always in a closed 
environment. So most of what is circulated around is 
hearsay and may not be entirely accurate. But, as the
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saying goes, there is no smoke without a fire. The
Brigade Mobile Mixte does exist and certainly uses ’tough’
57methods in dealing with suspects. The B.M.M. is now
euphemistically styled Poste de Recherche and is regarded 
as an extension of the sinister Centre National de Docu­
mentation (which is the new label for what was at first 
known as the Service de Documentation, SEDOC and later 
called the Direction de Documentation, DIRDOC). The 
police and gendarmes insist that only hard-core political 
offenders, subversive elements, and offenders against state 
security are ever taken to the B.M.M.
Judicial attitude towards police interrogations 
has always been to put a check on abuse by those conducting 
the interrogations. One form of check is the rule of 
evidence which precludes the use at trial of involuntary 
statements. This rule indirectly acts as a check on 
oppressive police practices by frustrating their efforts 
when they resort to methods that produce what will be held 
to be an involuntary statement. The statement of an 
accused person need not be spontaneous and it is not inad­
missible merely by reason of its having been obtained 
through police interrogations. But such a statement must 
not have been induced by force, threat of force, a promise 
of leniency from a person in authority, or a promise of 
pardon for, if it has been so obtained it is involuntary
57- Evidence Act, Cap. 45 of the 1958 edition of the laws, 
s. 27.
915.
and consequently inadmissible in evidence. To be admis­
sible in evidence in an Anglophone court, a confession 
must be voluntary. A confession is an admission made at 
any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or 
suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.
Voluntary confessions are deemed to be relevant facts as
57against the persons who make them. But confessions
caused by inducement, threat or promise are irrelevant in
criminal proceedings if the inducement, threat or promise
proceeded from a person in authority and were sufficient
to give the accused grounds which appeared to him reasonable
for supposing that by making it he was going to gain some
58advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature.
The practice in Francophone courts is markedly 
different. Confessions and admissions are received in 
evidence without regard to whether they are voluntary 
or not. The argument advanced is that the trial judge can 
be trusted to decide what weight to attach to the confes­
sion. Furthermore, whereas Anglophone courts are extremely 
reluctant to convict on the evidence of a confession alone, 
uncorroborated by some other extrinsic evidence, the same 
is not true of Francophone courts. Besides, whereas 
Anglophone courts adhere to the English Judges’ Rules, no 
comparable rules exist in the criminal process in Francophone
57. Evidence Act, Cap. 45 of the 1958 edition of the laws, 
s. 27.
58. Ibid., s. 28.
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Cameroon. The Judges’ Rules contain a concise and
authoritative statement of some of the essentials of
police conduct. They regulate police interrogation by
outlining the circumstances in which suspects must be
cautioned as to their rights before being questioned,
and those in which they may not be questioned at all.
Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to charge
a person with a crime, he must, before asking any questions,
caution the suspect in these words: "Do you wish to say
anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to
say anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say
will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence."
Questioning without a proper caution renders a resulting
statement improper. But the court has the discretion to
59admit or reject the statement in evidence.
The police and gendarmes do sometimes exceed 
the bounds of legality when they interrogate suspects.
It is therefore highly desirable that limitations should 
be placed on such interrogations otherwise a criminal trial 
would become nothing more than a formal ratification of a 
result effectively reached earlier at the level of the 
police or gendarmes.
59- The English Judges’ Rules were first promulgated in 
1912 when conflicting judicial decisions led the 
police to ask the Queen’s Bench judges to agree on 
proper methods of interrogation which would insure the 
admission into evidence of confessions legitimately 
obtained. The Rules were added to in 1918, reviewed 
in 1930 and again in 1964.
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B . Identifications
Sometimes, when an offence has been committed 
the police and gendarmes arrest several suspects among 
whom may be the actual offender. If the police have no 
clues as to who, among the persons arrested, the real 
offender is, they would need anyone who may have seen the 
offender committing the offence or escaping from the scene 
of the crime to come forward and assist in identifying the 
criminal. Identification can easily be done by using 
photographs or by the method of identification parades. 
Identification by means of toe or finger prints, and hair, 
blood or other bodily samples requires the services of 
forensic pathologists.
In the case of identification by means of photo­
graphs the witness is presented with the photographs of all 
the suspects for him to identify the criminal among them.
In carrying out this exercise no photograph must bear any 
mark or sign or be placed in such a way as to suggest to 
the witness who the police think the criminal might be. 
Obtaining the photographs of suspects presents no problem. 
Section 26 of the Police Ordinance, Cap. 154 of the 1958 
edition of the laws empowers the police to photograph per­
sons who are in lawful custody and to make their finger 
prints.
"Section 26 Cl). It shall be lawful for any 
police officer to take and record for the 
purposes of identification the measurements, 
photographs and finger-print impressions of
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all persons who may from time to time be In 
lawful custody:
Provided that if such measurements, photo­
graphs and finger print impressions are 
taken of a person who has not previously been 
convicted of any criminal offence, and such 
person is discharged or acquitted by a court, 
all records relating to such measurements, 
photographs, and fingerprint impressions 
shall be forthwith destroyed or handed over 
to such person.
(2) Any person who shall refuse to submit 
to the taking and recording of his measure­
ments, photographs or fingerprint impressions 
shall be taken before a magistrate who, being 
satisfied that such person is in lawful cus­
tody, shall make such order as he thinks fit 
authorising a police officer to take the 
measurements, photographs and fingerprint 
impressions of such person."
Often however, the police would not need to
photograph, measure or make fingerprint impressions of a
suspect held in lawful custody. All they need to do is
to ask the person so detained to produce his National
Identity Card. In Cameroon, every citizen is required by
law to possess and to keep in his possession whenever he
6 0goes out of his house, a National Identity Card. It
is a criminal offence not to have a National Identity 
Card or to fail to produce it whenever requested by any 
policeman or gendarme. The National Identity Card bears 
a passport-size photograph of the bearer and contains the 
following bits of information: the number of the card;
the date and place of Issue; the name and signature of 
the issuing authority; the names of the bearer and his
60. Law No. 64/LF/22 of 13 November 1964 (National Identity 
Card).
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parents; the bearer’s place and date of birth, his 
occupation, residence, height, signature, special marks 
on his body and the fingerprint impression of his right 
hand thumb. Each National Identity Card is established 
in triplicate by the police; one copy is given to the 
bearer while the police keep two copies. The National 
Identity Card is useful not only for criminal identification 
but also for identification in the case of serious accident, 
or death in circumstances in which the identity of the 
deceased or person seriously injured may not be immediately 
apparent.
One other method of identification for criminal 
purposes is the use of Identification parades. A prac­
tice borrowed from England, these parades were at one 
time fairly common in Anglophone Cameroon but the practice 
is now virtually obsolete largely because the police can 
now attain the same objective with the aid of National 
Identity Cards. The object of an identification parade 
is to make sure that the ability of the witness to recog­
nise the suspect has been fairly and adequately tested. 
Identification parades must not only be fair but must be 
seen to be fair. The witness’ attention should not be 
directed specially to the person the police already strongly 
suspect to be the criminal, for example, by being shown the 
suspect, his photograph or a description of him before the 
parade. The suspect must be placed among several persons 
who are as far as possible of the same age, height, general
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appearance, dress and position in life. The whole
parade must be supervised by an officer of police not
6 1directly concerned with the inquiry.
C. Search and seizure
Search by the police and gendarmes whether of 
the person, of premises or place of work is an unpleasant 
thing (especially when carried out in the night) because 
the exercise of that power involves questions of civic
rights. The C.P.O. and the C.I.C. contain similar pro-
6 2visions on police powers of search and seizure and on 
the admissibility in evidence of the fruits of an unlawful 
search. The fruits of an unlawful search are admissible 
in evidence in nearly every instance. Provided the con­
duct of the police or gendarmes was not demonstrably 
oppressive, articles seized during an unlawful search may
r Q
be used in evidence. The law appears to be that an
61. In England the police still make frequent use of iden­
tification parades. Across the Channel, in France 
where every Frenchman is required, as in-Cameroon but 
unlike in Britain, to possess a National Identity Card, 
the police and gendarmes make use of identity cards and 
seldom resort to identification parades. Cf. Bloch- 
Degeorge, TSur 1 ’identification des citoyens francais’, 
Gaz. Pal. 1951. II. 60.
62. C.P.O., Part 13; C.I.C., Chapters IV and V.
63. This accords with English law on the subject. American 
law on this point is however sharply different. The 
American Supreme Court has sought to prevent unlawful 
searches by prohibiting the production of articles so 
seized as evidence in court. So in America evidence 
obtained directly by an unconstitutional search and 
evidence obtained through leads supplied by such acti­
vity are inadmissible in evidence. Any such evidence 
is barred from use in court as 'the fruit of a poisoned 
tree1. See, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963).
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unlawful search does not render Inadmissible in any subse­
quent proceedings any incriminating evidence that may 
have been seized during the unlawful search. A search 
warrant may specify the objects to look for but the police 
and gendarmes are entitled to seize any other incriminating 
evidence found in the course of their search. When 
conducting their searches the police and gendarmes behave 
as though they have been licensed to turn the house or 
premises inside out and to seize any object suspected of 
having a criminal connection. The police or gendarmes 
would seize any article if they suspect that the article 
in question is either the fruit of an offence (for 
example, stolen property) or the instrument by which an 
offence was committed (.for example, a murder weapon, a 
false key) or material evidence to prove the commission 
or intended commission of an offence (for example, a 
letter, plan, or map setting out the plan of a robbery).
The police and gendarmes however have no power 
under the law to enter houses and premises to conduct 
searches except under a search warrant or where the search 
is incidental to an arrest made on premises. To search 
a person’s home or premises the police and gendarmes must 
obtain a search warrant authorising them to do so. If 
they are not armed with a search warrant they may never­
theless still enter and search; but then only if the 
occupier of the house has voluntarily and in writing
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authorised them to do so. "The home", proclaims
the preamble to the Cameroonian Constitution, "is invio­
late. No search may take place except by virtue of the 
law." In practice the police and gendarmes do sometimes 
conduct searches of homes without a warrant and without 
proper authorisation from the person whose home or pre­
mises is being searched. Sometimes a search warrant is 
obtained when in fact the search had already been conduc­
ted. However, there is no reason why a policeman or 
gendarme who enters a person’s house without a warrant or 
an authorisation by the occupier to do so may not, on the 
complaint of the aggrieved person, be prosecuted for 
invasion of residence under s. 299 of the Penal Code. 
Moreover, any forcible entry into premises without warrant 
is an actionable trespass.
A search warrant may be issued and a search 
conducted at any time and on any day - day or night,
Sunday or public holiday or any other day of the week.
For example, where an offence against state security has 
been committed, searches may be conducted in respect of 
that offence at any time and on any day. Moreover, a
64. In England, the legal position on this subject was 
epitomised long ago by William Pitt in these fine 
poetic words: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be 
frail - its roof may shake - the wind may blow through 
it - the storm may enter - the rain may enter - but 
the King of England cannot enter - all his forces 
dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." 
See, Ghani v. Jones [1969] 3 All E.R. 1700.
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search begun in the day may continue into the night. 
Furthermore, searches in places other than in private 
homes (public buildings, offices, vehicles, ships, car­
riages, receptacle or other place not used as a private 
home) may be conducted at any time, place, and on any 
date, with or without a warrant or authorisation from the 
owner, occupier or user. Whenever a private home is to 
be searched, its occupier must be notified and he must 
be present to give his consent to entry. If he is not 
available someone else in loco parentis or other person 
mandated by him may give the requisite consent in writing 
although in practice a verbal consent suffices. If a ' 
policeman or gendarme is armed with a search warrant, the 
requirement of the occupier’s consent in writing to enter 
and search the house is a mere formality, because if the 
occupier withholds his consent, or if ingress cannot be 
gained peacefully, the house may be broken into; and once 
inside, the policeman or gendarme may break out to free 
himself.
The law ordains that at the completion of a 
search an inventory must be made of all the objects seized 
and must be signed by the occupier of the premises and the 
police. Should the occupier of the house refuse to sign 
the police must make a note of the refusal. The seized 
objects must then be taken away and carefully preserved 
until conclusion of the trial. Perishable articles or 
things of noxious character may however be disposed of
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forthwith. In practice seized objects are seldom pro-
65perly preserved. Any police officer or gendarme
about to conduct a search must himself be searched before 
and after the search to ensure that the officer does not 
plant any incriminating evidence. In practice occupiers 
of premises never search officers who conduct searches 
in their premises or homes. This is partly because of 
fear and partly because of ignorance.
A suspect’s person may also be searched. Police 
and gendarmes call this kind of search la palpation. It 
is normally carried out by two officers, one facing the 
suspect and searching him while his colleague stands by 
ready to intervene if necessary. The officer doing the 
search feels the suspect’s pockets, his back, legs, body, 
etc. Sometimes the suspect is made to- stand facing a 
wall with his hands held up while the search goes on. This 
is a familiar scene to anyone who has watched a police film. 
The suspect's luggage (suitcase, brief-case, bag, etc.) 
may also be opened and searched. The suspect may even 
be required to undress. He may even be compulsorily sub­
jected to an operation or anaesthesia. Samples of saliva, 
blood, and a piece of skin or hair may also be taken.
Much would depend on the State Prosecutor and the medical 
advice given by the doctor. A State Prosecutor will not
65. Cf. s. 190 of the Penal Code which makes it an offence 
to misappropriate, destroy or damage any attached or 
garnished property.
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insist on an operation or anaesthesia if a medical doctor 
advises against it on physiological grounds.
There is a special form of search known as
6 6la rafle, that is, a cordon and search operation. It
is a system of nocturnal police raids carried out in any 
town or part thereof in which the police hope to find 
criminals or stolen property. Sometimes the operation 
is carried out by a combined force of the police, gendarmes 
and the army. The time when the operation is usually 
carried out is the early hours of the morning when every­
one is in bed and after the area of the search has been 
cordoned off. The forces of law and order knock on each 
door and order the occupants of the house out at gun 
point. Everyone is marched into an open space, usually 
a football field, and ordered to sit on the wet grass or 
ground. If anyone tries to ask any questions or tries to 
linger he receives the butt of the gun or a good beating. 
Each individual may be ordered to produce papers such as 
laissez-passer (now abolished), fiche d ’impot, carte 
nationale d ’identitg, carte du parti, and facture (i.e. 
receipt for any allegedly suspicious property found in your 
house). If he fails to do so, he is taken to the police 
station and locked up. Brutality is often rife during
66. This procedure is a survival of a technique frequently 
used by the army in former East Cameroun in fighting 
against ’terrorism’. Much the same technique is still 
employed by the police and the army in Rhodesia and 
South Africa.
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the conduct of these raids, even though each operation 
is supposed to be carried out in accordance with certain 
police guidelines which prohibit the use of brutality.
D . Eavesdropping
One method of criminal investigation which the
police, especially the plain clothes branch, have always
resorted to is the use of espionage systems to give them
surveillance over probable sources of' criminal activity.
The agent provocateur, the detective in disguise, the paid
informer, wire-tapping and other means of electronic sur-
68veillance all represent methods of eavesdropping. This
practice constitutes a dangerous inroad into privacy and 
the extent to which the police in Cameroon resort to it 
is not altogether clear. It does not seem that the police 
have developed techniques of electronic surveillance such 
as telephone interception, telephone tapping, and the use 
of microphones, recorders and shortwave transmitters.
They probably rely heavily on the use of paid informers, the 
detective in mufti and, to a lesser degree, on agents
67. This operation has been condemned in Anglophone Cameroon 
as revolting and horrifying. It is one of those things 
that has contributed to the Anglophone prejudice 
against gendarmes. In their eyes, the ubiquitous, 
armed and red-bereted gendarme is a symbol of cruelty 
and brute force.
68. George Dobry, 'Wire-tapping and eavesdropping: a com­
parative study’, J.I.C.J., vol. I, No. 2, 1958, p. 319.
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provocateurs. These practices are evidently viewed as 
a variant of search and seizure procedures which the 
police are by law authorised to carry out. However, 
one method of eavesdropping which has caused a great 
deal of concern is police interference with private com­
munications - letters, telephone conversations, tele­
graphic messages - although in Cameroon such interference 
is probably of limited scale.
In Cameroon it is by no means clear whether 
the police have any powers under the law to tamper with 
private communications. The right to privacy and secrecy 
of correspondence is guaranteed under the Constitution.
But this guarantee is not absolute. The preamble to the 
Constitution enacts:
"The privacy of all correspondence is 
inviolate. No interference shall be 
allowed except by virtue of decisions 
emanating from the judicial authorities.M
The import of this provision is that, although the privacy
of all correspondence is said to be inviolate, it may in
fact be interfered with. However,' such interference may
only be done under court orders. Thus, provided the
police have a court order to that effect they can always
69interfere with any correspondence. In fact the powers
69. Section 300 of the Penal Code makes tampering with
correspondence a criminal offence by punishing with a 
maximum sentence of one year’s imprisonment and a fine 
of one hundred thousand frances ’whoever without per­
mission from the addressee destroys, conceals or opens 
another's correspondence’. However, this provision 
does not apply as between spouses, to parents in res­
pect of their children under 21 years of age and uneman­
cipated, or to guardians or persons responsible by 
custom in respect of their wards. Furthermore, clearly 
a policeman who tampers with any correspondence after 
having been authorised by the court to do so, commits 
no offence.
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of search and seizure given to the police judiciaire, the
Procureur de la Republique, and the juge d finstruction
70under the Code d fInstruction Criminelle are generally 
considered to extend to the postal, telephone and tele­
graphic services.
The invention of the telegraph in 1844 and the 
telephone in 1876 put into the hands of the police the 
world over an important means of crime investigation.
The police argue that this form of criminal investigation 
is considerably effective in the detection of major crimes, 
especially offences against the security of the state. 
Odious, invidious and obnoxious as the practice of opening 
letters is, it is justified by the need to protect the 
State against the misuse of postal facilities by subver­
sive elements, ill-disposed persons and other criminals.
But desirable as this form of criminal investigation may 
be, it should be subject to strict procedural safeguards.
To ensure that there is no threat in it to the liberty 
of the individual, it should be carefully restricted to 
special and well-defined circumstances and purposes, and 
hedged about with clearly formulated rules and subject to 
very special safeguards. The police should be specifi­
cally prohibited from intercepting any communication
71without a High Court order or authorisation, except in an
70. C.I.C., ss. 8-10, 35, 87-89.
71. The magistrates who staff the Courts of First Instance 
are young and untested in the profession and it would 
not be safe to entrust this responsibility to them.
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obvious case of urgency, upon an ex parte application.
The application must be supported by affidavit stating 
that reasonable grounds exist to believe that evidence 
of crime may be thus obtained; identifying, in the case 
of wiretapping, the telephone line; and describing the 
person or persons whose communications are to be inter­
cepted and the purpose of the interception. The law 
should make a court warrant to intercept communication 
available only in cases of treason, espionage, armed 
revolt, customs fraud, and offences against the security 
of the state. Interference of communication in these 
cases is justifiable on the basis that those offences 
threaten the very existence of the nation. All unauthorised 
tampering with communication and other scientific and tech­
nological devices for electronic surveillance should be 
made a criminal offence. Furthermore, evidence obtained 
illegally by interference with communication should be 
made inadmissible in court.
E . The preliminary inquiry
There are certain offences which, because of 
their complexity and gravity, are required by law to be 
the subject of a preliminary examination by a judicial 
officer before actual trial (if the evidence warrants 
such a trial). In former East Cameroun such offences 
were ’felonies’ and serious ’misdemeanours’ and the 
inquiry was conducted, in accordance with the relevant
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72provisions of the Code d ’Instruction Criminelle, by a
special magistrate, le juge d ’instruction, appointed
73from among substantive judges. In former West Cameroon
every ’indictable offence’ was the subject of a prelim­
inary inquiry (sometimes called a ’committal proceeding’ 
or a ’preliminary investigation’) conducted by a Magis­
trate in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
74Criminal Procedure Ordinance. Under both codes the
preliminary inquiry is designed to act as a filtering pro­
cess to safeguard innocent persons from being sent for 
trial on insufficient evidence. The task of the investi­
gating officer is not to decide whether the accused is 
guilty, for that would amount to a usurpation of the 
function of the trial judge. His task is simply to 
decide whether the evidence is sufficient to send the 
accused to stand trial.
In August 1972 the juge d ’instruction was 
abolished and the powers to conduct preliminary inquiries 
was taken away from the bench and vested in the legal 
department. Section 24(1)(b) of the 1972 Judicial
Organisation Ordinance provides that the legal department
72. C.I.C., Book I, Chapters 6-9.
73. Ibid., s . 56.
74. C.P.O., Part 36.
75. Ordinance No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972 (Judicial Organi­
sation) as amended by Ordinance No. 72/21 of 19 
October 1972, ss. 24-29.
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"shall, in criminal matters and without prejudice to the 
rights of the civil party, investigate and record offences, 
undertake judicial inquiries and investigations ...”
The abolition of the juge d Tinstruction and the vesting 
of his powers and functions in the legal department was 
presumably designed to remedy the rather awkward situation 
whereby the juge d Tinstruction came under the supervision 
of the Procureur General when conducting a judicial inves­
tigation. Under the C.I.C. the independence of the juge 
d 1 instruction was more theoretical than real. The 
inquiry he conducted was seen as nothing more than the 
exercise of judicial police functions. So, in his capa­
city as judicial police officer the juge d Tinstruction
came under the control and supervision of the Procureur 
7
General. Furthermore, where there were more than one
juges d ’instruction attached to a particular court, it 
was the Procureur General who distributed the case-files 
among them at his discretion. He decided which case- 
file went to which juge d*instruction and he could with­
draw a case-file from a juge d 1 instruction he thought was 
incompetent. Besides, the Procureur General easily domi­
nated young magistrates appointed juges d * instruction.
Old habits die hard and so vestiges of this 
situation are still to be found in Francophone Cameroon. 
Section 27(1) of the Judicial Organisation Ordinance
76. C.I.C., ss. 57, 279.
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provides that as a temporary measure (how ’temporary’ is 
another matter) ’’the functions of State Counsel, parti­
cularly as regards the judicial investigations and pro­
ceedings in first instance,-may be assumed, under the 
control and direction of the Procureur General of the 
Court of Appeal, by the President of the Court of First 
Instance, or by a judicial officer delegated for this 
purpose” . This means that the presiding magistrate of 
a Court of First Instance may also act as investigating 
magistrate and as State Prosecutor. In other words, he 
conducts the preliminary inquiry, prefers the charge, 
prosecutes and sits in judgment. An analogous situation
obtains under the Indian and the Northern Nigerian Codes
7 6 fo i sof Criminal Procedure, and in Sudanese Criminal Law.
The Judicial Organisation Ordinance spells out 
certain common provisions relating to the conduct of pre­
liminary inquiries whether in Anglophone or Francophone 
Cameroon. A preliminary inquiry or judicial investi­
gation is conducted in camera (exceptionally in public)
77by the State Prosecutor assisted by a court registrar.
It is compulsory in the case of felonies and optional in
7 fi
the case of misdemeanours and simple offences. However,
76bis. Abdullahi Ahmed el-Naiem, ’The many hats of the 
Sudanese magistrate: role conflict in Sudanese cri­
minal law’, J.A.L., vol. 22, No. 1, 1978, p. 50.
77- Judicial Organisation Ordinance 1972, s. 24(4).
78. Cameroonian criminal law divides all breaches of the 
law into three - felonies, misdemeanours, and simple 
offences. Any offence carrying the death penalty or 
a penalty of over ten years’ loss of liberty, is a
/Continued over
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there are certain offences (both felonies and misde­
meanours) in respect of which no judicial investigation 
may be undertaken at all. The offences in question are 
listed in Ordinance No. 72/17 of 28 September 1972 on the 
repression of acts of lawlessness. They are: vagrancy,
cheque without cover, immoral earnings, simple theft, 
aggravated theft, aggravated misappropriation and false 
pretences, receiving, prostitution, corruption of youth,
indecency to children under sixteen, indecency to minor
79between sixteen and twenty-one, and homosexuality.
In any of these offences the suspect is obligatorily 
referred to the competent court for summary trial without 
any preliminary inquiry whatsoever. These offences 
carry heavy penalties (some, like aggravated theft carrying 
the death penalty, and others, like rape of a child under 
the age of sixteen carry a penalty of between fifteen and 
twenty five years’ imprisonment) and it is amazing that 
the law should ordain that they be tried summarily and 
without any preliminary inquiry having been held. The 
government however justifies this piece of legislation on
Footnote 78 continued from page 932.
felony; any offence punishable with loss of liberty 
for from ten days to ten years and/or with a fine of 
more than 25,000 francs, is a misdemeanour; a simple 
offence is an offence punishable with imprisonment 
for up to ten days or with fine of up to 25,000 francs. 
See s. 21 of the Penal Code. Simple offences are them­
selves divided into a first, second, third and fourth 
class. See s. 362 of the Penal Code.
79. Penal Code, ss. 247, 253, 294, 318, 320, 321, 324, 343, 
344, 346, 347 and 3^7bis respectively.
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the ground that the incidence of these crimes has in 
recent years increased to alarming proportions. Summary 
trial is expeditious with few defence guarantees and the 
accused does not in fact get a ’proper’ trial; besides, 
the trial proceeds as though the accused were already 
presumed guilty.
Section 29(1) of the Judicial Organisation Ordi­
nance provides that preliminary inquiries shall continue 
to be governed, in the Anglophone Provinces, by the 
Criminal Procedure Code, and in the Francophone Provinces, 
by the Code d ’Instruction Criminelle, in all their pro­
visions that are not contrary to the provisions of the 
Judicial Organisation Ordinance. Under the C.P.O. a 
preliminary inquiry is conducted like a normal trial before 
a court. It takes place in public (sometimes in camera 
if the magistrate deems it proper) and the procedure is 
adversary. The suspect is present with his witnesses 
and counsel (if any). A preliminary inquiry cannot, 
under the C.P.O., be held in respect of an unknown person. 
The accused must be known and he must be available to 
defend himself if he chooses to. Proceedings begin with 
a short address by the prosecution explaining the nature 
of the evidence against the accused and how this evidence 
indicates the offence charged. The prosecutor submits to 
the magistrate all the evidence then available to him 
which he thinks it is likely he will call on trial. The 
prosecution is required to adduce enough evidence to make
935.
out a prima facie case, that is, evidence sufficient, 
without anything said by the accused or his witnesses, to 
support a conviction by the trial court. The defence may 
or may not cross-examine prosecution witnesses to extract 
material useful at the trial.
At the conclusion of the prosecution evidence, 
the defence may make a no case submission; that is, a 
submission that the evidence produced by the prosecution 
is not of sufficient weight to warrant committing the 
accused for trial. Such a submission would be appro­
priate where the prosecution have failed to produce any 
evidence to establish an essential element of the offence 
and where the prosecution evidence is so weak or has been 
so discredited by cross-examination that no reasonable 
trial court could convict the accused. If at the close 
of the prosecution case the magistrate is of the opinion 
that a prima facie case has been made out against the 
accused, he makes a ruling to that effect and addresses 
him in these words: "Do you wish to say anything in
answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say anything 
unless you desire to do so, but whatever you say will be 
taken down in writing and may be given in evidence upon 
your trial".
The defence may then make a statement and call 
in defence witnesses who may in turn be cross-examined by 
the prosecution. Accused persons who are unrepresented 
often put in a defence. Where there is a defence counsel
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he may consider it wasted effort and tactically unwise 
to offer a defence at this stage unless he believes such 
a defence to be so strong as to compel the accused’s 
discharge. If the magistrate is of the opinion that 
the evidence against the accused is not sufficient to put 
him on his trial, the accused is discharged as to the 
particular charge under inquiry. But such a discharge 
is not a bar to any subsequent charge in respect of the 
same facts. On the other hand if the magistrate con­
siders the evidence sufficient to put the accused on his 
trial, he commits him for trial at the High Court.
The mechanics of conducting preliminary inquiries 
is that the evidence of each witness is reduced to the 
form of a deposition. It is taken down verbatim in long 
hand by the magistrate, and then read over to the witness 
by the magistrate. At the conclusion of the testimony 
the deposition is signed by the witness. Depositions 
provide the material on which the -indictment is based; 
they enable the trial judge to have a preview of the case
before the trial starts (serving in this respect the same
purpose as the dossier in the non-adversary system of 
criminal procedure); they reduce the chances of witnesses 
altering their testimony; they are useful to the defence 
because they reveal the prosecution’s case; they may be 
used to impeach a witness by showing prior inconsistent 
statements; and they are useful in a case where a witness
dies or becomes otherwise unavailable for trial.
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After the preliminary inquiries are concluded 
the prosecution drafts and files a formal accusation 
called an information or indictment, containing the 
charges against the accused who is then ’tried on infor­
mation’ . The information may contain more than one 
charge and charge more than one person with the same or 
different offences. Each offence charged in the infor­
mation is set out in a separate paragraph and is known as 
a ’count’. A count must contain (i) a statement of 
the offence alleged, with a reference to the section of 
the written law against which the offence is alleged to 
have been committed, (ii) a statement of the time and 
place of commission of the offence and any person or thing 
in relation to whom or which the offence is alleged to 
have been committed, and (iii) such other particulars 
as are necessary to give the accused sufficient notice of 
the matter with which he is charged.
The basic function of the preliminary inquiry 
under the C.P.O. is to provide an early and independent 
check on the initial decision of the police to prosecute, 
thus ensuring that an innocent person is not sent for 
trial on spurious and insufficient evidence. Histori­
cally however, the original purpose of the preliminary 
inquiry in England was rather different. In England, 
before there was an efficient police force, the justices 
of the peace took it upon themselves to investigate serious 
offences and interrogate suspects. The preliminary
938.
inquiry was in fact an investigative tool by which justices 
of the peace might examine a suspect to see what evidence 
they could extract from and against him and to preserve 
it for trial. In a sense they acted like the French 
juge d Tinstruction. The grant of a statutory right to 
accused persons to remain silent before the courts and 
the establishment of a modern police force trained in the 
investigation of crime destroyed the inquisitorial 
functions of the justices of the peace and made it unneces­
sary for them to supervise criminal investigations. With 
the differentiation of the functions of the justices of 
the peace from those of the police, the preliminary 
inquiry became a device for protecting an accused against 
unfounded accusations.
Now, under the Code d 1 Instruction Criminelle, 
the preliminary inquiry is inquisitorial in nature and 
must be held in camera. The accused need not be present.
A preliminary inquiry under the C.I.C. may be opened 
against an unknown person and it would be the duty of the 
juge d Tinstruction in such a case to establish, from the 
evidence available to him, the identity of the offender. 
When the juge d Tinstruction conducts a preliminary inquiry 
he is said be seised in rem and in personam. The pro­
cedure before the investigating magistrate is essentially
written. The State Prosecutor (or his assistant) may
80pop in, deposit his memorandum and then withdraw.
80. C.I.C., ss. 223-224.
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Neither the accused nor the civil party is heard perso-
81nally; they may only present written memoranda. The
preliminary inquiry is conceived as a device for criminal 
investigation.
The juge d 1 instruction constituted what was known 
as a juridiction d * instruction du premier degre, while the 
chambre de mise en accusation was a juridiction d'instruction 
du second degre (it re-examined the matter already investi­
gated by the juge d 1 instruction and decided whether the 
accused should be put on trial). In the event of suffi­
cient evidence, the chambre de mise en accusation committed
the accused for trial at the cour d Tassise by issuing an
8 2arr§t de mise en accusation. The chambre de mise en
accusation and the cour d Tassise no longer exist. When 
the State Prosecutor closes a preliminary inquiry, he may, 
by virtue of s. 24(7) of the Judicial Organisation Ordi­
nance, make one of three orders - refer the case to the 
Court of First Instance (if the evidence discloses that 
the alleged offence is a misdemeanour), or refer the case 
to the High Court (if the evidence discloses that the 
alleged offence is a felony), or direct that there is no 
ground for prosecution (if there is no evidence or the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a charge).
In a sense, when the State Prosecutor is con­
ducting a preliminary inquiry, he is acting both as judge
81 . Ibid., s. 217.
82. Ibid., ss. 217-219.
and prosecutor. Although he does not convict (he has no 
power to do so) he does decide whether there Is enough 
evidence to warrant a prosecution or not. Since the 
State Prosecutor has absolute discretion whether to prose­
cute in any matter or not his having to conduct a preli­
minary inquiry would seem an unnecessary procedure. 
Preliminary inquiry or not the State Prosecutor has to 
decide in every case whether to prosecute or not.
Besides, it is extremely odd that the crucial task of 
determining whether the accused should be committed for 
trial or not should be entrusted in the hands of one of 
the parties to the case (i.e. the State Prosecutor). 
Furthermore, what the State Prosecutor does under the dis­
guise of a preliminary inquiry is in fact conduct an 
inquisition. In fact the philosophy behind the present 
preliminary inquiry is that it is a mechanism for investi­
gating crime and not as a safeguard to ensure that the 
citizen is not subjected to the ordeal of a criminal trial 
except on evidence of sufficient weight to satisfy a 
magistrate that there is a case to answer.
II. Prosecutorial Discretion
The philosophy underlying prosecution is that 
anti-social conduct must be punished. Since anti-social 
conduct threatens the very fabric of society, the repres­
sion of such conduct is a matter of public interest for
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society as a whole. So the right to exact punishment 
or to refrain from doing so is the sole prerogative of 
society or the state. But since society or the state 
can only act through natural persons, the power to prose­
cute any anti-social conduct is delegated by the State to 
certain qualified persons in the.community. Such per­
sons are styled ’public prosecutors’ or ’state prosecutors’ 
for their job is to prosecute all breaches of the
O o
criminal law on behalf of the public at large. Having
stepped into the shoes of the community, the public prose­
cutor exercises discretion whether or not to prosecute
in any given case. In Cameroon, there is no rule of com-
84pulsory prosecution. All proseuctions are governed by
85the opportunity des poursuites principle, that is, the
83. In some jurisdictions there are no state prosecutors, 
prosecutions being conducted either by the police or 
private individuals. One such jurisdiction is England. 
There private prosecution (by citizens, local govern­
ment authorities, central government departments, public 
and private corporations), especially in the areas of 
theft, fraud, assault and damage to property, apparently 
still remains the order of the day. In practice there 
is a widespread reliance upon the police, who are regar­
ded as the natural and proper prosecutors of crime
with the primary responsibility of law enforcement, to 
prosecute these offences. An overwhelming bulk of 
prosecutions is therefore conducted by the police although 
some like sexual offences, require the fiat of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions.
84. Germany has a rule of compulsory prosecution, the 
LegalitcLt sprinzip . Under this principle the public 
prosecutor is required to take action against all judi­
cially punishable acts, to the extent that there is a 
sufficient factual basis (s. 152(2), German Code of 
Criminal Procedure).
85. The same principle obtains in France, Italy and Holland.
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principle of expediency or advisability. This rule is 
the opposite of another one, la legal!te des poursul't'es 
(literally, the legality of prosecutions; better, the 
rule of compulsory prosecution). Under the principle 
of expediency the State Prosecutor has the power to pass 
on the sufficiency of the evidence, to determine the 
adequacy of incriminating evidence and to decide whether 
to prosecute any given matter or not.
This principle evidently stems from the convic­
tion that no society will tolerate a rule of compulsory 
prosecution which is absolute and so relentless that the 
State Prosecutor were required to institute criminal 
proceedings in every case, no matter how weak the incri­
minating evidence. The State Prosecutor must therefore 
have the power to evaluate the evidence in advance of 
instituting a prosecution. If he- is convinced that a 
suspect’s conduct did not violate the criminal law or that 
the evidence cannot persuade the court of the suspect’s 
guilt, he serves the social interest by not wasting 
resources on a futile and frivolous criminal trial and by 
not subjecting the defendant to its many discomforts.
The State Prosecutor is mortal and may err in his exercise 
of his power of non-prosecution. He may misinterpret 
the law. He may misevaluate the cogency of the evidence. 
But this is a routine hazard of decision-making. It 
does not call into doubt the wisdom of allowing the prose­
cutor to decide.
As a general rule, the Cameroonian State
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Prosecutor monopolises the institution and conduct of
86prosecutions. But he does not monopolise the discre­
tion whether to prosecute or not. He shares that dis­
cretion with the Minister of Justice, his boss. Each 
exercises this discretion in a given area: prosecutorial
discretion in matters relating to State security and in 
matters involving high government officials, senior civil 
servants or other 'important* members of the community 
is exercised by the Minister of Justice; prosecutorial 
discretion in all other cases is exercised by the State 
Prosecutor.
1. Prosecutorial discretion exercised by the Justice 
Minister
In common everyday cases the State Prosecutor 
himself decides whether to prosecute or not but in other 
cases such a decision is taken by the Minister of Justice. 
Whenever the Minister of Justice decides that there must 
be a prosecution in respect of a certain matter, the State
86. Police and gendarme officers continue to prosecute in 
some Courts of First Instance in Anglophone Cameroon. 
But this is only a temporary measure pending the avai­
lability of more State Prosecutors. Section 27 of the 
Judicial Organisation Ordinance 1972 provides, "In cer­
tain parts of the national territory, the competent 
Procureur General may, when there are not sufficient 
Legal Officers, designate certain judicial police 
officers who, under his direction and control, shall 
conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute 
offences before the Courts of First Instance".
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Prosecutor must abide by the Minister’s decision and 
institute criminal proceedings irrespective of his own 
views on the case. Conversely, where the Minister decides 
against prosecution the State Prosecutor must drop the 
matter, his own views notwithstanding. The Minister’s 
discretion to decide in favour of or against prosecution 
is absoulte and is exercised whether there be compelling 
evidence to warrant prosecution or not. The Minister 
need not give any reasons for having decided one way or 
the other. No law however empowers the Minister of Jus­
tice to exercise prosecutorial discretion. His power 
to do so apparently arises from his position as the overall 
head of all the State Prosecutors in the country and is 
traceable to Circular No. 11 of 16 April 1962 from the 
Minister of Justice to all State Prosecutors in the country. 
This Circular, the subject matter of which is 'Hierarchical 
authority of the Minister of Justice - obligation to 
inform’, reads in full:
"In the interest of a better coordination 
of the Public Prosecution and in order to 
enable me give you all the necessary 
instructions as to the submissions that 
I would like you to develop in courts, I 
would like you, in the future, to inform 
me of all the matters which would appear 
to you to be of a certain importance, 
namely:
(a) Matters relating to the security of 
the State and to the repression of 
subversive activities
(b) All matters involving -
(i) parliamentarians, ex-parliamen­
tarians, mayors, and traditional 
chiefs
(ii) senior district officers, dis­
trict officers, and all high ran­
king civil servants as a whole
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(iii) law officers as a whole and those 
with the status of law officers
(c) Matters which, though falling under
common law jurisdiction, present an excep­
tional character of gravity (I.e., mutiny 
among different ethnic groups.
The reports concerning such matters must be 
sent to me by the Procureurs Generaux, either 
by letter or by telegram,' depending on the 
urgency of the matter, or even verbally or 
by telephone. Later on, even without a 
special order, they will have to send perio­
dical and detailed reports to me on the 
evolution of those matters reported by them­
selves or by the Minister.
The Procureurs de la Rgpublique and the pre­
siding judges/magistrates in charge of public 
prosecution will themselves have to inform 
their Procureur General in the same way as 
above.
In case of matters of a very exceptional 
urgency and gravity, the examining magis­
trates are authorized to submit such matters 
directly to the Minister provided they 
inform their Procureur General in the same 
time.
I would like the prescriptions of this 
letter, the receipt of which I would like 
you to acknowledge, to be strictly respected."
Some years later, the Acting Procureur General
for the then West Cameroon explained the tenor of the
above circular to all ’Federal Counsels’ in West Cameroon
as follows:
"It follows that as soon as you have been 
assigned a case file which deals with any 
of the classes of persons mentioned in 
the Circular and you come to the conclusion 
that a prosecution should be instituted, 
you should immediately draw my attention 
to that fact so that the approval of the 
Minister can be sought. Of course if 
there is no evidence to warrant a prose­
cution, an opinion to that effect will be 
given outright to the police and that
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will be the end of the matter.
The Minister exercises his prosecutorial discretion
in matters involving persons in the higher strata of
Cameroonian society and in practice he seldom decides
that the persons involved should be prosecuted. This
explains why generally the people who appear in courts in
Cameroon to stand criminal charges are almost always those
in the lower rung of society. This does not mean that
persons in the upper class never commit offences. They
certainly do. What happens is that they are, generally ^
8 8hardly ever prosecuted. In one road accident case
involving a legal practitioner, permission was sought by
the State Prosecutor from the Minister to charge and
prosecute the offender for reckless and dangerous driving
under s. 228(2)(d) of the Penal Code. The Minister
refused to give his fiat. ”J ’ai pris connaissance de
votre■rapport de reference," the Minister minuted, ret
89estime inopportunes des poursuites d ’office ...” In
another case, a representative of the now defunct West
87. See, Letter dated 28 December 1970 from Mr Nyo Wakai, 
Acting Procureur General for West Cameroon, to ’All 
Federal Counsels in West Cameroon’.
88. There are always exceptions however as may be seen from 
the 1973 Affaire de la Huitieme Coupe. The case kind­
led a great deal of local interest primarily because 
most of the defendants were members in the higher strata 
of society - Ministers, Bank Directors, higher civil 
servants, big businessmen, and so on.
89. LB.CON. 41/3 of 10 March 1971, Atabong Fidelis v. Klett 
Charles, Ministry of Justice, Dos. No. 102.530/DAJS/MJ.
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Cameroon Legislative Assembly caused a fatal accident at 
Banga. Permission was sought to charge and prosecute 
under sections 289(1) and 228(2)(d) of the Penal Code as 
well as under Regulation 36(2)(1) of the Road Traffic 
Regulations 1948 as amended by the Road Traffice (Amend­
ment No. 2) Regulations, 1962. Taking into account, no 
doubt, the privilege which the Representative enjoyed from
prosecution without the authority of the Legislative 
90Assembly the Minister declined to authorise any prose­
cution. "J’estime pour ma part," he wrote, "qu'il n Ty a 
pas lieu d ’engager d Toffice les poursuites dans cette
affaire et, d ’en laisser l’initiative eventuelle cl ceux qui
91sTestimeraient lesds." The Minister gave a similar
direction in a road accident case involving a district 
92officer and also in another case in which a local chief 
in Kumba, accompanied by his traditional council, went to 
farms owned by farmers of the Bamildke tribe and destroyed 
valuable economic crops on the ostensible ground that per­
mission to farm on the land had not been sought from the
90. By virtue of s . 2 of Ordinance No. 62/OP/15 of 12 
March 1962 as amended by Ordinance No. 62/OF/2 of 31 
March 1962 as further amended by s . 1 of Ordinance 
No. 62/OF/23 of 31 March 1962.
91. LB.CON.41/8 of 19 August 1971* Hon. Etame George, 
Ministry of Justice, Dos. No. 102.993/CF/DAJS/MJ.
92. LB.CON.41/27 of 2 October 1974, David Nde Fosah, 
Ministry of Justice, Letter of 29 April 1974.
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93traditional council.
Sometimes however, the Minister instructs the
State Prosecutor to take appropriate measures in a given
case, subject to giving him (the Minister) a subsequent
94
account of the progress of the case and its outcome.
Where criminal proceedings have already been instituted 
the State Prosecutor may still be instructed to dis­
continue the same. On 16 December 1975 a fatal accident 
was caused along the Likomba Hill through the reckless 
driving of a Provincial Inspector of Labour. He was 
charged in the Tiko Court of First Instance under s. 289(1) 
of the Penal Code. The Secretary General at the Ministry 
of Justice instructed the Procureur General, "Vous voudrez 
bein prescrire a votre substitut de Tiko, de ne requerir 
qu’une peine de principe a l ’audience” . The Minister’s 
instructions followed afterwards: "You are requested by
virtue of s. 10(1)(b)(new) of Law No. 66/LF/3 of the 10 
June 1966, to discontinue the criminal proceedings ...
You are further requested to make a report to me accor­
dingly.” Whereupon the Procureur General entered a
95nolle prosequi in respect of the case.
93. LB.CON.41/26 of 29 May 1974, The People v. Chief 
Victor Mukete & 13 Ors, Ministry of Justice, Letter 
of 27 April 1976.
94. LB.CON.4l/l4 of 10 October 1972, The People v. Chief 
J.B. Mokambe & 3 Ors, Ministry of Justice, Dos. No. 
104.090/DAJS/MJ. Defendants were charged with cor­
ruption but discharged and acquitted by the Kumba 
Magistrate’s Court: Ref. LBK.l/SCT/171.
95. LB.CON.43/37 of 3 April 1975, The People v. Effoudou 
Lombe Henri Gustave, Ministry of Justice, Dos. No. 
107/366/DAJS/MJ.
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In a case of embezzlement, the Minister would
often direct that the offender should be ordered to repay
the moneys embezzled. In one case, the branch manager
of a local bank was alleged to have misappropriated the
sum of 400,&80 francs cfa. The Minister gave the following
instruction to the Procureur General: "You are requested
to call on the offender to settle, within a period of two
months, running from the date of your request, the sum of
400,880 francs which he misappropriated failing which he
96would be prosecuted". But sometimes the Minister does
instruct the State Prosecutor to prosecute. So in one
case involving an assistant district officer (a case of
forgery sparked off by the publication of an article in
the Cameroon Outlook of 14 July 1976 and captioned fBig
Government Officer in Certificate Forgery with Sexy Girl1),
97the offenders were eventually prosecuted and convicted.
In another case, a Frenchman on technical assistance 
attached to the Police Training Centre, Mutengene, drove 
recklessly along the Mutengene-Tiko road and killed two 
pedestrians. The Minister gave the green light for him 
to be prosecuted under ss. 225(2)(d) and 289(1) of the 
Penal Code.^
96. LB.CON.4l/51 of 6 September 1976, The People v. Lucas 
Away Nyambi.
97- LB.CON.4l/57 of 1 December 1976, The People v. Wotany 
Sally Mojoko, Diyen Isidore, Case File No. CID.158/76
98. LB.CON.41/65 of 17 May 1977, The People v. Claudel 
Martial, Tiko Police, case No"! RRA* 47/76 .
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2. Prosecutorial discretion exercised by the State 
Prosecutor
The State Prosecutor exercises absolute prose­
cutorial discretion in all matters other than those 
listed in the 1962 Circular. He decides whether to 
prosecute or not. It makes no difference that the evi­
dence before him is sufficient or insufficient to warrant 
prosecution or no prosecution. No law requires the State 
Prosecutor to prosecute all charges for which there is 
sufficient evidence to justify a conviction. In theory 
therefore, the State Prosecutor may decline to prosecute 
even in a case of provable criminal liability. No one 
else may make good his refusal to prosecute. In practice 
however, State Prosecutors generally prosecute where there 
is enough evidence to sustain a prosecution.
The State Prosecutor is free to select, and does 
in fact select, among cases those he shall press and those 
not. He in fact picks and chooses which laws he will 
enforce and against which violators. Much depends on 
the degree of the social harm done. It may be small or 
insignificant. For example, cases of vulgar abuse 
(s. 307, s.R.367(9)), petty thefts, petty family squabbles, 
urinating in public (cf. s. 263), abuse in respect of 
bride price (s. 357), prostitution (s. 343), encumbering 
the highway (s.R.367(5)), begging (s. 245), and wagering 
(s. 249) are hardly ever prosecuted. As a general rule,
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the State Prosecutor alone prepares the charge, initiates 
criminal proceedings and conducts the prosecution. When 
he decides not to prosecute and closes the case-file, he 
is not obliged by any law to state the reasons for his 
action although in practice he generally writes down his 
reasons for closing a file. When a case has gone to 
court, the State Prosecutor in Anglophone Cameroon may 
compromise (for example, by way of plea bargaining), dis­
continue proceedings (for example, by entering a nolle 
prosequi), or insist on a full trial irrespective of the 
trial judge’s view of the case. However, the Cameroonian 
State Prosecutor exercises his prosecutorial discretion 
j udiciously.
A . Extent of prosecutorial discretion in Anglophone and 
Francophone Cameroon
In Francophone Cameroon, the opportunity des 
poursuites principle comes into play before the trial 
when the State Prosecutor has to decide whether to prose­
cute or not. When the decision to prosecute has been 
taken and a charge has been preferred in court, the prin­
ciple becomes inapplicable. The State Prosecutor cannot, 
for reasons of expediency, ask the court to discharge and 
acquit or throw out the case. Once the matter has gone 
to court, it must take its normal course, and it is for 
the trial judge to determine the issue of guilt or non­
guilt, whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted,
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although the Prosecutor has a right to indicate what he 
thinks the sentence of the court should be.
In Anglophone Cameroon, by contrast, prosecu­
torial discretion may be exercised even when a matter 
has already gone to court. The Prosecutor may plea- 
bargain or enter a nolle prosequi. The power to enter a 
nolle prosequi is derived from ss. 73-75 of the Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance which deals with the power of the 
Prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi in criminal cases 
at any stage of the proceedings before judgment. A nolle 
prosequi is entered if the Prosecutor states in court or 
informs the court in writing that the state intends that 
the proceedings shall not continue. The effect of a 
nolle prosequi is that the accused is at once discharged 
in respect of the charge or information for which the nolle 
prosequi is entered. If the accused has been committed 
to prison, he is released. If he is on bail the recog­
nizances are discharged. However, where an accused 
person has been so discharged, the discharge does not 
operate as a bar to any subsequent proceedings against him 
on account of the same facts. The State Prosecutor may 
also enter a nolle prosequi in committal cases. But the 
entry of a nolle prosequi in respect of an information 
filed after committal for trial is no bar for the filing 
later of a fresh information based on the same order of 
committal for trial.
Section 75(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 
empowers the State Prosecutor, in any trial or inquiry 
before a Magistrate’s Court, to withdraw, at any time
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before judgment is pronounced and with the consent of 
the court, from the prosecution of any person. The effect 
of such a withdrawal is that the accused is discharged 
in respect of the offence. But such a discharge does 
not operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings against the 
accused on account of the same facts. A complainant too 
may, with the court’s permission, at any time before a 
final order is made, withdraw his complaint under s. 284 
of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. The complainant 
must however satisfy the court that there are sufficient 
grounds for permitting him to withdraw the complaint.
The effect of such a withdrawal is that the accused is 
acquitted.
B . Declining to prosecute even in the face of sufficient 
evidence
There are a number of possible compelling reasons 
why, even in the face of sufficient evidence to justify 
a prosecution, the State Prosecutor may still decline to 
prosecute. The case may involve an ’important’ personality 
and the Minister has instructed the Prosecutor not to prose­
cute. Take cases of members who constitute the three 
branches of government. A member of the magistracy can­
not be arrested and prosecuted without the fiat of the 
Minister of Justice. There exists a political guarantee 
in favour of members of the legislature. Members of the 
National Assembly enjoy what has traditionally been known
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99as ’parliamentary immunity’. No member of the National
Assembly may be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, 
detained or tried because of opinions or votes by him 
in the exercise of his functions. Furthermore, a 
member of the National Assembly cannot be prosecuted for 
an offence, whether during the parliamentary session or 
not, without the authorisation of the National Assembly 
(when the House is in session) or the National Assembly 
Bureau (when the House is not sitting) . This immunity
however ceases to be effective in cases concerning the 
internal or external security of the State as defined in 
ss. 102-117 of the Penal Code, or where the parliamentarian 
is caught in flagrante delicto. The immunity also does
not cover arrests and searches. If a member of the National
Assembly commits an offence he may be arrested, searched 
and detained without the prior authorisation of the National 
Assembly. It is only when the State Prosecutor has de­
cided to prosecute that he must seek the authorisation of
the National Assembly to do so. If the Assembly refuses
99* Cf. s. 18 of the 1972 Constitution. The term is in 
fact a misnomer because it is not really a case of 
immunity but inviolability.
100. Ordinance No. 72/12 of 26 August 1972 (Regime of immu­
nity for parliamentarians of the National Assembly),
s . 1.
101. Ibid., s . 2.
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to lift the parliamentary immunity the Prosecutor cannot 
go ahead and prosecute. If the immunity is lifted, 
prosecution can only be in respect of the facts, and none 
others, contained in the resolution adopted by the Assembly.
In theory, the President of the Republic and his 
Ministers may be prosecuted for criminal offences like 
any ordinary citizen. Section 1 of the Penal Code pro­
vides that 'all persons shall be subject to the criminal 
law'. It is however extremely unlikely that the Presi­
dent of the Republic or any of his Ministers would be 
prosecuted while still in office. The situation is how­
ever different where the offence committed by the President 
or any of his Ministers is in respect of acts performed 
in the exercise of their offices. By s. 34(2) of the 
Constitution, "The Court of Impeachment shall have juris­
diction, in respect of acts performed in the exercise 
of their offices, to try the President of the Republic 
for high treason and the Prime Minister, Ministers and 
Vice-Ministers for conspiracy against the security of the 
State". The President can only be indicted following an
absolute majority vote by secret ballot of the National 
102Assembly. The Assembly's decision to charge the Presi­
dent is communicated to the Procureur General at the 
Supreme Court, who would then notify it to the president 
of the Court of Impeachment and the president of the
102. Ordinance No. 72/7 of 26 August 1972 (Court of Impeach­
ment), s. 14 .
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103Investigation Commission. After the necessary
inquiries have been made the Investigation Commission
decides, on the evidence before it, whether or not the
Head of State should be committed for trial before the
104Court of Impeachment. The initiative to commence
criminal proceedings against the Head of State is taken 
by the-National Aseembly, but the final decision whether 
there should be a prosecution or not rests with the Inves­
tigation Commission. The Prime Minister, Ministers and 
vice-Ministers charged with conspiracy against the 
security of the State are committed for trial by decree 
of the Head of State.10"*
Another situation in which the State Prosecutor 
may refuse to prosecute even where there is sufficient 
evidence to warrant such a prosecution is where the infrac­
tion is too trivial. Petty infractions (such as violations 
considered mala prohibita in American law) do not, by 
definition involve a high degree of moral guilt and the 
social harm done is generally slight. In such a case the 
State Prosecutor serves the public interest in not wasting 
time and state money prosecuting. However, public interest 
requires the prosecution of petty infractions if they are 
committed with exceptional frequency or if the accused
103. Ibid., ss. 16, 17.
104. Ibid., ss. 20-25.
105. Ibid., s. 18.
957.
charged with a petty infraction is a regular customer of 
the court.
The State Prosecutor would also refuse to prose­
cute a case which falls within those classes of case
which require the prior complaint of the victim, if such a
complaint has not been made or if it is made by someone
else other than the victim of the offence. Under the 
Penal Code, the State Prosecutor cannot prosecute in the 
following cases without the prior complaint of the persons 
therein named: persistent neglect by a civil servant (s.
151), invasion of residence (s. 299), defamation (s. 305), 
abuse (s. 307), patents (s. 328), trade-designs-pattersn 
(s. 329), incest (s. 360 - except where the incest is 
accompanied by notorious concubinage or marriage), adultery 
(s. 361), and desertion (s. 358). The reason why these 
offences may not be prosecuted without the prior complaint 
of a victim is not because of their triviality (which they 
are not) but because of the predominantly personal charac­
ter of the interests involved (moral and family consider­
ations) as well as the risk of discredit to and embarrass­
ment for the victim. However, once the complaint has been 
made, the State Prosecutor may, in the exercise of his dis­
cretion, decide whether to prosecute or not.
In certain cases, the State Prosecutor will not 
prosecute, either because the offender is immune from 
prosecution, such as in the case of theft between relatives 
(s. 323), or because the offence has been amnestied, as in
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the case of a subsequent marriage between a rapist and his 
victim (ss. 295-297, 73), or again because prosecution 
has been barred by lapse of time, as in the case of con­
tempt (s. 152) and defamation (s. 305). The Prosecutor 
will probably also not prosecute where the offender had 
acted out of a particularly laudable motive, although as 
a general rule motive does not affect criminal respon­
sibility. If the commission of an offence was prompted 
by compassion (.for example, mercy-killing) or praise­
worthy motives (for example, promotion of the social inter­
est such as helping to avert an imminent danger to the 
country), the State Prosecutor may think it expedient not 
to prosecute at all.
The State Prosecutor may also not prosecute 
where a prosecution would lead to public indignation and 
riot, as may for example happen if a 1amido or fon (i.e. 
chief) were to be prosecuted in his chiefdom. Political 
and diplomatic considerations also weigh in the State Prose­
cutor’s mind when deciding whether to prosecute or not.
More harm than good may be done to the public in proceeding 
in certain cases and circumstances.
As a general rule, the foundation of criminal
106jurisdiction in Cameroon is territoriality. In other
words the criminal law of Cameroon applies to any act or 
omission (whether by a foreigner or a Cameroonian) resident
106. Penal Code, ss. 7-9.
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107within Cameroon. However, Cameroonian courts have
jurisdiction over offences committed by Cameroonians out­
side Cameroon and foreigners resident In Cameroon but 
who committed the offence outside; subject to the proviso
that the offences are also punishable at the place of 
108commission. Cameroonians and. foreigners (If arrested
in Cameroon or extradited to it) are subject to the
criminal law of Cameroon in respect of any offence against
the security of the State or of counterfeiting the Great
109Seal or the currency of the State wherever committed.
Now, for a variety of possible reasons the prosecution 
of offences committed outside Cameroon or by foreigners 
might not be required by the public interest even though 
there may be sufficient evidence to warrant such a prose­
cution: the offence may already have been punished in a
foreign country, prosecution might jeopardise foreign 
relations, prosecution might imperil international comity, 
and so on. Even a serious offence such as treason or 
espionage may not be prosecuted at all if the Minister of 
Justice believes prosecution would be politically disadvan­
tageous to the country or that important public interests 
would present an obstacle to prosecution. For example, 
if prosecution would require devulging State secrets or
107. The tourist, passing traveller, and the man on a 
business trip do not count as residents.
108. Penal Code, s. 10.
109. Ibid., s. 8(b).
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would endanger national security, It would be foolhardy 
to prosecute.
C . Control of prosecutorial discretion
Theoretically, the State Prosecutor may be com­
pelled to prosecute where In the face of sufficient evi­
dence, he declines to do so. The victim may- himself
bring a private prosecution. In Francophone Cameroon,
the victim can compel the State Prosecutor to prosecute by 
suing civilly in the criminal court. When he does this 
the Prosecutor is bound to take over the case and prose­
cute. However, the victim Is entitled to bring a civil 
action In the criminal court only where the offence 
caused a personal and direct injury to him susceptible of 
giving rise to a constitution de partie civile. If the 
offence is one of those in which there is no victim in 
the usual sense (that is, in ’victimless’ crimes such as 
gambling, narcotics and sex offences where the criminal 
law is used to control conduct engaged in consensually), 
the ’victim’ cannot bring a private prosecution. In 
order to bring a private prosecution in Anglophone Cameroon 
the fiat of the State Prosecutor is necessary. But this 
fiat may be refused and there is no judicial review of 
such a refusal. One drawback about bringing a private 
prosecution in Cameroon is that, if the citizen prosecutor 
loses, he pays costs to the accused. This effectively
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discourages the institution of private prosecutions. 
Furthermore, once the Minister of Justice has instructed 
the State Prosecutor not to prosecute, no private prose­
cution may be brought unless the Minister says it may be. 
Again, where a private prosecution has been brought, it 
may be terminated by the Prosecutor entering a nolle 
prosequi. The citizen’s right to bring a private prose­
cution where the State Prosecutor has refused to prosecute 
is therefore more illusory than real.
A form of control over the Prosecutor’s dis­
cretion is the citizen’s right to file a formal complaint 
or petition to the Minister of Justice where the State 
Prosecutor has failed to prosecute in the face of suffi­
cient evidence. The object of such a complaint is to 
get the Minister to order the State Prosecutor to prosecute 
In practice, however, the Minister hardly ever interferes 
with the State Prosecutor’s discretion. When the com­
plaint is therefore rejected there is nothing else the 
complainant can do. In Cameroon, unlike in some countries 
there is no judicial review of the exercise of prosecu­
torial discretion. The citizen cannot bring a mandamus 
action for a judicial order to require the State Prosecutor
110. For example, in Germany. See, Joachin Hermann,
'The rule of compulsory prosecution and the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion in Germany’, 4l U.C.L.R. 
(1974), p. 468; John H. Langbein, ’Controlling prose­
cutorial discretion in Germany’, 4l U.C.L.R. (1974), 
p. 439.
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to prosecute. Even if the State Prosecutor were to be 
compelled to prosecute, there Is no safeguard against a 
possible attempt by him to sabotage at the trial a case 
he has been ordered against his will to conduct.
The only effective control over- the State Prose­
cutor’s prosecutorial discretion is exercised through 
the close supervision by the Ministry of Justice. Every 
month State Prosecutors make reports on their work to 
that Ministry. From these reports the Ministry is able 
to exercise a certain measure of control over the work 
of all State Prosecutors.
Ill. Trial Procedures
That the system of criminal procedure in Anglo­
phone Cameroon is adversary (or accusatorial) and that in 
Francophone Cameroon non-adversary (or inquisitorial) is 
now probably a misleading cliche. Although there are 
still major conceptual and attitudinal differences in the 
two procedural systems as they operate in Cameroon, there 
is little doubt that for roughly a decade now there has 
been a perceptible evolution towards a mixed system. The 
net result of this process has been a narrowing of the 
spectrum of differences in the two procedural systems.
Only those who never deviate into practicality and owe 
little allegiance to reality would ignore the fact that 
the two systems have been borrowing (perhaps unwittingly) 
from each other and that the difference between the two is
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not as wide as might at first glimpse be thought.
1. Commencement of trial
A. Preferring the charge
In Cameroon all criminal charges are preferred 
by the State Prosecutor acting on behalf of the general 
public. In discharging this duty the State Prosecutor 
must act fairly and not use his official position for his 
own personal advantage. In The People v. Gorji Dinka^'1 
the respondent was charged with making a false report 
contrary to s. 30*1(1) of the Penal Code. The particulars 
of the charge were that the respondent, at Buea on October 
10, 1968, made to Mr Rupert Thomas, a person in authority 
a false report by submitting a memorandum dated 7 October 
1968, accusing Mr Frederick Eko, Procureur General of 
West Cameroon, of partiality, bias, tribalism and cor­
ruption before, during and after the Commission of Inquiry 
into the West Cameroon Electricity Corporation which was 
liable to lead to the prosecution of or disciplinary pro­
ceedings against the said Mr Eko. The memorandum was 
held-by Dervish J. at the court below to be absolutely 
privileged and incapable of being produced in evidence 
in the proceedings. The respondent was accordingly dis­
charged. On appeal by the appellant, the Court of Appeal
111. West Cameroon Court of Appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 
WCCA/3 C./69, unreported.
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upheld the ruling by Dervish J. that the document was
privileged and Inadmissible In evidence. Cotran, C.J.
remarked, obiter.
"The Indictment, as all Indictments are, Is 
laid by the Procureur General of West 
Cameroon, on behalf of the people. The 
allegations are that Mr Dlnka, a leading 
barrister has accused Mr Eko, none other 
than the Procureur General himself, of 
tribalism etc. In those circumstances,
It Is quite evident that Mr Eko had a 
personal interest In the matter. Having 
such a person interest we cannot see how he 
can properly discharge his official func­
tions as Procureur General on behalf of the 
people, impartially and fairly.
"The prosecution then decided to appeal 
to this court, and the appeal is conducted 
for the prosecution by Mr Eko himself.
Again he chooses to act officially on 
behalf of the people, in a case where his 
own personal interest looms very largely.
"It has repeatedly been said in the court, 
and we would like to take the opportunity 
in this case, to repeat, that the function 
of the prosecution acting on behalf of 
the people in criminal cases is to act 
fairly and impartially in the interests 
of justice. It is not the duty of the 
prosecution to secure convictions, and espe­
cially not to use their official positions 
for their own personal advantage."
When the police or gendarmes make an arrest 
and have completed their investigations they may keep the 
suspect in police custody or, on the advice of the State 
Prosecutor, release him on police bail pending the date 
of the trial. • They would then compile a case-file.
This file consists of statements of witnesses and the sus­
pect, other pieces of evidence, the police investigator1s 
report (the proces-verbal or ’P.V.r). The case-file is
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then sent to the State Prosecutor’s Chambers. If 
these chambers are attached to a court of first instance, 
there would most likely be only one State Prosecutor 
there and he would have to decide, on the available evi­
dence, whether to prefer a charge or not. At the.
Court of Appeal level the Prosecutor’s Chambers usually 
has more than one State Prosecutor, headed by the Procureur 
General. As local head of the prosecutorial corps, the 
Procureur General distributes the case-files among his 
subordinates. Each Prosecutor studies the file allotted 
to him, states his legal opinion on the matter and 
returns the file to the Procureur General for control.
If there is a conflict of legal opinion on any particular
case between the Procureur General and a junior Prosecutor,
11?the views of the Procureur General must prevail.
If the State Prosecutor decides not to prefer 
any charge, he closes the case-file (classement sans suite). 
He is not required by law to give any reasons for closing 
the case-file should be choose to do so although in 
practice he generally does. The decision to close a 
case-file, like the decision to prefer charges, is an 
administrative and not a judicial decision and no appeal 
to a court lies against it. Furthermore, when a case-file
112. This is merely a way of maintaining discipline and 
ensuring respect for seniority within the prosecu­
torial corps. Evidently, there is no reason to 
suppose that the Procureur General’s legal opinion 
on any given matter is necessarily better than that 
of the junior Prosecutor.
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is closed the issue is not finally laid to rest but 
merely kept in abeyance.' Therefore, provided the action 
is not time-barred, the State Prosecutor may re-open it 
at any time and need not give-reasons for doing so, 
although in most cases he would re-open a case-file if he 
comes by fresh evidence which throws more light on the 
case.
Where the evidence discloses an offence charac­
terised as a felony, the State Prosecutor must conduct a 
preliminary inquiry before preferring a charge. If at 
the end of the inquiry the State Prosecutor decides to 
prosecute he draws an information and commits the accused 
to trial on information in the High Court. The infor­
mation must give sufficient particulars to indicate the 
place, date and nature of the offence. A preliminary 
inquiry is not necessary in the case of an offence charac­
terised as a misdemeanour. A person who commits a simple 
offence or a misdemeanour is charged directly to court 
without the holding of a preliminary inquiry. Similarly, 
a person caught red-handed committing an offence is taken
straight away to the State Prosecutor who prefers a charge
111and forthwith sends him to court to be tried summarily.
If the court is not sitting on the day the offence is 
committed the accused is remanded into custody and taken
113. Ordinance No. 72/17 of 28 September 1972 to simplify 
criminal procedure in respect of acts of lawlessness.
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to court at its next sitting.
On the question of preferring a charge there 
are two points on which practice in Anglophone and Franco­
phone Cameroon differs. In Francophone Cameroon once 
the State Prosecutor has committed the accused for trial 
he cannot subsequently withdraw the case or plea bargain. 
In Anglophone Cameroon the State Prosecutor may plea bar­
gain or enter a nolle prosequi at any stage of the trial.
There also, the way a charge is drafted is strictly regu- 
lllj
lated by law. Every charge or count on an information
must.contain (i) a statement of the offence alleged, 
with a reference of the section of the written law against 
which the offence is alleged to have been committed;
(ii) a statement of the time and place of the offence and 
any person or thing in relation to whom or which the 
offence is alleged to have been committed; and (iii) such 
other particulars as are necessary to give the accused 
sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged. 
The court would throw out a charge if it is defective (for 
example, a charge which fails to state the particulars of 
the offence) or bad for duplicity (for example, several 
acts of theft are made the subject of a single charge).
The position is otherwise in‘Francophone Cameroon. The 
manner of drafting a charge is not so well regulated.
The State Prosecutor may, in one document, charge several
114. Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Part 18.
968.
separate people with having respectively committed or 
taken part singly, severally or jointly, on one or more of 
several separate crimes.
B . Modes of trial
The court in which an accused person is tried
depends on the nature of the charge preferred by the State
Prosecutor. If the offence charged is a simple offence
or a misdemeanour, the accused must be sent for trial in
the Court of First Instance which exercises original juris-
115diction in cases of misdemeanours and simple offences.
If the offence is a felony the accused must be sent for 
trial at the High Court for that court exercises original 
jurisdiction in cases which are felonies. Thus,
offences of different gravity (in terms of penalties author­
ised) have been entrusted to courts of differing original 
jurisdiction. In these courts somewhat different proce­
dural and evidentiary rules apply. In the case of 
felonies, a preliminary inquiry must be conducted and the 
eventual trial at the High Court follows a more elaborate 
procedure than that in the Court of First Instance. Trial 
in the Court of First Instance is by summary procedure. 
Matters are disposed of with rapidity. The atmosphere is
115. Judicial Organisation Ordinance, 1972, s. 13(1)(a).
116. Ibid., s. l6(l)(a).
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informal. Not much regard is paid to technicalities.
For most of the time the court deals with matters of fact
rather than law. However, in both the Court of First
Instance and the High Court, the usual rules apply just
as in the superior courts.
In Cameroon the defendant does not decide which
type of procedure will be followed in his case. The
nature of the offence involved is decisive. If it is a
felony it is tried in the High Court where a more elaborate
procedure is followed; if it is a misdemeanour or a
simple offence it is tried in the Court of First Instance
117following a summary procedure. Simplified procedural
patterns are utilized as a deterrent device in respect
of certain serious crimes of alarmingly high incidence
such as aggravated theft which carries the death penalty, 
ll8bad cheques, misappropriation of public funds, and so 
IIPon. * More usually however, simplified procedural patterns
117. In common law jurisdictions by contrast, it is the 
defendant who determines the type of proceeding in 
which his case will be processed, by using the pleading 
mechanism and exercising waiver. In England for 
example, an accused person may either demand or waive 
trial by jury. In the United States, a defendant
can cause a relatively minor case to be tried in the 
most elaborate, costly and time consuming manner by 
simply refusing to plead guilty and to waive the jury 
trial.
118. For a study on the law of bad cheques in France, which 
law is the same as in Cameroon, see,. Carlson Anyangwe, 
’Dealing with the problem of bad cheques in France’,
C.L.R. 1978.
119. Ordinance No. 72/17 of 28 September 1972 to simplify 
criminal procedure in-respect of acts of lawlessness. 
This Ordinance also applies in Anglophone Cameroon 
even though s. 304(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordi­
nance excludes capital offences from indictable offences 
which might be tried summarily.
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are used to dispose of less serious offences. The defen­
dant cannot compel the court to dispose of the case 
either in a more or less elaborate manner than prescribed 
for the type of offence in question.
C. Courtroom layout and court etiquette
A striking contrast is found in courtroom layout 
in Anglophone and in Francophone courts. In the Anglophone 
Provinces, there is nothing about the architecture of a 
court house or building which singles it out from other 
buildings in the locality. There is no plaque or insignia 
to indicate that it is a law court. Each court house is 
oblong in shape, small in size, simple in architecture, 
and unimposing. Inside the court, there are no decorations, 
no ornaments, no carpets, no tapestries. You would 
search in vain in and outside the court for the Scales.
All you would find inside the court is the official photo­
graph of the Cameroonian Head of State hanging high up on 
the wall behind the judge's desk.
Each courtroom has two oblong-shaped boxes, 
one, the dock, for the defendant, and the other, the wit­
ness box, for the witness. The defendant traditionally 
sits in the dock in the centre of the courtroom with a 
policeman, gendarme or warder nearby but outside the dock.
He is isolated from his counsel and others on the court­
room by the walls of the enclosure. But the upper part of
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the defendant’s body Is In full view of the court. The
Institution of the dock seems at odds with the presumption
of Innocence. Why should the defendant be ’caged’ if
120he. is presumed innocent?
A witness gives his evidence from the witness- 
box, standing and not sitting as happens in American 
courts. The court may however, at its discretion, allow 
a witness to testify sitting. There are always three 
objects resting on the witness-box: a Bible, a Qu’ran
and a dane-gun - the paraphernalia for the-oath-swearing 
ritual.
Each courtroom provides for a higher, throne-like 
setting of the judicial bench so that the judge dominates 
the scene. The judge’s bench is generally a table or 
desk (with fat law books neatly arranged on it) placed 
on a dais.- Behind the judicial table are two side doors, 
one leading to the registrar’s office and the other to 
the judge’s chambers - the judge enters and leaves the 
court by this door. Below the judicial bench, in front 
of and parallel to it, stands a long table about a yard 
away from the judicial bench. This table is for defence 
and prosecuting counsel as well as for the court clerk; 
counsel sit facing the judge while the clerk sits backing
120. It may be noted that in America the dock has dis­
appeared and the accused sits at the counsel table 
with his lawyer. He comes and goes from the court­
room (if out on bail) like any other free person. 
Throughout the trial he is treated like an ordinary 
innocent citizen - which he is in the eyes of the law.
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him. When he wishes to speak, counsel rises at the table 
and stays there in one position, rocking himself to and 
fro, turning towards witness as occasion arises, but 
leaving the table only for some practical necessity such 
as pointing out a passage in a document to a witness.
Court officials (clerks and police officers) are circum­
spect, unobtrusive, and disciplined in their bearing, as 
befits their role. No attention is paid in Cameroon to 
courtroom acoustics. But in Anglophone courts the 
situation is mitigated by two factors: (i) judges always
remind counsel and witnesses that they have to speak 
aloud to the hearing of the entire court; (ii) the 
public is closer to the judicial bench, the bar table, 
the dock and the witness-box. The judicial bench in 
Anglophone courts is in fact much closer to the public 
seats than is the case in Francophone courts where the 
horizontal and vertical distance between the judicial bench 
and the public seats is quite wide. This in effect means 
that the aloofness from the public of the judge in Franco­
phone Cameroon is both vertical and horizontal while that 
of the Anglophone judge is vertical only.
Courts in Francophone Cameroon are also not 
decorative, but they are bigger and more elaborate in 
architectural design. Each court building proclaims boldly 
by the following inscription: PALAIS DE JUSTICE,1^  that
121. Cf. also, gens du palais (i.e., lawyers, the legal 
profession or fraternity), style de palais (i.e., 
legal jargon), and terme de palais (i.e., forensic 
or law term).
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it is a law court or court of justice. The judge, State
Prosecutor, and registrar (greffier) all enter and leave
the court (in that order) through the same door. All
122of them sit up there on the rostrum, the judge and the 
registrar sharing one table (the registrar sits on the 
right hand side of the judge) while the State Prosecutor 
sits at a separate table about two yards away from the 
judicial bench, on the right. When addressing the court 
the State Prosecutor stands up, perambulates, gesticulates 
with his hands, and may even go close to the judge.
The bench reserved for advocates is at a corner 
at the foot of the rostrum. There is a great deal of 
sprawling space for defence advocates. They frequently 
leave their desk and approach close to the witness and 
the judicial bench. In the course of his perambulations 
an advocate may gesticulate with his hands, roll the 
sleeves of his robe over his shoulder, and may even turn 
his back on the bench - exactly like an American attorney.
There is neither dock nor witness-box in a
Francophone court. All there is is a little crescent­
shaped cross-bar (la barre, it is called) erected in the 
well of the court about four yards away from the judicial 
bench. The defendant sits on the front row bench in 
the public gallery and is flanked either by armed gendarmes, 
policemen, or prison warders who are always very conspicuous.
122. This underscores the French conception of a court which 
is defined as comprising the Judge, the State Prose­
cutor, and the Registrar.
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The defendant gives his evidence standing at the cross 
bar. Since no attention is paid to courtroom acoustics, 
and since judges seldom insist on people speaking loud 
enough for the entire court to hear, spectators often 
find it difficult to follow what is being said, especially 
when, as often happens, defence counsel or State Prose­
cutor approaches close to the judge and engages more or 
less in a muttered discussion - a practice which detracts 
from the meaningfulness of a public trial. Court 
acoustics have a bearing upon the right to a public trial 
and attention ought to be paid to it, for example, by 
installing microphones and loudspeakers in the larger 
courts.
Another contrast between an Anglophone and a 
Francophone court relates to court etiquette. In Anglo­
phone courts barristers, State Prosecutors and judges 
are all robed and wigged, except in Magistrates’ Courts 
where they appear in ordinary suits. There is puncti­
lious attention to decorum: the judge is addressed as
’My Lord’ (a magistrate is addressed ’Your Worship’ or 
’Your Honour’) and anyone entering or leaving the court­
room bows to him. When the judge is about to enter the 
court he knocks three times on the door and the court 
clerk shouts, 'C-O-U-R-TI’. Everyone rises to their feet. 
The judge enters the court, goes to his seat, bows and 
sits down. Everyone else then sits down and the day’s 
business begins, often with the overnights. Everyone
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again rises to their feet when the judge also leaves the 
court. These entry and exit ceremonies last only a few 
seconds. When the court is in session anyone who falls 
asleep in court or makes any noise in the court or within 
the court precincts may be charged with contempt of court.
When the judge makes a ruling the clerks, prose­
cution and defence all intone benignly:'as the court 
pleases’. The judge himself speaks in the third person: 
’the court decides ...’, ’the court rules ...', ’the 
court over-rules ...’, ’the court upholds ...’, ’the 
court finds ...’, ’the decision of the court is ...’, et 
cetera. Although aware that the court is the cockpit 
of a legal battle, the common law trained lawyers prac­
tising in Anglophone courts have not let the combative 
nature of the adversary system blur their sense of 
decorum. They address each other in court as ’my learned 
friend’ and make their submissions ’with due respect’.
When conducting his cross-examination defence advocate 
’suggests’ or ’puts it' to the witness that he is so-and- 
so or that he did this-and-that.
The picture is different in Francophone courts. 
The judge's entry into the court is announced by the ring­
ing of a door bell. The judge, prosecutor, and registrar 
all enter the court at the same time and through the same 
door. Everyone stands when the judge enters the court and 
sits after the judge has sat down. The judge then says, 
’1 ’audience est pr§t’. He reaches for the first dossier
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on the heap in front of him, opens it, and calls the 
case ... The day’s business has begun.
Judge, State Prosecutor, defence counsels and 
the court clerk are all robed - the judge and state prose­
cutor in toga, counsel and registrar in billowing black.
The robe is compulsory in all courts. The judge, whether 
of a lower or superior court, is addressed as Monsieur le 
President, defence counsel la defense, and the prosecution 
1 ’accusation, le parquet or le ministere public. Counsel 
address each other as mon, confrere, never mon emminent 
confrere nor mon savant confrere. When the court is in 
session advocates may come and go, lean over a colleague, 
shake hands, whisper, tiptoe in and out of court. Not 
much attention is paid to decorum as in Anglophone courts.
One need not bow to the judge when entering or leaving the 
court and counsel may prowl around when speaking.
On the whole however, standards of discipline
and dignity appear to have fallen considerably in Cameroonian
courts. Altercations and the exchange of discourteous
language between the bench and the prosecution or the
defence, or between the prosecution and the defence, or
again between one defence advocate and another take place 
121time and again. This state of affairs has been sternly
123. Judicial and legal officers in the English-speaking 
part of the country claim, not without foundation, 
that conduct of this nature is alien to courts in 
Anglophone Cameroon and that it is something one comes 
across quite often in Francophone courts. In fact 
however, in Buea this writer witnessed a case in which 
counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant
/Continued over
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deplored by the Minister of Justice as may be seen from 
this telling circular from the Minister to all judges and 
State Prosecutors in the country.
"Ministfere de la Justice 
Yaounde, le 18 nov. 1976
Direction des Affaires 
Judiciaires et du Sceau
Courrier No. 9051/DAJS 
Objet: Tenue des Audiences
h Messieurs les Presidents des. Cours d ’Appel 
Messieurs les Procureurs G£ndraux pres les 
Cours d ’Appel 
Messieurs les. Presidents des Tribunaux de 
Grande et de Premiere Instance'.
Messieurs les Procureurs de la Rdpublique
"Mon attention a Ste appelee sur le fait que certaines 
audiences ne se ddroulent pas dans l ’ordre, la discipline 
et la dignitd exigd tant par la nature des affaires qui y 
sont debattues que par le cadre dans lequel elles se 
deroulent et que certaines d ’entre elles, il faut le dire, 
sont des veritables ’foires'.
Ainsi, il m'est revenue que, si dans l fensemble le public 
observe le calme necessaire pendant 1’audience par contre 
ce m§me public assiste a des veritables altercations, en 
des termes pour le moins discourtois, soit entre le 
President de la juridiction et le magistral representant 
le Minist^re Public, soit entre ces m§mes. magistrats et 
les avocats, soit entre les avocats eux-m§mes, ces confron­
tations ne s ’inscrivant evidemment pas dans le cadre des 
interventions ndcessitees par les debats.
Certains magistrats iraient meme, semble-t-il, jusqu’a 
interdire aux avocats de plaider, ce qui est manifestement 
illegal, ou les interpelleraient en termes mettant en
Footnote 123 continued from previous page.
were constantly getting at each other angrily (or so 
it seemed) as though they were engaged in a private 
duel of theirs. This writer also witnessed something 
of a similar nature between defence counsel and State 
Prosecutor in a Magistrate’s Court in Bamenda.
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cause leur honneur ou leur competence, ce qui est 
inadmissible.
Par ailleur, il m'a dtd donner d ?observer que malgre les 
heures fixees pour les audiences, celles-ci ne commencent 
dans certaines juridictions quTavec des retards considerables 
dfts souvent a 1 ’absence du President de la juridiction 
qui parfois m§me ne vient pas du tout et se borne' k faire 
renvoyer, par un greffier, les affaires enrdlees.
Enfin, s ’il est vrai que nos locaux actuels ne prdsentent 
pas toujours un cadre fonctionnel permettant k chacun 
(magistrats, avocats, prevenus, tdmoins) d ’occuper une 
place convenable amenagde dans le prdtoire, il serait 
souhaitable toutefois de reserver notamment aux avocats, 
un emplacement prdcis.
En outre, en ce qui les concerne, il y a lieu mdme en 
1 ? absence d ’un vestiaire destind ci, cet effet de reserve 
b. leur intention, un local ou ils puissent mettre et 
enlever leur robe, hors la vue du public.
J ’attacherai le plus grand prix k ce que tous les chefs 
de juridictions donnent par dcrit toutes instructions 
ndcessaire aux magistrats placds sous leur autorite, ainsi 
qu’aux auxiliaires de Justice de leur ressort pour qu’il 
soit mis fin aux errements constatds et que desormais les 
audiences se deroulent dans l ’ordre, le calme, la serenitd, 
voire la solennitd, que me parait devoir imposer l Texercice 
de la fonction judiciaire.
Je vous serais obligd de vouloir bien m ’accuser reception 
de la prdsente circulaire dont je vous demande d ’assurer 
la diffusion la plus large dans vos ressorts respectifs, 
ainsi que l fexecution et me rendre compte des mesures 
prises et des resultats obtenus.
Le Ministre de la Justice, Garde des Sceaux 
Joseph-Charles Doumba.
2. Conduct of the trial
A . The arraignment
In Anglophone courts the trial begins by the court 
clerk calling the case •- The People v.’XYZ. The defendant
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steps into the dock. The clerk invites all witnesses in
the case to leave the courtroom and hang around at a
little distance away from the court building until called.
He then reads the charge to the defendant and asks him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty to the charge as
read. The defendant may take any one of the following
course: stand silent, plead guilty to the offence charged,
plead not guilty, make■an objection on legal grounds to
124the trial proceedings. Legal objections are however
rare. Also, apart from the rare case where a defendant 
stands mute by visitation of God, defendants never stand 
silent. Defendants always plead guilty or not guilty.
Some defendants do plead ’guilty with reasons’. The 
courts take this as a not guilty plea. If the defendant 
pleads guilty, the court does not at once enter a guilty 
plea and then proceed to convict the defendant. It would 
ask the prosecution to give the facts of the case and if 
it appears to the court that the defendant pleaded guilty 
out of ignorance, it would enter a plea of not guilty and 
proceed to try the case in the usual manner. If the facts
124. It is possible at this stage for the defendant to
’plead to the jurisdiction’ or to demur to the charge. 
By a demurrer the defendant admits the facts alleged 
by the prosecution but says that in law they do not 
amount to the offence with which he is charged. The 
defendant may also plead that he has already been 
tried for the same or substantially the same offence. 
This plea is known as autrefois acquit (or convict) and 
is based on the principle against double jeopardy, that 
is, a man should not be put in peril twice for the 
same offence.
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as stated disclose no offence in law the court would 
discharge the accused. If the defendant pleads not 
guilty, the court enters the plea and the prosecution 
will then give an outline of the proof about to come and 
then proceed to call the prosecution witnesses.
In Francophone courts the trial judge picks up 
a dossier from the pile in front of him and calls the 
case - Ministere Public c. XYZ. The defendant steps out 
and moves forward to the crescent-shaped cross-bar. All 
witnesses in the case are asked to leave the courtroom.
The trial judge then reads out the charge to the defendant 
and asks him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
Apart from cases where the defendant was caught in flagrante 
delicto and where guilt is beyond doubt, guilty pleas are 
rare. If a defendant pleads guilty, the court accepts 
his plea and then asks him why he committed the offence 
with which he is charged. After listening to the defen­
dant's explanation (if any) and the State Prosecutor's 
proposal as to sentence, the court proceeds to pass sen­
tence. The trial judge does not ask the State Prosecutor to 
give the facts of the case because he is already acquainted 
with them, having had time to study the dossier at home.
The explanation given by the defendant as to why he com­
mitted the offence with which he is charged might, in 
appropriate cases, be taken as a mitigating factor. Where 
the defendant pleads not guilty, the trial judge will then 
turn to the State Prosecutor and say, 'la parole au
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Ministere Public’. The State Prosecutor will then get 
up, narrate the facts of the case and indicate how he 
intends to prove the defendant’s guilt.
B. The accused and the presumption of innocence
To say that an accused person is presumed inno­
cent until proved guilty does not mean that he is in fact 
innocent. If that were the case, he would not be charged 
In the first place. On the other hand, until an accused 
person has been properly tried and found guilty by a compe­
tent court of law, he must not be pre-judged guilty.
The presumption of innocence strikes a balance between 
these two positions by treating the accused as though he 
were innocent. This in effect means that in any criminal 
trial the burden of proving the alleged offence lies on 
the accuser and not on the accused. The person who charges 
another with crime cannot rely on his assertion alone to 
shift to the accused the obligation to prove his innocence.
It is for the accuser to prove the accused’s guilt as 
alleged by him and not for the accused to vindicate his 
innocence. Actori incumbit probatio, onus probandi 
incumbit ei qui dicit.
Although there is no explicit provision in the
Cameroonian Penal Code dealing with the presumption of 
125
innocence, that presumption is Itself an axiom of
125. Cf. however, Penal Code, s. 7^(2).
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Cameroonian criminal justice. In both Anglophone and 
Francophone courts, the accused is treated, until found 
guilty, as if he were innocent and he need not lend any 
aid to those who would convict him. The burden of proof 
is always on the State Prosecutor (save for example, in 
the case of insanity where the burden of proving insanity 
is on the accused). A corollary of the presumption of 
innocence is that the accused’s guilt must be proved 
’beyond all reasonable doubts’. The trial judge cannot
properly convict the accused if he entertains any doubt 
whatsoever as to his guilt. If at the end of the case 
there is a lurking doubt about the case then the benefit 
of that factual doubt must be resolved in the accused’s 
favour. The'maxim is, in dubio pro reo. However, while 
there is no doubt-that the presumption of innocence forms 
part of Cameroonian criminal law, certain practices in 
Francophone courts have tended to give the impression that 
the accused is presumed guilty and has to prove his inno­
cence. First of all, the judge often appears to be 
moving relentlessly towards- a pre-determined result of 
conviction. Secondly, persuasive use is made of preventive
126. Francophone courts speak of 1 ’intime conviction du 
juge. This expression means that the judge freely 
appreciates the value to be attached to the evidence 
before him. He decides, as it is said, according to 
his conscience. And he convicts or acquits depending 
on whether he is convinced of the accused’s innocence 
or guilt, not being bound by any particular rules of 
evidence. He is moreover not bound to justify the 
probative value he attaches to the evidence he retains.
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detention before trial. Thirdly, judges are very much 
disposed to believing evidence from police officers and 
gendarmes without any scrutiny.
Before a matter comes to open court, the trial 
judge in a Francophone court would have gone through the 
dossier and formed at least a provisional opinion (one 
way or another) in respect of the case. In most cases, 
the judge is more likely to form an opinion that the 
accused is guilty. In the first place, in courts where 
the trial judge is also the State Prosecutor, he would 
in fact be conducting an inquisition. Secondly, the 
attitude is often taken that, since the accused has already 
passed through the scrutiny of the police and the State 
Prosecutor (in cases where a preliminary inquiry has been 
conducted), the chances are that he is guilty otherwise 
the State Prosecutor would have dropped the charge against 
him. Once the judge has formed this initial though 
provisional impression of the accused's guilt the accused 
must strive as much as he can to change this impression. 
This is definitely an uphill task.
The fact that the accused is questioned closely 
by both the judge and the State Prosecutor (as though they 
were conducting- an inquisition) also gives the distinct 
impression of a prima facie presumption of guilt on the 
part of the court, an impression again given by the readi­
ness with which courts always tend to accord unquestioning 
credibility to evidence given by the police and gendarmes.
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Police and gendarmes’ reports (proces-verbaux) are always 
admitted in evidence without caution or scrutiny. There 
is no opportunity given to the defendant to try and dis­
credit or cast doubts on these reports. In fact police 
and gendarmes never appear in court to give oral evidence 
and be cross-examined by the defendant. They merely send 
their reports to the court without themselves putting in 
an appearance. Presiding judges have been known to ask 
defendants: "What reasons have the police to lie against
you?" This would seem to suggest that the police and 
gendarmes are presumed to be honest and that they may have 
no motive for framing someone. But it is common knowledge 
that police are sometimes biased, that they may in fact 
have a vested interest in a particular case, and that a 
police officer may in fact have motives for telling lies.
The operation of the remand or la detention 
provlsoire also gives the impression that the accused is 
presumed guilty. During the preliminary inquiry the 
suspect is usually held in provisional detention. Bail 
is seldom granted. Remand in custody before trial con­
stitutes a serious inroad into the presumption of inno­
cence because the suspect is imprisoned when in fact he has 
neither been tried nor convicted. Now, when the accused 
is eventually brought to trial the judge tends to convict 
and pass a custodial sentence of the same duration as the 
time spent in custody, in cases where in- fact he would 
normally have been acquitted or given only a non-custodial
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sentence. Moreover, most persons remanded into custody 
and then eventually brought for trial and given an acquit­
tal or a non-custodial sentence are those who have spent 
long months or years in custody, their jobs lost and their 
homes broken. Given all these factors, the accused in a 
Francophone court often tends to feel that the whole judi­
cial apparatus has been ranged against him. Consequently, 
he often adopts an attitude of despair and resignation.
C. Presentation of proof
All trial mechanisms are geared towards achieving 
two desires, to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. 
The object of trial procedures in both Anglophone and 
Francophone courts is the same search for the truth within 
the permissible legal framework. However, the techniques 
or mechanisms used for finding the truth in both courts 
differ. This difference comes out vividly during the 
proof presentation phase of the trial.
In Anglophone courts it is the trial judge him­
self who takes down the evidence. This he does in long 
hand in the form of direct speech. He does not take down 
verbatim all that is said; he condenses the evidence, 
eliminating irrelevancies. In Francophone courts by 
contrast, it is the court registrar and not the presiding 
judge who takes down the evidence. The greffier condenses 
into narrative form the substance of the evidence given.
The trial judge may from time to time draw the registrar’s
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attention to an important piece of testimony or any parti­
cular point he wants him to make a special note of.
Since the Cameronian greffier, unlike the English court 
registrar, is not a legally trained person, the danger is 
that he may omit or distort vital points made by counsel 
or witnesses. Sometimes there are material discrepancies 
between the clerk’s transcript and the notes which the 
trial judge may have himself jotted down in the dossier.
In such a case it seems the judge’s notes would prevail. 
There is no means by which defence counsel can ensure that 
his submissions and the testimony of his client and defence 
witnesses have been taken down accurately. Counsel may 
ask to inspect the clerk’s transcript or insist that note 
be taken of a particular point. But it is in the dis­
cretion of the clerk whether to accede to such a request 
or not. This partly explains why there is such a heavy 
reliance on paperwork. Advocates always take care to 
hand over to the trial judge their submissions and final 
addresses as well as any objections they may have raised 
in the course of the proceedings.
In Anglophone courts the trial judge begins the 
trial without any prior knowledge of the case. He operates 
initially in a factual vacuum. During the first hearing 
of a case he gets to hear of the facts for the first time 
like any spectator in the court. This means that he 
cannot dispose of a case as quickly as he would if he were 
already familiar with the facts of the case by the time the
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trial comes up. In Francophone courts by contrast, the
judge is familiarized in advance of the trial with summarised
records of all evidence taken during police inquiries or a
purportedly non-partisan judicial investigation by the
127State Prosecutor. Important consequences flow from
this. On the negative side, the dossier undoubtedly 
leaves at least some imprint upon the mind of the trial 
judge. The dossier may contain documents on or references 
to the accused’s prior criminal record. The judge’s 
advance knowledge of this fact may tip the scales against 
the accused in some close cases where a defendant in an 
Anglophone court would be acquitted. On the positive side, 
it may be said that without familiarity with the documents 
contained in the dossier the trial judge could hardly be 
efficient in closely examining the accused as he always 
does. Furthermore, prior acquaintance with the dossier 
enables the trial judge to despatch cases with speed and 
goes to explain in part the rather casual and cavalier 
manner in which the trial opens. The judge picks up the 
first case-file from the heap lying in front of him, calls 
the case, and the accused steps forward. The charge is 
read out by the judge who, especially in Courts of First 
Instance, simply proceeds to ask the defendant: ’Est-ce
que vous reconnaissez les faits qui vous sont reproches?’ or
127. In Anglophone Cameroon reports of the police and the 
State Prosecutor’s preliminary inquiry are not made 
available to the trial judge before the trial. Such 
reports have to be tendered in court, like any other 
piece of evidence, according to the rules of evidence
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’Qu’avez vous & repondre aux faits qui vous sont reproches?’ 
or again ’Expliquez-moi comment vous avez procede’. The 
accused would then ramble on with his version of the story, 
often going off at a tangent. He may of course be inter­
rupted by the trial judge who is free to put any question 
deemed appropriate to him. The State Prosecutor may do 
likewise. Now and again, the judge would read from the 
dossier, turn pages, select and read on: statements and
counter-statements made to the police or gendarmes or the 
State Prosecutor containing admissions, confessions, or 
retractions. One gets the impression that the trial is 
nothing more than a recapitulation of the written material 
in the dossier.. Within a short while the case is over.
The State Prosecutor stands up and makes his closing 
address. He invites the court to find the accused guilty 
and to pass ’an exemplary sentence’. The judge pronounces 
his verdict and sentences or acquits the accused, shuts 
the dossier, puts it away-,- picks up another case-file and 
calls the next case. At the end of the working day, about
twenty to thirty cases would have been disposed of.
The rapidity with which criminal cases are dis­
posed of in Francophone courts of First Instance is com­
parable only to the manner in which traffic cases are 
desptached in Magistrates’ Courts in Anglophone Cameroon:
Clerk: Case No. ... The People v. XYZ. That
you ... on the ... day of ... at 
about ... hours at ... in ... Division 
in the Magisterial District of the ... 
Province of the United Republic of 
Cameroon being the driver of taxi No.
... drove same on the public highway 
and carried ... passengers instead of 
... as authorised by the licensing
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authority and thereby contravened 
Regulation ... and punishable under 
the Road Traffic Regulation.
Guilty or not guilty
Defendant: Guilty (or guilty with reasons). Your
Worship.
Magistrate: Facts.
Police (or gendarme) Officer: Facts as per
charged, Your Worship.
Magistrate: What is your explanation?
Defendant: I was driving ... I was stopped by
the police (or gendarmes) ... etc.
Magistrate: I accept your plea and find you 
guilty.
Clerk, Police, Gendarmes: As the court pleases.
Clerk: You have been found guilty. What
have you to say before the court 
passes sentence on you?
Defendant: I pray the court to show mercy on me.
Magistrate: Anything known?
Police: Nothing known, Your Worship Cor, he
was convicted in case number ...).
Magistrate: 5,000 francs or one week.
Five minutes and a traffic case is over.
It is often said that the fundamental matrix of 
the adversary system of criminal procedure is based upon 
the view that proceedings should be structured as a dis­
pute between two sides in a position of theoretical equality
before a court which must decide on the outcome of the 
12 8contest. • The role of the trial judge becomes that of
12 8. Mirjan Damaska, ’Evidentiary barriers to conviction and 
two models of criminal procedure’, 121 University of 
Pennsylvania Uaw Review 506 (1973); Abraham S. Gold­
stein, ’Reflections on two models: inquisitorial
themes in American criminal procedure’, 26 Stanford 
Law Review 1009 (197^).
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a passive umpire who sees that the protagonists conduct 
their contest according to the rules. ' This is the general 
judicial attitude in Anglophone Cameroon. But in 
reality many judges do take an active part in the exami­
nation of the defendant and witnesses. Theoretically, 
these questions are posed only where necessary to clear 
obscure points and to ensure completeness. But such 
interrogations do go further than is traditionally accepted 
of common-law trained judges. This is undoubtedly a shift 
(perhaps not a conscious one) towards the Francophone 
system where the judge is an active participant in the 
criminal'trial, taking the initiative to amass evidence. 
Proceedings are conceived of not as a dispute as such but 
are considered an official and thorough inquiry, trig­
gered by the initial probability that a crime has been 
committed. The procedural aim is therefore simply to estab­
lish whether this is in fact the case, and whether the 
imposition of criminal sanction is justified. Few rules 
of evidence inhibit the judge’s power to question the 
defendant. Since the task of the trial judge is seen as 
consisting in the search for the objective truth, he is 
given complete leeway to ask the defendant any question he 
thinks will help in elucidating the truth. The Francophone 
judge is however in a psychologically difficult position: 
he is supposed to convict the defendant (if found guilty) 
and yet to maintain the presumption of innocence and to 
weigh disinterestedly the results of the interrogations,
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even though he Is familiar with the facts of the case 
beforehand.
A few other significant contrasts are worthy of
mention. In Anglophone courts the taking of proof or
manner of adducing evidence is split into examination-in-
chief, cross-examination, and re-examination. Each party
presents his case, calls his witnesses and examines them.
The witnesses may then be cross-examined by the other 
129party. The Francophone judge interrogates the defen­
dant, the lay and expert witnesses and bears the responsi­
bility for the completeness and correctness of the evidence. 
There is no cross-examination, although some courts do 
occasionally permit some form of cross-examination (mainly 
as a concession to Anglophone lawyers practising in these 
courts). If defence counsel wishes to ask any question 
to the witness, he must do so through the intermediary of 
the judge who, in any case, has the discretion whether to 
put such a question to the witness or not. If the judge 
refuses to put to the witness a question which counsel 
has asked him to, counsel may request the greffier to 
make a special note of the refusal.
Since there is now a uniform and cohesive prose­
cuting agency in Cameroon one would expect the philosophy
129. A common criticism of cross-examination is the unplea­
sant aggressiveness of the interrogation and the 
obviously common coaching of witnesses.
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of prosecution to be the same in both parts of the country. 
In reality however, the Anglophone State Prosecutor 
(unlike his Francophone colleague) is inhibited by tra­
dition from vigorously seeking a conviction and suggesting 
to the trial judge what sentence should be passed in any 
given case. In Francophone courts the State Prosecutor 
may invite the court to pass an examplary sentence and he 
always indicates the severity of the sentence he would 
like to see the court pass. This is never done in Anglo­
phone courts. There the philosophy is that the people 
are as much concerned to see an innocent man go free as 
to see a guilty man convicted and therefore the people 
can neither win nor lose a criminal case.
The scope of discovery is very limited in Anglo­
phone courts. On the face of it, defence counsel has 
the advantage of surprise. He decides what line of defence 
to pursue, what witnesses to call, what evidence to adduce, 
what strategy to follow and what arguments to advance.
In fact however, there is no explicit discovery rule in 
Anglophone courts which requires the State Prosecutor to 
disclose the prosecution’s evidence to the defence before 
the trial. The State Prosecutor too decides what strategy 
and arguments to follow, what witnesses to call and what 
arguments to advance. Since defence counsel are dep­
rived of pre-trial discovery and are ignorant of the 
prosecution’s evidence, some of them tend to object to 
evidence produced by the State Prosecutor out of a sheer
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fear of the unknown. Whenever this happens, the trial 
judge has to rule on the admissibility of the evidence. 
Sometimes objections lead to considerable arguments.
In Francophone courts on the other hand, the State Prose­
cutor makes the dossier available to the defence counsel, 
who may even take it home and study it. The defence 
counsel, however, need not disclose his case to the State 
Prosecutor. The Francophone State Prosecutor is there­
fore debarred from the advantage of surprise.
Traditionally, the role of the Anglophone judge 
(and to a lesser extent, magistrate) in court is that of a 
relatively neutral participant who ensures that the rules 
of evidence are satisfied. His role is analogous to 
that of an umpire in a contest between two sides. He 
may ask witnesses questions; but only sparingly and only 
to clear obscurities. The reason for this is to avoid 
giving the impression of taking sides. As a matter of 
practice however, the Anglophone judge (and much more so, 
magistrate) has moved closer to the Francophone judge.
He is the central and dominant figure in court. He has 
wide discretionary powers not only over the conduct of 
proceedings but also over the admission of evidence and 
in summarising and commenting upon the evidence. His 
role now far transcends that of a neutral participant or 
an umpire. He actively takes part in the interrogation 
of the defendant and witnesses and may even summon other 
witnesses if he thinks it appropriate or necessary in
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order to elucidate the truth. It is true that so far 
the bulk of questioning does not, as in Francophone courts, 
come typically fro-m the bench and it is not, as it is again 
the case in Francophone courts, the trial judge who begins 
the examination of witnesses. But, as in Francophone 
Cameroon, the criminal trial is beginning to be conceived 
of as somewhat in the nature of an official inquiry for 
the ascertainment of the full truth presided over by the 
j udge.
The procedure in Francophone courts is sometimes 
characterised as contradictoire. In fact however, 
partisan presentation of evidence and partisan zeal does 
not exist in those courts. It is thought that the 
taking of evidence is best safeguarded if left in the 
hands of the presiding judge, who must accordingly be 
thoroughly familiar with the contents of the files so as 
to be able to carry out the examination and to discharge 
his duty to clarify the facts. The influence of the 
parties upon the manner in which evidence is adduced at 
trial is therefore limited. So accustomed is defence 
counsel to the taking of evidence by the trial judge that 
he relies completely upon him and often fails to direct 
the taking of evidence in the manner favourable to his 
client’s case. The Francophone defence counsel is limited 
to posing a few additional questions and making his plai- 
doirie before the close of the trial.' There is however 
a gradual change of role taking place at the moment.
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Francophone counsel are now taking a much more active 
role in the presentation of evidence and the shaping of 
legal issues. Their methods of defence are increasingly 
taking an aggressive leaning. All this is undoubtedly 
due to the influence of Anglophone counsels practising 
in Francophone courts.
One further significant contrast between 
Anglophone and Francophone courts concerns the position 
of the accused as a witness. In Anglophone courts the 
examination of the defendant comes last after all the 
prosecution witnesses have been heard. In fact, the 
defendant cannot take the witness box, even if he wishes 
to, before the prosecution has established a prima facie 
case. Besides, it is up to the defendant whether to 
take the witness box or not. In other words, the accused 
has the freedom from being questioned: he cannot be
asked or compelled by the prosecution to take the witness 
box and questions cannot be addressed to him in the dock. 
The court must and does inform him of his right. The 
privilege against self-incrimination (that is, to refuse 
to answer an incriminating question) is recognised. A 
man may not condemn himself out of his own mouth without 
at least a warning. However, there is certainly some 
pressure on the defendant to testify from the witness box. 
If the defendant testifies from the dock, the evidence 
is not given on oath and little weight is attached to it. 
When he gives his evidence from the dock, the defendant
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is not cross-examined. But the court may draw adverse 
inferences from his refusal to take the witness stand. 
However, when the defendant takes the witness box to 
testify in his own behalf, he cannot by reason of that 
alone be cross-examined as to previous convictions.
Evidence of previous convictions becomes admissible only 
if such evidence is necessary to prove the crime charged, 
or if the defence offers evidence of the defendant’s good 
character, or if the defence attacks the character of a 
prosecution witness or that of a joint defendant. In 
such cases evidence of prior criminal record may be used 
to impeach the defendant’s credibility or to rebut evidence 
of good character.
In Francophone courts, the defendant is used 
as the primary source of evidence, both during the preli­
minary investigation and at the trial. He is ordinarily 
called as the first witness and is questioned closely by 
the presiding judge about his knowledge of the crime. 
Examining the defendant first probably has a number of 
advantages. It enables the defence to test the prose­
cution's charges. It enables the court to see how much
the accused admits. It gives the defendant the chance to
110make the first impression on the court. However, the
130. Glanville Williams, The proof of guilt, a study of
the English criminal trial, 3rd ed., Stevens & Sons, 
London, 1963 (2nd impression 1977), p. 8l.
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defendant in a Francophone court is not free to decide 
whether to take the witness box (which, incidentally, 
does not exist) and submit to the questioning process. 
Questions can always be asked of him. He has no right 
or freedom not to be questioned. He only has the right 
not to answer questions at all (that is, being mute of 
malice as sometimes happens in political trials) and 
not to respond to particular questions. Since the court 
may comment on and draw adverse inferences from such 
refusal to answer at all or to respond to specific ques­
tions, this acts as a psychological pressure to speak and 
respond to questions.
The law of evidence applicable in Francophone
courts (what is known as la preuve) is not as technical
and as highly developed as the law of evidence which
obtains in Anglophone courts. Evidence is any material
which a party wishes to bring before a court of law in the
hope that it will impel the court to arrive at a desired
conclusion on some matter of fact. Evidence may be oral,
documentary or real. The law of evidence in Anglophone
Cameroon as in all common law jurisdictions, has a five- 
131fold function. Firstly, it determines the competence
and compellability to give evidence of prospective witnesses, 
and regulates the procedure to be followed when evidence is
131. St. J. Langan, Civil procedure and evidence, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London” 1970, pp. 165-167.
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adduced; for example, the rules relating to the exami­
nation and cross-examination of witnesses. Secondly, 
it determines the relevance and admissibility of material 
tendered as evidence. This is largely an exclusionary 
function: evidence proferred is rejected either because
its factual connection with the issues in the case is 
non-existent or too slight, or because, although relevant,
its admission would for some other reason be unsafe or 
132prejudicial. Thus certain evidence is, according to
circumstances, excluded altogether or admitted only if cer­
tain conditions are satisfied: matters of hearsay, evi­
dence of opinion, evidence in respect of privileged 
matters where there is a desideratum higher than that of 
the disclosure to the court of all the relevant facts, and 
matters affecting the character of parties and witnesses. 
Thirdly, the law of evidence prescribes how certain facts 
(for example, birth, age, legitimacy, marriage) have to be 
proved. Fourthly, in certain, circumstances the law of
evidence dispenses with the necessity for proof altogether, 
as where facts are formally admitted; or holds that a
132. Rules exist for the admission or rejection of evidence 
on the ground that without them the admission or rejec­
tion of evidence would depend upon the individual 
caprice of an individual judge. Quot judices tot 
sententiae. In Francophone courts however, the admis­
sion or rejection of evidence largely depends on the 
trial judge.
133* This may be contrasted with the principle of la preuve 
par tous moyens which prevails in Francophone courts.
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party is estopped or precluded from proving particular 
facts; or provides that certain inferences shall be 
drawn as a matter of course from the proof of particular 
facts. Finally, the law of evidence deals with the rules 
requiring corroboration: evidence has to be evaluated as
it may be unsafe to accept a single item as constituting 
proof of a certain fact.
Rules of evidence of this nature do not exist 
in Francophone Cameroon.- Few rules of evidence inhibit 
the judge and the methods of adducing evidence or proving 
particular facts in court. There is no requirement for 
the prosecution to make out a prima facie case. Since 
the ultimate responsibility for ascertaining the truth 
is placed on the trial judge, whatever evidence he decides 
to examine becomes the court’s evidence. So, there is, 
strictly speaking, no ’prosecution’s case’ and there are 
no ’witnesses for the prosecution' although in court one 
sometimes hears of ’temoins h charge et & decharge’.
There are also no evidentiary rules requiring that a cer­
tain proposition of fact necessary for ascertainment of 
guilt be proved by more than one piece of evidence. For 
example, in Anglophone courts a confession must be corro­
borated by other extrinsic evidence before the court can 
convict. Rules as to corroboration of evidence do not 
exist in Francophone courts, although in practice at least 
a modicum of corroboration is always found.
A criminal trial in a Francophone court is not
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hedged about- by complex rules of evidence as found in 
Anglophone courts. Whereas Anglophone courts are concerned 
with the issue of admissibility, Francophone courts admit 
and ’freely evaluate’ (that is, the court decides what 
value to attach to any evidence adduced in court) all 
evidence that is logically relevant. In Anglophone courts 
not all evidence which has passed the test of logical rele­
vance and has been found suitable for rational inference
134is necessarily admissible under the Evidence Act. Some
rules of evidence exclude certain classes of logically 
relevant evidence largely on the theory that its impact on 
the fact-finder may be stronger than its actual probative 
weight. Such is the case with the rule against hearsay 
evidence, and the general rule against informing the court 
before the defendant has been found guilty of his bad 
character or criminal record.
In Francophone courts the trial judge hears all 
the evidence, freely decides on what weight to attach to 
which piece of evidence, and is trusted to be capable of 
disregarding the influence of relevant but untrustworthy 
evidence and of excluding it from the calculus of decision. 
So not all evidence that is relevant is ipso facto admis­
sible. For one thing, some form of hearsay evidence is 
excluded by Francophone courts as violative of the principle
134. Cap. 43 of the 1958 Laws.
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of immediacy. This principle is nothing more than an 
extension, to all types of evidence,- of the ’best evidence 
rule’ familiar to common law lawyers. - The theory is that 
original evidence is more probative than evidence filtered 
through intermediary sources. Furthermore, a Francophone 
judge may refuse to examine evidence (although the power 
to do so is nowhere defined in the' Code d ’ Instruction 
Criminelle) even though it appears logically relevant. For 
example, the court may refuse to hear a witness if his evi­
dence would add nothing new to what the court already 
knows. Again, just as an Anglophone judge would admit 
evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal record if the 
purpose of such evidence is to prove ’a system’, so too a 
Francophone judge would admit evidence of previous convictions 
as proof of modus operandi.
Another contrast between Anglophone and Franco­
phone courts relates to the victim of a criminal offence.
In Anglophone Cameroon the victim of a criminal offence can­
not claim damages in the criminal court. He must bring a 
separate civil action against the accused in the civil court. 
(In England however, such a victim can now be awarded ’com­
pensation’ by the criminal court.) In Francophone Cameroon 
by contrast, the victim of a criminal offence may join in 
the State Prosecutor’s criminal action against the accused
and claim compensation for injury suffered. This is known
115as constitution de partie civile and may be made at any
135. C.I.C., ss. 1 and 6 3 .
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stage of the criminal trial. The principal advantage
of this procedure relates to evidence. By joining as a 
civil party in the State Prosecutor’s criminal action 
against the accused, the complainant need not himself 
adduce any evidence concerning the defendant's criminal 
(and hence, civil) liability as this is done by the State 
Prosecutor. Where the complainant brings a separate 
civil action against the accused, the action will be stayed 
until the determination of the criminal action. The.prin­
ciple is, le criminel tient le civil en etat. The advan­
tage of this procedure to the complainant lies in the fact 
that should the accused be convicted evidence of this con­
viction is enough to enable the civil court to hold him 
civilly liable.
Two matters, common to both Anglophone and 
Francophone courts, are worthy of mention. These are, 
the language problem in the courts and the taking of oath 
by witnesses. The official language in Anglophone and 
Francophone courts is respectively English and French.
But most accused persons appearing before Courts of First 
Instance are either illiterate or only semi-literate.
This creates a problem of oral communication between defen­
dant or witness and the court. In Anglophone Cameroon 
and in the large towns in Francophone Cameroon (e.g., towns 
such as Douala, Yaounde, Bafoussam) the problem is resol­
ved by resorting to pidgin, a variant of broken English
136. C.I.C., s. 67.
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which has virtually succeeded in establishing itself as 
a de facto lingua franca in Cameroon. When illiterate 
persons appear in courts therefore they testify in pidgin 
and are examined and cross-examined in pidgin. If an 
accused person or a witness can only express himself in 
his vernacular tongue or in English (if he is appearing 
before a Francophone court) or in French (if he is 
appearing before an Anglophone court), then the office of 
an interpreter is always sought. The interpreter need 
not be an expert or a professional interpreter. Anyone 
with a working knowledge of the language or the dialect 
concerned may, after swearing to interpret faithfully, be 
allowed to act as interpreter. The interpreter is paid 
out of public funds at the rate of roughly 350 francs cfa 
per attendance.
Every witness giving evidence in court must
either swear or affirm that he will tell the truth. In
Francophone courts the witness swears to speak the whole
137truth and nothing but.the truth by simply raising his 
right hand and saying, TJe jure'. Children under 15 
cannot testify on oath but may give evidence in the form
1 o Q
of a declaration. In Anglophone courts any witness
who professes the Christian faith swears holding the Bible 
in his uplifted right hand. A Muslim swears on the Qu'ran 
and so-called pagans swear holding a gun in both hands.
137. Ibid., s. 75.
138. Ibid., s. 79.
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The oath words are: 'I swear by the Almighty God that
the evidence I shall give in this case shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth’. The unsworn 
evidence of a child is admissible when the judge is satis­
fied that he does not understand the nature of the oath 
but is possessed of sufficient intelligence to understand 
the duty of speaking the truth. Child testimony must be 
corroborated; the unsworn evidence of another child does 
not amount to corroboration.
The requirement of the oath is undoubtedly 
intended to be a pressure on the witness to speak the truth 
or else suffer punishment for perjuring by lying. The 
requirement is probably unnecessary and undesirable. The 
oath does not prevent the guilty defendant or the witness 
from perjuring himself. It is impossible to estimate 
how much deliberate lying goes on in Cameroonian courts. 
There are no lie-detectors. There is little doubt however 
that there are only few prosecutions for false testimony. 
This does not mean that witnesses do not tell lies. The 
probalem is that the nature of the offence of perjury 
(which, incidentally, carries a heavy penalty) makes prose­
cution difficult. Perjury is punished under s. 164 of 
the Penal Code with anything up to life imprisonment, and 
the offence is committed by ’whoever in any proceeding 
gives on oath or affirmation false evidence capable of 
influencing the decision’. This threat of a criminal 
sanction has not however prevented deliberate lying by wit­
nesses. If a witness has a direct interest in the outcome
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of a case, the chances are that his testimony will be 
shaded somewhat in favour of the side on which he testifies. 
He would lie.
But not all witnesses deliberately lie. Some­
times the witness is unconsciously suffering from partisan­
ship or taking sides. Sometimes, although the witness 
had the opportunity to observe the facts he speaks of, he 
had not the intelligence to observe these facts correctly.
It is common knowledge that two people may witness the 
same occurrence and yet take away with them an entirely 
different impression of it; but each when called into the 
witness-box is willing to swear to that impression as a 
fact. An adult, for example, sees an infinite variety 
of things which are meaningless to a child. Furthermore, 
one may have the opportunity of observation and even the 
intelligence to observe correctly; but it is still another 
thing to be able to retain accurately, for any length of 
time, what one has once heard or seen and be able to des­
cribe it intelligently. Many witnesses have seen one 
part of a transaction and heard about another part, and 
later on become confused in their own minds, or perhaps 
only in their modes of expression, as to what they have 
seen themselves and what they have heard from others.
All witnesses are prone to exaggerate, to minimise or 
enlarge the facts to which they take oath. Many witnesses, 
at least in some part of their story, mix facts with their 
own beliefs, impressions and inferences.
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3. Conclusion of the trial
On the face of it another contrast between Anglo­
phone and Francophone courts concerns the closing stage of 
the criminal trial. The difference is however super­
ficial and more apparent than real. In Anglophone courts 
when the prosecution rests and again at the conclusion of 
all the evidence, defence counsel may make a 'no case to 
answer’ submission inviting the court to discharge and 
acquit the defendant. The court would grant such a motion 
if the evidence is such that the court cannot reasonably 
and safely convict on it. In Francophone courts, sub­
stantially the same effect is achieved upon a demande by 
the avocat-defenseur for a relaxe purement et' simplement.
In both courts the closing stage of the trial Is punctuated 
by three concluding speeches: that of the prosecution,
the defence and the trial judge - in that order. In both 
courts also defence counsel always has the right to the 
last word - ~ The reason for this rule is
to lend greater weight or force to the presumption of 
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
A. Addresses by the prosecution and the defence
When the State Prosecutor makes his concluding 
address (known in Francophone courts as le requisitoire) 
he always strives to give a clear picture of the prosecution’s
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case. He repeats everything that had been heard, ham­
mering it into a sober and coherent pattern, inevitably 
linking all the pieces of evidence together. "My Lord, 
the accused did this and that ... he said so and so ...
The court would recall the evidence of ... The court would 
also recall the accused’s statement to the police ...
Were these not the words, the actions and the attitude of 
a guilty man? etc. etc." In the course of his address 
the State Prosecutor also attempts to neutralise evidence 
adduced by the defence. "My Lord, the defence would want 
this court to believe that ... But ... Allegations of 
extorted confessions have also been made in this court.
There may have been some irregularities. But that is 
probably a professional exigence. The police does not 
spend its time manufacturing confessions ..." And the 
prosecution would go on to unfold an elaborate and perhaps 
rather dialectical refutation of the idea of police irregu­
larities and other allegations that may have been made by 
the defence. At the end of his address the State Prose­
cutor always urges the court to find the accused guilty.
In Francophone courts, unlike in Anglophone courts, 
it is the rule for the State Prosecutor not only.to call for 
a conviction but actually to suggest to the court the sen­
tence it should pass. "Je ne veux pas la t§te de 
1’inculpe; je demande seulement une condamnation k vingt 
ans d'emprisonnement ferine ..." "Monsieur le President, 
vu la gravite du crime commis par 1 ’inculpe, je demande I 
ce qu’une peine exemplaire lui soit inflig£ ...". The
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State Prosecutor may also urge acquittal if he thinks the 
evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction. The 
underlying philosophy behind this is that it is the duty 
of the prosecution to present the true facts of a case 
rather than press for a conviction per se. However, 
straight-forward requests by the prosecution for acquittal 
are extremely rare partly because where there is insuf­
ficient evidence the State Prosecutor would not prosecute 
in the first place. Furthermore, motions for acquittal 
by the State Prosecutor are never made directly. He
simply says, fJe m'en remets au tribunal’. To what extent 
to
judges conform/or deviate from the State Prosecutor’s recom­
mendation as to sentence is hard to determine. One thing 
however, is very certain. The trial judge is not bound 
by the State Prosecutor’s submission as to sentence. His 
hands are not fettered and he may convict or acquit or 
pass sentence as he deems appropriate. However, if the 
prosecution does urge an acquittal, the court must do so; 
it cannot convict. This is so because the prosecution in 
this instance is in effect withdrawing the case against 
the accused and is offering no evidence on which the court 
may properly convict.
In Anglophone courts the State Prosecutor never 
calls for an acquittal. This is so because where there 
is insufficient evidence to proceed with the case the 
prosecution will not wait until the conclusion of the trial 
to ask for the accused to be set free. He will simply
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withdraw the charge by entering a nolle prosequi or asking 
the case to be withdrawn, or offer no evidence. Par more 
vigorous speeches, demanding convictions and heavy sen­
tences are made in Francophone courts than in Anglophone 
courts because of the differing policies in prosecution.
After the prosecution’s speech it is the turn of
the defence to address the court. Defence counsel will
bring out a sequence of facts, pursue a line of argument 
and make a rebuttal of the arguments earlier advanced by 
the Prosecution. ”My Lord, the prosecution’s case rests 
on nothing but conjectures, fabrications, conjectures pure 
and simple. ... Memory is fallible, behaviour unaccountable, 
actions not always what they appear to be. ... My Lord, 
the prosecution has woefully failed to make out its case; 
to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. The accused’s inno­
cence has amply been shown in this court. ... I urge the 
court to accept the evidence of ... and to dismiss that of 
... as a pack of lies . . ." . And finally a plea for 
acquittal so that the accused may walk out of the court 
the free man he was before he entered it.
There is some difference in style between an
address by an Anglophone counsel and that of a Francophone 
counsel. The address by an Anglophone counsel is likely 
to be analytical and intellectual rather than fervent 
emtoional appeals, which is what plaidoiries in Francophone 
courts are. When it comes to advocacy, the Francophone 
counsel surpasses his Anglophone colleague. ’’Messieurs
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de la cour ...” The avocat-defenseur at once takes to 
the wings of rhetoric, sprawling around the well of the 
court, flapping the sleeves of his black gown and occa­
sionally gesticulating with his hands. "The true 
accused, Messieurs de la cour; the true accused does not 
stand before you today, the true accused has escaped the 
long arm of temporal justice ... He is dead ...” A 
quotation from one of the French classics, and then cres­
cendo upon crescendo. "The case of the accused is the 
tragedy of an honest man ... a victim of duty ... If you 
convict him you will be ringing the death knell to honesty, 
decency and devotion to duty ...". And then other 
oratorical subjunctives, further quotations from the 
classics, Latin expressions, and then a dramatic finish. 
"You judge in the name of the people. If you convict 
this man you convict yourselves and the people. Monsieur 
le President, I have absolute confidence in your sagacity." 
And the advocate walks back to his seat. His client may 
be asked whether he has anything to add to what his counsel 
has already said. Often the reply is that he trusts in
his counsel. Then comes the judge’s speech.
B. Judgment
After the conclusion of the trial the judge often 
requires a day or more to write out his judgment. When
the judge begins to speak the whole court becomes as silent
as a grave. The moment of truth has come. Will the
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accused be convicted or will he be acquitted? In Franco­
phone courts the judge only reads his judgment which is 
often laconic and generally not very informative. In 
Anglophone courts, however, the judge reviews the entire 
case; that is, he goes over both the case for the prose­
cution and that for the defence. He delivers a creaking 
train of marshalled fact and dictum, now from the prose­
cution’s angle, now from the defence’s angle, now tilted
a fraction towards the middle. As he speaks every fact
and word is given a new order. "The prosecution’s case
is this ... But ... The defence contends that ... But . . .’’
And then a synthesis of the entire case. In the end the
court must reach one of two conclusions; a verdict of 
guilty or a verdict of not guilty. "I therefore find the 
accused not guilty. He is accordingly discharged and 
acquitted". "I therefore find the accused guilty as 
charged". If a guilty verdict is returned the court does 
not proceed to pass sentence at once. The prisoner is 
asked: "You stand convicted of ... Do you know of any
reason why this court may not pass sentence upon you?"
At this stage defence counsel normally gets up and pleads, 
often in a sober and subdued manner, for mercy. He may 
also plead mitigating circumstances, if any. This is the 
poignant moment of any criminal trial. Defence counsel’s 
combativeness is gone and he speaks now in a plaintive 
voice. "My Lord, the quality of mercy is not strained,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place
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beneath ... My Lord, this man has done meritorious ser­
vice to his country ... He is a first offender ... My 
Lord, he is married and has many children and dependants.
A term of imprisonment would do more harm than good both 
to him and society as there would be no one to look after 
his wife, children and dependants . . ." . The judge listens 
through, records the ple.c^  and then passes sentence.
The prisoner is taken straight away to prison if the sen­
tence is a custodial one.
IV. The Penal System
Section 17 of the Cameroonian Penal Code
expresses a fundamental principle in Cameroonian criminal
law. It provides:
"S. 17. No penalty or measure may be imposed 
unless provided by law, and except in respect 
of an offence lawfully defined."
This is the principle of legality which is often expressed
in the maxim, nulla poena sine lege; which means, no man
shall be made to suffer except for a distinct breach of
the criminal law, which law shall be laid down beforehand
in precise and definite terms. The retrosepctive impos-
119ition of criminality, the extension by analogy of a
139* Section 3 of the Penal Code provides: "No criminal
law shall apply to acts or omissions committed before 
its coming into force or in respect of which judgment 
has not been delivered before its repeal or expiry." 
The preamble to the Constitution also provides that 
the law may not have retrospective effect.
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criminal rule to cover a case not obviously falling within 
it, and the formulation of criminal laws in excessively 
wide and vague terms are therefore inconsistent with the 
principle of legality.
1. Sentencing
The wages of crime is punishment, the nature 
and range of which is wide. When a court convicts it 
must pass sentence. Sentencing is largely a matter of 
policy and at this stage in the proceedings the judge turns 
administrator. In passing sentence the trial judge must 
first advert his mind to certain sentencing principles.
He has first of all to decide on the object to be achieved
by imposing sentence. Is it retribution? deterrence? 
public protection? or reformation? After this first deci­
sion the trial judge then has to decide on the appropriate 
punishment to mete out. The punishment may either be a 
penalty or a measure.
A. Selection of sentence
In selecting sentence the Cameroonian judge must
address his mind to s . 93 of the Penal Code, which provides,
"S. 93- Sentence of penalty or measure shall 
vary, within such limits as may be prescribed 
or authorised by law, according to the circum­
stances of the offence and to the public
danger which it may represent, to the circum­
stances of the offender and to the likelihood 
of his reformation, and to the practical means 
of carrying it out."
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This means that the sentence must (1) be within the limits
prescribed by law, (11) fit the crime committed, and (111)
fit the criminal.
"The criminal law assumes, In the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, that people 
have It In their power to choose whether 
to do criminal acts or not, and that he who 
chooses to do such an act is responsible 
for the resulting evil. The law further 
assumes that the evil which might result 
from particular crimes can be nicely 
measured and graded, so that we have an 
elaborate scale of permissible punishments, 
varying from [the death sentence] to a 
mere fine." 140
In some jurisdictions such as In England for example, the 
law prescribes only the maximum punishment for each offence 
leaving It to the discretion of the trial court to fix a 
sentence varying from an absolute discharge to the statu­
tory maximum. In Cameroon however, both the minimum and 
maximum punishment for each offence are fixed by law.
Within these two poles the trial court has a free hand to 
impose any sentence taking into account the moral wicked­
ness of the offence, its danger to society, the circum­
stances of the offender, the particular degree of iniquity 
and dangerousness evinced by the offender, and the prac­
tical .means of carrying out the sentence.
The severity of the sentence that may be passed 
would therefore depend on the nature of the offence (circum­
stances of the particular offence and the harm done) and
140. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 3rd edition, Butter- 
worths, London, 1973, p. 5*
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on the circumstances of the offender (financial, family, 
personal character, and possibility of reform). Some­
times the courts adopt a retributive attitude towards 
punishment and inflict a sentence that reflects the degree 
of revulsion felt by the law-abiding citizens of the commu­
nity for the particular criminal act in question. In 
this way is gratified the public’s desire for vengeance 
or retaliation against a wrongdoer. So when for example, 
the incidence of robbery increased dramatically in the 
urban centres in 1972 and public outcry was loud, the
government reacted by prescribing a mandatory death sen-
141tence for robbery. The courts accordingly did not
hesitate to pass death sentences on those found guilty of 
robbery. Many robbers were publicly executed to serve 
as a deterrent and to convice the public that the govern­
ment was indeed going tough with robbers. Again, when 
sexual offences (prostitution and kindred offences, cor­
ruption of persons under 21, and indecency to minors) and 
offences against property (fraud, misappropriation of 
public funds) became rampant, the legislator reacted by 
prescribing severe penalties (in some cases sentence could
l4l. Ordinance No. 72/17 of 28 September 1972 to simplify 
criminal procedure in respect of acts of lawlessness. 
Robbery is characterised in the Cameroonian Penal Code 
as ’aggravated theft’ and is dealt with in s. 320 (new). 
That section provides: ”S. 320(1). Whoever commits
a theft by day or by night: (a) with force, or (b)
bearing weapons, or (c) by breaking in, by climbing in, 
or by use of a false key, or (d) with a motor vehicle 
- shall be punished with death."
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be as long as 20 years or a life sentence) in respect of 
those offences and the courts did pass those heavy sen­
tences. The notion of ’exemplary sentence’ Is one to 
which courts often make reference. Courts believe in the 
value of punishment both as a deterrent to the person sen­
tenced and to others. So they take the view that exemplary 
sentences are justified - they serve retributive and 
deterrent purposes.
Sometimes the courts inflict punishment which 
they consider to be appropriate to the harm done and not 
to the offender’s moral guilt. This is however at variance 
with the spirit of the theory of punishment as enunciated 
in the Penal Code. The Code would seem to require that 
punishment be proportionate to the offender’s moral guilt. 
This is illustrated by the attitude of the Code towards 
inchoate offences. An attempt (s. 94) or a conspiracy 
(s. 95) to commit a felony or a misdemeanour is treated 
as the commission of the substantive offence and punished 
in like manner. Similarly, secondary parties to crime 
(accomplices or accessores - s. 98) are punished in the 
same way as a sole or principal offender. Thus it is 
theoretically possible to punish with death anyone who 
attempts to murder, a person who conspires to murder, or 
an accomplice to murder. Courts are not required to punish 
an attempt or a conspiracy to commit a crime less severely 
(except on a finding of mitigating circumstances) than if 
the attempt or conspiracy were successful. Evidently, the
position of the Code is based on the premise that the moral 
guilt of him who attempts or conspires and fails is just 
as great as that of him who attempts and succeeds - he is 
no less dangerous and may have been merely unlucky in not 
succeeding. There is some evidence however that despite 
this legislative attitude, judicial attitude tends to regard 
failure as something of a mitigating factor. Attempts are 
in practice never punished as severely as the completed 
offence. Judicial attitude would seem to be that the harm 
done in the case of an attempt is not the same as in the 
case of the completed offence and so does not merit the same 
punishment. In such a case it seems the punishment is 
being proportioned to the harm done.
In certain cases however, courts apply the 'deter­
rence by deprivation of fruits' theory. This they do 
particularly in economic and financial offences where the 
offender has committed the offence after deliberately dis­
counting the risks he runs. If he considers that the 
profit which he has derived from the offence outweighs the 
disadvantages of the punishment which he foresaw, and which 
is then inflicted, he will find the game worth the candle 
and be ready to start again. Courts are often not blind 
to this psychological consideration. Accordingly, in 
order to deny the offender the opportunity to gain his 
liberty in the near future and enjoy his ill-gotten gains, 
they pass long prison sentences by steering closer to the 
maximum allowed under the law. Sentences in these cases
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Invariably include a court order under s. 35 of the Penal 
Code for the 'confiscation of any property, moveable or 
immoveable, belonging to the offender and attached, which 
was used as an instrument of ... commission [of the offence], 
or is the proceeds of the offence'.
In estimating the severity of the sentence to be 
inflicted for a particular crime, courts invariably take 
into account the circumstances of the particular offence 
and the public danger which it may represent. They endea­
vour to pass a sentence which fits the crime and the circum­
stances of the offender.
"Thus, it is wrong to increase the sentence 
because the accused has insisted on pleading 
not guilty or conducted his defence in a 
particular way; but the sentence may be 
reduced on the ground that he pleaded guilty.
The sentence may be reduced because D informed 
against his co-prisoner; it should not be 
increased because D did not inform. D's 
good record may be a ground for mitigating 
the sentence; but his bad record may not be 
allowed to aggravate it. A fine may be 
diminished because of D's poverty; but it ^ 2  
may not be increased because of his wealth."
The circumstances of the offender and the offence
may afford good reasons for suspending the enforcement of
the sentence passed or for passing a heavier or lighter
sentence. Accordingly, a first offender who has committed
an offence carrying a penalty of not more than five years'
imprisonment may be given a suspended sentence.
"S. 5^(1). Subject to any contrary pro­
vision of law, upon conviction for.felony
142. Smith and Hogan, op.cit., p. 10.
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or misdemeanour of an offender not previously 
sentenced to imprisonment, or where after 
such sentence his conviction has been expunged, 
the court may, for reasons to be recorded in 
the judgment, suspend for a period of from 
three to five years the enforcement of any 
sentence of imprisonment for five years or less, 
or of fine not imposed under section 92(2) of 
this Code.
"(2) Such suspension shall not affect any 
accessory penalty or preventive measure 
resulting from the conviction.
"(3) Where within the period so fixed, calcu­
lated from the date when the judgment becomes 
final,’ the offender commits a further felony 
or misdemeanour for which he is sentenced to 
imprisonment, and where such sentence is not 
suspended on probation, both sentences shall 
be served consecutively, that which has been 
suspended under this section being served 
first."
It is noteworthy that it is not the passing of the sentence 
that Is suspended. Suspended sentence means a sentence 
suspended when passed; that is, the court passes sentence 
and then suspends its enforcement. The purpose of a sus­
pended sentence is to administer a warning to the offender 
so that he may address his mind to the consequences of a 
new breach of the law. It is both a threat and a promise: 
a threat that in case of relapse within the time fixed by 
the court both sentences will be serve consecutively, and 
a promise that otherwise the conviction will be expunged 
(that is, at the expiry of this period not only does the 
suspension of the sentence become irrevocable but the con­
viction itself disappears as in the case of rehabilitation 
under s . 69).
Where a sentence of six months or more of impri­
sonment may be suspended, suspension may be combined with
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14 3probation. When combined with probation suspension
may also be granted to an offender with a previous sen­
tence of imprisonment for less than six months not sus­
pended. Probation means the subjection of the offender
to general and, in a fit case, to added special obli-
144gations of supervision and assistance. Superintendence
of compliance with these obligations is entrusted to a
magistrate who is assisted by salaried or honorary pro-
145bation officers. If during the period of probation
the offender commits a breach of these obligations the
court which suspended the sentence may order its enforce-
. 146 ment.
Certain circumstances either relating to the 
offence or to the offender may operate as aggravating 
or mitigating factors. Under s. 88 of the Penal Code 
previous convictions are aggravating factors and under 
s.89 the fact of being a public servant is also an aggra­
vating factor for any public servant who commits an offence 
against which it is his duty to guard or take action (for 
example, the police or gendarme officer who steals, the
143. Penal Code, s. 55.
144. Ibid., s. 56. The general and special obligations of 
an offender on probation are contained in ss. 4l and 
42 of the Penal Code.
145. The duties of a probation officer are outlined in 
s. 59 of the Penal Code.
146. Penal Code, s. 60.
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customs officer who indulges in smuggling, the prison warder 
who abets a punishable escape). Any increase of sentence 
incurred by reason of previous conviction or by the fact 
of being a public servant is in addition to any increase 
for reasons other than these two factors. Whenever sentence 
is aggravated under ss. 88 and 89 the maximum penalty pro­
vided for the offence is doubled.
In passing sentence the court may also take miti-
147gating factors into account. Mitigating circumstances,
unlike aggravating factors, are not catalogued and are in 
the discretion of the court. However, whenever the court 
grants the benefit of mitigating circumstance, it must 
state in its judgment the precise circumstance it has 
taken into account as mitigating factor. It is the almost 
invariable practice of courts to take the offender’s good 
character, his large family responsibilities, and some­
times his poverty and wretchedness as mitigating factors.
Mitigating facts operate to reduce the sentence that would
148otherwise have been passed.
B . Concurrent and consecutive sentences
Section 51 of the Penal Code expresses the rule
against consecutive sentences.
"S. 51 (1). Where any person Is convicted 
on several charges of felony or misdemeanour
147. Penal Code, s. 90.
148. Ibid., ss. 91-92.
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tried jointly, or of simple offence tried 
with either, only one sentence may be 
passed, not exceeding the maximum pre­
scribed for the most severely punished 
offence.
"(2) Where any person is convicted on several 
such charges tried separately, any sentence 
later passed may be ordered to run concur­
rently with, or in the case of fines to be 
merged in, any earlier sentence; and where 
it is not so ordered, the aggregate of the 
sentences may not exceed the maximum pres­
cribed for the most severely punished 
offence.
M(3) In the calculation of such aggregate 
an earlier sentence reduced by remission 
shall be counted at its reduced and not at 
its original length.
"(4) No sentence may be ordered to run con­
currently with, or to be merged in, a 
sentence which had already become final 
before the act or omission in respect of 
which the second sentence is passed.
"(5) In respect of simple offences sentences 
shall not be concurrent or merged unless 
the court shall so order.
"(6) Subject to any contrary order of the 
court, several sentences other than to 
principal penalties shall be consecutive as 
between themselves."
The rule against consecutive sentences is appli­
cable only to principal penalties (death sentence, custo­
dial sentence, fine). It does not, except otherwise 
ordered by the court, apply to accessory penalties (for­
feiture, publication of the judgment, closure of establish­
ment, confiscation) or to preventive measures (ban on 
occupation, preventive confinement, post-penal supervision 
and assistance, confinement in a special health institution,
confiscation). Nor does it apply to simple offences
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unless otherwise decided by the court or unless the 
simple offence forms part of the same transaction as a 
felony or misdemeanour.
The rule against consecutive sentences operates 
in a slightly different manner according as the charges 
have been tried jointly or separately. In practice 
the rule seldom applies -in the case of separate prose­
cutions. The law provides that if the second offence 
is committed after the conviction for the first has become 
final the sentences must run consecutively. The rule 
would however apply in the case of a second offence com­
mitted in the course of the first prosecution or an offence 
committed earlier but not discovered until after the first 
prosecution has been commenced. Ordinarily, where charges 
are tried jointly only one sentence must be passed. The 
single sentence passed must not however exceed the maximum 
prescribed for the most severely punished offence. As 
between a term of imprisonment and a term of detention of 
equal duration, imprisonment is regarded as a more severe 
sentence than detention. Similarly, as between a custo­
dial sentence and a sentence of fine, however heavy the 
fine, the custodial sentence is always treated as more 
severe.
Where any person is convicted on several charges 
tried separately, it is up to the discretion of the court 
whether to order the later sentence passed to run concur­
rently with, or in the case of fines to be merged in, any
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earlier sentence. If the court orders the sentences to
run concurrently the aggregate of the sentences may not
exceed the maximum prescribed for the most severely
punished offence.
Section 52 of the Penal Code deals with the order
In which consecutive sentences are to be served.
"S. 52(1). Sentences to loss of liberty 
shall be enforced in the chronological 
order in which the imprisonment warrants 
are notified to the offender.
"(2) Accessory penalties and confinement 
under section 43 of this Code shall run from 
the date when the sentence becomes final, 
while other preventive measures shall com­
mence from the expiry or suspension of the 
principal sentence.
"(3) Several consecutive preventive measures 
shall be enforced in the following order:
(a) Confinement in a health institution;
(b) Preventive' confinement;
(c) Post-penal supervision and assistance.
"(4) Where during the currency of any such 
measure, the offender is sentenced to loss 
of liberty for another felony or misdemeanour, 
the preventive measure shall be suspended 
until the new sentence shall have been served 
out."
Subsection (1) would appear to suggest that where sen­
tences of loss of liberty are consecutive the later term 
of imprisonment may not begin to be served until expiry 
of the earlier one. Unlike preventive measures which 
always follow on the expiry or suspension of the prin­
cipal penalty, accessory penalties run together with the 
principal penalty. It is most unlikely that confinement 
in a health institution, preventive confinement and 
post-penal supervision and assistance would be imposed in
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one judgment. However, they may be imposed in several
judgments and ordered to run consecutively. For example,
an offender may be sentenced by one judgment to preventive
confinement and by a later judgment to confinement in a
health institution as a drug addict. In such a case, the
sentence of preventive confinement is suspended and the
sentence of confinement in a health institution commenced
immediately; when the latter expires the earlier resumes.
Where a penalty is imposed in the course of service of a
measure, the latter is suspended until the former has
been served out; at the expiry of the principal penalty,
service of the measure would then resume.
In the calculation of sentence of loss of liberty
expressed in either days, months or years, a day means 24
hours, a month means 30 days and a year is reckoned by 
149calendar date. Where a new sentence is passed concur­
rently with one already passed, service of the new sentence
is deemed to have begun from the day when the first sen- 
150tence began. If a prisoner escapes, the period during
which he was unlawfully at liberty does not count in the
151duration of the sentence that was passed on him.
Besides, any sentence that may be passed for the offence 
of escaping from jail is always consecutive on that which
149. Ibid., s. 28(1)— (3).
150. Ibid., s. 28(4)(b).
151. Ibid., s. 28(5).
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152the prisoner was trying to avoid by escaping. In
computing the duration of any custodial sentence, the day
on which the offender was taken Into custody under that
152sentence must be Included. Thus any time passed In
custody awaiting trial Is always counted towards the sen­
tence. Section.53(1) provides that "where the offender 
has been in custody awaiting trial, the duration of such 
custody shall be wholly deducted from the computation of 
a sentence of loss of liberty".
What happens is that the trial court passes 
sentence without reference to any period spent in custody 
awaiting trial and then automatically deducts such period 
from the sentence passed. Where the period spent in 
custody awaiting trial exceeds the duration of the sentence 
passed the offender is released at once. But neither in 
this case nor in the case of an acquittal does the question 
of compensation for the custody arise. Thus if a person 
is kept in custody for months awaiting trial (as it fre­
quently happens) and is then eventually acquitted by the 
court he cannot sue for compensation for such detention.
A limited form of compensation however exists under s. 53(2) 
in respect of an offender who, after having been in custody 
awaiting trial, is sentenced to a fine only. In such a 
case the trial court may relieve him wholly or in part of
152. Ibid., s. 51(4).
153. Ibid., s. 28(4)(a).
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the said fine. This is however a discretionary step which 
the courts, in practice, take only when of the opinion 
that the time spent in custody is already sufficient 
punishment.
Section 27 of the Penal Code makes provision 
with regards to the commencement of sentence. Subsection
(1) provides that where the offender "has not been in cus­
tody pending trial, and where no warrant of arrest or remand 
is issued against him at the time of judgment ..., no 
sentence of loss of liberty may be enforced until it has 
become final". This in effect means that a custodial 
sentence does not, as a general rule, immediately deprive 
the offender of his liberty. In this regard there is a 
theoretical difference as to the position in Anglophone 
and Francophone Cameroon. In Anglophone Cameroon as soon 
as an offender is sentenced by the court he is taken 
straight away from the courtroom to the prison and it makes 
no difference that he has given the court notice of his 
intention to go on appeal. If he does go on appeal, he 
may however obtain bail from the appellate court until the 
final determination of the appeal. In practice bail in 
such circumstances is rarely granted and is therefore sel­
dom applied for. In Francophone Cameroon, the trial 
court may, when passing sentence and subject to certain 
exceptions, sign a warrant of arrest or remand. If 
it does not do so the offender is not deprived of his 
liberty until the final determination of the appeal that
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may have been taken out against the judgment. In prac­
tice however Francophone courts seldom fail to sign an 
order of arrest or remand when they pass sentence. In 
concrete terms therefore the position is the same in both 
halves of the country: as soon as an offender is given a
custodial sentence he is taken from the courtroom straight 
to the prison and it matters not that he goes on appeal.
If a woman given a custodial sentence is preg­
nant or has just had a baby, she may not begin to serve
154her sentence until six weeks after delivery. If
such a woman was already in custody pending trial she con­
tinues, until expiry of the said period, to be in custody as
155if awaiting trial. So, a pregnant woman in custody
awaiting trial or a woman who gives birth when in custody 
pending trial continues to have the advantage of this less 
vigorous regime of custody for six weeks after, despite her 
conviction and sentence. Since custody awaiting trial is 
compulsorily counted towards the duration of the sentence, 
her ultimate release is not postponed by reason of her 
starting to serve her sentence later.
It is submitted that the situation should be 
the same where a person, taken ill while in custody and 
removed to hospital, is given a custodial sentence while 
still in hospital and where a person already serving a 
prison sentence becomes ill and is removed to hospital.
154. Ibid., s. 27(2).
155. Ibid., s. 27(3).
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In either of these cases the prisoner continues to remain 
in hospital until cured and the time spent in hospital is 
taken into account in the computation of the duration of 
the sentence passed.
It may well happen that a husband and wife are 
sentenced for the same or different offences to imprison­
ment. In that event the sentence on one spouse may be 
suspended until expiry of the sentence on the other if 
the following conditions are satisfied: (i) the imprison­
ment is for less than a year, (ii) both spouses were not 
in custody at the time the sentence was passed, and 
(iii) the spouses have a fixed common residence and a child 
under the age of eighteen supported by them and in their 
charge.
C . Expungement of conviction
The effect of expungement of conviction is, 
theoretically speaking, to put the offender back in the 
position which he would have occupied if- he had never 
been convicted. His criminal record is wiped clean and 
he is restored to the status quo ante. The conviction 
recorded in the offender’s criminal record is struck off; 
it no longer counts as a previous conviction, nor towards 
preventive confinement, nor as a qualification for suspen­
ded sentence. Expungement may come about by expiry of the
156. Ibid., s. 54(4).
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157 158term fixed for suspension of sentence, by rehabilitation,
159or by amnesty.
Rehabilitation may be by lapse of time or by 
judicial order. In either case rehabilitation expunges 
a conviction for a felony or a misdemeanour and puts an 
end to any accessory penalty and preventive measure, save 
only confinement in a health institution and closure of 
an establishment. If a person is the subject of more 
than one conviction he may not be rehabilitated only in 
respect of a single conviction; if he must be rehabilitated 
then the rehabilitation must be in respect of all the con­
victions .
To qualify for rehabilitation whether by lapse 
of time or by order of the court the offender must have 
served any principal penalty of loss of liberty and paid 
all fines, subject to any remissions and to prescription. 
Rehabilitation is possible only where all principal penal­
ties have been served out, time-barred or remitted by 
pardon. It is also necessary that in every case costs 
due to the Treasury in respect of the proceedings resulting 
in conviction should have been discharged and all sums 
under any civil judgment given the criminal proceedings 
paid.
157- Ibid., s. 54(4).
158. Ibid., ss. 69-72.
159. Ibid., s. 73-
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There are a number of restrictions on the effects 
of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation does not affect the 
right of the Treasury to any sums already collected in 
satisfaction of civil judgment, expenses, fines or con­
fiscations; it does not of itself restore any decoration 
or to any order forfeited; it does not of itself restore 
to any public service, employment or office, and gives no 
right to restoration to the position in a public service 
which, but for the conviction, would have been attained.
The rehabilitation of a convicted person is no bar to any 
application for revision of conviction he may make with 
a view to establish innocence in fact.
An offender is automatically rehabilitated by
l60lapse of time if, during the time prescribed he does 
not suffer any further sentence of imprisonment or deten­
tion for felony or misdemeanour. In the case of a single 
sentence of more than five years or several sentences 
totalling more than two years, rehabilitation by lapse of 
time is no longer available. It may only be granted by 
order of the court. An offender may apply to the court
for rehabilitation from a conviction after five years or
l6lfrom a conviction for a misdemeanour after three years.
160. Five years in the case of a sentence of fine, ten 
years in the case of a custodial sentence of up to 
six months, fifteen years in the case of a single sen­
tence of up to two years, and twenty years in the case 
of a single sentence of up to five years. For this 
purpose, sentences ordered to run concurrently are 
counted as a single sentence.
161. The said period is computed from the date of release 
from loss of liberty, and of payment in the case of 
fine.
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Even after the death of the offender his spouse, ascen­
dant or descendant may revive or present an application 
for his rehabilitation within one year of the death.
Amnesty also expunges a conviction and also bars 
the commencement or continuation of any prosecution.
"Within prejudice to any civil right", enacts s. 73 of the 
Penal Code, "an amnesty shall expunge a conviction and 
shall put an end to the enforcement of all penalties, 
whether principal or accessory, and of all preventive 
measures pronounced in consequence of the conviction, 
save confinement in a health institution and closure of 
an establishment."
The law draws a fundamental distinction between 
amnesty and pardon. An amnesty expunges a conviction, 
a pardon applies only to the sentence and does not affect 
the conviction.. An amnesty without expungement of the 
conviction is in fact not an amnesty at all. It is only 
a pardon. Amnesty also differs from rehabilitation in 
important respects. Rehabilitation is possible only where 
all principal penalties have been served out, time-barred 
or remitted by pardon. An amnesty may, on the contrary, 
take effect at any- time, even before conviction. Rehabi­
litation always requires the effluxion of a certain time. 
ki amnesty is granted by law and operates expungement 
from the moment of its promulgation. Rehabilitation can 
only be directed against the person of the offender (that 
is why a person who has several convictions cannot be
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rehabilitated only In respect of some of those convictions 
but must be rehabilitated, If he must, in respect of all 
those convictions). An amnesty may operate in favour 
of the offender personally, the offence which he has com­
mitted, or both the offence and the offender.
D. Remission of sentence
Sentence may be remitted either by release on 
licence or by the grant of a pardon. Furthermore,
prescription'*'^ and death"*"^ "* operate to prevent the 
enforcement of a penalty. Release on licence means the 
premature release of a person sentenced to loss of 
liberty, whether as a penalty or as a preventive measure.
The governor of any prison may of his own motion 
recommend the release on licence of any prisoner not 
debarred by law and whose efforts to reform himself, whose 
work, and whose behaviour in custody have all been entirely 
satisfactory. Such governor is bound to forward to the 
executive through the Minister of Justice, any application 
by a prisoner not debarred by law from release on licence. 
Release on licence only suspends the enforcement of the
162. Penal Code, s. 6l.
163. Ibid., s. 66.
164. Ibid., s. 67.
165. Ibid., s. 68.
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sentence;1^  it does not expunge the conviction. 
Furthermore, it is granted only when sentence has been 
partly served - half the sentence in the case of a prin­
cipal penalty, two thirds of the sentence where sentence 
is aggravated by the fact of being a public servant, and
fiveyears of the sentence in the case of preventive
1 f) T
detention. The grant of release on licence is made
by the executive which may also revoke it. It is
revoked on conviction for felony or misdemeanour later
committed or for breach of any of the general or special
l68conditions of the licence. When release on licence
is revoked the offender is taken back to prison where 
he continues to serve his full sentence, the period 
during which he was at liberty being disregarded in the 
calculation of the duration of his term. For example, if 
an offender is released while he still has three years of 
his sentence to serve and his release is revoked after 
two years, he will then have to serve the whole three 
years; if he had behaved himself for one more year the 
release would have become irrevocable.
The court and not the executive, as in the case 
of release on licence, may, by recording its reasons for 
doing so, suspend or revoke any post-penal measure.'*'^
166. Ibid., s . 62.
167. Ibid., s . 63.
168. Ibid., s . 64 .
169. Ibid., s . 65.
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The prerogative of pardon is entrusted by the Constitution 
to the Head of State and in exercising that prerogative 
he is subject to no rules. Pardon is defined in s . 66 
of the Penal Code as "the commutation or remission, in 
whole or in part and with or without conditions, of a 
penalty or preventive measure or of the obligations of a 
probation order". Thus a pardon may apply equally to 
penalties, to measures and to the analogous obligations 
of probation.
A pardon may take the form of a commutation 
(that is, the substitution of one penalty for another) or 
of remission (that is, the reduction of the term of a 
penalty without varying its nature). However, it applies 
only to.the sentence and in no way affects the conviction. 
Remission of a penalty may be partial or total, and both 
remission and commutation may be subject to conditions of 
which the Head of State, as grantor or pardons, is the 
sole judge. In the event of breach of such conditions 
the grant of pardon automatically lapses.
A sentence for a felony, misdemeanour, or simple 
offence becomes unenforceable by prescription after 
twenty, five, and two years respectively. The running of 
time of however suspended while enforcement of the sentence 
is prevented by any consideration of law or of fact apart 
from the offender’s will (for example, during the paralysis 
of the administration by enemy occupation of part of the 
country). An offender’s death only prevents the enforcement
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of any custodial sentence that may have been passed on 
him; it does not prevent the enforcement of pecuniary 
sentences against his estate, confiscation, or closure of 
establishment. However, the representatives of the 
deceased are. only bound to the extent of the value of the 
property which the deceased has left with them.
2. Penalties
When it proceeds to select the appropriate sen­
tence to pass on a convicted person, the trial court has 
at its disposal a whole range of penalties from which to 
select. There are three categories of penalties under
170Cameroonian criminal law, namely, principal penalties,
171 172accessory penalties and preventive measures. There
is a conceptual difference between a ’penalty’ and a
’measure’. A penalty is a punitive weapon; a measure
is a defensive one. Penalties punish offences already
committed; measures look to the reduction of the risk of
relapse or repetition, or sometimes of the risk of an
offence merely threatened. Penalties are invariably
imposed when the object that is desired to be achieved by
sentencing is either retribution, public protection or
170. Ibid., ss. 22-26.
171. Ibid., ss. 30-35-
172. Ibid., ss. 36-50.
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deterrence; measures are Imposed when the object In 
view is re-education, reformation, treatability.
The wide range of penalties and measures at 
the disposal of Cameroonian courts is designed to enable courts 
to make the punishment fit not only the offence but also 
the offender, taking account of his chances of reformation, 
to avoid, in appropriate cases, short prison sentences 
which may do more harm than -good, to hold out to the 
offender the chances of redeeming himself by work and 
good behaviour (in society and not only in prison), and 
so to avoid so far as at all possible the risks of conta­
mination, relapse and repetition producing persistent 
offenders who can be dealt with only by preventive confine­
ment . .
A . Principal penalties
Section 18 of the Penal Code enumerates three 
types of penalties which are all characterised as ’prin­
cipal penalties’, death, loss of. liberty (whether by
173imprisonment or by detention) and fine. A fine means
a monetary fine. A court cannot sentence an offender to
173. Before the introduction of a common penal code for '
Cameroon in 1967, an offender in Francophone Cameroon 
could be sentenced to forced labour, reclusion, depor­
tation or banishment. Banishment has disappeared 
as a penalty but not the others. Forced labour and 
relcusion have simply been converted into imprisonment 
for a term or for life; deportation has been converted 
into detention for life.
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pay a fine in kind (for example a fine of so many heads 
of cattle). When an offender is sentenced to loss of 
liberty (that is, he is given a custodial sentence), this 
takes the form of either detention or a term of imprison­
ment .
The distinction between ’imprisonment’ and 
’detention’ is crucial in the Cameroonian penal system. 
Imprisonment is defined in s. 24 of the Penal Code as 
"loss of liberty during which the offender shall be 
obliged to work, subject to any contrary order of the 
court for reasons to be recorded in the judgment” . Deten­
tion on the other hand is defined in s . 26 as "loss of 
liberty imposed for a political felony or misdemeanour, 
during which the offender shall not be obliged to work, 
and shall be confined in a special establishment separately 
from those convicted, under the ordinary law". What there­
fore emerges is this. (1) There is a physical distinction 
between imprisonment and detention. This distinction 
consists in the segregation of ’ordinary law prisoners’ 
and ’political detainess’. Persons sentenced to detention 
are confined in a special establishment or failing such 
establishment in a separate wing of the ordinary prison.
(2) Ordinarily, a person sentenced to a term of imprison­
ment is obliged to work. A person sentenced to detention 
on the other hand is not obliged to work; this sounds 
attractive enough. But nothing can be more boring and 
agonising than to be locked up in prison for years just
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Idling around the confines of the prison without going 
out to do some form of work. Furthermore, since the 
political prisoner does no work there can be no proceeds 
of work, and therefore no prisoner's fund for him.
Section 25 of the Penal Code deals with prisoners’ fund 
and provides that "the proceeds of every prisoner's work 
shall be applied in part to the payment of any fine and 
expenses to which he is liable, in part to the discharge 
of any damages awarded against him in the criminal procee­
dings, in part to his family, in part to the furnishing 
of amenities at his request and if he has deserved it, 
in part to the building up of a reserve fund payable to 
him on release, and the balance to the Treasury”.
(3) Imprisonment is a punishment of loss of liberty for a 
person convicted under the ordinary law. Detention on 
the other hand is a penalty of loss of liberty inflicted 
on a person convicted of a 'political offence'. The 
penalty is often of an indeterminate duration. What a 
’political offence' is in Cameroon is anyone’s guess. 
Section 26 merely defines 'political offence' in terms of 
the prescribed punishment: any offence for which the
punishment is detention is political. An offence is poli­
tical if and only if the legislator prescribes detention 
as its punishment.
Capital punishment has raised and continues to 
provoke a great deal of controversy. The central argu­
ment for or against the death penalty is simply whether or
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not It serves as a deterrent to others. This has not 
and cannot be tested empirically. Nor are the arguments 
for and against the death penalty conclusive. At the 
end of the day therefore it would appear that the decision 
by any given country whether or not to have the death 
penalty in the armoury of its criminal sanctions is a 
political one rather than one based on criminological or 
moral grounds.
In Cameroon the death penalty has not been 
abolished and there are no calls for its abolition. The 
death sentence may be passed in cases of murder, robbery, 
and in respect of certain offences against state security. 
However, no sentence of death may be carried out until it 
has been submitted to the Head of State for commutation 
and he has signified his decision not to commute. Further­
more, a pregnant woman sentenced to death may only be 
executed after she has had her baby. No execution of a 
person sentenced to death may take place on Sunday or on 
a public holiday - for religious reasons, no doubt.
When the trial court passes sentence of death 
it must specify the manner in which execution is to be 
carried out. There are two lawful methods of carrying 
out the death penalty, by shooting or by hanging (in prison 
or in public). The court must always specify by which of 
these methods the death sentence it has passed is to be 
carried out. It is a grave moment indeed when the court 
pronounces the death sentence: "That you XYZ be taken
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from this place to a lawful prison and then to a place 
of execution and that you be executed by shooting (or 
hanging); and might the Lord have mercy on your soul".
The decision not to commute may direct that hanging or 
shooting be in public. As a matter of general practice 
most death sentences are carried out by hanging in gallows 
inside the prison. There have been in the last decade a 
number of public executions by firing squad, designed 
mainly to serve as a deterrent.
B. Accessory penalties
There are four types of accessory penalties -
forfeiture, publication of the judgment, closure of
174establishment, and confiscation. Section 30 of the
Penal Code gives a list of forfeitures (e.g. removal and 
exclusion from any public service, office or employment; 
incapacity to be juror or guardian, etc.) and s. 31 pres­
cribes the circumstances under which the forfeitures may 
be imposed. A death sentence commuted into life or a life 
sentence automatically carries with it all the forfeitures 
listed in s. 30. As a general rule, any sentence for 
felony carries with it all the forfeitures enumerated in 
s. 30 for the duration of the sentence and for ten years 
after liberation. But the court may, by a reasoned decision
174. Penal Code, s. 19.
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reduce this period. Where a sentence for felony is passed 
on the accused in absentia, any forfeiture takes effect 
from the date of publication of the notices prescribed by 
the Criminal Procedure Code. A sentence for a misdemeanour 
generally involves none of the forfeitures listed in s. 30. 
But where the law so authorises, the court may, by a rea­
soned decision, impose all or some of those forfeitures for 
not more than five years.
Where the section creating any particular offence 
so authorises, the court may, on conviction order publi-
1 yr "| *7 (1
cation of its judgment for a certain length of time
or the closure of a business or industrial establishment,
or of any premises devoted to a gainful activity, which was
177used for the commission of the offence. On conviction
for a felony or misdemeanour the court may, at its dis­
cretion, order confiscation of any property, moveable or 
immoveable, belonging to the offender and attached, which 
was used as an instrument of its commission, or is the
1 yQ
proceeds of the offence.
175. This is done by posting the judgment on a notice board 
at the entrance of the court or at other places deemed 
necessary by the court, including the door to the 
offender’s house.
176. Two months in the case of felony or misdemeanour, 
fifteen days in the case of a simple offence. Penal 
Code, s. 33.
177. Penal Code, s. 34.
178. Ibid., s. 35- Confiscation here is different from 
confiscation under s. 45.
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C . Preventive measures
As in the case of principal and accessory pen­
alties, preventive measures are imposed only upon con-
179viction of the accused. However, although preventive
measures are pronounced at the same time as penalties,
they do not take effect until after the principal penalty
has been served out or suspended. The various types of
preventive measures are: ban on occupation, preventive
confinement, post-penal supervision and assistance, con-
l80finement in a special health institution, confiscation
181and recognizance, a preventive measure which is sui 
generis.
If there is serious apprehension that an ex-convict 
if allowed to continue to exercise his occupation may 
repeat the same crime for which he was convicted, he may 
be banned from exercising his occupation for fro'm between 
one anf five years after having served out the principal 
sentence. Section 36 provides, "Upon conviction for a 
felony or misdemeanour under the ordinary law, the court 
may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, forbid 
the offender to continue to follow any occupation found to
179. Even in the case of a person of unsound mind, the 
court must, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 43, 
be satisfied that the lunatic in fact committed the 
acts he is accused of.
180. Penal Code, s. 20.
181. Ibid., ss. 46-50.
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stand In a direct relation to the offence, and his conti­
nuation in which would give grave reason to apprehend a 
repetition". On subsequent conviction the ban may be 
extended for life.
Whereas banned occupation appears as a preventive 
measure devised in the interest of the offender, preven­
tive confinement is seen as an answer to the need to pro­
tect the public from the depredation of confirmed criminals 
even if the offence has not in itself deserved a long 
prison term. Preventive detention is defined in s. 37 
as "confinement for from five to twenty years under a pro­
gramme of work and social reformation, during which the 
offender shall, in default of a separate establishment, 
be confined separately from convicts serving a sentence 
of imprisonment". In practice preventive confinement is 
executed in like manner to imprisonment on the ordinary 
prisons. In theory the need to protect the public must 
be reconciled with the other desiderata of reformation of 
the offender and his eventual integration in society.
In practice, scant regard is paid to the interest of the 
offender. Any person who, within the space of ten years, 
has been convicted for felony or misdemeanour for a number 
of times and under certain conditions specified in s. 39a 
may be sentenced to preventive confinement. However, such 
a sentence may not be passed on a person who would be aged
less than 25 or more than 60 years at the expiry of his
. , , 182 principal sentence.
182. Ibid., s. 38.
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Every offender sentenced to loss of liberty for 
more than a year may, on conviction (where the circumstances 
warrant and for reasons to be recorded In the judgment), be 
subjected by the court for up to five years to post penal 
supervision and assistance, consisting of general obli-
1 On
gations and, in a fit case, of added special obligations.
The general obligations include residing in a particular
place, giving the supervisor information on his means of
support, informing the supervisor in advance of any change
184of employment or absence of over two weeks. The
special obligations are many and include obligations to
take up residence in one or more specified places, to
remain in employment or follow a course of instruction, to
submit to measures of control or treatment, not to wager,
not to drive any class of vehicle, to avoid the company
of specified offenders, to abstain from undue consumption
185of alochol, and so on.
An order of confinement in a health institution 
may be made in respect of an insane person, a person who 
is partially insane or a drug or alcohol addict acquitted 
of a criminal- charge on grounds of unsoundness of mind.
Confiscation under s. 45 is compulsory where any­
thing whose manufacture, custody sale or use is unlawful;
183. Ibid., s. 40.
184. Ibid., s. 41.
185. Ibid., s. 42.
1046.
It Is Immaterial that the thing does not belong to the 
offender or that the prosecution does not result in con­
viction .
The purpose of recognizance is the same as the 
other preventive measures. But unlike others, recogni­
zance is applicable (except in the case of young offenders) 
where no offence has yet been committed. However, for 
this measure to apply the behaviour of the person should
have exhibited an unambiguous intention to commit an
offence. By s. 46(1), "any person who by his conduct or 
by his utterances shall have exhibited an unambiguous 
intention to commit an offence which may disturb the public 
peace may be required by the President of the district 
court to enter into a recognizance with or without solvent 
sureties in such sum as may be therein fixed to refrain 
from commission of any offence of the like nature for the
duration of the period therein . specified". The sum is
fixed having regard to the resources of the person bound 
oyer.
The essence of a recognizance is an undertaking 
to pay a defined sum (which is not however deposited) in 
the event of any offence envisaged being committed within 
a defined time. Ordinarily, the time bound over may not
exceed one year. But in the case of a habitual offender,
the time may be extended to three years. The recognizance 
may or may not be supported by solvent sureties. The 
conditions of the recognizance are fixed by the presiding
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magistrate. As a matter of practice care is always 
taken not to impose conditions which the person to be bound 
over cannot fulfil. Where a person required to enter 
into a recognizance does not do so, or fails to find the 
sureties required, he may be immediately imprisoned until 
he complies, though the term of imprisonment may not 
exceed that of the recognizance. Under s. 48 of the 
Penal Code, parents or other persons responsible for per­
sons under 18 years of age may be bound over for one year 
where the minor under their care has committed an offence: 
such parents or guardians must take all reasonable steps 
to see that the minor does not commit an offence.
3. Prisons
A prison is ’a public building or other place 
for the confinement or safe custody of persons, whether 
as punishment imposed by the law or otherwise in the course 
of the administration of j u s t i c e i t  is a world apart, 
a community of its own, the temporary or permanent home of 
society’s non-conformists - the flotsam and jetsam of 
society. It is a highly regimented environment in which 
the law breaker leads a humdrum existence with his funda­
mental freedoms forfeited. In a prison obedience to
186. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 1968, p. 1358. The 
term ’prison’ is sometimes used as a synonym for peni­
tentiary or jail, although originally a jail was a 
place for confinement not for punishment.
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orders and instructions is compulsory and automatic, hopes 
and ambitions are ruined and all the inmates are reduced 
to one common denominator - that of prisoner. Anyone, 
be he so high or so low, who has fallen foul of' the law 
may be admitted into prison. The method of recruitment 
rests with the police and the courts. The police do the 
arrest. The court conducts the trial and considers the 
appropriate sentence to be passed, taking into account the 
nature of the offence, aggravating and mitigating circum­
stances (if any) and the information available to it about 
the offender.
When the ’free’ society turns its back to 
criminals the prisons authorities embrace them. There 
are about sixty-four prisons in Cameroon, each of which 
is calssified as either a central prison, a production
1 Qy
prison, a prison-school, or a relegation centre. The
total inmate number of all these prisons runs in the
187. A central prison is a prison of orientation and selec­
tion. All prisoners sentenced to a term of over one 
year’s imprisonment are initially placed under obser­
vation in a central prison (there is one of such prisons 
at the chief town of each Province) for an indefinite 
period before being transferred (if necessary) to an 
appropriate prison. A production prison is one in 
which the inmates are enabled, through their labour, to 
participate in the nation’s developmental efforts.
A school-prison is a reformatory school or re-education 
centre where minors or adult convicts are given a prac­
tical or theoretical training. A relegation centre is 
a prison for persons who have been sentenced to rele­
gation under a regime of labour and social reform and 
for persons who are hardened criminals. See, Decree 
No. 73/774 of 11 December 1973 (Prisons administration), 
ss. 2-6.
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thousands. The exact figure is still shrouded in mystery.
The authorities are reticent about releasing figures;
particularly so in the case of political prisoners. So
there has been a great deal of guesswork by investigators
on this point. The foreign press has at various times
188put the number of political prisoners alone at 30,000.
If this is an accurate figure it would mean that the total 
number of both political and non-political prisoners is 
something over 60,000 as there -are always more non-political 
than political prisoners. The figure is however a gross 
exaggeration. There are neither prison facilities nor 
the resources to cope with such a large number of prisoners. 
A senior official at the Ministry of Territorial Adminis­
tration (prisons come under this ministry) puts the figure 
for both political detainees and ordinary prisoners at
189twelve thousand. This would seem a reasonable figure
190although perhaps a little bit on the conservative side.
188. Africa Confidential, vol. 18, no. 19, April 29, 1977, 
p. 2; ’Ahidjo holds tight the rein’, Africa, No. 77, 
January 1978, p. 52; ’Ahidjo’s seventeen years of 
iron rule in Cameroon’, New African, vol. 11, no. 10, 
October 1977, p. 991.
189. Fieldwork interview.
190. The lock-up figures for the Kumba, Maroua, Garoua,
Buea, Bamenda, Douala, and Yaounde prisons (the big­
gest prisons in Cameroon) are, respectively, always 
around 600, 700, 550, 530, 350, 2000, 2000 - a total 
of 6,730. The lock-up figure for each prison is made
up of four categories of prisoners: ordinary criminals,
political offenders, persons in custody awaiting trial, 
and persons under a regime of administrative internment. 
See, Prisons Administration Decree, . 1973, s. 1.
1050.
One difficulty about obtaining exact prison statistics is
that prisoners are frequently moved from one prison to
another in order to alleviate overcrowding. Furthermore,
there are two sets of political prisoners. First, there
are those political offenders who are arrested and detained
without trial by the political police. Their place of
detention is officially unknown to the prisons administration
191and the general public. Secondly, there■are those
political detainees who have been charged before and sen­
tenced by a court of law. These are detained in a special 
wing of the ordinary prison.
Each prison in Cameroon is run by a staff consis­
ting of warders, wardresses, the chief warder, and the 
prison governor or superintendent. The prison governor is
responsible for all matters concerning the administration 
192of the prison  ^ and the maintenance of order and discipline
19 3among prisoners. Any Cameroonian adult male or female
who has successfully completed at least primary school may 
be recruited as a warder. A minimum qualification of at 
least secondary school education is required for recruitment
191. It would in fact appear that they are detained in ad­
ministrative internment camps in Tchollire, Lomie,
Yoko, Tiguere, and Mantoum (now converted into a pro­
duction prison). Fieldwork interviews.
192. Prisons Administration Decree 1973, ss. 10, 19, 20, 
23-29.
193. Cf. Minister of Territorial Administration, Decision 
No. 500/D/MINAT (Disciplinary regulations for prison 
warders). The governor is assisted by a chief warder. 
See, Prisons Administration Decree, 1973, ss. 21-22.
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Into and promotion to the post of chief warder or governor. 
Upon recruitment, the warder must undergo a period of three 
months’ training (which includes physical drills, mob or 
riot control, hand to hand combat, and the use of fire­
arms) at the National Centre for Training and Re-training
194of Prisons Staff, Buea.
It is provided in the Prisons Administration
Decree that before a prisoner is incarcerated he must be
195medically examined, ■ his person searched and his personal
196effects taken and kept until the day of his release, a 
description of him recorded in a card-index, and his name 
entered in the lock-up register. Section 15 of the Decree 
provides that persons remanded into custody should be 
separated from convicted persons, women from men, condemned 
and dangerous prisoners from the other prisoners, minors 
from adult■prisoners, political prisoners from non-political 
prisoners, and convicted members of the armed forces from 
the other prisoners. But this segregation is only par­
tially practised. Most prisons for example, have no separate 
wings for minors. Furthermore, the general tendency seems 
to be to lump everyone together and to segregate inmates 
only according to sex. The conditions of persons remanded 
into custody are no better than those of convicted persons.
194. The Centre was set up by Decree No. 73/307 of 21st 
June 1973-
195. Prisons Administration Decree 1973, s. 33.
196. Ibid., ss. 12-13.
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The waiting period varies. Waiting for as long as one
year is normal; sometimes the period of waiting could be
197for as long as two years or even more.
Failure to segregate first offenders from recidi­
vists and minor offenders from adult ones produces nega­
tive results. The prison becomes a school where the art 
of crime is carefully learnt and rehearsed. Thus one 
often finds that delinquent and first time offenders 
graduate from prison as hardened criminals. Other 
prisoners make terrible progress in crime on discharge than 
when they entered prison. Prisons authorities argue that 
the prison intake has doubled in most prisons without a 
corresponding expansion of accommodation facilities.
They are quick to point out that the prisons are already 
breaking at the seams and that given the enormous over­
crowding there is just nothing they can do by way of segre­
gating the inmates. It is submitted that the provision 
of more accommodation is not the only way of dealing with 
the problem of overcrowding. The courts could change 
their sentencing policy in favour of non-custodial methods 
of dealing with offenders, especially those not convicted 
of serious crimes of violence. Those convicted of serious 
crimes would have to be imprisoned because of the need to 
protect the public. One may also advocate a reduction by 
the courts of the length of prison sentences they intend
197. Annual Report for the Douala Central Prison, 1975, 
Ministry of Territorial Administration, Yaounde.
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to Impose. There is nothing to lose but in fact some­
thing to gain in reducing sentences. There is no posi­
tive evidence that imprisonment has any special reformatory 
effect on offenders or that its deterrent effect is propor­
tional to its length. Short prison sentences would bring 
about a saving of public money and will ensure that while 
they are in prison offenders serve their sentences in the 
more humane conditions which a reduction in overcrowding 
would bring about.
Not all the prisoners in any given prison are 
necessarily persons sentenced by the courts of the area 
where the prison is located. Prisoners are frequently 
moved from one prison to another. Such transfers are 
used as a disciplinary measure (transfer of indisciplined 
prisoners to tough prisons) and as a means of alleviating 
congestion in overcrowded prisons. Furthermore, all the 
inmates of a given prison are not necessarily persons who 
have already been convicted and sentenced by the courts.
Some are persons remanded into custody by the courts or 
legal department and others are persons under administra­
tive internment.
Prison discipline is rigid in some prisons and 
lax in others. Generally, it is a disciplinary offence 
for a prisoner to assault a warder, to be lazy, to be negli­
gent, to damage property, to mutiny, to sabotage any work,
198to mutilate himself or to try to escape. Discipline
198. Prisons Administration Decree, 1973, s. 44.
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Is maintained by subjecting any prisoner guilty of breach 
of discipline to hard labour, confinement in an isolation 
cell for a number of days, imprisonment in chains, or sus­
pension or withdrawal of privileges (for example, the privi-
. 199
lege to receive visitors). But this has not deterred
prisoners from attempting to escape from prison. Many 
of them do in fact succeed in escaping. Escape rates are 
highest in Douala, Maroua and Garoua. Most escapes 
take place when prisoners are taken out to work, sometimes 
with the connivance of warders.
Any prisoner sentenced to more than three months’
imprisonment and who has discharged two-thirds of his term
and has throughout that period been of good behaviour may
be released on l i c e n c e . M o s t  prisoners in the jails
are persons who have been convicted either of theft (about
20180%) or assault occasioning bodily harm (about 14%).
The overwhelming majority of prisoners are male. Female 
criminality is very low. For example, in Garoua prison 
only 6 of the 525 inmates are female, in Maroua only 10 
out of 711, in Buea only 10 out of 600, in Bamenda 15 out 
of 285, and in Douala 50 out of 2000. Most female pri­
soners are serving sentences for petty assault Cabout 70%), 
petty theft (about 20%), unlawful abortion, and desertion
199. Ibid., ss. 45-50.
200. Ibid., s. 11; Penal Code, ss. 61-64.
201. Fieldwork interviews.
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202of matrimonial home. There is also quite a large
number of alien convicts (mainly from neighbouring coun­
tries) in jails in Cameroon. Most of them have been con­
victed either of fraud offences, smuggling or illegal 
entry into the country.
Official policy towards prisoners oscillates 
between punishment and treatment. But deterrence remains 
the corner-stone of Cameroon’s penal system. The authorities 
do occasionally talk of reformation and rehabilitation.
But that is nothing more than lip service because those 
matters are not approached with interest and conviction. 
Occupational skills (such as carpentry, bricklaying, 
weaving, carving, tailoring, and farming) are taught in 
only a few prisons (mainly in those in Anglophone Cameroon 
where such a tradition is long), and then only in a hap­
hazard manner due to lack of finance. As most prisoners 
are illiterate, provision exists for each prison to run 
adult education classes for its inmates. But educational 
facilities are nonexistent in most prisons, and where they 
exist classes are poorly run and organised. Very little 
or no assistance at all is given to ex-convicts to enable 
them to re-integrate into society.
Section 30(1) of the Prisons Administration Decree 
1973 provides that the daily ration of prisoners’ meals 
shall be balanced and-sufficient to prevent prisoners from
202. Fieldwork interviews and observation. The statistics 
were obtained from various prison governors.
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suffering from undernourishment and to provide them with
the energy they need to maintain health and carry out the
203work they are compelled to do. In reality however,
prisoners are undernourished. Quantitatively and quali­
tatively the food is poor and monotonous.. Each time 
prisoners are taken to do work outside the prison establish­
ment they seize the opportunity to steal food wherever 
they can, or beg or search rubbish bins for crumbs of food. 
Each prisoner gets only about 30 francs cfa (roughly 10 
pence) worth of food per day; in terms of weight, about 
14 oz. Meat or fish is definitely a luxury, a treat prisoners 
seldom get. Generally, prisoners get only one meal a day. 
Ostensibly, the idea is to make prison conditions poor and 
unattractive to potential criminals and recidivists.
Some officials maintain that,since imprisonment is a 
penalty for crime, prisoners must suffer. The reasoning 
behind this view is that if prison conditions are poor, 
disgusting, unattractive and irksome, potential criminals 
and recidivists would be deterred. If on the other hand, 
the argument goes, prison conditions are made attractive, 
recidivism would increase and poor, homeless and miserable 
persons might wish to make the prison their home. How­
ever, there is no conclusive evidence that uncomfortable 
and repulsive prison conditions necessarily serve as a
203.Prisoners must work and their labour is available for 
hire by anyone who may need it.
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a deterrent to would-be offenders. The-number of offenders 
In CameroonTs prisons has not diminished, even though 
prison conditions are so poor. In any case, prisoners 
are human beings and ought not to be treated like animals. 
Besides, they must be allowed basic mental and bodily 
salubrity.
Out of compassion for the conditions of prisoners, 
prison governors do allow relatives and friends to bring 
food to inmates. Prisoners are also allowed to cook their 
own personal meals (if they have the necessary utensils 
and foodstuffs)over open fires. The provision relating
2to the supply of uniforms, bed and bedding to each prisoner 
is honoured more in the breach than in its observance. 
Prisoners are no longer supplied with those necessaries; 
they bring their personal effects along with them; they 
wear their personal items of clothing and use their per­
sonal bedding. It is just too bad if an inmate cannot 
provide himself with these things. In fact most of them 
are destitute, lean, hungry-looking, half-naked, and sleep 
on rags or mats on the bare floor. So revolting and 
pathetic are the conditions of prisoners that there has 
been a public outcry for reforms.
"On January 24-26, the 20th Synod of the Presby­
terian Church, which represented about 970 
congregations in South-West and North-West, pro­
vinces, -voiced strong concern at the maltreat­
ment of prisoners. ... On March 4, World 
Prayer Day, Presbyterian congregations through­
out the two provinces collected food and funds
204. Prisons Administration Decree 1973, s. 31.
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to assist prisoners, who, the church claimed 
in a statement released on March 9, were fed 
on only 10 U.S. cents a day. fIn some prison 
houses,' the statement protested, 'it is said 
that inmates resort to garbage dumps in search 
of banana peelings for food.' Prisoners 
working in road-construction gangs, it said,
'can now be seen roaming the streets begging 
for food, money and sometimes shoes' - 
apparently, we understand, with the assent 
of warders who sympathise with their inmates' 
plight." 205
It is something of a miracle that for all the over­
crowding, the stench and parasites (lice, bedbugs, ticks) 
in the prison cells there are not many recorded deaths 
and outbreaks of diseases. Most inmates who complain 
of illnesses suffer either from diarrhoea, stomach ache or 
malaria. But these are common enough diseases in the 
country. It must be said that the-prison authorities do 
the best they can with the limited funds and facilities 
they have to keep prison sanitation good. That they do 
not always succeed is not due to lack of will or good 
intentions. Nurses and doctors pay weekly visits to 
prisons and prisoners who are too ill to be kept in prison 
are removed to the hospital. A few prisons have first aid 
facilities.
Prisoners may be visited weekly by friends and 
relatives and may write and receive letters. Such corres­
pondence is however censored. Limited recreational faci­
lities exist in some prisons. Each prison allows religious
205- Africa Confidential, vol. 18, No. 10, May 13, 1977, 
pp. 4-5.
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organisations to visit prisoners and conduct religious 
services inside the prison.
4. Juvenile delinquency
In the criminal law of Cameroon any person aged
between ten and eighteen years who commits a criminal
206offence is a juvenile delinquent. A juvenile delin­
quent may be charged with and tried for an offence either 
as principal or secondary party. There are no comprehen­
sive statistics on juvenile delinquency in Cameroon. But 
it is common knowledge that most juvenile delinquents are 
convicted either of assault, vagrancy or stealing; all 
of these are usually of a minor nature. There are a few 
cases of gambling and counterfeiting and isolated cases 
of infanticide and abortion.
The age distribution of juveniles who are delin­
quents reveals an interesting pattern. There are no 
recorded cases of offences by persons aged between ten and 
twelve years and only isolated cases of offences committed 
by persons aged between 13 and 15 years. About 95$ of 
juvenile delinquents come within the 16 to 18 years age 
bracket. This may be explained on the theory that at this 
stage of life the juvenile is going through a period of
206. Penal Code, s. 80. There is an irrebutable presump­
tion of criminal irresponsibility of a child who is 
below ten years of age. See, Penal Code, s. 80(1).
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psychological, physiological and social stresses. This 
stage is the age of adolescence, a transitional period 
between infancy and adulthood. The adolescent tries to 
adjust himself to be independent and responsible in a 
society that is beginning to look upon and treat him as 
an adult. The adolescent becomes increasingly aware of 
himself as an individual and of the milieu in which he 
lives. His needs become many but his resources remain 
limited for he is still economically weak. Lack of means 
to satisfy his increased needs and the urge to assert his 
independence are crucial factors that have pushed many 
juveniles on the road to crime, particularly economic crime.
It would be futile trying to catalogue the causes 
of juvenile delinquency. To begin with a complete theory 
of the causes of delinquency does not exist. Furthermore, 
every delinquent act has its own motivation and the internal 
disturbances which an individual juvenile may be experien­
cing are apt to be differently interpreted or analysed.
The opinion may nevertheless be ventured that certain nega­
tive factors stemming from the family (for example, unstable 
or broken homes, aggressive parents) and certain environ­
mental factors contribute to delinquent behaviour. Juve­
niles who have been deprived of parental care, love and 
protection, material assistance and moral upbringing are 
likely to become delinquents. Social changes, new ways of 
life and alien cultures in the urban centres drive many 
juveniles (their impulsive drives are exceptionally strong),
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in their search for adjustment, to crime. This adequately
explains why the problem of juvenile delinquency in
207Cameroon is essentially an urban problem. In the rural
areas, life is still unsophisticated and needs are few 
(no cinemas, no night-clubs, no bars, no discotheques, no 
need for sophisticated items of clothing and shoes). 
Parent-child relationships are face-to-face as opposed to 
the uncontrolled relationships in urban-areas. Control 
and interaction are intense and involve many people (the 
extended family) , who act on. the child directly. Disci­
pline is firm and standards of morality high.
A . Policy on the problem of juvenile delinquency
Official policy on the issue of juvenile delin­
quency may be characterised as prevention on the one hand, 
and treatability of juvenile offenders on the other hand. 
The prevention of juvenile delinquency is seen in a 
wider context involving not only the State but parents, 
schools, churches and social welfare agencies. Family 
control of and responsibility over children is vital and 
parents must not shirk in this responsibility. During 
the holidays parents can exert control by assigning their 
children to profitable activities. When schools are open
207. The main towns where juvenile delinquency is rife are 
Douala, Yaounde, Nkongsamba, Bafoussam (in that order) 
and, to a lesser degree, Garoua, Buea-Muyuka, Kumba 
and Bamenda.
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parents should be prepared to co-operate with school staff 
in order to understand the child’s ways and ambitions.
In this regard parent-teacher associations must be en­
couraged- and promoted. The churches on their part can 
reinforce the moral lessons learnt in the family and also 
discourage immoral attitudes that contribute to delinquency. 
Rural exodus has also been blamed as a contributory factor 
to juvenile delinquency. So the government has embarked 
on schemes to make rural areas attractive - the provision 
of good roads, more schools, and social amenities. This 
ploy, it is hoped, would stem the tide of rural exodus.
In fact it was the phenomenon of rural exodus (coupled with 
the very high rate of youth unemployment in the cities) 
that prompted the government to establish the National Civic 
Service for Participation in Development in July 1973 
under a law (No. 73/^0 making a two years’ period of 
national service obligatory for all Cameroonian youths.
The criminal law punishes juvenile delinquents.
But it also protects juveniles-by punishing severely anyone
who commits an offence against an infant: abortion, assault
on woman with child, infanticide, slavery and giving in
security, corruption of youth, moral danger, indecency to
children under sixteen, indecency to minor between sixteen
and twenty-one, advantage of weakness, assault on children,
kidnapping, kidnapping by force or fraud, aggravated kid-
208napping, and failure to return a child. Moreover,
208. Penal Code, ss. 337, 338, 340, 342, 344, 345, 346, 347, 
349, 350, 352, 353, 354, and 355 respectively.
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s. ^8 of the Penal Code enables the parents or other per­
sons responsible for persons under 18 to be bound over.
It is not the minor who is bound over but his parents or 
others responsible for him. And if in spite of the steps 
they have taken a minor still repeats his activities they 
are not necessarily to be blamed for., they are responsible 
for taking steps not for succeeding. They do however 
have to prove that the steps they took were all that could 
be reasonably considered necessary to the end in view.
In dealing with adult offenders the emphasis is 
on punishment. In the case of juvenile offenders however 
there is a clear shift of emphasis from punishment to 
treatment (that-is, reformation and re-education). The 
concept of treatment conjures up the picture of ’illness’. 
When a person is ill he goes to the hospital for treatment; 
if he does something wrong he may be punished for it.
The notion has now gained ground that a juvenile delinquent 
should be 'treated’ and not punished because he has not 
got the same motivations as an adult; he is a misdirected 
and misguided person who needs aid, encouragement and 
assistance.
In dealing with cases of juvenile delinquency 
Anglophone courts apply the unrepealed provisions of the 
Children and Young Persons Ordinance, Cap. 32 of the 19^8 
laws and the relevant provisions of the Penal Code, while 
Francophone courts apply the unrepealed provisions of the 
Juvenile Delinquency Decree of 30 November 1928, the Sim­
plified Procedure Law of 1958 and the relevant provisions
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of the Penal Code. In substance the law on juvenile
delinquency Is the same in both Anglophone and Francophone
Cameroon, a factor which undoubtedly facilitated the work
of the Criminal Procedure Commission when It came to deal
209with this part of the law.
B . The criminal responsibility of children and young persons
For the purpose of criminal responsibility the
criminal law distinguishes between three categories of
infants: those of less than ten years of age, those aged
between ten and fourteen years, and those aged between four-
210teen and eighteen years. An infant under ten is con­
clusively presumed to be totally irresponsible and may not
211even be tried for what he does; he is doli incapax.
He may be the subject of special measures of care and pro­
tection, but not of punishment nor of the preventive mea­
sures applicable to older children. An infant of between
ten and fourteen years of age may, as a general rule, be
212tried but his responsibility is only partial. There is
209. Draft Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 772-829; Gabriel- 
Louis Djeudjang, ’L Tenfant devant la justice au 
Cameroun1, Revue Juridique et Politique Independance 
et Cooperation, No. 2, 1977, p. 233-
210. Penal Code, s. 80. The relevant age is determined at 
the date of commission of the offence and not at the 
date of trial or conviction.
211. Ibid., s. 80(1). However, provided he is intelligent 
enough, an infant of less than ten years of age may be 
a competent witness in criminal proceedings.
212. Ibid., s. 80(2).
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an irrebutable presumption of law that a child below the 
age of twelve Is Incapable of having carnal knowledge. 
Consequently, Infants under the age of twelve have no 
criminal responsibility in respect of sexual offences 
involving carnal knowledge. Other offences committed by 
infants of between ten and fourteen years of age attract 
only such measures as may by law be provided on juvenile 
delinquency. The juvenile offender who falls within this 
age bracket may not be sentenced to a penalty nor to a 
preventive measure provided by the criminal law for adults. 
He may only be dealt with in the manner provided by law 
on young offenders. Thus he may be placed on probation, 
committed to a borstal institute, cautioned and discharged, 
or released to his parents or guardians or persons respon­
sible under customary law who may be required to enter into 
recognizance (with or without solvent sureties) in such 
sum as may therein be fixed by the court. This sum is 
forfeited if the juvenile offender commits any similar act 
within a period of one year, unless the obligor can prove 
that he took all reasonable steps to ensure that the minor 
did not commit the offence.
A person aged over fourteen and under eighteen
years is criminally responsible and may be sentenced even
to a penalty. However, for an offence committed by any
213such person, responsibility is diminished. The effect
of diminished responsibility is that the penalty provided
213. Ibid. , s. 80(3) .
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for the offence Is reduced. Penalty is reduced as
follows: (a) the penalty of death or loss of liberty for
life Is reduced to loss of liberty for from two years to 
ten years, (b) any other penalty for felony is reduced to 
a loss of liberty for from one year to five years, (c) the 
maximum penalty for misdemeanour is reduced by half and
215minimum to five days’ loss of liberty or one franc fine.
When a juvenile offender is apprehended he is 
taken to the police station where he is arrested and a 
cuationary statement recorded from him. The current law 
does not require that the juvenile offender's parents or 
guardians or other person in loco parentis be present at 
the police station before he is charged or a statement 
recorded from him. This is a serious lacuna in the law as 
juveniles are apt to be easily frightened of the police 
(and more especially the gendarmes) and may easily confess 
to acts which they in fact did not commit.
After recording the statement from the juvenile 
offender, the police or gendarmes may, where practicable, 
and depending on the nature, circumstances of the offence, 
and the offender’s antecedents, release him on police bail 
to his parents, guardians or any fit and proper person.
It is the responsibility of such parent, guardian or fit and 
proper person to produce the juvenile offender before the
214. Ibid., s. 87.
215. Ibid., ss. 87(1) and 92(1)
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court on a date fixed by the police or gendarmes. If 
there is no one to bail the offender, the offenders or 
gendarmes keep him in their cell and must produce him in 
court within twenty-four hours. Here however, practice 
is at variance with theory. Juvenile offenders without 
sureties are detained in police or prison cells. The 
period of such detention varies from days to months.
The effect on the infant is of course traumatic. It is 
submitted that police and court bail should be automatic 
and as of right with respect to juvenile offenders. If 
no one comes forward to bail the juvenile he should be 
taken to a children’s boarding home set up for the purpose 
and run by the Department of Social Welfare. In this 
regard one must advocate for a close and on-going collabor­
ation between the police and social workers. At the 
moment such a collaboration is practically nonexistent.
Many police and gendarme officers have not fully appreciated 
the role of social workers and such collaboration that 
sometimes exists between the two is generally low-keyed 
and ephemeral.
The arraignment and trial of the juvenile offen­
der takes place in chambers or in the courtroom provided it 
is cleared. In Cameroon there are as yet neither specia­
lised juvenile courts nor specialised juvenile court 
judges. If the juvenile-is charged with a felony he is 
tried in camera in the High Court; if the offence is a 
misdemeanour or a simple offence the juvenile is tried in
1068.
the Court of First Instance. Appeal from the decisions of 
both courts lies to the Court of Appeal and then to the 
Supreme Court. The trial of- a juvenile delinquent takes 
place in camera but the procedure remains the same as that 
in any ordinary trial. A practice has grown whereby the 
courts require the offender’s parents and the social wel­
fare officer who made out the juvenile's social enquiry
216report to be present during the trial.
In Anglophone courts when the juvenile is arraigned, 
the charge is read and explained to him. He may plead 
guilty or not guilty. If he pleads guilty the court 
records the facts of the case as stated by the prosecution.
If the facts disclose an offence as defined in law and the 
court is satisfied that the juvenile intended honestly to 
plead guilty, the court would accept his plea of guilty 
and convict him on it. If on the other hand the defendant 
pleads not guilty and it is possible to proceed with the 
trial, the prosecution calls in witnesses whom the defen­
dant or, if represented, his lawyer may cross-examine 
after examination in chief. At the close of the prosecution 
case the defendant may have no case to answer if the facts 
disclose no offence Under the law. In this case he is 
discharged on the merits. If he is found to have a case 
to answer, he is informed of his rights under the law and
216. Scott Anyangwe, ’The young offender in Cameroon',
paper presented at the Seminar on 'Understanding the 
child and adolescent’ held in London from 27th September 
to 16th October 1976, unpublished.
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then put to his defence. If at the end of the trial he 
is found to be guilty of the offence with which he is 
charged, he is convicted. In Francophone courts the 
judge adopts a more involved role in questioning the juve­
nile .
After conviction the court normally calls for 
the juvenile’s social enquiry report and his previous con­
victions (if any). These are necessary to enable the court 
to determine the appropriate measure or sentence to pass. 
Thus, where the offence is a serious one or the circum­
stances of the offence are aggravating or where the juven­
ile has had previous convictions, the court would normally 
commit him to the Borstal Institute. First offenders are 
generally placed on probation, cautioned and discharged,
released to their parents who may be required to enter
217into a recognizance, or given a suspended sentence.
In exceptional cases, where the juvenile has been a habi­
tual criminal and other means of dealing with him have 
failed, the court may, having regard, to the circumstances 
of the offence and the public danger which the offender may 
represent, actually sentence him to a term of imprisonment, 
or fine him.' However, courts sentence to terms of impri­
sonment only in extreme cases.
In most cases the court makes orders for the refor­
mation and re-education of the juvenile delinquent. There
217. Idem.
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are three centres In Cameroon which cater for delinquent 
children, maladjusted and abandoned boys. The three 
centres are the Institute of Child Welfare at Betamba, the 
Borstal Institute at Buea and the Observation Centre at 
Douala.. There are plans to build other observation centres 
at Garoua, Bamenda and Bafoussam.
These centres admit only male juvenile delin­
quents. No institute exists for female juvenile delin­
quents because they .are few and amenable within the extended 
family system. The borstal institute admits delinquent 
boys entrusted to it for rehabilitation by school and 
professional training and by any other means likely to 
develop their character, abilities and sense of personal 
responsibility. Such minor boys must be between 12 and 
18 years of age. They are placed in the institute for not 
less than one and not more than two years. Exceptionally, 
and with the agreement of the management of the institute, 
a minor may spend up to three years at the institute.
The file concerning any juvenile delinquent admitted into 
the institute must comprise an extract of the court’s deci­
sion, the social enquiry report, a copy of his birth certi­
ficate, and a medical certificate. At the moment, parents 
do not participate financially in the rehabilitation of 
their delinquent children. It is probable that parents 
would soon be required to do so.
On discharge from the borstal or prison most ex­
juvenile delinquents are not provided with any form of
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assistance to enable them to start off. With the 
exception of the few lucky ex-juvenile delinquents from 
the Betemba Child Welfare Institute who are given some 
form of employment In certain industries, most juveniles 
leave the. prison or borstal only to be confronted again 
with problems of accommodation, feeding, unemployment, 
re-integration into society and public acceptance. There 
is no effective scheme of post-penal supervision and 
assistance of ex-juvenile delinquents and most of them 
quickly encounter frustration and a good many find their 
way back into prison. This is a problem with the authorities 
must address their minds to seriously.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
MILITARY LAW
Military law, broadly speaking, is that system 
of law by which the military establishment of a State is 
partly or wholly governed; a code of laws and regulations 
for the raising,maintenance, administration and conduct of 
the armed forces. The object of military law is twofold:
(i) to provide for the maintenance of good order and dis­
cipline among members of the army and in certain circum­
stances among others who live and work in a military 
environment; and (ii) to regulate certain aspects of army 
administration, mainly in those fields which affect indi­
vidual rights. In practice however, the term military law 
is used with regards to its disciplinary provisions rather 
than to its administrative ones. In its narrow and usual 
sense therefore, military law means the system of law which 
governs the armed forces of a State, enabling discipline to 
be maintained and subjecting military personnel to trial 
and punishment by military courts. The term should not be 
confused with ’martial law1 which is the military enforce­
ment of order upon a civil population either in occupied 
territory in time of disorder.
Discipline is the backbone of the army. So, 
historically, military law developed out of the desire to 
ensure that the will of the commander was put into effect.
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Military law therefore traces Its origin to the prerogative 
power,of commanders. In Rome, just as a sector of civil 
law developed from the imperium of the magistrates, so did 
military law derive from the imperium of those same magis­
trates in their capacity as commanders of the military 
forces.
Military justice in the 1st century A.D. was 
somewhat rough-and-ready and heavy-handed and varying 
much with the individual commander. But it became more 
formalized and received treatment *100 years later in the 
Digest and Codex of the Emperor Justinian. With the rise 
of the kingdoms of the Middle Ages, the maintenance of 
discipline was enforced by ordinances or articles of war 
issued by the sovereign or by a commander authorised by 
him at the beginning of each campaign. With mercenary 
armies drawn from many nations in the wars of the 16th and 
17th centuries, each national contingent tended to apply 
the articles of the supreme commander according to its own 
rules of procedure. The articles of war of Maurice of 
Nassau, Prince of Orange, and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden 
are said to have had a considerable Influence on the 
national commanders who served under them, when they came 
to command elsewhere.
In England, the articles of war of the Prince 
of Orange formed the basis of Prince Rupert’s code of 1672. 
In 1689 a standing army was introduced in England and was 
governed by mutiny acts passed yearly, to which the articles
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of war were subordinate. These article of war-were 
replaced in l88l by an annually renewed Army Act which has 
since been reformed by the-Army Act 1955 and the Armed 
Forces Act 1971.
On the continent of Europe, the articles of 
Gustavus Adolphus continued to be followed until they were 
supplanted by the codification of the 19th century, which 
established throughout those countries a generally similar 
system that, with revision and amendments, continues to 
this day. In France the most important codification on 
military law was the Code de Justice Militaire of 19.28.
It has since been amended, particularly by the Code de 
Justice Militaire (pour l Tarm£e de terre) of 1950 and the 
Code de Justice Militaire of 1964.'*'
Although rules (unwritten) for the conduct of 
war and for the sanctioning of indiscipline among the 
fighting men existed in pre-colonial traditional societies 
(but there were no standing armies), the organisation of a 
modern system of military justice and the establishment of 
a standing army in Cameroon dates only as recently as i960.
* * * *
This chapter gives a brief historical account of 
the genesis of military law in Cameroon (Section I),
1. For this historical development of military law, see 
generally, The new Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 12,
1977, p. i9n
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discusses the jurisdiction of military courts (Section II), 
and analyses the procedure in those courts (Section III).
I. The Genesis of Military Law in Cameroon
The existence of military law came about with 
the creation of the Cameroonian Army (Para. 1) and the 
setting up of military courts in the country (Para. 2).
1. The creation of the Cameroonian Army
Cameroonian professional soldiers existed before 
1959, although the Cameroonian Army was created only in 
1959 by an Ordinance of 11th November.
A. The situation before I960
There were no standing armies in traditional 
society. In times of war every able-bodied male was re­
quired to take up arms against the enemy. Most villages 
however had ’war lodges* which consisted of notable war­
riors, men who had distinguished themselves in previous 
raids or battles. There were also ’war medicine■lodges’ 
which provided war magicians. When the Germans set about 
conquering the territory which later became known as 
Cameroon they fought various wars with tribal armies and 
it took them several years to bring the 'Schutzgebiet von 
Kamerun’ under their effective control. Given the impor­
tance of Kamerun which constituted the Mittel-Afrika which
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the Germans wanted to create and link with their East
African colony, a contingent of 1,550 soldiers (the
Schutztruppe) and 1,285 policemen (in reality a military-
cum-police force, the Polizeisoldat) were raised in
Cameroon and placed under the orders of the Governor.
In 1914, when the First World War was also being fought
in Cameroon, the Germans were able to put 2,500 men
(1,800 Germans and 700 natives) in the field against the
combined forces (13,000 men) of the British, French and 
2
Belgians. The remnants of the German native army were
disbanded following the defeat of Germany in the War and
the partition of Cameroon by the British and the French.
The Mandates Agreements for both the British and
the French Cameroons provided that
"The Mandatory shall not establish in the 
territory any military or naval bases, nor
erect any fortifications, nor organise any
native army force except for local police 
purposes and for the defence of the terri­
tory ."
Accordingly, Britain maintained no naval base and no mili­
tary force, posts or garrisons in the British Cameroons.
If military force was required, as it happened during 
World War II, it was drawn from the Nigeria Regiment of 
the West African Frontier Force whose permanent stations 
were confined to Nigeria. There was no recruiting of natives 
of the mandated territory for military service within or
2. Ndam Njoya, Le Cameroun dans les relations internationales, 
L.G.D.J., Paris, 1977, p.
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without the territory. But a tiny police force existed.
This situation changed slightly after World War II. A
provision of the Trusteeship Agreements for the two
Cameroons was to the effect that the Administering Authority
’’shall be entitled to establish naval, 
military and air bases, to erect fortifi­
cations, to station and employ its own 
forces in the territory and to take all 
such other measures as are in its opinion 
necessary for the defence of the territory 
and for ensuring that it plays its part in the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security. To this end the Administering 
Authority may make use of volunteer forces, 
facilities and assistance from the Terri­
tory in carrying out the obligations towards 
the' Security Council undertaken in this 
regard by the Administering Authority, as 
well as for local defence and for the main­
tenance of law and order within the Terri­
tory . ”
Britain made no undertaking to the Security Council with 
regards to the British Cameroons. However, the strength 
of the local police force was increased and its training 
programme given a military slant. Moreover, Cameroonians 
became eligible for recruitment into the Nigerian Army.
In French Cameroun, a militia force existed 
before World War II and was quickly transformed during that 
War into a bataillon de tirailleurs du Cameroun. It was 
placed under the command of a colonial infantry colonel, 
military commander of the territory. At the end of the War 
the security services in the territory were reorganised. 
There was the Gendarmerie and there was also the Garde
3. Arr§t£ of 1st June 19^6.
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camerounaise. The gendarmerie was commanded by a squadron 
chief and was split up into three sections, one each in 
Douala, Yaounde and Garoua. The Garde camerounaise was an 
auxiliary force trained by personnel of the' gendarmerie and 
commanded by a captain directly answerable to the Haut 
Commissaire. Apart from Camerounians in the gendarmerie 
and the garde camerounaise, there were others who enlisted 
in and saw service with the French Army. The manpower 
strength of the French Army in Cameroun increased drama­
tically after 1955 when the U.P.C. took to guerilla war­
fare to achieve its political objectives.
B . The position since i960
The Armee Camerounaise was created by an Ordinance 
of 11 November 1959 to take over from the French Army 
scheduled to leave Cameroun upon the attainment of indepen-
2j
dence on 1 January i960. The nucleus of the Army was 
formed by men drawn from the Garde camerounaise and 
Camerounians in the French Army. These men were organised 
into two companies and on 1 January i960 during the inde­
pendence day celebrations a Cameroonian Army was seen for 
the first time. The Army was very prominent during the
4. It was however only in 1965 that a Cameroonian took over 
command of the Cameroonian Army. Under military cooper­
ation agreements between Cameroon and France, French 
soldiers continue to serve in Cameroon in various capa­
cities; mainly as advisers. The number of these French 
soldiers in Cameroon has been steadily decreasing over 
the years.
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march past. Following reunification on 1 October 1961 
Southern Cameroonians serving in the Nigerian Army returned 
home and were integrated in the Armee Camerounaise.
Since then, the Cameroonian Army has grown and continues 
to grow in size.
Today, the Cameroonian Armed Forces consist of 
an Army organised into four infantry battalions, an Air 
Force, the Gendarmerie, a Navy and reservists (that is, 
people who have done their required two years' military 
service - preparation militaire - and may be called up at 
any time). The Air Force and the Navy are still very 
small in size and equipment. But they are gradually being 
developed with the return of Cameroonians who have com­
pleted their training in France and other European coun­
tries. Apart from guaranteeing national territorial 
integrity, the Army aids the police in the maintenance of 
law and order and is actively involved in the construction 
of roads and bridges (a task undertaken by the g£nie mili­
taire , the engineering corps). The Navy is responsible 
for guarding the coasts, maritime communications, main­
taining law and order in regions that are accessible to its 
units, and preventing illegal entry and smuggling.
The Cameroonian gendarme differs from his French 
counterpart in that he is a soldier first and a military 
policeman second. As a police force, the mission of the
5. Military police is the name given to soldiers who exercise 
police or other functions in armies. From the very 
beginning of military history armies have had men to 
perform military police duties. The military policeman
/Continued over
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gendarmerie Includes highway security and traffic control, 
counter-insurgency, special assignment to judicial duties, 
law enforcement in rural areas, and investigation and sur­
veillance of suspects. But the gendarmerie, by a law 
of February I960, forms an integral part of the Armed 
Forces, a situation which came about because "la gendarmerie 
(dont les effectifs sont equivalents k ceux de l'armde) 
avait toujours £td un puissant auxiliaire du commandement 
pour la lutte contre la rebellion et les enqu^tes contre 
les individus subversifs. As part of the Armed Forces, 
the mission of the gendarmerie is also to defend the terri­
torial integrity of the nation. The gendarmerie, adminis­
tratively headed by the ’d^legue general k la gendarmerie', 
is placed under the direct and exclusive authority of the 
Minister of the Armed Forces. In fact the gendarme 
undergoes the same military training as any other soldier.
The Armed Forces come under the Ministry of Armed 
Forces headed by a Minister of Armed Forces. There is no 
overall operational 'commander-in-chief' of the Armed 
Forces. The armee de terre, de l'air, la gendarmerie and
Footnote 5 continued from page 1079.
is a soldier first and a policeman second. The position 
is however different with the armies of France. There 
the gendarmerie are most closely concerned with security. 
In Britain or America most of the work done by the gen­
darmes in France would largely be carried out by the 
civilian police.
6. Francis M. Clair, 'La justice militaire dans la republique 
federale du Cameroun’, Revue de Droit Penal Militaire et 
de Droit de la Guerre, vol. 1^ 1962, p. 194.
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la marine each have their autonomous commanding officers. 
There is of course an etat major which coordinates the 
actions of all three and an Inspector-General of the Armed 
Forces. But there is no overall commanding officer.
The- constitutional supreme commander of all the forces is 
of course the President of the Republic.
The military training and tradition in the 
Cameroonian Armed Forces is French. The official language 
of command and instruction is also French. This means 
that any Anglophone seeking to get into any of the Armed 
Forces must know French. Recruits into the Armed Forces 
receive their training at Koutaba and at Ngaoundere.
Officers are initially trained at the Ecole Militaire 
Interarme du Cameroun (EMIAC) - the Inter-Force Military 
Academy created in I960 - and then at specailised schools 
(such as the artillery school at Chalon-sur-Marne) in 
France.
2. The establishment of military tribunals
In some countries, particularly in Britain and in 
America, a military court (also known as a military tri­
bunal or a court-martial) is an ad hoc body convened by a 
commanding officer and having no fixed seat. Not so in 
Cameroon. A military court here is a permanent court with 
a fixed seat and of mixed composition (civilians and sol­
diers). Military courts were first established in Cameroon
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under an Ordinance of 31 December 1959 dealing with the 
creation, composition and competence of military tribunals. 
"Creation de l ’armee, existence d ’une subversion armee, 
avait ... conduit le gouvernement de la Republique du 
Cameroun & mettre sur pied une justice militaire."
The military tribunals that were set up were subsequently 
placed under the control and supervision of the 1 service 
de la justice militaire* attached to the Ministry of 
Justice.
A. Military tribunals before 1972
The 1959 Ordinance set up five military tribunals 
in the Cameroun Republic. Each of these tribunals was 
presided over by a civilian magistrate who was assisted 
by two military officers. Civilian magistrates also dis­
charged the functions of juge d 1 instruction and of commis- 
saire du gouvernement. A military tribunal applied the 
provisions of the Code d 'Instruction Criminelle. The 
extensive powers given to these tribunals appear to have 
been dictated by the existence of an armed subversion in 
the country. Offences against the internal security of 
the State committed by U.P.C. guerrillas were at first tried 
by the ordinary criminal courts. But they soon became 
overcrowded because of the high incidence of such offences.
7. Ibid., p . 178.
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In order to relieve these courts of the heavy load of cases 
they had to deal with, a special criminal court (cour 
criminelle speciale) was created in May 1959 and empowered 
to deal summarily with offences against the internal 
security of the state and, generally, with offences commit­
ted with violence or using arms. However, the smooth 
running of the cour criminelle speciale (it was composed 
of a president and two assessors) was hampered by the per­
sistent failure of assessors to take part in the proceedings 
of the court. Intimidated by guerillas, these assessors 
were afraid of reprisals from them and so always pretended 
to be ill on the day scheduled for any trial. Shortly 
after the creation of the Army in November 1959 it began 
to be felt that the trial of U.P.C. insurgents could best 
be undertaken by the Army. Unable to fulfil the need for 
which it was established, the cour criminelTe speciale 
was abolished by an Ordinance of the 7th May i960 and its 
jurisdiction transferred to the five military tribunals 
which had been set up on 31st December 1959. Over 3000 
cases that had been pending before the special criminal 
court were transferred to the military tribunals.
Reunification of the ’two Cameroons’ on 1st 
October 1961 introduced another dimension into the problem 
of military justice. Military courts did not exist in 
the Southern Cameroons. The territory had no army and 
it was peaceful. The small number of Southern Cameroonians 
serving in the Nigerian Army were answerable before Nigerian
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Courts-Martial. Besides, although U.P.C. insurgents from 
the other side of the River Mungo took refuge in the terri­
tory, they made it a point not to commit any exactions 
there.
By article 5 of the 1961 Constitution, the Army, 
and consequently military courts, came within federal 
powers. The question whether the territorial jurisdiction 
of the military tribunals already in operation in East 
Cameroon should simply be extended to West Cameroon was 
answered in the negative. As many as 90$ of the matters 
coming before the military tribunals were allegations of 
subversion involving civilians and not soldiers. It was 
felt that it would be a political and a psychological 
blunder to have Anglophones involved in such cases tried 
in a language (French) and under a legal system (civil law) 
which were alien to them. Cameroon was (and. still is) a 
bilingual country with two legal systems, but, since there 
were no bilingual bi-jural legal personnel, it was decided 
that a federal system should be evolved which would take 
account of the need of generalising the principles of mili­
tary justice while respecting the tradition of each of the 
federated states. Accordingly, Ordinance No. 61/OF/4 of 
4 October 1961 was passed dealing with military judicial 
organisation in the Federal Republic. This Ordinance 
provided that the composition, taking of cognizance, and 
the initiation of action.in and the powers of military 
tribunals shall be the same in either federated state.
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However, the procedure in those tribunals was the criminal 
procedure in force in each of the federated states. Four 
military tribunals were established, three in East Cameroun 
(one each in Yaounde, Douala, and Dschang) and one in 
West Cameroon (in Buea). The Yaounde and Buea military 
tribunals were said to be .’permanent Military Tribunals’ 
while the others were Temporary tribunals.
Each military tribunal was presided over by a 
civil judge who was, in East Cameroun, a magistrate of the 
local First Instance Tribunal, and, in West Cameroon, a 
Chief Magistrate. The presiding judge was assisted by two 
army officers who had to be above or of equal rank with 
the accused soldier (whenever a soldier was on trial).
These officers were members of the court and deliberated 
together with the presiding judge on the question of culpa­
bility and sentence. Prosecutions were conducted by a 
’commissioner for Government’ who was either an army officer 
or a civil legal officer. In East Cameroon the incoherence 
of having a civilian legal officer prosecuting in a military 
court was resolved by sending officers who left the Ecole 
Militaire Interarmes du Cameroun, to do a crash course on 
civil and military criminal law and procedure. The course 
lasted six months and the officers were awarded a certificat 
d ’aptitude aux fonctions de magistrat militaire. In West 
Cameroon, the office of commissaire du gouvernement was at 
first assumed by a federal counsel in the Attorney-General’s 
Chambers. Later, the office passed over to a military 
officer.
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There were three types of military tribunals: 
permanent military tribunals, temporary military tribunals, 
and tribunaux aux armees. There was a permanent military 
tribunal in Yaounde and another in Buea. The Yaounde 
Permanent Military Tribunal was created by Ordinance 
No. 61/OF/4 of 4 October 1961. Its territorial juris­
diction extended over the whole country and it could sit in 
the following towns: Garoua, Maroua, Ngaoundere, Bertoua,
g
Yokadouma, Moloundou and Douala. The Buea Permanent 
Military Tribunal was created by decree No. 61/DF/73 of 
28 December 1961. Its territorial jurisdiction was 
limited to the federated state of West Cameroon. It could 
on the orders of the Armed Forces Minister or his delegate, 
sit in any Divisional headquarters of the federated state. 
By a curious turn of events this Buea Permanent Military 
Tribunal came to be competent to try only civilians. This 
came about as a result of the creation in September 1962 
of the tribunal aux armees in Buea. This tribunal robbed 
the Buea Permanent Military Tribunal of its competence to 
try soldiers. It retained the power to try only civilians 
accused of subversion, offences against state security, 
and fire-arms legislation.
Provision existed for the establishment of tem­
porary military tribunals. One such tribunal was set up
8. Decree No. 67/DF/636 of 15 December 1967 fixing the
localities in which the Yaounde Permanent Military Tri­
bunal may sit; Decree No. 69/DF/50 of 13 February 1969 
suppressing the Douala Temporary Military Tribunal.
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in Dschang. It was suppressed in 1964 and another one
g
set up in Bafoussam. There was also a temporary mili­
tary tribunal in Douala but it was suppressed in 1969. ^  
Temporary military tribunals could, on.the orders of the 
Armed Forces Minister sit in the chief towns of their 
areas of jurisdiction. Provision also existed for the 
establishment of 'tribunaux militaires aux armdesT.
These were in the nature of Anglo-American courts-martial.
In times of war, a tribunal aux armdes could be set up in 
any theatre of war on the proposition of the Armed Forces 
Minister. In such a case it would be convened at the 
headquarters of the field commander. A tribunal militaire 
aux armdes was empowered to try only soldiers and people 
treated as such and it applied exclusively the criminal 
procedure in force in the federated state of East Cameroun. 
Only one tribunal aux armdes was ever set up in Cameroon; 
and this was in Buea.1"' The reason for the setting up of 
this court in Buea was to ensure that soldiers serving in 
that part of the country were tried not according to the 
criminal procedure of West Cameroon but, like their brothers 
of the gun serving in East Cameroun, according to the cri­
minal procedure of East Cameroun.
9. Decree No. 64/DF/496 of 23 December 1964 setting up
the Bafoussam temporary military tribunal and suppres­
sing the one in Dschang.
10. Decree No. 69/DF/50 of 13th February 1969-
11. Decree No. 62/DF/349 of 21 September 1962 setting up
the Buea tribunal militaire aux armees.
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B . The Directorate of Army Legal Service
The Directorate of Army. Legal Service (le service 
de justice militaire), something of a miniature ministry 
of justice, was created -by and its attributes spelt out 
in Decree No. 65/DF/427 of 9 October 1965. ^  The head 
of the Directorate could be a civilian or a military officer 
appointed by decree of the President of the Republic. At 
the moment however, it is headed by a civilian judicial 
officer. He has been conferred the status, rights and 
prerogatives of military officer. The Directorate con­
sists of a number of military officers (some with a law 
degree, others taking part-time law courses at the Univer­
sity of Yaounde), registrars, and secretaries. It is
13divided into bureaux, each headed by a chief of bureau.
The Directorate has a wide range of duties. It 
controls and supervises all military courts and drafts 
all decisions of the Armed Forces Minister relating to 
prosecutions. Military courts must make monthly returns 
of court decisions and general reports of their work to 
the Directorate which may request clarification on or an 
explanation of any point or matter in the reports and returns. 
Personnel of the Directorate may moreover inspect any mili­
tary court. The Directorate goes through the copies of
12. A decree to organise the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
13. The important Bureau of Prosecutions and Clemency 
(Bureau d fAction Publique et Grdce) is at present 
headed by a Captain who holds the licence en droit 
degree.
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the various orders and judgments sent to it and may 
advise the Minister to order that an appeal be made 
against a particular judgment or to order a retrial by 
another court.
All reports (proces-verbaux) concerning offences 
over which military courts have jurisdiction as of right 
as well as all those concerning offences over which mili­
tary courts may claim jurisdiction must be sent to the 
Directorate. After studying the reports a decision is 
drafted, for the Minister, on whether to prosecute or 
not to. In a difficult case the Directorate would forward 
the matter, together with its considered opinion on it, 
to the Minister who decides on what action should be taken. 
Decisions taken by the Minister in matters of military 
justice are communicated to the military command and to the 
interested Ministries by the Directorate. The Directorate 
also deals with all applications for clemency and bail 
and controls la police judiciaire (SQrete Nationale,
DIRDOC, Gendarmerie) when acting within the framework of 
military justice. It also prepares draft legislation 
concerning offences triable (and the penalties applicable) 
and procedure in military courts. It examines the legality 
of texts submitted for the Minister’s approval. It parti­
cipates, in liaison with the bodies concerned, in drafting 
decrees, orders, and ministerial decisions that may be the 
object of 'recours contentieux’.
The administrative role of the Directorate consists
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In satisfying, within the budgetary limits, the needs 
of the various military courts, providing its personnel 
with the necessary professional training, awarding them 
marks, and participating in working sessions concerning 
the promotion of its personnel. The Directorate also 
acts as liaison between the Ministry of the Armed Forces 
and the different Ministires concerned with military jus­
tice, particularly the Ministry of Territorial Adminis­
tration and the Ministry of Justice. For example, Pro­
vincial Governors and Divisional Officers have been dele­
gated the power to initiate prosecution against civilians 
in military courts. All directives and comments from 
the Ministry of the Armed Forces to these administrative 
officers are forwarded by the Directorate not to them 
directly but through the Ministry of Territorial Adminis­
tration. The Directorate also deals with this Ministry 
in matters relating to prisons administration. It super­
vises military prisons and its head may inspect any prison 
in the country.
The Directorate maintains a close relationship 
with the Ministry of Justice. It works together with 
that Ministry in resolving all matters concerning civilian 
judicial and legal officers on secondment to military 
courts. It sees to it that decisions of the Supreme 
Court are known to and followed by military courts.
Appeals for clemency are forwarded by the Directorate to 
the Minister of Justice for onward transmission to the
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President of the Republic. If the President refuses to 
exercise his prerogative of mercy the Directorate must, 
in the case of a death penalty, see to it that the sentence 
is carried out within 48 hours.
II. Jurisdiction of Military Courts
Since September 1972 the system by which military 
justice Is administered in Cameroon has become a part of 
the country’s judicial system and consequently subject to 
the same general principles concerning the administration 
of justice in the State. Hitherto, military courts had 
existed in a sort of constitutional vacuum. The juris­
diction of military courts is spelt out in the Military 
Judicial Organisation Ordinance (No. 72/5) of 26 August 
1972. The Ordinance Indicates the territorial jurisdic­
tion of military courts, the persons justiciable before 
them, and the law applied there - what is known in the 
literature as the ratione loci, ratione personae, and 
ratione materiae jurisdiction respectively.
1. Jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of 
military courts
Under the old law the powers of military courts 
were sometimes wide and sometimes limited, depending upon 
circumstances - whether It was a time of peace or of war 
or other exceptional circumstance. This is no longer
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the case. The ratione loci and ratione personae juris­
diction of military courts is the same whether in times 
of peace or war. Besides, the Yaounde Military Court may, 
whenever necessary, sit in any locality in the country and 
provisions exist for the setting up of subordinate military 
courts when and where needed.
A . Territorial jurisdiction of military courts
The Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance of 
1972 established in Yaounde a Military Court whose juris­
diction covers the entire national territory. This 
Court may, on the decision of the Head of State, or, by 
special delegation, of the Minister of the Armed Forces, 
sit in any other locality of the country. However, the 
Ordinance makes provision for the establishment, by decree, 
and as needed, of one or more subordinate military courts. 
Two of such courts (one in Buea and the other in Bafoussam) 
were set up just around the same time as the Yaounde Court
was. The Yaounde Military Court however remains a ’cen-
14
tralizing' Court.
The new Buea and Bafoussam Military Courts have 
retained the personnel and territorial jurisdiction of the 
old military tribunals they have replaced. The territorial
14. Minister of the Armed Forces, Circular No. 2230/MINFA/ 
600/359 of 30 November 1972.
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jurisdiction of the Buea Military Court is limited to
the North West and the South West Provinces while that of
15the Bafoussam Court is confined to the Western Province. 
This in practice limits ipso facto the territorial juris­
diction of the Yaounde Military Court for, it only deals 
with matters from the other Provinces, viz., the Centre 
South, Eastern, Littoral, and Northern. However, since 
its jurisdiction is national, the Yaounde Military Court 
may sit in any part of the country or try an offence com­
mitted anywhere in the country.
A military court is composed of (i) a presiding 
judge who may be a civil or a military judicial officer 
or simply a military officer, (ii) two assessors (civil 
judicial officers or military officers) one of whom must 
be a member of the Armed Forces, (iii) a commissaire du 
gouvernement (with one or more deputies), a civil or 
military legal officer or an officer In the Armed Forces, 
in charge of conducting prosecutions, (iv) one or more 
judges in charge of conducting preliminary inquiries when­
ever necessary, and (v) one or more registrars, civilians 
or soldiers. Nothing is said as to whether the examining 
judges must be members of the Armed Forces only or whether 
they may be civilian judicial officers. In practice the
15. The old tribunal militaire aux armees in Buea has been 
suppressed and matters pending before it were trans­
ferred to the Yaounde Military Court.
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juge d1instruction at the military courts is always a 
military officer. It is noteworthy that the presiding 
judge and one of the assessors may both be either civil 
judicial officers, military judicial officers, or simply 
military officers. It has been suggested that this is a 
flexible approach which allows for variation in the com­
position of the court as events and the importance of 
the case warrant. However, because military tradition
requires that a soldier be tried only by his peers, the 
Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance provides that one 
of the assessors must always be a member of the Armed 
Forces, that military judges must be of at least equal 
rank as the accused soldier, and that where the presiding 
judge is unavailable, he is replaced by a civil judicial 
officer or the most senior military officer of the court in 
the highest rank. So organised, a military court can
properly sit in judgment over any senior military officer
17or any high personality in the country. In times of war
or other exceptional circumstances, the civilian members 
of the court are replaced with military officers.
B . Persons justiciable before military courts
The Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance 
specifically designates all those who may be indicted
16. Circular No. 2230/MINFA/600/359.
17. Ibid.
1095.
before military courts. All persons of at least 18 
years of age, whether male or female, civilian or military, 
alien or national, in peace times or at times of war or 
other exceptional circumstances, are justiciable before 
military courts. The test is whether the person has 
committed any of the offences over which military courts 
have subject-matter-jurisdiction. For example, subversion,
political offences, and offences against fire-arms legis­
lation are tried by military courts. Any person above 18 
years who commits any of those offences is tried before a 
military court and it makes no difference whether he is a 
civilian or an alien. Moreover, prisoners of war are 
also justiciable before military courts. Under the 
Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 12 August 19^9, 
prisoners of war must be tried by a military court, except 
where the law of the belligerent expressly allows a member 
of the belligerent’s Armed Forces to be tried by the ordi­
nary criminal courts for the same offences. Prisoners 
of war may not be sentenced to any penalties other than 
those which might be inflicted on members of the forces of 
the detaining power for the same act.
Only persons of less than 18 years of age may not 
be tried by a military court. If the person charged, 
whether as principal or accessory, is a child aged between
14 and 18, he must be tried by the ordinary criminal courts.
18The criminal responsibility of such persons is diminished.
18. S. 80(3) of the Cameroonian Penal Code.
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It is a principle of the criminal law of Cameroon that no
criminal responsibility arises from the act or omission
19of a person aged less than 10 years. So a child of
less than ten years of age cannot be tried for an offence.
A child over 10 and under 1^ may be tried; but he may 
neither be sentenced to a penalty nor to a preventive 
measure provided by the criminal law for adults. He may 
be the subject only of such measures as are specially pro­
vided by the laws on juvenile delinquency.
Subject to International Convention on privilege 
of jurisdiction and to the rules on diplomatic immunity, 
any foreigner charged with any of the offences triable by 
military courts, is justiciable before military courts.
This has always been the rule. Thus in Ministere Public c.
20Gbodogbe Paulin & Essembe Prosper the Douala Temporary
21Military Tribunal found the first defendant, a Dahomian, 
together with the second defendant, guilty of conspiracy 
against the Government and sentenced both of them.
2. The content of the law applied in military courts
The term ’military court’ is misleading and a 
misnomer in the Cameroonian context. Contrary to what may
19. Ibid., s. 80(1).
20. Douala Temporary Military Tribunal, Judgment No. 25 of 
2^th May 1967, unreported.
21. The Republic of Dahomey is now known as the Republic 
of Benin.
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at first have been thought, the Cameroonian military 
court does not try only soldiers and does not try only 
offences of a military nature. Rather, its jurisdiction 
extends to civilians and over non-military offences.
So while it enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over military 
offences it shares with the ordinary criminal courts 
jurisdiction over soldiers, civilians and non-military 
offences. Section 5 of the Military Judicial Organi­
sation Ordinance enumerates offences which may be tried 
by a military court. They are: (i) offences of a purely military
nature provided for in the Code de Justice Militaire;
(ii) offences of whatever nature committed by soldiers, 
with or without civilian co-offenders or accessories, 
either in barracks or on duty; (iii) felonies and mis­
demeanours against the security of the State; Civ) offences 
punishable by law with detention; (v) offences previewed 
in Ordinance No. 62/OF/18 of 12 March 1962 on the repres­
sion of subversion; (vi) offences aga-inst fire-arms 
legislation; (vii) offences of whatever nature, involving 
a soldier or likened person (assimile), committed in an 
area subject to a state of emergency or other exceptional 
circumstance; and (vii) all other offences related to the 
ones hereabove enumerated. Some of these offences are 
found in the Cameroonian Penal Code,, others in subsidiary 
penal legislation, and others still in the Code de Justice 
Militaire.
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A. The Cameroonian Penal Code
The Cameroonian Penal Code constitutes the 
ordinary criminal law of the land and is applicable, 
except otherwise provided, in all. its -entirety to any 
member of the Cameroonian Armed Forces who. offends against 
it. It makes no difference whether such a person is 
charged before a military court or an ordinary criminal 
court. The general position is that where a civilian or 
a soldier is tried for a crime other than a military offence, 
he is charged with the appropriate criminal law of the 
State.
A man who joins the army, whether as an officer 
or as ordinary soldier, does not cease to be a citizen.
A Cameroonian, by taking upon himself the additional 
character of a soldier, does not put off any of the rights 
or duties of a Cameroonian. Military men do not cease 
to have rights as citizens and as human beings. All 
systems of military law the world over aim to ensure that 
the soldier is in no way enabled to escape the obligations 
of his country's ordinary law or of international law as 
recognized in various conventions. Thus, with a few 
exceptions, the soldier's position under the ordinary law 
of the land remains unaffected. If he commits an offence
against the ordinary criminal law he can be tried and
22punished for it by the criminal courts.- In other words,
22. In respect of civil rights, duties and liabilities the 
ordinary law in general also applies to him although 
a few privileges are granted to him and certain restric­
tions are imposed upon him for the purposes of enabling
/Continued over
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should a soldier commit an offence which is of a non­
military nature, he may be tried by a civil court (’civil’ 
used here in contradistinction to ’military’), since the 
soldier remains a citizen with all attendant rights and 
duties, although he has other special duties and is sub­
ject to criminal sanctions provided by military law.
In normal times and save as otherwise provided, 
military courts are, like the civil courts, governed by 
the general principles of the criminal law found in Book I 
of the Cameroonian Penal Code. Law No. 67/LF/l of 12th 
June 1967 provides that Book I of the Penal Code "shall 
govern all other criminal law". So, ordinarily, military 
courts are bound by the principle of non-retrospection of 
laws and penalties as the civil courts are. A military 
court cannot impose any penalty or measure not provided 
for in the Code. For example, it would be illegal for a 
military court to sentence to deportation, flogging,
Footnote 22 continued from page 1098.
him the better to fulfil his military duties. In 
democratic countries soldiers retain the right to 
vote, if necessary by postal ballot, and to support 
the political party of their choice. Fear of ’poli­
ticising’ the army cannot be used as an excuse to 
deprive soldiers of their civil rights. However, 
political activity within the army service cannot be 
reconciled with the maintenance of discipline, while 
the circulation of propaganda or organisation on 
behalf of political parties whose tenets support a 
hostile power or are subversive to military discipline 
must clearly amount to a disciplinary offence as well 
as a threat to security.
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imprisonment in stocks or in chains, banishment, etc. 
Military courts are also governed by the same sentencing 
principles governing the civil courts. The presumption 
of inncoence should, save as otherwise provided, apply 
also to persons charged before a military court. Such 
a person must be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
The onus of proof must lie squarely on the Prosecution, 
which must prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
Any doubt, even if it is only a shadow, must be resolved 
in favour of the defendant.
Not even a military court may convict a person 
who is not criminally responsible within the meaning of 
s. 7^ of the Penal Code. It is a core principle of 
Cameroonian criminal law that criminal responsibility lies 
only on him who intentionally commits each of the ingre­
dient acts or omissions of an offence with the intention 
of causing the result which completes it. The accused 
must not only have committed the physical act (actus reus); 
he must also have had the intention to do so (mens rea). 
Moreover, the accused may avail himself of any of the 
partial or complete defences provided in the Penal Code. 
Irresistible physical compulsion, insantiy, involuntary 
intoxication, threats, lawful defence, necessity, provo­
cation and so on are as much defences in the military courts 
as in the civil ones. Of particular importance in the 
military context is the defence of obedience to lawful 
authority. A member of the forces is bound to obey
23. Cameroonian Penal Code, s. 83.
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the orders of his superiors. But this only relates to 
lawful commands. The question then arises. When is a 
command lawful and when is it not? Generally a lawful 
command is one which is not contrary to the law of the 
State or international law and is justified by military 
law. If the command is manifestly illegal, the person to 
whom it was given would be justified in questioning and 
even refusing to execute it. Under s. 83(2) of the Penal 
Code the plea of obedience to lawful authority will fail 
if the order was 1 manifestly unlawful*. This means that 
the plea will succeed even when the order was unlawful 
provided it was not manifestly so. But what is manifest 
to one person may not be to another. So, the court must 
always take into account the nature of the act and the 
personality of the accused.
The question of how far a soldier may avail him­
self of obedience to lawful authority as a defence to a 
charge of unlawful action is a topic that has been and 
continues to be of the greatest importance in relation to 
war crimes or crimes committed during a state of siege.
The issue has also been raised in relation to soldiers off 
duty. Are orders from an officer to his subordinate lawful 
when they affect the subordinate’s private life or when he 
is off duty, particularly as there is a tendency nowadays
to allow the soldier off duty much greater freedom from
24discipline than in the past? The prevailing attitude
24. The German Military Code, for example, places greater 
stress on the soldier’s retention of his fundamental 
rights under the Basic Law, and, generally, the soldier’s 
rights as a citizen are preserved as far as is compatible 
with the maintenance of discipline and efficiency.
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seems to be that the military commander must retain suf­
ficient control over the private lives of his subordinates 
to ensure that discipline and good order do not suffer. 
Hence, any orders reasonably calculated to maintain this
objective are regarded as lawful, even when they curtail
25the private actions of the soldier. But the commander
has no right whatsoever to take advantage of his military 
rank to give a command which does not relate to military 
duty or usage or which has for its sole object the attain­
ment of some private end. For example, an order that a 
soldier should run his officer’s private errands or take 
part in private theatricals may be legitimately disobeyed.
Book II of the Cameroonian Penal Code deals with 
particular crimes and is also applicable in the military 
courts when a soldier or a civilian appearing before it is 
charged with any offence provided in the code.
Section 5(2) of the Military Judicial Organisation 
Ordinance provides that military courts have jurisdiction 
to try ’offences of whatever nature’ committed by soldiers, 
with or without civilian co-offenders or accessories, either 
in barracks or on duty. The offence committed need not 
be a military offence. It may be any offence provided in
25. Thus, whether in private or not, drug-taking, homo­
sexuality, lesbianism, drunkenness and so on are not 
allowed in the Armed Forces as they impair efficiency 
and subvert discipline. The prohibition is absolute 
and it makes no difference that the civil legislation 
of the land is more tolerant and liberal on these 
matters.
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the Penal Code - theft, murder, assault, rape, et cetera.
In such a case, the soldier and the civilian co-offender
or accessory are charged with the relevant provisions
of the Penal Code but tried in the military court having
territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a
soldier while off duty or while out of barracks commits
an offence provided in the Penal Code, he is, as a general
rule, triable in the ordinary criminal courts. The
position is however otherwise in areas subject to a state
of emergency or other exceptional circumstances. In
these areas, military courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over whatever offence by a soldier or likened person (to
the exclusion of civilians), committed whether on or off
duty or in barracks or out of barracks. If the offence
committed is one previewed in the Penal Code, the military
court would have to apply the Penal Code.
Military courts are given exclusive jurisdiction
over offences punishable by law with detention and also
over felonies and misdemeanours against the security of
the State whether such offences are committed by soldiers
or civilians. Offences punishable under Cameroonian law
with detention are in fact political offences. By s . 26
of the Cameroonian Penal Code,
"Detention shall mean loss of liberty imposed 
for a political felony or misdemeanour, 
during which the offender shall not be obliged 
to work, and shall be confined to a special 
establishment, or failing such establishment 
separately from those convicted under the 
ordinary law."
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But what Is a political offence? In Cameroon, it is 
defined by the punishment prescribed for it. Any offence 
for which the prescribed punishment is detention is 
political. Most of these political offences are found 
in the Penal Code and detention is often for an indeter­
minate period. The offences are those which are injurious 
to (i) the internal security of the State: secession (s. Ill),
revolution (s. 114), forming armed bands for the purposes 
of secession, civil war or revolution (s. 115), and insur­
rection (s. 116); or (ii) the Constitution: electoral
malpractices (ss. 122 and 123), and violation of the prin­
ciple of the separation of powers (ss. 124 - 127); or
(iii) public authority: contempt of President and other 
dignitaries (s. 153), and resistance of a political nature 
to the lawful performance of duties (ss. 157 - 159); or
(iv) public peace: any unlawful assembly or riot with a
political flavour (ss. 231 - 234). Offences against the
internal security of the State are political offences.
But not all political offences are offences against the
internal security of the State.
"The explanation for the special rules for 
political offences is less in the nature of 
the acts in question than in the fact that 
those committing such acts are not anti­
social but merely anti-government. They 
are not base criminals, enemies of society, 
but intelligent men, progressive men, who 
seek the happiness of their fellow citizens 
and are sometimes forced to use illegal and 
even violent methods to achieve political, 
economic or social reform. In this way, the 
behaviour of the political criminal is essen­
tially different from the behaviour of the
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ordinary criminal. Hence the need for dif­
ferent punishments for such, offences, punish­
ments which do not carry the stigma of 
ordinary punishments, are not as severe and 
could easily be pardoned.” 26
27Offences against the external security of the State 
are also found in the Penal Code and.are. triable only by 
military courts. It is the government’s responsibility 
to ensure the internal and the external security of the 
State. Indeed, any Government, whatever it is, whatever 
its political form, however it came to power, must maintain 
order, ensure justice, the proper functioning of the public 
services, the survival of the nation, and protect its own 
authority and safety. However, the distinction between 
the internal security and the external security of the 
State would appear to correspond to the distinction between 
protecting a regime’s authority and safety on the one hand, 
and ensuring the survival of the nation on the other hand. 
Whereas the external security of the State touches upon 
the very heart of the nation, its very existence, the same 
cannot be said of the internal security of the State; at 
least not always. "The internal security of the state 
appears ... to concern the interests of the regime, for 
those who act against internal security seek not only to
26. Georges Levasseur, ’Justice and state security’, 
J.I.C.J., vol. V, No. 2 (1964), pp. 234-246 at p. 239.
27. They include treason, espionage, sabotage of defence 
installations, failure to report any activity likely
to injure the defence of the nation. See, ss. 102-108 
of the Penal Code.
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harrass the government but above all to get rid of it.
Hence the idea that such offences are bound up with
.... „ 28 politics.
Since any government must ensure the Internal 
and external safety of the nation, It Is to be expected 
that it deploys all lawful means against those whose acti­
vities could bring about the extinction of the nation, its 
annexation to a foreign country, its balkanisation, or 
its enslavement. Governments have always taken pains to 
kindle, nurture and promote patriotism and nationalism 
among their citizens as superlative virtues. To serve 
one’s nation, to shed blood for it, is always projected 
as something noble and glorifying. On the other hand, 
betraying one’s country is considered a very infamous act, 
a kind of parricide. Treason, like spying for an enemy,
is severely punished; and to be branded a traitor is a 
terrible insult.
The matter is not so clear-cut in most acts 
against the internal security of the State. This is so 
because it is more often the safety and authority of a 
regime or an oligarchy which is at stake. And when the 
regime acts against insurgents, it appears to be doing so 
out of selfish interest, out of concern for self-preser­
vation, out of concern to save its own skin. It has been 
said that regimes do not fall like ripe fruits. It is
28. Lavasseur, op.cit., p. 238.
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necessary to shake the branches, nay, the whole tree.
A campaign of opinion will rarely be sufficient to topple 
a regime. So, in order to achieve their objectives, 
opponents of a regime do have recourse to illegal or vio­
lent means. If they fail, they pay the price for their 
illegal or violent activities no matter what praiseworthy 
motives they may have had. They may take comfort from 
the idea that no particular stigma attaches to a political 
offender. On the other hand, success would appear as a 
final vindication of the means employed.
"If an act against the security of the 
State is successful and if it achieves its 
object, the overthrow of the regime, the 
person who has been successful (either by 
himself or with co-conspirators acting with 
him or after him) is assured not only of 
impunity but also of glory and perhaps of 
power. This is extremely tempting. No 
ordinary criminal can hope for such good 
fortune. The game Is worth the candle, 
especially for those whose passions are 
deeply roused. The throne or the scaffold 
... Political action in such a case is 
always collective and not individual and all 
is not lost if one person is caught and 
punished." 29
B . Subsidiary penal legislation
Not every penal provision is contained in the
Penal Code. There are several particular enactments which
10contain penal provisions. These include the Labour Code,
11the Law on the Use of Names and Pseudonyms, the Law on the
29. Ibid., p. 240.
30. Law No. 74/14 of 27 November 1974.
31. Law No. 68/LF/8 of 11 June 1968.
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12 11 Profession of Pharmacist, the Law on Civil Protection,
the Law on the National Civic Service for Participation In
Development, the Law on Cooperative Societies, the
Law on Sports and Socio-Educational Equipment, the Law
17on the General Regime of Princes, the Law on the National
18
Forestry Regime, the Law on the Exercise of Banking
19 4 0Activities, the Law on Social Insurance, the Law on
4l 42Insurance Bodies, the Law on Off-Licences Bars, the
41Law on Compulsory Insurance, and the Law on Automobile
44Guaranteed Fund. There are in addition certain subsidiary
legislations which are exclusively penal. These include
45the notorious Subversion Ordinance, the Clandestine
32. Law No. 69/LF/3 of 13 June 1969.
33. Law No. 73/12 of 7 December 1973.
34. Law No. 73/4 of 9 July 1973.
35. Law No. 73/15 of 7 December 1973.
36. Law No. 74/22 of 5 December 1974.
37. Ordinance No. 72/18 of 17 October 1972.
38. Ordinance No. 73/18 of 22 May 1973; Decree No. 74/357
of 17 April 1974.
39. Ordinance No. 73/27 of 30 August 1973.
40. Ordinance No. 73/17 of 22 May 1973; Decree No. 74/26
of 11 January 1974.
41. Ordinance No. 73/14 of Lo May 1973.
42. Decree No. 73/657 of 22 October 1973.
43. Decree No. 65/DF/565 of 29 December 1965; Law No.
65/LF/9 of 22 May 1965.
44. Decree No. 67/DF/495 of 17 November 1967.
45. Ordinance No. 62/OF/18 of 12 March 1962.
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Emigration and Immigration Law, and the Fire-Arms and
4 7
Ammunitions Law.
Military courts may* in certain situations, try 
offences committed under any of these enactments irres­
pective of whether the offender is a soldier or a civilian. 
The first of such situations is that envisaged by s. 5(2) 
of the Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance. Under 
that subsection, military courts have jurisdiction to try 
"offences of whatever nature committed by soldiers, with 
or without civilian co-offenders or accessories, either 
in barracks or on duty". But these courts cannot exer­
cise jurisdiction where the offence was committed out of 
barracks and while the soldier was off duty. An offence 
committed under those circumstances would be tried in the 
ordinary criminal courts. The position is not altered by 
the fact that the offender is a soldier.
The second situation in which military courts 
can exercise jurisdiction in this area is that postulated 
by s. 5(7). Under that subsection military courts 
are empowered to try "offences of whatever nature invol­
ving a soldier or likened person (assimile), committed in 
an area subject to a state of emergency or other excep­
tional circumstance". This means that during war, a state
46. Law No. 72/21 of 5 December 1974.
47. Decree No. 73/658 of 22 October 1973.
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of siege, or a state of emergency declared over the
49
whole country or only over parts thereof, military 
courts assume jurisdiction over offences of any type com­
mitted by soldiers and persons treated as soldiers. So
50 51a soldier who, for example, steals, or rapes, or
murders, or commits an assault in an area subject to a
state of emergency is triable only in a military court.
The position is the same whether the soldier committed the
offence out of or in barracks, or while on or off duty.
A conflict situation however arises where the offence
48. Art. 11(2) of the Cameroonian Constitution recognises 
the right of the President to decree ’a state of siege’ 
in the event of ’grave peril threatening the nation’s 
territorial integrity or its existence, independence
or institutions’. When this happens the ordinary
law is suspended; martial law is proclaimed. In 
such a case, the civil courts cannot afterwards, at 
the suit of an aggrieved party, enter upon an inquiry 
as to whether the circumstances were in fact such 
as to justify the issue of the proclamation and the 
acts done in obedience to it.
49. Art. 11(1) of the Constitution empowers the President 
to decree ’a state of emergency’ where ’circumstances 
require’. In fact there are many areas in Cameroon 
which are still under a state of emergency: Mezam,
Momo, Manyu, Meme, Ndian, Fako, Menoua, Mifi, Bamboutos, 
Haut Nkam, Nde, Nkam, Wouri, Moungo, and the Sanaga- 
Maritime Divisions including the District of Ndikini- 
meki. See, Ordinance No. 72/13 of 26.08.1972 (State
of Emergency); Decree No. 72/550 of 14.10.1972 
(Extension of state of emergency to a part of the 
Republic).
50. Minist^re Public c. Namba Joseph, Jugement No. 3/67 du 
6 mars 196 7 (Trib. Mil. Temp, de Douala).
51. Minist^re Public c. Babouka Ernest, Jugement No. 11/67 
du 17 mai 1967 ("Trib. Mil. Temp, de Douala).
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committed In the emergency area was perpetrated with the 
aid of civilian accomplices. If the offence was committed 
with civilian accomplices while the soldier was on duty 
or in barracks it would appear, on the strength of s . 5(2), 
that the jurisdiction of military courts would extend to 
the civilian accomplices. But what happens where the 
accused soldier committed the offence with the help of 
civilian accomplices while he was off duty and out of 
barracks? Would the military courts assume jurisdiction 
over both the soldier and the civilian accomplices? The 
law is silent on this point. But it is generally assumed 
that in such a case the civilian co-offenders and accom­
plices would be tried in the ordinary criminal courts while 
the soldier would be tried by a military court.
C . Offences under the Subversion Ordinance
Section 5(5) of the Military Judicial Organi­
sation Ordinance confers upon military courts the exclu­
sive power to try offences provided in the Subversion 
52Ordinance committed by civilians or soldiers. This 
notorious statute is generally regarded as the most 
obnoxious piece of penal legislation in Cameroon. This 
is not because the Ordinance prescribes high penalties for 
the offences it created. In fact the penalties in the
52. Ordinance No. 62/OF/18 of 12 March 1962 (Repression of 
Subversive Activities) as amended by Law No. 63/LF/30 
of 25 October 1963*
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Ordinance are milder (the highest prescribed penalty is 5 
years' imprisonment plus 2,000,000 francs cfa) than the 
penalties for comparable provisions in the Penal Code.
What has always caused concern about the Ordinance is 
the nebulous and open-ended manner in which the offences 
therein contained are couched. Cameroonians often say 
sarcastically that anything a person does is tantamount to 
subversion. This is merely a grim and cryptic way of 
saying that the Subversion Ordinance may be used and is 
used to strike at anyone who does or says anything deemed 
to be injurious to the authority and safety of the regime 
- from petty gossip in the home to overt anti-Government 
activities. It is primarily on this account that the 
Subversion Ordinance has been seriously indicted as unjusti­
fiable, aimed at completely shielding public authority 
from criticism, and contrary to democratic principles in 
that it constitutues an infringement on the freedom of 
expression.
But while these criticisms are compelling and 
justified, the error and attitude should be corrected which
53. See for example the Cameroon Penal Law Commission,
Proce&verbaux de la quatrieme session de la commission 
fdd^rale de legislation penale ouverte le 13 dec. 1965, 
p7 96, Ministry of Justice Yaounde; International 
Commission of Jurists, 'Emergency laws in the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon', 20 Bulletin of the International 
Commission of Jurists, September 1964, p. 7; H.N.A. 
Enonchong, Cameroon constitutional law, Yaounde, 1967, 
p. 146; P.Y. Ntamark, Constitutional development of 
the Cameroons since 1914, Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1969, 
p. 359; J.N. Monie, The development of the laws and 
constitutions of Cameroon, Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1970, 
p. 207.
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supposes that omnibus penal provisions such as those con­
tained in the Subversion Ordinance are the sole prero­
gative of Cameroon. All over the world, governments 
have always found it necessary to have at least one 
criminal offence couched in blanket terms; a catch-all 
offence to enable the prosecution of offenders who may 
escape if prosecuted under other offences. Breach of 
peace, sedition and conspiracy in Anglo-American criminal 
law are classic examples of amorphous offences.
"The essence of the crime of conspiracy is 
an agreement between two or more persons to 
commit an unlawful act. The crime is the 
agreement and its execution or non-execution 
is irrelevant. Moreover the agreement may 
be inferred: ’A nod or a wink may amount to
conspiracy'. But also it is not necessary 
that the conspirators should either have 
met or known each other so long as there was 
evidence that they were acting in concert.
... A single.person may be charged with 
conspiracy 'with persons unknown'.
"Moreover the unlawfulness of the act which 
the conspirators agree to commit is not 
limited to criminal acts. ... [A] person may 
be convicted of conspiracy to commit an act 
for which he would not be prosecuted if he 
acted alone. The charge of conspiracy may 
be used to avoid the necessity of some pro­
cedural requirement which attaches to the 
substantive act. ... As has been said, 'a 
conspiracy count puts the whole life-style 
of the accused on trial' ... Finally, and mere 
importantly, the penalties for conspiracy 
are in effect unlimited." 54
The Subversion Ordinance does not define 'subver­
sion' . Consequently, the term must be given its ordinary 
meaning. To subvert means to overthrow, .to overturn, to
54. J.A.G. Griffith, The politics of the judiciary, Fontana, 
Glasgow, 1977, pp. 135-136.
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pervert* to ruin. A subversive activity is therefore 
one tending to ruin or overthrow. In the case of sub­
versive activities against the Government it means 
activities tending to ruin or overthrow constituted 
authority. The Subversion Ordinance deals with five 
distinct activities characterised as ’subversive1.
1) Resistance to the application of laws
’’Any person who in any manner whatsoever incites 
any other person to resist in any manner whatsoever the 
application of laws* decrees, regulations or orders of 
any public administrative authority shall be guilty ...”
The maximum prescribed penalty is three years’ imprison­
ment plus a fine of 1,000,000 francs cfa. This offence, 
it is submitted, punishes, the inciter and not the incited.
If A incites B to resist the application of any law or 
order, then, under this provision it is A and not B who 
is prosecuted. The offence is committed as soon as 
there has been an incitement. The fact that the person 
incited did not do what he was being incited or instigated 
to do is irrelevant. But the incitement must be an incite­
ment to resist the application of laws, decrees, regu­
lations or orders of a public administrative authority.
If the incitement was for any other purpose, the inciter 
cannot be properly prosecuted under this provision. 
Furthermore, if the person incited does in fact resist the
55- Subversion Ordinance, s. 1; cf. Penal Code, s. 157.
1115.
application of laws, etc., then it may well be that he 
can be prosecuted under s. 157 of the Penal Code.
Provided the inciter is over 18 years of age, 
his status is irrelevant. He may be male or female, a 
Cameroonian or an alien, a civilian or a soldier. More­
over, the means of incitement is also immaterial. Incite­
ment is incitement whether done artfully, by suggestion, 
verbally, in writing, by broadcast or whatever means.
2) Ridiculing public authority
"Any person who acts in any manner likely to
bring into contempt or ridicule any public authority ...
56shall be guilty." This offence is more serious than
the previous one. It carries a maximum sentence of 5 
years' imprisonment plus a fin of  ^ 000,000 francs cfa.
As in the previous offence, this offence may also be com­
mitted by any person and in any manner whatsoever. The 
act must however be one 'likely to bring into contempt or 
ridicule any public authority’ The act need not be one
which has in fact brought the public authority into con­
tempt or ridicule. It is sufficient that the act complained 
of was likely to do so.
Contempt means "any defamation, abuse or threat 
conveyed by gesture, word or cry uttered in any place onen 
to the public, or by any procedure intended to reach the
56. Ibid., s. 2; cf. Penal Code, ss. 153 and 154: contempt 
of President, dignitaries and public bodies.
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57public" . The decisive test Is the publicness of the
act. So any abuse or threat which is not public cannot
legally amount to contempt. In Procureur General de la
 ^ 58Cour d TAppel de Yaounde c. Owona Robert the respondent
wrote a letter to the senior administrative authority of 
his area complaining of his ill-treatment by the local 
assistant district officer. The letter was sent under 
confidential cover through the usual administrative channel. 
The letter came to the notice of the assistant district 
officer who considered its contents to be offensive and 
injurious to him. He denounced the defendant who was 
then arrested and charged before the Yaounde Permanent 
Military Tribunalwith having acted in a manner likely to 
bring into contempt or ridicule public authority. The 
Military Tribunal convicted and sentenced him. His 
appeal to the Court of Appeal was upheld. On further- 
appeal by the Prosecution to the then East Cameroun Supreme 
Court, held, (1) that the alleged abuse was never public 
since the letter in question had been sent under confiden­
tial cover, and (2) that it had not been shown that in 
writing the letter the appellant had the intention to injure 
public authority. "The scope of the Ordinance of 12 March 
1962,” the Court said, "cannot be extended to acts foreign 
to the subversive activities which the enactment aims at
57. Penal Code, s. 152.
58. C.S.C.O., Arret No. 36 du 15 dec. 1964 , Bulletin No. 
11, 1964, p. 904.
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59suppressing.
3) Inciting hatred against the Government
"Any person ... who Incites hatred against the
6 0Government ... shall be punished." The penalty for
this offence Is the same as for the offence of ridiculing 
public authority. The offence punishes anyone who 
tries to rouse antl-Government feeling among the people; 
anyone who whips up a wish for the overthrow or destruc­
tion of the Government. The offence is consummated as 
soon as the Incitement is made. It is of little conse­
quence that there was no response to the incitement. 
Furthermore, the offence may be committed by any person 
and the method by which the incitement may be effected is 
irrelevant. It may be by word of mouth or in writing, 
through the spoken or written press, or by acting in a 
particular manner. Indeed, mere criticism may suffice, 
particularly if such criticism tends to show the Govern­
ment as bad, callous, ineffective, inept, or condoning or 
even-promoting corruption.^
>
4) Taking part in a subversive enterprise
"Any person ... who takes part in any subversive 
enterprise against the authorities of the Republic ... or
59. It is probably significant that this enlightened decision 
was given by a court composed of expatriate judicial 
officers: Messrs Corre, Mollion, Parant.
60. Subversion Ordinance, s. 2.
61. Cf. the Victor Kanga Affair, supra, Chapter Nine.
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6 2who aids and abets any such enterprise shall be guilty."
The penalty is the same as that for the previous offence.
This provision was often invoked to deal with any person
participating in the U.P.C. insurrection or in support of 
f) "3
it as well as against those who offered any form of
help or assistance (supply of food, water, money, foodstuff,
clothing, shelter, information, etc.) to U.P.C. guerillas
as in the case of Ministere Public c. Fo£ Gorgon & Akoudou 
64Augustin. If the defendant failed to inform the
authorities of the presence of the insurgents, he was guilty 
of partaking in a subversive enterprise even if he gave 
them assistance under duress: Ministere Public c. Betteng
Josu£.^
Refusing to go to the polls, especially where
the refusal is collective, may amount to subversion. In
6 6Ministere Public c . Mengu£ Damaris R&gine & 44 Autres
62. Subversion Ordinance, s. 2.
63. Tribunal Militaire Temporaire de Douala, Ministere 
Public c. Kameni Adolphe, Jugement No. 4/67 du 6 mars 
1967; Ministere Public c. Ngole Martin, Jugement No.
5/67 du 6 mars 1967; Ministere Public c. Tchate Martin, 
Jugement No. 2/67 du 6 mars 1967; Ministere Public c. 
Kamnekeu Maurice (alias voie sure) & Ngueussi Lucas 
Talias sans culotte), Jugement No. 1/67 du 13 janv. 1967; 
Tribunal Permanent Militaire de Yaounde, January 1971: 
Affaire Mgr Ndogmo et Autres, Affaire Ernest Ouandie et 
Autres.
64. Tribunal Militaire Temporaire de Douala, Jugement No.
1/60 du 3 dec. i960.
65. Tribunal Militaire Temporaire de Douala, Jugement No. 
20/67 du 22 mai 1967.
66. Tribunal Militaire Permanent de Yaounde, Jugement No.
71 du 15 mars 1971.
1119.
the defendants, most of them Illiterates, were adherants 
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious sect. They refused 
to vote during the 1971 presidential elections on the 
ground that their religion does not permit them to partici­
pate in politics. They were arrested and charged before 
the Yaounde Permanent Military Tribunal with ’’engaging in 
acts and manoeuvres likely to compromise public security, 
infringe the laws of the land or injure authority and 
national unity”. All but two of them were convicted and 
sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.
5) Dissemination of false news
"Any person who publishes or reproduces any false 
statement, rumour or report or any tendentious comment or 
any statement or report which is likely to bring into 
hatred, contempt or ridicule any public authority shall be 
guility ..." and shall be liable to a fine of from 200,000 
to 2 ,000,000 francs cfa or to imprisonment for a period
/f rj
from one to five years or to both such fine and imprisonment.
This is probably the most noxious of the subver­
sion offences as it makes a very serious inroad into freedom 
of expression and- the press. The provision punishes not 
only the publication and reproduction of any false statement, 
report or rumour^ but also the publication and reproduction
67. Subversion Ordinance, s. 3; cf. Penal Code, s. 240: 
false news.
68. Cf. the Tombel Massacre Case. The Bamileke had settled 
among the Bakossi, buying land and also beginning to 
control the commerce of the area. The Bakossi resented 
this invasion. Tension began to mount between the two 
communities. Shortly before Christmas 1967, four Bakossi
/Continued over
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of statements and reports which, although true, are accom-
69panled by tendentious comments. Such comments need
not be direct. They may be indirect, by insinuation or
innuendo. In The People v. Martin Yai, J.F. Gwellem and 
70S.N. Tita, the defendants, respectively reporter, editor 
and publisher of the Cameroon Times, had published in 
December 1969 an article captioned fTataw Installed Sector 
Commander’. The article reported that the Armed Forces 
Minister had ’pointed an accusing finger’ at members of the
Footnote 68 continued from page 1119.
were shot dead by terrorists. Terrorists or no 
terrorists, the Bakossi put the blame for the killing 
squarely on the Bamileke. So, attributing the death 
of their four fellow tribesmen to the Bamileke, the 
Bakossi came out in number, burning and killing Bami­
leke. Troops were rushed into the troubled area and 
by the time order was restored 236 people had died.
A total of 143 Bakossi were arrested and charged before 
the Yaounde Permanent Military Tribunal with subversion 
and the dissemination of false news. Seventeen were 
sentenced to death by firing squad, 37 to life deten­
tion, 38 to life imprisonment, 10 to 10 years’ imprison­
ment each, 4 to two years’ detention, one man died 
during the trial, and 36 were discharged and acquitted. 
See, West Africa, May 20th 1967, p. 672; Victor Le 
Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca & London, 1971, p. 156.
69. Cf. the Victor Kanga Affair.
70. ’Fate of Times men at tribunal - reporter jailed, 
editor, publisher fined’, Cameroon Outlook, vol. 2,
No. 11, Wednesday February 11, 1970, p. 1.
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Armed Forces. Defendants were arrested, detained and 
later arraigned In the Buea Permanent Military Tribunal 
for publishing a false report of the speech of the Minister 
of Armed Forces. The prosecution contended that the pub­
lication was likely to bring members of the Armed Forces 
to contempt and hatred with the civilian population.
The defendants were convicted. The same allegation of 
publishing false information was made against the defen­
dants in The People v. Martin Che, Peter Etah Oben and 
S.N. Tita.^1 The Cameroon Times had on August 29th 1970 
carried a lead story captioned ’Bishop Ndongmo arrested 
for alleged subversion’. The article went on to say that 
the rebel leader Ernest Ouandie 'gave in’. The prose­
cution argued that the phrase ’give in’ means ’surrender’ 
and that as a matter of fact Ernest Ouandie did not give in 
but was ’captured'. The report that Ouandie gave in, 
the prosecution argued, tended to undermine and to ridicule 
the Government. The defendants were convicted.
D . Offences against fire-arms legislation
Military courts also exercise exclusive juris­
diction over all offences against fire-arms legislation 
whether committed by soldiers or civilians, and whether 
committed during peace or war times or other exceptional
71. ’Trial begins at Military Tribunal on 3 Times men’, 
Cameroon Outlook, vol. 2, No. 80, Wedenesday October
21, 1970, p. 1.
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72circumstances. Offences against fire-arms legislation
are contained in sections 229, 237 and 238 of the Penal 
Code and in Decree No. 73/658 of 22 October 1973 regu­
lating the importation, sale, transfer, possession and 
carriage of arms and ammunition. Under this decree it 
is an offence for anyone to import, sell, transfer, possess 
or carry any arms or ammunition without the requisite 
administrative authorisation to do so. Authorisation may 
be granted by either the local Prefect or the National 
Security.
1) Illegal possession and carriage of arms
By s. 237(1) of the Penal Code, "whoever without
such permission as may be required by law manufactures,
exports, imports, keeps, transfers or sells any firearm
or ammunition shall be punished with imprisonment for from
three months to one year or with fine of from 50,000 to
300,000 francs, or with both such imprisonment and fine."
Here, the actus reus suffices for the offence to
be consummated and the only question before the court is
whether or not the requisite administrative authorisation
73had been obtained. In Ministere Public c. Mbei II Paul 
the defendant who had been given a hunting rifle kept it
72. Under the old. law military courts tried offences against 
firearm legislation only when such offences were com­
mitted in an area subject to a state of emergency.
In non-emergency areas, the ordinary criminal courts 
assumed jurisdiction.
73- Tribunal Militaire Temporaire de Douala, Jugement No. 
7/67 du 16 mai 1967.
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for one month without the authorisation of the adminis­
tration. Held, that he was guilty of being illegally in 
possession of a firearm.
Thus, if A gives his gun to B who keeps it 
without having obtained the administrative authorisation 
to keep it, he is guilty of being illegally In possession 
of a firearm. If A had-given the gun without having 
obtained the authorisation to do so, he is guilty of having
illegally transferred a firearm. So, in Ministere Public
74
c. Bineng Jean Francois, the defendant was properly con­
victed where he had transferred his hunting rifle to 
someone else without the requisite prior administrative
authorisation. The law is the same where, as in Ministere
75Public c. Kon Samuel the defendant was engaged in the 
traffic of gun powder.
A soldier on duty may carry a firearm and ammu­
nition; but only such arm and quantity of ammunition as 
has been normally supplied to him for purposes of his duty. 
So a soldier may be prosecuted of illegally possessing a 
firearm where he is authorised to carry a pistol and is 
found with a rifle. The same would apply where he is in 
possession of a far greater quantity of ammunition than 
he is normally supplied with. Furthermore, the fact that
74. Tribunal Militaire Temporaire de Douala, Jugement No. 
26/67 du 24 mai 1967.
75. Tribunal Militaire Temporaire de Douala, Jugement No.
8/67 du 16 mai 1967.
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a person is a soldier does not entitle him to possess 
any type of firearm not supplied to him for the purposes 
of his duty, without the requisite prior administrative 
authorisation.
A person who is illegally in possession of a 
firearm commits a further offence (carrying a double 
penalty) under s. 237(2) of the Penal Code where he 
carries such arm outside his residence. It is Irrelevant 
whether the arm thus carried was exposed or concealed. 
Furthermore, if a person delivers any arm or ammunition 
to any person without ascertaining whether that person is 
licensed to keep it he is guilty of an offence under 
s. 237(3) of the Penal Code and punished as an accessory. 
The type of arm or ammunition involved is irrelevant.
It may be one for killing men or one for killing animals; 
a civilian firearm or a military firearm; a compressed 
air weapon or a compressed gas weapon.
It may be noted that the terms ’firearm’ and 
’weapon’ are not co-terminous. A firearm is a weapon but 
a weapon is not necessarily a firearm. A firearm is a 
weapon discharged by explosion whereas a weapon is any 
instrument (a gun, a knife, an arrow, a piece of wood, 
a stick, a stone, a blade, a grenade, a bomb, etc.) of 
offence or defence. Section 117 of the Penal Code defines 
a weapon for the purposes of s. 116 (insurrection) and 
s. 238 (dangerous carriage of arms) as including both an 
arm properly so-called and any other article carried with 
intent thereby to inflict bodily harm or material damage.
1125.
2) Dangerous carriage of arms
"Whoever whether licensed or not to bear arms
shall bear any weapon within the meaning of section 117
of this Code in a place open to the public in manner
liable to disturb the public peace or to alarm any person,
shall be punished with imprisonment for from three months
to two years or with fine of from 50,000 to 300,000 francs,
V b
or with both such imprisonment and fine."
If the weapon was carried in a place open to the 
public in a manner liable to disturb the public peace or 
to alarm anyone, it is irrelevant whether the person 
carrying the weapon was licensed or unlicensed to do so, 
or whether the weapon was a firearm or not. The essence 
of the offence is (i) that the weapon is borne in a public 
place, and (ii) that it is borne in a manner liable to 
disturb public peace or alarm any person. Places open 
to the public include bars, sports grounds, markets, halls, 
cinemas, theatres, the public highway, nightclubs, etc.
Any weapon held or used in a threatening manner in public 
(for example a person in a crowd fires a gun in the air 
or holds it pointing to the crowd, a person holds an 
explosive substance menacingly in a crowded cinema) Is 
liable to alarm people and lead to a disturbance of the 
peace.
76. Penal Code, s. 238.
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3) Explosive substances
Explosive substances also come under firearm 
offences. Section 229 of the Penal Code punishes with up 
to one year’s imprisonment plus a fine of 100,000 francs 
any person who "infringes any regulation governing the 
manufacture, storage, transport, import or export of, 
or trade in explosive substances". This provision deals 
with those who illegally deal in explosives (for example, 
manufacturing or being in possession of gunpowder without 
authorisation) as well as with those who, though authorised 
to deal in explosives, contravene any regulation governing 
the manufacture, sale, storage, transport, import or 
export of that substance. For example, an authorised 
manufacturer of explosive substances who fails to store 
or transport them in accordance with the safety rules 
required by the regulations in force may be prosecuted 
under this section.
E . Military offences in the Code de Justice Militaire
Military courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over military offences. The ordinary criminal courts have 
no power to try military offences. Section 5(1) of the 
Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance directs military 
courts to try any military offence provided in the Code 
de Justice Militaire. This is in fact the French code of 
1928. It was promulgated in the then French Cameroun in 
1940 and savedon the eve of Independence by the Ordinance
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of 11th November 1959 which created the Cameroonian
Army. Article 20 of that Ordinance provided that in
the absence of new Cameroonian enactments the rules and
regulations in force in the French Army shall apply to
the Cameroonian Army. However, only articles 193 to 284
(’code de justice pour l’armee de terre’) of the Code are
in force in Cameroon. The offences in the Code are of a
purely military nature in the sense that they are Incident
only to military service and may, in principle, be commit-
77ted only by members of the army. They have no counter­
part in civilian jurisprudence and are usually styled 
’military offences’. Such offences include: mutiny,
insubordination, desertion, unauthorised absence from duty, 
failure to obey orders or regulations, disobedience to lawful 
commands or instructions, self-mutilation, sleeping or 
leaving a place of duty when on guard duty, striking a 
sentry or compelling him to let a person pass, violence on 
a sick or wounded soldier, neglect of duty, misbehaviour 
before the enemy, assisting the enemy, disorders and neg­
lects to the prejudice of good order and discipline, 
malingering, drunknness, offences against morale such as 
spreading reports relating to operations likely to create
77. In some countries, such as in Austria, the law recog­
nises no military offences by civilians. But in 
Cameroon, a civilian may, on the strength of the 
Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance, s. 5(2), 
commit a military offence either as a co-offender or 
as an accessory. For example, a civilian may be an 
accessory to a soldier’s desertion (art. 194 of the 
C.J.M.). In practice however, a civilian may commit 
a military offence only as a secondary party, never as 
a principal.
1128.
despondency or unnecessary alarm. Given the scope of this 
treatise only four of these offences (desertion, violation 
of instructions, disobedience to orders and commands) 
would be discussed.
1) Desertion
It is a military offence-under art. 194 of the 
Code de Justice Militaire for a soldier to desert. The 
punishment for the offence is imprisonment which, depen­
ding on the rank of the soldier, may be for as long as 20 
years where the desertion was accompanied by any of these 
aggravating circumstances: the deserter went away with
his gun, uniform or other military equipment; the deserter 
deserted with the help of a motor vehicle, a canoe or raft, 
a balloon, or an animal; the desertion took place in a 
theatre of war or in the presence of the enemy; the deser­
tion was in furtherance of a conspiracy to do so.
A person deserts who leaves or fails to attend 
to his unit or corps or place of duty; or who absents 
himself without leave or authorisation. Hence, a soldier 
who decides to take an extended French leave for over one 
week is in desertion. A soldier may be a deserter even 
though his absence was in the first instance legal. Thus 
if a soldier on normal leave overstays his holiday for as 
long as two weeks he is in desertion. Furthermore, a 
soldier who goes absent without permission and then decides 
to desert turns his absence into desertion and becomes a 
deserter as from the commencement of his absence. There
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would be a ’desertion £ l ’etranger’ (art. 195 of the
C.J.M.) where a soldier leaves Cameroonian territory 
without authorisation. Again, a soldier who while abroad 
abandons his unit is in desertion. Also, if a soldier 
was granted permission to go to country A and he goes to 
country B instead, he is in desertion.
2) Violation of instructions and disobedience to orders 
It is a military offence for a soldier or any 
person treated as such to violate instructions or to dis­
obey lawful orders and commands given by superior officers. 
An order or command may be negative or positive. The 
offence would be committed whether the disobedience was 
wilful or through neglect. It is irrelevant whether the
command or order was communicated directly or indirectly,
, 79
in writing or by word of mouth, or whether it was direc­
ted to an individual soldier, a group of soldiers or to 
the entire unit or corps.
The Code de Justice Militaire however distin-
8o
guishes between ’la violation de consigne’ and ’le refus 
81d ’ob^issance’. Article 230 of the Code punishes "any
soldier who violates a general instruction given to the 
troops or an instruction he has been personally ordered to
78. C.J.M.-, Articles 205 and 230.
79. Quare, whether it may be by gesture.
80. C.J.M., Art. 230.
81. Ibid., Art. 205.
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see carried, out ..." A soldier may be prosecuted under 
this article only where he has violated either (i) a 
general instruction given to the troops, or (ii) an 
instruction he has been personally ordered to see carried 
out. If a soldier violates an instruction given to him 
personally to carry out the proper charge would be dis­
obedience to lawful orders under art. 205. A charge 
under art. 230 would fail. This would be the more so 
where the instruction was nothing more than a piece of 
advice given to the soldier on account of his inebriety.
The appellant in Bessaye dit Mbaho Joseph c. Commissaire 
8 2du Gouvernement was a soldier with the rank of ’mar^chal 
des logis-chef1. He was a habitual drunkard. On 28th 
May 1963 he was so drunk that the Captain of his unit 
instructed him to remain indoors and not to venture out.
He ignored the instruction. He was arrested and charged 
before the Yaoundd Permanent Military Tribunal with having 
offended against art. 230 of the Code de Justice Militaire. 
He was convicted and sentenced to four months’ imprison­
ment ’for having violated an instruction he personally had 
to execute’. On appeal to the then East Cameroun Supreme 
Court, held, that the appeal must succeed for the following 
reasons: (i) art. 230 does not contemplate the situation
where a soldier violates an instruction given to him per­
sonally to carry out; and (ii) the offence is not committed
82. CSCO, Arret No. 8 du 8 Novembre 1963, unreported.
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where the instruction was given as nothing more than a 
piece of advice.
A soldier may be properly charged under art. 230 
with violating a general instruction only if that instruc­
tion was in fact a general instruction addressed to the 
troops as a whole. If the instruction was only addressed 
to a particular soldier and he violates it, a charge under 
art. 230 would fail: Tabi Noah Francois c. Commissaire du
O o
Gouvernement. The facts of that case are as follows.
A person by name Tchongna, allegedly a 1maquisard’ (terror­
ist) had been caught by the Gendarmerie Brigade at Foumbot 
and locked up in a cell in the gendarmerie camp. The 
unit commander issued an instruction to the effect that' 
under no circumstances was the 1maquisardf to be let out 
of his cell. On 1st November 1961, the appellant, for 
some apparently vague reasons, let out the detainee who 
escaped. The appellant was convicted under art. 2 30 by 
the Yaounde Permanent Military Tribunal. On appeal to 
the then East Cameroun Supreme Court, held, reversing the 
decision of the Military Tribunal, that "an instruction 
consisting in a prohibition against the removal of a 
’maquisard’ from his cell cannot be considered a general 
instruction given to the troops".
However, standing military instructions such as 
those relating to safety precautions in handling and mani­
pulating firearms are general instructions to troops as a
83. CSCO, Arr§t No. 33 du 31 decembre 1963, unreported.
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whole and must be followed by soldiers including a civilian
undergoing military training (premilitaire). D.. Jean,
84F.. Bernard and N.. Jean Jacques c. Ministere Public is 
a sad case in which a premilitaire was accidentally killed 
while undergoing military training. These are the facts 
of that case. The first appellant who had been on 
shooting practice handed in his gun on return to the 
barracks without having first verified whether there was 
still any bullet left in it. According to standing safety 
instructions he should have done so. The following day 
guns were issued by the second appellant for use in march 
past exercises. Among these guns was the loaded one and 
the person who got it was the third appellant. Unfor­
tunately, neither the second nor the third appellants had 
also bothered to verify, at the time of issue, whether the 
gun was loaded or not. They should have done so. While 
the third appellant was handling the gun, his finger acci­
dentally pressed on the trigger. The bullet that had all 
along been in the gun went off and killed T.. Mathieu who 
was also a premilitaire. The appellants were arrested and 
charged before the Yaounde Permanent Military Court with 
homicide and failing to follow military instructions.
They were convicted. Their conviction was upheld by the 
Supreme Court of Cameroon.
3) Disobedience to lawful orders or commands
Article 205 of the C.J.M. punishes any disobedience
84. CSC, Arr§t No. 129/P du 15 mars 1973, 8 R.C.D. 164 
(1975).
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to lawful orders whether such disobedience is as a result 
of a simple refusal to obey or by just failing to carry 
out the orders. The disobedience must however relate 
to the time when the order is to be disobeyed. If the 
order demands prompt and immediate compliance the accused 
will have disobeyed if he does not comply at once. If it
is to be complied with at some future time then no dis­
obedience lies until the soldier has failed to obey at 
that future time. Furthermore if the soldier fails to 
carry out the order as a result of act of God, he cannot 
be properly convicted of disobedience to lawful orders.
If the soldier refuses to obey but subsequently repents
and carries out the order, he may not be charged with dis­
obedience to lawful orders. But he may be prosecuted for 
insubordination.
It is insubordinate behaviour for a soldier to 
use threatening or insubordinate language to his superior 
officer or to strike or otherwise use violence to, or offer
violence to his superior officer as in Ministere Public c.
85Beti Luc where a Private assaulted a Captain.
4) Misapplication of public or service property
It is an offence punishable under s. 218 of the 
C.J.M. for a soldier to misapply or wastefully expend any 
public or service property. This offence covers the case 
where the soldier has misused public property while not
85. Tribunal Militaire Temporaire de Douala, Jugement No. 
3/60 du 3 dec. i960.
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necessarily acting dishonestly. It is furthermore an 
offence for a soldier to make away by whatever means or 
to lose, or by negligence to damage or allow to be damaged, 
any clothing, arms, ammunition or other equipment issued 
to him for his use for military purposes.
F . The problem of double jeopardy
There are no rules in the Military Judicial 
Organisation Ordinance to prevent the double jeopardy of 
an offender being punished for the same act both by the 
ordinary criminal court and the military court. Generally, 
however, when the accused has already been tried by the 
ordinary criminal court he may not subsequently be tried 
by the military court and vice versa.
A problem however arises where a person has com­
mitted a number of offences some of which fall within the 
jurisdiction of military courts and others within the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal courts. Supposing 
a person illegally in possession of a firearm were to use 
it in committing a robbery. Being illegally in possession 
of a firearm is an offence over which military courts 
enjoy exclusive jurisdiction. The criminal courts ordi­
narily have jurisdiction over the-offence of robbery.
There are two possible solutions to the problem: either
allow one of,the two courts to try both offences or dis­
join the offences and have one tried by the ordinary
1135.
criminal court and the other by the military court.
In reality however, jurisdiction over both 
offences will be exercised by the military court. The 
general rule appears to be that if several offences include 
an offence over which military courts have jurisdiction,
86then all those offences are triable in the military court. 
Thus a person undergoing military training who fails to 
follow military instructions with regards to safety pre­
cautions in manipulating a gun and as a result uninten­
tionally kills someone, can properly be tried by the mili­
tary court for both offences: 'D. . Jean & 2 Others c.
Minlst^re Public. In the sensational case of Minist^re
O rj
Public c. Ernest Ouandie & 28 Others which is often 
referred to as the ’Proems de la rebellion contre le 
Gouvernementf, the defendants were charged with "attempted 
revolution, organisation of armed bands, murders and wilful 
destructions, rapes, arrests, sequestrations, gang robbery, 
and accessory to these crimes". They were tried for all 
these offences by the Yaounde Permanent Military Tribunal. 
All but two of the defendants were found guilty as charged 
and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The ring­
leader, Ernest Ouandie, was sentenced to death with his 
immediate lieutenants and executed by firing squad in a 
public place in Bafoussam on January 15, 1971.
86. Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance, s. 5(8).
87. Chronologie politique africaine, Paris, 11 annee, 
Nos. 5 et 6, Juillet - Dec. 1970.
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Ill. Procedure In Military Courts
The general public’s idea of a military court 
is that of a court which applies a swift, rough and 
summary procedure. This is not necessarily the case; 
at least not in .normal circumstances. Contrary to popular 
belief, military courts ordinarily follow a more formal 
judicial procedure with all the accompanying guarantees 
and safeguards for the rights of the defence than that 
observed in summary proceedings. In fact s. 8(1) of the 
Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance specifically 
prohibits the application of ’la procedure de flagrant d£lit’ 
(summary trial) in military courts. Indeed, subject to 
contrary provisions contained in that Ordinance, the proce­
dure applicable in military courts is the same as that 
applied in the ordinary criminal courts. This is true 
of pre-trial as well as of trial procedures. As there are 
two systems of criminal procedure in Cameroon (one based 
on the common law and the other on the civil law), this in 
effect means that military courts apply two systems of proce­
dure. In reality what happens is that the Yaounde and 
Bafoussam military courts, located in the Francophone side 
of the country, apply the provisions of the Code d ’Instruction 
Criminelle while the Buea military court, located in the 
Anglophone part, applies the criminal procedure followed in 
the Magistrate’s Courts and contained in the Criminal Pro­
cedure Ordinance, irrespective of the nature and gravity
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8 8of the offence committed.
1. Pre-trial procedures
Pre-trial procedures - arrest, search and seizure, 
custody, ball, Initiation of prosecution, and the formal 
Investigatory procedures - are all the steps normally taken 
when an offence has been committed before the offender Is 
brought for trial In open court. When an offence has been 
allegedly committed, the- police make Inquiries In respect 
of the allegation. This is followed by a thorough and 
Impartial investigation conducted by the military juge 
d 1instruction before the accused can be brought to trial 
by the military court.
A . Police inquiries
Inquiries into offences committed and over which 
military courts have jurisdiction, are conducted by judicial 
police officers (officiers de police judiciaires) who may 
be civil or military policemen. This job is normally done 
by personnel of the National Security (i.e. the civil police 
force) and of the Gendarmerie (which also acts as a mili­
tary police) in accordance with the rules of criminal
88. Ordinance No. 4/OF.61 of 4 October 1961 (military judi­
cial organisation); Minister of Armed Forces, Ministerial 
Instruction No. 1510/MINFA/JM of 24 October 1962;
Minister of Armed Forces, Circular NO. 2230/MINFA/600/359 
of 30th November 1972.
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procedure applicable in the ordinary criminal courts.
Thus, arrest, search and seizure, custody, and bail are,
subject to contrary provisions in the Military Judicial
Organisation Ordinance, governed by the relevant provisions
of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (in the Anglophone;
Provinces) and the Code d 1 Instruction Criminelle (in the
\ 89Francophone Provinces).
The ascertainment of all offences must be made in 
a police report (proces-verbal) which must, without delay, 
be sent to the Minister of Armed Forces, a copy to the 
Commissaire du Gouverneme'nt, and another copy to the Minister 
of Justice for information purposes. These reports are 
given much weight (force probante) in court. Military 
offences or offences committed by soldiers (even with civi­
lian confederates) may only be investigated by gendarmerie 
officiers de police judiciaires, particularly if such 
investigations have to be carried out in military barracks 
or camps. The civil police have no power of investigation 
or arrest here. However, should a flagrant offence be 
committed, the local police may commence inquiries into it 
but immediately notify the gendarmerie. Absent the case 
where a flagrant offence has been committed, a civil 
policeman has no authority to arrest an offender who is a
soldier. Only a gendarme may do so. Arrest in military
90law may be either a close arrest or an open arrest.
89. See Chapter 15, supra.
90. A person in close arrest may be detained in a civil 
prison or police station; a soldier in close arrest 
may be held in a military corrective training centre 
or detention barracks.
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Houses may be searched and incriminating evidence 
seized. The hour of search is irrelevant; it may be in 
the day, it may be in the night. However, all night 
searches may be conducted only upon the written orders of 
the Armed Forces Minister. But nocturnal searches may 
be conducted without the Minister’s order in any of these 
circumstances: (.1) during a state of emergency, (ii) during
a state of siege, Ciii) during operations for the mainte­
nance of order, Civ) in the case of offences against state 
security, and (v) in the case of subversion offences.
A suspect apprehended may be detained for up to 
48 hours from the time of his apprehension. The period 
of detention may however be extended to five days, renewable 
once for a further period of five days, upon the written 
authorisation of the Commissaire du Gouvernement. In 
practice, authorisation is sometimes given verbally and 
persons may be detained for longer periods than the statu­
tory one. As a check on possible abuses such as these 
by police and gendarme officers, the law requires them to 
forward a daily report on detentions to the Minister of 
Armed Forces and the Minister of Justice. Furthermore, 
any abuse committed by a police or gendarme officer in 
respect of arrest, search, seizures and detention may lead 
to disciplinary sanctions and a claim by the victim for 
damages in the civil courts. If an offender who is a 
soldier is detained, his detention must imperatively be 
notified to his unit. The same applies where a court
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warrant or other judicial order is Issued against a 
soldier. A person detained may be granted bail. Gran­
ting of bail would appear to be the rule and detention the 
exception.
B . Formal Investigatory procedures
Before trial by the military court there is
a
always/formal investigatory procedure. As a rule this 
is conducted by a military investigating magistrate (juge 
d’instruction militaire). Prosecutions in court are con­
ducted by the Commissaire du Gouvernement. He is roughly 
the equivalent of the Procureur de la Republique at the 
ordinary criminal courts. The functions of the Commis­
saire du Gouvernement vis-a-vis the military juge 
d 'instruction are analogous to those of the Procureur de 
la Republique (as contained in the Code d ’Instruction 
Criminelle) vis-a-vis the old juge d ’instruction at the 
ordinary criminal courts.
The military juge d 1 instruction investigates a 
charge only upon an order for the laying of information 
(ordre d Tinformer) issued by the Minister of Armed Forces 
or the civil authorities empowered to do so. Generally, 
the Minister will issue such an order where the facts of 
the case as contained in the police report are obscure 
or insufficient and he is of the opinion that further 
investigations are necessary. In carrying out his inves­
tigations the military juge d 1 instruction has all the
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powers of the old investigating magistrate at the ordi­
nary criminal courts. He may go to any part of the
91Republic to carry out his investigations. He may give
rogatory commission to any judicial officer. He may dele­
gate any judicial police officer to undertake particular 
acts of investigation.
At the end of his investigations, the juge 
d T instruction makes the file available to the Commissaire 
du Gouvernement who would then write his submissions.
The dossier is also placed at the disposal of the accused’s 
counsel. If the juge d ’instruction comes to the con­
clusion that the case is one over which he has no juris­
diction to investigate into he must immediately send the 
case-file to the competent court. A copy of the ruling 
on jurisdiction- by the investigating magistrate must be 
sent to the Armed Forces Minister and, where the case 
has been sent to the ordinary criminal courts, another 
copy must be sent to the Minister of Justice. On the 
other hand, if at the end of the investigations the j uge 
d ’instruction is satisfied that the facts disclose no
91. This applies to the juge d ’instruction militaire at 
the Yaounde Military Court. Since the jurisdiction 
of this Court is national, the juge d ’instruction 
there may move to any place In the country to carry 
out his investigations. Not so with the investigating 
magistrates at the Buea and Bafoussam Military Courts. 
Since the territorial jurisdiction of these two courts 
is limited, the juges d ’instructions there may only 
move to localities within the territorial limits of 
the court.
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offence he must dismiss the case and discharge the 
accused. If the facts do disclose an offence, he must 
commit the accused for trial. A copy of the committal 
order must be sent on the same day it is made to the 
accused’s counsel.
C . Submission of cases to court
Cases may be laid before military courts only
by order of the Minister of Armed Forces who is the sole
authority who decides whether prosecutions should be
instituted. In emergency areas however, Provincial
Governors have been given extensive powers to maintain
order (nocturnal searches and arrest, severe restrictions
on the movement of persons and goods, heavy control of all
publications, detention for long periods without even
being charged, etc.) and authority, exercised concurrently
with that of the Armed Forces Minister, to cause prosecu-
92tions to be instituted before military courts.
The literature distinguishes between ’mettre en 
mouvement 1’action publique’ (to initiate prosecution) 
and ’soutenir 1 ’action publique’ (to conduct prosecution). 
The initiation or institution of criminal proceedings in
92. Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance, ss. 8(2) and 
11; Decree No. 72/736 of 29 December 1972 (Civil 
authorities empowered to institute proceedings in the 
military courts); Minister of Armed Forces, Circular 
No. 0222/MINFA/600/59 of 31 January 1973.
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the military courts Is the sole prerogative of the Armed 
Forces Minister who may delegate some of It to civil 
authorities. The actual conduction of a case In the 
military court is done by the Commissaire du Gouvernement. 
Despite appearances to the contrary, the Commissaire 
differs from the Procureur de la Republique at the ordi­
nary criminal courts. The Commissaire du Gouvernement 
is merely the mouthpiece of the Minister of Armed Forces 
at the military courts. He exercises no prosecutorial 
discretion. He may neither initiate proceedings, nor 
prefer a charge, nor discontinue a case, on his own initiative. 
Only the Minister may do so, using the Commissaire as a 
conduit pipe. The Commissaire ■ may only act in the manner 
he has been directed to by the Minister. The Minister 
tells him what line of argument to pursue and what submis­
sions to make. Like a true soldier, the Commissaire du 
Gouvernement must obey the instructions of his superior; 
his personal convictions or views on any given case are 
irrelevant.
A case comes to a military court by one of three
ways. First, by way of fcitation directe*. This takes
the form of an order for direct trial (ordre de mlse en
jugement directe) issued either by the Armed Forces Minister
9 3or the competent Provincial Governor. An order for
93. By art. 1 of Decree No. 72/736 of 29 December 1972,
Provincial Governors may, in an area subject to a state 
of emergency, initiate prosecution where a civilian has 
committed any offence (i) against state security,
(ii) under the Subversion Ordinance, (iii) under fire­
arms legislation, and (iv) related to any of these.
The Governor however has no authority to cause prosecution to 
be instituted against a soldier who did not act in league 
with a civilian. If the soldier committed the offence alone, 
only the Minister of Armed Forces may initiate proceedings 
against him.
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direct trial means that the court Is directly seised of 
the case. No preliminary investigations are conducted in 
respect of it. A case also comes to the military court 
by way of a committal order made by the military j uge 
d ' instruction. Finally, a case comes to the military 
court by way of an order for prosecution. This however 
applies to the Buea Military Court which follows the pro­
cedure applicable in the Magistrates' Courts. These 
orders seise the military court in rem and in personam.
This means that the court can only try the persons men­
tioned in the order and only in respect of the indictments 
contained therein.
2. Trial procedure
A . Convening the court
A military court can only sit when it has been 
properly convened. It is convened by the authority (Minister 
of Armed Forces of Provincial Governor) which had initiated 
the prosecution. The same authority fixes the date for the 
trial after consultation with the President of the court and 
the Commissaire du Gouvernement. The court president must 
make available to the accused the list of witnesses who have 
been summoned to come and testify in the case. The list 
must be communicated to the accused at least four clear 
days before the date scheduled for the trial. If the 
matter is one which falls within the legal aid scheme, the
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court president must designate counsel for the defendant. 
Soldiers are eligible for legal aid and an accused soldier 
standing trial may apply for such aid if he so wishes.
All members of the court must be convened well 
in advance. In times of war or other exceptional circum­
stances members of the court are convened by the Commissaire 
du Gouvernement 48 hours before the opening of the trial 
and the accused is given only 24 hours within which to 
choose an advocate.
B . Proceedings in court
On the day of the trial the defendant has to
94appear m  court accompanied by guards. The defendant
is required to be present in court. His defence may be 
conducted for him by an advocate. The institution of a 
defence advocate who is a military person (as for example 
in the United States) is unknown in Cameroon and so 
defence advocates in the military courts are always civilians. 
The stage at which an advocate may operate is much earlier. 
Normally, he may assist immediately after the first inter­
rogation, when the accused is informed of his rights.
The advocate then has rights of intervention during the 
preliminary investigation conducted by the military j uge
94. If he fails to appear judgment may be given in default 
and an arrest warrant issued against him. Moreover, 
if he is refusing to come to court, he may be brought 
there manus militaris.
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d TInstruction. In defending his client, defence counsel 
must not be In breach of his duty and obligations as advo­
cate. If he fails to show due respect to the court he 
may be charged with contempt of court under section 154 
of the Penal Code.
In normal times 'constitution de partle civile' 
may be made by the victim of the offence for which the 
defendant is standing trial. But the civil party may 
bring his civil action only after the Minister of Armed 
Forces has decided to prosecute. The victim cannot, by 
first bringing a civil action against the offender, compel 
the Minister to prosecute. Moreover, in time of war or 
other exceptional circumstance 'constitution de partie 
civile' cannot be entertained by the military court.
Before the court begins to hear the merits of 
the case, the parties must first register their pleas in 
bar Cif any) in- a single memorandum. Eventually, after 
the court has gone into the merits of the case, it gives 
a single ruling on both the pleas in bar and the merits of 
the case. Any member of the court may be recused (i) if 
he is a spouse or relative of the accused, (ii) if he has 
been summoned as a witness in the case, (ill) if he is a 
friend of the accused, and (iv) if there is enmity between 
him and the accused.
The defendant is used as the primary source of 
evidence. The court president first questions him to 
establish his identity. After this formality, he calls 
on the court registrar to read the charge or committal
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order as well as the names of the witnesses (civilians or 
soldiers) who have been summoned to come and testify in 
the case. When the witnesses have been called out, they 
are conducted into a room reserved for them. A witness 
may only leave the room when his turn comes to testify. 
After giving his evidence a witness is not allowed to go 
back into the room where the other witnesses are. Every 
measure is taken to ensure that witnesses do not confer 
with each other.
Proceedings in the military court are inquisi­
torial. The presiding judge does the questioning. He 
interrogates the accused and is at liberty to ask witnesses 
any questions concerning their testimonies. As a general 
rule, witnesses must give their evidence on oath, swearing 
to speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth. However, witnesses related to the accused whether 
by marriage or by blood, the civil party, and minors of 14 
years of age are not required to give their evidence on 
oath and so not much weight is given to such testimonies.
Cross-examination is alien to the system. The
presiding judge ’dirige les debats et assure la police de 
95l ’audience'. So if counsel wishes to ask the witness
any questions he must do so through the presiding judge. 
Counsel may not ask any question directly of the witness.
95. Military Judicial Organisation Ordinance, ss. 22(1) 
and 32.
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He puts his question to the presiding judge and prays him 
to be kind enough as to ask the witness the question.
The presiding judge would put counsel's question to the 
witness only if he thinks the question is proper. How­
ever, due to the influence of Anglophone advocates, some 
judges are not opposed to direct questions put to the 
witness by the advocate.
The presiding judge conducts the proceedings 
and sees to it that order is maintained in court. He may 
order any person disturbing the proceedings to be evicted 
from the court. If the person resists or causes an uproar 
he may be arrested there and then, detained, tried and 
jailed for up to six months without prejudice to the appli­
cation of the sentence prescribed for contempt of court.
The same would apply where the disturbance or uproar 
was caused by the accused himself. If the defendant de­
cides to be mute and refuses to answer questions posed to 
him by the presiding judge, as sometimes happens in poli­
tical trials, the judge is entitled to take no notice and 
to proceed with the case in the usual manner. Different 
considerations apply where the accused is mute not out of 
malice but by visitation of God. If a defendant or a 
witness is dumb he would have to answer questions put to 
him and give his evidence in writing. If a defendant is 
a deaf-mute all questions and answers would have to be done 
in writing. If the dumb or deaf-and-dumb defendant 
cannot write then the court must enlist the assistance of
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any person who can communicate with him. If a person 
is deaf, dumb and blind it is extremely doubtful whether 
he may be tried at all or called as a witness. It is 
submitted that he may not as it would serve no purpose.
The more usual case however is that where-a defendant or a 
witness speaks neither French nor English, or only one of 
these languages, or again where a document requiring trans­
lation has been rendered as evidence in court. In such 
a case the court must hire an interpreter or translator 
who would then swear to interpret or translate faithfully.
During the trial the defendant may be allowed to 
examine and comment on any real evidence tendered in court. 
As a general rule, the trial must take place in open court. 
But where trial in public would be dangerous to public 
order and good morality, the trial may take place in camera. 
Whether the trial in open court of any given case would be 
dangerous to public order and good morality or not is a 
matter for the court president to decide.
When all the evidence has been taken, the court 
invites (one after the other and in that order) the Com­
missaire du Gouvernement, the civil party and the defendant 
(or his advocate) to make their submissions. The Commis­
saire du Gouvernement may, depending on the directives he 
has received from the Minister of the Armed Forces, submit 
that the defendant be discharged and acquitted or that he 
be convicted and given such and such a sentence . Sub­
missions for acquittals are however rare. Even where it
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is thought that the defendant should be acquitted, the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement does not say so in clear terms. 
He would say, euphemistically, TJe m ’en remets au tribunal’. 
After the defence has made its submission, the civil party 
and the Commissaire du Gouvernement have a right of reply. 
But as in the ordinary criminal courts, it is the prero­
gative of the defence to speak last. After the final 
address by the defence, the court rises and members of the 
court retire to deliberate on the case.
C . Judgment and appeal
When the court retires in chambers to deliberate,
the Commissaire du Gouvernement and the court registrar
may not be present. While in deliberation, members of
the court may neither communicate with the outside nor
separate before a decision has been reached. A decision
9 6must be reached on the issue of both guilt and sentence 
and a single reasoned judgment delivered dealing with the 
pleas in bar that may have been made at the beginning of
96. This is distinctly different from what happens in coiranon- 
law jurisdictions. In England for example, the Court- 
Martial is convened by a military officer. The trial 
procedure is adversary in nature. The prosecution and 
then the defendant present their cases. The prosecu­
tion’s closing address is followed by that of the defence. 
Then there is a summing up by the judge-advocate who 
must adopt an impartial position. After this, there is 
a deliberation in closed court on the issue of guilt; 
the court then announces its findings in open court.
If the court’s finding is one of guilty, it then pro­
ceeds to get evidence of character and then retires again 
to decide on the award of sentence. The sentence is 
pronounced in open court.
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the trial, the question of guilt and of sentence. The 
court is entitled to examine all matters of fact and law, 
and aggravating or extenuating circumstances that may have 
arisen during the court proceedings.
The judgment of the court is read in open court.
If the defendant is convicted and sentenced he must be told 
he has ten days from the day of the rendition of the judg­
ment within which to go on appeal. A defendant in respect 
of whom judgment has been given in default may enter a
caveat in respect of.it (faire opposition) within five days.
97The military court may then review the case. Judgments
of the military courts are, in principle, appealable to 
the superior courts at all times. An appeal from a mili­
tary court lies to a Court of Appeal and from there to the 
Supreme Court. However, s. 29(2) of the Military Judicial 
Organisation Ordinance ousts the supervisory jurisdiction 
of the superior courts over military courts in respect of 
most offences triable in those courts. That subsection 
provides that no form of appeal whatsoever lies in respect 
of offences against State security (internal or external), 
offences of subversion, and firearms offences.
97. Under the Anglo-American system, the findings and sen­
tence of a Court-Martial are of no effect until they 
have been confirmed by a military commander, the con­
vening officer, or his superior. Both at this stage 
and subsequently, the proceedings are subject to review 
by the service authorities who may be'moved by a peti­
tion on behalf of the convicted soldier. However, an 
appeal from a Court-Martial may also lie to a superior 
court.
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When judgment has been delivered In the military 
court, it is the duty of the Commissaire du Gouvernement 
to see that it is executed. Apart from the military preven­
tive prison in Yaounde in which accused soldiers are 
detained while awaiting trial, there are no separate prisons 
for convicted soldiers. A person who is convicted and 
who goes on appeal must, unless granted bail by the Court 
of Appeal, remain in prison until the final determination 
of his appeal. Anyone who has been convicted and sentenced 
by a military court may petition the Head of State for 
pardon. Moreover, any convict who has served up to three- 
quarters of his term may be released on licence by decree 
of the Head of State. Political offenders often benefit 
from these measures.
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PART SIX 
ENVOI
This final part of this work discusses four 
miscellaneous topics which are nevertheless relevant to 
our subject-matter: human rights, legal education, the
cost of justice, and law reform.
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
HUMAN RIGHTS
"Human rights," said Andrew Young, the United
States’ Ambassador to the United Nations in an address In
August 1978 to the American Bar Convention In New York, "Is
not an Idea whose time has just come. It Is as old as
the Judeo-Christian tradition of our scriptures and the
declaration of faith in God and the individual which became
the basis of our declaration of independence. And if the
idea of human rights and the ideals in which we believe are
not new,, neither is the controversy."'*' In Cameroon too the
issue of human rights ’is not an idea whose time has just
come’. Some form of human rights existed in pre-colonial
Cameroonian societies. "The Cameroon customary law of
the time recognised principles analogous to the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, that is, to use your own
property or thing as not to injure your neighbour’s.
Breach of these unwritten and uncodified rules was vigor-
2
ously enforced by the customary courts." The right to 
property, freedom of discussion, freedom to protest (even 
by demonstration), and freedom from unwarranted molestation
1. ’Andrew Young on the role America has played in the fight 
for individual liberty’, The Times, Tuesday, August 15,
1978, p. 12.
2. H.N.A. Enonchong, Cameroon constitutional law, Yaounde, 
1967, p. 180.
1155.
all existed in pre-colonial Cameroonian societies.
The modern concept of human rights may be traced 
back to the concepts of natural justice and rights found 
in the Greek City States of ancient times. But perhaps 
the most important development in this area was the Magna 
Carta which established the Rule of Law in England over 
750 years ago. "No free man," declared the Great Charter, 
"shall be taken, imprisoned, outlawed, banished or in any 
way destroyed, nor will we proceed against him or prosecute 
him except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the 
law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one will 
we delay or deny right or justice." Magna Carta was the 
forerunner of the modern concepts of human rights and sub­
sequent comparable documents have directly or indirectly
3
borrowed from it. The French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and the Citizen was probably inspired by it.
Although the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is said to have been influenced by President 
Roosevelt’s concept of the Four Freedoms, the American 
President himself as well as the draftsmen of that document 
certainly drew from the Great Charter and the French Dec­
laration of the Rights of Man and the American Constitution. 
Finally, the European Convention on Human Rights and human 
rights provisions (where they exist) in the constitutions
3. 0. Hood Phillip & Paul Jackson, Constitutional and 
administrative Law, 6th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1978, p. 16.
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of Third World countries are based on the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The story of human 
rights therefore goes back to ancient times and over the 
centuries there has been a great deal of borrowing here 
and there by this or that country or organisation.
At this point an attempt must be made to explain 
what-human rights are. The expression ’human rights’ has 
no fixed and uniform definition. But it embraces ’civil 
liberties’ and ’civil rights’ - two terms which are them­
selves used interchangeably. Generally however, a person 
is said to enjoy a civil liberty when he is protected 
against some government action, but enjoys a civil right 
when the law confers upon him a positive power to do some­
thing. For example, the right to speak freely is a civil 
liberty; the right to use public facilities on an equal 
basis is a civil right. However the line is drawn between 
them, civil rights and civil liberties taken together 
encompass freedom of speech and religion, the right affor­
ded to criminal suspects, the rights of citizens to parti­
cipate in the political process, and the right to equal 
treatment under the law. In evaluating civil liberties 
or rights in any given country one considers, among other 
things, whether there is a ’free’ press and an independent 
judiciary, whether censorship is applied in defence of a 
ruling party, the degree to which the security forces 
respect individual rights, and the number of persons who 
are arrested for opinions rather than for violent or criminal 
acts.
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But what Is liberty? What is a right? Liberty 
may be said to be the extent to which the individual can 
determine his own destiny and act as he wishes, uncon­
strained by others in the society or group. The concept 
of liberty has two basic aspects: a positive aspect that
focuses on freedom to participate in the decision making 
process of the group or society, and the negative aspect 
that considers an individual’s freedom from governmental 
or social constraints. The concept of right is closely 
linked to that of liberty although both are not necessarily 
the same. A right is a claim or a title to anything what­
ever that can be enforced, or a claim to act, possess or 
enjoy anything or the use thereof, or it may exist in the 
nature of a privilege or a power. "That which is so 
directed for the protection and advantage of an individual 
is said to be his right. It has been described as a 
liberty of doing or possessing something consistently with
2i
law." A legal right is therefore one which is-protected 
by law. The- means of protection is the remedy which the 
law provides in the event of breach of such right. The 
existence of a legal right implies the existence of a legal 
remedy, for one does not exist without the other.
* # * *
This chapter surveys human rights provisions in
4. Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, Vol. 2, 1977s p. 1581.
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Cameroon during the colonial period (Section.I) and dis­
cusses the justiciability of human rights provisions in 
the Cameroonian Constitution (Section II).
I . Human Rights in Cameroon During the Colonial Period
During the German colonial period in Cameroon, 
human rights for the indigenous population were not recog­
nised and consequently not guaranteed by the colonial 
authority. After the defeat of Germany in the First World 
War she lost her colonial possessions, including Cameroon 
which was in 1922 placed under the mandates system and in 
19^6 under the trusteeship system. The Mandates and the 
Trusteeship Agreements for the territory contained human 
rights provisions. The guarantee of human rights in 
Cameroon is therefore traceable to these Agreements and 
the United Nations Charter,
1. Human rights provisions in the international tutelage 
Agreements.
Each of the two successive international tutelage 
Agreements for Cameroon (the Mandates Agreements of 1922 
and the Trusteeship Agreements of 19^6) contained pro­
visions dealing with human rights. The Mandates Agreements 
enjoined the Mandatory to- "ensure in the territory complete 
freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of
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worship which are consonant with public order and morality”. 
The Mandatory however had the right to exercise such con­
trol as was necessary for the maintenance of public order 
and good government. Under the Trusteeship Agreements, 
the Administering Authority was directed to "ensure in the 
territory complete freedom of thought and the free exercise 
of all forms of worship and of religious teaching which are
r
consistent with public order and morality”. It was also
enjoined to "guarantee to the inhabitants of the territory
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of petition,
7
subject only to the requirement of public order”. The 
only limitation on the exercise of these rights was the 
requirement of public order. This limitation was in 
itself not new. It represented the perennial tight-rope 
of balancing the liberty of the individual against the 
interest of society at large. The problem however, was 
that nothing was said as to what constituted ’public order’; 
it being left to each Administering Authority to determine 
its content. It was probably assumed that the limitation 
would be invoked only in appropriate cases. But this was 
not always the case. In the French Cameroun, for example, 
human rights provisions were consistently violated.
5. The British and the French Mandates Agreements for 
Cameroon, art. 7.
6. The British Trusteeship Agreement for Cameroon, art. 13 
and 1*1; the French Trusteeship Agreement for Cameroon, 
art. 10.
7. Idem.
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Article 76 of the United Nations Charter enjoined 
the.Administering Authority "to encourage respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms of all without distinc­
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to 
encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples 
of the world". After much hesitation France grudgingly 
introduced her Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 
into the French Cameroun. But that Declaration was neither 
sufficiently specific nor all-embracing. "The French 
Declaration was no more than a pious declaration of intent 
to grant certain vague ideas. In any case, the French 
jurists had always regarded them as a mere socio-political 
manifesto theoretically unenforceable in any ordinary court 
of law."^
The issue of human rights was one of those areas 
in which there was marked contrast between the French and 
the British Cameroons. In the French Cameroun the sub­
ject of human rights was almost taboo. In the British 
Cameroons on the other hand human rights were guaranteed 
and jealously guarded. Britain transferred her concepts 
of human rights to the British Cameroons. She introduced 
four basic freedoms into the territory: freedom of
expression subject only to the law of slander and libel, 
freedom of religion, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and 
freedom of association and movement. However, while such
8. Enonchong, op.cit., p. l8l.
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historic British documents as the Magna Carta of 1215, 
the.Petition of Rights of 1627, and the Bill of Rights of 
1689 generally embrace concepts of these freedoms, no 
English statute has expressly defined the liberties of 
the individual. But this is probably because fundamental 
freedoms are axiomatic to the British and are therefore 
not enunciated in any statute.
2. Introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights into Cameroon
Seeing that there was no uniformity in the appli­
cation of human rights in the British and the French 
Cameroons, the Trusteeship Council requested Britain and 
France, the Administering Authorities of both parts of 
the territory, to introduce the United Nations' Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights into Cameroon. The Declaration 
reads in part:
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foun­
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world, whereas disregard and contempt for 
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of the 
world ...
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, 
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, 
that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law, ...
Now, therefore, the General Assembly proclaims 
this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations ...
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Art. 
Art.
Art. 
Art.
Art.
Art. 
Art.
Art.
Art.
Art. 
Art.
1. All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights ...
2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth .in this Declar­
ation, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status ...
3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person.
5. No one shall be subject to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat­
ment or punishment.
7. All are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law.
9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.
11(1). Everyone charged with a penal 
offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according 
to law in a public trial at which he 
has had all the guarantees necessary 
for his defence.
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal 
offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, 
under national or international law, 
at the time when.it was committed.
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed 
than the one that was applicable at 
the time the penal offence was committed.
13(1). Everyone has the right to freedom 
of movement and residence within the 
borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return 
to his country.
17(1). Everyone has the. right to own pro­
perty alone as well as in association 
with others.
(.2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property.
18. Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion ...
19. Everyone has the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and. association.
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Art. 20. Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression ...
Art. 29(1). Everyone has duties to the com­
munity in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality 
is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and
freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
to such limitations as are determined 
by law solely for the purpose of 
securing the due recognition and res­
pect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just require­
ments of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic 
society ...
It was in response to the United Nations’ request for the 
introduction of the Universal Declaration into Cameroon 
that article 5 of the 'Statut du Cameroun’ of January 1959 
provided, inter alia, that all laws and regulations in 
the French Cameroun must respect the principles and funda­
mental freedoms inscribed in the Universal Declaration of
9
Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations. In 
response to the same request the British Government made 
well-defined and more adequate provision for fundamental 
human rights in the British Cameroons. These provisions 
were later included in the Southern Cameroons (Constitution) 
Order-in-Council, i960 as sections 76 to 85 and were 
enforceable under section 86.
Unlike the French Cameroun ’Statut’ of 1959, the 
Southern Cameroons (Constitution) Order-in-Council of i960 
contained detailed provisions dealing with human rights.
9. The i960 Constitution of la Republique du Cameroun con­
tained some of the provisions of the Universal Declar­
ation of Human Rights.
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Under the Order-ln-Councll a person was entitled to a fair 
hearing within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal 
established by law. A person charged with a criminal 
offence was entitled, unless the charge was withdrawn, 
to a fair hearing held in public by a court of competent 
jurisdiction within a reasonable time; the decision of 
the court had to be announced in public. Until he was 
found guilty, every person charged with a criminal offence 
was presumed to be innocent. The rule was however not 
deemed to have been violated on the sole ground that a 
law has imposed upon any such person the burden of proving 
any particular facts. A person charged with a criminal 
offence was entitled to be informed promptly of the nature 
of the offence, to be given adequate time to prepare his 
defence, to defend himself in person or be defended by a 
legal representative of his choice, to examine witnesses 
called for the prosecution and to have witnesses testify 
on his behalf, and to have without payment the assistance 
of an interpreter if he could not understand the language 
used at the trial. The law provided against arbitrary 
arrests and barrassment by the security forces. Police 
powers of arrest were set out in detail in the Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance.1^ All courts were required by law 
to keep records of their proceedings and an accused person 
or any person authorised by him was entitled to obtain 
copies of the record within- a reasonable time upon payment
10. Ss. 3-30.
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of such fees as may be prescribed by law.
Ex post facto legislation was regarded as 
unjust and undemocratic, so retrospective legislation 
imposing a penalty was not allowed. No person could be 
convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence was 
defined and its penalty prescribed in a written law, save 
in the case of contempt of a court of record. There were 
rules against double jeopardy. An accused person had 
the right to remain silent unless he chose to speak.
Subject to considerations of public safety, health, morality, 
and the freedom of others, one’s private life and family 
were inviolable. The following freedoms were guaranteed 
and jealously protected by the courts of law: freedom
of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to 
propagate one's belief or religion; freedom of expression, 
to hold opinions, to receive and impart ideas and inform 
without interference subject to interests of defence, 
public safety, public order, health and morality; freedom 
of assembly and association; freedom of movement and to 
reside anywhere in the territory; freedom from discrimi­
nation on the grounds of tribe, sex, religion, or political 
opinion. The Southern Cameroons High Court had juris­
diction to entertain matters concerning human rights vio­
lation.
At the time of reunification in 1961, English- 
speaking Cameroonians entertained grave fears about becoming 
second-class citizens in a Cameroon dominated by the
1 1 6 6 ,
majority French-speaking Cameroonians. They therefore
pressed but to no avail for minority protection and human
rights provisions to be entrenched in the 1961 federal
Constitution.
"Constitutional guarantees of individual 
liberties were another item of controversy 
among westerners and between them and the 
eastern delegation. The guarantees con­
cern a cause Southern Cameroonians con­
sidered, not altogether justifiably, lost 
at Foumban. K.N.D.P. pamphlets persistently 
had pledged: 'Human rights, in accordance
with the United Nations Charter will be pro­
tected by the constitution and enforced 
through courts.' Moreover, the constitu­
tion of the Cameroun Republic not only 
embraced the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the United Nations Charter, 
but specifically spelt out about twenty 
principles and rights taken from them.
Most western delegates at Foumban wanted to 
incorporate such guarantees into the con­
stitution, not just mention them in the 
preamble; they also wanted the courts to 
repudiate laws that failed to conform to 
the principles. 11
II. Justiciability of Human Rights Provisions in the 
Constitution
The achievement of independence by any country 
usually involved the enactment of a written constitution 
which often embodies a declaration of guaranteed rights, 
such as personal freedom, freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement and of association. Are 
such rights legal rights? and are they justiciable?
11. Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon federation: political
integration in a fragmentary society, Princeton Univer- 
sity Press, Princeton, 1970, p. 188.
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1. Justiciable and non-justiciable legal rights
Ordinarily, a legal right is one which is pro­
tected by law, the means of protection being the remedy 
afforded by law when the right is infringed. Human 
rights provisions in the constitution are clearly legal 
rights. They are guaranteed - that is, the state has 
undertaken to protect them. They are embodied in a docu­
ment which is itself legal; in fact the Basic Law, a law 
which is above and overrides the ordinary laws of the 
land. .Logically, this argument, based on the notion of 
the constitution as law, should lead to the inescapable 
conclusion that human rights provisions in the constitution 
are justiciable legal rights for, only disputes of a legal 
nature may be adjudicated by the courts. A dispute is of 
a legal nature if it affects a person's recognised legal 
rights or relations. Therefore, prima facie, the violation 
of a human right provision in the constitution is justi­
ciable unless judicial intervention is validly excluded by 
the constitution itself.
But the notion of the constitution as law is 
only one way of looking at a constitution. - A constitution 
is a mode of organising a state and its government. It 
is a body of fundamental principles according to which a 
state is structured. It is therefore a document which is 
essentially political in character - its authority and 
sanction sound in the realm of politics. This was in fact
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the original meaning and effect of a constitution and
today, there are many countries which still consider the
appropriate function of a constitution to be a political
charter of government consisting largely of declarations
of objectives or directive principles of government and
a description of the organs of government in terms that
12import no enforceable legal restraints. Such a consti­
tution is said to have no more than a political existence, 
its provisions are political not legal serving merely to
exhort, to direct and inspire governmental action, and
13to bestow upon it the stamp of legitimacy.
It is evidently desirable that a constitution 
should have the force of law. But that should not be its 
sole character. While having the force of law, a consti­
tution should be flexible enough to accommodate needed 
political commands, that is to say, commands which are 
legal and yet non-^justiciable. "There is no Inconsis­
tency in a command being legal and yet not judicially 
enforceable. Judicial enforcement is not an inexorable 
criterion of 'lawness*. A provision in a constitution or 
statute is not less legal because it is not judicially
12. B.O. Nwabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa,
Hurst & Co., London, 1977, p. 20 et seq.
13. In this connection the American Constitution is often 
contrasted with the Russian one. The latter is said 
to have the character of maxims of political morality 
and the individual rights which it purports to guarantee 
are regarded in the West as no more than a declaration 
of objectives, a statement of what the State will hope­
fully do for its citizens.
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14enforceable." Accordingly, most constitutions today
contain an admixture of justiciable and non-justiciable
provisions. This means that not all the relations created
by, or arising from the constitution are of such a nature
as to be enforceable by the courts. Some are of a purely
political nature, and therefore unsuitable for judicial
enforcement; their violation is non-justiciable. They
are known In the United States as ’political questions’
because, though legal, the duty they impose is basically
political in nature, and their observance depends upon
the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and,
ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising
their political rights.
"Luther v. Borden was the first important case 
in the United States to apply the doctrine of 
judicial non-intervention in political ques­
tions. Beginning with this decision, the idea 
was developed that there are some cases of 
which the courts are not authorized to take 
jurisdiction ... There are certain cases which 
are completely without the sphere of judicial 
interference. They are called, for histori­
cal reasons, 'political questions'. To what 
matters does the term apply? It applies to 
all those matters of which the court, at a given 
time, will be of the opinion that it is 
Impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. 
Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result 
from the fear of the vastness of the conse­
quences that a decision on the merits might 
entail. Sometimes it will result from the 
feeling that the court is incompetent to deal 
with the particular type of question involved. 
Sometimes it will be induced by the feeling 
that the matter is 'too high' for the courts.
But always there will be a weighing of consi­
derations in the scale of political wisdom." 15
14 . Nwabueze, op.cit., p. 25.
15. Maurice Finkelstein, 'Judicial self-limitation', 37 
Harv. L. Rev. 338 (1923), pp. 344-345-
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A constitution regarded merely as law becomes 
a boring, dreary, technical legislative enactment. To 
obviate this effect all constitutions, while having the 
force of law, invariably contain political objectives which 
are either affirmed in the body of the document itself (as 
in the case of the 1961 Cameroonian constitution) or in a 
preamble outside the enacted portion of the constitution 
(as in the case of the I960 and the present 1972 Cameroonian 
Constitutions). In examining whether the human rights 
provisions contained in the 1972 Cameroonian Constitution 
are justiciable or no more than a declaration of objectives 
having the character of political morality and therefore 
falling within the realm of 'political questions', it 
would be of interest to look also at the position under 
the federal constitution of 1961.
2. Human rights under the 1961 and the 1972 Constitutions
Cameroonian constitutions have always been con­
spicuous by their lack of a Bill of Rights. A 'Bill of 
Rights' or 'Declaration of Rights' implies that the rights 
concerned are entrenched or legally protected against
1 6repeal or amendment by ordinary legislative process.
Like the I960 Constitution, the 1972 Constitution refers 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and lists a 
number of rights and freedoms, but this is done, again as
16. 0. Hood Phillips & Paul Jackson, op.cit., p. 447.
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under the i960 constitution, not in the main body of
the Constitution but in the preamble to it - presumably
to underscore the fact that they are intended not to be
justiciable rights. The 1961 federal constitution came
closer to having something of a Bill of Rights, but the
single article that dealt with this issue was too laconic
and nebulous to be of much practical value.
Indeed, the 1961 federal constitution dealt with
the issue of human rights only tangentially. The main
reference to human rights in that constitution was in art.
1(2) which provided, inter alia, that ’The'Federal Republic
of Cameroon ... affirms its adherence to the fundamental
freedoms set out in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights’. The interpretation of this cryptic provision was
fraught with difficulties. Evidently, the Declaration
referred to was that proclaimed by the United Nations
General Assembly on 10th December 1948. It has been hailed
as a Charter of liberty of the oppressed.
"The Universal Declaration is, and remains, the 
most important instrument and landmark in the 
history of mankind. It is the Charter of 
liberty of the oppressed and the down-trodden.
It defines the limits which the almighty state 
machine should not transgress in its dealings 
with those whom it rules. And, from the 
lawyer’s point of view, most important of all, 
it proclaims that the rights of human beings 
’should be protected by the rule of law’.” 17
However, it does not appear that the provisions of
17. Sean MacBride, ’The meaning of human rights year’, 
J.I.C.J., vol. VIII, No. 2, 1967, p. III.
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the Declaration were anything other than mere exhortations, 
statements of ideals, a common standard which all peoples 
and all nations should strive to achieve. It is true that 
several resolutions taken by the United Nations indicate 
the growing reliance by that body on the proposition that 
the Declaration established binding obligations, a vio­
lation of which by a state may be severely condemned by
the General Assembly. It is equally true that the United
Nations acknowledges that there can be no international 
peace or security without the protection of liberty.
But it is a commonplace conclusion that the Declaration has 
no force of law. That this is so is eloquently demonstrated 
by the European Convention on Human Rights which is designed,
as its preamble indicates, to bring about the collective
enforcement by European states of certain of the human 
rights inscribed in the Universal Declaration. If the 
Universal Declaration had legal force there would have 
been no need for the European Convention. It would have 
been redundant. Furthermore, in 1966 the United Nations 
drew up a more elaborate formulation of human rights in 
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cul­
tural Rights and in the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights.
The Universal Declaration did not therefore create 
legal rights the infringement of which may be adjudicated 
by a court of law. There is no judicial protection of 
the rights and freedoms inscribed in the Declaration. For,
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there Is no Universal Court of Human Rights (analogous to 
the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg) with 
jurisdiction to pronounce on violations of human rights.
The only way in which the United Nations can implement 
the rights and freedoms inscribed in the Declaration is 
through the political and not the judicial machinery; and 
this is by way of condemnation at the General Assembly, 
but this is ineffective, ad hoc and disjointed. All 
the Declaration appears to.have done is to prescribe a 
standard of political morality for United Nations member- 
states. Consequently, a mere affirmation of adherence 
by any state to the Declaration is of little practical, 
though perhaps of'some psychological, significance to the 
individual citizen.
Commentators and politicians in Cameroon gener­
ally took the view that art. 1(2) of the 1961 Constitution 
incorporated by reference the Universal Declaration into 
the corpus of Cameroonian law, that the 1961 Constitution 
should be read as though the Declaration was part and parcel 
of it, and that the effect of such an incorporation of 
the Declaration into the constitution was to convert the 
provisions of the Declaration not only into legal rights 
but into justiciable legal rights as well. It is however 
doubtful whether this view was wholly justified. The 
language employed in art.. 1(2) (’affirms adherence to'), 
it is submitted, was not sufficiently mandatory to warrant 
an individual ipso facto and ipso jure to act upon the
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provisions of the Declaration. Furthermore, the Federal 
Republic merely 'affirmed adherence' to the fundamental 
freedoms set out in the Declaration; it made no under­
taking guaranteeing those freedoms to the citizens.
Moreover, the departure from the drafting technique, 
employed in the i960 Constitution, of laying down seriatim 
the rights envisaged, would seem to suggest that it was 
never intended that those freedoms and rights referred to 
should be justiciable. This would seem to be the only 
possible and plausible explanation why the Southern Cameroons'
delegation to the Foumban constitutional conference regar-
18ded the human rights issue as a cause they lost. They
had advocated for 'human rights in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter', human rights 'protected by the 
constitution and enforced through courts'. There is also 
another reason why art. 1(2) was vague - perhaps consciously 
intended to be so. Not all the provisions of the Univer­
sal Declaration are of a justiciable nature. Some are 
merely statements of political morality. Besides, art. 1(2) 
did not err on the side of precision when it merely alluded 
to 'the fundamental freedoms' set out in the Declaration 
without specifying the_ freedoms, among those set out in the 
Declaration which the draftsmen of the Constitution con­
sidered to be 'fundamental' and also without saying whether 
the word 'freedom' is used to include 'right' (for, the 
Declaration enunciates not only freedoms but rights as well).
18. Johnson, op.cit., p. 188.
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The affirmation in art. 1(2) of the 1961 Consti­
tution was therefore of no practical value or usefulness.
It was no more than a pious declaration conferring no 
right on anyone. This was. the.more so as the affirmation 
was made in terms of the Federal Republic as a whole and 
could thus hardly be enforced against the Head of State 
or any official. In 1970 the now defunct Federal Court 
of Justice was presented with an opportunity to pronounce
on the legal effect of art. 1(2). This was in the case
- IQof Eitel Moulle Koula c. Republique Federale du Cameroun,
the facts of which were very simple. In May 1970 the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses religious sect was proscribed in 
Cameroon following the refusal of its adherents to go to 
the polls during the presidential elections of that year.
The plaintiff, an adherent of that sect, contended that 
the Government's action in proscribing the sect deprived 
him of the freedom to practise his religion and was tanta­
mount to a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights to which Cameroon has affirmed its adherence. The 
court had no difficulty in non-suiting him. The court 
however avoided a discussion on the effect of the affir­
mation contained in art. 1(2) of the Constitution. Instead, 
it based its judgment on a law which empowered the Govern­
ment to proscribe any association whose activities were 
deemed to be against l'ordre public.
19. CFJ/CAY, Arrgt No. 178 du 28 mars 1972, 3 R.C.D. 54 
(1972).
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In fact human rights were honoured more In 
breach than in their, observance. The high-handedness of 
the much-in-evidence red-bereted gendarmes, police 
excesses, the ubiquitous secret police and the network of 
informers, press censorship, the system of passes, noc­
turnal raids by police and gendarmes, road checks, and 
other illiberal practices created a tense and uneasy 
atmosphere of fear and bewilderment. In Anglophone 
Cameroon there were loud calls for the abolition of police/
gendarme raids, loud cries for freedom of speech and press 
20freedom, persistent appeals for the abolition of the
laissez-passer because it ’prevents the free movement of
people ..., cuts across one of the United Nations freedoms
... and is as bad and repugnant as the pass system in some
21parts of the world', and the arbitrariness and iron-fist 
tactics of gendarmes came under constant attack and was a 
source of persistent complaints.
A different situation would appear to obtain 
under the 1972 Constitution. In dealing with the question 
of human rights the draftsman of the 1972 Constitution 
borrowed a leaf from the i960 constitution. Human rights 
provisions in the 1972 Constitution have been inscribed in 
the preamble and not in the main body of the document.
20. 'NUCS want press freedom', Cameroon Outlook, Vol. 2, 
No. 65, Friday, August 28, 1971, p. 1.
21. ’Laisser-passer is another barrier', Cameroon Outlook, 
vol. 1, No. 25, Friday, August 1st, 1969, p. 27
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Reference Is made to the fundamental freedoms embodied both 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
United Nations Charter. A number of specific rights 
and freedoms have been set out seriatim: freedom of
expression, assembly, association, religion, movement, the 
press, from arbitrary arrest, and so on. At the end of 
the preamble there is an undertaking by the State that it 
'guarantees to all citizens of either sex 'the rights 
and freedoms set out in the preamble of the constitution'.
The question which arises here is whether these 
rights and freedoms, ordinarily justiciable if they had 
been inscribed in the main body of the Constitution, become 
non-justiciable simply because they have been spelt out 
in the preamble. This raises the question of the legal 
force of a preamble to a constitution. Traditionally, 
the device of a preamble has always been used to affirm 
fundamental political objectives - objectives which fall 
within the realm of 'political questions' and are conse­
quently non-justiciable. Thus in one Cameroonian case 
it was held that 'les prdambules n'dnoncent que les prin- 
cipes gdn£raux du droit, et ce & titre indicatif, alors 
que la loi <3nonce les dispositions constitutionnelles
proprement dites et, de ce fait, l'emporte sur le prdambule
22d'une constitution'. Is one therefore to assume from
this rather sweeping statement that the rights and freedoms
22. Cour d'appel de Garoua, Arr§t No. 9/c. du 5 mai 1973, 
6 R.C.D. 143 (1974).
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inscribed in the preamble to the 1972 Constitution are 
non-justiciable? It is submitted that this cannot be 
the case. The device of a preamble is certainly used to 
enunciate fundamental political objectives and general 
principles of law. But this does not mean all that is 
inscribed in a preamble automatically falls outside judi­
cial protection. The preamble is part and parcel of 
the Constitution and surely those provisions which are 
not merely statements of political objectives ought to 
be protected judicially. Human rights come under this 
head. An infringement of any right or freedom enunciated 
in the preamble to the constitution would be tantamount 
to a violation of the Rule of Law.
It is germane to mention here the position in 
France because the Cameroonian constitution has drawn from 
the French one. For a long time the Conseil d'Etat 
maintained that provisions in the preamble to a consti-
23tution did not have the character of legal prescriptions.
In the 1960s however, it came round to admit that Tles
declarations de droits et preambules constitutionnels
ont force de textes juridiques’, a violation of which by
the administration was an illegal act that may be challen- 
24ged in court. But this may only be done if the pro­
vision alleged to have been violated is sufficiently precise
23. C.E., 27 fevr. 1950, R.D.P. 1950. 694, concl. Gazier.
24. C.E., 12 fevr. I960, Societe Eky, D. i960. 263, note 
Jean l'Huillier.
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25and not vague and general. The controversy as to the
legal force of the preamble to a constitution was finally 
laid to rest by a decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel 
of 16 July 1971 which declared a law referred to it for a 
decision thereon to be contrary to the freedom of asso­
ciation guaranteed in the preamble to the French con-
... , . 26 stitution.
The preamble to the 1972 Cameroonian constitution 
is conceptually divided into two parts. The first part 
proclaims that ’the people of Cameroon’ are "proud of its 
cultural and linguistic diversity . . . , convinced that the 
salvation of Africa depends on the realization of an ever 
more closely-knit solidarity between the African States 
. . . , resolved to exploit its natural wealth in order to 
ensure the well-being of every citizen by the raising of 
living standards ...” This part of the preamble affirms 
political objectives and is therefore nothing more than a 
political manifesto. The second part however contains 
human rights provisions and is couched thus:
"The People of Cameroon,
Declares that the human being, without dis­
tinction as to race, religion, sex, or 
belief, possesses inalienable and sacred 
rights;
25. C.E., 29 nov., 1968, Tallagrand, Recueil Lebon, 1968,607.
26. D.1972.685. See also, Jean Rivero, ’Les principes 
fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la Republique: 
une nouvelle categorie constitutionnelle?’, D. 1972, 
chron. p. 265; Rene Chapus, ’De la soumission au droits 
des reglements autonomes’, D.1960, chron. p. 119.
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Affirms its attachment to the fundamental 
freedoms -embodied in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter 
and in particular to the following principles:
Everyone has equal rights and obligations.
The State endeavours to assure for all its 
citizens the conditions necessary for 
their development.
Freedom and security are guaranteed to each 
individual subject to respect for the rights 
of others and the higher interests of the 
State.
No one may be compelled to do what the law 
does not prescribe.
Everyone has the right to settle in any place 
and to move about freely, subject to the 
statutory provisions concerning public order, 
security and tranquillity.
The home is inviolate. No search may take 
place except by virtue of the law.
The privacy of all correspondence is inviolate. 
No interference shall be allowed except by 
virtue of decisions emanating from the judi­
cial authorities.
No one shall be subjected to prosecution, 
arrest or detention except in the cases and 
according to the manner determined by the law.
The law may not have retrospective effect.
No one shall be judged or punished except by 
virtue of a law promulgated and published 
before the offence was committed.
The law ensures the right of everyone to a 
fair hearing before the courts.
No one shall be harassed because of his origin, 
opinions or beliefs in religious, philosophical 
or political matters, subject to respect for 
public order.
Freedom of religion and freedom to practise 
a religion are guaranteed.
The State is secular. The neutrality and 
independence of the State in respect of all 
religions are guaranteed.
Il8l.
The freedom of expression, the freedom.of the 
press, the freedom of assembly, the freedom 
of association, and.the freedom of trade- 
unions are guaranteed under the conditions 
fixed by the law.
The Nation protects and promotes the family, 
the natural basis of human society.
The State ensures the child’s right to edu­
cation. The organisation and control of 
education at all levels are bounden duties 
of the State.
Ownership is the right guaranteed to everyone 
by the law to use, enjoy, and dispose of 
property. No one shall be deprived thereof, 
save for public purposes and. subject to the 
payment of compensation to be determined by 
the law.
The right of ownership may not be exercised 
in violation of the public interests or in 
such a way as to be prejudicial to the 
security, freedom, or existence of property 
of other persons.
Everyone has the right and duty to work.
Everyone must share in the burden of public 
expenditure according to his means.
The State guarantees to all citizens of 
either sex the rights and freedoms set out 
in the preamble of the constitution.”
Some of these provisions are clearly nothing but
political objectives and are too imprecise and vague to
be justiciable. Such provisions are easy enough to pick
out. They are the following declarations: that the human
being, without distinction as to race, religion, sex or
belief, possesses inalienable and sacred rights; that
everyone has equal rights and obligations; that the State
endeavours to assure for all its citizens the conditions
necessary for their development; that the nation protects
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and promotes the family, the natural basis of human 
society; that the state ensures the child’s right to 
education; that the organisation and control of education 
at all levels are bounden duties of the State; that every­
one has the right and duty to work; .and that everyone 
must share in the burden of public expenditure according 
to his means.
It is submitted that these provisions all
the others dealing with rights and freedoms are justiciable 
legal rights. The preamble ends with this crucial pro­
vision: "The State guarantees to all citizens of either
sex the rights and freedoms set out in the preamble of the 
constitution”. The mode of guarantee is protection 
through the judicial machinery. In a speech at the cere­
monial opening of the Supreme Court in December 1973, the 
Head of State declared: "The mission of judicial and legal
officers consists simultaneously in guaranteeing the funda-
2 7mental recognised rights of every citizen ..."
No case on an alleged violation of any of the 
rights or freedoms set out in the preamble to the 1972 
Constitution has yet reached the courts. But the question 
whether the government may be held to have violated a pro­
vision of the preamble to the Constitution arose in respect 
of non-retrospective legislation in 1973. The preamble to 
the constitution and s. 3 of the Cameroonian Penal Code
27. Ahmadou Ahidjo from A to Z , S.A.E.P., Paris, 1976, 
p~! 12 3 (A C .N .U. publication) .
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provide that the law may not have retrospective effect.
In September 1972 however, the Government passed a law
(Ordinance No. 72/16 of 28 September 1972) prescribing
the death penalty for persons found guilty of aggravated
theft. Section 3 of that law gave It retrospective effect.
The question then arose whether s. 3 violated the provision
against ex post facto legislation contained in the preamble
2 8to the 1972 Constitution. In Gregory Fru v. The People
the Buea Court of Appeal held, per Endeley, C.J., that the
constitutional protection subsisted notwithstanding s. 3
of the 1972 Ordinance. This enlightened decision was
however not followed by the Bamenda Court of Appeal in
29Abdu Yakubu v. The People. The court held,per Ekema,
C.J., that although the 1972 Ordinance was retrospective 
it did not infringe the constitutional provision on non­
retrospective legislation. The court based its decision 
on a rather narrow and strict construction of the word 
’may’ used in the constitutional provision. The use of 
the discretionary may and not the mandatory shall, the 
court reasoned, meant that the legislator was not abso­
lutely debarred from passing retrospective laws.
However, these cases at least indicate that the 
rights and freedoms spelt out in the preamble to the 1972 
Constitution are justiciable. Indeed, the human rights
28. Buea Court of Appeal, Crim. App. No. CASWP/4c/73, 
unreported.
29. Bamenda Court of Appeal, BCA/32c/75, unreported.
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provisions in the 1972 Constitution are regarded in 
Cameroon more or less as a bill of rights. But these 
provisions must always be weighed against particular 
enactments which have a restrictive operation.
3. Limitations on the operation of human rights provisions
When the rights of individuals are over-emphasised, 
government becomes too weak to keep order. On the other 
hand if the rights of government are widely stressed the 
rights of individuals become threatened. For this reason 
a balance is often struck between the powers of the govern­
ment and the rights of the individual. Fundamental rights 
incorporated in the constitution are always restricted, 
expressly or impliedly, by some such concept as ’public 
order’ or ’due process of law'. Although fundamental 
rights are conceived as inalienable and sacred, their full 
enjoyment is always restricted one way or the other. For 
example, in times of war, or during a state of emergency, 
the liberties of the individual are drastically reduced.
Many parts of Cameroon are still under a state of emergency 
and individual liberties in these areas are greatly reduced. 
Administrative authorities in these areas are given wide 
sweeping powers to maintain order: day and nocturnal
searches may be conducted by the forces of law and order, 
persons may be arrested and detained for days or weeks 
without being charged, severe restrictions are placed on
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the movement of persons and goods, meetings and publications 
may be prohibited if it is thought that they are likely 
to cause disorder.
Each right or freedom inscribed in the 1972
Constitution has a restrictive operation. Freedom and
security are guaranteed to each individual 'subject to
respect for the rights of others and the higher interests
of the State'. Everyone has the right to settle in any
place and to move about freely, 'subject to the statutory
provisions concerning public order, security and tran-
quillity1. The home is inviolate and no search may take
place 'except by virtue of the law'. No one shall be
subject to prosecution, arrest or detention 'except in the
31cases and according to the manner determined by the law'.
No one shall be harassed because of his origin, opinions 
or beliefs in religious, philosophical or political matters, 
'subject to respect for public order'. Political parties
and groups may take part in elections. They shall be
formed and shall exercise their activities 'in accordance 
with the law'. Such parties 'shall be bound to respect 
the principles of democracy and of national sovereignty 
and unity'. Freedom of religion and freedom to practise 
a religion are guaranteed. But the government may ban
30. Cameroonians are required by law to carry national iden­
tity cards and the police and gendarmerie do stop inter­
city travellers and ask for pieces.
31. This is a highly controversial area in which practice 
often belies theory.
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12any religious movement in the name of public order.
Freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly,
of association, and to form trade unions are guaranteed
subject to ’the conditions fixed by the law’. In fact
the ’conditions fixed by the law’ are often restrictive.
For example, s. 4 of Law No. 67/LF/19 of 12 June 1967
on associations declares any association of a tribal nature
null and void. In 1970 'tribal’ unions were proscribed
11m  the country. J The Government may, on the proposition
of the local prefect, suspend any association ’pour troubles
graves’ even before taking legal steps to have it dissolved.
Civil servants may form a trade union only If they have
been authorised by the Minister of Territorial Administration 
14to do so. Freedom of the press Is restricted by the
system of press censorship and freedom of expression by
fear of police spies and informers.
"What strikes the visitor here more than 
anything else is the generalised climate of 
fear. Cameroonians are exceptionally 
cautious about holding political discussions 
with strangers - aware as they are, of the 
large numbers of police spies and informers.
32. Eitel Moulle Koula c. Republique Federate du Cameroun, 
op.cit.; ’Between heaven and earth’, Cameroon Outlook, 
vol. 2, No. 36, Friday, May 15, 1970, p. 2; Law No. 
67/LF/19 of 12 June 1967 (the Law on Associations).
33. The Cameroon Outlook, vol. 2, No. 16, Monday, March 2, 
1970, p. 2, in its editorial captioned ’Tribalism: a 
new phase’, claimed that ’tribal’ unions re-emerged as 
'country meetings’ and suggested that such meetings be 
covered by security officers.
34. Law No. 68/LF/19 of 18 November 1968 relating to profes­
sional associations or unions not governed by the Labour 
Code.
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’The walls have ears’ ... There are still 
one or two privately-owned newspapers here; 
but rigid censorship - applied by the local 
Prefet (Prefect) - ensures that nothing 
critical of the government can get printed.
In South-west province, the two Anglophone 
newspapers, the Cameroon Times and Cameroon 
Outlook, appear quite often with large 
white spaces in their columns to remind the
reader that the prefect has been hard at
work exorcising unpatriotic paragraphs.” 35
Indeed, the press law (Law No. 66/LF/18 of 21 December 1966) autho­
rizes prefects to seize, before any judicial action against the
newspaper concerned, any publication contrary to good morals, likely
to disturb public order, or to injure the security of the 
state. Local prefects are also empowered to vet all 
articles which local papers intend to publish.
All this does not however mean that no form of 
press freedom and freedom of expression exists in Cameroon.
The censorship power granted to prefects is often abused 
by them. Some of these prefects use this power to conceal 
their own ineptitude and to shield themselves from meaning­
ful criticisms. ’’Most censors hardly know exactly what 
they are looking for. Thus most of them are seized by 
hysteria the moment they see newspaper scripts on their 
tables so much so that even the most rational criticism is
of.
blue-pencilled.” The government’s policy on this matter
has always been to encourage and welcome ’constructive
35. Henry Freedman, ’Ahidjo’s seventeen years of iron rule 
in Cameroon’, New African, October 1977, p. 992;
’Ahidjo holds tight the rein’, Africa Magazine, No. 77, 
January 1978, p. 52.
36. ’The down-trodden Cameroon journalist’, New Africa, 
September 1978, p. 67.
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criticisms1-. The national paper, the Cameroon Tribune, 
never appears with white spaces and it sometimes carries 
powerful editorials on government short-comings and the 
corruption of government officials. Radio Yaounde and 
Radio Buea run programmes which seriously criticise govern­
ment officials who misuse their offices or shirk in their 
responsibilities. These programmes also attack police 
and gendarme excesses whenever these have come to the 
public notice.
It is strongly submitted that neither the Press 
Law, the Subversion Ordinance, nor the provisions in the 
Penal Code dealing with sedition should be construed by 
the courts as preventing fair criticism which is reasonably 
justified in a democratic society. And Cameroon is a 
democratic State. Every Cameroonian, it is further sub­
mitted, has the right to discuss any grievance, canvass 
and censure the acts of government and their publi-c policy. 
He may even do this with a view to effecting a change in 
the party in power or to call attention to the weakness 
of the government so long as he keeps within the limits 
of fair criticism. It is clearly legitimate and consti­
tutional by means of fair argument to criticise the govern­
ment of the day. Moreover, political freedom, particularly 
free speech, tends to function as a safety valve, preven­
ting resentment and hostility from being transferred into 
hatred and violence. What should not be permitted is to 
criticise the government in a malignant manner. Such
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attacks, by their nature, tend to affect pUblic order 
and tranquillity. Similarly, the constitutional pro­
vision guaranteeing freedom of expression must be con­
strued as guaranteeing nothing but ordered freedom. The 
provision cannot therefore be used as a licence to spread 
false news likely to cause fear and alarm to the public.
En guise de conclusion, one may say, without fear 
of serious contradiction, that at first the attitude towards 
human rights in Cameroon was casual and cavalier but that 
over the last five years or so there has been growing a 
positive attitude towards the protection of human rights 
so long considered the exclusive reserve of the most 
advanced nations. Human rights represent minimal moral 
standards for human society and are considered a corner­
stone of a free society. They indicate the ways in which 
a society protects individual freedom. However, none 
of these rights is absolute in character. Freedom is an 
important good. But it may conflict with other goods. 
Freedom of religion for example does not serve to protect 
acts judged to be morally licentious. The speaker’s 
freedom is maximised if he is allowed to incite a riot.
But the peace of society may require constraints. So 
freedom of speech does not extend for example to seditious 
utterances that pose a clear and present danger to the 
safety of the Republic. Similarly, press freedom does 
not extend to the publication of defamatory, obscene, or
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seditious matter.. Absolute freedom means anarchy.
One freedom is tolerable only to the extent that It does 
not unreasonably curtail another. Unlimited liberty 
would lead quickly to anarchy, the law of the jungle and 
the triumph of the strong over the weak. In a developing 
country like Cameroon, it is imminently desirable that 
greater freedom must go hand in hand with the raising of 
living standards, the removal of poverty and starvation 
and the spread of a better life.
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
LEGAL EDUCATION IN CAMEROON
In Cameroon the creation of an advocate, a 
maglstrat, or a University law teacher Is a long process. 
As recently as the late 1960s most Cameroonians who 
wanted to pursue any form of legal education had to go 
abroad to France, England or Nigeria.'*' It was only In 
1962 that there was created in Cameroon a Centre des 
Hauts Etudes. This is what became known as the Federal 
University of Cameroon and, since 1973, the University 
of Yaounde. Although the Faculty of Laws and Economics 
was one of the first faculties of the young University 
it initially attracted only a few students. This was 
particularly true in the case of prospective students 
from the English-speaking part of the country who, because 
the University was strongly French-orientated (it was 
created under the auspices of Fondation Frangaise) and 
because they were handicapped by a lack of knowledge of 
French, did not find going to study in that University an 
attractive proposition.
Nevertheless, the creation of the Faculty of
1. Indeed, at the moment, most Cameroonian magistrats, 
advocates and University law teachers are people who 
have had their legal education at a University and/or 
Law School, Inn of Court or Barreau in either Nigeria, 
Britian or France.
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Laws and Economics was a welcomed development as it meant 
that some form of legal education was now available on the 
spot, especially to French-speaking Cameroonians and 
those without resources to go abroad. In 1965 there was 
another development in the area of legal education in 
Cameroon. A school of magistracy was created to train 
the country’s future judges and state prosecutors. It 
was attached, as the 'Magistracy Division’, to the 
Ecole Camerounaise d ’Administration which had been created 
in 1959. At the moment legal education in Cameroon takes 
two forms, the academic aspect and the professional 
training.
I . The Academic Aspect
There is only one University in Cameroon, the 
2
University of Yaounde, and the academic side of legal 
education is offered by the Faculty of Laws and Economic 
Sciences of that. University.
1. The Faculty of Laws and Economic Sciences
To be admitted into the Faculte de Droit et des 
Sciences Economiques the candidate must meet the necessary
2. Plans are currently afoot to decentralize the University. 
Campuses would be created in Buea (School of Translation 
and Interpretation), Douala (School of Business Adminis­
tration), Dschang (School of Agronomy), and Ngaoundere 
(School of Chemical and Animal Sciences).
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entrance requirements. Once admitted into the Faculty 
the student follows a course of study that leads, after 
a minimum of four years - (now reduced to three), to the 
award of the Licence en Droit degree.
A . Admission requirements
In Cameroon a child begins primary school at 
the age of six. He spends seven years there and a fur­
ther seven years in a secondary school. Secondary edu­
cation is provided in State-owned and privately-owned 
(mainly by missionary bodies: the Roman Catholic, Presby-
terian, and Baptist) institutions. After four years of 
secondary education the pupil in the Francophone part of 
the country obtains the certificate known as the brevet 
d’dtudes du premier cycle (B.E.P.C.). He spends another 
two years to obtain the probatoire (sometimes known as the
’premier bac1) and a final year to have the baccalaureat 
/ \ 4(sometimes known as the 'deuxieme bac T). The secondary
3. These schools are known either as lycees (i.e. State- 
owned grammar schools) or colleges (privately-owned 
grammar schools) in the Francophone Provinces. In the 
English-speaking Provinces they are various styled 
’colleges’, ’secondary schools’, ’grammar schools’, or 
’comprehensive schools’. There also exist the so-called 
'commercial colleges’ which also have grammar school 
subjects on their curriculum.
4. The baccalaureat examination (popularly called the ’bac’
or ’bachot~r) is taken into one of a number of sections 
or ’series': the serie A Is the 'literary' section and
has several options; the serie B is the economics sec­
tion; the serie C is the mathematics and physical science 
section; the serie D is the mathematics - biology section; 
and the serie E is the 'technical' section. Most 
students admitted into the Faculty of Laws and Economics 
are holders of either 'Bac A’or 'Bac B ’. The baccalaureat
/Continued over
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school pupil in the English-speaking side of the country 
spends five years to obtain the General Certificate of 
Education, Ordinary Level, and a further two years to 
obtain the Advanced Level.
Any student who has either the G.C.E. ’A ’ level 
in at least two ’arts’ subjects obtained at one sitting 
and with good grades or the baccalaureat,  ^may register
Footnote 4 continued from page 1193*
examination which is a local examination conducted by 
the Ministry of Education consists of a dissertation on 
a given topic and a series of comprehensive tests in 
such broad areas of knowledge as philosophy, liter­
ature, languages, natural sciences and mathematics, 
and finally an oral examination before a panel of 
’professeurs’.
5. As recently as 1976 the G.C.E. was an external examination 
organised by the University of London. Since, the 
Ministry of Education has taken over and it is now the 
Cameroonian G.C.E. To obtain the G.C.E. ’0 ’ level the 
pupil must pass in at least five subjects (including 
English Language) at one sitting. The pupil himself 
selects from the relevant G.C.E. syllabus, the number of 
subjects he wishes to offer. Passes in between seven 
and nine subjects are fairly common. To obtain the ’A ’ 
level the pupil must pass in at least two subjects taken 
at one sitting. Most students pass in three subjects.
The G.C.E. examination consists of comprehensive and 
essay type questions. There is generally no oral test. 
The G.C.E. candidate is always expected to show origi­
nality and the ability to analyse and criticise in 
answering his questions.
6. This means that the candidate must have also passed 
either the brevet (a pupil without the brevet cannot 
proceed to the bac) or the G.C.E. ’0 ’ level in at least 
five subjects at one sitting, including mathematics and 
a science subject.
People without the ’A' level or the Bac may be 
matriculated for.the capacite en droit course after pas­
sing a special, entrance examination organised by the 
Faculty for that purpose. The capacite course takes at 
least two years. The capacite en droit certificate gives 
access to some civil service position and entitles the 
holder to register as a 1st Year student in the Licence 
course. Most capacite students are civil servants in 
Yaounde who do the course part-time.
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at the Faculty of Laws and Economic Sciences. In keeping
with Government policy, there is no restriction on the
intake. Any applicant who satisfies the requisite entry 
conditions is admitted. This Faculty is the largest in 
the whole University with an enrolment figure of over 4000 
students. Tuition, as in the other Faculties and Schools 
of the University, is free. In addition, hundreds of 
students have a monthly grant which varies between 15,000 
to 35,000 francs cfa, depending on the student’s year of 
study and his academic performance.
To obtain the Licence en Droit degree the student 
must have successfully completed the four years’ (now three) course. 
He may proceed to do a Masters in Law which takes two years 
and perhaps the Doctorat en Droit for which he must put in
a further three years. The Faculty is modelled on the
pattern of corresponding Faculties in French Universities 
both in terms of its organisation and law teaching tech­
nique. However, one singular aspect of the Yaounde Law 
Faculty is that its programme of study is bi-jural in charac­
ter. Many graduates of the Faculty are in fact not only 
bi-jural but also bilingual.
B . Organisation and course of study
The Yaounde Faculty of Laws and Economics is 
divided into four departments: the Economics Department,
the Public Law Department, the Private Law (Anglophone) 
Department, and the Private Law (Francophone) Department.
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Each is headed by a ’chef du departement’ who is generally 
either a Professor or an Assistant Professor. The Faculty
*7
is headed by a Dean (Doyen) who must be a Professor but who 
may be a ’privatiste1, a ’publiciste’, or an economiste.
The Dean’s deputy and close collaborator is the Vice-Dean. 
Ever since Cameroonians took over the running of the 
Faculty in 1973, the Dean has always been a Francophone 
and his vice an Anglophone. The day-to-day management of 
the Faculty is carried out with the indisepnsable collabor­
ation of the Faculty’s Secretary General who comes under 
the authority of the Dean.
The programme of study at the Faculty is pres­
cribed by Government decree. It includes subjects which 
elsewhere are taught only in Law Schools or Inns of Court. 
However, the Faculty takes into account the fact that its 
students number many who will not enter any legal profes­
sion. Hence, it also aims at broader objectives than 
just the practice of the law. Which is why in addition 
to course of a more strictly legal nature, courses in the 
political and social sciences are also taught - sociology, 
political ideas, political regimes, public liberties, 
political economy.
The Faculty awards two basic degrees. The l i e erice 
en sciences economiques is destined for students specializing
7. So long as there are Professors in the Faculty no one 
below the rank of full Professor may be appointed Dean 
of the Faculty r^ ardUss of. , so it would seem, his eru­
dition and experience.
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in economics while the licence en droit is meant for law 
students (whether specializing in the private or public
g
law area). The dichotomy is thus between rjuristes' 
and ?economistes1. But this division is marked only in 
the last two years of the four years programme. During 
the first two years all students, whether intending even­
tually to specailise in the laws or in economics, offer, 
in addition to their respective main subjects, certain 
common courses: introduction to economics, sociology,
history of Cameroonian institutions, introduction to law. 
Students who successfully complete the first two years are 
awarded the certificate of bachelier en droit. This 
diploma gives access to some civil service positions.
The programme for the first two years for 'priva- 
tiste’ law students includes the following core subjects: 
introduction to the English legal system, family law 
(including customary law), droit de la famille et de la 
personne, law of contract, droit des obligations, droit 
constitutlonnel (including political regimes and ideas), 
droit p£nal general, equity (including trust), droit
8. Students intending to enter one of the legal professions 
or to pursue a career in Government service or business 
will normally end up with a licence en droit. Because 
some knowledge of law is viewed as helpful in a number 
of careers, hundreds of students always flock annually 
into the Faculty of Laws and Economics, making it the 
largest Faculty in the University. However, only a 
small number of all the students who matriculate in the 
1st Year ever go through the course successfully and 
obtain their degrees. The failure rate in the 1st Year 
is sometimes as high as 70$. Moreover, a great deal 
of winnowing does take place from year to year.
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administratif, and political sociology. These core sub­
jects are compulsory for both English and French-speaking 
students. Lectures are given in both French and English 
in the sense that English law subjects are taught in 
English while French law subjects are taught in French.
In the last two years Tjuristes' students must 
elect between two major fields of concentration: private
law or public law. Course offered in the public law field 
include public international law, civil liberties, pri­
vate international law, methodology of the social sciences, 
public finance including taxation, contentieux administratif. 
The private law field is further bifurcated into an Anglo­
phone section and a Francophone section. But students 
of both sections must follow a number of core subjects which 
include droit penal special, droit des assurances, droit du 
travail, regime foncier, and land law (including conveyancing). 
The subjects taught in the last two years are: law of
torts, sale of goods, law of partnership, mercantile law, 
civil procedure, carriage (droit des transports), criminal 
law (special part), criminal procedure, evidence, trust, 
land law (including conveyancing), taxation, succession, 
labour law, private international law, public international 
law, company law, and jurisprudence and legal theory. These 
subjects are taught in English in the Anglophone section 
and in French in the Francophone section. Common courses 
are taught in English and French (i.e. French law courses 
are taught in French and English law courses are taught in
1199.
English; If a particular subject Is one over which there 
exists a uniform Cameroonian law - such as labour law, the 
penal code, land tenure - the language of lecture depends 
on the teacher asked to take the subject).
Examinations are held thrice a year; a mid-year 
examination known as 'partielsT and an end of year exami­
nation taken in June and also in October for candidates 
who failed in the June session. A student who did not 
enter for the June examination may not enter for the October 
session. A student may proceed to the next year only if 
he obtains a pass score on an aggregate of the mid-year and 
the end of year marks. All students successfully completing 
the licence en droit programme have the same right of access 
to the various legal professions whether their field of 
concentration is private law or public law. In practice 
however, private law graduates always tend to opt for 
either the magistracy or the bar while public law graduates 
almost always opt for a career in the Government service 
either as administrateur civil principal, inspecteur des 
douanes, inspecteur des impots, or a functionary in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, a public law gradu­
ate who contemplates entering the diplomatic service must 
undertake a further two years course of study at the 
Cameroon Institute of International Relations (IRIC).
C. Law teaching technique
The general technique of law teaching in Yaounde
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University follows the pattern of law teaching in French 
Universities. Two methods are combined: cours magistraux
or formal lectures and travaux diriges or ’tutorials’.
Lectures are considered the superior pedagogic methods.
They are given in amphitheatres which vary in size, the 
largest having a sitting capacity of 700 students at a time. 
Teachers prepare their notes and read them out to students 
who always strive to take them down verbatim and at exami­
nations do their very best to reproduce the teacher’s 
exact words. The University authorities are evidently 
unhappy about this state of affairs. The student is con­
stantly reminded that a University is not a secondary 
school where a student can afford to adopt a passive attitude, 
relying solely on what he has been told by his teachers.
The job of the University teacher is merely to guide, 
orientate and assist the student who must show Initiative 
and originality.
Attendance at formal lectures is not compulsory.
Most students prefer to study from the cours polycopies, 
that is, mimeographed transcripts of the teacher’s lectures. 
They are widely available and most students do not bother 
to buy the prescribed textbooks, complaining (to some 
extent justifiably so) that the books are not available 
locally. In fact few students ever read any legal liter­
ature other than their notes and the teacher’s mimeograph.
The authorities are not happy with this development.
Teachers have been asked to refer students more and more to
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the library and to discourage heavy reliance on mimeographs. 
A University Bookshop is being built to provide students 
with textbooks.
The second and complementary limb of law teaching 
in Yaounde University is the method of 1travaux diriges’ 
(which literally means ’guided work’ but which we may 
render simply as ’tutorials’). These are meant to supple­
ment the formal lectures and attendance at them is compul­
sory for every full-time student of the Faculty. Whereas 
the cours magistraux are theoretical expositions dealing 
more with general principles than with their practical 
application, travaux diriges are designed for practical 
work. Thus they may involve the preparation of a written 
comment on a court decision, the drafting of written plea­
dings, the drafting of charges, the drafting of statements 
of claim, the making of affidavits, the discussion of the 
various procedural steps which may be taken In a concrete 
case, the answering of specific questions or problems raised 
by students with regards to the formal lecture, the dis­
cussion of factual problems, and even (although this is 
never done) the organisation of moots. Unfortunately 
however, a certain amount of lecturing often goes on even 
during the travaux diriges sessions. This is so because 
these sessions are also expected to be used in filling 
the gaps left by the teacher in his formal lectures.
Attendance at travaux diriges sessions is obli­
gatory. Persistent absence for no justifiable reasons
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may have a detrimental effect on the student’s end-of- 
year results. At each session students are required to 
participate not only orally but also by submitting written 
work whenever there is one to be submitted. Marks are 
awarded for participation and-regular attendance. These 
marks also count in determining the student’s overall 
results at the end of the year. The importance of travaux 
diriges may also be gauged from the fact that each yearly 
examination is not partly written and partly oral only; 
it also requires the preparation of a written essay on some 
point of legal theory as well as the solution of more 
practical problems.
One of the objectives of the travaux diriges 
sessions is to provide a means of contact between teacher 
and student as no opportunity for class discussions exist 
during the cours magistraux. Students are divided into 
’small’ tutorial groups. In fact the groups are not small 
at all as they usually consist of about thirty students 
each. Although students are free to go to their teachers’ 
offices if they have problems, discussion and exchange of 
views between teachers and students, so typical of Anglo- 
American education, is still noticeably .lacking. Further­
more, although students are encouraged to ask questions 
(during the travaux diriges sessions and not during the 
cours magistraux) they are generally not inclined to do 
so and, in any case, prefer not to take any position which 
might be regarded as critical or disrespectful of the
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professor. Besides, it would seem that some teachers
are not inclined to want to close the gap for fear that
they might yield some of the authority which they think is
g
necessary for effectiveness as a teacher.
To obtain the licence en droit degree the student 
must satisfy the examiner in the written and in the oral 
examinations including the presentation of a dissertation 
(memoire) on a legal topic chosen by the student himself.
The presentation of a dissertation in part fulfilment of 
the licence en droit degree was however abolished in 1978. 
The written examination in the fourth year consists of 
four subjects. Three of these subjects are made known to 
the student at the beginning of the fourth year. The 
fourth written subject, unknown to the students until the 
day of the examination, is chosen from among the subjects 
taught, by the Dean of the Faculty. Only students who have 
satisfied the examiners in the written examination may pro­
ceed to the oral one. The oral examination consists of 
interrogations in four subjects (other than the ones at the 
written examination). The interrogation on each subject 
is conducted separately by the teacher who teaches the 
subject. To be awarded the degree the student must, on 
aggregate, score an average mark on the following items: 
the travaux diriges marks, the mid-year examination marks, 
the marks obtained at the written examination, and the marks 
obtained, at the oral examination.
9. It is a rare phenomenon to find a teacher at the University 
of Yaounde having a meal at the students’ restaurant or a 
drink in the students’ canteen.
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The names of candidates, their score for each 
subject, and the total marks obtained by each student are 
entered on a proc^s-verbal which is put up on the Faculty’s 
notice board. Successful candidates are indicated by the 
sign ADD (admission definitive) and unsuccessful ones by 
the sign AJ (ajournd). Successful students call at the 
Faculty and collect their ’attestation de r£ussite’ and 
later, degree. There is no graduation ceremony.
With his Licence en Droit degree the door is 
open for the young law graduate to elect either private 
practice, the magistracy, or law teaching at the Univer­
sity. Whichever road he takes he must put in at least 
another two years of study. If he decides for example to 
become a law teacher he must continue his studies for at 
least another two years in order to obtain the degree of 
Master of Laws. He needs a further three years in order 
to obtain the degree of Docteur en Droit. Only holders of 
at least a Master of Laws degree may be recruited to teach 
law at the Faculty of Laws and Economic Sciences of the 
University of Yaounde.
2. Law reporting and legal periodicals
Legal writing - whether in the form of treatises, 
books, commentaries or articles - has exercised and con­
tinues to exercise considerable influence over the develop­
ment, interpretation and systematisation of the law in the
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older countries of Europe.1^ This has been aided In no 
small part by the availability of law reports and legal 
periodicals. Without them legal writing would have been 
extremely difficult. Moreover, they are indispensible 
tools for the student of law, the law professor, the legal 
practitioner and members of the judiciary. However, 
although law reporting and legal writing has been with the 
countries of Europe for several centuries now, it is only 
a recent phenomenon in Cameroon. During the colonial 
period .there was no form of law reporting in either the 
French or the British Cameroons. Law reporting and legal
10. Although in the Anglo-American tradition, the organised 
exposition of legal principles is primarily the pro­
vince of the judiciary the works of people like 
Glanville, Bracton, Coke, Blackstone, etc., have 
played a decisive role in the development of 'the 
common law. Even today, books and articles by legal 
scholars (whether dead or still alive) are frequently 
cited in court. In France the role of doctrine (i.e. 
the body of opinion on legal matters expressed In 
books and articles) is of paramount importance in the 
development, interpretation, analysis, synthesis and 
evaluation of the law. Indeed, "the doctrinal com­
ment in legal periodicals, which often accompanies the 
reports of important cases, serves as dissent from or 
concurrence with the underlying theories of the deci­
sion, referring to past case-law on the points invol­
ved and suggesting valid grounds for decision.
Modern doctrine thus tends to place court decisions in 
the proper perspective, as well as to indicate the 
policies underlying legislation which must eventually 
be interwoven into an organised legal system ...
French judges themselves recognising the constructive 
role of doctrine in this regard, do not consider doc­
trinal dissent, however vigorous, as an affront to 
judicial prestige. On the contrary they view it as 
an indispensable aid to the judicial process, and the 
courts often adopt a theory suggested by a commentator." 
See, David & de Vries, The French legal system, Oceana 
Publications, New York, 1958, pp. 124-125.
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writing in the country are post colonial developments.
A. Bulletins des Arrfets de la Cour Supreme
These were the first series of law reports ever 
to be produced in Cameroon. Produced by the Ministry 
of Justice and printed by the Government Printer, the 
Bulletins first appeared in i960 and since then production 
has been fairly regular. Published every semester, the 
Bulletins des Arrets report only cases originating from 
the French-speaking part of the country and decided by the 
Cour Supreme du Cameroun (up to 1972 it used to be cases 
decided by the cour supreme du Cameroun oriental). Cases 
from the English-speaking Provinces, even when decided on 
appeal by the Supreme Court of Cameroon, are never reported. 
All cases are reported in French.
Each Bulletin is divided into four parts, each 
part dealing with a particular subject matter. Part one 
deals with droit pgnal, part two with droit local, part 
three with droit social, and part four with droit civil et 
commercial. Each issue of these reports is numbered (for 
example, the issue of the second semester of 1973 is No. 29) 
and the pagination has been -continuous from, year to year. 
However, there is no official form of citation. Most 
writers cite them as fBull.f Cases reported in the 
Bulletins are not annotated and do not have the familiar 
'note/ (i.e. critical evaluation or comment by a scholar) 
often found at the end of some cases reported in French law 
reports.
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Cases decided by the Supreme Court and which 
are reported in the Bulletins are, in typical French 
style, formulated like a decree, short, cryptic and largely 
uninformative. Each case opens with the ritual 'La cour' 
and 'attendu que* and closes with the traditional refrain, 
'par ces motifs, rejette', or alternatively, 'par ces 
motifs, casse et annule'. An Anglo-American educated 
lawyer will scan each judgment in vain for any argumen­
tative exposition,, expatiation, or citation of cases by 
the judge. The judge merely refers briefly to the argu­
ments of the appellant and the respondent, saying whether 
the 'moyen' advanced by the appellant is 'fond*?' or not, 
and then goes on to hold one way or the other (by rendering 
what is known in the laterature as an 'arret confirmatif' 
or an 'arret infirmatif'), stating briefly his reasons for 
arriving at the decision he has arrived at. The 'reason' 
advanced often takes the form of a curt attendu clause 
referring to the relevant law which has been 'viold' or 
not 'Viold'. The clause ends with a statement saying 
whether or not the 'arr&t attaqud encourt la cassation1. 
Most judgments take just one and a half pages. A judgment 
that runs through four pages is a rarity. At the end of 
each reported judgment are the names of the 'president', 
the 'rapporteur', the 'procureur general' and 'avocats' in 
that order.
B. The West Cameroon Law Reports
The West Cameroon Law Reports (only three volumes
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of which were ever produced) contain selected judgments 
of the Supreme Court of West Cameroon. Volume one of 
the reports contains cases decided in 1962, 1963 and 1964 
and is cited as (1962-1964) W.C.L.R. The second volume 
contains cases decided in 1965, 1966 and 1967 and is 
cited as (1965-1967) W.C.L.R. The third and last volume 
in the series contains cases decided in 1968 and is cited 
as the 1968 W.C.L.R. These reports were compiled, edited 
and annotated in typical English fashion by Mr J.A. O'Brien 
Quinn (an expatriate legal officer) on behalf of the West 
Cameroon Bar Association and published by the Government 
Printer.
Up to 1970 no attempt was made to report cases 
decided by the courts in the English-speaking part of 
Cameroon. In 1970 the West Cameroon Bar Association set 
up a 'Council for Law Reporting' with Mr O'Brien Quinn as 
chairman. Mr Quinn then went ahead to produce the reports 
for 1962-64 and for 1965-67. This initiative was much 
appreciated by the Bench and the Bar when the first volume 
of the reports was publicly launched. However, when Mr 
Quinn proceeded to produce the 1968 volume steps were taken 
by the Bench and the Bar to prevent him from doing so. It 
was claimed that he did not consult with the other members 
of the committee, that law reporting is hardly done by a 
single person, and that the comments at the foot of some 
of the judgments already reported were proper only in a law 
journal and not in a law report. These arguments, it is
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submitted, are lame and Idle. It is common knowledge 
that annotations are in order in a law report. More­
over, English legal history shows that law reporting was 
originally the work of individuals. It is significant 
that ever since Mr Quinn was forced to abandon this praise­
worthy undertaking, his detractors have never been able to 
produce a single law report.
C . The Annales de la Faculte de Droit
These were reviews produced twice a year by the 
Faculty of Laws and Economics. They were valuable perio­
dicals, the first of their kind in Cameroon, in which 
members of the academic staff of the Faculty published 
articles of legal and economic interest. The first issue 
of these Annales was produced in 1970. In 197^ however, 
after the seventh issue had been produced, publication 
stopped. This was largely because the Cameroon Law Review 
had been founded in 1972 (under the auspices of the Univer­
sity but run by the Law Faculty) and it was not thought 
economically advisable to continue with the Annales. More­
over, it was felt that with the founding of the Cameroon 
Law Review, the Annales had become redundant.
D. The Revue Camerounaise de Droit
The Cameroon Law Review was founded in 1972 by 
the Law Faculty but it is under the auspices of the Univer­
sity. Initially, the ambition had been to produce twice
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a year. But by 197^ it had become clear that this was 
impossible. Production has been most irregular. Some­
times only a single issue is produced for a year. At 
other times, no issue is produced at all. The difficulty 
does not appear to stem from a lack of contributions.
The problem appears to be one of lack of funds and the 
inability of local publishers to do a good job. Efforts 
are currently being made to overcome these difficulties.
The Revue Camerounaise de Droit has been faith­
fully modelled on the pattern of the French Jurisclasseur 
Periodique (commonly known as the J.C.P.). The Revue 
is divided into three parts. Part I deals with doctrine 
(legal articles), Part II with jurisprudence (case-law), 
and Part III with textes (statutory enactments). Part II 
is further divided into a number of rubrics: j urisprudence
administrative, jurisprudence penale, jurisprudence civile 
et commerciale, jurisprudence sociale, jurisprudence de 
droit local, and jurisprudence de droit international prive.
The Review is only bilingual in the sense that 
articles written in English may be published in it. 
Otherwise, there is in practice, although perhaps not in 
terms of policy, nothing bilingual and less still bi-jural 
about it. There is only one English-speaking member on 
the Review’s twenty-man editorial board. Besides, statu­
tory enactments are reproduced in the Review only in French 
even though all statutory enactments in Cameroon are 
available in the Official Gazette in English and in French.
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Finally, the Review only reports cases decided by courts 
in the Francophone Provinces of the country.
E . The Recueils des Grands Arr§ts
These are collections, in book-form, of a selec­
tion of cases decided by the now defunct Federal Court of 
Justice sitting as an administrative court. The venture 
has been that of private individuals. In 1972' Jean-Marie 
Breton, then a law lecturer in the Law Faculty produced a 
monograph: Recueil des principales decisions de l ’assemblee
pleniere de la cour federate de justice statuant en conten- 
tieux (1967-1972). Perhaps the better known of these com­
pilations is the two-volume Recueil des grands arrets de la 
jurisprudence administrative de la cour federal de justice, 
by Francois-Xavier Mbouyom, Procureur General at the Supreme 
Court. Tome one was produced in 1970 and contains cases 
decided between 1962 and 1970. Volume two was produced 
in 1975 and contains cases decided between 1970 and 1975.
One merit of Mbouyom*s collection is that it is bilingual. 
The reported cases have been translated into English. 
However, the translation is at times of poor quality and 
here and there one finds■printing errors in the English 
version. This has greatly whittled down the value of the 
English version which must therefore be read with much 
circumspection.
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F. Recueil Penant
Founded In France In 1891-by a Mr D. Penant, the 
Recueil Penant is a revue trimestrielle which reports 
selected cases from the.appellate courts of Francophone 
African countries and publishes legal articles on any legal 
aspect concerning any of those countries. In fact how- 
ever, the Penant publishes articles only on the private 
law area. There is another French periodical (the Revue 
Politique, independance et cooperation) devoted also to 
French-speaking countries, which publishes articles on 
the public law area. The Penant styles itself as ’revue 
de droit des pays d ’Afrique’. This is an ambitious and 
a misleading title. The ’revue’ does not in fact concern 
itself with English-speaking and Protuguese-speaking African 
countries.
The Penant was, in the colonial era, the only 
’review' which reported selected cases of the appellate 
courts in France’s colonial possessions. A number of 
cases from the French Cameroun were therefore reported in 
i t . ^  Independence did not affect this process. Each 
issue of Penant reports at least one case originating from 
the Francophone part of Cameroon. It also publishes 
legal articles on aspects of law in Cameroon. Although it 
is. a 'revue trimestrielle', the Recueil Penant is in fact
11. Cases decided by the courts in the British Cameroons
were hardly ever reported. Only a handful found their 
way into the Nigerian Law Reports.
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not what would be understood in England or America as a 
’law quarterly review’. It does not publish only legal 
articles. It also reports cases. It is both a ’law 
report1 and a legal periodical.. The ’revue’ is divided 
into two major parts, doctrine and j urisprudence. This 
latter part is further divided into four sections: 
jurisprudence administrative, jurisprudence civile, j uris­
prudence pdnale, and jurisprudence sociale. There are also 
two minor parts: chroniques and bibliographie.
G . Le Monde du Travail
To complete this catalogue, one should perhaps 
mention the quarterly review, Le Monde du Travail, founded 
in December 1977 by the Ministry of Labour. It publishes 
articles, cases and statutory enactments and various agree­
ments relating to labour law. It can only be hoped that 
this review which is making a bold attempt to be both 
bilingual and bi-jural would stand the test of time.
II. Professional Training
The licencie who wishes to engage in the private 
practice of the law or follow a career in the magistracy 
must undergo professional training. Professional 
training for the magistracy is given in the Magistracy 
Division (hereinafter referred to as the School of Magis­
tracy) of the Ecole Nationale d ’Administration et de la 
Magistrature (ENAM).
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1. The School of Magistracy^2
Decree No. 59/123 of 27th July 1959 set up an 
Ecole Camerounalse d TAdministration In Yaounde to train 
the higher cadres of the Public Service. In 1965 a 
Magistracy Division was added to it and it became the 
National School of Administration and Magistracy. ENAM 
comes under the President of the Republic who has delegated 
his powers with regards to the School to the Public Service 
Minister. For practical purposes therefore the School is 
under the Ministry of the Public Service. ENAM trains 
and provides refresher courses for civil servants, magis- 
trats, and court registrars. Headed by a Director, it 
consists of a Department of Studes, a General Secretariat, 
and a Library Section. The Department of Studies is made 
up of an Administrative Division (for the training of civil 
servants) and a Judicial Division, in fact, the School of 
Magistracy. The basic mission of the School of Magistracy 
is to train the countryrs future judicial and legal officers.
A . Admission into the School of Magistracy
To be admitted into the School of Magistracy, 
the candidate must hold the Licence en Droit degree or a 
recognised and approved equivalent law degree, be a 
Cameroonian, be of good health, have no criminal record,
12. See also, Chapter Nine, supra.
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and pass the prescribed competitive examination into the 
School. This examination is held annually around 
September-October. As recently as two years ago however, 
there was no concours to get to the School of Magistracy. 
This was because few law graduates were interested in pur­
suing a career in the magistracy. Conditions of service
were not particularly attractive. Now, things have
changed and more and more law graduates are opting for 
the magistracy. The concours device has therefore been 
introduced to limit the number of intake each year.
Section 11(3) of the Rules and Regulations governing the 
Judicial and Legal Service specifically provides that Mif 
the number of candidates exceeds the number of available 
places, recruitment shall be effected by means of a com­
petitive examination".
Persons holding the degree of doctor of laws may 
be admitted straight away, without having to pass a com­
petitive examination, into the second year of the course. 
Candidates admitted to the School of Magistracy are called 
legal probationers. They must take the following oath:
"I swear well and truly to perform my duties, scrupulously 
to keep secret all discussion of judgment, and in all ways 
to bear myself as a worthy and faithful legal probationer." 
While in training the legal probationer has the status of 
probationer civil servant and receives a monthly allowance 
not subject to pension contributions.
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B. Course of study
The duration of studies at the School of Magis­
tracy Is two years. The studies comprise practical 
and theoretical courses as well as courses of training in 
the courts, in the central administration of the Ministry 
of Justice and, in suitable cases, in the public services 
and offices of auxiliary officers of justice. Education 
and training courses may be undertaken in part abroad.
The programme of study is designed not only to turn out 
someone who can sit on the bench but one who can also 
prosecute and serve in an administrative capacity in the 
Ministry of Justice.
During his first year of training at the School 
of Magistracy, the legal probationer attends courses, 
seminars, and lectures designed to broaden his general 
cultural horizon and to increase his legal knowledge.
Courses taught include general culture, criminal law, 
judicial organisation, land law and administrative law.
At the end of this first year students go out to the courts 
to have forensic experience. The* general policy has 
always been to. send Anglophone students to courts in the 
Anglophone Provinces while Francophone students have 
their forensic training in the courts in the Francophone 
Provinces. The School itself is divided into an Anglophone 
and a Francophone section. There is no scheme whereby 
students from the Francophone Provinces are enabled to 
acquire forensic experience in the courts in the Anglophone
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Provinces. They are in effect shielded from the common- 
law influence. Anglophone students on the other hand are 
exposed to the civil-law influence. The School of Magis­
tracy is located in the French-speaking side of the country 
and some Anglophone students are sent to courts in Yaounde.
In the second year students increase (through 
lectures) their knowledge in such subjects as criminal and 
civil procedure, evidence, commercial law, customary law, 
execution of judgments and so on. They receive practical 
training at the 'Palais de justice' in Yaounde, and at 
the Ministry of Justice. Up to 197^3 the second year 
used to end with a three to four months' 'stage' at the 
I.I.A.P. in Paris. While in training legal probationers 
may attend any consultation in an advisory capacity. He 
may be designated ex officio by the appropriate judicial 
authorities to assist or represent parties before the 
courts.
At the end of their training all legal probation­
ers (auditeurs de justice) must sit for the end of course 
examination. Those who succeed (the pass mark is 12/20) 
are awarded the Diploma of the National School of Adminis­
tration and Magistracy (Judicial Section) and absorbed into 
the Judicial and Legal Service on the first scale, first 
incremental position. They begin their judicial career 
in the lowest court, the Court of First Instance. Those 
who fail the examination have their appointments terminated. 
They may however, in certain circumstances, be appointed
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legal assistants (attache de justice) and placed at the 
disposal of the Procureur General at an Appeal Court.
One of the issues which has often lent itself to 
much debate is whether it is really necessary to stretch 
the training programme at the School of Magistracy over a 
two-year period. Two years is rather a long time for the 
scope of the course. The present programme can conven­
iently be compressed into twelve months (or at most fif­
teen). This is the more so as the subjects taught are 
merely a rehearsal of what the student would already have 
studied at the Law Faculty in Yaounde. It may be noted 
that the School offers no comparative law courses. This 
is a matter for regret. The absence of such courses has 
also contributed to a situation where even in 1979 most 
judicial and legal officers in either side of Cameroon 
still remain in cloistered ignorance of each other’s legal 
system.
2 . Apprenticeship
In Cameroon there is n o ’Law School’ which trains 
private practitioners. The School of Magistracy only 
trains lawyers who intend to enter Government service as 
judicial and legal officers. The Cameroon Bar Association 
has strongly recommended the establishment of an ’Institute 
of Legal Education* to train lawyers who intend to go into 
private practice. But until the setting up of such an
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Institution (if it ever is) the only way the holder of a 
licence en droit (or an equivalent law degree) may become 
an advocate in Cameroon is by doing pupillage for two 
years with an advocate and being called to the Cameroon 
Bar.
A. Pupillage
Pupillage takes two years. It is governed by 
the 1972 Bar Law as amended and the Internal Regulations 
of the Bar. Pupillage is designed to give the pupil advo­
cate skills and techniques in his chosen profession and to 
test his character and integrity. It is under the control 
of the Bar Association acting through the President of 
the Bar Council. To be admitted to pupillage, the candi­
date must submit proof to the Bar Council that he is 
Cameroonian, that he has an advocate willing to take him, 
that he holds the licence en droit degree (or its recog­
nised and approved equivalent) and that he is of good moral 
character.
Candidates admitted to pupillage take their oath 
before the Court of Appeal of the place where they intend 
to do their pupillage. They swear never to say anything 
contrary to law or morals, and to respect the courts and 
public authorities. They take the title of avocat stagiaire
13. This topic has been given exhaustive treatment in
Chapter Ten, supra, and so no more than the broadest 
outlines shall be given here.
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(pupil advocate). The pupil advocate works under the 
guidance, direction and supervision of the advocate in 
whose chambers he is undergoing his training. They 
must attend court sessions and also seminars organised for 
their benefit by the President of the Bar Council. Any 
pupil advocate may be commissioned by the President of 
the Bar Council or a court to handle a legal aid brief.
While undergoing his training the pupil advocate 
must show due respect to his trainer. A pupil advocate 
does not pay for his training. On the other hand he is 
not paid a salary by his trainer. He however gets an 
allowance, the exact amount of which he must negotiate 
on an individual basis with his trainer. Upon the 
satisfactory completion of his pupillage, the pupil advo­
cate is called to the Bar as an advocate. But before he 
can begin to practise, he must have applied for and ob­
tained the authorisation of the Head of State to practise 
law.
B. The proposed Institute of Legal Education
The present system whereby aspiring advocates 
receive their professional training in the chambers of 
individual advocates has always been regarded as unsatis­
factory. Accordingly, on 26th July 1976, the Bar Council 
appointed Mrs Siewe and Mr Luke Sendze to look into the 
problem of training pupil advocates in Cameroon and make 
recommendations. The Siewe-Sendze Commission studied the
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training of pupil advocates under the French and English 
legal systems and came to the settled conclusion that 
training in chambers ought to be discouraged for the 
following reasons: (i) the pupil may not have an advocate
willing to accept him, (ii) the advocate in whose chambers 
the pupil is undergoing his training may be of mediocre 
quality - a fact which is true of many Cameroonian advo­
cates, (iii) the advocate may be concerned with only one 
type of litigation, Civ) supervision of the pupil may be 
difficult as the advocate may not have much time to devote 
to him, (v) the President of the Bar Council may not always 
be able to effectively supervise the pupils’ training, 
and (vi) training in chambers is haphazard and not uniform.
The Commission recommended the creation of a 
’Law School’ which would train both Government and private 
lawyers. The course programme which would be the same 
for both sets of lawyers will include the following sub­
jects: criminal procedure, civil procedure, ethics of
legal practice, evidence, the Cameroonian legal system, 
legal drafting, and conveyancing.
In June 1978 the President of the Bar Council 
submitted a draft proposal to the Minister of Justice incor­
porating the recommendations of the Siewe-Sendze commis­
sion. The Draft Proposal called for the establishment of 
an ’Institute of Legal Education in Buea' to be run by a 
’Council of Legal Education’ also to be created. The 
Institute and the Council would be placed under the Bar
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Association and subject to the overall control of the 
Presidency. The Institute would offer the courses 
recommended by the Siewe-Sendze commission and the period 
of study would be two years. At the end of their 
training, successful candidates would be awarded a certi­
ficate to be known as ’Diploma in Practical Jurisprudence1 
- a highflown name indeed. So far however, nothing has 
come of these proposals.
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CHAPTER NINETEEN
THE COST OF JUSTICE
This chapter attempts to assess the cost of legal 
services in Cameroon: the cost of trying a man, the cost 
of litigating, and the cost of court overheads.
I . Legal Cost
In every trial, the individual directly involved 
as well as the State incur certain expenses.
1. Expenses incurred by the individual
The defendant in a criminal court or the liti­
gant in a civil court pays for four main items: (i) the
court fees and taxes, (ii) the expense of collecting evi­
dence and bringing witnesses to court, (iii) the charges 
of advocate (if one is briefed) and process servers , and
(iv) the expense of travelling to and from the court.
A . Court fees and taxes
In Cameroon the prosecutor in all criminal cases 
is always the State whether the prosecution arose from a 
private complaint or otherwise. In any criminal trial
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therefore, the individual always appears as a defendant.1 
As a result he pays no court fees and taxes (except where 
the defendant goes on appeal). In civil matters however, 
the situation is different. Except where he is granted 
legal aid (or where, as in labour cases, proceedings are 
free of charge) the plaintiff in a civil suit must pay the 
necessary court fees and taxes. They are intended to help 
defray the cost of operating the court system. Two types 
of fees are collected, filing costs and service fees.
The amount payable as filing cost depends on the 
pecuniary value of the plaintiff's claim. According to 
the fee schedule for the Magistrate’s Courts in the Anglo­
phone Provinces the charge for an action involving a 
subject matter whose monetary value is say 10,000 francs 
cfa Is 700 francs; 2,600 francs where the amount of the 
claim is 50,000 francs; 3*900 francs where it is 100,000 
francs; 7,800 francs where it is 200,000 francs; 11,700 
francs where it is 300,000 francs; 15,600 francs where it 
is 400,000 francs; and 18,500 francs where it is 500,000 
francs. Any action whose pecuniary value is more than
500,000 francs must be taken to the High Court which alone 
has jurisdiction to entertain the action at first instance. 
The filing cost for any claim above 500,000 francs is
1. The only situation where an individual in a criminal 
trial appears otherwise (absent the case of witnesses 
or where the defendant goes on appeal) is where he is 
the victim of an offence and he joins in the criminal 
action against the accused as a civil party in order to 
claim compensation for the injuries he has suffered.
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25,000 francs. In the Francophone Provinces the charge 
is calculated at 3% of the pecuniary value of the suit.
Thus If the plaintiff is claiming say 100,000 francs he 
would have to pay 3,000 francs filing cost. In the 
Anglophone courts filing cost must be paid in cash. This 
is not necessarily the case in the Francophone courts.
Costs may be paid by affixing the proper amount of stamps 
onto the instrument (such as the statement of claim, 
summons, ’exploit’, and so on) before use. Indeed, exten­
sive use is made of timbres fiscales. This practice is 
gradually gaining currency in the English-speaking part of 
Cameroon. For example, all over the country documents 
relating to matters of status such as marriage certificates, 
birth certificates, age declarations and so on, must have 
affixed to them fiscal stamps to the value o f '250 francs. 
This has completely eclipsed the practice in former West 
Cameroon whereby the sum of l80 francs was charged for any 
legal document signed by the Commissioner for Oaths. The 
fee for an application for any of the prerogative writs 
(habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari), a writ of fifa, or 
an order of injunction or specific performance is 1,730 
francs. In the High Court the filing cost (sometimes also 
known as ’summons fee’) is 25,000 francs in the Anglophone 
courts, and 10,000 francs in the Francophone courts.
Service fees are also not uniform in Cameroon.
The Francophone Provinces, the fees for procedural docu­
ments which the huissier serves is roughly 1,200 francs.
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In the Anglophone Provinces courts charge 70 francs as 
service fee for each document to be served plus a further 
mileage charge, the amount of which varies depending upon 
whether the person to be served resides far away or near 
the location of the court. The mileage charge schedule is 
as follows: 70 francs for the first two kilometres plus
40 francs per subsequent kilometre; however, the maximum 
mileage charge is 260 francs where the person to be served 
resides in a place accessible by motorable road, and 520 
francs per day of journey if the person to be served lives 
in an area not accessible by motorable road.
B . The expense of collecting evidence and bringing 
witnesses to court
Before a case comes up for hearing, the parties 
or their counsel would have engaged in one form of dis­
covery device or another in preparation for the case. 
Expenses would therefore have to be incurred on this head. 
Expenses in the preparation of a case include expenses 
incurred to obtain statements from witnesses or experts; 
copies of police or gendarme reports (proces-verbaux or 
constats de police) and other documents, particularly in 
accident cases (crucial in insurance claims); expert 
reports (crucial, for example, in paternity proceedings 
where a blood test - expertise sanguine - is often neces­
sary), especially if the matter is a highly technical one;
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the expenses involved in going to a specified locality
2
to inspect the place; and the expenses incurred in the 
discovery of papers and tangible evidence in the hands 
of an adverse party.
However, the expenses incurred in the preparation 
of a case are generally small because counsels seldom 
engage in wide-ranging factual investigations. More­
over, experts’ fees vary and depend on the type of investi­
gation involved. Expert accountants and auditors, for 
example, charge higher fees than physicians. But they 
are seldom solicited. On the other hand, the services 
of doctors, for forensic purposes, are much in demand.
So they do make a lot of fortune out of litigants and the 
courts. General practitioners in Cameroon charge 2,500 
francs for an ordinary medical examination.
2. This is important in suits concerning real property.
In the Francophone Provinces the visit and inspection 
would often be done by a huissier. The report he makes 
after such an inspection is known as a constat d ’huissier.
3. This is however of limited application in the Francophone 
Provinces. True, the Code de procedure civile et com- 
merciale provides that a party wishing to use a document
must make it available to the other side. But this 
rule is evidently of no help to a party who needs a docu­
ment his opponent has but does not wish to use. Courts 
sometimes permit discovery beyond this by a so-called 
actio ad exhibendum. But there is, generally speaking, 
no duty, in non-commercial cases, to make available to 
the other party documents or other tangible evidence one 
has but does not wish to use. The maxim is, nemo 
tenetur edere contra seipsum - nobody is bound to produce 
documents against himself.
^. Under the French system, evidence collected in advance 
is known as ’la preuve preconstituee’.
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C . The charges of advocates and process-servers
For preparing an original summons or duplicate 
original summons, notice of appeal or other paper requiring 
formal service, and levying execution the process-server 
is entitled to a fee.
Counsel too are of course entitled to their fees.
But the fees charged vary and are not subject to official 
regulation. Each individual advocate fixes his consul­
tation fees as he pleases. Some charge 2,500 francs, others
3.000 francs, others still 3,500 francs, and yet others
5.000 francs. There is in fact no obligation to charge
a fee at all. It may be waived. Few advocates however do 
so; and then only in respect of a person with whom he 
has some kind of relationship. The fees payable to an 
advocate for handling any brief are freely negotiated 
between the advocate and the client. The fee charged is 
reckoned on the basis of certain factors: the amount of
difficulty involved in the work, the importance of the case, 
and the advocate’s personal standing. Some advocates do 
sometimes take into account the extent of the client’s 
financial distress, that is to say, the extent of his poverty. 
This factor tends to reduce the fee. In theory the fee 
for handling any brief must be agreed upon before the 
brief is taken. In practice however, counsel does some­
times secure from his client an agreement that his fee 
shall depend on the outcome of the case. Contingency fees 
are particularly popular in insurance claims.
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In actions for small claims or in petty offences, 
the plaintiff or defendant often does not brief an advo­
cate. Moreover, a party in any legal proceedings in the 
Magistrate’s Court or High Court may be represented by a 
non-professional advocate. Furthermore, where the action 
is one for compensation for industrial injury, the plaintiff 
is entitled to legal aid and would not have to incur any 
expenses (except the expense of travelling to and from the 
court).
D . Travelling expenses
A plaintiff or defendant in legal proceedings 
in court bears the cost of travelling to and from the 
court for himself and for his witnesses. If the witnesses 
have been summoned by the court itself, then their travel­
ling expenses and attendance allowances are paid by the 
court. The attendance allowance for witnesses subpoenaed 
by the court varies according to the witness’s station in 
life. An ordinary worker is paid 70 francs for each 
court attendance. Experts, professional men and those 
in the higher levels of the civil service are paid 1,400 
francs for each appearance. The allowances are so small 
that most witnesses never ask for them.
Whether travelling expenses would be little or 
much will clearly depend upon how far the plaintiff and his 
witnesses live from where the court is located and for how
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long the case would go on. A drop In a township taxi 
in Cameroon is 75 francs in Yaounde and Douala, and 50 
francs in the other towns. The fare in an inter-town 
transport is roughly 5 francs per kilometre per person 
where the road is tarred, and roughly 10 francs per kilo­
metre per son on untarred roads. Since the roads in the 
rural areas are untarred, litigants there spend a lot on 
transport.
The various court fees and taxes appear to be 
reasonable. Whether the cost, for any individual liti­
gant, of obtaining justice is substantial or not would 
evidently depend on the nature of the suit, its gravity, 
how complicated it is, the vigour with which it is con­
tested, and the celerity with which it is examined. Pro­
vided that inability to pay fees is never allowed to 
prevent anybody from having access to the courts there 
seems no strong case against the present scheme of things. 
It may be argued that although the cost of obtaining jus­
tice is well within the ability of even the poor to pay, 
they however do so with tears. This is certainly true in 
many cases. One way of alleviating this burden on the 
indigents is to extend the scope of the legal aid scheme.
2. Expenses incurred by the State
In the days of the itinerant justices in England, 
for example, courts were expected to be self-financing and
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even to make a profit for the King. During the colonial 
period, courts In Cameroon were also expected to be self- 
financing. There is still a vestige of this idea.
People who make use of the service and facilities pro­
vided by the courts must pay for them. But attitudes 
are changing. The cost of the law should not be such 
that the poor are prevented from getting justice. Accor­
dingly, in present-day Cameroon it is the prime responsi­
bility of the State to provide the machinery and the faci­
lities for the rendition of justice. The courts are 
State agencies providing a public service to the citizenry.
The cost, for the State, of setting up and running 
the judicial apparatus encompasses the following: expenses
incurred in building and equipping court houses, judicial 
emoluments and other salaries (paid to the clerical staff 
of the courts, etc.), expenses incurred in trying a man, 
and the cost of managing the legal aid scheme.
A . Expenses incurred on court buildings
Justice used to be rendered under a palm or other 
tree. That was in the days of old. These are modern
times. The State must provide special houses in which
justice is rendered. But it is not sufficient merely to 
provide the court houses. They must be equipped. The 
courtroom itself needs to be equipped: benches for members
of the public; the desk and chair for the judge; benches 
for advocates; a table and chair for the Prosecution;
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table and chair for the court clerk; the witness stand 
for witnesses; and the dock for the accused. The 
judges’ chambers need to be furnished. So too the 
offices for the State Prosecutors. The court needs to 
be provided with stationery, record books and various 
office equipment. Judges and State Prosecutors have to 
be provided with means of transport.
These various items have to be either replaced 
or repaired when existing stocks go bad or are exhausted.
The court building itself has to be refurbished from 
time to time. A small and simple court house with a 
seating capacity of say one hundred persons would cost no 
less than three million francs to build. Fortunately, it 
is not every day that one builds a court house. There 
are over one hundred court houses in Cameroon. . Nearly 
all of them were built during the colonial period.
B . Judicial emoluments and other salaries
The personnel of the law - judges and state prose­
cutors - as well as court officials (the clerical staff of 
the court, officiers de police judiciaire and so on) are 
paid out of public funds. This payment takes the form 
of salaries, wages and various allowances. Judicial 
salaries have been discussed elsewhere in this treatise.
An idea of how much is spent by the State on judicial 
salaries alone may be obtained from this conservative cal­
culation. There are at the moment 160 magistrats in
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Cameroon. Their monthly salaries vary, ranging from
110.000 to 250,000 francs. Take the conservative sum of
120.000 francs as the average monthly salary of these 
magistrats. Their total salaries for one year would be
120.000 x 160 x 12 which gives 130,400,000 francs cfa.
C . Expenses incurred in trying a man
The cost of prosecuting an offender falls on the 
State. The ministere public spends money in the prepar­
ation of each trial. The amount spent of course varies 
with the nature of the offence committed. The amount 
would be substantial where the offence is serious and com­
plicated. The State Prosecutor may need expert witnesses, 
or medical examinations or tests; he may want to go to 
the scene where the offence was committed and inspect it; 
he may want the police to carry out further and detailed 
inquiries. Witnesses called by the State have to be paid 
an attendance allowance and reimbursed their travelling 
expenses.
Even when the accused gets convicted and sen­
tenced, the State has to keep and maintain him in prison. 
The cost of catching an offender, trying him and punishing 
him (if convicted) may be quite substantial for the State. 
But then the State is only a legal entity. Behind the 
corporate veil are individual citizens of the State.
These individuals pay taxes. These taxes are used in the
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management and running of the affairs and services of the 
State. For practical purposes therefore, the cost of 
providing justice, however colossal, may legitimately be 
regarded as being borne by the community as a whole.
In any case, the courts do not run at a loss.
They constitute, on the contrary, a substantial source 
of income for the Government. Take a tiny court like 
the Tiko Magistrate’s Court. It makes at least 6,000,000
francs annually from court fines, fees and taxes. Take 
also the small Buea-Muyuka Magistrate’s Court. It col­
lected 5*707,486 francs from fines, etc. in the 1974/75 
year; and the tiny Mamfe Magistrate’s Court netted 1,887,000 
francs during the 1975/76 year. Courts located in the 
bigger towns have incomes which are several times higher 
than these. Take the Douala, Edea, and Garoua Courts of 
First Instance for example.
Table 5 : Revenue from courts
Court
Year
DOUALA 
Amt. due Amt. paid
1968/69 45,468,052 17,179,286
1969/70 41,412,475 7,910,665
1970/71 51,977,581 400,959
1971/72 - -
1972/73 - -
1973/74 - -
1974/75 78,643,847 33,380,981
1975/76 67,383,333 33,112,416
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Table S continued
Court
Year
EDEA
Amt. due Amt. Paid
GAROUA 
Amt. due Amt. Paid
1968/69 - - 1,616,732 483,749
1969/70 - - 1,803,804 143,144
1970/71 - - - -
1971/72 - - 14,190,690 11,221,126
1972/73 14,731,304 2,293,687 - -
1973/74 13,712.244 3,952,840 - -
1974/75 15,771,198 3,577,348 - -
1975/76 27,822,099 2,447,010 4,917,691 2,335,456
Source: Compiled from financial statistics available at
the Ministry of Justice Yaounde.
In the Francophone Provinces court fines are not paid on 
the spot as is the case in the Anglophone Provinces. On 
paper the total amount of fines imposed by a court for a 
given year may be so much. But in reality not all of 
that amount is ever paid in. In the above statistics the 
column 'Amount Due' shows the total amount of court fines 
for the year. The 'Amount Paid' column indicates the 
amount actually collected for the year. It would easily 
be observed that a substantial amount of the total fines 
is never always collected or paid in. The reasons for 
this were given by one State Prosecutor in his annual 
report:
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"II convient de singnaler lei, que le faible 
rendement enregistre dans le domaine de recouvre- 
ment d'amendes et frais de justice provient 
d'une part, du fait que certains debiteurs 
qul declinent a desseln une fausse adresse alors 
de la constatlon de 1'Infraction devlennent 
introuvables au moment du recouvrement; et 
d ’autre part, h la morality corrompue de 
certains gendarmes et policiers qui, charges 
du recouvrement d'amendes et des frals de 
justice, s'arrangent souvent avec ceux des 
ddbiteurs connus, pour mettre carrement leur 
dossiers dans les tirroirs en vue de laisser 
courir la prescription en leur faveur ou 
encore de retourner ces dossiers au parquet, 
assortis des proc£s-verbaux rapportant 
effectivement que les interessds ont £t<§ 
infructueusement recherch^s." 5
II. Legal Aid
The provision of State aid to poor litigants or 
accused persons without means is a distinctive feature of 
all modern systems of the administration■of justice. It 
is based on the liberal idea that the machinery of justice 
ought not to be denied on the grounds of financial need.
The concept of equality of everyone before the law is 
meaningless if a person cannot, because of lack of means, 
have access to the law courts. In such circumstances jus­
tice would be available only to the rich and outside the 
reach of the poor. This is consistent with a humane and 
civilised social system. The provision of legal aid to
5. Report dated 11 March 1976, by the Procureur de la
Republique, Douala, on the 1974/75 Judicial Statistics 
for the Douala Court of First Instance; Parquet No. 
35/CF/PPR/Dla, p. 9, Ministry of Justice, Yaounde.
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the underprivileged Is an attempt to redress the balance 
between the rich (the State inclusive) and the poor in 
the judicial process. It represents a shift towards the 
concept of a 'welfare law'.
In the former West Cameroon, a limited form of 
legal aid existed in civil and in criminal matters. In 
criminal matters, it was based on the English 'Poor Persons' 
legislation and was available under s. 352 of the Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance but in respect of capital offences only. 
Even then it was not automatic. The section provided that 
'if the accused is not defended- by a legal practitioner 
the court shall, if practicable, assign a legal practitioner 
for his defence'. In the civil law area there was a form of 
legal aid concerning only matters in forma pauperis. Here, 
fees could be waived by the court if the applicant could 
convince the court that he was a pauper. The High Court 
and the Court of Appeal had power under Order 7 Rule 83(3) 
of the Federal Supreme Court Rules 1961, to waive fees for 
paupers upon application made by motion on notice supported 
by affidavit.
In former East Cameroon, there was also only 
a limited form' of legal aid available during the pre­
independence period. Decree No. 60/224 of 5th December 
I960 set up legal aid offices at each court in the country. 
Legal aid was available as of right in certain cases or 
on request depending on the applicant's financial situ­
ation.- This decree was amended by Decree No. 64/DF/155
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of 6th May 1964 (Itself also amended by Decree No. 65/DF.93 
of 2nd April 1965) and extended to the former West Cameroon. 
These various enactments have now been repealed and the 
current law on the subject is Decree No. 76/521 of 9th 
November 1976 ’portant reglementation de 1’assistance judi- 
ciaire1. This decree establishes legal aid commissions 
at the courts of the Republic, spells out those eligible 
for legal aid, deals with the effect of grant of legal aid, 
and indicates the conditions under which legal aid would 
be withdrawn.
1. Legal aid commissions
There is a legal aid commission instituted at 
each court in Cameroon. The legal aid commission at each 
court is competent to grant legal aid with regards to pro­
ceedings before and the execution of judgments from the 
court. These commissions are under the control of the 
Minister of Justice. Ordinarily, each commission at a 
Court of First Instance consists of three members: the
presiding judge of the court concerned, the State Prose­
cutor (or the commissaire du gouvernement in a military 
court), and the local Prefect or sub-Prefect. Each com­
mission has a secretariat which is run by the chief regis­
trar of the court at which the commission has been 
instituted. In the appellate courts (Court of Appeal, 
Supreme Court) each commission consists of five members:
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the president of the court concerned (chairman), the State 
Prosecutor of the court, a practising barrister designated 
by the President of the Bar Council, a representative of 
the Minister of Finance, and a bailiff designated by the 
State Prosecutor of the relevant court. Each commission 
also has a secretariat which is run by the chief registrar 
of the relevant court.
All decisions by the commissions are by majority 
vote. But in the event of split the chairman has a 
casting vote. Members of each commission are convened 
by the chairman of the commission concerned. Members must 
be convened at least four days to the scheduled date of 
the meeting. Each commission may, by decision of the 
Minister of Justice taken on the advice of the presiding 
judge of the court at which the commission has been set up, 
split into sub-committees where the number of applications 
for legal aid warrants it. In an urgent case, the chair­
man of a commission may provisionally grant legal aid 
pending a final decision of the commission on the matter.
2. Eligibility for legal aid
By section 1 of the Legal Aid Decree, legal aid 
is granted "in order to enable a natural person, party to 
a trial or in an ex parte proceeding (un acte de juridiction 
gracieuse), to obtain judgment or the order applied for, 
or their execution, with dispensation to advance all or
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part of the fees he ought normally to bear". In Cameroon 
therefore, legal aid is available only to natural persons. 
Artificial persons fall outside the scope of the scheme.
So too organisations, foundations, clubs, and associations 
whether charitable or not. Legal aid is however not res­
tricted to contested cases. It is available in ex parte 
matters, cases of executive references, and in the execution 
of judgments. Legal aid is granted either as of right or 
on request.
A. Legal aid on request
Legal aid is granted on request after examination 
by a legal aid commission of the application for legal aid.
It is granted by reason of the financial situation of the 
person requesting it. This means that the decision whether 
to grant such aid or not is based on the familiar means test. 
Application for legal aid may be made orally or in writing. 
The application is made to the secretary of the relevant 
commission. The secretary of each legal aid commission 
is the chief registrar of the court at which the commission 
has been instituted. Oral applications are reduced into 
writing by the secretary. The application together with 
the required documents attached thereto is then forwarded 
to the chairman of the commission.
All applications for legal aid must be accom­
panied by a document or documents to satisfy the commission 
that the applicant is of insufficient resources. The
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requisite supporting document is either a certified copy 
of the applicant's tax return, a certification of non­
taxation, or a certificate from the local administrative 
officer indicating, where necessary, whether the applicant 
is subject to the minimum fixed tax. If the application 
is not accompanied by any of these documents, the secretary 
of the commission must inform the applicant that he has 
thirty days within which to produce the document. If 
the applicant is still unable to produce any of these docu­
ments after the thirty days have elapsed, his application 
for legal aid is rejected by an order of the commission's 
chairman after consultation with the legal department.
If the application for legal aid is in order 
(that is, it is accompanied by the required supporting 
document), it is the duty of the commission to hear the 
applicant, investigate his financial resources, determine 
the importance to the applicant of the exercise of this 
rights (this means the commission would probably have to 
consider the merits of the applicant's case), invite (at 
its discretion) the adverse party to challenge the appli­
cant's claim of lack of means, and to make a reasoned 
ruling, without much delay, stating whether or not legal 
aid has been granted.
Legal aid is granted to natural persons of 
insufficient means to enable them to assert their rights 
in court or to enable them to execute any judicial decision 
obtained without the grant of legal aid. The following
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persons are eligible for legal aid on request: (.i) indi­
gents, (ii) the rank and file of the Armed Forces,
(iii) persons subject to the fixed tax tariff, Rate A,
(iv) persons subject to the minimum annual fiscal tax,
(v) a wife in divorce proceedings where she is the mother 
of an infant child and has no income of her own, and
(vi) persons other than those already mentioned where the 
anticipated expenses of the suit cannot be borne by their 
resources initially thought to be sufficient.
When a legal aid commission has made a ruling on 
an application for legal aid, the secretary of the commis­
sion must notify the applicant within five days through 
administrative channels. If the application is successful, 
a copy of the decision granting legal aid is forwarded 
within five days to the head of the local Stamp Registration 
Office. The presiding judge seised of the case must then 
designate an advocate (or a bailiff in the case of execution 
of judgment) to assist the beneficiary of the aid.
Decisions of a legal aid commission on grant or 
refusal of legal aid are. not subject to appeal by any of 
the parties. However, the minist^re public and the Presi­
dent of the Bar Council are each entitled as of right to 
refer for review by a legal aid commission at an Appeal 
Court, within ten days, any ruling made by a legal aid com­
mission at a court of first instance. Decisions of legal 
aid commissions are not subject to judicial review.
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B . Legal aid as of right
Legal.aid Is granted as of right by reason of 
the nature of the matter and in the cases provided for 
by law. Without prejudice to those cases in which legal 
proceedings are free of charge (for example, in labour 
matters), legal aid is available as of right to the follow­
ing persons: (1) injured employees; legal aid is auto­
matic for employees, victims of industrial accident, 
claiming compensation against their employers; (2) deserted 
wives; legal aid is also automatic to a deserted wife 
who is unemployed and without means in proceedings to 
obtain maintenance for herself and children under her care; 
(3) appellants against a death sentence; legal aid is 
finally automatic for any person sentenced to death who 
has appealed against that sentence and whose defence was 
not conducted in the court below by an advocate.
An advocate commissioned under the legal aid 
scheme to defend a beneficiary of legal aid receives four 
types of payments: he is reimbursed the cost incurred by
him in conducting the case; he is reimbursed his travelling 
expenses (if he has incurred any); he is reimbursed the 
expenses incurred on accommodation (where necessary); and 
he is paid 5,000 francs per day throughout the whole trial.
3. Effects of grant of legal aid
Once granted legal aid covers proceedings still
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to be instituted and matters which are sub judice.
Legal aid extends as of right to acts and proceedings 
relating to the execution of judgments and any order made 
by the court after the aid has been granted. If in the 
course of the trial of the case for' which legal aid was 
granted another matter arises involving the beneficiary 
of the aid, the earlier finding of lack of means is con­
clusive of the issue whether he is of insufficient means. 
However, a specific grant must be made in respect of this 
new case.
Legal aid granted is not withdrawn simply because 
the court seised of matter has declared itself incompetent 
to try the case. It remains available to the beneficiary 
when the case comes before the competent court. Indeed, 
until the matter for which the assistance was originally 
granted has been finally disposed of, legal aid once granted 
may only be withdrawn under the conditions laid down by law.
The person to whom legal assistance has been 
granted is entitled to the free services of an advocate, 
bailiff, process server and auctioneer. He pays no court 
fees or taxes. Witnesses' fees and travelling expenses 
are paid by the Government Treasury. He pays no stamp 
duty or taxes whether on summonses, judgments or other pro­
cedural documents. The same is true even of documents 
which he wishes to use as evidence and for which he would, 
in normal circumstances, have to pay stamp duty and taxes. 
Even if the case goes against him, he pays no costs and 
fees. They are all borne by the Government Treasury.
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4. Withdrawal of legal aid
Legal aid may be withdrawn only by the commis­
sion which had in the first place granted it. A commis­
sion may withdraw legal aid in one of two circumstances:
(i) if the beneficiary's financial position has substan­
tially improved after the grant of the aid, and (ii) if 
the beneficiary had obtained the grant by fraud. The 
commission may act on its own motion, at the request of 
the ministere public, or at the behest of an adverse party. 
In all such cases the beneficiary, must be notified of the 
commission's intention to withdraw the assistance granted 
to him. Any withdrawal of legal aid must be supported by 
reasons. However, legal aid may be withdrawn at any time 
and at any stage of the case. Once legal aid has been 
withdrawn the applicant becomes fully liable for all court 
fees, taxes and costs.
Although legal aid in Cameroon covers both civil 
and criminal matters, it is only concerned with matters 
that come within the court framework. It does not extend 
to the provision of legal advice or services outside the 
court. It is submitted that the limitation of the scheme 
to matters that have already come to court leaves much to 
be desired as it still leaves unaided a large sector of 
the population, people who need legal advice but who are 
too poor even to afford the money to pay the advocate's 
consultation fee. There is no persuasive reason why the
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existing scheme should not be extended to involve lawyers 
other than private practitioners. In this connection the 
provision that legal assistants (auditeurs de justice) may 
be commissioned to handle legal aid briefs is an enlightened 
one. Indeed, one may venture to suggest that one of the 
duties of the legal department should be to provide legal 
advice in civil cases.
Decentralisation of the legal aid scheme by 
establishing a legal aid commission at the seat of each 
court in the country must be welcomed. It has brought 
the scheme nearer to those who need it most - those at the 
bottom rung of the socio-economic scale. However, the 
scheme serves only a limited purpose if, as is the case at 
the moment, it remains incognito to the people who need 
it most - the underprivileged. The overwhelming majority 
of the people are illiterate and uninformed. No attempt 
has been made to educate them on this point. As a result 
most of them do not even know of the existence of the 
scheme. This is true not only of the people in the vil­
lages (who need as much attention as the town dwellers) 
but also of the underprivileged sector of the urban popu­
lation .
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CHAPTER TWENTY 
LAW REFORM AND THE FUTURE
Law reform means much more than just reprinting, 
amending or harmonising laws.1 It supposes a comprehen­
sive and profound revision of the laws; a thorough review, 
rethinking, reformulation and better draftsmanship; a 
remoulding of the laws to keep pace with modern trends 
while also reflecting the people’s more and cultures.
Every law reform exercise is necessarily an attempt to 
improve and modernise the existing legal order, to change 
the legal status quo.
Nowadays, it is the exception rather than the 
rule to find an independent African country that has not 
embarked or is not embarking on- a radical revision of its 
statute laws, particularly those of colonial heritage.
For over a decade now Cameroon as part of an overall Govern­
ment policy to harmonise and codify all the laws in force 
in the country, has also been engaged in the revision of 
her laws and trying to see how best to deal with the three 
systems of laws in the country. The situation here is 
complex.
1. When a fresh print of laws is made by the Government 
Printer with the authority of the Government, incorpor­
ating all necessary additions, omissions, substitutions 
and amendments and eliminating all repealed matter, the 
process is known as reprinting. Harmonisation is 
nothing more than a 'scissors and paste' operation.
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There are three systems of law co-existing in 
Cameroon: the customary law, the common law, and the
civil law. Furthermore, local legislation (in the shape 
of laws passed by the National Assembly, decrees and ordi­
nances by the Head.of State, subsidiary legislation made 
by Ministers, and local subsidiary legislation in the 
nature of by-laws, orders and rules made by Provincial 
Governors, Prefects, and local councils for their own 
particular areas of authority) is in an immensely unwieldy 
and confused state; a mosaic, a veritable labyrinth in 
which even those initiated in the law can easily get lost. 
Finally, Cameroon is constitutionally a highly centralised 
unitary state.- Given these factors, law reform in Cameroon 
has rightly come to be regarded by the Government and law 
reformers as not only necessary but urgent, albeit the 
delicacy of the exercise. "This is both an urgent and 
delicate task; urgent because it is obvious that sets of 
laws which correspond to different principles cannot co­
exist for long within a unitary state; delicate because
2
it affects the traditions and values of men."
There are two aspects of law reform: reform of
the substantive and adjective law on the one hand, and 
reform of the form of the law on the other hand. Sub­
stantive law is the law administered by the courts, that 
is, the content of the principles and rules, mainly in terms
2. Press conference by President Ahidjo on 9th February 
1973, ACAP Daily News Bulletin, 10th February, 1973, 
p. 30.
1249.
of a person’s rights and duties. Adjective law on the 
other hand is the law which relates to practice and pro­
cedure, that is, the law which deals with the bringing 
of legal proceedings in court, civil or criminal. Reform 
of the form of the law means that the law ought to be 
well drafted, simple, intelligible, certain, well-arranged, 
adequately indexed, easily accessible to all, and up-to-date.
Unfortunately, this has not always been the case. 
Legislation in Cameroon is largely ad hoc and framed to 
deal with particular situations or mischiefs as they arise. 
Laws are framed ’extemporaneously, not as parts of a system, 
but to answer particular exigencies as they occur’.
Attempts are hardly ever made to integrate new laws dealing 
with substantive aspects of that same subject. Thus, 
the law on a given area is often found to be scattered over 
a number of principal and subsidiary legislation, including 
amendments and supplements. Furthermore, the legislator 
not infrequently resorts to the technique that may be 
described as 'framed legislation*: encatments often con­
tain provisions to the effect that a particular aspect of 
the law shall be dealt with in detail by a future enact­
ment (often a presidential decree or a. ministerial order). 
Again, it sometimes happens that laws are so hurriedly
3. Marshall H.H. & Marsh N.S., ’Case law, codification and 
statute law revision’, in R.A. Woodman (ed.), Record of 
the third commonwealth and,empire law conference. 
Sydney-Australia 25 August - 1st September 1965, Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, 1966, p. 420.
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drafted that no sooner have they rolled out of the printing 
press than there are amendments. In fact amendments and 
supplements come so frequently that it is really a headache 
keeping pace with them. Finally, there are sometimes 
deplorable specimens of badly drafted and translated laws. 
Under these circumstances, any meaningful reform exercise 
should not only be limited to a reform of the substantive 
and procedural law but should extend to a reform of the 
form of the law.
But how can this task best be done? By consoli- 
4 5
dation? revision? piecemeal legislation? or codifi­
cation?
Cameroon has elected codification. There was 
never a public debate on this issue and the choice of 
codification gt la francaise as a method of law reform 
appears to have been instinctive rather than conscious and 
deliberate. Nevertheless, in the Cameroonian context, 
codification would appear to be the best method of achieving 
legal unity in the country. Besides, all countries today 
strive towards the attainment of a code. A code purports 
to contain all-the law upon a particular subject. It is
4. That is, the incorporation of the content of a number of 
existing statute laws, together with amendments, into
a single enactment.
5. Revision is said to consist of preparing and providing 
for public use, an up-to-date set of the laws as of a 
particular date, incorporating all amendments and adap­
tations made thereto and eliminating therefrom all 
repealed, obsolete and unnecessary matter. Cf. Marshall 
& Marsh, op.cit., p. 427.
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said to crystallise the law and to preclude the citing 
of any case law or statute on the subject. But then, 
the word ’code’ is not a term.of art and there is no com­
pelling reason why a code may not allow some reference 
to previous decided cases in order to make its provisions 
meaningful.
The efficient working of a code should not be 
hampered by a wrong approach to its administration. 
Accordingly, the Cameroonian codes, as I envision, should 
clear up uncertainties in the existing law and the diffi­
culties caused by the co-existence of three systems of 
law and several uncoordinated and possibly conflicting 
judicial decisions. The fact that a code is said to 
crystallise the law on a particular subject is the more 
reason why the court should be allowed to interpret it 
(liberally, using travaux preparatoires where necessary) 
and to supply a casus omissus whenever necessary. A 
Cameroonian code should not prevent a body of case-law 
growing up around it. In France, for example, the exis­
tence of codes has not diminished the importance of 
jurisprudence. The makers of a code cannot foresee all 
possible contingencies. Human prescience is limited. 
Therefore, after a code is promulgated, cases are bound to 
arise for which no provision has been made. A customary 
remedy for such a situation is the introduction of legis­
lation to amend the code. But there is no reason why 
there should also not be judicial law making in this area.
Codification need not consist of a single
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compendium. The laws of France and Germany, for example, 
can be found In several codes. However, the codes of 
those countries are quite large. What is needed in 
Cameroon is the drafting of smaller codes with greater 
specialisation. For example, there should be a family law code, 
a mining code, a law of property code, a commercial code 
and so on. The great merit of these small and specialised 
codes is that they can more easily be amended than if they
formed part of a larger code. Thus, for example, it was
easy to abrogate completely the 1967 Labour Code and 
replace it with the 1974 one.
The extent to which codification has been 
embarked upon in Cameroon has not been the same in the civil 
and in the criminal laws areas. More effort has gone into 
the criminal than into the civil law.
I . Codification in the Civil Law Area
At the moment, only one code, the Labour Code, 
has been produced in the civil law area. However, this 
part of the law had received its fair share of attention 
during the colonial period.
1. Attempts at codification during the colonial period
The codification attempts by the Germans and the 
French during the colonial period were not concerned with
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law reform as such. Each colonial power Introduced a 
variant of Its own laws into the territory as the basic 
law. But provision was always made for the continued 
existence of the indigenous law. True, serious limi­
tations were placed on it. But once a rule of indigenous 
law had passed the ’repugnancy’ and the ’incompatibility’ 
tests (or the ’civilisation’ test as in French Cameroun), 
it was enforceable by the courts. However, indigenous 
law was neither uniform nor written. Nurtured in the 
system of codes, the Germans, and the French after them, 
unlike the English unused to codes, saw in this ’oral’ law 
an uncertain law and so undertook to codify it. The pur­
pose of the exercise was therefore to ascertain, record 
and harmonise the content of the indigenous law.
A . The German attempt
As early as the l890s, the Germans had set them­
selves the gigantic task of ascertaining and codifying the 
laws and customs of the natives in Germany’s colonies.
In 1896 a certain Professor I. Kohler of Berlin produced 
a questionnaire entitled ’Questionnaire for the study of 
the legal situation of the so-called primitive peoples 
especially in the German colonial territories’. It was 
divided into five parts: family law, property law, cri­
minal law, procedural law, public and international law.
It contained one hundred main questions and numerous subsi- 
diary questions. For nearly a decade however, nothing was
6 . File No. TA-l8, Cameroon National Archives, Yaounde.
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heard of this project.
But on 3rd May 1907 the' Reichstag adopted a reso­
lution requesting the Imperial Chancellor "forthwith to 
collect and examine the material relating to the law of 
natives in the German colonies and to cause an authentic
7collection of the customs of the natives to be compiled". 
Accordingly a sub-committee was set up to prepare a draft 
questionnaire. The earlier draft by Professor Kohler 
was readily adopted with only a few modifications. Several 
copies of this questionnaire were sent out to Governor 
Seitz in Buea for distribution to local administrators 
in the Schutzgebiet von Kamerun.
The research was slowly conducted. This was 
partly because those assigned to conduct the interviews 
were either local administrators or missionaries who had 
other duties and considered the project to be less urgent 
and of secondary importance. Up to the time of the out­
break of the First World War in 1914 material had been col­
lected from only six coastal tribes: the Boulou, Bakossi,
g
Bassa, Banok, Batanga, and Mabea. The collected material 
(still available.at the National Archives in Yaounde) is a 
fascinating record of the indigenous law as it was before 
European colonisation. Although the material concerns
7. Victor Lehmann, ’The German appellate practice’, in
Barnett Hollander, Colonial justice - the unique achieve­
ment of the Privy Council’s committee of judges, Bowes
& Bowes, London, 1961, p. 109.
8. File No. TA-18, Cameroon National Archives, Yaounde.
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only six tribes, the law therein recorded reflects fairly 
accurately the indigenous law as it obtained in the other 
tribes of the country.
B . The French attempt
When France replaced Germany as the colonial 
power in what became known as the French Cameroun, there 
was some hesitation on the part of the new colonial power 
as to whether to revive the abortive attempt by the Germans 
to codify the indigenous law. There were those who advo­
cated codification as the proper way of dealing with 
indigenous law. It was argued that through codification 
the indigenous law would be made uniform, clear, certain 
and of great help to judges who applied it. On the 
other hand, there were those who argued that codification 
would stultify, mummify, misrepresent and distort indi­
genous law and that indigenous law which would have evolved, 
adapting itself to changed circumstances would, by being 
cast into the mould of a code, become static, giving the 
picture of a law as it was at the time of the codification.
The French however came to the conclusion that 
codification was the best thing to do about indigenous law. 
In the 1930s attempts were therefore made to codify the 
indigenous law in Cameroun following an earlier attempt 
to do the same thing for Togo in 1926. By a circular of 
11th October 1932 the Commissaire de la Republique directed 
the heads of the administrative units in Cameroun to conduct
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research on the ways and customs of natives in their res­
pective areas of administration; a research to serve as 
a basis for a general codification. "This codification," 
the Commissaire however noted, "shall not be completely 
unalterable. Custom evolves under diverse influences just 
as our civil law has undergone those modifications brought 
about by case-law. But native customary law, without
claiming the force of the civil law, shall constitute a
o
precious guide for the native tribes."
The research was only to be concerned with the 
civil law area. The investigators were directed to use 
the French Code Civil as a model; to follow its method 
and classification of subject-matter. All material col­
lected had to be classified, by ethnic group, under the 
following five rubrics:
I. Community: definition, constitution, dissolution,
exclusion, community groupings, community coun­
cil, head of the community.
II. Persons: domicile, absence, marriage, filiation,
adoption, authority over minors, custody, 
majority and emancipation, interdiction.
III. Property: common property, definition, constitu­
tion, transfer, wills, gifts inter vivos.
IV. Contracts: object and nature of contracts,
9. Henri Labouret, Le Cameroun, Centre d TEtudes de politique 
etrangere, Paul Hartmann, Paris, 1937, PP• 79-80. My 
translation.
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conditions of validity, proof, principal con­
tracts (sale, exchange, hire, loan, bailment, 
agency, pledge or pawn).
V. Prescription.
A subsequent circular of 2nd May 1933 requested the investi­
gators to find out what the indigenous law was before 
European colonisation, whether the law had changed and if 
so, the factors responsible for such change.
Unfortunately, this project failed to give the 
awaited results. The French made the same mistake as the 
Germans had. They entrusted the task into the hands of 
local administrators. Their administrative responsi­
bilities made great demands on them and they approached 
the project with a lackadaisical attitude, considering 
it to be of secondary importance. The sketchy material 
collected was simply discarded because the individual 
investigators concerned had failed to follow the pattern 
of the Code Civil. It was decided to start the whole pro­
ject all over again. But it never was. It was abandoned.
What ought to have been done would have been to set up a 
committee specifically commissioned to undertake the pro­
ject .
It was largely because of the failure to produce 
a comprehensive code in the civil law area with regards to 
indigenous law that the French embarked on what they termed 
’codifications speciales’. Even here, not much was done.
In response to observations by the Permanent Mandates
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Commission on the dangers of marriages In Africa by 
persons under the age of puberty, the French had passed 
a decree on 30th November 1926 prescribing severe penal­
ties for parents who married off children below the age 
of puberty. Almost a decade later, an Arrete of 26th 
May 193^ was passed regulating marriages between natives.
It was provided that Muslims would continue to be governed, 
in this respect, by Islamic Law. All other natives who 
were not Muslims were, except for the Kirdi, Bamoun and 
Bamileke, to be governed by the codified customary law of 
marriage annexed to the 193^ arrete. But this arrete had 
many short-comings. For example, it created an irrebutable 
presumption that handing over the bride to the groom 
meant that marriage consideration had been completely paid 
off. This ignored the fact that under indigenous law 
marriage consideration is paid in instalments and may con­
tinue throughout the duration of the marriage. The arrete 
was also in error when it prescribed a fixed monetary 
amount as what should be paid as marriage consideration.
Many provisions of the arr£t£ were simply ignored. Another 
arr§te of 11th January 1936 had to be passed to- deal with 
the short-comings of the earlier arrete.
Up to the time of independence in I960 no further 
attempts at codification were made by the French. But 
from time to time, attempts were made to compile in easily 
accessible form all the laws in force in the territory.
The initiative was however that of individual French legal
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officers serving In the territory rather than an official 
undertaking by the Government. Among these compilations 
one may cite the Repertoire gdndral des textes ldgislatifs 
et reglementaires applicables au Cameroun compiled in 195^ 
by H. Ch§ne, the five volumes of Codes et lois du Cameroun 
compiled between 1956 and 1958 by Gaston-Jean Bouvenet 
and Rene Bourdin, and the seven-volume Repertoire chrono- 
logique du droit camerounais compiled between 1965 and 1968 
by Guermann M. and R. Olivier.
No corresponding compilations existed in the 
Southern Cameroons. Some of the laws applicable there were 
to be found in the 1958 revised edition of the laws of 
Nigeria. But there were some laws applicable in the 
territory which were not to be found in the 1958 edition 
of the laws. Such laws included pre-1900 English statutes 
of general application the laws for the time being in 
force in England with regards to divorce and matrimonial 
causes, and legislation by the Southern Cameroons House of 
Assembly. No one had taken the trouble to ascertain and 
compile these various laws.
Nor was there any attempt by the British to 
record or codify the indigenous law. However, a Native 
Authority could, and if the Commissioner required, must 
record what in its opinion the indigenous law was on any 
point within its jurisdiction, and if the Commissioner was 
satisfied that such a declaration was correct, it became 
effective within the jurisdiction of the Native Authority
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which made it. A Native Authority could also recommend 
to the Commissioner that a rule of indigenous law be 
amended within its jurisdiction. The Commissioner appro­
ved the amendment if he was satisfied that it was expedient, 
not repugnant to natural justice, equity, or good con­
science and not in conflict with any written law in force 
in the territory.
2. Attempts at codification since independence
The political unification in 1961 of the ’two 
Cameroons’, each of which had a different legal system, 
culture and official language, at once meant that a modus 
vivendi, at least for the immediate future, had to be 
found to accommodate both systems. It was not a sane 
proposition to abandon laws of colonial heritage and make 
a complete tabula rasa. Accordingly, successive Cameroonian 
constitutions have always provided for the continuation in 
force of all existing laws not officially or Implicitly 
r e p e a l e d . H o w e v e r ,  while no one was in any doubt 
that legal unity could not be achieved contemporaneously 
with political unity, no one was equally in doubt that the 
ultimate goal to aim at was for national legal unity.
This meant not only harmonising the legal systems of the
10. i960 Constitution, s. 51; 1961 Constitution, s. 46;
and 1972 Constitution, s. 43.
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two federated states (West Cameroon and East Cameroun), 
but reforming existing laws. The death of the federation 
and the adoption of a unitary system of Government in 
June 1972 has given greater stimulus, drive and persis­
tence to the law commissions in Cameroon because ’sets of 
laws which correspond to different principles cannot co­
exist for long within a unitary state
In February 1964 two federal law reform commis­
sions were set up: the Federal Commission for Penal
Legislation and the Federal Commission for Civil and
12Customary Legislation. The latter commission was
charged with the preparation of a draft Cameroonian Civil 
Code, a Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations, and 
a Civil Procedure Code. Little has however been achieved 
in this area. None of these proposed codes has been 
produced. A proposed draft code on family law was cir­
culated among judges, lawyers and various other persons 
for comment. That was in 1973. But nothing has been 
heard of it ever since. Members of the Civil Legis­
lation Commission appointed by Order No. 15 of 13th November 
1973 are: His Lordship Justice S.M.L. Endeley (chairman),
Paul Bonniol and Augustin Tefak, JJ., Barristers Simon 
Francois, Paul Aubriet, Luke Sendze, Ben Muna, and Paul 
Koti; chiefs Christopher Tsala, Dieudonne Koambi, Lamido
11. Press conference by President Ahidjo, op.cit.
12. Decree No. 64/DF/84 of 29th February 1964.
1262.
Amansali, Fon Angwafor III, Joseph Kamga, and Richard 
Ntoko; the Archbishop of Yaounde, the Secretary General 
of the Egllse Presbyterlenne du Cameroun, and Iman Mohamed 
All. The Commission excludes University law teachers, 
sociologists, anthropologists and linguists. The Com­
mission is concerned only with the customary law and so 
far its work is still in the exploratory stage. What 
Is being aimed at is not to produce a customary law code 
but to ascertain, record and then integrate all aspects 
of customary law with the ’modern’ law. This would be 
in keeping with Government policy to do away with the 
dichotomy between ’modern’ law and ’customary’ law in the 
civil law area and to have just 'one civil law' as there 
is just 'one criminal law’.
Only one code, the Labour Code, has been pro­
duced in the civil law area. This Code which was promul­
gated in 1967 drew heavily, but not exclusively, from the 
French Code du Travail d'Outre-Mer of 1952. Given the 
changed political situation in the country in 1972, the 
1967 Labour Code was completely withdrawn and a new Labour 
Code, with important deviations from the old one, was 
promulgated in 1974.
II. Codification in the Criminal Law Area
The codification exercise has been vigorously 
pursued in the criminal law area. This is understandable.
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This area of the law touches on the liberty of the indi­
vidual. Before independence and reunification the 
criminal law and procedure applicable in the Southern . 
Cameroons was already codified. So too was the criminal 
law and procedure applicable in the French Cameroun. In 
the Southern Cameroons the Nigerian Criminal Code Ordi­
nance, Cap. 42 of the 1958 laws and the Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance, Cap. 43 of the 1958 laws were fully applicable. 
The French Code Penal and Code d fInstruction Criminelle 
(as modified to suit local conditions) were applicable in 
the French Cameroun. The provisions of the codes appli­
cable in one territory were not the same as those appli­
cable in the other territory. Moreover, whereas the 
criminal procedure in the French Cameroun was, in essence, 
inquisitorial in nature, that in the Southern Cameroons 
was accusatorial coupled with concepts of protection 
against self-incrimination.
At Independence and reunification, given the dis- 
partiy in the two systems, a Federal Commission for Penal 
Legislation was set up In 1964 and asked to prepare two 
draft codes, a draft penal code and a draft criminal pro­
cedure code. Since then, there has been continuous 
activity in this area.
1. The genesis of the Cameroonian Penal Code
The Cameroonian Penal Code took a little over two
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years to draft and It came out In two stages. Book I
(the General Part) became law on 12th November 1965 and
came Into force on 1st October 1966. Book II (the
Special Part) became law on 12th June 1967 and came Into
force on 1st October 1967. Although the Criminal Law
Commission was charged with producing the code, its
actual drafting was done by a committee of three (made up
of one Englishman, Mr Clarence Smith, and two Frenchmen,
Messrs Richard Gilg and Robert Parant). The committee
drew from the Italian Penal Code of 1931, the ill-fated
French draft Penal Code of 1934, the Nigerian Criminal
Code (based on the 1879 draft code of James Fitzjames
Stephen for use in England, which, although not adopted
by that country, was passed into law with variations in a
number of Commonewealth countries including Queensland
and Canada), and the French Penal Code. The Criminal
Law Commission had hoped to draft not only the Penal Code
but the Criminal Procedure Code as well. They never
actually did so although they did make a rough outline of
13a proposed criminal procedure code.
2. The Criminal Procedure Code
The Penal Code had been drafted entirely by 
foreigners. The drafting of the Criminal Procedure Code
13. See generally, J.A. Clarence-Smith, 'The Cameroon Penal 
Code: practical comparative law', 17 I.C.L.Q. 651
(1968).
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on the other hand Is being undertaken entirely by 
Cameroonians. The Criminal Procedure Code Commission 
is constituted as follows: (i) the President and Procureur
General of the Court of Appeal for the South West Province, 
(ii) the President and the Procureur General of the Court 
of Appeal for the North West Province, (iii) the President 
and Procureur General of the Supreme Court, (iv) the 
Directors in the Ministry of Justice, (v) two law Profes­
sors (one Anglophone, and one Francophone) from the Law 
Faculty of the University of Yaounde, (vi) two advocates 
- one Anglophone and one Francophone, (vii) one represen­
tative each from the following bodies: the General Dele­
gation of the Gendarmerie, the General Delegation of 
National Security, the Directorate of Army Legal Service, 
and the Directorate of Documentation. Two technical 
advisers from the Presidency attend working sessions of 
the Commission as observers. The clergy, trade unions, 
sociologists, anthropologists and linguists are not 
represented in the Commission.
The initial work on the Criminal Procedure Code 
was not done by the Commission. A proposed draft of the 
code had earlier been prepared by the Ministry of Justice.
It was certainly based on the rough outlines prepared in 
1966 by the Criminal Law Commission. This draft was 
then submitted to the Criminal Procedure Commission as a 
basis on which to start. The Commission studies the pro­
posed draft article by article making proposals, suggestions,
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amendments, deletions, additions and so on, where neces­
sary. Actual drafting article by article and chapter by 
chapter is done by a drafting committee of four members 
(two Anglophones and two Francophones). It is the duty 
of the Drafting Committee to put the views and ideas 
agreed upon by the Commission in legal phraseology, and 
to present the code clearly, simply and intelligibly.
The Committee also has as its task to ensure that both 
the English and the French versions of each article import 
one and the same idea. There is also a Harmonisation 
Committee of four members (two Anglophones and two Franco­
phones) whose duty it is to look into those sections of 
the proposed draft code over which members of the Commis­
sion have failed to agree and to make recommendations.
Indeed, disagreements (sometimes violent and 
acrimonious) there have been. Some members of the Com­
mission have tended to approach the whole law reform exer­
cise from a partisan point of view; seeing it through 
the optics of a struggle as to which system (the common 
law or the civil law) will emerge victorious. Way back 
in 1964 when the Law Commissions were first set up, one 
commentator had warned against the dangers of this retro­
grade and reactionary attitude.
"The struggle for dominance between the two 
foreign systems must, like the Cold War, be 
kept out ... It must not be allowed to 
reduce the work of a Law Reform Committee 
to that of negotiation. A Cameroon legal 
science is the basis for research. The 
search is for a Cameroon idea of legality, 
first as it is (influenced by European Ideas)
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and then as It ought to be in the light 
of Cameroon culture ... The idea Is not 
to attempt to compromise the three systems, 
or to copy the one or the other. Nor is 
the choice that of which is the best to 
be adopted or which should survive. The 
struggle for survival among preconceived 
or conservative ideas must also be dis­
couraged." 14
Fortunately, the Commission as a whole is very 
conscious of its onerous mission. Debates during working 
sessions have, on the whole, been lively, constructive and 
fraternal. At the moment the Commission is virtually 
through with its task and it is expected that the Code 
(of about 600 sections) would become law before 1979 runs 
out. ^
The general physiognomy of the Code adequately
1 6reflects the common law and the civil law systems.
Which is not surprising. The Commission used the fol­
lowing source material: the Criminal Procedure Ordinance,
the Code d 1Instruction Criminelle, the French Code de 
Procedure Penale, and the Canadian Criminal Procedure 
Code. The Cameroonian Criminal Procedure Code is, like 
the Cameroonian Penal Code, bilingual and bi-jural. To 
take random examples, the Code contains provisions relating 
to the presumption of innocence, constitution de partie 
civile, habeas corpus, and cross-examination. When the
14 . P.B. Engo, 'Some aspects of legal reform in Cameroon', 
ABBIA No. 6, August 1964, pp. 157-171, at page 160.
15. Fieldwork interview.
16. Fieldwork interview.
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Code would have been promulgated, codification in the 
criminal law area would have been over. Full attention 
would then be focused on the civil law area.
Ill. The Future
It is in the civil law area that law reform 
in Cameroon will encounter the stiffest test yet. To 
be sure, there shall not be much of a hurdle in the 
family law area. The law on this subject in both halves 
of the country is almost the same and there are already 
a number of legislative enactments (the law on the use 
of names and the law on civil status registration) common 
to both sides of the country. Outside the family law 
area , (for example, law of contract, commercial law, 
property law, civil procedure) however, the Cameroon 
law reformer faces an arduous task. There is a temptation 
here of simply adopting the French Code Civil and having 
it translated into English. This is what has happened in 
Mauritius. Such a modus operandi is in fact no law 
reform (or 'harmonisation' as the exercise is commonly 
known In Cameroon) at all and does not commend itself to 
the Cameroonian law reformer. Law reform in the civil 
law area should be carried out piecemeal, taking one area 
at a time and producing monographs to be commented upon by 
various members of the community. This writer has already 
suggested that Cameroon should settle for smaller codes
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(because easily drafted and revised) and that greater 
attention, than has hitherto been the case, should be 
paid to draftsmanship and language.
It is in fact easier to harmonise the common- 
law system in Anglophone Cameroon and the civil-law 
system in Francophone Cameroon than it is to harmonise 
their parent systems in England and France. To begin 
with both systems are not indigenous to Cameroon. Secondly, 
unlike France, Britain did not introduce a carbon copy of 
her legal and judicial system in Cameroon. She introduced 
a system which was closer in many respects to what France 
introduced in the French Cameroun. Thus for example, 
unlike in England but like in France and in the French 
Cameroun, magistrates in the British Cameroons participated 
actively in the criminal trial and gave reasons for their 
decisions. Thirdly, whereas France extended her various 
codes (with minor tinkerings to suit local conditions) to 
Francophone Cameroon (thus ensuring that the law there 
was substantially the same as that in France) Britain did 
not make a timeless extension of her laws to Anglophone 
Cameroon. The reception provision made the common law, 
the doctrines of equity, and statutes of general appli­
cation in force in England only as of 1900, applicable in 
Anglophone Cameroon. Thus only pre-1900 statutes applied 
and still apply (whether any of such statutes have in fact 
been amended or repealed in England itself) in Anglophone 
Cameroon. This in effect means that there is sometimes a 
gulf between ’English' law in Anglophone Cameroon on a
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particular subject and the law on the same subject in 
England.
The tendency to look at law reform in Cameroon 
as a struggle between the common law and the civil law 
as to which system would emerge victorious must be 
eschewed. It would be a sad thing if law reformers in 
Cameroon were to approach law reform from preconceived 
ideas and sectarian loyalties. There is no doubt that 
some do look at it from this angle. Such an attitude 
must be strongly condemned. The task for the Cameroonian 
law reformer is to produce a legal system which in essence 
answers to Cameroonian needs, fits into Cameroonian cir­
cumstances and synchronizes with Cameroonian aspirations 
in the modern world. It is submitted that any rule of 
law which passes this test must be included in the 
Cameroonian legal arsenal whether such a rule originates 
from the civil law system, the common law system, or any 
other legal system in the world. The exercise cannot be 
a question of the majority imposing its will on the minority, 
for, law reform must not be allowed to degenerate into a 
count of heads.
Having said all this one can still point to the 
fact that so far, in the interaction between the common 
law and the civil law the latter has come on top. In 
areas such as military law, administrative law, and the 
judicial and legal service the influence of the civil law 
has totally eclipsed that of the common law and the Labour
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Code bears all the stamp of the civil law influence.
It is however submitted that it is premature to take this 
as an index of the direction towards which things would 
necessarily continue to move. Take for example, the 
most recent code, the Criminal Procedure Code. The 
impact of the common law in it has a slight edge over 
that of the civil law.
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